ML15139A082

Comment (15) of Kevin Kamps on Behalf of Beyond Nuclear Opposing Draft Guidance Regarding the Alternate Pressurized Thermal Shock Rule

ML15139A082
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	05/12/2015
From:	Kamps K Beyond Nuclear
To:	Division of Administrative Services
References
80FR13449 00015, NRC-2014-0137
Download: ML15139A082 (410)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:Page 1 of 2RULF~ .IEPUBLIC SUBMISSION701 15 A 11: 51As of: 5/13/15 12:07 PMReceived: May 12, 2015Status: PendingPostTracking No. ljz-8ite-d89aComments Due: May 12, 2015Submission Type: WebDocket: NRC-2014-0137 -D-FI\!-DTechnical Basis for Regulatory Guidance on the Alternate PTS RuleComment On: NRC-2014-0137-0001Draft Guidance Regarding the Alternate Pressurized Thermal Shock RuleDocument: NRC-2014-0137-DRAFT-0014Comment on FR Doc # 2015-057543/>, X-/Submitter InformationName: Kevin KampsAddress:Beyond Nuclear6930 Carroll Avenue, Suite 400Takoma Park, MD, 20912Email: kevin@beyondnuclear.orgGeneral Comment

Dear NRC,

Please see the attached files:1. August 8, 2005: REQUEST FOR HEARING AND PETITION TO INTERVENE, submitted to the U.S. NRCASLB, by attorney Terry Lodge, on behalf of Don't Waste Michigan and NIRS, in opposition to Palisades' 20-year license extension (specifically, the first contention, beginning on page 4, regarding "The license renewalapplication is untimely and incomplete for failure to address the continuing crisis of embrittlement").2. September 16, 2005: PETITIONERS COMBINED REPLY TO NRC STAFF AND NUCLEARMANAGEMENT COMPANY ANSWERS, submitted to the U.S. NRC ASLB, by attorney Terry Lodge, onbehalf of Don't Waste Michigan and NIRS, in opposition to Palisades' 20-year license extension (pages 2 to 23are regarding Contention 1, The license renewal application is untimely and incomplete for failure to address thecontinuing crisis of embrittlement).3. Petitioners' Appendix of Evidence (129 pages), which accompanied its September 16, 2005 Reply.4. November 3, 2005: Transcript of oral argument pre-hearing before the NRC ASLBP, re: 20-year licenseextension for Palisades. Theering was held in South Haven, Michigan. (See, specifically, the portionshttps.://www.fdms.gov/fdms-web-agencycompnent/contents reamerobjectld=0900006481 add28d&for... 05/13/2015 Page 2 of 2pertaining to PTS risks, including pages 34-80 (pages 17-63 of 206 on PDF counter), and following, asarticulated by attorney Terry Lodge on behalf of intervening groups NIRS and Don't Waste MI.)Please accept the numerous challenges and criticisms contained within these documents, in the current contextof Entergy Nuclear's July 2014 License Amendment Request for 1 OCFR50.61 a regulatory relief, as publiccomments in your DG-1299 and NUREG-2163 proceeding. At the time, in 2005, 10CFR50.61 was the rulingregulatory regime. The concerns raised by attorney Terry Lodge on behalf of intervening groups NIRS andDon't Waste MI at the time, are all the more poignant now, that an even less conservative alternate fracturetoughness rule (1OCFR50.61 a) is the context for this proceeding on DG-1299 and NUREG-2163.Thank you for considering our public comments.Sincerely,Kevin Kamps, Beyond Nuclear (and Don't Waste Michigan, board member representing the KalamazooChapter)AttachmentsSept 2005 Combined Reply Appendix8 8 2005 petition9 16 2005 Combined Reply11 3 2005 transcripthttps://www. fdms.gov/fdms-web-agency/component/contentstreamer?objectld=090000648 1 add28d&for... 05/13/2015 RAý5 (O5z2(DOCKETEDUSNRCUNITED STATES OF AMERICANUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION.September 22, 2005 (3:47pm)OFFICE OF SECRETARYBEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD RULEMAKINGS AND.ADJUDICATIONS STAFFIn the Matter ofNUCLEAR MANAGEMENTCOMPANY, LLC(Palisades Nuclear Plant)))))Docket No. 50-255-LRASLBP No. 05-842-03-LRCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.I hereby certify that copies of the "PETITIONERS' Appendix of Evidence In Support ofContentions" in the above-captioned proceeding have been served with copies by U.S. FirstClass mail this 16th day of September, 2005:Office of the SecretaryATTN: Docketing and ServiceMail Stop: O-16C1U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington, DC 20555-0001Office of Commission AppellateAdjudicationMail Stop O-16C1U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington, DC 20555-0001Dr. Anthony BarattaAdministrative JudgeAtomic Safety and Licensing Board PanelMail Stop: T-3F23U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington, D.C. 20555-0001Dr. Nicholas G. TrikourosAdministrative JudgeAtomic Safety and Licensing Board PanelMail Stop: T-3F23U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington, D.C. 20555-0001Ann Marshall YoungAdministrative JudgeAtomic Safety and Licensing Board PanelMail Stop: T-3F23U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington, D.C. 20555-0001Kary Love, Esq.Executive Business Center348 Waverly Road, Suite 2Holland, MI 49423Paul GunterNuclear Information & Resource Service1424 16' Street, NWSuite 404Washington, DC 20036Chuck JordanChairmanGreen Party of Van Buren County50521 34th AvenueBangor, M1 49013Alice HirtWestern Michigan Environmental Action Co.1415 Wealthy Street, SESuite 280Grand Rapids, MI 49506Michael KeeganCo-ChairDon't Waste Michigan2213 Riverside Drive, NEGrand Rapids, MI 49505Maynard KaufmanMichigan Land Trustees25485 County Road 681Bangor, MI 49013Ternpt4Le C ey- 037 .I .IsmTerry Lodge, Esq..316 N. Michigan St. Suite 520*Toledo, OH 43624-1627'David R. Lewis, Esq.* Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman, LLP2300 N Street, N.W. -Washington, DC 20037-1128Jonathan Rogoff, Esq.Vice President, Counsel, & SecretaryNuclear Management Company, LLC700 First StreetHudson, WI 54016Susan Uttal, Esq.U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionOffice of the General CounselMail Stop: O-15D21Washington, D.C. 20555/s/Terry J. Lodge PGTerry J. Lodge EX-HIBIT I AADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDSUNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSIONWASHINGTON. D.C. .20545January 27, 1970Honorable Glenn T. SeaborgChairmanU. S. Atomic Energy CommissionWashington, D. C. 20545

Subject:

REPORT ON PALISADES PLANT

Dear Dr. Seaborg:

At a Special Meeting, January 23-24, 1970, the Advisory Committee onReactor Safeguards completed its review of the application by ConsumersPower Company for authorization to operate the Palisades Plant atpower levels up to 2200 MWt. This project was also considered at the113th ACRS meeting, September 4-6, 1969,:the 115th ACRS meeting,November 6-8, 1969, and the 116th ACRS meeting, December 11-13, 1969.Subcommittee meetings were held on July.31, 1969, at the site, and onOctober 29, 1969, December 3, 1969, and January 22, 1970, .in-Washington,D. C. During its review, the Committee had the benefit of discussionswith representatives of Consumers Power Company, Combustion Engineering,Inc., Bechtel Corporation, the AEC Regulatory Staff, and their consultants.The Committee also had the benefit of the documents listed. The Committeereported to you on the construction of this plant in-its letter datedJanuary 18, 1967.The site for the Palisades Plant consists of 487 acres on the easternshore of Lake Michigan in Covert Township, approximately four and one-half miles south of South Haven, Michigan. The minimum exclusion radiusfor the site is 2300 feet:and the nearest population center of more than25,000residents consists-of the cities of Benton-Harbor and St. Joseph,Michigan, which are approximately 16 miles south-of the site.The nuclear steam supply system;for the' Palisades Plant is'the firstof the Combustion Engineering line'currently licensed for construction.A feature of the Palisades reactor is the omission of the-thermal shield.Studies were made by the applicant tb show that omission of the shieldwould not adversely affect the flow characteristics within the reactorvessel -or alter the thermal 'stresses in the walls of the vessel in amaniner detrimental to'safe operation of the plant.' 'Surveillance specimensin the vessel will be used to monitor the radiation damage during thelife of the plant. If these specimens reveal changes that affect thesafety of the plant, the reactor vessel will be annealed to reduce I ItsHonorable Glenn T. Seaborg January 27, 1970radiation damage effects. The results of annealing will be confirmedby tests on additional surveillance specimens 1rovided for this purpose.Prior to accumulation of a peak fluence of 10 nvt (> 1 flev) on thereactor vessel wall, the Regulatory Staff should reevaluate the continuedsuitability of the currently proposed startup, cooldown, and operatingconditions.The secondary containment is a reinforced concrete structure consistingof a cylindrical portion prestressed in both the vertical and circumferentialdirections, a dome roof prestressed in three directions, and a flat non-prestressed base. Before operation, it will-be pressurized and extensivemeasurements will be made of gross deformations and of strains in thelinear, reinforcement, and concrete, and the pattern and size of cracksin the concrete will be observed and measured. The applicant has proposedsuitable acceptance criteria for the pressure test, and the ACRS recommendsthat the Regulatory Staff review and assess the results of this testprior to operation at significant power.The prestressing tendons in the containment consist of ninety, one-quarter-inch diameter wires. They are not grouted or bonded, and are protectedfrom corrosion by grease pumped into the tendon sheaths. The applicanthas proposed that selected tendons be inspected periodically for brokenwires, loss of prestress, and corrosion. If degradation is detected,the inspection can be extended to the remaining tendons, all of whichare accessible. The applicant is performing studies to determine theappropriate number and interval for tendon inspection. This matter shouldbe resolved in a manner satisfactory to the Regulatory Staff.The core is calculated to have a slightly negative moderator coefficientat full power operation at beginning-of-life, but uncertainties in thecalculations are such that the existence of a positive moderator coeffi-cient cannot be precluded. The applicant has stated that the moderatorcoefficient will not exceed +0.5 x 10- a k/k/*F at beginning-of-life,computed from start-up test data on a conservative basis. The applicantalso plans to perform tests to verify that divergent azimuthal xenonoscillations cannot occur in this reactor. The Committee recommends thatthe Regulatory Staff follow the measurements and analyses required toestablish the value of the moderator coefficient.The meteorological observation program conducted at the site subsequentto the Committee's report to you on January 18, 1967, indicated theneed for the addition of iodine removal equipment to the containmentfor use in the unlikely event of a loss-of-coolant accident. The applicantproposed to install means for adding sodium hydroxide to-the water inthe containment spray system. However, because of uncertainties regardingthe generation of hydrogen and the effects of other materials resulting Honorable Glenn T. Seaborg-3-January 27, 1970from-the reaction.of this alkaline solution with the relatively largeamounts of aluminum in the containment, this spray additive will notbe used unless it can be shown by further studies that the use ofsodium hydroxide-is clearly acceptable. In'addition,*the applicantwill carry out-studies of iodine removal by borated water sprayswithout sodium hydroxide. If the-results of these studies are notacceptable, a different iodine removal system satisfactory to theRegulatory Staff.will be-installed at the first refueling outage. Areport on the applicant's plans will be submitted to the AEC withinsix months following issuance of a provisional operation license. TheCommittee believes that this procedure is satisfactory for operationat power levels not exceeding 2200 MWt.The applicant has stated that if fewer than four primary coolant pumpsare operating, the reactor overpower trip settings will be reducedsuch that the safety of the reactor is assured in the absence of automaticchanges in the thermal margin tr-ip settings.The Committee believes that, for transients having a high probabilityof occurrence, and for which action of a protective system or other.engineered safety feature is vital to the public health and :safety,'an exceedingly high probability of successful action is needed. Commonfailure modes must be considered'in ascertaining an-acceptable level ofprotection. Studies are to be made on further means of preventingcommon failure modes from negating scram action, and of design featuresto make tolerable the consequences of failure to scram during anticipatedtransients. The applicant should consider the results of such studiesand incorporate appropriate provisions in the Palisades Plant.The Committee recommends that attention be given to the long-termability of vital components, such as electrical equipment and cables,to withstand the environment of the containment in the unlikely eventof a loss-of-coolant accident. This matter is applicable to all large,water-cooled power reactors.Continuing research and engineering studies are expected to lead toenhancement of the safety of water-cooled reactors in other areas thanthose mentioned: for example, by determination of the extent of thegeneration of hydrogen by radiolysis and from other sources, anddevelopment of means to control the concentration of hydrogen in thecontainment, in the unlikely event of a loss-of-coolant accident; bydevelopment of instrumentation for inservice monitoring of the pressurevessel and other parts of the primary system for vibration and detectionof loose parts in the system; and by evaluation of the consequences ofwater contamination by structural materials and coatings in a loss-of-coolant accident. As solutions to these problems develop and are evaluated Honorable Glenn T. Seaborg-4-January 27, 1970by the Regulatory Staff, appropriate action should be taken by the applicanton a reasonable time scale.The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards believes that, if due regardis given to the items mentioned above, and subject to satisfactorycompletion of construction and pre-operational testing, there is reasonableassurance that the Palisades Plant can be operated at power levels up to2200 MWt without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.Sincerely yours,/s/ Joseph M. HendrieJoseph ti. HendrieChairman

References:

1. Final Safety Analysis Report for the Palisades Plant2. Amendments No. 9-19 to license application NRC STAFF PRESENTATIONTO THEACRS

SUBJECT:

PALISADES PRESSURED THERMAL SHOCKDATE:DECEMBER 9, 1994PRESENTER:BARRY J. ELLIOTSENIOR MATERIALS -ENGINEER.MATERIALS AND CHEMICAL ENGINEERINGBRANCHDIVISIONMOF ENGINEERING*OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION(301) 504-2709 10 CRF 50.61 RT.Ti EVALUATIONRTPTs SCREENING CRITERIA PER 10 CFR 50.61-270 OF FOR AXIAL WELDS AND PLATES-300 OF FOR CIRCUMFERENTIAL WELDSRTPTs VALUE = I + M + ARTP TSI = INITIAL REFERENCE TEMPERATURE (RTNDT) OF THEUNIRRADIATED MATERIAL.-MEASURED VALUES MUST BE USED IF AVAILABLE.-IF GENERIC VALUE NOT AVAILABLE, GENERIC MEANVALUES MUST BE USEDM = MARGIN TO COVER UNCERTAINTIES IN THE VALUES OFINITIAL RTNDT, COPPER AND NICKEL CONTENTS, FLUENCEAND THE CALCULATION PROCEDURES.ARTPTS =MEAN VALUE OF THE ADJUSTMENT IN REFERENCETEMPERATURE CAUSED BY IRRADIATION AND IS AFUNCTION OF NEUTRON FLUENCE, PERCENTCOPPER AND PERCENT NICKEL-CALCULATED USING SURVEILLANCE DATA-IF SURVEILLANCE DATA IS UNAVAILABLE, THEADJUSTMENT IN REFERENCE TEMPERATURE MAY BECALCULATED FROM TABLES USING THE BEST-ESTIMATEPERCENT COPPER AND NICKEL PALISADES PTSSINCE THE SURVEILLANCE WELD MATERIAL INNOT THE SAME AS THE BELTLINE WELDS, THEDETERMINE THE EFFECT OF RADIATION USINGINDUSTRY DATAPALISADES ISLICENSEE MUSTNUCLEARTHE STAFF MET WITH THE LICENSEE ON MARCH 9, 1994 TODISCUSS THE LICENSEES PROGRAM FOR FURTHER EVALUATIONOF THE CRITICAL WELDS IN THEIR RPVTHE LICENSEE PLANNED TO:-GATHER ADDITIONAL MATERIALS PROPERTIES DATA FROMITS RETIRED STEAM GENERATORS (WELDS FABRICATED..USING W5214 AND 34B009 WELD WIRE)-INSTITUTE AN AUGMENTED SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMTHATlWOULD CONTAIN THE-LIMITING WELD METAL-EVALUATE ANNEALING OF THE REACTOR VESSEL-CONSIDER INSTITUTING AN "ULTRA LOW" LEAKAGE FUELSTRATEGY S GA W c 5214/SGES6' DIA.6' OIA. PALISADES PTS cont.STAFF ISSUED AN INTERIM SER ON JULY 12, 1.994 AND ISSUED ACOMMISSION PAPER AND NUREG:REPORT ON RPVs ON OCTOBER28, 1994. THESE DOCUMENTS STATED:-BASED ON PREVIOUS NUCLEAR INDUSTRY DATA THEPALISADES REACTOR VESSEL WAS PROJECTED TO REACHTHE PTS SCREENING CRITERIA'IN2004, PRIOR TO EOL, 2007-STAFF SER NOTED THAT THE PTS EVALUATION COULDCHANGE BASED ON THE INFORMATION TO BEACQUIREDFROM-THE:SG WELDS,ON NOVEMBER 1 THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE STAFF BYTELEPHONE THAT THE CHEMISTRY DATA FROM THE W5214WELDS INDICATED HIGHER-COPPER CONTENTS THANPREVIOUSLY ASSUMED.-EVALUATION OF THE STEAM GENERATOR WELD MATERIALALSO INDICATED-A HIGHER INITIAL RTNDT VALUE THAN THEMEAN GENERIC VALUE.ON NOVEMBER 18 THE LICENSEE SUBMITTED THEIR ASSESSMENT,'OF THE IMPACT OF THESE NEW DATA ON THE RTPTs VALUE. THISASSESSMENT INDICATES THAT.PALISADES REACTOR VESSELWOULD REACH THE PTS SCREENING CRITERIAIN 1999STAFF MET WITH THE LICENSEE ON NOVEMBER 21, 1994 TODISCUSS THE NEW INFORMATION.STAFF REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SENT TOLICENSEE ON NOVEMBER 30, 1994.STAFF EVALUATION IS SCHEDULED TO BE COMPLETED BYJANUARY 31, 1995. PALISADES PTS cont.THE STAFF IS CURRENTLY REVIEWING THE LICENSEE'SNOVEMBER 18 SUBMITTAL.CRITICAL AREA BEING ASSESSED INCLUDE:-EFFECT OF THERMAL AGING, HEAT TREATMENT AND TESTMETHOD ON UNIRRADIATED REFERENCE TEMPEiRATURE-BEST' ESTIMATE CHEMICALCOMPOSITION FROM STEAMGENERATOR-AND NUCLEAR INDUSTRY DATADEPENDING UPON HOW THE NEW DATA ARE USED IN THEANALYSIS THE PTS SCREENING LIMIT COULD BE REACHEDBEFORE 1999STAFF WILL RECEIVE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FROM RESCONTRACTOR, ORNL GENERIC IMPLICATIONS OF NEW DATAREVIEW OF OTHER RPVs WITH PALISADES WELD MATERIAL(i.e. W5214 or 34B009 WELD METAL)-OTHER PLANTS STILL SATISFY PTS SCREENING CRITERIAAND UPPER SHELF ENERGY CRITERIA-LOWER FLUENCE OR USE OF ACTUAL SURVEILLANCE DATAOTHER PLANTS THAT ARE PROJECTED TO BE NEAR THE PTSSCREENING CRITERIA BEFORE END-OF-LIFE ARE BEING ASSESSED-SENSITIVITIES BEING STUDIED-PROACTIVE MEASURES MAY BE APPROPRIATE The New York Times > Premium Archive > Cheap and Abundant Power May Shutter So... Page I of 4NYlimes:-H, !or- Simte -Archive EXHIBIT 1 CNYTimes: lI-om.e -Site..In..dex -Arý ive -Help Welcome, kevin8869 -MembGo to a Section G.o Site Search: [TTT '- GoThis page is print-ready, and this article will remain available for 90 days. Instructions._for Saving About this.Service PurchaseHistporI `f NAN A-IA L DESK./Cheap and Abundant Power May Shutter Some ReactorsBy MATTHEW L. WALD (NYT) 1518 wordsPublished: April 14, 1992Nuclear plants that provide 10 percent of the nation's nuclear power may be closed this decade becausetheir operating costs are too high to compete against a rising tide of cheap surplus electricity, expertssay.More than 100 plants under construction were abandoned in the 1970's and 80's because of their cost.But the idea that an operating nuclear plant is not competitive with other sources of electricity violatesthe fundamental logic of nuclear power, which is that planitsý may"be expensive to build:but are cheap torun."It used to be that everyone said, once you built it, there wasn't any question that .costs were lower,"said Victor Gilinsky, an energy consuIltant and former member~of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission."Nocv they are more expensive to run thýan other plants."' Aging Steam GeneratorsIn the next few years, at least 10 utilities will need to replace steam generators, which are giant heatexchangers that have shown a tendency to rust and crack, said Gary R. Doughty, an expert on plant lifeextension with the Nielseh Wurster Group, a consulting firm in Hartford. The job generally runs about$150 million for each reactor.Other utilities face .questions about the condition of their reactor vessels, the great steel pots that holdthe fuel. Years of bombardment by neutrons, the subatomic particles that sustain a chain reaction, areknown to make metal more brittle, but the extent fthe problem is not clear.Some utilities that operate a single reactor may be tempted to pull the plug, he said, because that wouldallow elimination' of an entire division.In Rowe, Mass., the owners of the 32-yearold, Yankee;Rowe reactor decided in February that the plantwas too ýmall and too old to justify the investment needed to keep it in service, given the general powersurplus in its region. Southern California Edison reached a similar judgment recently about its 24-year-old San Onofre I plant near San Clemente, although the plant has not yet been shut. And last year theSacramento Municipal Utility District decided to shut the Rancho Seco plant as uneconomic at the ageof 15. Others around the country were retired in earlier years. some at even younger ages.With only a handful of additional plants likely to be finished and no new ones on order, the result couldbe an accelerated march to the extinction of nuclear power in the United States. Currently, 108 are The New York Times > Premium Archive > Cheap and Abundant Power Ma' Shutter So... Page 2 operating, producing about 20 percent of the nation's electricity. Some of those. however, are doingvery well, in 1991. 25 plants set records for themselves in the number of kilowatt-hours produced.John F. Ahearne, a former member of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and now the director ofSigma Xi, the Scientific Research Society, said that plants that were not economic were more likely tobe shut now than they would have been a few years ago. In the last 10 years, he said. the utilities havecome to be dominated by business managers, replacing what he called "technologists." or "people whowere committed to nuclear power because they thought it was just a good thing for this country." TheBottom LineIn the view of the business managers, he said, "the role of a utility is to make money." They are thepeople who canceled over-budget reactor construction projects in the 1980's. he said, and they arewilling to shut plants now if there are cheaper alternatives.The price of oil, which is currently low, plays a small role in keeping the electricity market highlycompetitive, especially in places like New York, which uses oil for about 20 percent of electricitygeneration. But nationally, electricity made from oil is less than 5 percent of total generation.Natural gas plays a far larger role, because it represents about 10 percent of the utilities' fuel usenationally, and about half the generators recently completed or under construction use natural gas. Onthe basis of energy content, natural gas prices have been substantially below oil prices recently.In addition, overall demand for power has been driven down by recession and by conservationmeasures, with utilities often subsidizing customers' installation of light bulbs, motors and other devicesthat will do the same work with less power. Price May RiseSome experts believe that as the economy turns around, the demand for power will rise and hence itsprice. In addition, requirements of the new Clean Air Act will raise the cost of coal-fired power. and ifthe United States institutes a carbon tax in the next few years to stave off global warming, that wouldmake nuclear power more competitive, too.Experts are not sure how many nuclear plants will shut in this decade. The chainnran of the NuclearRegtilatory Commission, Ivan Selin, said in a telephone interview that three or four were vulnerablesoon. Mr. Aheamne said it could be 10 by the end of the decade.Mr. Selin said it was unlikely that any utility would decide to close a plant that was running smoothlyand was not in immediate need of any big investment. But if a plant required a large investment, hesaid, "that could push it over the brink." In that category he put the Consumers Power Company'sPalisades plant, near South Haven, Mich., which opened in 1971, where the pressure vessel may nowbe brittle, the same weakness that was suspected at Yankee Rowe. Consumers Power's Big Rock Pointplant, in Charlevoix, Mich.. opened in 1965, which has no known significant flaws but is by far thesmallest still operating, and Rochester Gas and Electric's Robert E. Ginna plant. near Rochester, whichopened in 1970 and faces the expensive replacement of its steam generators.All those plants are old and fairly small. Mr. Selin said it was far from clear whether the problem wouldextend into the large plants that entered service in the mid-1970's. But it might, he said in a telephoneinterview."There are two ways of looking at it," Mr. Selin said. "You can say each is different, and there is notrend, or you can say there's an underlying trend here. The financial people are beginning to worry The New York Times > Premium Archive > Cheap aand Abundant Power May Shutter So... Page 3 of 4about an underlying trend."In fact. Lehman Brothers organized a conference for utility investors last month oh the question ofwhether old plants Were still economic. It drew two dozen investment managers.The Utility Data Institute, a firm in Washington.that charts operating costs, reported recently that in1990 fuel, operating and maintenance expenses at nuclear plants came to $21.89 for one thousandkilowatt-hours produced, about as much electricity as a typical household uses in two months. At a coalplant, the fuel, operating and maintenance cost for the same amount of energy was $20.24. The coal :cost was up slightly in 1990 and the nuclear cost down compared with 1989. but nuclear has exceededcoal for the last several years.Those figures are an average for all nuclear plants, meaning that some are significantly higher.Relicensing a QuestionThe old reactors have a variety of factors working against them.Mr. Doughty ofNielsen Wurster pointed out that a plant that was nearing the expiration of its 40-yearoperating license and needed major investments would have to face the economics of amortizing theexpenses over the few remaining years of operation. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission hasestablished a policy for granting license extensions, but no plant has yet applied and no one is sure howeasy it will be to get one.Carl A. Goldstein, a spokesman for the U.S. Council for Energy Awareness, the nuclear industry'spublic relations arm, said that more plants would probably be found to be uneconomic, but that thepoint at which a plant should be written off could not be defined until the Nuclear RegulatoryCommission made clearer what would be required for a plant to be re-licensed. And nuclear economicscould improve, he said, because plant operating and maintenance expenses could decline.Mr. Doughty said that investing new money still made good sense for most plants. but that he fearedthat reactors with 6,000 megawatts of capacity, or about 6 percent of the nation's total nuclear capacity,would shut in the next few years. Reason to Stay OpenHow much is ultimately closed may depend on how state rate regulators handle the costs, said PeterBradford, the chairman of the Public Service Commission in New York and also a former member ofthe Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Mr. Bradford, a speaker at the Lehman Brothers session, said autility with a large investment in a reactor might seek to keep it running so it could continue to collectdepreciation. even if cheaper power were available elsewhere.That. lie said, would create a conflict between the interest of customers, who would want the plantclosed, and the interest of the utility, which would want to let it run. The solution, he said, would be toallow utilities to write off plants that had become economically obsolete, and collect the investmentfrom customers."Otherwise, the utility doesn't have the incentive to make the right decision," he said.Photo: Utlities may be tempted to pull the plug on existing nuclear plants as they become too expensiveto operate. Owners of the 32-year-old Yankee Rowe reactor in Rowe. Mass., closed it in Februarybecause the plant was too small and too old to justify the investment needed to keep it in service.(Associated Press) (pg. D25) Table: "Nuclear Plant Retirements" Plant, location Years in operation The New York Timnes > Premium Archive > Cheap and Abundant Power May Shutter So... Page 4 o1 4Size. in megawatts San Onofre 1, San Clemente, Calif. 1968-1992 or 1993 436 Yankee Rowe, Rowe,Mass. 1961-1991 175 Rancho Seco. Sacramcnto, Calif. 1975-1989 918 Fort St. Vrain. Platteville. Colo.1979-1989 330 La Crosse, Genoa. Wis. 1969-1988 50 Dresden 1, Morris. II1. 1959-1978 207 Humn'boldtBay. Eureka, Calif. 1962-1976 65 Shippingport. Shippingport. Pa. 1957-1982 60 Indian Point 1,Buchanan, N.Y. 1962-1980 265 Peach Bottom 1, Peach Bottom, Pa. 1966-1974 40 Fermi i. Newport.Mich. 1963-1972 61 Elk River, Elk River, Minn. 1962-1968 22 CVTR, Puerto Rico 1962-1967 17Pathfinder. Sioux Falls, S.D. 1964-1967 59 Piqua, Piqua. Ohio 1962-1967 59 Hallam. Hallam, Neb.1962-1964 75 Graph: "At What Cost" shows average cost, in cents per kilowatt hour, for fuel. operationand maintenance of nuclear power plants. 1982-1990. The cost at the most economical nuclear plantwas 1.21 cents per kilowatt-hour in 1990. The highest cost was more than 5 cents. (Source: Utility DataInstitute) (pg. D25)Copyright 2005 The New York Times Company I Privacy Policy I Home I Search I Corrections I Help I Back to rop EXHIBIT I DThe Aging of Nuclear Power Plants:A Citizen's Guide to Causes and EffectsNuclear Information and Resource Service The Aging of Nuclear Power Plants:A Citizen's Guide to Causes and Effectsby James RiccioandStephanie MurphyCopyright 1988 byNuclear Information and Resource Service1424 16th Street NW, Suite 601, Washington, DC 20036(202) 323-0002 IV. Embrittlement of Reactor Pressure Vesselsand Reactor Pressure Vessel SuTplortsin Pressurized Water Reactors..Irradiation , eembrittlement of the reactor pressure vessels (RPVs)may be the single most important factor in determining the.operating" life of a PWR. The design of pressure vessels-isgenerally the same for allPWRs ' Combustion Engineering. (CE). andBabock'and Wilcox-(B&W) manufacture their own vessels.whileWestinghouse either purchases its vessels from CE, B&W, ChicagoBridge.and'Iron or, Rotterdamr Dockyard Company. Regardless; of themanufacturer,`PWR vessels are generally constructed from eightinch thick steel plates, formed and welded to create the vesselstructure.The major age-related mechanism associated-with this component isembrittlement. Embrittlement is the loss of ductility, i.e., theability of the pressure vessel metals to withstand stress withoutcracking. It is. caused by neutron bombardment of the vesselmetals and is contingent upon the amount of copper and .nickel inthei.metal and the extent of neutron* exposure .or fluence. As themetal in the reactor pressure :vessel is bombarded with radiation,*high-energy atomic particles pass through: the.steel wall; Indoing. so, these atoms collide with atoms in the metal.and knockthem out of.,position. Over time this results in a loss of.ductility.In an unirradiated vessel the metal loses its ductility at about40 degrees Fahrenheit. As the vessel becomes embrittled, thetemperature .at which it loses its ductility rises. This change inthe mechanicaliproperties of the metal from'ductile to.-brittle ischaracterized as'the "reference temperature for nil ductilitytransition" or, 'RTdt'., Thus 'as' the reactor 'ages and: the pressurevessel is exposed to 'more radiation, .the RTndt can shift from itsoriginal 40 de rees F to as much as 280-290 degrees F or. more inextreme cases.8Embrittlement.is of evengrater concern to those plantsconstructed prior to 1972.sA cordng-to"theial Shock expertsfrom the .Electric Power "Research :Institute- (EPRI), 'records showthat there is copper in the dwalls of older vessels. TheodoreMarston, who works on thermal:shock for-.EPRI,. stated that," (w)eused a lot of auto stock (.for'the vessel metal), when you melt i"you can't get'all the wire 6uft." 'The use. of.'copper was .alsoextensive in-the welds "f' the vessel- walls-in.older reactors.Copper coated wire was 'routinely used to weld together -the .largeplates which make up the RPV. The NRC's director of safetytechnology stated that. "the copper..was.used:to.-prevent-rust,someone probably got a:$10 prize for the suggestion."49.tThe' significance of reactor-pressure:vessel embrittlement and the19 concomitant shift in RTndt is the increased susceptibility topressurized thermal shock (PTS). Pressurized thermal shock occurswhen the reactor pressure vessel is severely overcooled. RPVtechnical specifications generally limit cool down to a rate of100 degrees F. per hour. However, during, an overcooling event thevessel may experience a drop in temperature of several hundreddegrees per hour. This extreme drop in temperature of the vesselcreates thermal stresses through the RPV wall. As the RPV isovercooled, there is a drop in the pressure of the primarycoolant loop. This rapid decrease in the pressure of the primarycoolant causes the high pressure injection pumps in the emergencycore cooling system to automatically inject coolant into theprimary loop. As the injection of coolant repressurizes the RPV,the vessel is subjected to pressure stresses. The stresses placedon the reactor pressure vessel by overcooling andrepressurization cause pressurized thermal shock.50Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) can be initiated by a host ofmishaps including: instrumentation and control systemmalfunctions; small-break loss-of-coolant accidents; main steamline breaks; feed water pipe breaks; and steam generator tuberuptures. Any of these incidents can initiate a PTS event, but aslong as the fracture resistance of the reactor pressure vesselremains high, i.e. the RTndt remains low, such transients are notlikely to cause the RPV to-fail. After the fracture resistance ofthe. RPV is reduced through neutron bombardment, however, severeovercooling accompanied by repressurizhtion could cause flaws inthe inner surface of the RPV to propagate into a crack whichbreaches the-vessel wall.51For failure-of the reactor pressure vessel to occur severalfactors must be present: (1) the vessel must have a flaw ofsufficient size to propagate; (2) the vessel material must besusceptible to irradiation embrittlement due to copper and nickelcontent; (3).the vessel must be sufficiently irradiated to causea decrease in ductility, represented by an increase in the RTndtvalue; (4) an event must initiate a severe overcooling transientwith repressurization; and (5) the resulting crackmust be ofsuch a size and location that the RPV's ability to-maintain corecooling is-affected. This type of failure is beyond the designbasis of PWRs: the safety systems, including the emergency corecooling system and-the containment, are not designed to withstandcracks in the pressure vessel. Without the reactor pressurevessel surrounding the radioactive fuel, it would be impossibleto sufficiently cool the reactor core and a meltdown wouldensue.52Pressurized thermal shock is a safety issue for every, pressurizedwater reactor. PTS is of lesser concern-for boiling waterreactors because radiation embrittlement is not as severe aproblem with BWR vessels. This is due to the greater amount ofwater between the reactor core and the vessel walls in BWRs. The20 additional water absorbs a greater amount of neutrons so thatfewer bombard the walls of the RPV. The walls of a BWR vesselare also thinner than that of a PWR. Therefore, there is less ofa temperature differential between the inner and outer walls ofthe vessel during a cooldown and thus less stress.53While every PWR vessel is susceptible to pressurized thermalshock, those designed by Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) are inherentlymore susceptible to accidents.,that can initiate PTS. This isprimarily due to the unique design of the B&W steam'generators.B&W reactors use once through steam generators, or OTSGs (seeAppendix D). OTSGs differ from .other PWR 'steam generators in thatthe-generator tubes are only partially covered with water andcontain a smaller volume. This makes the B&W-reactor much moresensitive to changes in feed water flow-changes in the flow* cancause large rapid changes in the temperature of --the reactor. As aconsequence, incidents which interrupt feed water flow presentmore severe challenges to. the safety systems than would -beexperienced in other PWRs. The result is an increased incidenceof -overcooling events in- B&W reactors and an increasedprobability of pressurized thermal shock.54.On December 26, 1985, a severe overcooling event occurred at aB&W facility near Sacremento, California. -A loss of power to the"non-safety" integrated control- system at the Rancho Secofacility caused a reduction in the main feed water flow to thesteam generators. Coolant level in-the steam generatorsdecreased, reactor temperature and pressure increased :and thereactor.scrammed. Feed water valves controlled by the integratedcontrol system could not be operated and remained open.- A rapidand severe overcooling event ensued and was exacerbated by thestart up of the auxiliary feed-water system which'sprayed evencolder water directly onto the steam generator tubes. The reactortemperature dropped 180 degrees iF in 24 minutes,- easily violatingthe technical specification limits of 100degrees/hour. 'Additionally, the recommended pressure/temperature limits forpressurized thermal shock were exceeded,':-although the RTndt limitwas not.ý55If the overcooling event had been more severe or the-reactorpressure vessel morP e'mbrittled,-. the RTndt -limit may have beenreached and the.vessel could have ruptured precipitating-ameltdown. Equally as disturbing-as the accident itself is thefact that the failures and':consequences of the event wereessentially the same as those previously experienced at RanchoSeco and other- plants designed by B&W. In-fact, many of-thesafety. problems experienced-during.*the transient were identicalto those supposedly resolved by the:"short-term" modificationsimposed on B&W plants -by the:NRC in the wake:of the Three MileIsland accident.56-In May 1979, after the TMI accident; the NRC shut down every B&W21 facility, including Rancho Seco. The Commission ordered thatprocedures and training be implemented to assure that steamgenerator levels could be maintained if the integrated controlsystem failed. Approximately a month later, the NRC staffconcluded that "the licensee has developed adequate proceduresand operator training to control AFW (auxiliary feedwater) flowto the steam generators to specific values independent of theICS, should a failure of the ICS occur, and therefore, is incompliance with this part of the order."'57 However, on December26, 1985, the staff's conclusions were proven incorrect whenoperators at Rancho Seco were unable to control the feedwaterflow to the steam generators. The NRC's reaction was to conduct ayear-long review of problems that were supposedly resolved sixand a half years earlier.The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has vacillated on the issue ofpressurized thermal shock for over ten years now. As early as1977, test samples placed in B&W reactors were indicating thatembrittlement was progressing at a faster rate than had beenexpected. RTndt limits had been originally set at200 degrees Fahrenheit. However, as these limits were reached inthe early to mid 1980s, the NRC began developing new limitswithin the framework of the PTS rule.In a briefing to its Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards in1982, the NRC staff considered RTndt limits of 230 and 250degrees F for longitudinal and circumferential weldsrespectively. However, by 1985, the NRC sought to amend itsregulations on pressurized thermal shock. The proposed amendmentswould establish an RTndt below which the risk from a PTS event isconsidered acceptable. These new reference temperaturesestablished limits of 270 degrees F. for plate materials andaxial welds and 300 degrees F. for circumferential welds.58The Commission attempted to gloss over the fact that an increasein the RTndt translated into a decreased margin of safety. TheNRC press release said the rule constituted "further protectionfrom pressurized thermal shock." At least one expert was notbuying the NRC's line. Demetrios Basdekas, an NRC safety engineerand long time critic of the Commission's handling of the PTSissue, opposed the new rule on the grounds that the referencetemperatures were unrealistically high.Dissatisfied with the NRC's handling of the PTS issue, Basdekasmade his opinion known in a letter to the New York Times. Theletter stated that while," (t)he Nuclear Regulatory Commission ischarged with ensuring that nuclear plants are operated 'withadequate protection' of the public health and safety. .bureaucratic foot dragging and preoccupation with publicrelations and financial problems of the industry are contributingto a shortsighted view -that technical problems can wait or donot exist.522 Basdekas contended that the new PTS rule was flawed in that itfailed to recognize control system failures as a possibleinitiator of accidents that could challenge the pressure vessel.The NRC was not only failing to acknowledge Basdekas' contentionsbut plant operating experience as well. On March 20, 1978, theB&W designed Rancho Seco nuclear power plant experienced a PTSevent precipitated by a control system failure. While replacing alight bulb in the integrated control system, an operator droppedthe bulb into the control panel shorting out the control roominstrumentation which eventually led to an overcooling of .thereactor accompanied by repressurization of the vessel. The eventis believed to-represent the most severe and prolongedovercooling event to date with a change in temperature of 300degrees F. per hour.60 Basdekas was able to convince the NRC thatcontrol system failures were an unresolved safety issue., but thecommission continued to ignore these failures in theircalculations on pressurized thermal shock.In response to the NRC's ambivalence,- Basdekas wrote theCommissioners suggesting an independent panel review the PTSissue. The nuclear safety engineer stated that,.our understanding and treatment of both thesystems/process and materials/mechanics aspects of thisissue remain wanting. I also believe that the agencyand the public would benefit from the opportunity of anindependent panel of experts to contribute to yourdecision making. ...I might..not have accomplished agreat deal beyond receivingpunishment andintimidation, but I am satisfied that I have stayedaway from what appears to, be increasingly in voguewithin the agency to literallygive the store away.61Basdekas further explained the prevailing attitude within the NRCwhen asked by the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Energyand the Environment, Rep., Morris.K. Udall (D-Ariz.), to commenton NRC responses to the Committee on the topic of pressurizedthermal shock. Basdekas stated that:A satisfactory resolution, however, cannot be achievedunder currently prevailing attitudes within the NRC. Onone hand the NRC left it up..to the utilities operatingthe plants -chosen for evaluation to provide design andoperational information on a voluntary basis, and on aschedule of their convenience, while internallyestablishing an arbitrary.schedule forproducing a"resolution" document and withdrawing previouslyallocated resources while engaging in a variety ofprohibited personnel actions and abuse of authority tointimidate and impede if not silence those voicingconcern or disagreement.62-23 The NRC adopted the PTS rule in July 1935. In less than si:cmonths from the date of its adoption, control system failure hadprecipitated a severe overcooling event at the Rancho Secofacility (discussed above). Yet the NRC still failed toacknowledge control system failures in their analysis ofembrittlement and pressurized thermal shock.The NRC has continued its research on the PTS issue, focusing onmethods to calculate and mitigate embrittlement of reactorvessels. To cope with the most severely embrittled reactors, theNRC has allowed some plants to redesign the configuration of thefuel rods so that fewer neutrons bombard the pressure vesselwall. The NRC has also released for comment a second revision ofa regulatory guide (1.99) which specifies how utilities are tocalculate the extent of embrittlement and the limits foroperating with embrittled pressure vessels. The revision is animprovement in that it takes into consideration the copper andnickel content of the RPV materials. However, a major source ofuncertainty still exists due to the limited accuracy and thevariable range of the data base (a comparison of embrittlementlimits under each revision of regulatory guide 1.99 is providedfor each plant in appendix E). 6The NRC has attempted to put the PTS issue behind it, but theproblem of embrittlement has been recurring like a bad dream. Newquestions involve the reactor pressure vessel supports. Thesehold the pressure vessel in place and, depending upon the design,can be exposed to substantial amounts of radiation. There arefive major types of RPV supports, four of which are used in PWRs.The major factor in determining embrittlement of the supports istheir exposure to reactor core beltline neutron flux. Two typesof supports are directly exposed to irradiation from this area ofthe reactor, the neutron shield tank supports and the columnsupports. These two types of supports are used in 90% of theoperating PWRs in the United States.64The danger of embrittlement of the structural steel supports isthe possibility that the neutron bombardment has so irradiatedthe metal that it cracks under the stress of the combined loadsit was designed to bear. In the NRC jargon this is known ascatastrophic brittle failure. This type of accident is beyond thedesign basis for safety systems and could result in total loss ofreactor cooling capability. For catastrophic brittle failure tooccur three conditions must be present: (1) there must be a flawof critical size; (2) there must be a sufficient load on thesupport to create critical stress at the crack tip of the flaw;and (3) the temperature must be low enough to promote a cleavagefracture at the crack.65It appears that the NRC is once again attempting to finesse theissue of embrittlement. In May of 1975 it was discovered that the24 asymmetric loads placed on reactor pressure vessel supportsbecause of postulated loss-of-coolant-accidents were not takeninto consideration in the design of the supports for the reactorsat North Anna units 1 and 2. This underestimation of thepotential burden on the RPV supports, coined the "North Annasyndrome," prompted the NRC to require all PWRs to reevaluate theloads placed on the structures. It was discovered that theadditional load resulting from a double ended-rupture of thereactor coolant piping, also known as a guillotine break, wasequal to the combined loads the structures were thought tosupport.66The Commission responded to this issue in April of 1986 byexempting guillotine breaks from consideration. The NRC hasstated that:.the dynamic effects associated with postulatedpipe ruptures of primary coolant loop piping inpressurized water reactors may be excluded from designbasis when analyses demonstrate the probability ofrupturing such piping is extremely low under design "basis conditions. 7The NRC bases this exemption on the "leak-before-break" theory.In essence the NRC is saying that the additional load placed onthe RPV support in the event of a guillotine break need not betaken into consideration because the pipes will leak before theybreak. However, as previously noted, leak-before-break is neitheran "established law", nor should it be the, "sole basis forcontinued safe operation."Another factor contributing to the issue of embrittlement of RPVsupports is the accelerated shift in RTndt of the supportmaterials. Data from the test reactor at the Department ofEnergy's Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has shown a greaterthan expected rate of embrittlement for steel that has beenexposed to low temperature irradiation. A letter from theAdvisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) to Victor Stello,NRC Executive Director for Operations, stated that the RTndt ofsteel, "irradiated slowly at 120 degrees can rise much morerapidly with exposure to fast neutrons than would be expectedfrom the available experimental work obtained in testreactors.",68The ACRS requested that Stello look into the implications of theORNL findings on embrittlement and the impact on the NRC's plansto extend reactor life past the 40 year license. Stello'sresponse stated that," (t)he ORNL summary coincides with ourevaluation that the neutron shield tanks and support structuresdo not appear to pose any safety problems." However, closeexamination of the report reveals that the ORNL did notconclusively state that embrittlement was not a problem. In fact25 the raport found that, "plant specific data are r izd -for anaccurate evaluation of the potential for L7W v7ase! supportfailure. ,,69The ACRS was understandably "c(ncerned and pe-ipecxed" by Mr.Stallo's response. Interpretation of the data revealed thatstructural steel supports are experiencing 2 to 3 times theembrittlement as might have been predicted. However, Mr. Stellofailed to draw any inferences from this information. The ACRSstated that they could, "see no reason to be sanguine about thesafety of operating nuclear power plants with the largest,heaviest component in the primary system supported on astructure, parts of which are fully brittle. This is unsafe byany type of analysis."'70The NRC's final word on embrittlement of RPV supports is stillout as the staff seeks further documentation. In the meantime,support reliability has been judged to be adequate. It escapescomprehension how the supports could be found adequate withoutinspecting them or determining the extent of actualembrittlement.26 EX~iFI~T 1 EOfficial Transcript of ProceedingsNUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMIVMISSIONTitle: Advisory Committee on Reactor SafeguardsJoint Subcommittees:Materials and MetallurgyThermal Hydraulic PhenomenaReliability and Probabilistic Risk AssessmentDocket Number:Location:Date:(not applicable)Rockville, MarylandWednesday, December 1, 2004Work Order No.:NRC-114Pages 1-137NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.Court Reporters and Transcribers1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.Washington, D.C. 20005(202) 234-4433 151 rationale.2 MR. ERICKSONKIRK: Yes. What we do find3 on the graph on the lower right-hand side is that the4 flaws that are driving the through-wall cracking5 frequency fully 90 percent of them are fairly small6 flaws and that's the observation.7 DR. WALLIS: Because there aren't very8 many big ones? Is that what it is? It's more9 probable that you would have a small flaw under the10 surface?11 MR. ERICKSONKIRK: Absolutely. There's a12 very low probability of having big flaws and even if13 you increase the big flaw probability by credible, or14 even incredible factors, it wouldn't matter much. I15 apologize for that. You are absolutely correct. The16 first rational was erroneous.17 DR. WALLIS: This flaw distribution is18 based on rather skimpy evidence. This is one of the19 areas where -- I mean, heat transfer Dittus-Boelter if20 you believe that. It's based on data points. But the21 floor distribution in these walls is based on a few22 examinations. Isn't it?23 MR. ERICKSONKIRK: A few examinations but24 infinitely more than we had the first time.25 DR. WALLIS: It's much better than you hadNEAL R. GROSSCOURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.(202) 2344433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 2344433,n, QT R..POR,'-,'n i. .234-4433 -. -~n-raW `- -161 the first time.2 MR. ERICKSONKIRK: Much better than we had3 the first time. I think as a laboratory geek at heart4 I have to admit I would really like to have more data5 on this and I don't think there's anybody in the6 technical community that would disagree with this.7 But I think it's also important to8 recognize that the flaw distribution doesn't rest on9 experimental evidence alone. Certainly we started10 with -- excuse me. We start with experimental11 evidence both from destructive and nondestructive12 evaluations but that's then also bolstered by --13 DR. WALLIS: But those were of individual14 reactor vessels.15 MR. ERICKSONKIRK: That's right.16 DR. WALLIS: But there are a hundred17 reactor vessels. I don't know how convincing it is18 that the flaw distribution that you measured in a19 couple of vessels which were taken apart is typical of20 all other vessels.21 MR. ERICKSONKIRK: No. I think it would22 be unfair to say that a single experimental23 distribution derived from two vessels could be just24 looked at and thought to be representative of the.25 other vessels.NEAL R. GROSSCOURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS.-11 .AkIIr% A% NW EXHIBIT 1 FPALISADES COULD REACH ITS PTS SCREENING LIMIT EARLIER THAN EXPECTEDConsumers Powers' Palisades may reach its PTS screening limit, a key indicator of reactor vessel brittle-ness. next year--eight years earlier than NRC staff reported to the commission as recently as late October-according to testimony at a December 8 commission meeting.Consumers Power advised NRC on November 18 that new information on reactor vessel integrity showed thatthe critical PTS limit likely will be reached by 1999, five years earlier than an NRC staff analysis in late Octobershowed. Jack Strosnider of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation's (NRR) Division of Engineering toldCommissioners Kenneth Rogers and Gail de Planque that information developed even more recently by testing ofmaterial from the plant's decommissioned steam generators may have pushed.up the date-perhaps to as early asnext year. NRC staff said they hope to produce a new evaluation of Palisades data by the end of January.According to NRC regulations, a plant that has reached its PTS (pressurized thermal shock) screening limitsmay not operate unless the licensee presents additional information to justify the safety of the decision.A Consumers Power executive who observed the meeting expressed disappointment that the new informationshowed the Palisades reactor vessel might reach the limits earlier than previously thought. The purpose of thetestin" was to justify operation to the end of the plant's original operating license in 2007.The inability of Yankee Atomic Electric Co. to provide sufficient information about the integrity of Yankee'sreactor vessel, together with economic issues, prompted the Yankee to shut that unit permanently in 1992.As recently as October 28. when NRC staff issued Secy 94-267, "Status of Reactor Pressure Vessel Issues," theagency projected that Palisades would reach its PTS screening criteria in 2004. On November 18, ConsumersPower submitted a revised evaluation of the PTS issue that indicated the vessel would reach the critical level in1999.Analysis of the critical beltline welds, along the axis of the reactor vessel, depends a lot on exactly whatproportion of copper is present in the weld wires used to join the metal plates. Analysis of the metallurgy of thewelds continues apace at Palisades, a nuclear engineer for the company told Inside N.R.C.In a separate development at the meeting, NRC staff told the commissioners that they would, if necessary,compel ABB Combustion Engineering to divulge data on reactor vessel weld integrity that the vendor seeks to keepconfidential.The clash over the data from the Combustion Engineering Reactor Vessel Owners Group-data owned by ABBC-E-attracted attention from Commissioner Rogers, who told staff, including Office of Nuclear Reactor Regula-tion (NRR) chief William Russell, that "I Would like to be kept informed of the discussions with the industry group(led by ABB C-E)."I think the commissioners would be interested (in updates on the matter)," Rogers continued. "What are theproprietary aspects here that they are concerned about? I would hope that we could get over that hurdle."Russell told Rogers that the basis for ABB C-E's request that the data be kept confidential is that it containsinformation on how C-E reactor vessel welds were carried out-"using the methods of twenty to thirty years agothat are no longer used." Russell said he was hopeful that the agency and the company would come to a voluntaryagreement on the issue.At the end of the meeting. Rogers repeated his call for the data to be made public. "I hope we'll be successful,ultimately, in filling out that data set."NRC wants to include the data in a database called the Reactor Vessel Integrity Data Base, or RVID.RVID summarizes the properties of reactor pressure vessel materials for all plants; it is based on docketedinformation and is scheduled for public availability in the first quarter of 1995.tNSitIDEN.H.C. -D~'teember 12. 1 J9J.413 EXHIBIT 1 GDavid Jaffe -Palisades phone call Page 1David Jaffe -Palisades Dhone call Paae 1 HFrom: Stephanie CoffinTo: Hoffman, StephenDate: 11/24/04 3:05PM

Subject:

Palisades phone callWe had a phonecall with them Monday.They no longer plan on submitting an exemption to apply "Master Curve" at their facility.Instead, they will be managing it in accordance with the May 27, 2004 guidance fromReyes to the Commissioners. They are following Point Beach and Beaver Valley closely.I gave them feedback especially about the flux reduction requirements of the current ruleand suggested they review the Point Beach submittal and our associated SER withOpen Items, and to check for applicability to their plant.FYI for Matt and Barry and Nell:If they see that the new PTS rule will not be published in time for them (they currentlyexceed the screening criteria in 2014 -I don't know if we agree with that), they willsubmit the Master Curve exemption in 2007.StephanieCC: Duvigneaud, Dylanne; Elliot, Barry; Mitchell, Matthew; Ray, Nihar; Stang, John at'look OnLife ExtensionSPECIAL REPORT TO THE READERS OF NUCLEONICS WEEK...INSIDE N.R.C.,AND NUCLEARFTELA Mthe nuclear industry tries to hang on in an in- tute (NEI.The organization-born March 16 whencreasingly competitive marketphaci, considerations of four U.S. nuclear trade groups consolidatedý-is ema-extending plant lifetimes beyond their allotted 40 years 'blemiatic of the squeeze nuclear utilities face. paring.sometimes seem an academic exercise. Yet whether down and cutting costs as they navigate the uncertain.the US. will have nuclea pwer as a future energy ties economic competitiveness has thrust on the indus-.option-regardless of the cost or avallability of other 'try. Ultimately, the decisiontoseek li'censereiiewil..-options-depends in large degree on license renewal -"will be an economic decision uiitf'ies and life cycle management decisions being made today. into account many factors,' said Peters... The licens of 49 of the 110 nuclear units in the US: *. ".'There may be people who, outof sheer stubborn-...are set to expire in the coming two decades, by 2014 -ness,, continue to pursue license renewal-:-6d NRC.(though some could be further delayed by recaptuming '.1 may let them-but whether it wil be viable for these.*their constructi6n period and dding it to the license -plants to continue after 30 years is questionablew said.period)* Will utilities irefurbish and recertify them as Jim Riccio,an attorney with Washington, D.C.-basedsafe to produce power beyond their current 40-year -Public Citizen4 a Ralph Nader lobby. RcCodioubts thaticenses? Oi-i1l they beshuttered one by* one as their any of the U.S. nuclear units will even get to the ends dflicenses ran 6ut with someforced into premature shut- their licenses "It won't be the antinuclear-forces t"at.".down? force them to'cl6se, but the people who do their ledger.books,". he said, adding, Economic and sfty cdnsid-"NRC Chairman. Ivan Selin, counts license renewal .erations willshut these plants*down.' ."' .*as the "number one topic' before the commission. He is..optimistic that at least some utilities will apply to extend-' Only 46% of electric utility executiies expertto*the operating lives of their plants. "Inteiest is higher .see operating licenses exiended formost plants ac.nowthan.t has been for two years. rm certain that ... diing to a survey rdeased by the Washiniton'Iner-.many reactors will come in for license renewal," he " ..national Energy Group in January. Odds remaid inasserted... ..'" favor of most units continuing to operate throughthe,,-Selin says the NRC is on the verge of coming out *. first 40 years, the executives said. But only 37% 6f-re' with a rule thatwill. iniake the.process of applying for. spondents believed there would be iies.... e..e. 6fplint life ektefiiiozisimple, cheap, and predictable: "I -nuclear power in the U.S. "Pivately, CEOs tk aýoiit.feel good ab6ut theilicen6e renewal process we're de'-: someday turning over title of [nuclear] .plantsr-even.,.iveloping-though my .satisfaction is tainted by the fact :.the best ran ones-to the governmeWt,'.said the reort,that we should have got things right the first time.,' "1:.'994 Electric Utility Outlook."Among government and industry expe-ts, the NRC .Those utilities that set their sights on plt'life &ex"chiefs may be a lone Voicdf optimism. A recent ' tension wil have to brave uncharted tri."toryAfeW,by the Edison Electric Institute concluded that.-fa years ago, the path ajpeared relatively my hfo.ad.from life e'nesioin being .tequestion-;L0.st-related, The industry would devlop pilot license reatel sub.-'premature shutdowns are likely to beain'issue for Utili- --mittals for a lead BWR and a lead FWR, which wouuld "ties as early as this year (Nuclebnics Week. 17 March,j;. pave the way for other utilities to follow with'reneiv". .1). ... .. "--. i .applications. But the process has takefi imn ed "Even traditional boosters of nuclear energy eipress 'turns. Yankee Rowe's experience as a lead PWR led.serious doubtsabout how manyw-if any-plants will 'ultimately to its shutdown, and the other utilities hv"see life beyond their 40th birthdays. "I'm relatively sure -hung back.some plants will go in for license renewal, although it- Competition has changed the landscape of the "ec-."all depends on load gr&ovth at the time they g6 in,' said utility industry entirely in two years. Economic .Scott Peters, a spokesmafi for the Nu6lear Energy'Insti- decisions to seek license renewal will be made on i-* .* -I plant-by-plant basis, industry experts say. Few generali-"zations can be drawn to predict likely candidates- someutilities view their nuclear units as albatrosses, othersembrace them as assets. The price of other energysources in a given region, the philosophy of state regu-lators, public perceptions about nuclear power in acounty or state, the numberof units a utility is operat-ing, and the age, condition, and operating history ofeach plant-not to mention the cost and degree ofhassle involved in meeting NRC's forthcoming rule-will all influence the life extension decision.Key players and issues to watch include:* , VirginiaPower, the only utility to announce plansto apply for life extension. It surprised industry peersand NRC by unveiling plans to initially seek five-yearlicense renewals-instead of 20 years--for Surry andNorth Anna.The Babcock & Wilcox Owners Group, whichplans to submit a license renewal application on one ofits FWRs by 1997. Duke Power's Oconee-1 is one of thetop candidates for their submission.* Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., which has spent$15-milon on a combined life cycle management andlicense renewal program. The company may decide toapply to extend the Calvert Cliffs licenses for 20 years..NRC's rule rewrite, ordered by the commission-ers in February. Will the new rule provide the cheap,simple, predictable application basis Selin has prom-ised? And how will utilities implement it?@ Other nations' experience. Electricite de France(EDF) has taken the lead in grappling with many of theaging issues that U.S. utilities must evaluate in the tech-nical assessments of their plants. EDF has developed alist of 18 essential components. In Sweden, the clashbetween politics and performance once agairn is comingto a head, where power opponents want to seelifetimes limited on plants considered by U.S. analsts.to be among the best performers in the world.VIRGINIA POWER TAKES THE BULL BY THE HORNSVirginia Power Co;.could be the first utility to testNRC'spromise of a simpler and cheaper approach tolicense renewaL The company unveiled plans in Febru-ary to file an application early in 0995to renew the oper-at.g licenses for the Surry and North Anna nuclearstitions for five years (inside N.RC., 21 Feb., 1).V'iginIa Powee'i nuclear units are 'very competi-tiv'e" said William Stewart, president-nuclear. 'Ourproduction costs are excellenL Our units were built inthe 1970s, so the [capital] cost was low.' Stewart char-acterizes the decision as one that could make the utilityeven more competitive. 'We're not in a scramble here,'he said.'We'rejust looking ahead.Stewart said the five-year life extension initiative hasreceived the support of Wall Street utility analysts,whom he briefed on the plan in February. Their re-sponsewas farvorble. The feeling was that a five-year..renewal is feasible. .Reduci~; Esbar.Costs.Company officials concede the decision to pursuefive-year license reniwals is 'an economic rather thanan operational'. 6n.e, primaril driven by the current..clUmate of economic competitiveness. Martin Bowling,manager of the utility's nuclear licensing programs,said that renewing the licenses at its two duahl-nitnuclear stations by five years would lower 'busbar'costs-the amount it costs to produce electricity at thepoint it leaves the plant; including capital costs, taxes,fuel, and operations and maintenance costs.In 1992, Virginia Power's busbar costs were 2.84cents per kilowatt-hour.(KWH) at Surry and 3.42 cents/KWH at North Anna. Overall busbai costs for nucleargeneration are 3.1 cents/KWH, Stewart said.Costs would be lowered by changing depreciationrates and reducing near-term decommissioning trustcollections. Lower costs would help hold down future.rate increases and keep the utility competitive, Bowlingexplained. In their economIcanalysis, utility officialscalculated that; as a near-term effect. "depreciation.expense is reduced each year, $21-million the first yearand up to $49-milion by 2011.' 7-.Virginia Power has replaced steam generators at-three of the four units and plans to replace the steamgenerators at North Anna-2 in;1996 at a 1996 dollar"equivalent to the $120-million spent last year to replace.the steam generators in unit 1..Stewart said the company has spent morne than $5--million to date on license renewal work, most of it on...technical analyses under the old NRC rule; Surry-1-began opeati.ng in December 1972 and its license ex-.pires in May 2012; Surry-2 started up inMay.1973 and.* its license expires in January 2013. North Anna-l -started operating in June 1978 and its license expires inApril 2018; unit 2 began operations in December 1980and its license expires in August 2020.*. Company officials recently proposed a streamlined*.integrated plant assessment (IPA) process to NRC -staffers. They say the technical analyses under their.IPA would be done no differently whether they.were.applying for a five-year extension or a 20-year one. Util-ity plans call for submitting a license renewal apýlica-tion during the first quarter of 1995, but that could 'change if NRC's revised license renewal rule is not out.yet, Stewart noted. -.Assuming Virginia Power's license renewal applica-tion proceeds on track, the utility should provide a casestudy on how NRC will have utilities show compliance *~i ~I -Pa"e 201OOK ON LVE ]C'ENSION-Nudeanics Week. March 31; Inside N.R.C.. April 4; Nudceariha, April 11, 1991a 10sn w#. .-.I .. ... " .-... reliance on the rmaintenance rule, completing the re-views needed for a license renewal application is notgoing to be a piece of cake. There will be considerabledocumentation required.Thermal fatigue monitoring'of the pmriary system isan example of how life extension work provides short--term and long-term benefits, Dbroshuk said. Engineersanalyzed all the Class I piping, for instance, and createda computerized data bank that not only is used toftrackaging mechanisms like fatigue, .but can be used in op.erations. 'We've been able to provide an analysis of theplant-and respond to transients that seeduring a startup and allow them to continue on withoutdoing holds and analysis,' an engineer on the teamsaid.A priority of die life cycle management programhas been evaluating the reactor pressure vessel. CalvertCliffs-I is cur-ently going to exceed NRC's pressurizedthermal shock (PTS) screening criteria between 2004and 2006. Unit 2..ws built using lower-copper weldmaterial, so it doesn't have the same problem.There are plant-specific differences that make us:believe unit I's embrittlement is much less than NRC'scorrelation would predict,' said Marvin Bowman, anengineer on the life cycle management team. "Theseinclude fabrication process differences, heat treatmentdifferences, materials differences, weld materials, weldfluxes that were used.-they're all part of thatembrittlement process."BG&E officials submitted the technical evaluation toNRC last November and are expecting to receive NRC'sreview by this summer. 'We think we have a verysound technical basis for continued operation of unit 1'Doroshuk said."We'ye done substantial flux reduction and we cando much more aggressive flux reduction if we have to,involving radical fuel management," Bowman added.The"conclusion of BG&E's plant assessment activi-.ties to date: 'We've found that, materially, the plantshould last for 60 years,. Doroshuk said. 'We haven'tfound the show-stopper--even in the reactor vessel'REACTOR VESSEL INTEGRiTY, COSTS, CRUCIAL TO LTFE EXTENSIONCoping with reactor vessel embrittlement is a prior- vative danger signals of growing embrittlement, set inity for managing planr life exiension, as several U.S. 10 CFR 50 and its Appendix G. Utilities have a numberreactors likely will face the problem after about 40 of ways to cope with embrittlement as operating life-years of operation .time progresses, including flux reduction through fuelPWR vessels are more susceptible than BWRs' be- management, such as installing neutron absorbers oncause'the PWR vessels are narrower and contain less the core periphery. Utilities can also analyze their yes-coolant, so more neutrons reach the vessel walls. Most sels' metal to prove they won't hpprpach the NRC crite-PWRvessels in the U.S. are made of steel known as ria within their operatinglives, and monitor the accu-A533-B alloy, an alloy of iron, carbon, and manganese racy of those analyses by regularly removing and test-".with some nickel In a number of older vessels, the ing specimens of vessel material, which are kept inside.welds joining the vessel's curved plates contain some the vessels in capsules.copper. As neutrons from the corestrike the ste.l, theychange the crystalline structure of theA533-B alloy. As" vessel lifetime is lengthened, arateofThe weld material is especially affected, with the neu- embrittlement which was no concern for 40 years oftrons disrupting the crystal lattice, creating dumps of o Operation may become a barrier to reaching 60 yeirs,coppe-atoms and vacancies in the matrix. Tis process "and utilities that did.not previously have to be con-..makes the steel more brittle. * .- -cerned about PTS are having to look again: "..-.NRC h i -io'n-on*" The brittleness is measured in two ways: the' :: :the status of their vessels withregad to PTS ihnd upperupper shelf energy loss and the ieference temperature. shelf energy. From this informafiori, the agency hasat nil ductility tempeiraure (RT-NDT).The loss of duc-. deduced a list of especially vulnerable re"actoirs that Listility can leave the metal vulnerable to ductile fractures. fluctuated from aromnd one to six reactors, as utilidsa tearing that can take place in seconds or minutes, and -take measures to alte the rate of embrittlement.L.to pressurized thermal shock (PTS).lie latter could -Calvert Cliffs, Duquesne Light Co.'s Beaver Valley, andoccur i& during an accident, coolant is Suddenly re- -Consumer Powers Palisades have beei mentioned as'stored to an overheated vessel. ;ad it could causean:.: particularly vulnei-able. While oppIiuons within'NRC ard"abrupt fracture of the metal.:Reactor opeirators must":. the industry appear tb'ýaiy, the utilities generally holdshow NRC that their vessels are proof against both " thatfurther analysis of the metallurgy of their reactors'types of faHure. will prove that the vesg s d rSl-l last to the ends of theirBecause ductility loss is cumulative, operators plot license periods.-.the time it will take their vesel to ieach the RT-NDT. -According to thehlatest NRC list, seven units'.vesselsand upper shelf criteria that NRC selected as a conser-' likely will enc6uiinter PTS concerns before the ends ofOU.LOOK ON LE .ENSlON-Nuc e.nkc Week, Mar,' 31; -akd. N.April 4; Nuc*..'.el.-ril *2, 1991 PAP- 901994 MAGraw-HW Inwc. Reprodudionforbdw witho.ut e ,s , iermio,. Ir iREACTOR VESSELS WITH PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK (PTS) CONCERNSEstimated Year PTS Screening License ExpirationCriteria will be Reached Date per NUREG 1350Plant NamePalisadesFort CalhounCalvert Cliffs-1Point Beach-2Point Beach-iBeaver Valley-11997-20052013>2005>2013>20102014PTS CONCERNS BEYOND CURRENT END-OF-LICENSE LIFEZion-1Oconee-2Surry-1Salem-1Zion-2GinnaDiablo Canyon-iCook-IFarley-1.St. Luce-I20112019>201220202023202620342037>2050>205003/14/200706/07/200807/31/201403/08/201310/05/201001/29/201612/26/200810/06/201305/25/201209/25/200812/26/200804/25V200604/23/200803/25/200906/25/200703/01/2016Source: ARCtheir licenses, and nine other units' vssels iill fall inthe category after their current licenses expire (seetable).Annealing: The Last DitchUtilities that look soon enough can alter the rate ofembrittlement early in a vessel's life, but for older reac-tors the standard methods may not be able to changethe rate enough.That can leave utilities facing an ex-pensive problem for life extension. YAEC chose toclose Yankee because the pro.vng thevessel's stage of embrittlement was too expensive-andNRC's requirements for that proof too open-ended--tobe justified economically for a 185-MW reactor.One option is to replace the vessel, which has neverbeen done and is estimated to cost as much as S100-million. Another choice being viewed with increasingfavor by reactor owners is annealing the vessel, or heat-ing it to the point where the crystalline structure of thesteel is paiy orfufly restored to its origina fractureresistance. Estimates for annealing range around $10-million.Annealing is a routine process in metallurgy and hasbeen extensively modeled, but it ii complicated byvessel radioactivity. For. U.S. vessels, it would involveheating the beltline weld, and in some cases the axialwelds or some vessel plates, to about 850 degrees F forabout a week. The longer the heat is applied, the morecomplete the restoration of the metal's crystalline struc-ture. Theoretically, heating the vessel for as much astwo weeks could restore the metal 1009.Different annealing specialists offer different esti-mates of how long the repair done by an annealing jobwould last Some estimate annealing could restore avessel to service for five or six years, while others sayfield experience indicates 60 to 70 years. Researcherssay more study is needed.-Alan Hiser of the mateials engineering branch ofNRC's Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES),said that the level of restoration of embrittlement due to* annealing, and the rate of re-embrittlement, is depen-dent on a number of factors. If the material is a weld,rather than a plate, the annealing repair will be lesseffective and the re-embrittlement rate faster. The* chemistry of the material is crucial, as well-steels orwelds containing nickel or copper are more subject toboth embrittlement and re-embrittlement.Hiser emphasized that the difference between thereactor operating temperature-around 550 degreesF-axid the temperature of annealing (850 degrees) hasan important effect. The greater the difference betweenthe two temperatures, the more successful the anneal-ing will be and the longer its effects will last NRC hasfunded research on annealing that was carried out by.IPae 200OUýiLOK ON LIFE EXTENSION-Nuc.Ie-dme Week. March 31; Imld. N.R.C., April 4; Nuc1earFu4e, April 21, 1991 DOE at Oak Ridge. and Hiser's views also take into can restore as much as 100% of the damage due to neu-account research performed by Westinghouse on be- tron flux, depending on the fctors mentioned. 'Fromhalf of EPRI, the U;S. Navy, and Russian annealing the data we've seen so far, it appears that (after anneal-specialists. ing) you get the same embritlement rate you got in.-Hiser said that most studies have considered anneal-,. tiflly,' he said.ing for 168 hours, or one week.On thebasis of 168 The American Society. of Testing & Materials' Stan-hours and 850 degrees, Hiser said that anannealing'job dard E509-86 model posits that re-emnbrittlemenit-occursYANKEE EFFORT FOUNDERED ON VESSELZc',s doe. not bring all m en plans to fulflilmelet. to maintain that uniformity.-Homer Ultimately, Yankee's unique design proved to beits undoing. On February 26, 1992-41 months afterAt the time, it seemed logical. Yankee Atomic YAEC received DOE's proposed contrict for the five-Electric Co.'s (YAEC) Yankee was byfar theoldest year lead plant effort--theYAECboard voted PWR operating in the U.S. Though small and unique permanently close the unit. Yankee had been"volun.in design, ithad Agood operatingrecord andYAEC tarily" shut down the previous October after thewanted to extend the operating license that was td' NRC staff recommended that it be laid up until ques-expire in 2000. -tic s regarding the degree of embrittlement of its'When DOE and the Electric Power Research reactor pressure vessel (RPV) could be resolved.Institute (EPRI) were looking for candidates to test never were. " ..the license extension waters, the 185-MW Yankeegot the nod for PWRs, despite EPRI's expressed Yankee's RPV design made it virtually imposr-reservations about using older, smaller plants as iible--or it least extremely impensive-, o answerlicense extension guinea pigp and despite the fact- the questions NRC'and intervenors had posed. The'that Virginia Poweir had already done extensive jun.- 'RPV's configuration severely limited ins ecoion oftial screening of possible lidense extension road- .. the beltlindeweld region. Yankee's vessel consists ofblocks for Surry-1, anh824-MW PWR of a more co-in. '..a rolled 0.109-inch-thick stidnlesi steel sheet welded'mon design. in several locations.-but not.dompletely bofided.-ioThe issues.were timing and money'. Surry's ii-.. the shell..That incomplete bond made ultrasonic"cerise wouldn't expireuntil 2012. The Yankee plant. 'inspection of the welds vety difficult, because thewas YAEC's only asset Therefore, YAEC had no " 'gap' betweeb thie cladding and the Vessel shellchoice but to go forward with license extension,.. hindered the ultrisonic instriuments' ability to accu.even if it wasn't chosenias a lead plant. 'We were rately identify and size weld flaws,..going to file a license extension' application,' said .Yankee's RV aso has a thermal shield justinside.YAEC's Bill Szymýcfak, a membeirof theYanke'e the vesseilwall. The proximityof the shield to the,license extension'team. "There iwas sentimentat the vessel shell restricts the accessibility to the beltlinetime that (the lead plan) should hv' beenSurry .*regionadi'estrictsinsj~ectionsofcriticalwelds. Tobut we were going to be in the queue an ay. position'instruments for inspection, the thermal*"As a single-ass& company, rpgardless of whit .shield would have to be destroyed and remonved,:."anyone else was doing, we were going forward,' unless inw tools were manufacui-ed to make the$iS2ýýkT-ddid. HZIiifiYAEC befdi--ttie-NRC f- --eld--2aEsibleYAEC sttil '-..a license extension at the same time the pilot plants. inspection equipment,'but that cost a lot and thewere going through would have been a -complkat- economics of saving Yankee-which already wasn't*"ing factor,"he said.. ..selling electricity it a compýtitive price in recession-DOE arid EPRI were, in fact, very concerned. ravaged New England-.just didn't add up.about maintaning a uniform front on license renewal " YAEC even briefly considered replacing the RPV.before the NRC. When' YAEC signed on islead .Though DOE'S Sandia National Laboratories con-PWR, a provision in its cbntract with DOE and EPRI .luded that the replacemeht was "technically achiev-.required that its licensing submittals be "suffidently able," th.e ileisionon replacement was ultimately anconsistent' with those filed by Noi'thern States economic one.. It was estimated that RPV replace-.Power Co. foi the-lead BWR. Mohticello, that NRC. merit could be paid off ovier 20 years with a ramte in-wouldn't be able to 'leveriage onepLaiht against the acrease of 1/2 to -.1cent per KWH for the first year,other.'. " .-." .which would drop to 0.1 cent the last year. Of 'If YAEC had Meled 'a icdns6 extension applicati-n. coursethat payback scenario assumed license ex-as a third party, it would not have been constrained OUrL.OOK ON IFE EX1ENSION-Nuleriwles Week, March 31; Insidi N.R.C., Apr,4; NuclerFud, April 11 1991 Page 21 at the same rate as before annealing, but thatembrittlement restarts from a point of greater ductil-ity-a "lateral shift" in the embrittlement curve. Rus-sian experience in annealing 13 reactor vessels hasverified the lateral shift approach to analyzing re-embrittlement, Hiser said. Even if an annealing jobdoes not repair all flux damage, he said. "You will al-ways end up better (after an annealing), but there's nosignificant impact on the rate of embrittlement."However, each reactor vessel responds tofluence according to the particular circumstances of itsconstruction, including the type of material used in thesteel and the welds. The rate of fluence accumulationbefore and after annealing will also have an effect, Hisersaid.' "Assuming the same rate of fluence accumulation ofthe vessel and 100% recovery (from embriftlement), thevessel should be good for the same period as beforeyou annealed,* Hiser said.Hiser's views on annealing and re-embrittlement arebased on more than a decade of research on the topicin the U.S., where sample coupons have been testedmany times for embrittlement rates and response toannealing, and on full-vessel annealing in Russia.Westinghouse has moved strongly into the nascentfield. David Howell, manager of engineering servicesfor the vendor, said, 'Mhe nuclear industry needs thisprogram for life extension and to meet license require-ments, plus we see annealing as a sales opportunity.'Westinghouse has raised more than $2-million of $4-million it is seeking from the industry to conduct anannealing demonstration at the never-completedMarble Hill reactor in Indiana. Westinghouse plans touse indirect gas-fired heating to raise the vessel's tern-perature. Extensive monitoring will be designed toanswer critical engineering questions, such as how theprocess affects nozzles and pipes attached to the vessel.Westinghouse faces competition from a team formedof Framatome subsidiary B&W Nuclear Technologies,MPR Associates Inc. of Alexandria, Va., and a- consor-tium called Russian Annealing Moht. The moht, o'rconsortium, is formed of Moscow's Kurchatov Institute;vendor Gidropress; Cnitrmash; and other Russian orga-nizations, which has annealed 13 vessels in Russia.MPR Associates principals Bill Schmidt-and NomanCole praise the Russian technology, which relies onelectric resistance heating, as simple and reliable.Schmidt said that Electricite de France (EDF) special-ists who met with his company said that they wereconcerned that the Westinghouse process could not belicensed in France because, of the dangers of workingwith natural gas.U.S. annealing specialists visited Novovoronezh in1992 to witness the annealing of a VVER-440 vessel.The Russian approach is different, the specialists say,because Russian vessels are made of ring forgings, sothe circumferential weld area to be annealed is only.about three feet wide. U.S. reactors, which are longerand have axial welds, would have to be annealed in aband about 12 feet wide. Also, some U.S. reactorswould require annealing on plate sections.MPR's Cole said that the recovery in RT-NDT atNovovoronezh was greater than 80%. While Russianannealing specialists haverachieved recovery of 100% inthat index of PTS vulnerability from some annealing-projects, they guarantee recovery of 80% from theirannealing process.Keith Wichman, annealing specialist with NRC'sresearrh arm, agreed.Russian annealing projects haveachieved recovery rates over 90%. That level of recov-ery is equivalent to full recovery for his purposes,Wichman said, adding that above 90% recovery, distinc-tions are meaningless.No full-scale armealing project is now on thedrawing boards at an operating U.S. reactor, despite theoptimism of the annealing vendors. Utilities have rea-son to be cautious, since the first utility to anneal al-most certainly will have to pay extra to defray the costsof licensing the process and the extra costs associatedwith the learning curve on the techinology.In any event, the first U.S. annealing likely will nottake place before the turn of the century, since othermethods of lowering embrittlement rates will work untilthen. Jack Hanson, an annealing specialist at Palisades,said his utility's decision on annealing would be gov.-erned by the economics of the process when licenserenewal is evaluated years from now. Hanson addedthat the most important factdr in that calculation will bethe price of natural gas-the strongest competitor tonuclear power plants.NRC DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW RULE ANGERS STATESIn addition to the safety reviews, NRC will require anenvironmental review as part of. the license renewalprocess. NRC's proposed amendments to tailor theexisting environmental review rule (10 CFR Part 51) tothe license renewal process have come under attack by.states for what they view as an attempt by NRC to pre-empt their traditional review of need for generatingcapacity and alternate energy sources.The amendments include a draft Generic Environ-mental Impact Statement (GEIS), published in Septeni-ber 1991, in which NRC decided to treat the issues ofneed for power and alternative energy sources in thesame way they are handled in an operating licensereview. While the agency performs a detailed analysisPage 12otn1LOOK ON UFE MENSION-Nude n.ci Week. March 31; Insda N.R.C., April 4; NuclearFuel, April 11, 1991 EXHIBIT I IconsumersPowerPMEWENGPROGRESSGenral Offlces 1"S Wan Parntil Road. Jacksn, MI 49201

• 1517l 788.S050May 17, 1990Nuclear RegulAtory CommissionDocument Control DeskWashington, DC 20555DOCKET 50-255 -LICENSE DPR-20 -PALISADES PLANT -COMPLIANCE WITH PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK REGULATION 10CFR50.61 AND REGULATORYGUIDE 1.99 REVISION 2 (TAC NO. 39970)Consumers Power Company (CPC) submittal on April 3. 1989 provided a revisedreport on reactor vessel fluence for Cycles I -8. Attached is the vesselfluence reduction report describing the effect of incorporating lovwleakagefuel management for the Cycle 9 core loading pattern. In this proposed Cycle9 design, 16 thrice-burned fuel assemblies with zircaloy-clad hafnium absorberrods will be used at the selected core peripheral locations to protect thevessel axial welds from neutron fast flux E)1.O MeV. Remaining core peri-pheral locations will be loaded with twice-burned fuel assemblies. Allonce-burned and fresh fuel assemblies will be inside the core away from theperipheral locations.This report reflects results based upon the development of in-house methodo-logy utilizing the DOT 4.3 discrete ordinates transport code and ReactorEngineering Analyses performed during the period of 1987-1990. It concludesthat the PTS screening criteria will be exceeded at the axial weldsin September. 2001. as opposed to the previously reported exceed date ofMarch, 2002. The difference reflects an improvement in vessel flux reductionin Cycle 9 relative to Cycle 8 and slightly higher vessel flux levelscalculated by the refined in-housa transport methodology relative to,the Westinghouse methodology previously utilized. Thus, the previously0C0590-0016-NLO2,u '.-4 o'Y )nr/ý IF InNuclear Regulatory CommissionPalisades Nuclear PlantThermal Shock Reg IOCFR50.61/Reg Guide 1.99 Rev 2May 17, 1990derived conclusion that the flux reductions achieved in the Cycle 8 and 9 coreloading patterns are, by themselves, insufficient to allow plant operation tothe current expected end of life in 2011 remains valid. Further measures, eg,greater flux reduction, Regulatory Guide 1.154 analysis, vessel shielding etc,are necessary to allow plant operation to the nominal end of plant life andbeyond.Richard W SmedleyStaff Licensing EngineerCC Administrator, Region III, USNRCNRC Resident Inspector -Palisadest0C0590-0016-NLO2 ANALYSIS OF THE REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL FAST EUTROWI FLUEMCEAND PRESSURIZED TEIRMAL SUOCK REAERUNCE TEHPERATURESFOR THE PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANTMay 1990Performed by theReactor Engineering DepartmentPalisades Nuclear PlantConsumers Power Company!

a .TABLE OF CONTENTSSECTION TITLE PACE*.0 INTRODUCTION 12.0 SUMMARY 33.0 METHODOLOGY B3.1 OVERVIEW 83.2 FUEL MANACEMENT 83.3 GEOMETRY 93.4 MATERIAL CROSS SECTIONS 103.5 NEUTRON SOURCE 103.6 BURNUP CORRECTIONS 1I3.7 NEUTRON TRANSPORT ANALYSIS 123.8 VESSEL FLUENCE CALCULATIONS 123.9 FLUENCE LIMITS/REFERENCE TEMPERATURE CALCULATIONS 124.0 RESULTS 324.1 COMPARISON TO MEASURED DATA 324.2 FLUX/FLUENCE DISTRIBUTION 324.3 CALCULATIONAL UNCERTAINTY 334.4 ADJUSTED REFERENCE TEMPERATURES AND 33SCREENINC LIMITS5.0 DISCUSSION 455.1 IMPACT OF RESULTS 455.2 ADDITIONAL FLUX REDUCTION 455.3 REFINED FLUX MEASUREMENT 465.4 OTHER PTS ACTIVITIES 47M10490-0055A-0P03i

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Consumers Power Company-previously submitted-to the NRC a report describingCycle 8 (luence reduction measures for the Palisades Nuclear Plant reactorpressure vessel.[IlI It was committed that.an additional. fluence reportreflecting Cycle 9 fuel management and extrapolated to nominal plant end-of-life would be submitted to the NRC. The information contained herein isintended to address-the fluence re-evaluastion and reduction program as previ-ousLy committed to and to describe the methodology utilized for determiningvessel incident fast fluxes and fluence levels.In order to accurately calculate pressure vessel fluence levels, in-housemethodology was developed.utilizing the DOT.4.3 discrete ordinates transportcode as the base model.. Training in the use of DOT 4.3 and associated crosssection libraries and support codes was obtained from Combustion Engineering.The scope of the training included code usage and model development as well asresults evaluations. In-house methodology of flux calculations was furtherrefined via consultation with Westinghouse Electric Company, Radiation andSystems Analysis-Nuclear Technology Division. Westinghouse determined thatConsumers Power's neutron transport methodology represented state-of-the-artpractice consistent with Westinghouse methodology (2,81.The modeling of the vessel and fluence analysis was performed using DOT 4.3 andthe SAILOR cross-section library. Cycles I through 7 core loading patternswere typical of out-in fuel management in that the fresh fuel was placed on thecore periphery. This approach results in the maximum overall core neutronleakage and flux to the reactor pressure vessel. The Cycle 8 core vas loadedwith thrice burned fuel assemblies with stainless steel shielding rods locatednear the axial weld locations. In the previously submitted report (11, fluxreductions of a factor of two were achieved at the axial weld locations fromthe Cycle 8 loading pattern. The design goal for Cycle 9 was to meet or exceedthe flux reductions achieved in Cycle 8. The proposed Cycle 9 load.ing patternconsists of thrice burned fuel assemblies with hafnium absorbers located at thesame core peripheral Locations that utilized stainless steel shielding rods inM10490-0055A-0P03 I'llCycle 8. The remaining core peripheral locations will be loaded WiLh LWiCeburned fuel assemblies. All of the new fuel assemblies will be located wiLhinthe core interior.In this report. cycle-specific calculations have been performed for Cycles Ithrou&h 9. Results presented address the accumulated vessel flu.ence throughthe end of Cycle 7 as well as the flux reductions obtained-for. the Cycle 8(currently in operation) and Cycle 9 (under design) low leakage loading paL-terns. Vessel fluence limits based on the IOCFRSO.61PTS screening criteriaand both the 1OCFR 50.61 and Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, referencetemperature correlations are calculated based on the vessel material chemis-tries. Vessel lifetimes are calculated relative to the fluence limits assumingthe flux-reduction fuel management for Cycle 9 and beyond utilizing the Regula-tory Cuide 1.99, Revision 2 reference temperature correlations. In addition,details are provided about the in-house methodoloay'and data 131 and the statusof Consumers' in-house flux reduction and measurement program.M10490-OOSSA-OP03 2.0 SUIHARYNeutron transport calculations were performed using'the DOT 4.3 computer codeand SAILOR cross section library.- The 2D R.-6.neutron fluxes (E>1.0 KeV) werecomputed using:DOT"4.3 with consideration of axial flux peaking.. For each ofCycles I through 9,.cycle specific DOT-runs have been.made. For.Cycles Ithrough 7 on-line core.monitoring energy :generation data and actual cycleoperational history data wereýutilized for.-vessel flux and fluence calcula-tions; calculations for Cycles 8 and 9 utilized predictive core simulatordata. A comparison'between calculated and measured fluxes at the W-290 wallcapsule location, analyzed at the end of Cycle.5, was made, .It:was found thatthe calculated:fluxes were about .4% higher than.the measured values,.thusassuring reasonable flux predictions for the models.Flux levels for Cycle 8 were compared with-that of Westinghouse methodology(1). The in-house model indicates a positive bias in the flux calculationsrelative to the Westinghouse methodology and-this bias varied with theazimuthal -locations. Maximum variation was on the order of about .122 at 45location 131. ,.. *Pressure vessel fluence limits based on the PTS screening criteria ofIOCFR5O.61were calculated using the reference temperatut:(Rl) correlations ofboth lOCFR5O;61-and:Regulatory Cuide.-l99# lev.2 using the vessel chemistriesprovided in Reference 4. The results are summarized in Table.2.1 and show thedramatic reduction in the vessel weld fluence limits with the use of theRegulatory Cuide 1.99 RT correlation. With the pending issuance. of a revised1OCFRS0.61 incorporating the Regulatory Culde. 1.99, Rev:2 RT correlation, themore restrictive Regulatory'Cuide fluence limits utilized-in this study.--Core loading patterns for Cycles 8 and 9.'are designed to provided substantialflux reduction at-the axial 'veld locations:in comparison to previous cycles.The associated flux reductions for the primary vessel materials are-shown inTable 2.2. Fast flux (E>l.O HeY) reductions of more than 502 were obtained atthe axial weld locations for Cycles 8 and 9 in comparison with Cycle 7. For.Cycle 8, at the circumferential weld and base metal (peak) locations, about 20%MI 0490-005SA-0P03 4flux reduction was obtained. However, for Cycle 9 the flux reductions are onthe order of 48% at these locations.Vessel lifetimes based on when the PTS screening criteria are met were deter-mined for fuel management schemes with flux reduction for Cycles 8, 9, andbeyond. Operation beyond end of Cycle 8 (September 1990) was assumed to occurat 75% capacity. With no flux reduction utilized, the PTS screening criteriawould be exceeded at the axial welds in.1995; utilizing Cycle 8 flux reduc-tions, this would be extended to 2000. With flux reduction incorporated inCycle 9 and beyond, the PT3 limit would be exceeded at the axial welds again,but not until about September, 2001. These predicted dates are far short ofthe assumed nominal plant operating license expiration date of Karch, 2011.While the flux reduction obtained in Cycles 8 and 9 substantially reduced theaxial weld flux levels, the reduction is insufficient to remain within the PTSscreening criteria through the minimia plant. life (nominal end of operatinglicense). Some additional flux reduction will be possible through more aSgres-sive low-Leakage fuel management in Cycle 10 and beyond. However, in order toallow plant operation at least until the nominal license expiration date,additional PTS-addressing measures will have to be implemented (eg, RegulatoryGuide 1.154 analysisi. vessel shielding, etc). Activities are currently under-way with the Combustion Engineering Owners' Group in the areas of additionalvessel surveillance data and modet development for a Regulatory-Culde 1.154analysis; initial conceptual discussions are underway with other vendors forincorporation of weld specific vessel shielding in Cycle 10.An ox-vessel dosimetry program was developed by Westinghouse and hardwareinstallation was completed during the end of Cycle 7 refueling outage. Thisprogram would supplement the existing surveillance program. In addition to theex-vessel program, Combustion Engineering will install an In-vessel dosimetrycapsule at the W-290 capsuli holder vacated following Cycle S. These in-vesseland ex-vessel dosimetry programs will provide measured data for use in vesselwall and vessel, support fluence evalujitions. -U--*5r7 W. .°7Updates on vessel fluence levels and adjusted reference temperatures viii beprovided to the NIC as actual operational data Including vessel dosimetryInformation is obtained. In additionp developments in fuel managementt vesselmaterials information, vessel shielding and other PTSorelated areas thatsubstantially impact the vessel lifetime vwil be reported as required in1OCFR50.6l.- .-1.,M104U90-OOSA-OP03 Ira*.~. ..'.* ~ .*'h -.a. .MP.a'" 3.0 HMEHODOLOCY3.1 OverviewThe pressure vessel fast neu.tron fluence level's (1)1.0 eV) were calculatedutilizing available historical and predictive fuel cycle information.The primary analytical model was based on a two dimensional (RpO) discreteordinates code DOT 4.3 representation (51 of the Palisades reactor vesselconfiguration. The representation includes a model of the core/vessel ecome-* try, the neutron source distributionp and nuclear Interactions as representedby cross section data. Measurement datiwas available for comparison from ananalysis of radiometric dosimeters Irradiat'ed In the 11-290 vessel wall surveil-lance capsule 161, which was removed it the and of Cycle 5. The measured fast* neutron flux as calculated from the measured activities using reactor powerhistory, dosimetry cross sections and basic nuclear data was used to comparethe DOT calculated neutron fluxeslfor Cyclis I through 5.. Individual DOTcalculations for remaining Cycles 6 through'.9 were also made. To-daee' fluencelevels were calculated and end-of-Hise.fluenc' levels were extrapolated basedupon anticipated capacity factors for the rmaining life of the PalisadesPlant.3.2. Fuel ManagementS...7 Palisades followed a standard out-in fueling scheme through Cycle 7(Figure 3.1). In this scheme, only fresh fuel wes placed around the coreperiphery,. This approach results in the maximum overall core neutron leakageand fast flux to the reactor.vessel, but minimizes power peaking and generally-* ." * *provides the greates*.theaL margin..Utilization of.the Resulatory"Cuid. 1499 Rev 2, reference temperatuke correla-.. ions for comparison to the l*0CES0.6*l TS screening-criteria determined thatthe axial welds would be responsible for limltinj the life of the Palisadesreactor vessel. It was decided to alter thi fuel management strategy to' -.,.: :. ... ,... *

• S9distribute the power away from these critical weld' locations for Cycle 8operation. A low leakage loading pattern was adopted to improve the neutroneconomy and to reduce the fluence 'levels at the axial welds.A total of 16 thrice-burned stainless steel shielded assemblies were installedat the core periphery. In addition, eight twice burned assemblies were placedon the core periphery. The remaining 24 peripheral locations were filled'lithfresh fuel.assemblies (figure 3.2). With this arrangement, it was anticipatedthat the.reduced power.In the peripheral assemblies vouldreduce the primarysource of.fast neutrons reaching the reactor vessel axial'velds.Design-of the Cycle 9 core is based upon 52 fresh, 60 once-, 76 twice-, and 16'thrice-burned fuel assemblies. All thrici brned'assemblies will have zircaloy;ý-clad hafnium rods placed in eight guide tube locations. These assemblies willbe placed on the edge of-the core near critical weld locations (figure 3.3).Hafnium is an effective absorber primarily for neutrons in the thermal througtAepithermal energy ranges. It is anticipated that the power in these thrice-burned fuel assemblies will be greatly reduced alongwith the neucron source.,Therefore# there will be fewer neutrons reaching the vessel at the criticalweld locations.3.3 CeometryThe Palisades reactor exhibits one-eighth.(1/8) core symmetry, thus only a zeroto 45 degree sector has been included ii the DOT model (Figure 3.4)0 In 'thisfigure two surveillance capsules attached to 'the Inner vessie vall are shown.A plan view of the Palisades .apsule arrIanjeint Li shown LnFg ure" 3.5, withspecific surveillance capsules dimensions sihotmida Figure 3.6. "Flgure'3.ý5:shows that fourobf the:45 degree sectors do not have any capsules. Two other-* .: -, -' .... , ...1 7sectors have one accelerated (attached to core support barrel).and one"walcapsule. The remaining two sectors have two ves'el-wall capsules at the 10"-'.and 20" locations.The utilized DOT model contains two vall capsuls a't the" 10" and 20 locations. This model utilizes 99 radial and 98 :azimuthal inter-vals for.a total of.9702.meshes in polar (.R O)geometry. 'Fine mesh detail. hasbeen utilized asnecessary in setting up the .geoery.model-toaccuratelyrepresent the.reactor core, shroud, bypasi flow, core supportbarrel, inlet.... ..i0490.00 ..OP03...............""" ...;" ." ." 'I I tsio10flow, surveillance capsules# vessel clad and the vessel wall regions. A totalof 15 outer assemblies have been modeled to represent the detailed core; thetotal model mesh extends to just outside the vessel In' the reactor cavity area.Various regions of the DOT model are represented in such a way that theirvolumes are close to that of the physical volumes of the reactor internals.3.4 Material Cross SectionsThe DOT model analysis employed a P3 expansion of the scattering cross see-tions. The microscopic cross sections used in the analysis were obtained fromthe SAILOR cross section library. Macroscopic cross sections were calculatedfor each region in the model using the computer code CIP. Plant specificmaterial compositions and the corresponding atomic densities were used for thisanalysis.3.5 Neutron SourceAssembly-wise radial power distributions were obtained from the Palisadesincore monitoring system (INCA) for Cycles I through 71 fuel vendor-generateddiscrete PDQ bundle power data were used for Cycles 8 and 9. Average energygenerated by fuel assemblies was obtained from the exposure data and the heavymetal weight of the assemblies to calculate cycle average assembly powers.Figures 3.7 through 3.15 exhibit the fifteen (15) outer peripheral normalizedbundle powers for Cycles, I through 9. Cycle 8 actual assembly power data todate is adequately modeled by utilizing the predictive core simulator informa-tion. Local pin power distributions were derived from discrete PDQ modelcalculations. The local pin power distributions and the average assembly powerswere combined to determine core normalized pin power distributions.Axial peaking was accounted for by applying the bundle specific axial peakingfactors to the-normalized pin powers of the fifteen modeled fuel assemblies.This approach. conservatively. dafines the axial variation of the vessel incidentneutron/source. Aial power information was obtained from INCA core mohitoring-data for Cycles 1 through 7 and 3D XTO core simulator models for Cycles 8 and9. The core power distributions were Initially calcul'ated in Cartesian (xy)geometry from the original data sources. The Cartesian geometry was convertedto a polar (R.e) geometry using an algorithm that maintained equivalent averagesource strength over the affected surface area between coordinate systems.* ' ..* " .... ..". " ..* ,*"" : '... , ." " ." " -.. : L .

a3.6 Burnup CorrectionsAs the fuel starts to deplete in the core.-during plant operation, exposure ofthe individual fuel assemblies increases and a-build up of plutonium isotopesoccurs. Plutonium isotopes have higher.u ,(neutrons/fission) and K (energy/fission) values and exhibit fission spectra shifted towards the higher energies(harder spectra) than uranium isotopes..:Thecontributions of the-Individualisotopes U235, U238, Pu239 and Pu2Al to the-core neutron source-have been* .accounted for in the present set of flux calculations. Since the fissionspectra and effective neutron yield differs for'the above isotopes,. the core..neutron source and the vessel wall flux will generally increase with the fueldepletion for-given peripheral assembly power levels. This:is especially..important for the twice and~thrice burned fuel at the core periphery for.Cycles8 and 9. Composite fission spectra for each of Cycles I through.9 have there-.. fore been developed. Individual Isotopic fission-spectra were obtained fromENDF-B/V for the uranium and plutonium isotopes. The spectra were collapsed to47 energy groups similar to the SAILOR'Library.[71. Theexposure dependentneutron source for each cycle was then determined by weighting. the individualgroup-wise neutron yields with the corresponding exposure dependent isotopicfission fractions based on the cycle average'exposure of five-peripheralassemblies. Only 19 groups abovel MeY have been employed in the DOT model forthe fast fluxýcalcalations, Cycle 'specific flesion.spectra-are shown in Table3.1 in comparlson with the SAILOR Libraryfission spectra. Fission spectra arenormalized to'one (1) neutroa in the;47-groups, similar to the SAILOR Library.From Table 3.1, it can be noted that high energy neutron groups have higheryields for Cycles 8 and 9, compared to the previous seven cycles.In the DOT model, cycle-specifIc uIK ratios for fifteen (15) fuel assemblieswere obtained from CASMO lattice depletion code data for a standard Palisadesfuel type, utilizing -middle-of-cycle exposure-values. The effect-of neutron* yield and energy generated In these assemblies were incorporated in the neutronsource. These effects are more Important on the fast flux at the reactorvessel for Cycles 8 and 9 as compared to previous Cycles I through 7.'- .HIO490-0055A-OP03 ." , " .,. * *-. *,' .*. -.* ...** ......'" "rgk". ' .' ' .. I III'* '*" " -" v' -.*.**~j4*~**12; ..;' " .~~~....... .....-;* -R+.r.-'. *.. .. ..3.7 Neutron Transport Ana&l'ysis4., The spatial distribution of neutron flux In -the reactor was calculated usingthe~ DOT 4.3 computer code. The DOT program solves the Saltzman transportequation in tvoý-dlmenuilonal geome~try us'Ing the method of discrete ordinates.Thr odr cttrng(3And S8 Angular quadratures were used. The cycle-by-cycle 'neutron flux distribution's were calculated using the cycle-dependentneutron sources And material compositions... .3.8 Vessel Fluence Calculations *. :Fluence levels of a given cycle were obtainedi by 'multiplying the flux at theclad-base metal interface by the effective ful power seconds at 2530 ?NT11 for.that cycle... Accumul-*ei fl'encv.u.at..tha'EOC. "'.re:c a .ated..b-y. 'addingthe fluence for All the Cycles I through So7 Further estrapoladii~on tend-of-life fluence is based upon.'t-ie timat'...hat.ths 'plant-w-1.eiate.at.75%."*, .capaciy a 8at.th" ca"cuated'fluencerate the -f" f h 'Cycle. 9-.. proposed core loading scheme*. " * -3.9 Fluence Limits/Reference Temperature Calculatios. .30'. Target fluence limits for' press i la vesel veds and bac semetal's are calculatedusing the eOCM5nsO.6correliation fotr uT'aln .the vesseld -material PTSscreening criteria The reference tempnsu urature. corerlation Is given as::. .I + + ..* ... .* ........ .,.j" I e

• l O
• 7
• 3 OoIi) 0' 7..4'..*J~.9.....~* p.4r.I,* J..s41..I"UneretRTp73 is the adjusted reference temperature for pressurized thermal.shock cnuiderations ('F) 13I is the initial reference temperature ('F)M is the margin term (F)Cu, N4i are the copper and nickel content (in weight percent), respectivelyf is the accumulated fluence (E>1.0 1eV)) in units -of 1019n/cm2* The corresponding,*(luence limits are determined by solving the RT correlation"for the fluence values' Initial-reference temperature and chemistry information* and corresponding .fluence limits are shown in Table 3.2.Target (luence'limits for. pressure vessel welds and base metals are alsocalculated using Regulatory Cuide.1.99, Rev 2 referenqe temperature correlationand the lOCFR50.61 P7T screening criteria.. The adjusted reference temperaturefor each material in the beltline is given assART .InitiAl RTNDT..* aTT. K MarginorART I I
• NI4 ARTMDTwhere: &R~j~ .) 1(cf0.26B 10lot 'f)aI, H and f have the same meaning as above. -the chemistry" factfoi, CF ('F)depends on the content of copper and nickel in the.belt line Thisfactor is provided In Regulatory Cuide-1.99, layv2. The correslpondin fluencelimits are determined by solving the.IT correlation for the fluince value andare shown-in Table 3.3.For each. Cycles 1 through 9, fluence values were obtained for the base metal,and axial and circumferential weld materials. Using the parameters of Table3.3 and the accumulated fluence at the and of each cyclep the coriespondingadjusted reference temperatures were calculated.L..- ,04.T-- ý ---l .--.. -, -: .....-, ," ....". .'

J24.0 RESULTS4.1 Comparison to Measured'DataThe W-290 surveillance capsule was removed at the end-of-Cycle 5 and wasanalyzed by Westinghouse (6). The measured average flux at the W-290 capsulewas corrected for a discrepancy in the power Irridiation history data (Figure4.1) versus that utilized In Reference 6. The corrected measured flux at theW-290 capsule was 6.73x101O n/cm2-uec. DOT calculations for Cycles I through 5provide a cycle-energy averaged flux at the W-290 locations of 7.02x1010n/cm2-sec (31, 4Z higher that the measured value. It was also noted that thelead factors obtained for Cycles I through S from DOT calculations were fairlyconstant (between 1.24-1.27). These facts indicate that calculated flux valuesfrom the in-house DOT results can be directly used for reasonable end-of-lifefluence calculations. It should be noted that these results are a slightimprovement over the DOT calculations utilized in Reference 1, which exhibiteda *1lZ bias relative to the measured W-290 fluxes.4.2 Flux/Fluence DistributionFor Cycles I through 9, the maximum fast flux occurs at the azimuthal intervalbetween 16'44"-17* at the clad-base metal interface (Table 4.1). Flux distri-butions for Cycles 3 through 7 are very similar. Comparison of flux distribu-tion between different cycles is presented in figures 4.2 and 4.3. Thesefigures confirm that the maximum flux occurs around 17'. Wall capsules at 10*and 20" exhibit an attenuating effect In their immediate vicinities, but do notaffect the peak fluxes. For Cycles I though 7, a second'peak occurs around the32" azimuthal location. For Cycles 8 and 9p this peak is eliminated as aresult of the implementation of low leakage fuel management schemes. Substan-.tial flux reduction for the low leakage fuel management schemes relative to thehigh neutron leakage loading patterns is apparent. Radial flux distributions-at the 0, 17 and 30 degree azimuthal locations for Cycles 7 (representative ofprevious cycles), 8 and 9 are presented in Appendix 7.1..mi0490-OO55a-opO3:t : 33Accumulated fast, fluence distributions at the end of Cycle 9 and FOL at theclad-base metal -interface is shown in Figure 4.4. Based upon Reg. Cuide 1.99,Revision 2, fluence limits corresponding to base metal, axial, and circumferen-tiaL welds are-also presented in Figure 4.4. From this figure it. can be notedthatithe [luence values at-the axial welds at 0' and 30' are limiting the lifeof the Palisades reactor pressure vessel...Table 4.2 summarizes the cycle specific fluence (Q4) and accumulated fastfluence (10) at the clad-base metal interface for each of Cycles 1 through 9.For the selected azimuthal locations: 0' (axial weld location), 17" (maximiumof peak at base metal), 30' (axial weld location) and 45', effective full poweryears (AEFPY) for each cycle and the accumulated EFPY's are also presented.Table 4.3 provides the fluence limit violation dates with Cycle 9 fluence ratesfor plant operations beyond the end of Cycle 8 date of September, 1990.4.3 Calculational UncertaintyA number of factors contribute to the uncertainty in the projected peak fastfluence at the reactor vessel wall. These factors are due to the conversion ofmeasured activity data to fluxes, uncertainties in material composition,neutron-cross sections, power distributions, as-built core/vessel dimensicnsand cycle-by-cycle variation in the fast flux lead factors. An uncertainty of.+/-25% is estimated in the calculated vessel wall fluence, typical of currentneutron transport methodology uncertainties. The calculated *4% flux biasrelative to actual W-290 measured fluxes indicates that vessel wall fluxpredictions are reasonable given the inherent uncertainty in the methodology.4.4 Adjusted Reference Temperaturas and Screening LimitsAdjusted reference temperatures (ARTs) as a function of effective full poweryears (EFPYs) corresponding to the fluence values at the end of Cycle I through9 and projected to plant EOL, have been plotted in Figure 4.5. PTS screeninglimits for each of the beitline materials are provided. This figurem10490-0055a-opO3 0suggests that the axial welds are the Limiting material for the Palisadesreactor pressure vessel relative to PTS limits. Table 4.4 provides the summaryof PTS adjusted reference temperatures for base metal, axial and circumferen-Lial weld materials. Note that for the licensed end-of-life date of March, 2011,ARTs for the axial welds at 30 degrees exceed the PTS screening limit of 270"F.mi6490-OOS55-opO3 -o-455.0 DISCUSSION5.1 Impact of ResultsModifications to the Cycles 8 and 9 loading patterns substantially reduce the'flux at the critical weld locations and delays exceeding thePTS screeningcriteria to about September 2001, as opposed to in 1995 if no flux'reductionmeasures are taken. The fLux reductionii insufficient, however, to allowoperation of the plant within the PTS scr4ening criteria until the minimumexpected plant life, corresponding to the expiration of the pending (ull termoperating license in March, 2011.In-house flux calculations have a positive bias with respect to Westinghousemodel (13,.mainly due to the slightly Larger core sizi in'the in-house mode'l.The bias ranges from .0.5 at 0' and Increases to about +11.7 at the 450location. In additlon, more realiStici plant-specific design and operacionaldata have been utilized in the in-house model. This approach therefore doesnot depend very heavily on assumptions used for the flux calculations, butrelies on the plant specific parameters.In order..to maximize vessel lifetime#"further measures must be isken in 'theareas of greater flux reduction,. Re Cuide 1.154'analysis'to properly define,the real Palisades PTS risk, ind'possible vessel annealins/shle1ldingactions 'toreduce the accumulated vessel .embrittlemsint rates5.2 Additional Flux ReductionThe most straightforward method of reducing the vessel fast flux level isreduction of the source itselfq which has been initially addressed with theincorporation of low-leakage fuel uanagement and stainless steel shield rodsIn Cycle Aand thrice burned fuel with hafnium absorbers for Cycle 9. Whileflux reduction gains are proedicedfor Cycle 9s some further reductions arebelieved to be obtainable viI fuefl mNagement 'alone, Cycle 9 iill be the firstcycle with the new steam genersators installed. The new' enerators are expectedto provide substantially higher prims coo0laint flow than'the'current generators. 46The increased flow, which can be quantified accurately during Cycle 9 opera-tion, will provide additional core operating thermal margin and thusallow higher power peaking limits to be utilized in developing the Cycle 10Loading pattern. The higher peaking will provide additional fuel managementflexibility and support more aggressive low-leakage fuel management for furtherreductions in vessel wall fluxes.Additionally, Cycle 9 will be the first cycle to incorporate a new high thermalperformance (HTP) spacer grid design in the fresh reload fuel. Insertion of asecond reload of fuel with the HTP spacers in Cycle 10, along with developmentof a Palisades-specific DNB correlation for the HTP fuel, will provide addi-tional allowable peaking factor increases to be utilized in Cycle 10.A third area design to allow greater fuel management flexibility in the Cycle10 core design will be the installation, utilization, and optimization of a newfull core power monitoring system beginning in Cycle 9. This monitoring systemwill allow the Cycle 10 loading pattern design to utilize 1/4 core symmetry, asopposed to current 1/8 core symmetry utilized in Cycles 1-9t and will providemore options for reducing power and flux levels in peripheral fuel assemblies.Discussions have been held with NSSS vendors on the possibility of installingcritical material irea neutron shields. A shield between the fuel and thevessel wall would act to reflect, slow down, or absorb high-energy neutronsbefore they could reach the vessel wall. Stainless steel shielding pads couldbe designed to mount near the core support barrel to maximize the attenuationof the high energy neutrons of concern. The possibility exists to use otherhybrid materials which are better neutron shielding then stainless steel andtherefore provide further neutron flux reduction beyond that attainable withlow leakage fuel management alone. It is estimated that internal Vesselshielding could reduce the flux at the critical axial weld locations a minimumof 25Z.5.3 Refined Flux MeasurementIn order to benchmark vessel fluence calculationsp an upgraded vessel dosimetryprogram has been'initiated to supplement the existing surveillance capsuleprogram. An ex-vessel, dosimetry program was developed by Westinghouse andhardware installation occurred during the and of Cycle 7 refueling outage. TheH10490-005A-OP03si .47dosimetry installed will provide detailed azimuthal and' aiial mapping of the270-360 degree vessel quadrant, with gradient chains installed in the otherthree quadrants to prov.ide accurate axial andcross-quadranLmappins. it isintended to exchange this dosimetry at the end of Cycle 8 with similar sets:of.dosimeters for the Cycle 9 irradiation period. The dosimetry will providemeasured data for use in vessel wall and supports fluence evaluations. Inaddition to the ex-vessel program, Combustion Engineering has been contractedto fabricate and install a replacement In-vessel dosimetry capsule to beinserted into the W-290 capsule holder vacated following Cycle 5. installationwill occur during the next refueling outage (Fall 1990). When installed, thiscapsule "vill provide an excellent through-wall correlation with the ex-vesseldosimetry installed in the same quadrant.In addition to implementing the supplemental dosimetry program, efforts will bemade to extend the DOT model up to the reactor cavity area to analyze theex-vessel dosimeters. A further enhancement planned to the DOT model will beto synthesize a 3-D model for flux calculations to remove some of the inherentconservatism in the calculations due to utilization of the bundle-specific peakaxial power over the entire core axial height.5.4 Other PTS ActivitiesPlanned flux reduction measures do not appear to fully solve the vessel fluenceissue relative tu rTS. Consumers Power Company is pursuing & methodologythrough the Combustion Engineering Owners Croup (CEOG) to augment plant data bycorrelating surveillance material and data from other plants to Palisadesvessel materials. Such data could allow Palisades to reduce operating restric-tions caused by Regulatory Cuide 1.99, Rev 2/10CFR50.61 default margin termsand initial reference temperatures for generic weld material in absence ofactual Charpy weld test specimen data.A detailed risk evaluation based on Regulatory Cuede 1.154 analysis is alsobeing pursued through ClOG. Such analysis will identify and summarize thepotential risk of a PTS event occurring. This risk would be based on the knownH10490-0055A-0P03 48operating activities. or transients uhich could lead to a PTS event. Theprogram is being undertaken in a phased approach with the currently in-progressPhase I dealing with generic model development only. The analysis, if actuallyneeded, would be completed at least three years prior to the predicted exceeddate of the PTS screening criteria.H10490-0055A- 0P03o,'** .... b'

96.0 REFERENCES

1. Letter from R W Smedley (CPCo) to NRCp "Docket 50-255 -License DPR-20 -Palisades Plant -Compliance with Pressurized Thermal Shock RuleIOCFR5O.61 and Regulatory Culde 1.99 Revision 2 -Fluence Reduction Status(TAC No. 59970)," April 3, 1989.2. Letter from J C Hoebel (Westinghouse) to I A.Klavon (CPCo) "Interim Reportof Westinghouse Review of Consumers Power PTS Calculations,"August 29, 1989.3. Engineering "Analysis Package for PTS study, Reactor Engineering Depart-ment, Palisades Plant (1987-90).4. Letter from K W Berry to MRC, "Response to Request for Additional Informa-tion -Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTB) Rule IOCFR50,61," August 7, 1986.5. RSIC Computer Code Collection DOT IV Version 4.3 (Report No, CC-429).6. WCAP -10637, Analysis of Capsules T-330 and W-290 from the ConsumersPower Company Palisades Reactor Vessel Radiation Surveillance Program,M K Kunka and C A Cheneyp September# 1984.7. RSIC Library Collection SAILOR DLC-76.8. Telecopy of E.P. Lipincott (Westinghouse) to O.P. Jolly (CPCo), "FinalReport on Westinghouse Review of Consumers Power PTS Calculations," April209 1990.IH10490-0055A-0P03 EXHIBIT I JUNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONWASHINGTON, D.C..20555-0001May 19, 1995NRC GENERIC LETTER 92-01, REVISION 1, SUPPLEMENT 1: REACTOR VESSELSTRUCTURAL INTEGRITYAddresseesAll holders of operating licenses (except those licenses that have been amended topossession-only status) or construction permits for nuclear power reactors.PurposeThe U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is.issuing this supplement to GenericLetter (GL) 92-01, Revision 1, to requiie that all addressees identify, collect and reportany new data pertinent to analysis of stiuctural'integrity of their reactor pressure vessels(RPVs) and to assess the impact of that data On their RPV integrity analyses relative tothe requirements of Section 50.60 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10CFR 50,60), 10 CFR 50.61, Appendices G and H to 10 CFR Part 50, (which encompasspressurized thermal shock (PTS) and upper shelf energy (USE) evaluations) and anypotential impact on low temperature overpressure (LTOP) limits or pressure-temperature(P-T) limits.BackgroundThe staff issued GL 92-01, Revision 1 "Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity," on March 6,1992, to obtain information necessary.to assess compliance with requirements regardingRPV integrity in view of ceiftain cnceins raised in its review of RPV integrity for theYankee Nuclear Power'Statibfi.'All licensees submitted the information requested by July2, 1992. Following receipt and review of.licensee supplements responding to requests foradditional information, the stdff completed itsrieview of licensee responses to GL 92-01,Revision 1, in the fall of 1994. Thi'staff issued NUREG 1511, "Reactor Vessel StatusReport," summarizing keyaspeets ihe'.work in December 1994 [Ref. 1].The staff has recently revie.ed data relevaint to the PTS evaluations of several plants.These reviews showed that licensees may not have considered all pertinent data in theirresponses to GL 92-01, Revision 1, or in their RPV integrity evaluations. It has nowbecome apparent to the staff that no single organization has all the data relevant to RPVintegrity evaluations. A major complicating element in this regard is that proprietaryconsiderati(ns have inhibited effective sharing of information.

It has been demonstrated that some RPV integrity evaluations are very sensitive toconsideration of new data. For example, under certain conditions, changing the meancopper content for the limiting vessel beltline material by a few hundredths weightpercent can change the predicted date for reaching the PTS screening criteria of 10 CFR50.61 by several years. In addition, changes in estimates of mean copper content canaffect the validity of PTS evaluations based on surveillance data. The staff will beconsidering the impact of these findings in plant-specific evaluations and in its longer-term reassessment of 10 CFR 50.61. PTS is a concern only for pressurized water reactors(PWRs) because boiling water reactors (BWRs) operate with a large inventory of water atsaturated steam conditions and, therefore, are not subject to PTS.However, in addition to concerns regarding PTS evaluations, consideration of additional,unreviewed RPV data can also affect evaluations for USE, P-T limits, and LTOP limits.These evaluations pertain to both PWRs and BWRs, except for LTOP limits, which applyonly to PWRs. The staff recognizes that addressees have previously submitted datapertinent to these evaluations as required by the regulations and in responses to GL 92-01, Revision 1, and QL 88-11.Based on currently available information, the staff believes that the near- term focus forRPV integrity will be the Palisades RPV which is predicted to reach the PTS screeningcriteria by late 1999, before any other plant. However, because of the importance of RPVintegrity and the potential impact of additional, unreviewed data on existing RPVevaluations, the staff believes that this issue needs to be resolved on an expedited basis.Although the issues raised in this GL supplement were highlighted by concernspertaining to PTS analyses, licensees should consider the effect of the reexamination ofRPV data on all aspects of RPV structural integrity.Regulatory RequirementsAs required by 10 CFR 50.60(a), licensees for all light water nuclear power reactors mustmeet fracture toughness requirements and maintain a material surveillance program forthe reactor coolant pressure boundary. These requirements are set forth in Appendices Gand H to 10 CFR Part 50. 10 CFR 50.60(b) provides that proposed alternatives to therequirements of Appendices G and H to 10 CFR Part 50 may be used when an exemptionis granted under 10 CFR 50.12. 10 CFR 50.61 provides fracture toughness requirementsfor protecting PWRs against PTS events. Licensees and permit holders have also madecommitments in response to GL 88-1l, "NRC Position on Radiation Embrittlement ofReactor Vessel Materials and Its Impact on Plant Operations," to use the methodology inRegulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, "Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor VesselMaterials," to predict the effects of irradiation as required by Paragraph V.A of AppendixG to 10 CFR Part 50.DiscussionThe staff focused its examination of the GL 92-01, Revision 1, data and other docketed below or the appropriate NRR project manager./s/'d by RPZimmermanRoy P. ZimmermanAssociate Director for ProjectsOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts: Edwin M. Hackett(301) 415-2751Keith R. Wichman(301) 415-2757Lead project manager: Daniel G. McDonald(301) 415-1408Attachments: 1. References2. List of Recently Issued NRC Generic Letters(NUDOCS Accession Number 9505090312)ATTACHMENT 1GL 92-01, Rev. 1, Supp.May 19, 1995References[1] NUREG-I 51 , "Reactor Pressure Vessel Status Report," U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission, Washington, DC, December, 1994.[2] Letter from Elinor Adensam, USNRC, to Kurt Haas, Consumers Power Companyforwarding, "Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Related tothe Evaluation of the Pressurized Thermal Shock Screening Criteria, Consumers PowerCompany, Palisades Plant, Docket No. 50-255", April 12, 1995. lip" oEXHIBIT I KOctober 28, 1994 POLICY ISSUE SECY-94-267(Information)FOR: The CommissionersFROM: James M. TaylorExecutive Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

STATUS OF REACTOR PRESSURE-VESSEL ISSUESPURPOSE:To provide an update of the status of plants with'regardtoA"pendix.G,"Fracture Toughness Requirements," to Part 50 of the Code of FederalRegulations (10 CFR) and 10 CFR 50.61, "Fracture Toughness Requirements forProtection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock Events."BACKGROUND:.In SECY-93-048, the staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) statedthat it was performing detailed reviews of licensee'responses to GenericLetter (GL) 92-01, "Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity,.10 CFR 50.54(f)."As part of this review, the staff has assessed the.upper-shelfenergies(USEs), transition temperatures, and reference temperature for pressurizedthermal shock RT(p P) or adjusted reference temperatures (ARTs) for'alldomestic commerciaY nuclear power plants. Appendix Gto 1O0CFR Part 50requires licensees (1) to operate their reactor vessels with pressure-temperature limits that are dependenton the amount' of indrease.in thetransition temperature resulting from neutron radiation, and' (2) to maintainthe Charpy USE throughout the life of the vessel of no less than 41 Joules (50ft-lb), unless it is demonstrated that lower values of USE will providemargins of safety against fracture equivalent to those required by Appendix Gof the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler. and,Pressure VesselCodes (ASME) Code-. The analyses submitted by licensees to"demonstrate marginsof safety equivalent to thoserequired-by Appendix G of the ASME Code arecalled equivalent margins analyses. '7he increase in the transitiontemperatures affects the RT, values for pressurized water reactors (PWRs)that are calculated in accorJance with-10 CFR-50.61 and the ART that iscalculated in'determining the pressure-temperature limits for. both PWRs andboiling water reactors (BWRs). : *NOTE: TO BE MADE PUBLICLY AVAILABLEIN 10 WORKING DAYS FROM THEDATE OF THIS PAPERContact:B. Elliot, NRR/DE/EMCB504-2709 Plant Name: PalisadesDocket Number: 50-255NSSS Vendor: Combustion EngineeringVessel Manufacturer: Combustion EngineeringEdition of ASME Code for Design: Winter 1965 Addenda to 1965 ASME CodeDate of Commercial Operation: December 31, 1971Date of License Expiration: March 14, 2007RTpt, for the Limiting Beltline Material:Limiting Beltline Material: Axial welds, heat W521410 Fluence at EOL: 1.gIEIg n/cm2Initial RTT: -56FMethod of Determining Chemistry Factor: Chemistry data per ParagraphC.1.1 of RG 1.99, Rev. 2Increase in RTNoT at EOL: 265"FMargin: 66 FRT at EOL: 275"FDafes at which PTS Screening Limit will be exceeded: 2004USE for the Limiting Beltline Material:Limiting Beltline Material: Plate 0-3804-1, heat C-13081/4T Fluence at EOL: 1.615E19 n/cm2Initial USE: 72 ft-lbPercent Drop at EOL: 31%USE at EOL: 50 ft-lbDate USE Screening Limit will be Exceeded: After EOLBases for Accepting the USE at EOL: Chemistry data per Paragraph C.1.2"of RG 1.99, Rev. 2

REFERENCES:

July 3, 1992, letter from G. B. Slade (CPCo) to USNRC Document ControlDesk,

Subject:

Palisades Plant--Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity--Response to Generic Letter 92-01, Revision 1February 23, 1994, letter from D.W. Rogers (CPCo) to USNRCAugust 31, 1990, letter from G.B. Slade (CPCo) to USNRCJuly 12, 1994, letter from A. Hsia (NRC) to CPCo EXHIBIT 1 LOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationItems of Interest-Week Ending November 4, 1994SECY-94-267, "Status of Reactor Pressure Vessel Issues"In Commission Paper SECY-94-267, "Status of Reactor Pressure Vessel Issues,"the staff indicated that the Palisades reactor pressure vessel would reach thepressurized thermal shock (PTS) screening criteria in the year 2004. We alsoindicated that the licensee was gathering additional materials properties datafrom its retired steam generators (the welds in the retired steam generatorswere fabricated using the same materials as used in the fabrication of thelimiting Palisades reactor vessel beltline welds) and the results of thesetests could change the date when the plant-wi-1 -ch-the.-PTS...screeningDuring telephone conversations.with the licensee on November I and 2, 1994',-.,the staffwas informed of preliminary data from the retired steam generatorsthat indicates the Palisades reactor pressure vessel could reach the PTS-screening criteria earlier than 2004. The licensee is continuing to evaluatethe new data 'and to gather additional materials properties from its retiredsteam generators. If the preliminary data are confirmed, the plant wouldreach the"PTS..screening criteria at the next outage in May 1995.,,.A meetingbetween the staff and the licensee has been tentatively scheduldd'fo. .November 18, 1994, to discuss the test results. EXHiIBIT I MiMATERIALS ISSUES IN PALISADES PTS EVALUATIONPRESENTED TO NSRRC SUBCOMMITTEE ONMATERIALS AND ENGINEERINGJanuary 24., 1995IMichael E. Mayfield, ChiefElectrical, Materials and MechanicalEngineering BranchDivision of Engineering Technology, RESU.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington, D.C.64 ~6~ SAA~'A~bk~1~.C- (-.S INTRODUCTION* Materials Research Program Providing Direct Support to NRR on CurrentRegulatory Issues, Includingo Palisades PTS Evaluationo BWR Core Shroud Cracking* Both Issues Have Generic Implicationso Research Program Adjusted to Address Those Implications* Presentations Will Summarize the Issues and the Research Programs1 BACKGROUND -- PALISADES PTS EVALUATION* 10 CFR 50.61 Fracture toughness requirements for protection againstpressureized thermal shock eventso Includes embrittlement screening criteria -- RTprs-270°F for axial welds and plates-300'F for circumferential weldso If 'criteria are to be exceeded, flux reduction and plant specific analyses maybe:requiredRTs =- + M + ARTisI ' 'Initial reference temperature (RTNDT) of the unirradiated materialS M'easured values must be used if available.If plani specific v*6lues not'available, generic mean must be usedM" Margin to coveIr uncertainties'ARTpTs = Mean Value of shift in reference temperature due to neutronirradiationA function of fluence, and chemical composition (copper andnickel)2 PALISADES PTS* Palisades surveillance data not same as beltline weld material-Requires use of industry generic data* Licensee took actions to provide representative data-Gathered additional material properties from welds in retired steamgenerators-Instituted an augmented surveillance program-Evaluated annealing of the reactor vessel-Considered instituting an "ultra low" leakage fuel strategy &*4 (w/0 Staff SER dated July 12, 1994 and NUREG-1 511Palisades vessel projected to reach PTS screening criteria in 2004 -- prior toEOL in 2007Noted that evaluation could change based on information from SG welds3 6' DIA.6' DIA.4 PALISADES PTS* November 1, 1994, licensee informed staff that data from SG welds-Indicated higher copper contents than previously assumedIndicated higher initial RTMDT than mean generic value-Licensee assessment indicated reaching PTS screening criteria in 1999* Staff's assessment on-going-Depending on how the new data are evaluated, PTS screening criteria couldbe reached before 1999 S C P, 62Z--1* RES providing support to NRR in resolving issues raised by licensee-Thermal embrittlement of SG welds cause of higher initial RTNDT-Averaging of chemistry values-Effects of post-weld heat treatments on physical properties-Statistical analyses )f chemistry and initial property data5 RESEARCH EFFORT ON PALISADES ISSUESRES staff and contractors involved in providing independent assessment of dataand analysis methodsO* Thermal Embrittlement-Literature survey-Evaluation of data from Power Reactor Embrittlement Data Base-Evaluation of mechanisms of thermal embrittlement-Combined effects of thermal aging and neutron flux-Examination of mechanical properties data related to Palisades-Drop-Weight Specimen fabrication techniques* Chemical Composition-Analysis of generic data-~Fabrication techniques -- single arc versus tandem arc-Data weighting-Coil-weighted averaging-Recommendations on data treatment6 THERMAL EMBRITTLEMENTe Palisades SG RTNOT tests indicate an initial value of -20°F compared to genericmean of -560F-Cited thermal embrittlement as likely cause-10 EFPY at approximately 5001F-Presented results from Belgian paper -- suggests 70TF shifts possible-Inconsistent with "common wisdon"-RES effort to look at available data and known mechanisms* Literature survey* Review of PR-EDBo Evaluation of Belgian data7 BASE METAL0I.I-.C3125ISO10075 -5025 25-50lotA2128, A3028I PENSE A,502 POTAPOVS 12 DEVAN3 SERPAN 2 13.14,15 D4 SERPAN 1 16 KUSSHA5 STEELE6 LOWE71375RUCE '855UL806040L)2 D20 0A5338 07 HASEGAWA 14 1218 LOWE29 DRUCE '86 t010 DEVAN 911I PENSE, i ill~ l , , , ,ll~ i , , Il l~l I t 1 ,,Ill10-201 I I 2IIII _ I I I I IIJ......... ....... , I I I I II ... ......... ..10210 104AGING TIME (h)1061 08 WELD METALS150126too752" 50I-02.25I1111111 1 1 1111111 1 1 1 111111 , ~ ~ ~ I I!!I SERPAN Ij2 LOWE3 ORUCE '854 KUSSMAUt.6.6 DEYAH7 GERARD 2L)*'8.9 SERVER- pAI70-10930 04 06-02 soI I11111 I 11111 I III 111 I I111111 LA I I Ill,80706o60403020I00-10-20U0I-I-0201--25 "-50I0Il102AGI1G TIME (h)105t0o10 Plot of Residual vs. Effective Full Power Yearfor Weld Materials per 177 Data Points(UU'a,so6040200-20-40-60000 0oP 000% .000 0Go00 000CO 0a00000aUUT I I I01 2 3 4 5 6EFPY [year]7 a 9 1011 PLot of Residual vs. Effective Full Power Yearfor Weld Materials per PR-EDB240200 0160120 0aoo40 of 0 D a 0 00 80 S0 o0 0 Q--000 0 $"" 0._00 00 000 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15EFPY [year]12 DOEL I UNIRRADIATED CONTROLS AGED VS UNAGED160140120t003(DI~izLaJ8060'40 -200 L-fSO-1O0 -50 0 50 100 ISO 200TEMPERATURE (0C) ..13 CONCLUSIONS ON THERMAL EMBRITTLEMENT* Thermal embrittlement not likely source of higher RTNDT* Statistical variablity more likely--20'F value is within +2a of generic mean14 PALISADES CHEMICAL COMPOSITION ISSUE* Key issue is how to weight new data from SG welds* Several proposals are being considered0 Cannot provide more details until staff discussions are completed and SER issued15 CHEMISTRY CONTENT ISSUES* Palisades SG dataa Weld fabrication procedure* Six different coils used in fabricating welds* How does chemical variability relate to wire coil composition-Statistical treatment of data16 RESULTS FROM MIDLAND UNIT 1 RPV' " ';"' 117 Z W XORNL-DWG 92-i-823Ay zBLOC)( IDENT.AND LOCATION1 7 1-8 1-9 110 1-1 ---- 1I.0. TRAVEL(6-BLOCKS)19IU OVERALL COPPER CONTENT IN MIDLAND WELDSSHOWS WIDE VARIATIONREGIONBeltline.SECTION91113153134COPPER (WT %)0.22 to 0.340.16 to 0.340.21 to 0.320.22 to 0.330.37 to 0.460.38 to 0.42Nozile,W LLClrv Z-ý c:cx, 61-od-20 RESEARCH PLAN TO ADDRESS THE GENERIC ISSUES* Evaluating the effects material chemistry and radiation environment on irradiationembrittlement of RPV steelso Examine samples from two representative RPV welds at ORNLo Examine samples of thermally aged samples from retired SG shellso Evaluate variability in chemistry and mechanical properties both along the weldand through the thicknesso Develop generic guidance on estimating chemistry and properties variability* Evaluate the combined effects of thermal aging and neutron irradiationo Thorough assessment of technical literatureo Review and assessment of foreign positions on thermal agingo Detailed metallurgical assessment of thermally aged materialso Evaluate thermal aging, heat treatments, and flux effects on neutronembrittlement21 SCHEDULEFY00.00* FY00FY001995Determine the variability of chemistry in representative RPV weldsAssessment of technical literature and foreign positions on thermal agingInitiate metallurgical assessment of thermally aged materialsContinue irradiations of RPV materials1996Complete report on irradiation effects on old-fabrication practice plate materialEstablish generic guidance for estimating material chemistry and propertiesvariability1997Complete report on irradiation effects in the Midland weldComplete determination of effects of thermal aging on RPV materials from SGs22 SUMMARY* PTS continues to be a significant issue for PWRs* Palisades PTS evaluation highlights uncertainty in initial properties and inembrittlement estimates* Research program addressing the key factors23 EXHIBIT 2 ANUREG/CR-2907BNL--NUREG--51581Vol. 14Mrnýadioactive Materials Reletasedrom Nuclear Power Plants.1. .0 ,nnual Report 1993'I...............................a.pared bylichler, K. Doty, K. Lucadamor.." 1 ..ookhaven National Laboratoryepared for1. Nuclear Regulatory Commission-:.. .:...... '....:ar -,~ *0-~.~9601290279 951231-CR-2907R De)- Cf-)fd (,if 1.0 Introducrion1.1 PrpoThis report, prepared annually for the staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.presents measured data on radioactive materials in effluenrts released from licensed commercialreactor power plants. These data were reported by licensees for plant operations during 1993.This information supplements earlier annual reports issued by the former Atomic EnergyCommission and Nuclear Regulatory Commission.'1.2 ScpcReleases of radioactive materials are governed by 10 CFR Part 20 and 50 and by limitsestablished in the Technical Specificatioris for each facility. The requirement for reportingeffluent releases by nuclear power plant operators Is described in 10 CFR 50.36a. Through itsOffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission maintains aknowledge of radioactive releases from licensed nuclear reactors to ensure that they are withinregulatory requirements. This report summarizes data from the licensed nuclear power plantsthat were declared by the utilities to be in commercial operation as of December 31. 1993.Data are included for several licensed facilities which are permanently or indefinitely shutdown (Browns Ferry I & 3. Brunswick 1. Dresden 1, Fort St. Vrain. Humboldt Bay. IndianPoint 1. LaCrosse, Rancho Seco 1. San Onofre 1. Three Mile Island 2. Trojan 1. Yankee Rowe 1)and Shoreham which was never in commercial operation.1.3 Soure ofDaThe information included in this report was obtained from data reported by thelicensees. Individual licensee reports are available in the NRC Public Document Room. GelmanBuilding. 2120 L Street, Washington. D.C. 20555 and in local Public Document Rooms locatednear each licensed facility. Licensee reports varied in the format and extent of informationprovided.Data from prior years used in the comparison tables were obtained from the previousannual summaries.2.0 Tabulated 2Data2.1 Airborne and Liquid EffluentsTables I through 4 list for each reactor, the measured quantities of total noble gasesand of 1- 131 and particulates (with half lives greater than 8 days) released in effluents to theatmosphere during each of the years 1974 through 1993. Tables 5 and 6 list the totalmeasured quantities of tritium released In liquid effluents in each of the years. Tables 7 and 8list the mixed fission and activation products not including noble gases. tritium and alphareleased in liquid effluents in each of the years.Previous reports In this series are listed on page ii and iil. ?3k" 6f Illm1--- r zP BT --Pr--I.IOTA I71479 107 -IArt=-.za C-29 IAzrnsas One 28s2averI1I 1=2BZ2wcd IBraidI'ood3yroz I=Cala 1.6=Iwba IC=+/-W= 2com mncbc Pmk I.Doi6a d- 66kI 1=ay-12l Rrr-' 313zISBe~se IDabloCý I=2Josph &L Fsxley IJoseph U. Faricy2Fcn Ca~hourt I.lzmaitn Pamz M*2MCGIat Imlfsumt 3North Aza M*2Ocmmee M& 3P21 Veide IPalo Vere 2Palo Vere'Prmeaglazid 1&2Rab 5= I* H. a. pzblwsz2SI2SanODuf IS=~ Onafr 2-3Scqiaoyuh 18a* South TC=$St. LudIg I5L Uscý2Sury iaThx= MIle 1-1-4 21man.51 4.S0EvP02 2.IZZ. -, 2^40SE+2 2.SAE-=2 1.=-*C2 2.12E.02 4.42Z.O2!- 7E,01 2J89E*O- 2.44E.,211.60S.CO 1.OE#02 3.49Ee02- 9.597--6 3ME8Z.1 1.4O-A.2.W6*(= ^-74E-= -5.7SE.M 4.96-&+,= S14ECr- 4.9 IE.G2' 1.OOE.O35.64E+01 I a2E4O 2.8GE*4I 6.24E.02 1=+0 -.7=4r S. IIMýLW.06.21 1.54E.O 1.X.O2 1.9SW.O 2.71K.1*9SE5*O2 2.SOS=- 2.M..0 1.9~O -242. CS,+ 1.72-"4E-0O3 5XE( 4ASZ.3 .6.67E+03 3-94Z,03 34W.- 3M+ 5.29E.W4.79E-01 7.94E+01 3.i2E*- -3..71E.a2 %..1=-4= .7E. 2.7SE.2 '2.41t.(Sha.w Wit Other Un2 12.3G 1. 1S44 4-T7E-kr 'G.42E-.n9.24E+0O1 2.77E02 '. AM+02 2-5+2 2J46LF-2.3.0 2JE2.19E-02 1.r/E.0( 3.6-M.& LS3E*. 3.1=#E.(U 2. 18.ý 2. 16E'02ISM2~C6~.c2 1:09E.'02I.9E4.~ 2.38E.021.84E.~2 4.6OE.~433E.03 7.56~L23E..03 8.8S~'O21.~2r.o2 1.99E*02S.63z4o1.. 1.14E*~3-1E*C- 4.12ZEO23MSE.02.. 3.17E*=3.D8E-M0 34ME.Wn4.OSE.03' 3-0OE.W1.72E.- 343 01JSE.02 2.87540I.Sa05*02 1.499+0M1.495402S.105.*0 4.36E.O01 9.6.2E+00 5.585*018. A.0 8.5502 6-94E+02. 9-"E+=01.42S.02 4.54F-01 1.005-01 13504.495*02 N/D a 4555-04.D0E-02 2-%.96*03.815*4 4.005*03 =.39443 -.715403'551E*02 6.2:.0NIV N/D4.46E-= .7.247#M.2.M5*0 2-=+37.12r,+=7.625*0121.47E-02;N/R3.715*02i .M 5.715*02 1.615*05.7*2 3.545*02 1.26.0.2.3*2 1.795.-0 2.Sz*'M8.2*2 5.025*( 5-39E*02&.62E.(= 6.005*02 SAM0*=a.335*0 6.465*01 7.43E-011.885*2 9.515*01 2.405-024.935*0 7.22-40 2.O8E.0&.42E.(= 5.255*02 2.2.5.2.97502 5.4!E*02- 1.575*01&.92--.w 2-U.38*01=33401 2.42S*02 1.285*0 .28502 .75U2 323*2 .150-*~ ..1S5-0124 4.425+= 7.82C*0 4.08E+02 7.47E*02 3.575*W. .2.255.02 531FEO2 9.105*03.1.O.2 4.83E*C-2 1.99E+0 1.92*02 *1.5SE.0 349*1 25.+01 7.11E-00 3.9 15.03JzE401 7.851 6.105-04 S.- S- M.85N/ -ef/VD N/D3.050 315*2 1.59E*03 6.6M5*01 L24E*02 1.035*02 2.005*023.465*023.775401l3.75-cZ04.NID=24.345.0NIR- Not P;cgcNID Not D~acc3be Lup T- -* 2TY'7r1004 , 1101 .L2!a 1=3 L3 I= opIfI 122-1 100 C" iC0IAz1rlmrIM O= IAzrz1Saa One 2Bea VauI:y IlaBrackood IB3i-khdmid 2a~y= I aCakc~wor 1&Catzwta 2.C.7stmJ Rtavu3JascP.?. L Farley Ijcscp~i M.L Fancy 2Fan Calhours IP- F-GInm. -kddam f~ciIngliza Point M2Indbn Point 3MCGLUM INhfflstarie 3Northi AW.a I=Ocolies 12a 3pall aesP41 Ver~tde IPalO vcr aPalO Verde 3P= B~each laP:=sWuJad IanH. E b.bia 2Sal= ISal=i 2am Ord&- I22n Onofra 2-3South T'~s ISauri, To= 2.St. La.u ISt. Lucie 2sumw I7br-Nc M sie d 2Thr h1E islad3.09t*4=IMEO-02 2.O6!.(= 5.72E,<M2.B1Z.021.37Mý34.20E-021.402-1.07z.oa4.13E+023.56-.02.35E.CM4.SS-.<=&.66r.O31.14Z.O31.79E"0O2(.74+4014.28E-a25.02z.Oa1.67E-02.4. 12F-0144r- 4.4SE.M7.ZS!,. 7=#840I.18Z402 3.64SC.021.19.c2 3.644<1026 1.97F.03.Z.CSFE+01 2.44SE.0d.98E402 8SIE4327.14E.c2 e-37..02a..'"E # C &cSE.021.94F.02 2.22Ei'3.57E#(M 3.649.=2S8.03 3.17t.032.48E-=21632.2 Z*=oS.67Z*= 3.40E*022.ZOZ+02 2.&IE..0 2.67-.022.4.&E42 4.40E.02 5 "204-09E-02 8.312E-k 4.912..022.74E+02 5.UE*02 8.502.02.44-M20 5.582-02 6.50E.=2I.GIE.O3 IME2-03 9.9&,2.=8.932E42 S.M9.= .2208.242.-= 2.3EE+0 7M2E.013M.532-. 4.45E.4= 2.972-.023.=32-02 4AW.45. 2.97Ek021. md-021.I02.03 8.74E44= 2.582-03S.11E+02 3.44E.*0 5.10E.02.3.S0E-01 2.39E4=2 1..t72.024.23E.02 9=35*= 9.e882*0S.16E-02 6.992-02 7.352-.027.53E.02 8.082*02 &72-4.022.332-02 1.2820 1.74E*023.47-E02 3.92v2*4M =3.21-0.182.03 4.812-03 9.89E.CM4.852*023.432*02-3.4.32.021.432*033.23-0E+21.582*034.49E.CM3.262-01.0M-+034.71Z*0=3.53E.=21.772*03.762-.024.832-032.=.220&.45E.=2S.382*424.342i.03.892*424.39E-02432.s42a3.04E*02M/DN/flMiD7.37E*a25582*429.34"-11.38844=2.22E-0= 3Z12*02S.872-02 3.40E-=24.402*02.1.722*023.232*026.20r.+=S.282-033.732*02 2.94F,.= 3.512*021.84E-02 3ZO.30- 1.182*04.022*0 4.582*0 4.9221024.=+202 4.5824.0 4.9-"Z+021.662*02 -2202*01 2.56E;425.412*02 i.90E.021.489403 1 -%*C*03 83&.36-1.24E.03 1.342*03 2.49C-0=4.282*02 8.32+01 I.192*02RID' NHID H/DHID N/flHID4.392*2 '5.l602*05.732-02 3.512-023=.2202 Mi.=1-02.912-02 4.322-0&sm2-02 4.232c02S.292-2 4.232*022.59t-0= 3.562*02SAM72*= &97E-0=.1.94F,643 1.GE40037. 102.02 I.022.02.32-9 024 206201N/I3 WDX

• HIDlNiD HIDl&.44E9023.79E4=22.439.0M4.=4=+04.5=+025.282+07.74E4=2I. M#+03HID3.3w.;=2I-TTE-01~3.53025.=-(M0 4.S1E.022.98E-=2 3.08E.024252*02- 5.529;CM9.8-2 8.052.4m1.1*3 2.06E-4=1.7",E-03 8-6E.36-3.882*2 .13.0322.8&+2 4.132-028.112*02 5.042-cl4.232*2 8.0 32.023.B4E*02 549.89 M3.802*0 1.8 12.0I.222*0 1.03E.036.182-01 9.=.<a07.0*2 8.85E2*022.132-02 1.77E-0=8.632*02 COO.=009.012Z* 5.3r.4.50Z-=2 ".Ci-02.302*02 2.%5E#(=*2.17E2-02 2.722*024 Z 06. 3.882-024.332-0 3.882*021.CSS*82 3=.=3.03.962*02 5.162+029.232*02 6.932-09.98*M01 1.102,4A38.092*01l 2.102-*a*HID N10N/ln M/flN/fl H/fl4.162-02 4.642*024.722*02 4.BG2-02.42E401 7.44E.403.94E-02 8A.48-0*2.4=+*02 3A=32*02.5*2 5.0min03.002+01 45209.89E-02 9.7W,=02.I02-03 a&OSE+06.41E+02 a8.382*822.972-02M S.00*4011.34E-01 3.092*02331=40m 9.212+023.082*02 1.77E.023439"*1 2.38E*W4.=.,(= 4.7, SE+=1.35W,04 2.22E-03HIDl1.873+02 2.852*025.112*02.6.702*024.102*024.!532*027.09EA02 327E.02 3.59EC0=4.49E4=2 4.059*02 4.642*02I.83201 LAM=+0 7.292*02.i42*0 5i.382-02 3.642-03.792*02 6-%.+M* 6.09c-016.6UM0 3.882-02 1112*422.272-03 1.2-&=3 'S.822*08=.=0*0 643c-2 .02m3.53E402* -6.082*03.C3E4= 4.422E021.422*315209.272*01a 1.082*0I ..303 1.132.02 3.86_-02 S.oI4022.48.*=, 1.1922 2.02.IZ.<U 1.1 03 8.532+02 1.eEE203 1.44.-433.9*2 3.17E*-02 3.452-02 6.215*02 6.122-422302.,. 4.7,-oE. 4.6E=83, 7.42E*M2.7 M -WEMl2.75P.+M 4052.02 2.842-02 4.082*02= 4.002.4=2.782.,2 .3=E+02 2.7=2-C2 4.0-M2*02 2.84E.<2 4.062*02 4.0=02023.7=4M 73.62-. 7.-.52-2 .4.320 8.132*02 6.082*02&7"2*02 8.15E24 W 4.94E+02 1.11*-03 9.13,=-, 9.74E-141.97c'4= 3.7=+.=2 2.10-0E2 3-29,*2 5.612E+-1.00-3 1.48.-03 5.492-03 9.76Z406 8.30.-04 6.19E2.3 3.53-4,32.43E+02 1.732*0 3.7m.=0 3.122*02 2.192-02 I.s92*02 1.92-05.832*025.802*021.132*021.132*022.182-022.532*024.732.011332.032282*021332.02-Incuddwt Thm Wite W-An 2 totaM/D ; riot Dete:salbL Table 6UqLiqonct i~cmapmh By yewkinud 1tdo =4dAc6dyud PeudUca :(C=IiPressurize Water ReactorsEi=1ULia~ ~2Z5 i~Z5 iSflJ~za 122DI=8 12M2Arkaruias One IArkansaas One 2Ecavw--Valley 1 h2Braittwood IBradwood 2Byron IdaCalla.By* iCalven C Mf 182Ca~utawbCatawba 2Comoanche PeakeDonald C. Cook 1&2Crystal Rtver 3DWAS-BCSMe IDitablo Canyon 382Joseph btMazk7 IJoseph W MFLIey 2ran CalLihuriPL .Qlia%Haddam NeckHarm IUxtian Poin 182Indian PC= 3Ke"wneeMame YankeeMc~utre IMc~uit=2Millstone 2Millstone 3North Anna 182Oconee 12.8 3PalisadesPalo Verde IPalo Verde 2..Palo Varde 3Point beach M82Prairie 1.6mn 182Rancho Sec IH. B. Robinson 2Salem IStl1n 2San Onofre ISan Onobre 2-3Seabrook ISequayah 182South Tccas ISouth Tccas2St.Ltlc~cISt.Luc* 2Surrn ISurry 182ThrecMile Isand IThree M&l IWand 2TM1 2/Epicw7lqa I6.502E00 3.1)E-20 1.31E.01 4.50E00 " 6.05E00 3.09E200 3.42E00 7.SOE*00 5.80E*00 4.30E240*1.302*+00 4.M13200 2.5ý-5.90E.00 3.70E.001.70E-01' 6.52E-01 2.93E-01 1.21E-0I 1.04E-01 1.44E-01 1.472-01 6.09F,-02-1.44E+00 1.182*00 3.482.00 6.13E+00 7.802*00 4.53E400 2.68E+00 5.262.00 2.2 4Eý002.60E-01 '1.87E400 1.5=+W0 1.48E+00' 2.582*00 1.37200 1.862*00 1.90E+00 '6.83"10*1.54E-02 2.962-'02 4.162-01' 1.462.-01 1.29E-01 1.072-01 1.502.-012.60E-02 9.01E-02 4.28E-02 2.072.01.: 7.92E-01 2.19E-01 .0.5.39E-011.03E-01 5.866E-02" 6.182-02 1.31E-0l 5.9.4E-02.69E-02 ."290F2* 2.30200 -3.60E-01 5-502-01 3.63E-01 5.95E-01 2.452-03: 5.332-01' .1.75E-01 2.03E-01i.002-0) "4.20E-01 6.90E-01 6.47E-02, 6.07E-02 8.63E-02 1.96E-02 3.85E202 6.172-012.202+00 1.20E*00 1.30F-01 1.71E.00 9.50F,-01 8.67E-01 2.76E-01 7.12E-01 6.93E-024.20.00" 4.93E-,O < 4.98E400" .02,-0 1.99-00 1.942-*0'0 1.262400 5.67E+00 2.41E*00.ShownWt OtherUnit 1.03:00. '4'.02.01.: 2.90E*00 2.62E,00 5.46E-01" 4.00E-01" 7.20E-01 2.83E-00 1.26E"00 6.99".01 8.94,-01 6.17-.01 8.15'-01 1.522*00* .4.00E"00 3.21200 < 2.842E+00 4.42E-01 1.04E-01 4.63E-01 2.97E-01 .,4.36E-01 7.032-01-"' 3.94E-01 1.752*00, 2.oo0-02 2.60E-01 o ".620 2.79*00 4.872+:00 2.8 1 :+0 4.182*00 1.39,,01.- .' 2~.68E-01 -5.89E-4-I 1.0=4"00 6.76E-0 1.32I2*001.902*00 5.05E*00 7.932*00 3.62E*01" 6.512-CO' 9.242-ý01 1-",4E;00 I.7SE-k)0 1.04E*005.902*0 3.45E*00 4.402-01 9.292-i02 ..9.65E-02 1.28,-01 8.73E,203 3.316M,-02 I.27.-012.0o0-01 3.242400'" L.50,-00 6.86--01' 7 -" 0 .2.95E+00< 1.00E-01 4.50E-01'. 1.00E-01 " 320E2'- 4.94E2-03 9.002-k03 1.32E2-02 9.12M-03 2.232-03< 1.00E-0C2 ND : "/ " N/IL "f' " N/MD ' 3.78603" 5.922-01 2.16E-012.502E*0 4.5E0-01 3.502-01 3:29E,01-" 1.78E-01 "2.99201 '--3.5-01 -1.84E+00 1.20E.*01.0oo-02 2.6882 I 3.98+00 -- 2.852*00 2.502*00 '3.22E-00!'.3.89E-01" 1.51E.*00 3.21E-00S.002-0 1.2,2*00 '7.4300-" 9.842"00
• 118.*01 1.102*01 1:12E;01"' 3.42;00 2.15E*00-" ... ... " " " :" :6 -015.75E-o22.042-021.93E-01 *41.802-014.022*,005.44E-015.43E-011.992.-011.87E+007.8612*005.812*00'1.43F,007.48E-021.272*003.162-022.8-01"18.23E-012.972*002.85F*00N/R' il 2.78200 9.822*00 41.6112*00.5.80E*00 2..802*0:- 2.67*00 "2.3 ý-00" .3.072*01.24E-04-3.802+00 9.272*00 3.37E2.0) -6.55E-01 2A412*00 2536W0 3.85z*60 .,.6.112;00 6.682-001.30E*00 7.00.-02 1.00E201- 1.94EZ--' -6.242.01 4.910 f. 1.83i-01 -8.89-02'" 5.29E-W2'3.922-01f 3.31-.01i 1.4502ý"" 0 4.252-05NID NID N/fD2.7*.00" 4.19*00" 7.07T-OI 5.552-01 7.8-013 9.942-01 8..56-012.99,*004.37E-011.47..001.45E+018.12,E-029.032,-05N/D3. 10E-01NIR -Not PzpwredN/fl -Not Detectable Tahbl 8fL'qcd E~amaa Ccumatac By Yearmk .F-s aind Activoclem Prouct 10kPessumu Waer. ReactoaFpr-'Lg12ad 12108 -.35+/-5 +/-5.1=2 1001 I.=2 16"3Arkansaus One IArkansas. One 2Beavcr Valley IdaBrniwacol I-Brmjdwood 2Byron ma2Callaway ICalvert ClJft 1&2Ca~awva ICawt.a 2Comanche Peak IDonald C. Cock 1 &2Crystal R.,Me 3DavwBesse IDiablo Canyon 1&2Joseph M. Farley IJoseph bl. Faziey 2Fort Calhoun IR. E. Glnna'Haddam neckHari IIndian Point 2&2Indian Pcmt 3Kmwun~eMaine YankeeMcGuire I2Mlllstone 2Millsutexi 3North Anna 162Oconee 1.2A 3PalladesPalo Verde 1Palo Verde 2Palo Verde 3Point Beach 1M2Prate Island 1&2lRanco Sew Ii-K B. Robinso 2Salem I-Sal- 2San Onofre ISan Onafre 2-3Seabrook ISouth T"m ISouth Tms 2St Luce ISt. Lucie 2SuEMM ISurry 1&2Thres Mile IWand IThre Mile 2IM1 2/EpicarT2cjan4. 1 OE-WO 3.53E-MO 5.09E+00 2.45ECO02.48E.O0 4.36E.O0 3.43E.00 1.652.-CO2.03E-01 1.13E-01 1.19E-0l 6.69E-015.OO-021.63E-01 4.05E.-O 2.48E.001.07.-03 4.97E-03 3.83F.02 4.922-011.64E.-OO 2.3813C00 1.79E0-C 5. 292-CO01.26E-O 3.82E-01 6.53E-013.82E-01 6.53E-011.19E2400 2.26E-60 3.34E-01 2.OOE0O02.34E-01 2,51E2.0 8.12E-01 9.55E-011.89E-01 1.852-01 6.15E-02 6.51E-021.16E-02 3.20E0-C I.IIE 1 2.8613406.34E-02 6.72"-02 1.02E-01 5.09E-028.63E-02. 3.77-02 8.22-02 4.63E-022.91E+.-O 2.88E-0 1 8.37E-02 2.031-011.69M-01 5.222E-0 6.47E-02 5.8892B-2.63E-02 8.44E-02 3.101-01 4.262-029.08E.011.85E-00 3.61E.0C 6.02E20C1.26E.-.O 4.18E-01 1.95E-01 3.47E-011.35.-66 5.33E-01 1.291306O8.62E2-. 3.12E-02 2.99"-C1 8.81E-016.21E-01 7.73E-01 1.571.+-C1.51E*CO 6.21E-01 7.73E-01 1.57E20O3.55E,00 4.602.0 4.492.-CO 4.072.-CO3.022-+O0 5.40E+0C4.51E.-0O 5.072.C 9.41E-01 1.33.W001.58E+-CO 4.16E+00 3.02Z+00 3.68.-2 5.833E-02 1.408-Cl 9.23E-=2N/D N/D N/DM/D N/DN/D1.2213+0l 1.90E.OC 1.60E-Cl 7.55E-C11.91F-02 2.75E-02 6.01-01 6.04.-026.3313-01 7.39&-03 1.45E-03 5.78.-043.90E-01 9.41E-02 2.861"1C 7.36E-013.31E.00 2.88E*0 4.352.00 3.33202.75E+00 2.802.CO, 6.122,CO0 4.07E-02.74E-C 7.79E2C 8.51E-01 8.42E-011.30E.01 1.12EC01 8.2015-1 5.37E-C13.23E+0C 1.452.CO0 1.865-01 4.6613-011.93E+00 2.72E200 2.,3C+00 5.95E-011.93E2.C 2.75E-00 2.432.00 5.42E-C14,54-+00 7.09l-01 3.26E-01 4.88"-019.73E.-0 8.55E.C 5.17E.003.4115-02 6.302-03 1.41E-02 4.41Z-026.46E-"4 1.77E-04 1.87E-04 1.16E-04NID ---3.49E-01 4.653-01 2.64E-01 2.09-C014.46E-001.02E-018.57E-003.04E.-CO1.40E-CO2.64E,-,O5.42E-015.42E-014.44E-012.31E-011.682-012.00E-07.97E-028.53E-023.08E-013.432-026.87E-018.04.-022.84 E.-CO3.22E-015.012-Cl3.49E-012.57E240O2.572F-0O8.8994003.15ECO4.32E-013.109-CWO3.432-02N/DHIfDN/D9.581-022.55F,0-5.79E-039.64E-013.2113003.23£.007.11F,-011.16 ,04.48"1-C2.24"l-02.64E-012.59E-0C7.55E-Cl2.41E2-C4.582-021.12"-..2.01E-0112.04E.-00 2.132.CO02.652.-O0 2.52E-015.45,-01 2.552-C2.502CE*O 2.13E2CO2.52=.CO 2.13E2-O6.35E2-C 1.18E.-001.01E-02 3.86E-022.072.,CO 1.42E2C003.42E-01 9.782-013.422-01 9.78E-011.19F-028.06E-01 1.612.-CO2.36E-01 6.191-011.84E-C1 1.411-011.612-CO 2.80E2O01.12E20.0 3.59E.-C2.73E.CO0 1.85E-C003.14E-01 3.41E.20I.OIE22-C 5.232-011.012.-Cl 5.232016.70E-01 4.102E-C1.59E-02 4.54E-031.59E-MCO 1.44.-EO03.812-01 4.62,-013.81E-01 4.6513,-01.57E-01 3.99E-011.03E+,CO .1.12EC07.31.-027.34E-025.6213-018.12E-023.90E-022.42E-016.38E-015.921-012.832-Cl1.54E-MO1.06C.-015.942.-C1. 16 .M-3.82=-.WC3.752-03NIDN/DN/D5.58E-021.73"-12.15-.032.82E-013.112.-C3.58.-CO06.87E-019.192-C11.09E-043.542-011.17E-022.62-C012.53F,-011.3-,E4001.612-023.152,-047.47E-028.29E-028.05E-0111.50"-017.31E-013.09E-012.06E-Cl2.872-Cl2.00E.CO02.C002.-CO8.76E2CO2.47E.-0C6.752-C13.1 12.C7.75E-03.N/DN/DHID1.1E.-021.302-Cl2.082-043.603-013.00.-O03.14E.004.03E-012.02E-012.21E-031.22.-CO7.09,W005.722.-C7.68E-013.56E-012-16E-021.77E-041.80E-011.84E-018.471-012.14E-011.9013-012.08",,,.01.52E-0 17.432-016.621-011.302.-CO2.862-012.35E-0114.132-Cl1.04E2.01.042.-CO2.062Ct.2.991.CO03.202.-Cl2.402,4OO2.14-021. N/DH/PN/D5.89E-021.852-012.04E-042.362-012.3124004.22E-019.94E-021.22E-011.4E2.CO05.08E,.003.6124003.98E-013.092-C16.08E-012.84E+003.5E.0283ME-051.63E+.C1.102-017.44"-011.77E-011.77E-015.902-013.42E-011.73E-013.14F,-011.532.-CO2.13E-016.42E-022.512"Cl3.27F,-l3.272,012.14E-CC2.42E.-O4.98E-012.58E+-O3.882-03N/DN/DH/D4.29E-016.66E-C14.831-042.20E-013.27EC+003.632.C003.79E-011.032-011.19E-012.12.+001.74E.-C5.12E-015.12E-012.23E-018.27E-022.60E-021.22E-041.75F,.O03.962-02!4.77E-014.772-C I1.262.-CO4.01E-021.55E.-CO4.472-014.47E-014.18E-015.37E-015.30E-015.21E-029.85E-017.60E-021.122-015.19F-011.37E-018.36E-017.791-027.24E-011.072-011.203-l011.62"-012.,52-012.85E-011. ISE--002.2413-0O4.832-C14.702-C11.40E-02NIDH/DN/D2.32E-011.9513-013.921-045.47E-02.*3.21E2.-C3.65E,.-1.14E+-002.94E-019.181-02-1.52E+-CO5.73E-012.94E-017.55E-016.79E-011.93E-012.08E-028.822-027.68E-041.06E-011.61E-C1 1.44E-01 3.80E-02 8.95&-02Thi nurnberis a coazcs tonthat reportedinl the 1990rpe-included with Three Mile [-land 2 totalNID -Not Detectable

-hTable 2Abtorme =UEm C~medso BY YewrFlocki and Acttvadna Gomm Crota ComicsPrwsu-,=ed wate ReactorsEZ-AL.MA ..147q I=Z 12fl I QzA 1 i m I=~ 2AzrcansSOne IArlcmns*.I One 2Beaner Valley 16aBraiwod IBuigwwood 2Callaway ICalyr C.liff 3&2Catawba ICatawba. 2Ccnairhe Peak IDonald C- Cook 1 &2Davu-esase IDiablo Canyon M&2Joseph M. Farley IJoseph M. Faziey 2Fort Calhoun IR.E. GiniaHaddamn NeckHIarts I .Indian Point ma~Indian Point3Kewatince-Maine yanmeeMoccuac IMilsonea 2Milstone 3North Anna 1&2Oconee 12A 3PaIllsadciIPalo Vere 1Palo Verde 2Palo Vere3Point Beech'1&2Prairi Island m&Rancho Seca IH. B. Robinon 2Sa1kn 2San Ondr ISan Onofre 2-3Seabrook ISequoayh 1&2South Texas ISouthTexas 2St. I lISt. Lucie 2Swn-r ISurry 1&2Three Wie Island IThree Mile Is1-An 2M&1I2/f~pici1.96E.02 1.03E+035.69E.03 1.39E-04 7.5OE-03 8.51E.03 3.S0E.04 3.73E-03 2.10E*03 9.83L.024.53E+63 9.37E-03 4.35E+03 9.78P-+03 1.34Es.0I.07E.OO 4.73E.01 '3.90E.02 1.75E.03 0.64E.01 8.06E.O2 1.31E.02 I.95E.027.72E+03 9.40E-03 2.23E*04 2.76F.+04 1.02E.04 2.96E.03 2.1SE.03 B.OOE.03 9.75E+032.64E+00 9.75E+02 3.80E+03 ;4.SSEi.04 1.09E+04 3.76E+03 5.42Em0 3.88E.033.35E-03 .6.86E-03 7.25E*04 3.BSE.04 3.96E-04 6.85E.031.27E-03 -.2.l0C.O3 -I.68E+03 -c 3.35E+03 I.0IE+03 "S.3E0232SE+023.38E-03-'.3.53E+03 3.IS.-0*3 1.92-04 .2.21E-02 .3.81E-04 2.20E.04.2.60E.'O 3.54E*03 8.47E.023.OSE.02 4.29E+402 1.94E+03 3.81E.O3 .1.36E+03 7.06E+W 2.97E.C2 1=22E63 3.46E.02 8.79E-M7-57E.02 1.04E*04 5.52E.03 3.20E*03 9.72E+02 .7.62E. B.SIE*02. 5.46E*02 I.95E*O3 7.12P*M7.OOE.OO 4.80E.02 4.32E.0l '3.12E-63 2.14E.03 5.53E.O. 2.68E+03 1483E+03 7.54E+02 2.76E.038.20E+03 1.16Ee.04 I.G0E.04 1.41E04 -9.03E+03 9.38E+03 .9.13E+03 7.27E.03 9.58E+03-Shown wuit Other Unit .8.09E+02 .2.47E.402 1.1I1E.03 6.57E+03 2.58E.O3 5.60E.023.35E#03 2.45E.03 1.40E.03 -2.43E*03 4.44E.02 I.SEM.~ .1.22E-02 1.ISE.02 1.66E#= < =E+0~.26.36E.03 4.09E.03 1.30E+03 3.57E.O3 1.55E-03 2.9E.3-W 4.072.03 3.23E.0 1-53E.03 5.07E+611.58E-01t~.A 1.6SE-03, 1.60E.03I .60E.031.S72.03 2.28E.03 7.5.4E.02 3.59E.03 1.33E+03 2.24E*03 9.09E#03 9.06E4=31.51.0 E*I20 ..920 6.2aE.03 3.50E+.03 5.30E-03 4.3.4E.03 2=."2.01-4E( 15]-644.9-143.6E.04 ".3E0 4.792.04 1'.92E#04 1.63E.04 2.4 1E.04 2.40E.0.,c 1.OOE.00 2.61E+03 2-99E+01 5.99E+01 %23E.02 6.84E.01 1.40E+02- 3.00E+03 7.38203 3.OOE*.039.74E.03 .4.45E-04 i.9 12.03 I.13E+.03 5.16E.2 .9.682*0 6.41E.( .2 6i.I2.402 9.93P-.02 7.SSE-033.62E+02 2.17E.03 '.74E403 6.732.02 1.26E.03..6.972*02 2.60E.62 '4.65E+01 5.472.02 2.76E+021.18E+GiZ 'i.27E.2 '2.'002#03 --7.IOE.03 B.BIE03 1.58E#W .1372.03 1.48E+03 68a92.022.312.03 I.172. 6.40E. 2' .4.762.02 8.94E.02 -W2E0 .S8 ..2 5.132*02 I.75E-02 2.93E -M1 .00E-62 'IS62.0I 1.02E.01 '2.492*02 '7.82E+61 i.062*03 2.3.4E+02 1.252.02.1.12.3 .16*02- .~ *. .7742.0 6.092*02 1. 11 E-03 7.442.021.782*03 1..I4E*W **1.812.0 6.37E*02 1.052*03 :4'.17E.0= B.S1E.01. 1.06E4016.40E+00 7.432*033.01E#03 9.03E*03 5.74E+03 3.92F.4031.72E+03 2 .54E4" 2.93.4 1.54204 --12.30E*04 2.,3,.04--6.E6E,3 -8.04E+03 1.912.04 i.,,04' 4.36E.0 1.7 6.17+03 "JAM". 2.1 IE'04" 9.1 2 .' E. , "-2.76E#03 1.6 , "-i.s5,.o4 .... 4.64E-03o.-s5.81E-02 U.SATW&73E+00 9.97E+06 "4.72E+04 2.882E02 -489..0-'I64E-02 9.026F*M7.66E+0= .4.45.03 3.262,*0 9.472*02 410."I 02 1.2424.0 9.032EC22.16E.0.41.25.E03:.5.882,025.49.0 ","2.012.012.29E*02*Changes to the entries fcrrojan far 1976- 1967 reprwei+/- wryonswhich wuc upwm and xpp -Ine the TmjaJulyDecernba, 1990Mee~t and Waste Miposal Report. .,-ý tos tche crtrim for MaimeYankie far g M9718 eepaaatz aom" whidih wnmm"zeporined anid explaled hI thec Maine Yankeo etoteln . 'raM. 2Ahtme ===is C~oinazls By Tomr7iamdo aand Accvnam G0se (Total CoieslPressunied Wazer ReactcnArkansa.3 One IArkansa One 2Bcave- Valley I WB-dwood IBmud'mood 2Byron 1&2Ca.la-ay ICahmn ChUff 1&2Catawba ICatawba 2Comanche Peak IDonald C. Cook 1&2Rlvst3Dzaia-Bese IDiablo Canyorn 1WJoseph M. Farley IJoseph M. Farcly 2Fort Calhoun IRF .GinnaHaddama NeckHams IIndan Point 3Kewaunec-Maine YankeeMcGuire IMcGuire 2Mlstone 2Mfstone3North Anna 132Oconee 12A 3PalisadesPalo Verde IPalo Verde 2Palo Verde 3Feint Beach 1&2Prairie sand I32Pancho Seco IH. B. Robinson 2Salem ISal=m 2San Onofre ISan Onofr 2-3Seabrook Isaquoyah 332South Temes ISouth Teas 2St. Lucle 1SL Luc!e2 "Sumomcer ISurry Three MUe Island IThre MWe Island 2T1. 2/2pl;ewr12.14 12ORs .1255 !*a7 Ian3 12.Q3 .1253 1213. 122.90E-033.26E-031.1 6E.038.10E-03. 1.71E03 3.26E.028.91E.03 3.4E2-03 2.06E-023.92E0)1 7.57E204 2.25E-022.81E-011.24E2032.16E-039.41E-014.19E-013.82E-.016.89E2025.70E.031.56,.031.W62+032.33E+032.76E2031.57E,021. 17E2.035.07E+028.16Z+027.22E-023.282-033.15E,2+3.15.E022.79E+022.00E.02 1.67E.033.83E-03 3.98E-032.77E+026.36E.025.19E-037.65E-031.36E-031.36E.23i.30,'O032.902E034.55E.032.4 1E.032.41 E,033.I06.03 4.94E.03 3.29E-02 8.75E-02 2.58E202 1.15E+021.96E.03 3.05E+,03 2.76E-03 1.10E-03 3.41E.03 4.54E-035.02E-02 3.I8E-.02 5.09E-04 3.80E-02 1.092.O2 3.78E-025.86E-02 5.72ME=2 2.32E+03 7.14E,02 3.27E,02 3.35E,021.70E+03 1.28E-03 1.30E203 9.60E02 9.92E-013.99E-03 8.63E.02 1.94E+03 7.22E+02 5.92E+02 1.602,021.52E-03 1.48E.03 5.68E+ 4M.23E20 7.85E2.2 .642-022.96-402 "4.06E-42 2.099.M 1.77+02 5.17E0 I 5.3 13.027.52E-03 2.76E+03 2.339.03 3.5E,203 2.55E.03 1.71E+041.71E203 2.25E-03 1.15E-033.78E.03 1.88E+03 2.05E+03 4.688+03 2.27E+02 8.77E-011.88+E03 1.54E+03 !.93E-3 1.82E+03 3.102.,2 3.141302-4.04E.01 -4.97E.01 < 6.55E-01 -3.19E-01 c 2.91E+01 6.,521#011.54E-02 4.41E202 1.07E.3 8.34E20 9.19E#01 2.02E+012.28ME03 1.93E*03 1.05E*03 2.04C.03 1.95E#03 7.19E+022.28MEv3 1.93E203 1.05E+03 2.04E203 1.95E*03 7.19E2024.002.02 1,02.,02 3.97E202 6.34E-02 2.46E+022.39E*01 1.05E+02 8.44E.01 2.961-021.76E.04 8.0E5203 5.71E#03 1.OSE0+3 4.83E+02 1.448.032.282-4 2.35-204 2.43E.04 1.05E+04 2.59E.04 8.97E2032.84E.01 3.68E..3 1.73;-.02 1.75+*03 2.43E2.03 1.=2.022.67E+03 1.272+03 1.94E,03 6.41E2025.47E+03 197E+03 4.29E.022.52F.-02 1 16S+02 8.34E+029.30E+01 3.162*02 2.78E201 4.82E+01 8.08E+01 1.50IE017.58E.01 4.596,.01 3.03E-01 8.772-01 1.42E-01 1.732+03.83E-03 "*4,67.03 9.30E-01 2.16E-02 1.526M03 2.00Z4434.90E-01' 2.146+03 6.59E+02 7.701+02 1.04E+03 2.791.3011.95E,1 1.682,-03 1.39E203 3.64E-03 5.29EM02 1.39E4431.81-E03 1.159,03 8.56E202 1.06E+03 1.182+03 7.306+018.62E401 3.836-3 4.116-.02 9.812.0, 2.996-03 9.0Z.=4.00E+04 2.53E+04 8256-03 2.186-04 5.12E203 2.4&E+03N/D6.68E+03 4.576E-3 1.21E+00 NID 2.25E.02 3.85E+038.646-02 4.452,021. 1620,3.53E2(4 5.089-04 3.336=04 6.216-03 1.426-03 4.532-037.68E+03 9.559-03 9.982,,3 8.60E-03 9.16E.03 2.22.2031.642"01 1.402+02 1.39E201 &.346-02 3.32E+02 1.822+036.95E+03 2.079+03 1.99E2+3 3.082+02 3.66E+02 1.37E-023.82Z-01 1.082+0 3.80E403 7.89E+02 1.872+03 2.10E+032.07"+02 N/D 2.802-01 HID 4.401-01 NID3.99E-01 " "+. "8.98E+02 1.10E+03 9.42E+02 24-W-02 4.25F,02 5.94E+.027.00E-021.89E+028.17E2011.42E2+031.02Ev031.24E.039.02E+026.72E-025.33E-025.33E.029.06Em021.88+E027.31E.031.09E2035.63E-0L8.722+013.38E+014.59E(025.95E3021.462+035.96E2-02.23E+036.262+G22.31E.009.46E-225.18+E*025.18E2022.89E+032.1124.029.522+028.84E+031.21E-027.08E+02"6.76E2+01.20E+038.03E+002.202-017.20E+003.13E+021.49E+021.80E2031. 16E+031.072+*026.072,031.72EW021.09-.028.19C+025.34E-027.5113-024.5136026.662+02N/D.044.95E.021.59E-031.49E-025.24E+035.28E.031.04E-.21.36.-.022.57E-034.01O+024.01E+025.89E+038.10E+0011.41E+031.16E*034.62E+011.09E.023.56E423.5seO205.142+026.112+038.62E+021.41E+036.05E.011.81E+001.13E+034.49E+024.49E*023.89E+021.25E+022.24E+033.45E+036.26E+012.912+035.29E+=24.382+0222.00F.+013.60E+01NID2.26E+003.66E+021.92E+022.492.032.922*011.42F608.55E+014.672+012.05E+034.90E+024.34E+023.543+011.66,+028.93E+021.7CE-031.55E+027.71E+013.772E+024.03E+025.87E+034.28E*024.28E-021.76E.032.04E.027.867.023.62E+012.46E.006.822-022.68E+011.513E.025.41F-022.79E+001.36E.035.1252+032.15E+011.60-+004.01E+024.05E+026.362+021.13E.321.232+033.29E+037.462+012.222+032.01E+024.35E,015.06EO+t2.54E-016.932-027.59E+006.75r,+02.68E+024.12E+031.412a039.13E-012.07E+022.8924026.2"E-+023.30O2+06.59E6023.382+021.6 1E+0I5.73E+025.81E-052.02.072+02122311.79E,015.211+015.!62.+023.49E+021.222+028.082+022.14E2026.482-026.48E+021.92E+022.06E+033.482.+022.14E+002.61E2019.26E-001.40E+022.08E2033.49E-021.68E.034.172+013.67Z-014.50E+014.84E-(24.8424021.322+013.00E+0l6.58,-029.2913015.799-022.626-01.97E-021.0tE+013.68E-01N/D3.992E021.12E-033.42E-224.202.+021.54+03- .1.092-017.71E-4012.42E2011.79E#012.81E+028.62E.012.4313+024.15E2014.411-02.4E5.342+01*Chasnges to the cita-ea for Trojan for 1976- 1967 am re mm~ which wer r~eported an~d cepltatinan the Trojan .1uiy.Dccba 1990Ewmuct and Wastel" co-- Chan ta the muleS for Maine Yankee ior 1977- 1988 am = nan which we. reported and eqhitned in Main Yankee repoz ?lleiScmsartnua3 MUucat and Rcleas Reports or 770131'- 9'01231- Dcilmet Date 92/01/08.&I Included wu.h Three Mae sland 2 tomlNID -Not Detectable EXHIBIT 2 BATTACHMENT 2NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLCPALISADES NUCLEAR PLANTRADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORTGASEOUS EFFLUENTS -SUMMATION OF RELEASESJanuary -December 20013 pages follow TABLE HP 10.5-2PALISADES PLANT RADIOACTIVEEFFLU~ENT REPORTGASEOUS EFFLUENTS -SUMMATION OF RELEASESJanuary 1. 2001 to December 31. 2001Est TotalA. FISSION AND ACTIVATION GASES Units 1st Qtr 2nd Qtr 3rd Qtr 4th Qtr Error %1. Total release Ci 3.01E+00 2.92E+00 2.21E-02 0.002. Average release rate for 5.6period uCi/sec 3.B8E-01 3.72E-01 2.78E-03 0.003. Percent of annual avg EC x 1.67E-04 1.84E-04 1.16E-06 0.00B. IODINES_1. Total Iodine

• Ci 5.52E-04 3.85E-04 5.69E-05 0.002. Average release rate for 10.3period pCi/sec 7.09E-05 4.90E-05 7.16E-06 0.003. Percent of annual avg EC 2 3.93E-65 3.52E-05 7.62E-06 0.00C. PARTICULATES1. Partlculates with half-life> 8 days C1 2.80E-06 2.36E-05 7.72E-06 7.09E-062. Average release rate for 18.0period pCi/sec 3.59E'07 3.01E-06 9.71E-07 8.92E-073. Percent of annual avg EC I 8.47E-06 1.92E-05 2.38E-05 2.12E-054. Gross alpha radioactivity Ci 5.17E-67 2.01E-06 3.72E-06 2.07E-060. TRITIUM1. Total Release Cl 4.81E+00 1.53E*01 5.27E+00 4.93E+002. Average release rate forperiod pCi/sec 6.18E-01 1.95E+00 6.63E-01 6.20E-013. Percent of annual avg EC 2 1.31E-03 4.15E-03 1.41E-03 1.32E-03E.1. Beta Airdose at SiteBoundary Due to Noble Gases(ODCM App A III.C) mrads 2.13E-04 2.14E-04 1.56E-06 0.002. PercentIimit 2.13E-03 2.14E-03 1.56E-05 0.003. Gamma Airdose at SiteBoundary Due to Noble Gases(OCM App A III.C) mrads 7.25E-05 7.82E-05 5.26E-07 0.004. Percent limit % 1.45E-03 1.56E-03 1.05E-05 0.00F.1. Maximum Organ Dose toPublic Based on CriticalReceptors (ODCM App AIII.D) mrem 5.64E-03 1.62E-02 5.47E-03 4.98E-032. Percent of limit % 7.52E-02 2.16E-01 7.29E-02 6.64E-02*NMOE: Data is reported for 1-131and 1-1332 only.

TABLE HP 10.5-2PALISADES PLANT RADIOACTIVEEFFLUENT REPORTGASEOUS-EFFLUENTSJanuary 1, 2001:to December 31. 20011. FISSION GASES Units 1st Qtr 2nd Qtr 3rd Qtr 4th QtrArgon-41 Ci 7.33E-04 <LLD <LLD <LLD.. Krypton-85 Ci <LLD <LLD -<LLD <LLDKrypton-85m Ci. <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLD.Krypton-87 Ci 2.31E-04 <LLD <LLD <LLDKrypton-88 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLDXenon-131m Ci 4.29E-03 6.11E-03 <LLD <LLDXenon-133 Ci 3.00E+0O 2.83E+00 2.21E-02 <LLDXenon-133m Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLDXenon-135 -Ci 2.-21E-03 8.53E-02 <LLD <LLDXenon-135m Ci 4.44E-03 9.41E-04 <LLD <LLDXenon-138 Ci -<LLD <LLD <LLD <LLDTotal for Period Ci 3.01E+00 2.92E+00 2.21E-02 <LLD2. IODINES -Iodine-131. -Ci -2.22E-04 2:28E-04 5.69E-05 <LLDIodine-132 Ci -<LLD 1.OOE-03 <LLD <LLDIodine-133 Ci --3.30E-04 1.57E-04 -<LLD <LLDIodine-134- Ci LD- <LLD- -<LD. <LD <LLDIodine-135 Ci <LLD': <LLD <LLD <LLDTotal for Period Ci 5.52E-04 1.39E-03 5.69E-05 <LLD TABLE HP 10.5-2PALISADES PLANT RADIOACTIVEEFFLUENT REPORT3. PARTICULATES* Units 1st Qtr 2nd Qtr 3rd Qtr 4th QtrChromium-51 Ci <LLD 1.BOE-06 <LLD <LLDCobalt-58 Ci <LLD 1.47E-05 <LLD <LLDIron-59 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLDCobalt-60 Ci <LLD 4.16E-07 <LLD 1.82E-06Zinc-65 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLDStrontium-89 Ci 9.75E-07 8.25E-07 9.95E-07 7.95E-07Strontium-90 Ci 4.80E-07 5.15E-07 4.95E-07 4.65E-07Niobium-95 Ci <LLD 3.92E-07 <LLD <LLDZirconium-95 Ci <LLD 5.57E-07 <LLD <LLDRuthenium-103 Ci <LLD 1.29E-07 <LLD <LLDCesium-137 Ci <LLD 7.92E-07 1.51E-06 <LLDCerium-144 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLDNet unidentified beta Ci 1.34E-06 3.51E-06 4.72E-06 4.01E-06Total 2.80E-06 2.36E-05 7.72E-06 7.09E-06*Particulates with half-lives > 8 days. EXHIBIT 2 CATTACHMENT 3NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLCPALISADES NUCLEAR PLANTRADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORT'.LIQUID EFFLUENTS -SUMMATION OF RELEASESJanuary -December 20012 pig-es follow ' TABLE HP 10.5-3PALISADES PLANT RADIOACTIVEEFFLUENT REPORTLIQUID EFFLUENTS -SUMMATION OF ALL RELEASESJanuary 1. 2001 to December 31. 2001A. FISSION AND ACTIVATION Est TotalPRODUCTS Units 1st Qt'r 2nd Qtr 3rd Qtr 4th Qtr Error %1. Total release (notincluding tritium, gases.alpha) Ci 2.81E-06 2.45E-04 0.000 3.68E-052. Average release rate for 26.0period iCilmi 7.35E-14 9.68E-12 NIA 3.79E-123. Percent of EC % 1.29E-05 6.02E-04 N/A 3.91E-04B.'TRITIUM1. Total Release Ci 2.73E+01 9.87E+01 6.80E-03 3.70E+012. Average dilutedconcentration during period PCi/m1 7.15E-07 3.90E-06 6.36E-10 3.82E-06 4.013. Percent of EC % 7.15E-02 3.90E-01 6.36E-05 3.82E-01C. DISSOLVED AND ENTRAINEDGASES1. Total Release Ci 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0002..Average dilutedconcentration during period .pCI/me N/A N/A NIA N/A N/A3. Percent of EC %. NIA N/A N/A N/AD.GROSS ALPHA RADIOACTIVITY(Total Release)C17.45E-082.13E-060.0001.65E-07E. VOLUME OF WASTE RELEASED(Prior to Dilution) Liters 1.02E+05 3.78E+05 0.000 1.70E+05F. VOLUME OF DILUTION WATERUSED DURING PERIOD Liters 3.82E+10 2.53E+10 1.07E+10 9.68E+09G. MAXIMUM DOSE COMMITMENT -WHOLEBODY mrem 3.B8E-05 2.55E-04 3.35E-08 3.89E-04Percent of 0004 App A III.Hlimit 2.54E-03 1.70E-02 2.23E-06 2.59E-02H. MAXIMUM DOSE COMMITMENT -ORGAN mrem 3.70E-05 2.15E-04 3.35E-08 4.80E-04Percent of COCH App.A III.Hlimit 7.40E-04 4.30E-03 6.70E-07 9.60E-03-I-TABLE -P 10.5-3PALISADES PLANT RADIOACTIVEEFFLUENT REPORTLIQUID EFFLUENTSJanuary 1. 2001 to December31. 20011. NUCLIDES RELEASED Units Ist Qtr 2nd Qtr 3rd Qtr 4th QtrManganese-54 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLDCobalt-58 Ci <LLD 2.23E-05 <LLD <LLDIron-59 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLDCobalt-60 Ci <LLD 3.44E-05 <LLD <LLDZirconium-95 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLDStrontium-89 Ci 3.57E-07 1.02E-06 <LLD 5.44E-07Strontium-90 Ci 2.45E-06 1.97E-06 <LLD 1.62E-06Silver-lOrm Ci <LLD 1.28E-04 <LLD <LLDIodine-131 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD .<LLDCesium-134 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLDCesium-137 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD 3.46E-05Niobium-95 Ci <LLD, <LLD <LLD <LLDSilver-110m Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLDAntimony-125 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLDNet unidentified beta Ci <LLD 5.72E-05 <LLD <LLDFission & ActivationProduct Total Ci 2.81E-06 2.45E-04 0.00 3.68E-05Tritium. Ci .2.73E+01 9.87E+01 6.80E-03 3.70E+01Grand Total Ci 2.73E+01 9.87E+01 6.80E-03 3.70E+01. EXHIBIT 2 D; -.:. -, AATTACHMENT 2Nuclear Management Company, LLCPalisades PlantDo'cket 50-255RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORTGASEOUS EFFLUENTS -SUMMATION OF RELEASESJanuary -Deceurmber 2002, f3 Pages Follow TABLE HP 10.5-2PALISADES PLANT RADIOACTIVEEFFLUENT REPORTGASEOUS EFFLUENTS -SUMMATION OF RELEASESJanuary 1, 2002 to December31, 2002Est TotalA. FISSION & ACTIVATION GASES Units 1st Qtr 2nd Qtr Yd Qtr 4"h QIr Error %1. TOTAL RELEASE Ci 5.01E-01 3.20E+00 1.65E+00 3.26E+012. Average release rate forPeriod uCilsec 6.44E-02 4.07E-01 2.08E-01 4.10E+00 8.413. Percent of annual ave EC % 2.90E-05 1.71E-04 8.49E-05 1.71E-03B. IODINES1. Total Iodine

• Ci 2.611E-04 4.55E-04 6.81E-04 1.20E-032. Average release rate forPeriod uCi/sec 3.35E-05 5.79E-05 8.57E-05 1.50E-04 9.883. Percent of annual ave EC % 1.60E-05 2.98E-05 4.31E-05 1.31E-04C. PARTICULATES1. Particulates with half-life >than 8 days Ci 1.94E-04 4.88E-06 2.82E-06 8.32E-072. Average release rate for 15.97Period uCilsec 2.50E-05 6.21E-07 3.55E-07 1.05E-073. Percent of annual ave EC % 6.OOE-05 2.22E-05 1.27E-05 3.75E-064. Gross Alpha radioactivity Ci 8.23E-07 1.75E-06 1.42E-06 7.17E-07D. TRITIUM1. Total release Ci 4.87E1+00 4.73E+00 4.7913+00 5.23E1+002. Average release rate forPeriod uCi/sec 6.26E-01 6.02E-01 6.03E-01 6.5813-013. Percent of annual ave EC % 1.33E-03 1.28E-03 1.28E-03 1.40E-03E. SITE BOUNDARY DOSE1. Beta Airdose at Site BoundaryDue to Noble Gases mrads 3.55E-05 2.321-04 1.38E-04 2.33E-032. (ODCM App A I3E.C)2. Percent limit % 3.55E-04 2.32E-03 1.38E-03 2.33E-023. Gamma Airdose at SiteBoundary Due to NobleGases (ODCM App A IT.C) mrads 1.22E-05 7.45E-05 3.17E-05 7.68E-044. Percent limit % 3.10E-04 1.49E-03 6.34E-04 1.54E-02F. ORGAN DOSE .... _,1. Maximum Organ Dose toPublic Based on Critical Receptors(ODCM App A IIJ.D) mrem 5.70E-03 5.36E-03 5.66E-03 1.94E-022. Percent limit % 7.60E-02 7.15E-02 7.55E-02 2.59E-01__L* NOTE: Data is reported for 1-131 and 1-133 only.

TABLE HP 10.5-2.PALISADES PLAN"T RADIOACTIVEEFFLUENT REPORTGASEOUS EFFLUENTSJanuary 1, 2002to December 31, 20021. FISSION GASES Units .Qtr 2"'Qtr 3"t Qtr 4L QtrArgon-41 Ci -<LLD <LLD <LLD 8.68E-04Krypton-85 Ci <LLD 9.20E-02 3.56E-01 3.93E-01Krypton-85m Ci <LLD : <LLD 9.85E-05 2.72E-04 -Xenon-131m , Ci <LLD. .1.27E-03: 6.54E-03 5.08E-03Xenon-133 Ci 4.97E 3.10E+00 1.28E+00 3.22E+01Xenon-135 Ci 1.46E-03, .2.19E-03. 2.55E-03 2.65E-03.Xenon-135m Ci 2.72E-03. 3.72E-03 4.65E-03 5.36E-03Total for Period Ci .5.01E-01 3.20E-+00 1.65E+00 3.26E+01.2. IODINES Units 1Vt Qtr

• 2nd Qtr 3rrd Qtr 4" Qt-Iodine-131 Ci 8.1 11-05 1.61E-04 2.32E-04 9.30E-04Iodine-132 Ci. :<LLD <LLD <LLD <LLD.Iodine-133 .Ci. -.80E-04 2.94E-04 4.49E-04 2.65E-04'Iodine-134 Ci <LLD <LL) <LLD <LL)Iodine-135 Ci <LUD <LLD <LLD <LLDTotal for Period Ci 2.61E-04 4.55E-04 6.81E-04 1.20E-03 I ItylTABLE HP 10.5-2PALISADES PLANT RADIOACTIVEEFFLUENT REPORTGASEOUS EFFLUENTSJanuary 1, 2002 to December 31,2002*PARTICULATES Units 1" Qtr 2nd Qtr 3rrd Qtr 4 QtrChromium-51 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLDCobalt-58 Ci 1.06E-04 <LLD <LLD <LLDCobalt-60 Ci 8.35E-05 <LLD <LLD .<LLDCobalt-57 Ci 6.53E-07 <LLD <LLD <LLDZinc-65 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLDStrontium-89 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLDStrontium-90 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLDCesium-134 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLDCesium-137 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLDNet unidentified beta Ci 2.45E-06 4.88E-06 2.82E-06 8.32E-07Total for Period Ci 1.94E-04 4.88E-06 2.82E-06 8.32E-07* Particulates with half-lives > 8 days EXHIBIT 2 EATTACHMENT 3Nuclear Management Company, LLCPalisades PlantDocket 50-255.RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORTLIQUID EFFLUENTS -SUMMATION OF RELEASESJanuary -December 20022 Pages Follow TABLE HP 10.5-3PALISADES PLANT RADIOACTIVEEFFLUENT REPORTLIQUID EFFLUENTS -SUMMATION OF RELEASESJanuary 1, 2002 to December 31, 2002X. FISSION & ACTIVATION Est TotalPRODUCrS Units Ist Qtr 2ýd Qtr 4th Qtr Error %1. Total release (not includingtritium, gases, alpha) Ci 9.59E-05 0.000 1.83E-04 7.48E-072. Average release rate forPeriod uCi/ml 2.45E-12 N/A 4.93E-12 1.89E-14 17.313. Percent of EC % 3.13E-04 N/A 2.90E-04 3.78E-06B. TRITIUM1. Total Release Ci 4.17E+01 4.09E-02 4.90E+l01 7.27E+O02. Average diluted concentrationduring period uCi/ml 1.06E-06 1.03E-09 1.32E-06 1.84E-06 4.013. Percent of EC % 1.06E-01 1.03E-04 1.32E-01 1.84E-01C.-DISSOLVED & ENTRAINEDCASES1. Total Release Ci 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 N/A2. Average diluted concentrationduring period uCi/mI N/A N/A N/A NIA3. Percent of EC % N/A N/A N/A N/AD. GROSS ALPHA RADIOACTIVITY(Total Relcase) Ci 3.09E-08 0.000 2.74E-06 3.74E-07I. VOLUME OF WASTE RELEASED(Prior to Dillution) Liters 1.93E+05 0.000 2.10E+05 2.20E+05F. VOLUME OF DILLUTMONNWATERUSED DURING PERIOD Liters 3.92E+10 3.97E+10 3.71E+10 3.95E+10G. MAXIMUM DOSECOMMIT'TMENT-WHOLE BODY mrem 8.47E-05 5.36E-08 1.73E-04 9.72E-05Percent of ODCM App A Ill. H limit % 5.651-03 3.57E-06 1.151-02 6.482-03H. MAXIMUM DOSECOMMITMENT -ORGAN mrem 1.13E-04 5.36E-08 2.55E-04 9.69E-05Percent of ODCM App A IIr. H limit % 2.26E-03 1.07E-06 5.10E-03 1.94E-03 TABLE HP 10.5-3PALISADES PLANT RADIOACTIVEEFFLUENT REPORTLIQUID EFFLUENTSJanuary 1, 2002 to December 31, 2002NUCLIDES RELEASED Units I$I Qtr 2nd Qtr 3rd Qzr 4h QtrManganese-54 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLDCobalt-58 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLDCobalt-60 Ci 4.15E-05 <LLD 1.12E-04 <LLDZirconium-95 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD ýLLDSilver-] 10m Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLDStrontium-89 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLDStrontium-90 Ci 6.95E-07 <LLD 7.35E-07 7.48E-07Cesium-134 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLDCesium-137 Ci <LLD <LLD 6.87E-05 <LLDIodine-131 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLDAntimony-125 Ci .<LLD <LLD <LLD <LLDNet unidentified beta Ci 5.37E-05 <LLD <LLD <LLDFission & ActivationProducts Total Ci 9.59E-05 0.00 1.83E-04 7A8E-07Tritium Ci 4.17E+01 4.09E-02 4.90E+01 7.27E+01Grand Total Ci 4.17E+01 4.09E-02 4.90E+01 "7.27E+01 EXHIBIT2FATTACHMENT 2RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORTGASEOUS EFFLUENTS -'SUMMATION OF RELEASESJANUARY -DECEMBER 2003..p., .-* * *1*3 Pages Follow TABLE HP 10.5-2PALISADES PLANT RADIOACTIVEEFFLUENT REPORTGASEOUS EFFLUENTS -SUMMATION OF RELEASESJanuary 1, 2003 to December 31, 2003Est TotalA. FISSION & ACTIVATION Units S1" Qtr 2fd Qtr 3' Qtr 4"' Qtr Error %GASES1. Total Release Ci 6.07E+01 3.05E+00 4.96E-01 7.42E-012. Average release rate forPeriod uCi/sec 7.81E+00 3.88E-01 6.23E-02 9.33E-02 5.573. Percent of annual ave EC % 3.27E-03 1.48E-04 2.82E-05 4.15E-05B. IODINES1. Total Iodine
• Ci 1.86E-03 8.78E-04 4.00E-04 3.53E-042. Average release rate forPeriod uCi/sec 2.39E-04 1.121-04 5.04E-05 4.44E-05 8.463. Percent of annual ave EC % 2.15E-04 1.02E-04 2.181-05 1.90E-05_C. PARTICULATES1. Particulates with half-life >than 8 days Ci 8.28E-04 1.32E-04 1.42E-06 4.38E-072. Average release rate for 7.89Period uCilsec 1.06E-04 1.68E-05 1.79E-07 5.51E-08 I _I3. Percent ofannual ave EC5.28E-052.03E-056.34E-061.97E-064. Gross ALPHA Radioactivity Ci 4.20E-07 6.16E-07 5.86E-07 4.56E-07D. TRITIUM1. Total release Ci 5.39E+00 6.43E+00 5.25E+00 5.16E+002. Average release rate forPeriod .uCi/sec 6.93E-01 8.182-01 6.602-01 6.49E-013. Percent of annual ave EC % 1.47E-03 1.74E-03 1.40E-03 1.38E-03E. SITE BOUNDARY DOSEI. Beta Airdose at SiteBoundary Due to Noble mrads 4.36E-03 2.642-04 3.78E-05 5.32E-05Gases (ODCM App A IIC)2. Percent limit % 4.36E-02 2.64E-03 3.78E-04 5.32E-043. Gamma Airdose at SiteBoundary Due to NobleGases (ODCM App A Ill.C) mrads 1.44E-03 5.41E-05 1.12E-05 1.78E-054. Percent limit % 2.88E-02 1.08E-03 2.24E-04 3.56E-04F. ORGAN DOSE1. Maximum Organ Dose toPublic Based on CriticalReceptors (ODCM App A mrem 3.09E-02 1.55E-02 5.66E-03 5.52E-031Il.D)2. Percent limit % 4.12E-01 2.07E-01 7.55E-02 7.36E-02* NOTE: Data is reported for 1-131 and 1-133 only.

TABLE HP 10.5-2PALISADES PLANT RADIOACTIVEEFFLUENT REPORTGASEOUS EFFLUENTSJanuary 1, 2003 to December 31, 20031. FISSION GASES Units 1 Qtr' 2nd Qtr 3td Qtr 4" QtrKrypton-85 Ci 8.33E-01 7.75E-01 4.34E-02 1.26E-02Krypton-87 Ci !<LLD <LLD 2.50E-04 <LLDKrypton-E8 ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLDXenon-131m Ci 1.14E-02 9.13E-02 <LLD <LLDXenon.133 Ci 5.98E+01 2.18E+00 4.47E-01 7.24E-01Xenon-133m Ci <LLD 5.84E-04 <LLD <LLDXenon-135 Ci 9.55E-02 1.81E-03 1.54E-03 1.65E-03Xenon-135m Ci 2.94E-03 2.24E-03 3.32E-03 3.63E-03Xenon-138 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLDTotal for Period Ci 6.07E+OI 3.05E+00 4.96E-01 7.42E-012. IODINES Units l"Qlr- 2"d Qir:-i 3Y-Qzr 4* 4QrIodine-131 Ci " .51E.03 7.23E-04 1.03E-04 8.95E-05Iodine-132 Ci '- 1.06E-05 1.34E-04 <LLD <LLDIodine-133 Ci 3.46E-04 1.55E-04 2.97E-04 2.63E-04Iodine-135 Ci 4.65E-06 <LLD <LLD <LLDTotal for Period 1Ci 1.87E-03 1.01E-03 4.00E-04 3.53E-04 TABLE HP 10.5-2PALISADES PLANT RADIOACTIVEEFFLUENT REPORTGASEOUS EFFLUENTSJanuary 1, 2003 to December 31, 20033. PARTICULATES* Units Is Qtr 2Vd Qtr 3"d Qtr 4'h QtrChromium-5I Ci 2.86E-04 <LLD <LLD <LLDManganese-54 Ci 1.88E-05 <LLD <LLD <LLDCobalt-58 Ci 3.62E-04 1.17E-04 <LLD <LLDCobalt-60 Ci 4.14E-05 9.38E-06 <LLD <LLDNiobium-95 Ci 5.47E-05 1.80E-06 <LLD <LLDRuthenium-103 Ci 8.88E-06 <LLD <LLD <LLDStrontium-89 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLDStrontium-90 Ci <LLD 2.40E-07 6.70E-07 3.75E-07Ccsium-134 Ci 8.49E-08 <LLD <LLD <LLDCcsium-137 Ci 9.57E-07 <LLD <LLD <LLDZirconium-95 Ci 5.17E-05 1.1 IE-06 <LLD <LLDCobalt-57 Ci <LLD 1.46E-07 <LLD <LLDNet unidentified beta Ci 3.33E-06 2.42E-06 7.50E-07 6.30E-08Total for Period Ci 8.28E-04 1.32E-04 1.42E-06 4.38E-07* Particulates with half-lives > 8 days EXHIBIT 2 GATTACHMENT 3RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORTLIQUID EFFLUENTS -SUMMATION OF RELEASESJANUARY- DECEMBER 20032 Pages Follow TABLE HP 10.5-3PALISADES PLANT RADIOACTIVEEFFLUENT REPORTLIQUID EFFLUENTS -SUMMATION OF RELEASESJanuary 1, 2003 to December 31,2003A. FISSION & ACTIVATION Est TotalPRODUCTS Units 1s Qtr 2nd Qtr 3 d Qtr 4th Qtr Error%1. Total release (not includingtritium, gases, alpha) Ci 2.09E-04 5.40E-04 0.000 1.45E-032. Average release rate forPeriod uCi/ml 8.25E-12 1.60E-11 N/A 3.75E-11 14.163. Percent of EC % 7.37E-04 8.89E-04 NIA" 2.42E-03B. TRITIUM .._*1. Total Release Ci 5.87E+01 9.21E+01 5.57E-02 4.67E+012. Average diluted concentrationduring period uCi/ml 2.32E-06 2.72E-06 1.39E-09 1.21E-063. Percent of EC

• _% 2.32E-01 2.72E-01 1.39E-04 1.21E-01 .4.01C. DISSOLVED & ENTRAINEDGASES1. Total Release Ci 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0002. Average diluted concentration " .N/Aduring period -uCi/l N/A N/A /A N/A3. Percent of ECN/AN/A"N/AN/AD. GROSS ALPHA RADIOACTIVITY(Total Release) Ci <LLD 8.30E-07 0.000 <LLDE. VOLUME OF WASTE RELEASED(Prior to Dillutian) Liters 1.79E+05 -3.49E+05 0.000 1.79E+05F. VOLUME OF DILLUTION VATERUSED DURING PERIOD Liters 2.53E+10 3.38E+10 4.01E+10 3.86E+10G. MAXIMUM DOSECOMMrITrMENT-.WHOLE BODY mrem 2.49E-04 3.92E-04 7.3 1E-08 6.49E-04Percent or ODCM App A 111. H limit % 1.66E-02' 2.61E-02 4.87E-06 4.33E-02H. MAXIMUM DOSECOMMITMENT-ORGAN mrem 3.05-04 5.02E-04 7.31E-0S 1.04E-03Percent of ODCM App A 111. H limit _ 6.1 0E-03 I -00E-02 .I46E-06 2.08E-02 TABLE HP 10.5-3PALISADES PLANT RADIOACTIVEEFFLUENT REPORTLIQUID EFFLUENTSJanuary 1, 2003 to December 31, 2003NUCLIDES RELEASED Units lst.Qtr 2nd Qtr .3r Qtr 4"h QtrManganese-54 Ci <LLD 2.35E-05 <LLD <LLDCobalt-58 Ci <LLD 1.20E-04 <LLD 3.31E-04Cobalt-60 Ci 1.16E-04 1.03E-04 <LLD 6.38E-04Zirconium-95 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLDSilver-11Oin Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLDStrontium-89 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLDStrontium-90 Ci 2.86E-06 I.03E-05 <LLD 2.86E-05Cesium- 134 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD 7.5 1 E-05Cesium-137 Ci 3.76E-05 1.37E-04 <LLD 1.84E-04Iodine-131 Ci <LLD <LLD <LLD <LLDAntimony-125 Ci <LLD 9.76E-05 <LLD <LLDNet unidentified beta Ci 5.22E-05 4.91 E-05 <LLD 1.91E-04Fission & ActivationProducts Total Ci 2.09E-04 5.40E-04 0.0 1.45E-03Tritium Ci 5.87E+01 9.21E+01 5.57E-02 4.67E+01Grand Total Ci 5.87E+01 9.21E+01 5.57E-02 4.67E+01 EXHIBIT 2 Hinventory ofadionuclides forthe Great LakesNuclearTaskForceInternationalj ointCommissionDecember 1997International Joint CommissionUnited States and Canada United States Government Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)10 CFR 835 (1995) Occupational Radiation Protection .40 CFR 51 (1993) Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of inplementationPlans, as amendedUNSCEAR (1977)Sources, Effects and Risks of Radioactivity; Report to the UN General Assembly with Appendices;United Nations, New York.UNSCEAR (1982)Sources, Effects and Risks of Ionizing Radiation; Report to the UN General Assembly withAppendices; United Nations, New York..UNSCEAR (1983)Sources, Effects and Risks of Ionizing Radiation; Report to the UN General Assembly withAppendices; United Nations, New York.UNSCEAR (1993)Sources, Effects and Risks of Ionizing Radiation; Report to the UN General Assembly with .IAppendices.; United Nations, New York.Wahlgren, M.A., Robbins, J.A., and Edgington, D.N. (1980)Plutonium in the Great Lakes. In: Transuranic Elements in the Environment, W.C. Hanson (ed.);United States Department of Energy, Washington, D.C. pp. 659-683.Yan, N.D., Mackie, G.L., and Boomer, D. (1989)Chemical and biological effects correlates of metal levels in crustacean zooplankton from CanadianShield Lakes: a multivariate analysis; Sci. Total Environ. 87/88: 419-458.

This generic letter supplement only requires information from the addressees under theprovisions of Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and 10 CFR50.54(0. Therefore, the staff has not performed a backfit analysis. The informationrequired will enable the NRC staff to determine whether licensees are complying with therequirements of10 CFR 50.60, 10 CFR 50.61, Appendices G and H to 10 CFR Part 50 and any associatedlicense conditions, and licensee commitments related to GL 88-1 Vand GL 92-01,Revision 1. The staff is not establishing a new position for such compliance in thisgeneric letter supplement. Therefore, this generic letter supplement does not constitute abackfit and no documented evaluation or backfit analysis need be prepared.Federal Register NotificationA notice of opportunity for public comment was not published in the Federal Registerbecause the NRC needs to receive the responses to the generic letter in an expeditiousmanner. However, comments on the technical issue(s) addressed by this generic lettermay be sent to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document ControlDesk, Washington, D.C. 20555.Papenrork Reduction Act StatementThe information collections contained in this request are covered by the Office ofManagement and Budget clearance number 3150-0011, which expires July 31, 1997. Thepublic reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 600hours per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing datasources, gathering and maintaining the data needs, and completing and reviewing thecollection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any otheraspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for.reducing this burden, tothe Information and Records Management Branch (T-6 F33), U.S. Nuclear.RegulatoryCommission, Washington, D.C., 20555-0001, and to the Desk Officer, Office ofInformation and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-1 0202, (3150-0011), Office of Managementand Budget, Washington, D.C. 20503.Compliance with the following request for information is voluntary..The informationwould assist the NRC in evaluating the cost of-complying with this GL supplement.(1) the licensee staff time and costs to perform requested record reviews and developingplans for inspections;(2) the licensee staff time and costs to prepare the requested reports and documentation;(3) the additional short-term costs incurred as a result of the inspection findings such asthe cost of the corrective actions or the costs of down time; and(4) an estimate.of the additional long-term costs that will be incurred as a result ofimplementing commitments such as the estimated costs of conducting future inspectionsand repairs.If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical contacts listed JIM-relevant data;(3) a detenrnination of the need for use of the ratio procedure in accordance with theestablished Position 2.1 of Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, for those licensees that usesurveillance data to provide a basis for the RPV integrity evaluation; and(4) a written report providing any newly acquired data as specified above and (1) theresults of any necessary revisions to the evaluation of RPV integrity in accordance withthe requirements of 10 CFR 50.60, 10 CFR 50.61, Appendices G and H to 10 CFR Part50, and any potential impact on the LTOP or P-T limits in the technical specifications or(2) a certification that previously submitted evaluations remain valid. Revised evaluationsand certifications should include consideration of Position 2.1 of Regulatory Guide 1.99,Revision 2, as applicable, and any new data.Required ResponseAll addressees are required to submit the following written responses providing theinformation described above:(1) within 90 days from the date of this generic letter, a written response to part (1) of theinformation requirement specified above; and(2) within 6 months from the date of this generic letter, a written response to parts (2),(3), and (4) of the information requirement above.Address the required written reports to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001, under oath or affirmation underthe provisions of Section 182a, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and 10 CFR50.54(f). In addition, submit a copy to the appropriate regional administrator.The NRC recognizes the potential difficulties (number and types of sources, age ofrecords, proprietary data, etc.) that licensees may encounter while ascertaining whetherthey have all of the data pertinent to the evaluation of their RPVs. For this reason, 90days is allowed for the initial response.The information obtained from the licensees as a result of Revision I to GL 92-01 hasbeen entered into a computerized reactor vessel integrity database (RVID), which will bemade publicly available in the third quarter of 1995. The NRC intends to hold a publicmeeting on this GL supplement within 30 days of its issuance and a public workshop onRPV integrity, addressing the RVID and other RPV integrity issues, in the third quarterof 1995.Related Generic Communications(1) NRC Generic Letter 92-01, Revision 1, "Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity," March6, 1992.(2) NRC Generic Letter 88-11, "NRC Position on Radiation Embrittlement of ReactorVessel Materials and Its Impact on Plant Operations," July 12, 1988.Backfit Discussion NRC Staff Generic Evaluation of RPV Structural Integrity Data for PTS EventsThe staff is assessing the generic implications of chemical composition variability withregard to the current methodology for ensuring protection against PTS events for PWRs.The staff considers that the larger variability observed in recent reviews could beapplicable to other reactor vessels and may, therefore, reduce the margins of safety.provided by the PTS screening criteria. The staff will evaluate this concern as part of itsreview of plant-specific evaluations and longer-term reassessment of the PTS rule.To provide assurance that all PWRs will maintain adequate protection against PTS eventswhile the PTS rule is being reassessed, the staff has assessed all of the PWR RPVs usinggeneric values of chemistry and increased margin terms to account for potentially largerchemical composition variability. It should be noted that such analyses are consideredconservative evaluations, that were performed to determine .whether an immediate safetyconcern exists for this issue and whether there is adequate time to perform a morerigorous assessment of the issue. As stated in the previous section, based upon currentlyavailable information, the staff believes that the Palisades vessel will exceed the PTSscreening criteria before any other PWR. However, because of the importance of RPV.integrity and the potential impact of additional, unreviewed data on RPV evaluations, thestaff believes that this issue needs to be resolved on an expedited basis.Consideration of All Data Relevant to Reactor Pressure Vessel IntegrityAs described previously, another result of recent reviews was that the staff becameconcerned that licensees might not necessarily have all of the data pertinent to theevaluation of the structural integrity of their RPVs. This is particularly true where theRPV fabricator holds, or has held, the'applicable data to be proprietary in nature. Suchdata include, but are not limited to: chemical composition, heat treatment, plate andforging manufalcturing process records, RPV fabrication records, all mechanical propertydata (tensile, impact, fracture toughness), and surveillance data. Sources of data thatlicensees should reexamine include material test reports from the steel producer, weldwire manufacturer, RPV fabricator, independent testing laboratories and nuclear steamsupply system (NSSS) vendor. Licensees are encouraged to work closely with theirrespective vessel owners groups and NSSS vendor groups to ensure that all sources ofinformation pertinent to the analysis of the structuial integrity of their RPVS have beenconsidered. The information submitted in response to th.is generic letter should beconsidered to be public information.Required Information.Addressees are required to provide the following information:(1) a description of those actions taken or planned to, locate all data relevant to thedetermination of RPV integrity, or an explanation of why the existing data base isconsidered complete as previously submitted; .(2) an assessment of any change in best-estimate chemistry based on consideration of all infornation on the two key aspects of RPV structural integrity of primary concern to theNRC: PTS and USE. With respect to USE, licensees of all plants were able todemonstrate compliance with the Appendix G requirements either through considerationof applicable data or through equivalent margins analyses. With regard to PTS, only twoplants (Beaver Valley I and Palisades) were projected to exceed the PTS screeningcriteria of 10 CFR 50.61 before the end of operating life (EOL). As stated previously,based on data and analyses submitted for GL 92-01, Revision 1, and other recent reviews(e.g, Ref. 2), the staff has determined that not all licensees were aware of all theinformation pertinent to the analysis of the structural integrity of their RPVs. In addition,recent reviews have indicated larger-than-expected variabilities in weld chemicalcomposition, which have, in turn, highlighted the extreme sensitivity of RPVembrittlement estimates to small changes in the chemical composition of beltlinematerials.Recent NRC Staff Evaluations of RPV Structural Integrity Data for PTS EventsThe staff issued a safety evaluation report to the licensee for Palisades on the variabilityof reactor vessel weld properties for the Palisades reactor vessel on April 12, 1995 [Ref.2]. The staff agreed with the licensee's best-estimate analysis of the chemical compositionof the reactor vessel welds and concluded that continued operation through Cycle 14 (late1999) was acceptable. As discussed previously, while performing the evaluation, the staffnoted larger variability in the chemical composition of the welds compared to thatassumed for the development of the PTS rule. The staff evaluated the implications of thislarger variability on the PTS rule generic margins for the Palisades vessel using the sameanalytic methods as those used in formulating the rule. The staff has reviewed the otherPWR vessels and, based upon currently available information, believes that the Palisadesvessel will reach the PTS screening criteria by late 1999, before any other PWR.On March 27 and 28, 1995, the staff reviewed the Asea Brown Boveri-CombustionEngineering proprietary RPV data-base. The most significant information reviewedconcerned the Kewaunee RPV. The particular concern was the impact of data generatedsubsequent to the response to GL 92-01, Revision 1, on the plant's PTS evaluation. Thestaff met with the licensee for Kewaunee (April 13, 1995) to discuss issues related toconsideration of all appropriate chemical composition data in addition to the applicablesurveillance program data. In that meeting, the licensee presented its plant-specificsurveillance program results and some new information related to the chemicalcomposition variability in the RPV welds. Based upon this information, the licenseebelieves that the Kewaunee vessel will not exceed the PTS screening criteria before EOL.The staff has not completed its review of the new information on the Kewaunee vessel.However, based on the new vessel specific surveillance data, chemical composition dataand the greater margin to the PTS screening criteria (300°F for the limiting Kewauneecircumferential weld compared to 270°F for the limiting Palisades axial weld), the staffbelieves that the Kewaunee vessel will not exceed the PTS screening criteria before thePalisades vessel. A key aspect of the Kewaunee review is the determination of the needfor use of the ratio procedure in accordance with the established Position 2.1 ofRegulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, by licensees using surveillance data. .2~ (7/74-~c~1'- 4cr./'~~ 511a ~'EXHIUBIT 3 A§ '('3/4A /fý I Vess .'(CiewmC r5/oe,6)AeJ .5fk7r # AILK?4ove'r t"~e- , 12c o' -()tcrera~e ~Ai/ t~~CIA. jr /er&, qecwyeýýhpý Ar t/e r wsF@ -s oil ..........oF ..-. _.,o, aelye-A/l,1,c-Výr'ILId (I/u S( A/i --W rove_/IcaSA4s C- iAý-ZAb A-ro,- #,._73-r, e el- -0ur~ F .\A& C, I ý41i7-*A t 5!rtM$/ 4S(/'IreYc7 i O'v ý-('.. /e/2w ./9(-, /asw ý )J,- cl4 cb~ cr-C~n CIOe pA2(ýa/ u() fho.t~~d-) A/tica h:1le' -0r5.-S.V/-%j2e. e -tAe& dQý5i,'ca.° ..I ) EXHIBIT 3 BUNITED STATES OF AMERICANUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONBEFORE THE SECRETARYIn the Matter ofNuclear Management Company, LLC Docket No. 50-255Palisades Nuclear Power StationRegarding Renewal of Facility OperatingLicense No. DPR-20 for an Additional 20Year PeriodDECLARATION OF Dr. Ross Landsman,Retired U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionNuclear Safety Engineer and Palisades Dry Cask Storage InspectorUnder the penalty of perjury, I, Ross Landsman, declare that the following statements aretrue and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief:1. My name is Ross Landsman. I am a retired U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionRegion III Nuclear Safety Engineer and Palisades Dry Cask Storage Inspector. I live at.9234 North Lowell, Skokie, Illinois.2. NRC Region III, where I formerly worked before recently retiring, has requestedassistance from NRC Headquarters division of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), incoordination with the division of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) Spent(sic) Fuel Project Office (SFPO),-in order to resolve questions involving the licensingbasis for the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant and the appropriateness of the licensing basisto the seismic design of the Palisades ISFSI.I3. On August 4, 2004, on behalf of the NRC, I completed an inspection of design andoperational activities associated with the new y constructed Palisades ISFSI pad. Theresults of this inspection were documented inWNRC Inspection Report No.07200007/2004-002 (DNMS). As a result, I identified two issues, characterized asviolations by me in .the draft report but changdd to unresolved items (URI) by my boss inthe final report to allow Palisades to go ahead 'and load fuel instead of stopping them eventhough it was not safe. These two issues were associated with the licensee's translation ofthe safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) from the reactor site to the ISFSI pad (URI072007/2004-002-1) and its assessment of the sub-surface bearing stability beneath theISFS1 pad (URI 0720007/2004-002-2). After the final report was issued, I wrote aDiffering Professional Opinion (DPO) on this issue but the agency (the NRC) would notaccept it based on the fact that there was no issue to disagree about since the NRC has notmade a decision on my issues yet because they changed them from violations to unresolved items. I informed them that they did make a decision and let Palisades loadcasks over my objections. They turned me down again because I was retiring andofficially couldn't brother them any more, but the point is, the pad is not safe to hold anyloaded casks.4. During an inspection of the 2004 ISFSI installation, I reviewed the licensee's seismiccalculations associated with the ISFSI pad and the irradiated fuel canisters. I determinedthat the licensee performed the ISFSI pad SSE calculations assuming a seismic horizontalacceleration of 0.2g in the free-field and at the ISFSI pad ground surface elevation of 623feet. The licensee stated its understanding that the seismic horizontal acceleration valueof 0.2g was approved by the NRC at the time of initial reactor plant licensing. Thelicensee further stated its understanding that the 0.2g horizontal acceleration value wasapplicable for SSE seismic calculations associated with any location and at any elevationon the plant site. I noted that the licensee performed a soil-structure interaction, seismicassessment for the ISFSI pad using the SSE seismic horizontal acceleration of 0.2g. Thesoil-structure interaction assessment results indicated that the irradiated fuel canisterswould experience 0.25g horizontal acceleration during an SSE. The irradiated fuelcanister seismic horizontal acceleration design limit is 0.25g.5. While reviewing the licensee's calculations, I noted significant differences between theelevation and subsurface soil composition of ihe reactor plant and the 2004 ISFSI pad.Specifically, the reactor containment building was constructed, following the removal ofthe soil/sands overburden, at a ground surface elevaiion of 590 feet on compacted glacialtill. The 2004 ISFSI pad was constructed, without the removal of the soils/sandsoverburden, at a ground surface elevation of 625 feet on sands that the licenseemechanically compacted. The licensee estimated that the compacted glacial till soil layer,at the location of the 2004 ISFSI pad, was at an elevation of 560 to 570 feet.6. Based upon the subsurface soil composition and elevation differences between thereactor plant site and the 2004 ISFSI site, I determined that the licensee's application ofthe 0.2g horizontal acceleration value that the ISFSI site was non-conservative.Specifically, the inspectors noted that the calculated SSE seismic horizontal accelerationwould likely be larger at the ISFSI compared to the reactor plant site due to the increasedsite elevation and the approximately 50 to 60 feet of mechanically compacted sandspresent on top of the compacted glacial till material at the ISFSI site. In addition, Iconcluded that the soil-structure interaction calculation results were non-conservative,which if revised to incorporate a larger horizoftal acceleration vsalue based on theincreased ISFSI. pad elevation and the soil profile differences, would likely result in aseismic horizontal acceleration value in excess of the irradiated fuel canister design limit.7. Additionally, correspondence between the. NRC and the licensee, dated December1966, telephone call between R. Maccary (Atomic Energy Commission, AEC) and H.Wahl (Bechtel for the licensee), indicates that the NRC considered SSE to be defined ashaving a horizontal acceleration, at the bedrock, of 0.1 5g with an amplification factor of1.25, producing a 0.2g ground acceleration. This demonstrates the NRC's understanding2

13. Revision 0 of the Final Safety Analysis Report indicated that a 0.2g surfaceacceleration was used for the SSE. Licensee calculations of the seismic adequacy of thosestructures housing safety-related components were all performed at the grade elevation of590 feet. Thiswas also the ground surface elevation since the overburden of sand duneswas removed prior to construction.14. NRR and NMSS have been requested by NRC Region III to respond to each of thefollowing questions:a. During initial licensing of the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant, did the NRC anchorthe horizontal acceleration for seismic evaluations at the "ground surface" of thereactor building, elevation 590 feet and on top of the compacted glacial till, or the"ground surface" of the general plant site, any elevation and with anycombination of soil structures intervening between the "ground surface" and theunderlying bedrock?b. During Initial licensing of the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant, did the NRCconsider that the seismic horizontal acceleration would be amplified from itsvalue at the bedrock to the value used at the "ground" surface due to the type andthickness of the intervening soil between the bedrock and the "ground surface"?c. Does the NRC expect, based upon the regulations in I OCFR72.212(b)(2)(i)(B)and IOCFR72.212(b)(3), a licensee to incorporate new information andtechnology into its assessment of the continued appropriateness and re-applicationof the previous reactor plant seismic siting and design criteria for the design andconstruction of an ISFSI pad?d. Irrespective of the previous answers, should the NRC require the licensee todemonstrate that the irradiated fuel canister seismic design is appropriate, usingISFSI pad-specific seismic data, given that the calculated ISFSI horizontalacceleration is at the canister design limit without consideration of the increasesexpected due to the site-specific soil:profile and elevation?15. Regarding intra-NRC coordination on these questions, NRC Region III staff spokewith NRR staff and others on April 29, 2005. NRR agreed to accept this issue as a TaskInterface Agreement and to respond to this request 30 days after receipt, but at least priorto the next dry cask loading campaign, because the pad is not safe to hold the irradiatedfuel. The Task Force Agreement Number is 2005-06.16. Upon request, I would be happy to identify the more than one dozen referencesreferred to in the preparation of this declaration./s/ Dr. Ross Landsman[Signature]Date: 9-15-20054 UNITED STATES OF AMERICABEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF THE SECRETARYIn the Matter ofDocket No. 50-255NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANYPALISADES NUCLEAR GENERATINGSTATIONRegarding the Renewal ofFacility Operating License No. August 8, 2005DPR-20 for a 20-Year PeriodREQUEST FOR HEARINGANDPETITION TO INTERVENENow come the Nuclear Information and Resource Service(hereinafter "NIRS"), West Michigan Environmental Action Council(hereinafter "WMEAC"), Don't Waste Michigan (hereinafter "DWM"), theGreen Party of Van Buren County (hereinafter "Green Party"), theMichigan Land Trustees (all collectively known as Petitioners-Intervenors), and Ann Aliotta, Katherine Beck, Lee Burdick, BruceCutean, W. Ronald Elmore, Jane Gardner, Barbara Geisler, KarenHeavrin, Janine Heisel, Mary Lou Hession, Alice Hirt, LaurettaHolmes, Chuck Jordan, Judy Kamps, Gary Karch, Maynard Kaufman, NellyKurzmann, Nan Lewis, Michael Martin, Maria Ochs, Elizabeth Paxson,Ken Richards, Margaret Roche, Pamela S. Rups, James 0. Schlobohm,Sally P. Schlobohm, Catherine Sugas, Elizabeth M. Sugas, RobinTinholt, Barbara Trumbull, and Sally Zigmond (collectively known asMember-Intervenors) and hereby make their REQUEST FOR A HEARING andPETITION TO INTERVENE in the captioned matter, pursuant to the Federal Register Notice of June 08, 2005 [Volume 70, Number 109, Page33533-33535] and in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR § 2.714and § 2.309.In support of their Request and Petition, said Intervenorsfurther state as follows:1. Nuclear Information and Resource Service is a nonprofitcorporation with over 6000 members, a number of whom live in theGreat Lakes Region of the United States, including over 100 inMichigan and 50 of whom make their residences within fifty (50) milesof the Palisades Nuclear Generating Station (hereinafter"Palisades"). The central office of NIRS is located at 1424 16thStreet NW, Suite 404, Washington, DC 20036.2. Western Michigan Environmental Action Council is a nonprofit,tax-exempt environmental organization started in the mid-1960's. Ithas 1500 members, most of whom live in Michigan, and an estimated 400to 500 live within 50 miles of the Palisades nuclear plant.3. Don't Waste Michigan is a nonprofit organization begun in the1980's with about 25 members, nearly all of whom live in Michigan,and of which an estimated 5 currently live within 50 miles of thePalisades nuclear plant.4. The Green Party of Van Buren County is a political party andassociation of persons which came into being around environmentalissues. It has a membership of approximately 15 members, all of whomare residents of Van Buren County, Michigan, and all of whom residewithin 50 miles of the Palisades nuclear plant.5. Michigan Land Trustees (website www.michiganlandtrust.org)was founded in 1976. It is an association of 60 to 70 individuals and families dedicated to preserving and protecting farm land inMichigan. Most of its members reside in southwest Michigan, at least15 of whom live within the 50-mile zone around the Palisades nuclearreactor.6. Members of these organizations who live or have property andfamily within the 50-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) including theimmediate area around the Palisades Nuclear Generating Station whichis sited in Covert, Michigan have requested Nuclear Information andResource Service, West Michigan Environmental Action Council, Don'tWaste Michigan, the Green Party of Van Buren County and the MichiganLand Trustees (hereinafter "Petitioners") to represent them and theirrespective interests in this proceeding.6. The Declarations of individuals Ann Aliotta, Katherine Beck,Lee Burdick, Bruce Cutean, W. Ronald Elmore, Jane Gardner, BarbaraGeisler, Karen Heavrin, Janine Heisel, Mary Lou Hession, LaurettaHolmes, Chuck Jordan, Judy Kamps, Gary Karch, Maynard Kaufman, NellyKurzmann, Nan Lewis, Michael Martin, Maria Ochs, Elizabeth Paxson,Ken Richards, Margaret Roche, Pamela S. Rups, James 0. Schlobohm,Sally P. Schlobohm, Catherine Sugas, Elizabeth M. Sugas, RobinTinholt, Barbara Trumbull, and Sally Zigmond are annexed to thisRequest and Petition, with each individual declarant identifying hisor her affiliation with the petitioning organizations.7. Petitioners-Intervenors, as organizational intervenors,believe that their members' interests will not be adequatelyrepresented without this action to intervene, and without theopportunity to participate as full parties in this proceeding. if the Palisades Nuclear Generating Station license is renewed withoutresolving the Petitioners'-Itervenors' safety concerns andenvironmental issues, this nuclear generating station may operateunsafely and pose an unacceptable risk to the environment, therebyjeopardizing the health and welfare of the respective Petitioners'-Intervenors' members who live, recreate and have businesses withinthe vicinity of the nuclear power reactor.PETITIONERS' CONTENTIONSTECHNICAL/HEALTH/SAFETY ANALYSIS CONTENTIONS1. The license renewal application is untimely and incompletefor failure to address the continuing crisis of embrittlement.The Petitioners allege that the Palisades license renewalapplication is fundamentally deficient because it does not adequatelyaddress technical and safety issues arising out of the embrittlementof the reactor pressure vessel and unresolved Pressure Thermal Shock("PTS") concerns that might reasonably result in the failure of thereactor pressure vessel ("RPV"). The Palisades nuclear power stationis identified as prone to early embrittlement of the reactor pressurevessel, which is a vital safety component. As noted in the opinion ofPetitioners' expert on embrittlement, Mr. Demetrios Basdekas, retiredfrom the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the longer Palisadesoperates, the more embrittled its RPV becomes, with decreasing safetymargins in the event of the initiation of emergency operationprocedures. Therefore, a hearing on the public health and safetyeffects of a prospective additional twenty years of operation, giventhe present and prospective embrittlement trend of the RPV isimperative to protecting the interests of those members of thepetitioning organization who are affected by this proceeding.2. Excessive radioactive and toxic chemical contamination inlocal drinking water due to emissions from Palisades nuclear powerplant as part of its daily, "routine" operations.The radioactive and toxic chemical emissions from the Palisadesnuclear power plant into the waters of Lake Michigan contaminate therecently-installed drinking water supply intake for the City of SouthHaven, built just offshore from Van Buren State Park and justdownstream from the Palisades reactor, due to the direction of theflow of Lake Michigan's waters and the very close proximity of thePalisades reactor to the South Haven drinking water supply intake.U.S. National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration modelsconfirm the direction of water flow in Lake Michigan toward the intake. Petitioners-Intervenors hope to produce public records oftoxics and radiation testing of the water source to evidence thispublic health problem.ENVIRON1ENTAL CONTENTIONS3. The Palisades reactor has no place to store its overflowingirradiated nuclear fuel inventory within NRC regulations.The indoor irradiated fuel storage pool reached capacity in1993. But the outdoor dry cask storage pads at Palisades, both theolder one nearer Lake Michigan and the newer one further inland, arein violation of NRC earthquake regulations. 10 CFR § 72.212(b) (2)(i) (B) requires that:Cask storage pads and areas have been designed toadequately support the static and dynamic loads of the storedcasks, considering potential amplification of earthquakesthrough soil-structure interaction, and soil liquefactionpotential or other soil instability due to vibratory groundmotion. .According to Petitioners' anticipated expert, Dr. Ross Landsman,former U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III dry cask storageinspector, the older pad violates the liquefaction portion of thisregulation, and the new pad violates the amplification portion of theregulation. Petitioners contend that neither the older nor new drycask storage pads at the Palisades plant were designed inconsideration of the factors contained in the cited regulation.4. The unloadable, unmovable dry storage cask #4 at Palisades.In 1993, Consumers Power (now Consumers Energy) assured afederal district judge that if it encountered problems with loadeddry casks at Palisades, it would simply reverse the loading procedureand return the high-level radioactive waste to the storage pools. Butthe fourth cask loaded at Palisades, in June 1994, was shortlythereafter admitted by Consumers Power to be defective, having faultywelds. However, eleven years on, Consumers has yet to unload thedefective cask, because it cannot. Petitioners state that Consumersperpetrated a fraud upon the court and the public, with the complicitsupport by the NRC, and has critically undermined its credibility asto any pledges about the safety of dry cask storage.The significance of this problem with cask #4 is considerable.For example, the configuration of the 18 to 19 dry casks currentlystored on the older pad nearer Lake Michigan is such that the casksfurthest back cannot be moved or unloaded until all other casks infront of them have been moved out of the way first. This configur-ation increases the risks, making it very difficult to addressemergencies involving certain casks in the configuration in a timelymanner.

5. There is no permanent repository for the nuclear waste whichwould be generated at Palisades after 2010.Any waste generated at Palisades after 2010 would be excess tothe capacity of the proposed national dump at Yucca Mountain, Nevadaaccording to U.S. Department of Energy projections in its YuccaMountain Final Environmental Impact Statement (Feb. 2002), asrevealed in Tables A-7 and A-8 on pages A-15 and A-16 of Appendix A.In fact, the waste generated at Palisades from 1971 to 2010 may alsobe excess to Yucca, in that the proposed dump maynever open. TheState of Nevada maintains that NRC's "Nuclear Waste ConfidenceDecision" is erroneous, in that it biases NRC to favor the YuccaMountain dump license lest it be proven wrong in its assurance to thepublic that a high-level radioactive waste geologic repository willopen in the U.S. by 2025. Because so much uncertainty surrounds theYucca Mountain dump proposal, as well as other high-level radioactivewaste proposals, Petitioners-Intervenors contend that waste generatedat Palisades during the 20 year license extension could very well bestored at Palisades indefinitely, a scenario inadequately addressedby the applicant and NRC.6. Intensifying sand erosion and avalanche risk around dry caskstorage pads.The more casks loaded on the storage pads at Palisades, the morerisk of erosion to the sand supporting the pads, given the largeweight of the casks themselves (well over 100 tons each), weatherrelated erosion of the sanddunes, as well as the erosion that willoccur due to more severe weather impacts from the global climatecrisis and climate de-stabilization. Arresting erosion at both padsis important to safety and radiation containment over the long haul,given the proximity of the waters of Lake Michigan. The State ofMichigan and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers have designated thesand dunes upon which the older pad is located -so close to thewaters of Lake Michigan -as a high-risk erosion zone.The Lake Michigan dunes are subject to "blow outs" where entiredunes are blown out during wind storms and lighting strikes. See F.Nori, P. Sholtz, and M. Bretz (Department of Physics, The Universityof Michigan), "Sound-Producing Sand Avalanches," Scientific AmericanVol. 277, No. 3 (September 1997). At Warren Dunes, some 35 milessouth of Palisades, sand blowouts have been estimated to travel asmuch a one-quarter mile per day, exposing 5,000-year-old trees thathave long since turned to charcoal. "Some chilling facts about Duneshistory,"http://www.nwitimes.com/articles/2005/07/25/news/region/0256d4c429632b30862570460062843b.txtThe Palisades dunes could, in a wind storm or lightning strike,shift, blow and cover the dry cask storage area. As weather patternsintensify (as anticipated) this potential for erosion will increase.Additionally, the dunes and shore line are geologically prone to sandavalanche. A sand avalanche coupled with a seismic event couldcompromise the integrity of one or more casks at Palisades.

7. Non-radiological persistent toxic burdens to area watersources.The impact of 20 additional years of pollution by toxicsdisclosed but not adequately controlled under requirements of theNational Pollutant Discharge Elimination System will directly affectwater quality of nearby sources, including Lake Michigan. In 2000,for example, Palisades was found to be in "continuing noncompliance"for its apparent multiple misuses of Betz Clam-Trol in Lake Michiganfor the dispersion of mussels and clams affecting the water intakes.See http://www.epa.gov/region5/water/weca/reports/mi4qtrOl.txtNPDES violations also contradicts the spirit, intention andexplicit recommendation of The International Joint Commission. In its"Ninth Biennial Report on Great Lakes Water Quality," theCommission's Recommendation #16 (at p. 42) urges that "[g]overnmentsmonitor toxic chemicals used in large quantities at nuclear powerplants, identify radioactive forms of the toxic chemicals and analyzetheir impact on the Great Lakes ecosystem."MISCELLANEOUS CONTENTIONS8. Increased embrittlement of re-used fuel rods as buffers toreduce embrittlement of RPV walls.To mitigate the prospect of increased embrittlement of thereactor pressure vessel (RPV), the Palisades operator usespreviously-irradiated fuel to create a buffer next to the RPV wall.The second-use of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor coretends to weaken and damage the cladding on the fuel rods, makingfuture waste handling, storage, and ultimate disposal -whether on-site at Palisades, in transport, and at future storage or dump sites-problematic. It poses an elevated risk for the safety of Palisadesworkers and the general public. Moreover, the U.S. Department ofEnergy ("DOE") depends on the integrity of the fuel cladding as ameans of preventing or minimizing the chances of unanticipatedfissioning in storage casks or other units -in effect, as a means ofdelaying radiation releases into the groundwater at the Private FuelStorage (Utah) and Yucca Mountain (Nevada) sites.8. Environmental justice denied by the continuing operations ofPalisades.Palisades nuclear generating station is a the source ofenvironmental justice violations. Located within a predominantlyAfrican-American and low-income township, Palisades provides woefullyinadequate tax revenues to the host community, considering the largeadverse impacts and risks the reactor inflicts. Palisades' African-American employees have traditionally been stuck in the dirtiest andmost dangerous jobs at the reactor, with little to no prospects forpromotion. Some of Palisades' African American employees have alsoexperienced death threats at the work place, including nooses hung intheir lockers or in public places to symbolize lynching, an attempt to silence their public statements for workplace justice.Palisades' license extension application also has inadequatelyaddressed the adverse impacts that 20 additional years of operationsand waste generation would have on the traditional land uses, spiritual,cultural, and religious practices, and treaty rights of variousfederally-recognized tribes in the vicinity of the plant and beyond,as well as effects upon non-federally recognized tribes governed byinternational law. Only three tribes were contacted by the NRC byAugust 8th, 2005, and invited to participate in the license extensionproceedings, which effectively excluded a number of tribes within the50-mile zone around the reactor. For this reason alone, the August 8,2005 deadline for requesting a hearing to intervene against thePalisades license extension should be extended, until all tribeswithin the 50-mile zone and beyond, which have ties to the powerplant site and its environs, are contacted.Also, Palisades' license extension applicationinadequately addresses the adverse socio-economic impacts of acatastrophic radiation release due to reactor core embrittlementleading to core rupture, as they would be found among the low-incomeLatin American agricultura l workforce of the Palisades area. Too,possible synergistic effects of such catastrophic radiation releasescombined with the toxic chemical exposures these low income Latin-American agricultural workers already suffer on the job have not beenevaluated.Finally, there is an unacceptable lack of Spanish languageemergency evacuation instructions and notifications to serve theSpanish speaking Latino population within 50 miles of the Palisadesreactor, especially migrant agricultural workers.9. Chronic emergency unpreparedness within EPZ.Emergency responders in the 50 mile zone around the Palisadesnuclear reactor are inadequately trained and inadequately equipped torespond to a major radioactivity release during an accident or attackat the plant.Even with its shiny new fire trucks, Covert, Michigan does nothave the staffing, equipage, training nor preparedness for a majorradiological emergency. Covert's best, good as it is, is still nomatch for a chernobyl style fire. The remainder of the emergencyplanning zone is occupied by rural, volunteer fire departments, whichhave even less equipment and resources with which to work. Radiationmonitors and radiation-protective gear are in short supply or unheardof. Isolation wards for radioactively contaminated victims (so theydon't harm the doctors and nurses and other patients) are very rareor non-existent at most, probably all, hospitals within 50 miles.10. Economic damage in Palisades region in event of accident orattack on the power plant causing severe radiation release.Given that a severe radiation release from Palisades due toaccident or attack would significantly damage the economic base ofwestern Michigan, not only within the 50 mile zone around the reactor, but even beyond it, due to crops and products that wouldhave to be destroyed, as well as the lingering stigma attached towestern Michigan agricultural products after such a release, a SevereAccident Mitigation Analysis must be performed, publicized andcirculated for public review and comment as a precondition toconsidering whether or not to grant a license extension.11. Threats of terrorist attack and sabotage against thePalisades nuclear power plant.Located on the shoreline of Lake Michigan, the source ofdrinking water, fish, recreation, and other economic value to tens ofmillions of people downstream, Palisades represents a target forpotentially catastrophic terrorist attack or sabotage intended torelease large amounts of radioactivity into the Great Lakes basin.Palisades represents a radioactive bull's eye on the shore of 20% ofthe planet's surface fresh water, the Great Lakes. The operatingreactor (containing many billions of curies of radioactivity) andhigh-level waste storage pool (containing tens to hundreds ofmillions of curies) are vulnerable to such attack, as are the outdoordry storage casks, so highly visible stored in plain sight.12.Respectfully submitted for the Petitioners,/s/ Terry J. LodgeTerry Lodge, Esq.Ohio Sup. Ct. #0029271316 N. Michigan St., Ste. 520Toledo, OH 43624-1627(419) 255-7552Fax (419) 255-5852tjlodge50@yahoo.comKary Love, Esq.Executive Business Center348 Waverly Road, Suite 2, Holland MI 49423(616) 399-4408Fax (616) 399-0868Co-Counsel for all Petitioners-Intervenors and Member-Intervenors CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE/TRANSMISSIONI hereby certify that the foregoing Request for Hearing andPetition to Intervene, along with five (5) Notices of Appearance, wassent this 8th day of August, 2005 via email only to the following:Office of the SecretaryUnited States Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington, DC 20555-0001Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications StaffEmail to Office of the Secretary : HEARINGDOCKET@nrc.govOffice of General CounselUnited States Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington, DC 20555-0001Email OGCMailcenter@nrc.govAnd that the same was sent via first-class mail on the 9th ofAugust, 2005 to:Jonathan Rogoff, Esq.Vice President Counsel & SecretaryNuclear Management Company LLC700 First StreetHudson, WI 54016/s/ Terry J. LodgeTerry J. Lodge UNITED STATES OF AMERICABEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF THE SECRETARYIn the Matter ofDocket No. 50-255NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANYPALISADES NUCLEAR GENERATINGSTATIONRegarding the Renewal ofFacility Operating License No. August 8, 2005DPR-20 for a 20-Year PeriodNOTICE OF APPEARANCE OF PAUL GUNTERPursuant to 10 CFR 2.713(b), Paul Gunter hereby enters anappearance on behalf of Nuclear Information and Resource Service(NIRS) and provides the following information:1. I am Director of the Reactor Watchdog Project for NuclearInformation and Resource Service at 1424 16th Street NW, Suite 404,Washington, DC 20036, Tel. 202 328 0002 and my email address is<pgunter@nirs.org>.2. I have been appointed by NIRS to jointly represent theorganization and its members in this proceeding./s/ Paul GunterPaul Gunter8/8/2005Date UNITED STATES OF AMERICABEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF THE SECRETARYIn the Matter ofDocket No. 50-255NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANYPALISADES NUCLEAR GENERATINGSTATIONRegarding the Renewal ofFacility Operating License No. August 8, 2005DPR-20 for a 20-Year PeriodNOTICE OF APPEARANCE OF MICHAEL KEEGANFOR DON'T WASTE MICHIGANPursuant to 10 CFR 2.713(b), Michael Keegan hereby enters anappearance on behalf of Don't Waste Michigan (DWM), and provides thefollowing information:1. I am Co-Chair of the board of Don't Waste Michigan at 2213Riverside Drive, NE, Grand Rapids, MI 49505, phone (734) 735-6373 andmy email address is <mkeeganj@comcast.net>.2. I have been appointed by DWM to jointly represent theorganization and its members in this proceeding./s/ Michael KeeganMichael Keegan8/8/2005Date UNITED STATES OF AMERICABEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF THE SECRETARYIn the Matter ofDocket No. 50-255NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANYPALISADES NUCLEAR GENERATINGSTATIONRegarding the Renewal ofFacility Operating License No. August 8, 2005DPR-20 for a 20-Year PeriodNOTICE OF APPEARANCE OF ALICE HIRTFOR WESTERN MICHIGAN ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION COUNCILPursuant to 10 CFR 2.713(b), Alice Hirt hereby enters anappearance on behalf of the Western Michigan Environmental ActionCouncil (WMEAC), and provides the following information:1. I am a member of WMEAC, the office of which is located at1415 Wealthy Street, SE, Suite 280, Grand Rapids, MI 49506, phone(616) 335-3405 and my email address is <alicehirt@charter.net>.2. I have been appointed by WMEAC to jointly represent theorganization and its members in this proceeding./s/ Alice HirtAlice Hirt8/8/2005Date UNITED STATES OF AMERICABEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF THE SECRETARYIn the Matter ofDocket No. 50-255NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANYPALISADES NUCLEAR GENERATINGSTATIONRegarding the Renewal ofFacility Operating License No. August 8, 2005DPR-20 for a 20-Year PeriodNOTICE OF APPEARANCE OF CHUCK JORDANFOR GREEN PARTY OF VAN BUREN COUNTY, MICHIGANPursuant to 10 CFR 2.713(b), Chuck Jordan hereby enters anappearance on behalf of the Green Party of Van Buren County,Michigan, and provides the following information:1. I am the Chairman of the Green Party of Van Buren County,the office of which is located at 50521 34th Avenue Bangor, MI 49013,phone (home) 269.427.8339 (cell) 269.271.2038, email <jordanc@btc-bci.com>.2. I have been appointed by the Green party to jointlyrepresent the organization and its members in this proceeding./s/ Chuck JordanChuck Jordan8/8/2005Date UNITED STATES OF AMERICABEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF THE SECRETARYIn the Matter ofDocket No. 50-255NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANYPALISADES NUCLEARGENERATINGSTATIONRegarding the Renewal ofFacility Operating License No. August 8, 2005DPR-20 for a 20-Year PeriodNOTICE OF APPEARANCE OF MAYNARD KAUFMANFOR MICHIGAN LAND TRUSTEESPursuant to 10 CFR 2.713(b), Maynard Kaufman hereby enters anappearance on behalf of the Michigan Land Trustees and provides thefollowing information:I am a member of the Michigan Land Trustees. My office islocated at my home, 25485 County Road 681, Bangor, MI 49013.2. I have been appointed by the Michigan Land Trustees tojointly represent the organization and its members in thisproceeding./s/ Maynard KaufmanMaynard Kaufman8/8/2005Date UNITED STATES OF AMERICABEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONBefore the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board)In the Matter of) Docket No. 50-255-LRNUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANYPALISADES NUCLEAR GENERATING ) ASLBP No. 05-842-03-LRSTATION)Regarding the Renewal of Facility OperatingLicense No. DPR-20 for a 20-Year Period ) September 16, 2005PETITIONERS' COMBINED REPLY TO NRC STAFFAND NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY ANSWERSNow come the Nuclear Information and Resource Service, et al., Petitioners-Intervenorsherein (and hereinafter referred to as "Petitioners"), by and through counsel, and respond tothe "NRC Staff Answer Opposing Petition to Intervene and Request for Hearing" (hereinafterreferred to "Staff Answer"), and to the "Nuclear Management Company's Answer to the August8, 2005 Request for Hearing and Petition to Intervene" (hereinafter referred to as "NMCAnswer"). Petitioner respond in opposition to those portions of the respective Answers whichdeny the admissibility of Petitioners' proffered contentions.ARGUMENTPreliminary Note As To Standing IssuesNuclear Management Company raises no objections to the standing of the sundryIntervenors. NMC Answer p. 2. The Staff quibbles, not about the standing of the Intervenors,but only that the Organizational Intervenors have failed to demonstrate that they have-I-organizational standing. Staff Answer pp. 7-8. Because they are assured that somecombination of their numbers has standing to raise the pending contentions, thePetitioners/Intervenors will make no further arguments on the standing issue, but instead willdefer to the Board to render a final determination.Response as to Contention No. 1 (The license renewal application is untimely andincomplete for failure to address the continuing crisis of embrittlement)NMC and NRC staff have argued that Contention 1 regarding the Application'sproposed management of the embrittlement of the Palisades reactor pressure vessel isinadmissible because the Contention (i) fails to challenge the Application and demonstrate theexistence of a genuine dispute on a material issue of fact or law; (ii) fails to provide a factualbasis to support any dispute with the application, and; (iii) improperly challenges Commissionregulation. These assertions are incorrect.1) The embrittlement contention is within the scope of the proceedingThe extended operation of the Palisades nuclear steam supply system falls squarelyunder 10 CFR § 54.21 and § 54.29(a) which focuses on the management of aging of certainsystems, structures, and components and the review of time-limited aging evaluations.A genuine dispute exists within the Application that is germane to the health and safetyof the petitioners who live, work and recreate out to 50 miles from the Palisades nuclear powerstation in Covert, Michigan.The Palisades Reactor Pressure Vessel is the subject component. There is no safetyredundancy to this single largest component in the Palisades nuclear steam supply system.Palisades is arguably one of the most embrittled reactor pressure vessels, if not the mostembrittled vessel, in the United States. The nuclear steam supply system for Palisades was thefirst of the Combustion Engineering line licensed for construction. Documentation as early as1970 identifies Surveillance specimens in the vessel will be used to monitor the radiationdamage during the life of the plant. If these specimens reveal changes that affect thesafety of the plant, the reactor vessel will be annealed to reduce radiation damageeffects. The results of annealing will be confirmed by tests on additional surveillancespecimens provide for this purpose. Prior to the accumulation of a peak fluence of 10 E19 nvt (>1 Mev) on the rector vessel wall, the Regulatory Staff should reevaluate thecontinued suitability of the currently proposed startup, cool down, and operatingconditions.1Exhibit 1-A. All exhibits are found in "Petitioners' Appendix of Evidence in Support ofContentions" (Pet. App.), a copy of which is provided with this response in hard copy to theASLB and the parties.The Petitioners have been able to establish that the licensee could not providesurveillance materials for critical weld material in the Palisades vessel beltline welds in 1994.2See Exhibit 1-B.A commitment was made for the Palisades plant as early as 1970 to make actualphysical efforts by annealing the vessel to restore ductility should any "radiation damage"affecting plant safety be discovered. In fact, calculations later recognized by NRC staffconcluded that the Palisades vessel could have surpassed its Pressure Thermal Shock ("PTS")limits as early as 1995. Repeated Palisades re-analyses have produced a widening range ofresulting estimates for exceeding vessel embrittlement limits with a very broad range ofuncertainty (as much as +/- 25%) with as many PTS values for the severely-embrittled reactorvessel. Palisades has neared the maximum-embrittlement goalposts time and again over theyears,3 but each time they have been moved back following rejiggering of the assumptions and'Report on Palisades Plant, Letter from Joseph Hendrie (ACRS) to Glen Seaborg, Chair AEC, January27, 1970.2 Palisades Thermal Shock, NRC Staff Presentation to the ACRS, Viewgraphs, December 09, 1994, p.3.3"For example that is sort of a summary of the regulatory framework that applies to annealing.With regard to Palisades, we completed an evaluation in April of 1995 in which we concluded that theywould reach the screening criteria. At least they were okay until 1999. That evaluation was consistentwith the 50.61, the Pressurized Thermal Shock Rule. The current license for Palisades expires in 2007so they would fall somewhat short of the current operating license with regard to the life of the vessel."

calculations. In 1995, fox example, the NRC staff noted that the "Palisades RPV... ispredicted to reach the PTS screening criteria by late 1999, before any other plant." NRCGeneric Letter 92-01, Revision 1, Supplement 1: Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity (May 19,1995) (Exhibit 1-J). The most recently-recognized estimates project that the current PTScriteria will be exceeded in 2014, which is early in the proposed 20-year license extensionperiod.The Applicant asserts that NRC approved methodology was used to perform neutronfluence calculations consistent with Regulatory Guide § 1.190 and described in WCAP-15353,"Palisades Reactor Pressure Vessel Fluence Evaluation." The Applicant argues that "at theappropriate time, prior to exceeding the PTS screening criteria, Palisades will select theoptimum alternative to manage PTS in accordance with NRC regulations, and will make theapplicable submittals to obtain NRC review and approval."'4 The Applicant argues that withrespect to addressing technical issues relating to neutron irradiation embrittlement of thereactor pressure vessel that the Applicant adopts the third measure set forth in 10 CFR §54.21(c)(1) to disposition the issue -i.e., adequate management of the effects of neutronirradiation embrittlement -for the period of extended operation.The content of technical information of an application is set forth in 10 CFR § 54.21 toinclude a review of systems, structures and components subject to an aging managementreview to include the reactor vessel, the core shroud and component supports. 10 CFR §54.21 (c)(1) stipulates an evaluation of time-limited aging analyses where the applicant mustdemonstrate (i) the analyses remain valid for the period of extended operation; (ii) the analyses"Briefing on Annealing Demonstration Project," NRC Public Meeting, August 27, 1996.4"Application for Renewed Operating License for Palisades Nuclear Generating Station," NuclearManagement Company, March 22, 2005, ADAMS Accession Number ML050940446, p. 4-15. have been projected to the end of the period of extended operation; (iii) the effects of aging onthe intended function(s) will be adequately managed for the period of operation.Under the current rule (10 CFR § 50.61), three courses of action can be taken tomanage aging of the reactor vessel: 1) The operator shall implement flux reduction programsthat are reasonably practicable to avoid exceeding the PTS screening criteria;2) For those plants where no "reasonable flux reduction program will prevent RTptsfrom exceeding the PTS screening criterion" the operator can take a look at plant-specificevaluation of plant systems, thermal hydraulics, reactor vessel design, etc. This analysis mustbe submitted at least three years before RTpts is projected to exceed the PTS screeningcriteria; or;3) Anneal the pressure vessel as provided under 10 CFR § 50.66, or the annealing ruleand Regulatory Guide § 1.162, which provides guidance on how to implement the annealingrule.There is a requirement that a licensee that desires to anneal the reactor vessel mustsubmit a thermal annealing report 3 years before actually performing the annealing. Thisthermal report has four major sections in it. One is an operating plan basically identifying howannealing is to be performed.The Petitioners do not agree that the current rule necessarily affords an either/or choiceto be made by the company, as with choosing from a Whitman's Sampler box of candy, butrather, that it contemplates a combination of efforts in concert to achieve the largest margins ofsafety. The Petitioners further suggest that the operative words in 10 CFR § 50.61(b)(4) [wherethere is "no reasonably practicable flux reduction program" to prevent exceeding the PTScriteria] require, not only consideration of the financial interests of the utility, but that the regulation is heavily weighted in the direction of considering public safety. Hence thePetitioners dispute licensee's assertion in the Application ( page 4-10) that:The flux to the reactor vessel would have to be reduced by an additional factorof 3 in order to reach March 24, 2031. Some additional flux reduction could conceivablybe achieved by installation of additional shield assemblies and/or flux suppressiondevices (e.g. hafnium inserts). Flux reduction of the magnitude required at Palisadeswould require far more extraordinary measures, such as the installation of neutronshields on the exterior of the core support barrel. It is unlikely that a plant modificationof this magnitude would be cost-effective. (Emphasis added)It is highly likely that NMC would pursue alternative solutions rather than rely on fluxreduction to extend the reactor vessel life. Other alternatives that would be considered wouldinclude completion of the safety analysis as specified in 10 CFR § 50.61 (b)(4), and thermalannealing treatment as specified in 10 CFR § 50.61(b)(7). Any alternative that NMC maypropose in the future to extend the life of the Palisades reactor vessel would, of necessity, bediscussed thoroughly with the NRC and would be subject to formal NRC review and approvalbefore it could be implemented. The ultimate method used to manage PTS for extended plantoperation would be governed by NRC regulations independently from the license renewalprocess."5The Petitioners also dispute that part of the Application where the licensee states (p. 4-15) in its Analysis that "The current pressure/temperature analyses are valid beyond thecurrent operating license period, but not to the end of the period of extended operation. Theseanalyses are estimated to expire in 2014."' The licensee admits in its Application that it seeksto limit an aging management strategy as required in 10 CFR § 54.21(c)(1)(iii) and adopt asubset of the established management strategies as established by 10 CFR § 50.61 forfracture toughness requirements to protect against pressurized thermal shock events based on5/d., p. 4-10.6 Id., p. 4-15. economic considerations to the licensee. It does so, however, without adequatelydemonstrating that the proposed alternatives can confidently address and mitigate advancingembrittlement and the associated higher Pressure Thermal Shock values any better than thelicensee's admitted inability to reduce, cost-effectively, an increasing safety-significant risk tothe public through flux reduction programs. Petitioners argue that all of these managementstrategies are in place to provide reasonable assurance that the public health and safety willbe protected, first and foremost, and that they are not mere options to be predicated onconsideration of the company's financial bottom line.Petitioners submit that an effective and reliable management plan for a twenty-yearextension must begin with the incorporation of all NRC management strategies as outlinedunder 10 CFR § 50.61, including fluence reduction efforts, not just the company's perceivedcost-effective ones. This is particularly germane to Palisades, as the NRC staff has recognizedthrough a broad set of calculations and associated uncertainties in determining the actualseverity of the embrittlement that the vessel might have exceeded the PTS criterion as early as1995 or might, according to later questionable estimations, exceed as late as 2014. That wouldbe three (3) years into the 20-year license extension period sought by NMC.The Applicant has already abandoned a previous commitment to anneal the severelyembrittled Palisades pressure vessel, discussed infra. Petitioners are unsure whether theApplicant abandoned its previous commitment to anneal the Palisades reactor pressure vesselbecause of economic considerations, or because of operational issues and risks associatedwith re-embrittlement of annealed beltline welds. NMC instead now relies on a complex re-analysis to assure safety margins in the physically-deteriorating reactor pressure vessel. Therequisite labyrinth of computer models that has resulted has been subjected to much healthyskepticism from the NRC's own Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. In light of these problems, petitioners suggest that it is unreasonable for the Applicantto forego Flux Reduction programs for the extension period which might reasonably reduce therisk to public health and safety from a Pressure Thermal Shock accident potentially occurringduring the same license extension period without demonstrating with a high degree ofconfidence that alternative approaches, including the option of annealing the vessel, canadequately preserve required public safety margins in the extension period.Instead, the Application seeks less costly and undemonstrated efforts for the extensionperiod by vaguely proposing to alternately;1) incorporate another embrittlement and PTS re-analysis which is recognized bysignificant uncertainties that potentially seek to merely pencil whip a worsening safety issuewith narrowing safety margins for the proposed extension period or;2) resort to a yet-to-be demonstrated effective annealing of the reactor pressure vessel,a process which the same operator had already previously committed to in 1995 andabandoned in 1997.The applicant's statement that it can abandon actual physical and operationalmeasures to reduce the neutron fluence affecting embrittlement of the pressure vessel raisesan undue public risk from a Pressure Thermal Shock event.Therefore, the Petitioners suggest that under current established management strategyPalisades may have already exceeded the current PTS criteria or if not, will exceed the criteriaearly in the proposed license renewal period (viz., 2014). It is therefore unreasonable andunacceptable for the Application to foreclose options within its established managementstrategy for economic reasons without first being required to demonstrate with confidence thatthe proposed alternatives adequately provide for the public's protection from this significantongoing and potentially worsening age-associated safety issue. Petitioners are particularly concerned that safety focused measures such as FluxReduction Programs at Palisades fall victim to the economic imperative to keep the reactoroperating even at unacceptably reduced margins of safety rather than make much-needinvestments.This controversy is an historical problem at Palisades. The New York Times reportedApril 12, 1992 on a comment by then-NRC Chairman Ivan Selin on the vulnerability ofPalisades to early closure because of embrittlement:Mr. Selin said it was unlikely that any utility would decide to close a plant thatwas running smoothly and was not in immediate need of any big investment. But if aplant required a large investment, he said, 'that could push it over the brink.' In thatcategory he put the Consumers Power Company's Palisades plant, near South Haven,Mich., which opened in 1971, where the reactor pressure vessel may now be brittle, thesame weakness that was suspected at Yankee Rowe. .. .Exhibit 1-C.There is a grave issue of law here: whether the economically-dictated priorities ofPalisades, or the health and safety concerns of the Petitioners, conform to NRC regulations. ALicensing Board should not address the merits of a contention when determining itsadmissibility. Carolina Power and Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal PowerAgency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-837, 23 NRC 525, 541 (1986); TexasUtilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 1), ALAB-868, 25 NRC 912,933 (1987); What is required is that an intervenor state the reasons for its concern. HoustonLighting and Power Co. (Aliens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-590, 11 NRC542 (1980).The Petitioners have stated reasons for their concern. The Board should conclude thatthe Application is deficient and should be rejected."Cheap and Abundant Power May Shutter Some Reactors," Matt Wald, New York Times, April 14,1992.

2) There are many factual disputes affecting public health and safetyPalisades Nuclear Power Station is a Combustion Engineering Pressurized WaterReactor identified as one of the earlier reactor vessels of greater concern whose current 40-year license expires in 2011 after being granted a four-year recapture period.As NIRS has pointed out in its earlier publication, "The Aging of Nuclear Power Plants,A Citizen's Guide to Causes and Effects":Irradiation embrittlement of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) may be the singlemost important factor in determining the operating life of a Pressurized Water Reactor.The design of pressure vessels is generally the same for all PWRs generallyconstructed from 8 inch thick steel plates, formed and welded to create the vesselstructure.The major age-related mechanism associated with this component isembrittlement. Embrittlement is the loss of ductility, i.e, the ability of the pressure vesselmetals to withstand stress without cracking. It is caused by neutron bombardment ofthe vessel metal and is contingent upon the amount of copper and nickel in the metaland the extent of neutron exposure or fluence. As the metal in the reactor pressurevessel is bombarded with radiation, high-energy atomic particles pass through the steelwall. In doing so, these atoms collide with atoms in the metal and knock them out ofposition. Over time this results in the loss of ductility.In an unirradiated vessel the metal loses its ductility at about 40 degreesFahrenheit. As the vessel becomes embrittled, the temperature at which it loses itsductility rises. This change in the mechanical properties of the metal from ductile tobrittle is characterized as the 'reference temperature for nil ductility transition' or RTndt.Thus as the reactor ages and the pressure vessel is exposed to more radiation, theRTndt can shift from its original 40 degree F to as much as 280-290 degrees F or morein extreme cases.8From Exhibit 1-D.The embrittlement of the all-important reactor pressure vessel, which has no redundantsafety feature in a nuclear power station, is of even greater concern to those plantsconstructed prior to 1972. Palisades was issued its construction license in 1967. According tothermal shock experts within Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), there is an8 The Aging of Nuclear Power Plants: A Citizen's Guide to Causes and Effects, Nuclear Information andResource Service, 1988, Chapter IV, " Embrittlement of Reactor Pressure Vessels and Reactor PressureVessel Supports in Pressurized Water Reactors," p. 19.

indeterminate amount of susceptible copper in the metal walls of these older vessels and inthe weld material used, to join the vessel plates.The significance of embrittlement of the vessel component and the shift in RTndt is theincreased susceptibility to pressurized thermal shock (PTS). Pressurized thermal shock occurswhen the reactor pressure vessel is severely overcooled. RPV technical specificationsgenerally limit the cool down to a rate of 1000 F per hour. During an overcooling event (i.e.,pipe break) the vessel may experience a drop in temperature of several hundred degrees perhour. This extreme drop in temperature can send a thermal shock through the vessel wall. Asthe vessel is overcooled there is a drop in the pressure of the primary coolant loop. This rapiddecrease in the pressure of primary coolant cause the high pressure injection pumps in theEmergency Core Cooling System to automatically inject coolant into the primary loop. As theinjection of coolant repressurizes the RPV, the vessel is subject to pressure stresses. Thestresses placed on the RPV by overcooling and repressurization cause the Pressure ThermalShock.Pressure Thermal Shock can be initiated by numerous accidents, including: controlsystem malfunctions, small, medium and large break loss of coolant accidents including mainsteam line break, feed water pipe break, and steam generator tube ruptures. Any of theseevents can initiate a PTS event, but as long as the fracture resistance of the reactor pressurevessel material and welds remains high, i.e., RTndt values remain low, such transients areconsidered unlikely to cause vessel failure. However, the reduction of fracture resistance withinthe RPV wall and weld materials, severe overcooling accompanied by repressurization cancause pre-existing flaws in the inner surface of the RPV to propagate into cracks which can gothrough the vessel wall resulting in the associated uncontrollable loss of coolant water over thereactor core. For failure of the RPV to occur a number of factors must be present:1) the vessel must have a flaw of sufficient size to propagate and a typical vessel canhave thousands of varied-sized flaws;2) the vessel material must be susceptible to irradiation embrittlement due to copperand nickel content;3) the vessel must be sufficiently irradiated to cause a decrease in ductility,represented by an increase in the RTndt value;4) an event must initiate a severe overcooling transient with repressurization;5) the resulting crack must be of such size and location that the RPV's ability tomaintain core cooling is affected.Petitioners believe it more likely than not that some or all of these factors are present atPalisades, as they articulate below. Petitioners believe they have provided quite sufficientinformation to establish the existence of a genuine dispute with the applicant on a materialissue of law or fact, as required by 10 CFR § 2.309(f)(1 )(v) (formerly § 2.714(b)(2)(iii)). SeeGeorgia Power Co. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-9121, 33 NRC 419,422-24 (1991), appeal dismissed, CLI-92-3, 35 NRC 63 (1992); Arizona Public Service Co.(Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), CLI-91-12, 34 NRC 149, 155-56(1991); Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 and 2), LBP-02-4, 55 NRC 49, 64-68 (2002).A. Significant flaws are likely to exist on the surface of the Palisades reactor pressurevessel wall and considerable uncertainty exists to dispute assumptions with regard to theextent that these flaws can contribute to making PTS events increasingly risk-significant.The Petitioners have significant safety-related concerns with regard to the uncertaintythat exists with the analyzed flaw distribution in the Palisades reactor pressure vessel. Asdocumented in transcripts as recent as 2004, the NRC's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards shares in those concerns and disputed flaw distribution assumptions:Dr. Wallis [ACRS]: This flaw distribution is based on rather skimpy evidence.This is one of the areas where---I mean, heat transfer Dittus-Boelter if you believe that.It's based on data points. But the flow [sic "flaw"] distribution in these walls is based ona few examinations. Isn't it?Mr Ericksonkirk [NRC RES]: A few examinations but infinitely more than we hadthe first time.Dr. Wallis: It's much better than you had the first time.Mr. Ericksonkirk: Much better than we had the first time. I think as a laboratorygeek at heart I have to admit I would really like to have more data on this and I don'tthink there's anybody in the technical community that would disagree with this. But Ithink that it's also important to recognize that the flaw distribution doesn't rest onexperimental evidence alone. Certainly we started with -excuse me. We start withexperimental evidence both from destructive and nondestructive evaluations but that'sthen also bolstered by --Dr. Wallis: But those are individual reactors' vessels.Mr. Ericksonkirk: That's right.Dr. Wallis: But there are a hundred reactor vessels. I don't know howconvincing it is that the flaw distribution that you might measure in a couple of vesselswhich were taken apart is typical of all other vessels.Mr. Ericksonkirk: No. I think it would be unfair to say that a single experimentaldistribution derived from two vessels could be just looked at and thought to berepresentative of the other vessels.'Excerpted from Exhibit 1-E.B. The Petitioners urge that Palisades reactor pressure vessel is susceptible toirradiation embrittlement due at least to its copper/nickel/phosphorus content and disputeassumptions that regard the viability of reactor vessel sampling of susceptible materials andthe associated RTndt /RTpts assumptions specific to Palisades reactor pressure vessel.Palisades does not have representative samples of susceptible materials forsurveillance requirements of its reactor pressure vessel, including the weld material in theOfficial Transcript of NRC Proceeding, ACRS Joint Subcommittees: Materials and Metallurgy ThermalHydraulic Phenomenon Reliability and Probablistic Risk Assessment Meeting, December 01, 2004, p. 15line 17-p. 16, line 25. vulnerable beltline welds. Palisades' assumptions on the material contaminants in the vesseland weld materials are based on questionable extrapolations of generic industry data andmaterials taken from weld material in Palisades' discarded steam generator which arguably didnot experience the same level of adverse operational conditions as those degrading thereactor vessel beltline welds.Further, adequate analysis of the Palisades beltline welds has been problematic due touncertainties in determining the copper, nickel and phosphorous content of the susceptiblematerials. In 1994, NRC staff at one point clashed with ABB Combustion Engineering staffwho had refused to divulge data on reactor vessel weld integrity that the vendor on proprietarygrounds that the company wanted to keep confidential. NRC said that it might need to compelCE to release the data.10 Exhibit 1-F.C. Petitioners dispute the viability of NMC assumptions regarding the degree to whichPalisades pressure vessel materials have been degraded due to radiation-inducedembrittlement and suggest that significant uncertainty exists with regard to the degraded stateof the vessel, represented by an increase in its RTndt and RTpts values, for them to beaccurately used as a reference point for an additional twenty-year extension.The Applicant has over the years set forth many re-evaluations of the Palisades Rtndtand RTpts values with a wide range of findings and uncertainty as to bring into question theviability of the degree of embrittlement of the Palisades reactor pressure vessel in its currentcondition to withstand a PTS event. The petitioners dispute the Applicants' claim that "Thecurrent pressure/temperature analyses are valid beyond the current operating license period,but not to the end of the period of extended operation. These analyses are estimated to expirein 2014."110 Palisades Could Reach Its PTS Screening Limit Earlier Than Expected," Inside NRC, December 12,1994, p. 13.1 Palisades Application, p. 4-15 Petitioners are aware of NRC communications which raise this dispute with regard tothe NMC assertions that they do not exceed PTS screening criteria until 2014:From: Stephanie CoffinTo: Hoffman, StephenDate: 11/24/04 3:05PM

Subject:

Palisades phone callWe had a phone call with them Monday.They no longer plan on submitting an exemption to apply "Master Curve" at their facility.Instead, they will be managing it in accordance with the May 27, 2004 guidance fromReyes to the Commissioners. They are following Point Beach and Beaver Valleyclosely.I gave them feedback especially about the flux reduction requirements of the currentrule and suggested they review the Point Beach submittal and our associated SER withOpen Items, and to check for applicability to their plant.FYI for Matt and Barry and Neil:If they see that the new PTS rule will not be published in time for them (they currentlyexceed the screening criteria in 2014 -I don't know if we agree with that), they willsubmit the Master Curve exemption in 2007.StephanieCC: Duvigneaud, Dylanne; Elliot, Barry; Mitchell, Matthew; Ray, Nihar; Stang, John12Exhibit 1 -G. Petitioners contend that at best, whether or not Palisades has exceeded its RTptsremains inconclusive and at worst RTpts were exceeded as early as 1995 or 2001. As such,the petitioners dispute that the licensee has established an accurate and reliable referencetemperature point for Palisades pressure vessel RTndt and RTpts values as a basis forextending Palisades operations for an additional 20-year period.D. The petitioners contend that a significant dispute exists with regard to NMCassumptions on the low probability of an event to initiate a severe overcooling transient withrepressurization such that the resulting crack will be of such size and location as to make theprobability of a significant Palisades vessel fracture acceptably smallS2Notes from NRC Telephone Call, "Palisades phone call," 11/24/2004, ML043340206. NMC relies heavily upon assumptions that the probability of an initiating event isacceptably small, as do other pressurized water reactor operators. Given the associateduncertainty with the actual degradation of the Palisades reactor pressure vessel, thePetitioners submit that to take any comfort that the "big one" is not going to occur isuncomfortably remniscent of the lack of an effective governmental response to the inadequatelevees around New Orleans based on the improbability of conditions leading to the Gulf Coastcity encountering a hurricane greater than Category Ill.This type of accident is beyond the design basis of Palisades Nuclear Power Station,namely its safety systems, including the emergency core cooling system and the containment,which are not designed to withstand cracks in the pressure vessel resulting in the inability tosufficiently cool the reactor core and reactor core damage.3) The petitioners dispute the Applicant's assertion that it can optionally anneal theembrittled vessel, given the lack of a demonstrated effective annealing process for anyirradiated commercial reactor pressure vessels and the applicant's abandonment of aprior commitment for annealing the Palisades reactor pressure vessel that make theabandonment of Flux Reduction efforts for economic considerations unreasonableAnnealing, while a routine process in metallurgy, is acknowledged to be complicated byreactor pressure vessel radioactivity. For Palisades it would involve heating the beltline weldand perhaps the axial welds or some vessel plates to about 8500 F for approximately a weekor more. Even then, early estimates as to how long an annealing repair will last is a matter ofdebate and depend on a number of factors. Alan Hiser, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissionwas attributed to say "If the material is a weld, rather than a plate, the annealing repair will beless effective and the re-embrittlement faster. The chemistry of the material is crucial, as well -- steels or welds containing nickel or copper are more subject to embrittlement and re-embrittlement."'3 Exhibit 1-H.Palisades has previously announced plans to anneal the reactor pressure vessel buthas taken no action. On January.5, 1995, Consumers Power Company informed itsemployees that the Palisades reactor would reach its PTS screening criteria limit as early as1996. Consumers Power then announced plans to anneal the Palisades vessel by the year2000.14Palisades operators met with the NRC Commission Chairman on May 11, 1995regarding its planned annealing operation."5While the Applicant refers to annealing of the pressure vessel to mitigate the severelyembrittled component as an option it can take up at the "appropriate time," in fact, theApplicant withdrew its original request for further NRC staff review of its Preliminary ThermalAnnealing Report as the company disclosed that it no longer had plans to anneal theembrittled vessel in 1998.16NRC and the nuclear industry had an opportunity to test the annealing process on theirradiated decommissioned Yankee Rowe nuclear reactor pressure vessel but took no suchaction, instead Yankee Atomic Corporation used the badly embrittled vessel as a nuclearwaste container for burial in Barnwell, South Carolina. While the NRC and industry havereferred to the Yankee Atomic vessel as atypical of other commercial vessels, a valuableopportunity to test the annealing process on an irradiated specimen was a lost opportunity for"1 Outlook for Life Extension, Special Report to the Readers of Nucleonics Week, Inside NRC andNuclearFuel," April 11, 1991 p. 10.4 "Consumers May Anneal Palisades' Vessel-A U.S. First," Nucleonics Week, January 12, 1995, p. 1.Meeting Summary between the Chairman and Consumers Power Co., US NRC, Microfiche Address84015:231- 84015:231." Consumers Energy Co. (formerly Consumers Power Co.) Withdraws Request for Further Staff Reviewof Preliminary Thermal Annealing Report, April 24, 1997, US NRC PDR, Microform Addresses:92745:358-92745:359. the entire industry. As a result, there is no experience with annealing severely-embrittledcommercial power reactors in the United States which, coupled with the Applicant'sabandonment of Flux Reduction Programs and the unreliability of the Applicant's past safetyanalysis, renders the Application deficient and deserving of rejection.4) The Petitioners argue that Contention 1 on the Palisades embrittlement andPTS issue is not an improperly challenge to Commission rulingsThe Petitioners have valid and proper concerns regarding consistent, thorough andviable analysis and documentation of Pressure Thermal Shock values calculated by both theindustry and the NRC for Palisades, which is arguably one of the most embrittled reactors inthe United States. Since 1981, the Palisades pressure vessel has been at the forefront of theembrittlement controversy and associated safety concerns for a Pressure Thermal Shockaccident.The Palisades nuclear power station pressure vessel has been analyzed and re-analyzed by NRC and projected to exceed its Pressure Thermal Shock Screening Criteria innumerous time frames:> April 03, 1989, Consumers Power provided a revised report on reactor vessel fluencefor operational cycles 1 through 8 in association with its vessel fluence reduction report. "Itconcludes that the PTS screening criteria will be exceeded at the axial welds in September2001 as opposed to the previously reported exceed date of March 2002.17 Exhibit 1-1.Consumers Power Company (Now CMS) acknowledges a calculational uncertainty of + / -25%in estimating the calculated vessel wall fluence, this is said to be typical of current neutrontransport methodology uncertainties. Consumers reported:'7 Compliance with Pressurized Thermal Shock Regulation 10CFR50.61 and Regulatory Guide 1.99Revision 2 (TAC No. 59970), Consumers Power, May 17, 1990, p. 1. A number of factors contribute to the uncertainty in the projected peak fastfluence at the reactor vessel wall. These factors are due to the conversion of measuredactivity data to fluxes, uncertainties in material composition, neutron cross sections,power distributions, as-built core/vessel dimensions and cycle-by-cycle variation in thefast flux lead factors.18> In the October 28, 1994 revision of NRC's "Status of Reactor Pressure Vessel Issues"(SECY 94-267) reports the staff indicated that the Palisades Pressure Vessel would reach thepressurized thermal shock (PTS) screening criteria in the year 2004.19> In a revision in November 1994, NRC staff reported that:[T]he staff was informed of preliminary data from the retired steam generatorsthat indicates the Palisades reactor pressure vessel could reach the PTS screeningcriteria earlier than 2004. The licensee is continuing to evaluate the new data and togather additional materials properties from its retired steam generators. If thepreliminary data are confirmed, the plant would reach the PTS screen criteria at thenext outage in May 1995.20> On January 24, 1995 in a NRC meeting on "Materials Issues in Palisades PTSEvaluation," the Palisades PTS criteria is again referenced and revised in staff view graphsstating: "November 1, 1994, licensee informed staff that data from SG [steam generators]welds -Indicated higher copper contents than previously assumed -Indicated higher RTndtthan mean generic value- Licensee assessment indicated reaching PTS screening criteria in1999. 021> On November 24, 2004, a documented NRC telephone conversation furtherenlightens the ongoing uncertainty and inconsistency of estimating a still elusive timetable forexceeding the public safety-related criteria:From: Stephanie Coffin81d., p. 33.q "Status of Reactor Pressure Vessel Issues," SECY-94-267, US NRC, October 28, 1994 (Exhibit 1-K).2-"ltems of Interest," Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Week Ending November 04, 1994 (Exhibit 1-L)..21 "Materials Issues in Palisades PTS Evaluation," Presented to NSRRC Subcommittee on Materials andEngineering, US NRC, January 24, 1995 (Exhibit 1-M). To: Hoffman, StephenDate: 11/24/04 3:05PM

Subject:

Palisades phone callWe had a phone call with them Monday.They no longer plan on submitting an exemption to apply "Master Curve" at their facility.Instead, they will be managing it in accordance with the May 27, 2004 guidance fromReyes to the Commissioners. They are following Point Beach and Beaver Valleyclosely.I gave them feedback especially about the flux reduction requirements of the currentrule and suggested they review the Point Beach submittal and our associated SER withOpen Items, and to check for applicability to their plant.FYI for Matt and Barry and Neil:If they see that the new PTS rule will not be published in time for them (they currentlyexceed the screening criteria in 2014 -I don't know if we agree with that), they willsubmit the Master Curve exemption in 2007.StephanieCC: Duvigneaud, Dylanne; Elliot, Barry; Mitchell, Matthew; Ray, Nihar; Stang, John" 22[The petitioners note that the referenced May 27, 2004 communication from Reyes to theCommissioners regarding Palisades management plan is not available to the public throughNRC ADAMS.]Palisades values for exceeding the PTS criteria have been extremely fluid, back andforth, with significant disparity in the year that the criteria is exceeded. The lack of consistentreliable analyses of the rate and level of embrittlement, complicated by the lack of viablePalisades-specific in-vessel sampling materials, together with dependence on generic industrydata, demonstrate the unreliability of data used to establish Palisades' compliance with thescreening criteria and subsequent effective mitigation actions for the license extension period.22 Notes from NRC Telephone Call, "Palisades phone call," 11/24/2004, ML043340206, Exhibit 1-G. This contention arises from evidence contained within the NRC's Staff contacts with theaffected utility. The bases for a contention need not originate with the petitioner. Petitionershere properly may base their contention on NRC Staff letters to an applicant, so long as thereis an adequate explanation of how alleged deficiencies support its contention and that there isadditional information in support. Louisiana Energy Services L.P. (Claiborne EnrichmentCenter), LBP-91-41, 34 NRC 332, 338-339 (1991). See Sacramento Municipal Utility District(Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-92-23, 36 NRC 120, 136 (1992), appealgranted in part and remanded, CLI-93-3, 37 NRC 135 (1993).5) The significant uncertainty represents a dispute of fact that underminesconfidence in Palisades treatment of PTS values for the License Renewal ProcessThe Palisades nuclear power station one of four U.S. reactor sites participating in thedevelopment of models for developing the technical basis for the revision of the PTS Rule. Areview of transcripts of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Joint SubcommitteesMaterials and Metallurgy and Thermal Hydraulic Phenomena and Reliability and ProbabilisticRisk Assessment reveals substantial and significant uncertainties with regard to capturing andbounding public safety risk associated with ongoing operations further complicated by thetwenty year license extension in three major technical areas: probabilistic fracture mechanics,thermal hydraulics and probabilistic risk assessment.NRC staff went to the ACRS in November 2004, seeking a letter of endorsement of thestaff effort to revise the current PTS rule. The revised PTS screening criteria is incomplete andfraught with uncertainty. According to the NRC Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, in its Conclusions and Recommendations on NUREG-1809 "Thermal-Hydraulic Evaluation ofPressure Thermal Shock "should be substantially revised."23There are numerous citations in the ACRS transcripts that underscore the uncertaintythat prompted the ACRS' call for the substantial revision of the technical basis for on Thermal-Hydraulic Evaluation of Pressure Thermal Shock.5) There is a lack of transparency and an incomplete record of NRC processes anddocuments which potentially affect the Palisades License Renewal Process with regardto how the Revision of the PTS Rule may affect the outcome of the ApplicationThe NRC has not provided sufficient transparency and completeness of the publicrecord germane to the processes with potential implications for the Palisades licenseextension. The Petitioners are not able to thoroughly review current NRC efforts to revise itsPressure Thermal Shock Rule. NRC has not made all of its germane safety documentation,albeit draft documents, available for public review. Two key examples are:1) "Technical Basis for Revision of Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) Screening Limitin the PTS Rule (10 CFR 50.61): Summary Report," NUREG-1 806, Draft for Peer ReviewPanel and ACRS Review, November 2, 2004; and2) "Thermal Hydraulic Evaluation of Pressurized Thermal Shock," NUREG- 1809, Draft,February, 2005.Whether or not a basis for contentions has been established must be decided byconsidering the contentions in the context of the entire record of the case up to the time thecontentions are filed. Thus, when an application for a license amendment is itself incomplete,Pressure Thermal Shock (PTS) Evaluation Project: Technical Basis for Revision of the PTS ScreeningCriterion in the PTS Rule," March 11, 2005, Graham Wallis, Chairman, Advisory Committee on ReactorSafeguards, US NRC, p. 1., NRC ADAMS ML 050730177. the standard for the admission of contentions is lowered, because it is easier for petitioners tohave reasons for believing that the application has not demonstrated the safety of theproposed procedures for which an amendment is sought. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (PointBeach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-45, 14 NRC 853 (1981). Petitioners urge thatthis contention should be deemed admissible at a lower standard precisely because there isundisclosed information which can be explored adequately for its relevance to the Applicationat a hearing.With respect to their Contention No. 1, Petitioners have demonstrated many factualconundrums which must be resolved by means of a merit hearing. All that is required for acontention to be acceptable for litigation is that it be specific and have a basis. Whether or notthe contention is true is left to litigation on the merits in the licensing proceeding. WashingtonPublic Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2), ALAB-722, 17 NRC 546, 551n.5 (1983), citing Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Aliens Creek Nuclear Generating Station,Unit 1), ALAB-590, 11 NRC 542 (1980); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station,Units 1 and 2), ALAB-806, 21 NRC 1183, 1193 n.39 (1985); Philadelphia Electric Co. (LimerickGenerating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 694 (1985). The factual supportnecessary to show that a genuine dispute exists need not be in formal evidentiary form, nor beas strong as that necessary to withstand a summary disposition motion. What is required is "aminimal showing that material facts are in dispute, thereby demonstrating that an 'inquiry indepth' is appropriate." Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Unit 1), CLI-94-10, 40 NRC43, 51 (1994) (citing Final Rule, Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings --Procedural Changes in the Hearing Process, 54 Fed. Reg. 33,168, 33,171 (Aug. 11, 1989),quoting Connecticut Bankers Association v. Board of Governors, 627 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir.1980). Response as to Contention No. 2 (Excessive radioactive and toxic chemicalcontamination in local drinking water due to emissions from Palisades nuclear powerplant as part of its daily, "routine" operations)NMC states (Answer p. 14) that this contention "is inadmissible because (i) thesubstance of the assertions (alleged radioactive and chemical emissions from the plant) areoutside the scope of this proceeding, and (ii) the assertions are vague and unsupported byfactual basis." The Staff likewise challenges (Staff Answer p. 14) this contention as "...vagueand lacking in the required supporting information ... " The NRC goes on to state (Answer p.14) that Petitioners failed "to provide the specific factual information necessary to provide avalid basis for any safety claim ..." Petitioners provide considerable information below, but itshould be noted that the NRC has had in its possession these very documents for years, evendecades. NRC staff also challenges this contention as being "generalized and unsupportedarguments," but the information supplied below turns away that assertion. The NRC staff'sfailures to address these concerns is a violation of the agency's own mandate and mission toprotect public health and safety and the environment.NMC says (Answer p. 15) that "radioactive and chemical emissions from the plant arenot issues related -to the management of aging or time-limited aging analyses." On thecontrary, such emissions are age-related, in that deteriorating and degrading reactor systems,including the Palisades reactor's fuel rods, pipes, tanks, and valves, will increase the amountsof toxic chemicals and radioactivity released into the Lake Michigan ecosystem over time dueto increased leaks and malfunctions. Not only do "routine" releases thus increase, but so doesthe risk of more severe incidents and accidents as the reactor ages.NMC (Answer p. 15) seeks to dismiss the validity of this contention by stating"[r]adiation exposure to the public during the renewal term is a Category 1 issue determined to be small, based on a generic finding that radiation doses to the public will continue at currentlevels associated with normal operations." However, as stated above, releases of toxicchemicals and radioactivity over time can be expected to increase due to more leakage andmalfunctioning of age-deteriorated and degraded equipment and systems. In addition, therecent report published by the National Academies of Science (NAS) Committee on theBiological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR VII, published June 2005 and entitled "HealthEffects from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation") found that exposure to even lowlevels of ionizing radiation has a negative impact on human health. See http://www.nap.edu/books/030909156X/html. The significance of the NAS BEIR VII Report's findings andrelevance to ascertaining the implications of 20 more years of radioactivity emissions fromPalisades is unmistakable. The NRC's previous conclusion that the impact to public health isminimal or trivial must be re-evaluated in light of the recently published NAS BEIR VII report.NMC urges that the contention is "inadmissible because it is vague and unsupported byany factual basis, "that it "fails to identify what toxic and radioactive substances allegedly arereleased during the plant's 'routine' operations, and in what respect any such emissions areallegedly 'excessive.' "Specifically, the radioactive releases from the Palisades nuclear powerplant into the environment of the Great Lakes Basin that are of most concern includeradioactive hydrogen (tritium), radioactive noble gases (such as xenon and krypton, whichrelatively quickly transform into biologically active radioactive substances such as cesium andstrontium), as well as fission products, activation products, and transuranics that find their wayinto the environment after escaping the reactor or the irradiated fuel.Documentation recording such releases at Palisades includes the "RadioactiveMaterials Released from Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG/CR-2907, BNL-NUREG-51581, Vol. 14, Annual Report 1993, prepared by J. Tichler, K. Doty, and K. Lucadamo, BrookhavenNational Laboratory, prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, covering the years1974 to 1993, and documenting reported annual emissions of such liquid and airborneeffluents from Palisades as tritium, mixed fission and activation products. See Exhibit 2-A.The following figures were reported for emissions from the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant:From Table 2, pages 8 to 10Airborne Effluents Comparison By Year/Fission and Activation Gases (Total Curies)1974: <1.OOE+001975: 2.61 E+031976: 2.99E+011977: 5.99E+011978: 3.23E+021979: 6.84E+011980: 1.40E+021981: 3.OOE+031982: 7.38E+031983: 3.OOE+031984: 2.84E+011985: 3.68E+031986: 1.73E+021987: 1.75E+031988: 2.43E+031989: 1.52E+021990: 1.21E+021991: 6.26E+011992: 7.46E+011993: 9.29E+01From Table 6, pages 20 to 22 Liquid Effluents, Comparison By Year/Tritium (Curies)1974: 8.10E+001975: 4.16E+011976: 9.63E+001977: 5.58E+011978: 1.01E+021979: 1.26E+021980: 7.47E+011981: 2.78E+021982: 1.79E+021983: 2.35E+021984:6.95E+011985: 4.29E+021986: 6.32E+011987: 1.19E+021988: 2.83E+021989: 8.06E+011990: 1.49E+021991: 5.52E+011992: 8.09E+011993: 2.1OE+02From Table 8, pages 26 to 28Liquid Effluents, Comparison By Year/Mixed Fission and Activation Products (Curies)1974: 5.90E+001975: 3.45E+001976: 4.40E-011977: 9.29E-021978: 9.65E-021979: 1.28E-011980: 8.73E-031981: 3.31E-02 1982: 1.27E-011983: 7.48E-021984: 3.68E-021985: 5.83E-021986: 1.40E-011987: 9.23E-021988: 3.43E-021989: 3.75E-031990: 7.75E-031991: 1.14E-021992: 3.88E-031993: 1.40E-02Similarly, the Palisades effluent release reports for 1994 to 2000 could be similarlyexamined in detail. The following reports for 2001 to 2003 clearly show that emissions havecontinued. In fact, annual reports for 2004 to the present day would show that emissionscontinue still. Radioactivity emissions into the air, water, and soil are inevitable at Palisadesnuclear power plant, and would continue from 2011 to 2031 if allowed.Palisades' ""RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORT: GASEOUS EFFLUENTS -SUMMATION OF RELEASES: JANUARY-DECEMBER 2001" ATTACHMENT 2 reports thefollowing:FISSION & ACTIVATION GASES, Total Release:1 Qtr: 3.01 E+00 Ci2nd Qtr: 2.92E+00 Ci3rd Qtr: 2.21E-02 Ci4th Qtr: 0.00Specific radionuclides are listed individually. See Exhibit 2-B. In ATTACHMENT 3, "RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORT: LIQUIDEFFLUENTS -SUMMATION OF RELEASES: JANUARY-DECEMBER 2001" the totalrelease of fission and activation products (not including tritium, gases, and alpha emitters) wasreported as:1st Qtr: 2.81 E-06 Ci2nd Qtr: 2.45E-04 Ci3rd Qtr: 0.000 Ci4th Qtr: 3.68E-05 CiAgain, individual nuclides released are identified there. See Exhibit 2-C.Palisades' ""RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORT: GASEOUS EFFLUENTS-SUMMATION OF RELEASES: JANUARY-DECEMBER 2002" ATTACHMENT 2 reports thefollowing:FISSION & ACTIVATION GASES, Total Release:1 s Qtr: 5.01E-01 Ci2nd Qtr: 3.20E+00 Ci3rd Qtr: 1.65E+00 Ci4th Qtr: 3.26E+01Specific radionuclides are listed individually. See Exhibit 2-D.In ATTACHMENT 3, "RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORT: LIQUIDEFFLUENTS -SUMMATION OF RELEASES: JANUARY-DECEMBER 2002" the totalrelease of fission and activation products (not including tritium, gases, and alpha emitters) wasreported as:Is' Qtr: 9.59E-05 Ci2nd Qtr: 0.000 Ci3rd Qtr: 1.83E-04 Ci 4th Qtr: 7.48E-07 CiAgain, individual nuclides released are identified there. See Exhibit 2-E.Similarly, Palisades' "RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORT: GASEOUSEFFLUENTS -SUMMATION OF RELEASES: JANUARY-DECEMBER 2003" ATTACHMENT2 reports the following:FISSION & ACTIVATION GASES, Total Release:I Qtr: 6.07E+01 Ci2nd Qtr: 3.p5E+00 Ci3rd Qtr: 4.96E-01 Ci4th Qtr: 7.42E-01Individual fission gases identified as being released in various amounts from Palisadesinclude: krypton-85, 87, and 88; Xenon-131m, 133, 135m, 138; individual lodines identified asbeing released in various amounts from Palisades include: Iodine 131,132, 133, 135;Particulates with half-lives greater than 8 days include: Chromium-51; Manganese-54; Cobalt-58; Cobalt-60; Niobium-95; Ruthenium-103; Strontium-89; Strontium-90; Cesium-134; Cesium-137; Zirconium-95; Cobalt-57; as well as net identified beta emitters. See Exhibit 2-F.In ATTACHMENT 3, "RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORT: LIQUIDEFFLUENTS -SUMMATION OF RELEASES: JANUARY-DECEMBER 2003" the totalrelease of fission and activation products (not including tritium, gases, and alpha emitters) wasreported as:1 " Qtr: 2.09E-04 Ci2nd Qtr: 5.40E-04 Ci3rd Qtr: 0.000 Ci4th Qtr: 1.45E-03 Ci Again, individual nuclides released are identified there. See Exhibit 2G.As the NAS BEIR VII Report found, even so-called "low" level radiation exposure has anegative, adverse impact on human health.Petitioners challenge the methodology upon which all of these annual reports arebased. On September 13, 2005 Kevin Kamps of NIRS spoke by phone with a worker at theCity of South Haven, Michigan's Water Filtration Plant. The City of South Haven's WaterFiltration Plant supplies drinking water to customers in the City and townships of Casco, Covertand South Haven. This plant supplies water to nearly 3,400 customers located in these areas.The water comes from Lake Michigan, a surface water source, through an intake pipe locatedabout a mile offshore from South Beach in the City of South Haven, just several miles northand downstream (given the prevailing direction of flow in Lake Michigan) from the Palisadesnuclear power plant, which emits radioactivity into the waters of Lake Michigan daily. The lakewater is treated, settled, filtered and disinfected as it goes through the Water Filtration Plant,but radioactivity is not removed by any of these processes.The worker at the Water Filtration Plant explained that while he does collect samples ofLake Michigan water on a daily and monthly basis to test for radiation, he turns those samplesover to the Palisades nuclear power plant, which then performs the testing itself (and/orthrough subcontrators). This fox-guarding-the-henhouse transfer of the water samples backinto the hands of the Palisades nuclear power plant represents an unacceptable methodology,given its vulnerability to falsification by Palisades personnel, which would be in the interest ofPalisades, to under-report radioactivity levels in the source of drinking water for nearbycommunities. Genuinely independent radiation monitoring must be performed, without the risk of falsification by the very company that stands to benefit from low reports of radiation in thewaterNMC states (NMC Answer p. 16) that "...Petitioners... failed to provide any 'allegedfacts' or 'expert opinion that supports the contention.' "To the contrary, Petitioners haveconsulted with Dr. John Robbins, a Great Lakes limnologist recently retired from the U.S.Chamber of Commerce, National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Adminstration (NOAA),Great Lakes Environmental Research Laboratory (GLERL) in Ann Arbor, Michigan (where,among other things, he specialized in analyzing radioactivity in the Great Lakes, beingreferenced in such publications as the International Joint Commission's Nuclear Task Force'sDecember 1997 "Inventory of Radionuclides for the Great Lakes," namely, the report he co-authored in 1980 entitled "Plutonium in the Great Lakes," which appeared in "TransuranicElements in the Environment," edited by W.C. Hanson, published by the U.S. Dept. of Energy,see specifically pages 659 to 683 of that report, referenced on page 98 of the IJC report). SeeExhibit 2-H. Dr. Robbins has established that the predominant current flow is from south tonorth in Lake Michigan near the Palisades nuclear reactor. Therefore, not only the new intakebuilt just offshore from Palisades, but the old intake at South Beach in South Haven aredirectly in line for radioactive and toxic chemical contamination. Dr. Robbins believes that it isnot implausible, on average, for those water intakes to serve as radioactivity receptors from theemissions into Lake Michigan at Palisades. Thus, the drinking water for South Haven, Casco,and Covert could very well be contaminated with radioactivity from Palisades, which, even atso-called low levels, would have an adverse impact on human health, as found by the NASBEIR VII Report.To confirm the direction of Lake Michigan water flow in the vicinity of Palisades, Dr.Robbins referred us to Dr. Dave Schwab, who still works at NOAA's GLERL. Dr. Schwab is one of the top experts on the direction of flow of Lake Michigan's waters. Dr. Schwab confirmsthat the prevailing direction of Lake Michigan water flow is from south to north, the verydirection of flow that would carry radioactivity and toxic chemicals released by Palisades intothe drinking water intakes for South Haven, Casco, and Covert. Dr. Schwab pointed to thefollowing field data to support this finding:Gerald Miller, Michael McCormick, James SaylorGreat Lakes Environmental Research Lab2205 Commonwealth Blvd.Ann Arbor, MI 48105Phone: 734/741-2119, 734/741-2277, 734/741-2118FAX: 734/741-2055Email: michael.mccormick@noaa.govGLERL Vector Averaging Current Meter (VACM) Moorings 10/1999-06/2000Manufacturer: EG&GHeader Line: N Lat (dec. deg), W. Lon (dec. deg), VACM Depth (m), Inst. No.,Year Deployed, Mooring NameExplanation of Columns in the Data SetYEAR Year (UT)DOY Day of year (UT)TIME Universal time (UT -Hours and minutes HHMM)E Eastward component of mean horizontal current (cm/s)N Northward component of mean horizontal current (cm/s)WT Water Temperature (deg C)Data Sources:Inst DepthFile Name Mooring Lat (N) Lon (W) No. Dates VACM/Water Op #VO1-1999-12M.txt VO1-99 41 48.89' 86 40.80' 556 No Data 12/20m S1999294.01V01-1999-19M.txt V01-99 41 48.89' 86 40.80' 265 10/20/99-06/15/00 19/20m S1999294.01V03-1999-14M.txt V03-99 41 58.17' 86 57.34' 569 10/20/99-06/15/00 14/62m S1999293.03V03-1999-61M.txt V03-99 41 58.17' 86 57.34' 348 10/20/99-06/15/00 61/62m S 1999293.03 V04-1999-1OM.txt V04-99 41 54.85' 86 40.74' 347 10/20/99-06/15/00 10/18m S1999294.02(A)V04-1 999-1 7M.txt V04-99(A)V05-1999-12M.txt V05-99V05-1999-39M.txt V05-99V06-1999-13M.txt V06-99V06-1 999-60M.txt V06-99V07-1999-11 M.txt V07-99V07-1999-58M.txt V07-99(B)V08-1999-09M.txt V08-99V08-1999-56M.txt V08-99V09-1999-11 M.txt V09-99V09-1999-18M.txt V09-99V1 0-1999-1OM.txt Vi 0-99V1 0-1 999-27M.txt V1 0-99V11-1999-1OM.txt V11-99V1 1-1999-37M.txt V1 1-99V12-1999-11M.txt V12-99V1 2-1999-58M.txt V1 2-99V1 3-1999-13M.txt V13-99V1 3-1999-20M.txt V1 3-9941 54.85' 86 40.74' 354 10/20/99-06/15/00 17/18m S1999294.0241 57.95' 86 44.82' 572 10/20/99-06/15/00 12/40m 31999293.0541 57.95' 86 44.82' 551 10/20/99-06/15/00 39/40m 31999293.054200.53' 8647.90' 274 10/20/99-06/14/00 13/61m S1999293.0442 00.53' 86 47.90' 311 10/20/99-06/14/00 60/61m $1999293.044207.41' 8641.19' 574 No Data 11/59m 31999299.014207.41' 8641.19' 319 10/26/99-06/14/00 58/59m S1999299.0142 15.18' 86 39.87' 279 10/26/99-06/13/0042 15.18' 86 39.87' 568 10/26/99-06/13/0042 14.51' 86 25.19' 573 10/27/99-06/14/0042 14.51' 86 25.19' 352 10/27/99-06/14/0042 15.83' 86 27.90' 553 10/27/99-06/14/0042 15.83' 86 27.90' 277 10/27/99-06/14/0042 17.20' 86 31.35' 555 10/27/99-06/14/0042 17.20' 86 31.35' 280 10/27/99-06/13/0042 20.27' 86 38.08' 583 10/27/99-06/13/0042 20.27' 86 38.09' 349 10/27/99-06/13/0042 20.04' 86 21.65' 577 10/19/99-04/25/0042 20.04' 86 21.65' 576 10/19/99-04/25/0009/57m56/57m11/19m18/19m10/28m27/28m10/38m37/38m11/59m58/59m13/21 m20/21 mS1999299.02S1999299.0231999300.0531999300.05S1999300.0431999300.0431999300.0331999300.0331999300.0231999300.0231999292.0131999292.01-----------------------------------------------------------------------------(A) Water temperature only(B) Current velocity data ends 10/26/99, water temperature to end.Missing data denoted by -999.0Manufacturers specifications:Velocity: Threshold 2.5 cm/sRotor Constant 34.6 cm/revTemperature: Accuracy +-0.1CCompass: Accuracy +-5 degSee http://www.glerl.noaa.gov/eegle/data/1999-00/moormiller/vacm.meta.txt for a better laidout format, and also see http://www.glerl.noaa.gov/eegle/data/objects/obj_1 8.V1 3.4.html Station V-1 3 is the closest to Palisades, and thus the most relevant to questions ofLake Michigan water flow direction in the vicinity of the reactor. Dr. Schwab has mostlyaddressed the macro level of water flow in Lake Michigan, but is now delving into the issue ofmicro level of water flow. Thus, he will address locales of tight scope, such as the immediatevicinity of the Palisades reactor, so close as it is to one operational and one potential source ofdrinking water for the residents (and large numbers of visitors, given the tourism of theLakeshore region) in South Haven, Casco, and Covert.Additionally, Dr. Rosalie Bertell, GNSH, with the International Institute of Concern forPublic Health, has provided consultation to Petitioners. Dr. Bertell has also served as alongtime National Advisory Board member of NIRS. Dr. Bertell has served on the Nuclear TaskForce of the International Joint Commission, where she helped in the publication of the"Inventory of Radionuclides for the Great Lakes," (Dec. 1997), as well as the 1999 "Report onBioaccumulation of Elements to Accompany the Inventory of Radionuclides in the Great LakesBasin." Dr. Bertell has worked professionally in Environmental Epidemiology since 1968,served on the Advisory Boards for the Great Lakes Health Effects Program of Health Canada,and the Ontario Environmental Assessment Board and has been a member of the IJC ScienceAdvisory Board. She has published a "Handbook for Estimating the Health Effects of Exposureto Ionizing Radiation" and the popular non-fiction book "No Immediate Danger: Prognosis for aRadioactive Earth," together with more than 100 other publications. She has providedconsultation to Petitioners on the issue of performing water sampling near Palisades in order tocorrect the methodological flaw mentioned earlier of Palisades handling the water samplesbefore they are actually tested by an independent institution.Dr. Bertell referred Petitioners to Dr. Hari Sharm in Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, anuclear chemist who can test for radioactivity and toxic chemicals in Lake Michigan water samples for Petitioners. Dr. Sharm has expressed an interest in helping to carry out this vitalwork and is assisting Petitioners in the process of developing a methodology for carrying outthis independent assessment on the radiation and toxic chemicals being emitted by thePalisades nuclear power plant into the drinking water source, Lake Michigan, for the residentsand visitors in South Haven, Casco, and Covert.The basis-with-reasonable-specificity standard requires that an intervenor include in asafety contention a statement of the reason for his contention. This statement must eitherallege with particularity that an applicant is not complying with a specified regulation, or allegewith particularity the existence and detail of a substantial safety issue on which the regulationsare silent. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-106, 16 NRC 1649, 1656 (1982), citing 10 CFR § 2.335 (formerly § 2.758). While NRCregulations have not yet changed to accommodate the conclusions of BEIR VII, this majorscientific pronouncement compels a rethinking of the exposure of the public to routine radiationemissions from Palisades through their water supply. A substantial safety issue is exposed inthis contention, and it must be admitted for the inquiry of a contested hearing.Response as to Contention No. 3 (The Palisades reactor has no place to store itsoverflowing irradiated nuclear fuel inventory within NRC regulations)The Staff argue that "[t]his proposed contention lacks basis and support... [and] failsto establish that a genuine dispute exists on a material issue of law or fact .... Staff Answerp. 15. The Nuclear Management Company maintains that the contention is "...inadmissiblebecause it is not supported by a basis demonstrating the existence of a genuine materialdispute." NMC Answer p. 16. In a way, the Petitioners agree; there is no material dispute overthe facts, but the facts compel the conclusion that Palisades' dry cask storage arrangements violate NRC regulations.Specifically, the material facts prove -and exceed the threshold showing that must bemade here -that neither the old nor the more recent, "new" concrete pads holding dry casks atPalisades conform with longstanding NRC requirements for earthquake stability standards. Asthe attached Affidavit of Dr. Ross Landsman, formerly of the Nuclear Regulatory Commissionstaff, depicts, both pads were built on compacted sand and other subsurface materials,dozens of feet above bedrock and well above the ground elevation of the nearby nuclearpower plant. Dr. Landsman, who has decades of experience and a direct oversight role in theinspection of dry cask storage at Palisades when he worked at NRC Region III during thecritical period of dry cask storage installation and operation from 1993 to 2005, has concludedfrom his personal knowledge of the subsoil conditions that the older pad nearer the lake is inviolation of NRC liquefaction regulations under 10 CFR Part 72.212(b)(2)(i)(B)24, while thenewer pad further inland is in violation of NRC amplification regulations under the sameregulations. Neither the older nor newer dry cask storage pads at the Palisades plant weredesigned in consideration of the factors contained in the cited regulation. See LandsmanAffidavit, ¶ ¶ 3-13.25 Either violation, then, violates 10 CFR 72.212(b)(3).26 This means that thecask storage pads have violated NRC regulations since they were constructed, andabsent enforcement will continue to violate NRC regulations during a 20-year license24[[The general licensee shall perform written evaluations, prior to use, that establish that]: Caskstorage pads and areas have been designed to adequately support the static and dynamic loads of thestored casks, considering potential amplification of earthquakes through soil-structure interaction, andsoil liquefaction potential or other soil instability due to vibratory ground motion.25The Landsman Affidavit appears in electronic form annexed hereto and also in hard copy at pp.App. 3-a through 3-d of the "Petitioners' Appendix of Evidence in Support of Contentions."26[The general licensee shall]: Review the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) referenced in theCertificate of Compliance and the related NRC Safety Evaluation Report, prior to use of the generallicense, to determine whether or not the reactor site parameters, including analyses of earthquakeintensity and tornado missiles, are enveloped by the cask design bases considered in these reports. Theresults of this review must be documented in the evaluation made in paragraph (b)(2) of this section. extension and beyond.The NRC, unfortunately, considers the older pad nearer the lake to be in compliancewith regulations and allows NMC to store high-level radioactive waste there, while the NRC issupposedly still trying to resolve through ongoing inspection, investigation, and analysis thestatus of the newer pad, which is situated further inland from Lake Michigan. However, duringthis alleged period of ongoing investigation, the NRC is allowing NMC to store waste on thenew pad despite the unresolved safety concerns. Dr. Landsman's understanding is that thenewer pad was built big enough to accommodate all the dry casks currently stored on the olderpad nearer the lake, because, despite public pronouncements to the contrary by ConsumersEnergy, Nuclear Management Company, and the NRC, the older pad clearly violatesregulations, which means that the 18 to 19 casks currently stored on the older pad27 must bemoved to the newer pad. The problem is, moving the casks from the older pad to the newerone is analogous to jumping from the frying pan into the fire.Dr. Landsman sought repeatedly while he worked for the NRC to see this unresolvedsafety issue corrected. Now, however, four casks are being stored on the newer pad. Inaddition, plans have been in place for additional casks to be loaded and stored on the newerpad in the near future, perhaps as early as fall 2005.While the NRC staff inveighs (Staff Answer p. 16) that "[p]etitioners lack the requisite27Including the unloadable, unmovable cask #4 at Palisades, loaded in June 1994 and shortlythereafter admitted by Consumers Power to be defective, having faulty welds. Now, eleven years on,Consumers has yet to unload the defective cask, because it technically cannot do so safely. And theconfiguration of the 18 to 19 dry casks currently stored on the older pad nearer Lake Michigan is suchthat the casks furthest back cannot be moved or unloaded until all other casks in front of them have beenmoved out of the way first. This situation increases the risks, making it very difficult to addressemergencies involving certain casks in the configuration in a timely manner.Although Petitioners/Intervenors are withdrawing their Contention No. 7 concerning dry cask #4as a separate contention (see infra), Palisades' noncompliance with earthquake standards has elevatedportents for this particular vessel of high-level radioactive waste. basis and support for their claim, highlighted by the fact that they have not produced anyaffidavits or other evidence as to the opinion of their 'anticipated expert'," the NRC had thebenefit for years of Petitioners' expert's warnings and has done little to nothing about it,contrary to the agency's mission and mandate to protect public health and safety and theenvironment. NMC states (NMC Answer p. 19) that "Contention 3 is not supported by a basisdemonstrating a genuine issue." Actually, it is the dry cask storage pads, and the very deadlyhigh-level radioactive waste they hold, that is not supported by a base that is safe and securefrom earthquake dangers. NMC further urges (Answer p. 19) that "[t]he results of the licenseeanalysis showed that the [older] pad could support the casks safely. The results aredocumented in a letter to the NRC dated July 27, 1994." NMC additionally cites the NRC'sSeptember 20, 1994 "Independent NRC Staff Final Safety Assessment of the Dry StorageFacility at Palisades Nuclear Power Plant Site" as further proof of issue resolution. NMClikewise points out a June 5, 1995 NRC Information Notice (95-28, "Emplacement of SupportPads for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Installations at Reactor Sites," p. 3) as proof that all is fine atthe older pad nearer the lake.But both the Staff and NMC somehow have failed to disclose the contents of a letterwritten by Dr. Landsman while at NRC Region III as a safety engineer and dry cask storageinspector overseeing Palisades, to the then-Commission Chairman, Ivan Selin, on February17, 1994, warning that:[I]f you use NRC-approved casks under Subpart K [of 10 CFR Part 72], theregulations are silent about the foundation material or the pad. Actually, it's theconsequences that might occur from an earthquake that I'm concerned about. Thecasks can either fall into Lake Michigan or be buried in the loose sand because ofliquefaction .... It is apparent to me that NMSS [sic] doesn't realize the catastrophicconsequences of their continued reliance on their current ideology. (Emphasis added)Dr. Landsman has never received a meaningful response to this warning and would attest under oath at the hearing of this contention that his safety concerns about the older pad, whichinvolve violations of NRC regulations and violations of public health and safety andenvironmental protection -remain inadequately addressed and unresolved to this day.The NRC staff (Staff Answer p. 16) asserts that "[t]his part of the Commission'sregulations has no relation to license renewal." NMC states (Answer p. 16) that "[t]hiscontention is beyond the scope of 10 CFR Part 54, because the dry cask storage pads are partof the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation ('ISFSI') facility which is distinct from -andlicensed separately from -the Palisades nuclear power plant." Both responses are disingen-uous. It is impossible to disconnect the dry cask storage pad problems from the proposedlicense extension. If both dry cask storage pads violate NRC safety regulations and are barredfrom use, then where, exactly, would NMC store its bulging inventory of irradiated nuclear fuel?And where would the 22 to 23 dry casks already loaded and stored on those defective pads atPalisades be moved to? These are not rhetorical questions; the answers are integral to the 20year license extension proposal, given that high-level radioactive waste is an inevitablebyproduct of electricity production at the Palisades nuclear reactor.NRC staff also claim (Staff Answer p. 16) that this contention impermissibly attacksNRC regulations, specifically the GElS on reactor license extension as well as the "NuclearWaste Confidence Rule." But, truth be told, at present there is no place for the wastesgenerated during a 20 year license extension at Palisades to be stored without violating NRCregulations. The NRC's "Nuclear Waste Confidence Decision" places false confidence in theavailability of a geologic repository in the U.S. by the year 2025, and biases the NRC in favorof approving a license for the proposed Yucca Mountain, Nevada dumpsite (the only oneunder consideration). It also, by implication, biases the NRC in favor of approving a 20-yearlicense extension at Palisades. NMC dismisses this contention (NMC Answer p. 18) by stating "... it is a challenge...to the generic findings in the GElS and Appendix B to Part 51." NMC further cites aCommission ruling on license extension at Oconee which states that "[t]he Commission'sgeneric determinations governing onsite waste storage preclude the Petitioners fromattempting to introduce such waste issues into this adjudication." But there was not firmevidence of regulatory violation concerning onsite waste storage in the Oconee proceeding.Presumably when the NRC establishes generic findings regarding on-site waste storage itassumes either that its safety regulations are being met at the particular nuclear plant inquestion, or else that it plans to take enforcement action against any violations of itsregulations. But, Petitioners here have articulated evidence that tends to prove in a compellingfashion that both of the dry cask storage pads at Palisades are in violation of NRC earthquakeregulations. This begs the question, why is NRC allowing high-level radioactive waste storageon pads at Palisades that are in violation of NRC earthquake regulations?At page 17 of its Answer, NMC states as fact something which is wholly false: that"[b]oth site specific and general licenses are issued for a maximum of 20 years, not 40 yearsas for nuclear power plants." Yet, late last year, the NRC Commissioners, by a 2 to 1 splitdecision (with NRC Chairman Nils Diaz voting against the proposal), approved a 40 yearlicense extension at the Surry Nuclear Power Plant ISFSI in Virginia, the oldest ISFSI in theU.S. So while the initial license may be granted for an initial 20 year period, NRC has indeedgranted a license extension for an ISFSI for 40 years. This potentially monumental safety errorcould well be relicensed.On page 18 of its Answer, NMC misconstrues Petitioners' contention, perhaps tomislead the Board. NMC states "[t]he regulations do not require licensees to explore the agingof components for a facility not covered by this license renewal proceeding. ..". It is not the aging of the pads that is at the heart of this contention (although pad deterioration over time isa significant safety issue that must be addressed as well), but rather the fact that both ISFSIpads at Palisades have continuously violated NRC earthquake regulations since the day theywere built.At the August 28, 2005 NRC public meeting in South Haven concerning the proposed20 year license extension at Palisades, neither NRC nor Nuclear Management Companyofficials could give the number of dry casks already loaded on the two pads at Palisades. Evenif the Staff and NMC don't ascribe the requisite seriousness to these issues -given the deadlynature of high-level radioactive waste -the Board must.All that is required for a contention to be acceptable for litigation is that it be specificand have a basis. Whether or not the contention is true is left to litigation on the merits in thelicensing proceeding. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2),LBP-89-28, 30 NRC 271, 282 (1989), aff'd on other ,qrounds, ALAB-940, 32 NRC 225 (1990);Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), LBP-91-19, 33 NRC 397, 411 (1991), appeal denied, CLI-91-12, 34 NRC 149 (1991). Here, the factsalleged, coupled with the expert opinions proffered, easily meet those requirements.A Licensing Board should not address the merits of a contention when determining itsadmissibility. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-106, 16 NRC 1649, 1654 (1982), citing Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Aliens Creek NuclearGenerating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-590, 11 NRC 542 (1980); Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (WolfCreek Generating Station, Unit 1), LBP-84-1, 19 NRC 29, 34 (1984); Commonwealth EdisonCo. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-11, 21 NRC 609, 617 (1985),rev'd and remanded on other grounds, CLI-86-8, 23 NRC 241 (1986). The petitioner simply must provide sufficient information to establish the existence of a genuine dispute with theapplicant on a material issue of law or fact. 10 CFR § 2.309(f)(1)(v) (formerly 2.714(b)(2)(iii)).See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-35, 34 NRC163, 166, 169-170, 175-76 (1991); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear PowerStation, Unit 1), LBP-91-39, 34 NRC 273, 279 (1991); Louisiana Energy Services, L.P.(Claiborne Enrichment Center), LBP-91-41, 34 NRC 332, 338 (1991); Northeast NuclearEnergy Company (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2), LBP-92-28, 36 NRC 202, 214(1992); Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-93-3, 37 NRC 135, 142 (1993); Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco NuclearGenerating Station), LBP-93-23, 38 NRC 200, 205 (1993); Gulf States Utilities Co. (River BendStation, Unit 1), CLI-94-10, 40 NRC 43, 51 (1994). Certainly, Petitioners have in respect to thiscontention shown material facts which implicate serious issues of regulatory law. The ASLB,given the strong facial showing Petitioners have made, cannot inquire more deeply into themerits of the contention, but instead must admit it for hearing.The standard for a safety contention in operating license cases (Petitioners recognizethis is not an operating license case) is relatively loose; a contention about a matter notcovered by a specific rule need only allege that the matter poses a significant safety problem[10 CFR § 50.57(a)(3)] for finding of reasonable assurance of operation without endangeringthe health and safety of the public. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2),LBP-82-116, 16 NRC 1937, 1946 (1982). Here, of course, the contention alleges incompelling fashion the continuous violations of specific regulations. As it appears they wouldeasily meet the operating license standard for a safety issue, the panel must admit theircontention for the continuation of that operating license for 20 years beyond its expiration.Because as a matter of fact, Petitioners have met -and exceeded -the pleading requirements for this contention, the Board must, as a matter of law, proceed to hear it on themerits.Response as to Contention No. 7 (Non-radiological persistent toxic burdens toarea water sources)NRC staff claim (Answer p. 22) that this contention "lacks specificity and support."Below is the actual NPDES report summarizing a number of areas in which Palisades is not incompliance with its National Pollution Discharge Elimination System permit requirements,specifically in continuing non-compliance concerning the toxic chemical Betz Clam-Trol.NPDES NUMBER GRANT LIMIT VIOLATION ENFORCEMENT STATUSINSTANCE OF NONCOMPLIANCE RNC DATE ENFORCEMENTACTION DATE STATUS DATE COMMENTS****** ******************* ****************************************OCPCO-PALISADES POWER PIT NON-COMPLIANTCOVERTM10001457 ***FINAL***.........

• SUMMARY SECTION ..........PH 001A 11/30/00 NC CONTINUING NONCOMPLIANCETRO-DISCHARGE TIME 001A 11/30/00 NC CONTINUING NONCOMPLIANCEOXIDANTS, TOTAL RESIDUAL 001A 11/30/00 NC CONTINUING NONCOMPLIANCEBETZ CLAM-TROL CT-2 001A 11/30/00 NC CONTINUING NONCOMPLIANCEBETZ CLAM-TROL CT-4 001A 11/30/00 NC CONTINUING NONCOMPLIANCE"Continuing Noncompliance" indicates that the violation cited in the above summary was notthe first time such a violation had occurred, so that violations on limits of releases of persistenttoxic chemicals from Palisades nuclear power plant into the waters of Lake Michigan appearsto be an unfortunate, and harmful, pattern. As late as 2003 and 2004, the formal NPDESreports on the use of Clam-Trol at Palisades were mere recitations of the 2000 reporting data.See http://www.epa.gov/region5/water/weca/reports/mi2qtrO4.pdf (for 2004), andhttp://www.epa.gov/region5/water/weca/reports/mi2qtrO3.pdf (for 2003).Thus, NMC's claim (Answer p. 26) that Petitioners' reference provides "no basis for Petitioners' allegation or 'apparent multiple misuses of Betz Clam-Trol"' is false, for "continuingnoncompliance" indicates a pattern extending over time.The NRC staff states (Answer p. 22) that "it is not within the [Nuclear Regulatory]Commission's jurisdiction to make any determination as to the adequacy of such permits [suchas NPDES permits] in protecting the environment." Yet the scope of 10 CFR Part 54 (set outat §54.4) encompasses "(a) Plant systems, structures, and components ... [including] (2) Allnonsafety-related systems, structures, and components whose failure could preventsatisfactory accomplishment of any of the functions identified in paragraphs (a)(1) (i), (ii), or (iii)of this section." Presumably, maintaining unclogged water intakes at Palisades fall within thisscoping parameter. If so, then NPDES noncompliance is a relevant issue because NMC is notbeing truthful about the measures it is taking concerning the perennial clogging problemcaused by zebra mussels in Lake Michigan. This disregard for compliance with regulations,not to mention indifference to the environmental health of Lake Michigan and the public healthimpacts of persistent toxic chemicals released as part of reactor operations does not comportwith the NRC's supposed mandate and mission to protect public health and the environment.Palisades' ongoing releases of persistent toxic chemicals into Lake Michigan is aviolation of the letter and spirit of the "Ninth Biennial Report On Great Lakes Water Quality" bythe International Joint Commission, the binational U.S.-Canadian federal governmental agencywhose mandate and mission is protecting and preserving the Great Lakes. At page 35 of thatIJC report, it states:Specific Persistent Toxic Substances:The Commission reiterates from its Sixth Biennial Report that, under theAgreement, (Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978) 'the overall strategy or aimregarding persistent toxic substances is virtual elimination, and the tactic or method tobe used to achieve that aim is through zero input or discharge of those substancescreated as a result of human activity.' This is both necessary and reasonable.'Persistent toxic substances are too dangerous to the biosphere and to humans to permit their release in any quantity.'Twenty additional years of such toxic chemical emissions from Palisades into LakeMichigan -especially if they are too inconvenient to report -will have a significant adverseimpact on human and ecosystem health.There regulations requirement that an intervenor supply the bases on which theintervenor intends to rely. Georgia Power Company (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1and 2), LBP-94-22, 40 NRC 37, 39 (1994).Nonreporting of important, and required, information about toxic releases obscures anymeaningful evaluation of the functioning of nonsafety features of Palisades which will benecessary to plant operations during the license extension period. This contention should beadmitted.Response as to Contention No. 8 (Environmental justice denied by the continuingoperations of Palisades)NMC states (NMC Answer p. 28) that Petitioners J...fail to challenge the Applicationand to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute on a material issue of fact or law..."and "fail[s] to provide an adequate factual basis to support any dispute with the Application."NMC states that "...none of Petitioners' claims address the 'essence of an environmentaljustice claim' arising under NEPA in a NRC licensing proceeding -i.e., 'disproportionately highand adverse human health and environmental effects' on minority and low-income populationsthat may be different from the impacts on the general population."Petitioners dispute these conclusions. The heart of the contention is that Palisades' 20-year license extension could very well adversely affect minority and low-income populations indisproportionately high ways not faced by the general population in the area, in particular uponNative Americans.

NMC cites (NMC Answer p. 30) NRC pleading rules requiring that contentions "mustinclude references to specific portions of.. .the applicant's environmental report.. .that thepetitioner disputes and the supporting reasons for each dispute." Petitioners take greatestissue with NMC's Environmental Report, Section 2.10, entitled "Historic and ArchaeologicalResources."The Environmental Report gives very short shrift to historic and archaeologicalresources. The potential for Native American burial sites, or other Native sites such as formervillages or encampments, at or near Palisades is not mentioned anywhere in theEnvironmental Report.Petitioners submit that the conclusion "no significant historical or archaeologicalresources were known to occur in the study area" is unsupported by the "Attachment C.Cultural Resources Correspondence" found in the Report. There are just two letters, one fromConsumers/NMC to the Michigan State Historic Preservation Office, the second from theDepartment of the Interior to the Atomic Energy Commission.Respecting the February 11, 2005 letter from Dan Malone at NMC and Stephen Wawroat Consumers to Ms. Martha MacFarlane-Faes at the Michigan State Historic PreservationOffice (MSHPO), the first paragraph reveals that MSHPO has "concern pertaining to possible,unreported archaeological properties on, or within the vicinity of, the Palisades site." Yet NMCfails to include any documentation spelling out these concerns from MSHPO in the companies'Environmental Report, other than the brief mention that concerns exist.Also in the letter, Malone and Wawro state in conclusory fashion that 20 more years ofnuclear activities at the site will not disturb the land, and "Therefore, NMC and Consumers donot believe a survey of the project area is necessary, as Federal and state agencies haveconfirmed on multiple occasions that no historic properties, archeological or architectural, are known to exist on, or in the immediate vicinity of the Palisades site."However, Petitioners fear that 20 more years of operations at Palisades risks a large-scale radiological accident. Even if no accident were to occur, the daily operations of Palisadesnuclear power plant releases "low" levels (and sometimes, not-so-low levels) of radioactivityinto the air, water, and soil. It also generates high-level radioactive waste, large quantities ofwhich have already been stored at Palisades for nearly 40 years, and ever-growing quantitiesof which will continue to be stored on-site for at least several decades to come, even if dumpstargeted at Native American lands out West (sacred Western Shoshone Indian treaty land atYucca Mountain, Nevada; the Skull Valley Goshute Indian Reservation in Utah) are opened.Since the actual opening of such dumps is ever more doubtful, this means that Palisades'high-level radioactive waste could remain on-site indefinitely into the future. The "routine" or"accidental" radioactive contamination caused by 20 additional years of operations atPalisades would be a significant adverse impact upon Native American burial or other siteslocated there. Such sites are considered sacred and religiously significant in the cultures ofmany Native American tribes, so befouling these sites with radioactive or toxic chemicalcontamination or heavy industrial usage could qualify as a desecration under the terms of thefederal Native American Freedom of Religion Act.Certainly this qualifies as a disproportionate, highly adverse impact on NativeAmericans, that, for example, European-Americans do not face from 20 more years ofoperations at Palisades. There most likely are not European-American sacred burial groundsat the Palisades site, nor former village sites (also considered sacred and worthy of greatrespect by Native cultures) there. But there is certainly the potential, and perhaps thelikelihood, that burial sites or former encampment, habitation, or village sites exist on thePalisades property. Lea Foushee, a Native American woman at the North American Water Office in Minnesota, has explained to Petitioners that beautiful vistas were often chosen asburial sites by Native Americans since time immemorial. Palisades certainly overlooks abeautiful vista to the west, overlooking Lake Michigan. Native American cultures in Michiganalso regard the westward direction as the one people travel when they pass away, passingthrough the "Western Door," making it even more likely that burial sites exist at or nearPalisades. Traditional Grand River Band of the Odawa Indians storyteller Larry Plamondonalso has told Petitioners that rivers and creeks were often chosen as habitation sites by NativeAmericans since time immemorial.The Palisades nuclear power plant is bounded not only by the lakeshore to the west,but by the Brandywine Creek to the immediate south, as well as an even larger creek to theimmediate north in Van Buren State Park. The possibility for significant Native Americanarchaeological resources on the Palisades site is very real, and should not be so flippantlydismissed by NMC. It is irresponsible that NMC and Consumers would state so strongly thatno "survey of the project area is necessary" when it, and federal and state agencies, appear tohave done little if any such surveying in the past.The only documentation NMC and Consumers give in their Environmental Report tosupport their claims is a letter dated April 7, 1972 from the U.S. Department of the Interior(DOI) to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (the predecessor to today's NRC). In that letter,DOI states "It does not appear that the existing plant should directly affect any existing orproposed unit of the National Park System, nor any site eligible for registration as a nationalhistoric, natural or environmental education landmark; however, the final statement shouldcontain evidence of consultation with the State Historic Preservation Officer concerning theeffects of the power station on places on or being considered for nomination to the NationalRegister of Historic Places." This statement seems potentially irrelevant to such issues as Native American burial sites, former village sites, etc. located on the power plant site or alongthe transmission line corridor. It's interesting that consultation with the Michigan State HistoricPreservation Officer is mentioned, because from Petitioner Kevin Kamps' (of NIRS) recentcontact with Ms. Martha MacFarlane-Faes at MSHPO by phone on August 30, 2005, it apearsthat very little consultation had taken place between her office and the companies involved. Infact, she admitted that the "ball may have been dropped" on these important matters. TheMSHPO's files on this matter do not put to rest the question as to whether or not NativeAmerican archaeological resources at the Palisades site could be in harm's way if a 20 yearlicense extension were granted. It's clear that the companies, Consumers and NMC, as well asthe state and federal agencies, have allowed this license extension proceeding to progress tothis advanced stage without adequately addressing the potential impacts to Native Americansites, rights, and values.The U.S. federal and State of Michigan agencies also have not adequately consultedwith the impacted tribes in a meaningful, government-to-government manner, as is requiredunder treaty, law, and regulation. In its February 2005 letter to the Michigan State HistoricPreservation Office, NMC and Consumers also mention that: "A May 19, 1972 letter from theMichigan State Liaison Officer for Historic Protection to the AEC [Atomic Energy Commission]confirmed the DOI's determination and stated that Palisades would not 'adversely affect knownhistorical or archaeological resources of the State of Michigan.' " They go on to state that a"Terrestrial Ecological Survey" conducted 26 years ago by a private contractor paid byConsumers "found no significant historical or archaeological resources were known to occur onthe Palisades site" and that these findings were confirmed by the Director of the MichiganDepartment of State's Michigan History Division, which verified that "no significant historical orarchaeological sites had been found in the immediate area of Palisades." We question how "significant" and "immediate" were and are defined by these profit-driven private companies,and by these state agencies? Are Native American sites such as burials or villages consideredsignificant, especially 25 to 40 years ago, when many of these reports referred to werepublished? It seems imperative that an updated, comprehensive, independent site survey beconducted before Palisades is granted a license to perform nuclear and other activities on thissite for another 20 years.It appears from the lack of supporting documentation that neither the AEC nor the DOIever did a careful survey of the Palisades site or adjoining transmission lines. NMC andConsumers seem unconcerned about the potential for unknown Native American burial sites orother cultural resources. Yet, given the presence of creeks just north and just south of thePalisades nuclear power plant site, it seems all the more likely that Native American villages orencampments might have been located there. And given the forested, large dunes surroundingthe Palisades nuclear power plant, it seems possible that even burial sites might be locatedthere, especially considering the great beauty of the area, and the remarkable view to the westover Lake Michigan. One definition for "palisade," after all, is "a line of bold cliffs." (Webster'sNew Collegiate Dictionary) It very well may be that the hundred-year-old Palisades Parksummer community with 200 cottages immediately south of the Palisades nuclear power planttook its name from the "cliffs," or tall forested sand dunes, on the site. Certainly Palisadesnuclear plant took its name from the Palisades Park community, much to the chagrin of theresidents, many of whom have opposed the nuclear reactor since before it was built in the late1960s.NMC and Consumers state in the 2005 letter that adequate protections are in place tosafeguard cultural resources on the site. They write "Examples of activities requiring anEnvironmental Review include disturbance of 1 or more acres of previously undisturbed land, any earth change within 600 feet of water, wetland and waterway activities, and structuralinterference with landforms, lakes and streams, among others." But, given the decades of,apparent lack of concern, perhaps it should not be surprising that such "protections" actuallycontain huge loopholes. For example, a good deal of Palisades nuclear power plant property -including much of the forested dunes -almost certainly is more than 600 feet from LakeMichigan. Thus, even such "protections" could still allow for overlooking or ignoring burial sitesduring construction projects. The nuclear companies state repeatedly throughout theEnvironmental Report that "NMC does not plan to undertake any major refurbishmentactivities," an admission that itself has dire implications, given the deteriorated state of thereactor and its safety systems. But then again, Consumers never envisioned in the early 1970sthat it would need to install dozens of 20 foot tall, 132 ton concrete and steel silos to storehigh-level radioactive waste just 150 yards from the waters of Lake Michigan. And yet, 20years later, that is exactly what they did. So who knows, really, what projects the companieswill need or want to perform on the site over the course of the next 20 years?In addition to the ever growing stockpile of high-level radioactive waste stored on-site,in 2008 the so-called "low" level radioactive waste dump where Palisades has sent largequantities of atomic trash for decades will no longer accept such wastes from Palisades. It isvery possible that Palisades would thus expand on-site "storage" for "low" level radioactivewastes, as well, some of which is actually intensely radioactive, despite the euphemistic name.Lastly, NMC and Consumers state in the last paragraph of their letter that it, and a copy of theresponse to it from the Michigan Historic Preservation Office, would be included in theEnvironmental Report. No such response is included. It is disconcerting, given the dearth ofsupporting documentation (Consumers Power Company's 1979 "Terrestrial Ecological Survey-Palisades Plant Site" is referenced in the Environmental Report, but a copy of this survey - seemingly the only actual site survey ever conducted, or at least mentioned in theEnvironmental Report or documents provided by MSHPO, is not included).Brian D. Conway of the State of Michigan Historic Preservation Office wrote a letter onMarch 14, 2005 to James Holthaus at Palisades Nuclear Power Plant stating "...we havereviewed your comments and concur with the recommendations outlined in your [Feb. 11,2005] letter...". This begs the question, who dropped the ball? NMC/Consumers, or MSHPO?Or both? It's encouraging that MSHPO has expressed concerns, apparently, in the past. Butit's discouraging that NRC-imposed deadlines such as the August 8'h deadline forintervening/requesting hearings and the August 22nd deadline for environmental scopingcomments have come and gone, with no action regarding the potential for Native Americanimpacts from this proposal being adequately addressed by the companies nor by the federal orstate agencies.Given the sovereignty of these tribes and bands, and the treaty rights that existbetween them and the United States federal government, the NRC has a government-to-government responsibility to meaningfully consult with these tribes and bands on suchsignificant federal actions as granting the Palisades reactor an additional 20 years ofoperations. An independent, comprehensive archaeological survey must be conducted beforeNRC grants a 20-year license extension to assure that Native American archaeological sitesare not negatively impacted by future Palisades reactor operations. Such impacts as harm tolake sturgeon -sacred to some Great Lakes tribes -must also be evaluated. It is interestingand telling that NMC's Environmental Report assigns no "importance" to lake sturgeon (inTable 2.3-1, Page 2-47), despite its State of Michigan "threatened" status, and its sacredstatus in the cultures and traditions of various Great Lakes Native American Tribes, and itsimportance to the natural history of Lake Michigan as an ancient indigenous species in the ecosystem. This is an indication that NMC/Consumers is not acknowledging or addressingenvironmental justice impacts of 20 more years of operations at Palisades on NativeAmericans.Quite recently, a Native American cultural site came to the attention of local tribalofficials who did not know about it before. An August 12, 2005 article in the Grand RapidsPress ("Sense of adventure: Historic sites will highlight a new Black River paddling pathway")had an accompanying map showing a Native American site of historical significance southeastof South Haven on the Black River, just south of 12th Street, east of M-43, and west of 66thStreet/County Road 687. This is well within the ten mile zone from the Palisades reactor,perhaps even within seven miles. Dave Lemberg, director of the Great Lakes Center forMaritime Studies at Western Michigan University in Kalamazoo, played an important role inselecting the historic sites that would be featured along the water trail for canoes and kayakersdescribed in the article. He and other historical and archaeological experts -but mostimportantly tribal officials and traditional elders -must be meaningfully consulted to ensure anindependent site survey at and around Palisades to protect Native American cultural resourcesthere.The NRC Staff, in its challenge to this contention, inexplicably ignores Petitioners'arguments about the potential for disproportionately high adverse impacts on Native Americancultural resources on the Palisades site that have never been identified.Tom Goldtooth, executive director of Indigenous Environmental Network in Minnesota,and Winona LaDuke, executive director of Honor the Earth, are long-time advisors to NIRS onsuch matters and can serve as expert witnesses on these Native American environmentaljustice contentions.Technical perfection is not an essential element of contention pleading. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-01-3, 53 NRC 84,99 (2001). The sounder practice is to decide issues on their merits, not to avoid them ontechnicalities. Consumers Power Company (Palisades Nuclear Plant), LBP-79-20, 10 NRC108, 116117 (1979).WITHDRAWN CONTENTIONSPetitioners hereby give notice of the withdrawal of the following contentions fromconsideration:Contention No. 5 (no permanent repository for the nuclear waste which would begenerated at Palisades after 2010)Contention No. 6 (Intensifying sand erosion and avalanche risk around dry caskstorage pads)Contention No. 828 (Increased embrittlement of re-used fuel rods as buffers to reduceembrittlement of RPV walls)29Contention No. 9 (Chronic emergency unpreparedness within EPZ)Contention No. 10 (Economic damage in Palisades region in event of accident or attackon the power plant causing severe radiation release)Contention No. 11 (Threats of terrorist attack and sabotage against the Palisadesnuclear power plant)Respectfully submitted for the Petitioners,28This Contention was mislabeled as No. 8 in the original Petition inasmuch as there was aseparate Contention also numbered 6, but for consistency of reference is defined in this section as beingNo. 8.29This Contention is being withdrawn in the belief that the gravamen of it can be addressed withinContention No. 1 raised by the Petitioners, "The license renewal application is untimely and incompletefor failure to address the continuing crisis of embrittlement." /s/ Terry J. LodgeTerry Lodge, Esq.Ohio Sup. Ct. #0029271316 N. Michigan St., Ste. 520Toledo, OH 43624-1627(419) 255-7552Fax (419) 255-5852tjlodge50@yahoo.comKary Love, Esq.Executive Business Center348 Waverly Road, Suite 2, Holland MI 49423(616) 399-4408Fax (616) 399-0868Co-Counsel for all Petitioners-Intervenors and Member-Intervenors UNITED STATES OF AMERICANUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONBEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARDIn the Matter ofNUCLEAR MANAGEMENTCOMPANY, LLC(Palisades Nuclear Plant)))))))Docket No.ASLBP No.50-255-LR05-842-03-LRCERTIFICATE OF SERVICEI hereby certify that copies of the "PETITIONERS' COMBINED REPLY TO NRC STAFFAND NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANY ANSWERS" in the above-captioned proceedinghave been served on the following through deposit in the NRC's internal mail system, withcopies by electronic mail, as indicated by an asterisk, by U.S. mail, first class, as indicated bydouble asterisk, with copies by electronic mail, or by U.S. mail, first class, as indicated by tripleasterisk, and that paper copies only of "PETITIONERS' APPENDIX OF EVIDENCE INSUPPORT OF CONTENTIONS" were delivered all parties at the following mailling addresses;all on this 16th day of September, 2005:Office of the Secretary*ATTN: Docketing and ServiceMail Stop: O-16C1U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington, DC 20555-0001(E-mail: HEARINGDOCKET@nrc.gov)Office of Commission AppellateAdjudicationMail Stop O-16C1U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington, DC 20555-0001Dr. Anthony Baratta*Administrative JudgeAtomic Safety and Licensing Board PanelMail Stop: T-3F23U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington, D.C. 20555-0001(E-mail: ajb5@nrc.gov)Dr. Nicholas G. Trikouros*Administrative JudgeAtomic Safety and Licensing Board PanelMail Stop: T-3F23U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington, D.C. 20555-0001(E-mail: n.trikouros@att.net)Ann Marshall Young*Administrative JudgeAtomic Safety and Licensing Board PanelMail Stop: T-3F23U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington, D.C. 20555-0001(E-mail: amy@nrc.gov)Kary Love, Esq.**Executive Business Center348 Waverly Road, Suite 2Holland, MI 49423(E-mail: karylove@yahoo.com)Paul Gunter**DirectorNuclear Information & Resource Service1424 16th Street, NWSuite 404Washington, DC 20036(E-mail: pgunter@nirs.org)Chuck Jordan**ChairmanGreen Party of Van Buren County 50521 34th AvenueBangor, MI 49013(E-mail: jordanc@btc-bci.com)Alice Hirt**Western Michigan Environmental Action Co.1415 Wealthy Street, SESuite 280Grand Rapids, MI 49506(E-mail: alicehirt@charter.net)Michael Keegan**Co-ChairDon't Waste Michigan2213 Riverside Drive, NEGrand Rapids, MI 49505(E-mail: mkeeganj@comcast.net)Maynard Kaufman***Michigan Land Trustees25485 County Road 681Bangor, MI 49013David R. Lewis, Esq.**Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman, LLP2300 N Street, N.W.Washington, DC 20037-1128(E-mail: david.lewis@pillsburylaw.com)Jonathan Rogoff, Esq.**Vice President, Counsel, & SecretaryNuclear Management Company, LLC700 First StreetHudson, WI 54016(E-mail: jonathan.rogoff@nmcco.com)Susan Uttal, Esq.U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionOffice of the General CounselMail Stop: O-15D21Washington, D.C. 20555(E-mail Address: slu@nrc.gov)/s/ Terry J. LodqeTerry J. Lodge I ..Offi al Transcriptof PrOceedings .-o NUCLEA REGULATORY COMMISSION6,crNovember 8, 2005 (10:00am)OFFICE OF SECRETARYRULEMAKINGS ANDADJUDICATIONS STAFFTitle Plisade Generation-StationLicense RenewalDocket Number: 50-255-LR; ASLBP No.: 05-842-03-LRLocation: South Haven, MichiganC)Date:Thursday', November 3, 2005,IWork Order No.:NRC-693Pages19-222NEAL R. -GRosS AND Co.;. .INC.Court Repoirters and Transcribers1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.Washington, D.C. 20005(202) 2344433-J itiW94LA-TE-AV-a. UNITED STATES OF AMERICAK-I4- + + + +BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONBefore the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board+ + + + +NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT COMPANYPALISADES NUCLEAR GENERATING STATIONRegardingLicensethe Renewal of Facility OperatingNo. DPR-20 for a 20-Year PeriodDocket No. 50-255-LRASLB No. 05-842-03-LRTHURSDAYNOVEMBER 3, 2005ki+ + + + +1555 PHOENIX ROADSOUTH HAVEN, MICHIGAN+ + + + +The above-entitled matter commenced pursuant toNotice before Ann Marshall Young, Dr. Anthony Baratta, Dr.Nicholas Trikouros, Administrative Judges.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 PRESENT:For the Office of Commission Appellate:Administrative Judges:Ann Marshall YoungDr. Anthony BarattaDr. Nicholas TrikourosNRC STAFF:Michael J. Morgan -Project ManagerSusan UttalMichael SpencerCounsel for NMC, Applicant:Paul A. GauklerDavid R. LewisCounsel for the Petitioner/Intervenor:Terry LodgeKary LovePaul GunterDebra Wolf -Law ClerkNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 I-N-D-E-XK_/Exhibit No.2DescriptionMay 27, 2004 memo from theExecutive Director of OperationsPage130K>K>NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 I PROCEEDINGS2 (9:00 A.M.)3 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: My name is Ann4 Marshall Young. I am the Chair of the Licensing Board for5 this proceeding, and I'm going to ask -- I'm the legal6 judge on the Board. I'm going to ask my colleagues to7 introduce themselves and then I'd like to ask all the8 parties to introduce yourselves and who you have with you.9 Dr. Baratta?10 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: I'm Anthony Baratta,11 I'm one of the technical judges.12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Nick Trikouros,13 technical judge.14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And we have our law15 clerk, Debra Wolf, over here. Let's start with the NRC.16 MS. UTTAL: Thank you, your Honor. Susan17 Uttal, the NRC, representing the NRC Staff. To my1s immediate right is Michael Spencer. He's with OGC but he19 is not entering an appearance in this case. To his right20 is Michael Morgan who is the project manager for renewal on21 the safety side. And behind me is Robert Schaaf who is the22 project manager on the environmental side.23 MR. LEWIS: I'm David Lewis, and with me is Mr.24 Paul Gaukler. We're with the law firm Pillsbury, Winthrop,25 Shaw & Pittman, representing Nuclear Management Company inNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 23I this proceeding.2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: All right. And Mr.3 Lodge?4 MR. LODGE: Thank you. I'm Terry Lodge, and5 seated with me is Kary Love who is a Michigan attorney who6 is not entering an appearance but will be assisting me.7 Also with me is Paul Gunter who is one of the named8 designees of one of the organizational Petitioners that9 would be the Nuclear Information Resource Service, and10 Alice Hirt who is another named designee here I believe on11 behalf of Don't Waste Michigan. We are expecting a couple12 of the other actual personal representatives but we are13 prepared to proceed.14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: All right. Before we15 get started, are there any preliminary matters from anyone?16 Okay. Let me tell you what our plan of action is and we'll17 proceed from there. We thought the most appropriate thingis to do would be to start with any argument that the parties19 might have on the motions to strike. Then we would move20 into hearing argument on the contentions one by one.21 We will have the most questions for all of you22 on Contention 1, and so we'll start with that and then23 proceed as appropriate through the day. If we have any24 short periods and we know that there will be less time25 required for argument on any particular point, we canNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433""":- 24I change the order. But unless something like that happens,K-/2 that would be the order that we would plan to go with.3 On the motions, we can either take a short4 amount of time or a long amount of time depending upon what5 all of you would like to do. The way we are approaching6 this is to consider the motions as effectively asking us7 not to consider anything in the Petitioner's reply that8 does not focus on the matters raised in the answers. And9 we would do that based on case law to that effect.10 If all of you are in agreement with that11 approach and don't wish to make any further argument, there12 is no need to do so. That would be the way that we would13 handle the objections essentially raised in the motions.14 If any of you would like to make any argument that we15 should go further than that or do anything different than16 that, we're glad to hear your argument on that. What we17 would probably get into, if we take that route, we'd be18 looking at the actual reply in comparison to the answers19 and have you argue to us which portions should or should20 not be considered.21 Let me just, I think the first motion was filed22 by -- would you prefer I just, I call you NMC? As a party23 to NMC?24 MR. LEWIS: NMC is fine, Judge Young.25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: So, why don't we startNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433.'." .* -. ..... ..- ..... .... : : ... .... 25I with you, Mr. Lewis?2 MR. LEWIS: I guess I need a clarification of3 what your contemplated ruling is. If by -- we argued in4 our answer that the contentions did not have bases and did5 not address the portions in the applications that were6 deficient. We think that that information had to be in the7 original contention and if it is submitted in the reply, itS required a showing that there was good cause and the other9 lateness factors have been met.10 So, we not think it's appropriate in a reply to11 submit an answer that says yes, we have no basis in the12 original contention but here's 50 pages of bases.13 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right.14 MR. LEWIS: And so, our position is that in our15 legal arguments where we say they haven't discussed the16 application, they haven't provided the basis, they don't17 dispute what's wrong with our programs, not appropriate to18 then cure that in a reply, that the reply should be a legal19 explanation of why their original contention was20 appropriate and not a cure. And we believe that is21 consistent with what the Commission directed in the LES22 decision.23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: That is, and I guess24 the only thing that I would add is that in your answer, for25 example, you did include some argument in effect about whatNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 26I you did, in effect going beyond saying there is no basis or2 there is no genuine issue, et cetera. You actually talk3 about what you did and you raise, you make reference to4 certain NRC regulations. What the Commission has said is5 that the replies must be narrowly focused on what's raised6 in the answer. So, if we without argument find that7 anything in the reply focuses on what is raised in the8 answer, we would be likely to consider that but we would9 not consider anything in the nature that you discussed that10 would be in effect filling in blanks that you asserted were11 present in the original contention.12 Now, there may be, drawing that line may not be13 completely black and white in all instances, but that would14 be the approach that we would take. And so, if you want to15 make any argument, we're glad to listen to it.16 MR. LEWIS: Let me just add that, in our17 answer, we pointed to the sections in our application that18 addressed embrittlement, not to address the merits of the19 embrittlement issue but to show that the application20 included discussions that simply had not been addressed or21 challenged in the original petition. So, it was not our22 intent to address the merits of the issues but simply to23 indicate that in fact this was a topic that was addressed24 at some length in the application and it simply hadn't been25 disputed.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 27I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: And you're referringK_/2 to, for example, in your reply to I guess would be page 113 and 12, for example on Contention 1 where you state, well,4 let me just pick the statement on page 12. The application5 also identifies the steps that NMC gives and will be taking6 to ensure protection against -- as an example.7 MR. LEWIS: Yes. In other words, it is a8 legitimate contention to say an applicant hasn't addressed9 the topic if there is nothing in the application. But10 where in fact the application addresses the topic, then the11 contention has to explain why that is an insufficient12 response. And so, what we were pointing out is, yes, our13 application had addressed this topic and it was essentially14 unchallenged in the original petition.15 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But now, you do get16 into some argument on the meaning of 10 CFR Section 50.61,17 for example, and also I think, primarily that one, that's18 the central one on 54.21(c)i also. So, I mean, if it's19 not, if our explanation is not clear enough to you, we'll20 be glad to hear argument from you on it. I guess you can't21 completely cut off any reply at all.22 MR. LEWIS: Oh, I agree with that.23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And obviously, one way* 24 that a party or participant could reply would be to say no,25 we did state a basis and this is what the basis was. ButNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 28I when you get into arguments about the meanings of2 regulations and that sort of thing, it's not as black and3 white as I think you may have been suggesting earlier. And4 obviously the reason for the Commission even to have5 addressed this and to have talked about replies need to6 focus on the matters raised in the answer is that it is not7 always completely black and white. We understand the8 principle that you're talking about and I think probably9 all counsel do.10 Do you want to make any further argument based11 on what we've said?12 MR. LEWIS: No, I just have to rest on the13 pleadings and that we're ready if there are specificK>14 portions of the reply that you have questions about and15 think may need to be addressed. I'm going to need to16 address those during the argument as well.17 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Ms. Uttal?18 MS. UTTAL: Yes. I just have three things that19 I want to raise. First of all, the Petitioners --20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Excuse me. Could you21 talk a little more to the microphone?22 MS. UTTAL: I'm sorry.23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And get closer to it,24 both for us and the court reporter.25 MS. UTTAL: The Petitioners in their reply haveNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 29I a discussion about, that there is no prejudice to the other2 parties. The Commission does not consider prejudice to be3 a factor and is not in the LES case. It's compliance with4 the regulations that is the factor. Secondly, and I think5 I pointed this out in my brief, they rely on outdated cases6 such as the North Anna case that had been basically7 overturned by two subsequent changes in the rules.8 And my third thing is something new. The9 declaration filed by Dr. Landsman, Dr. Landsman is a former10 employee of the NRC, recent employee. And as such, he is11 barred by federal law, I think it's 18 USC 207, from12 testifying. There are exceptions for expert witnesses but13 the exception only goes to facts and observations. Dr.14 Landsman cannot give his opinion on anything.15 I checked this out with our ethics advisor in16 OGC and I believe he also talked to Dr. Landsman about it,17 so he's aware of it. Unfortunately, there were portions of18 his declaration that contain opinion. And I have prepared19 a redacted version where I've done a strikeout of what we20 consider to be his opinion which I'd like to give to the21 Board and to the other parties.22 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, let me just23 address this issue of striking and redacting. I mean, in24 modern legal practice, you don't strike things from the25 record in terms of removing them from the record. TheNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* , .,, ,. .... [...- .* .,- .... . 30I record is there. We may not consider them, but if there2 were an appeal, the only you can maintain a record is not3 to black out portions of it.4 MS. UTTAL: Well, I didn't black it out.5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: So, redacting a6 document and substituting it, I don't think would be7 appropriate.S MS. UTTAL: What I've done it is a strikeout so9 you can read it, what the words are. But I think that the10 board should be aware of what the problems areas are and11 what cannot be considered and what he cannot testify to.12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: You can certainly13 submit that and we'll include that in the record.14 MS. UTTAL: Okay..15 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And again, thank you16 for bringing the statute to our attention. But again, I17 think in our consideration of all the parties' arguments onis the contentions, it should be clear what we have considered19 and what we haven't considered, and we will not consider20 anything that is not focused on what has been raised in the21 answers. That's what we have been directed to do in case22 law, and that's how we plan to approach it.23 Did you have anything further, Ms. Uttal?24 MS. UTTAL: That's it. Nothing else, your25 Honor.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 31K>12345678910111213141516171819202122232425ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. And so, if youwant to, I don't exactly have a good -- maybe you couldhelp out by getting things from him. And we'll just makethat an exhibit. And could you give enough for us and thenone for the court reporter, and we could make that anexhibit to the transcript.Now, Mr.' Lodge, what would you like to say onthis? Would you like to have any further argument or isour explanation --MR. LODGE: I appreciate your explanation. Iwould like to make a couple of observations.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay.MR. LODGE: Number one, I wonder if I couldrequest that we defer discussion on the Landsmandeclaration until we actually discuss that particularcontention because I think that's a more appropriate pointin time. And also, it will give us an opportunity --ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Can you -- I thinksomeone is not able to hear you.MR. LODGE: Pardon me. It will give us anopportunity to digest the strikeout version of thisdeclaration. And I at least want to examine thepossibility of resolving that matter if it is acceptable tothe Petitioners.Secondly, I will confess that I have practicedINEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433., .. ....".. . 32I before the NRC several times over the years, but not in a2 license renewal proceeding involving the revised3 regulations. I would like to say for the record that we4 understood the rules basically to require the contentions5 to be a succinct statement of our contentions, of our6 points. And we did take the responsive pleadings to be7 analogous to a Civil Rule 12 motion to, essentially a8 procedural attack on the method pleadings which then9 contained in the case of NMC and the Staff, contained10 argument going into matters of evidence and substance11 beyond the mere procedural attack to which we then12 responded in detail.13 It was and remains our position that we wereKJ14 fleshing out at best or worst the originally articulated15 contentions. And in effect, I believe your Honor may have16 identified that as being the process we went through. We17 were responding to that sort of secondary more substantive18 side of the motions to strike. Thank you. That's all I19 have.20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. I guess maybe21 we can make it a little bit more clear how we're going to22 approach this. I think the inclination would probably be23 where you provided additional, and I'm not sure that it is24 that similar to a Rule 12 situation but where you would25 provide additional evidence if you will that that wouldNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 33I generally be the sort of thing that I think the Commission2 has said we would not consider in deciding whether to admit3 a contention.4 If on the other hand you made argument in5 response to the example I gave before on the interpretation6 of a regulation that would be relevant to the contention7 that you raised in the first place, that might be another8 sort of situation. If as we go through the contentions9 anybody wants to raise, and I guess we would expect you to10 raise specific points that you think we should or should11 not consider, that would be fine. And if you want to make12 your argument about the Landsman document, I don't see any13 problem with doing that when we get to that contention.14 Anyone else? All right. Okay, anything15 further on the motions? And so, basically what we're16 saying is what our approach will be and we would not intend17 to make a formal ruling on the motions given thei8 explanation that we've provided. We're not going to strike19 the entire reply. We're going to consider it in the manner20 that you've described. And as we go to the contentions,21 you can make any additional argument you wish to make on22 that.23 All right. I guess also, as we go through24 argument on the contentions, we would start with the25 Petitioners and then go to NMC and then the Staff. AndNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433..... . 34I then, if we have any further argument, we will have a lot2 of questions I think and we want to make sure that everyone3 gets out their points. We would ask that you not just4 repeat what you have written in your pleadings and address5 the concerns that's explained after that. And I'll tell6 you in advance, we will probably be interrupting to ask7 questions as we go.8 Any questions or anything further before we9 move on to Contention 1? All right. Mr. Lodge, actually10 if you could just give me one second?11 All right, go ahead.12 MR. LODGE: Before getting into the substance13 of things, I would like to indicate, if it is acceptable to14 the panel, I think this is more a request, that from time15 to time, I hope you will indulge me in consulting with some16 of the Petitioners. A lot of our drafting and filings were17 essentially done and accomplished in a committee type of18 fashion which I'm sure is probably true with the other19 parties. In any event, I hope you will indulge my need20 from time to time to interrupt.21 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: That's fine.22 MR. LODGE: Our first contention respecting23 embrittlement is noteworthy in that it is the type of24 contention that was identified by the Commission itself in25 the Turkey Point decision that was referenced by this panelNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433.. .. .......... .... 35I in its initial, I believe the initial scheduling order, the2 CLI-01-17 Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 decision wherein the3 panel discusses Part 54, 10 CFR Part 54, and specifically4 mentions among adverse aging effects metal fatigue,5 erosion, corrosion, thermal and radiation embrittlement.6 The gist of our contention is actually quite7 simple: that the longer the Palisades nuclear reactor is8 allowed to operate with the occasional necessary use of9 fast shutdown types of technologies, the greater the risk10 that embrittlement is an ongoing degenerative process, and11 ultimately the enhanced possibility that a pressure thermal12 shock will occur that causes a rapture of the reactor13 vessel itself. We believe that this is an admissible14' contention because of the obvious fact that we're talking15 about a 34-year-old, I believe, or a 34-year-operation16 record that has among other things left Palisades as unique17 in the Byzantine part of the nuclear industry as a plant18 that must be watched and must be closely and carefully19 considered for its embrittlement potential.20 As was indicated in our possibly forbidden21 reply on the contentions, we note a distinct history of22 'all over the map' computations using multiple computer23 programs. We understand that there is no longer available24 real time metal samples, so-called surveillance capsules or25 coupons that are available to be removed from the reactorNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 36I vessel upon refueling and to be analyzed for the2 embrittlement characteristics that they may or may not3 portray. We understand that that is probably the case4 since the ninth refueling which was well back into the5 1990's.6 We understand that the --7 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Excuse me. Ma'am, I'm8 sorry, but you're really going to have to leave that in a9 stationary position. I think that --10 MS. CAREY: And you say the microphones are on?11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: They should be on,12 yes.13 MS. CAREY: Thank you.14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Mr. Strasma, is15 that --16 MR. STRASMA: Yes, stationary position. As17 long as it's not distracting, it's fine.18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right. I think moving19 around may be a little bit too distracting. Go ahead, Mr.20 Lodge, I'm sorry.21 MR. LODGE: Thank you. We understand from our22 review of the Palisades embrittlement history that the23 anticipated estimated dates at which there would be a24 critical problem with the reactor vessel range from 1995 to25 the present utility projection of 2014 which of course isNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433.............................................. ,......°.,-..* 37I several years into the projected 20-year extension period.2 In other words, if a 19-year chunk of time during which it3 has been projected and anticipated, estimated or guessed,4 that there would be the potential for a severe crisis under5 the right circumstances from pressure thermal shock.6 We, in short, believe that (a) the subject7 matter jurisdiction if you will of this panel clearly8 encompasses this particular aging degenerative problem; and9 secondly, that the data as summarized in our originally10 filed contentions but certainly as amplified in our reply11 shows that this issue must be subjected to hearing. As I12 say, we anticipate from the public domain documents that we13 have reviewed prior to even filing the contentions, that14 the history is so mixed, so troubled, and frankly,15 technically controversial, that the Palisades plant has to16 be put under a microscope as a poster child for the17 embrittlement problem.18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Let me just ask you,19 obviously it would have been good to have the, from your20 standpoint, to have the additional information that you21 provided in the reply in the original contention. But just22 looking at the original contention, do you want to make any23 further argument on it alone as meeting the contention24 admissibility standards in 10 CFR 2.309(f)?25 MR. LODGE: Beyond the reply that we made inNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433~~~~~~........-. .. .. ...................... .... .*. * ... " 3SI the motion to strike, I don't believe so.2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay.3 MR. LODGE: Is your Honor getting at a4 particular point?5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: No. I mean, you did6 make arguments on that and we've understood them basically.7 As I understand your argument, well, for example, on the8 issue that Mr. Lewis raised a minute ago, that I believe9 you said in your reply that you're alleging a failure to10 include information rather than -- let's see. Your11 response to the claim that you haven't included references12 to specific portions of the application was, as I13 understood it, that your belief is that the application14 fails to contain information on a relevant matter. And the15 critical fact that you're alleging to support your16 contention is the identification of the Palisades Plant as17 prone to early embrittlement. Am I understanding that18 correctly?19 MR. LODGE: Yes. Yes, correct.20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Could I ask a21 question with regards to the -- 309(f)2 requires you to22 provide a brief explanation of the basis for your23 contention. Could you, in reference to your original24 filing, point to where that statement adheres in Contention25 1?NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 319I MR. LODGE: Well, I reread this with an eye to2 that, your Honor, in responding to the motion to strike. I3 think that the basis is the implied in that the4 embrittlement issue is of course explained and discussed at5 length in the application, and we believe that, as I've6 indicated, that the law clearly, the law on the subject7 clearly envisions that embrittlement is a type of8 degenerative process that's within the scope of the9 proceeding. If you're saying, if you're questioning us,10 did you use the word 'here is our basis', no, we did not.11 I believe that it is implicit and we were anticipating with12 the expertise of this panel would probably acknowledge that13 it is the type of problem that is covered in the14 application and therefore can be challenged.15 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Okay.16 Unfortunately, well, because of Turkey Point, isn't the17 Board constrained though from filling in, so to speak? You18 know, you used the word implied in what you just said, and19 I think in light of Turkey Point, there is some language in20 there that says that the Board could not fill in21 information. Could you reply to that? I'm struggling, you22 can see what I mean.23 MR. LODGE: I have seen, and I know the wording24 you're referring to, I think that, frankly, that the25 Commission's statement in that regard certainly sets noKNNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 40I objective standard unless it is that this panel is to read2 the contention and decide if it articulates what we call a3 justiciable issue.4 I think that, I guess I'm filling in, I think5 that the Commission-expects that the panel is going to6 exercise a certain amount of discretion, and also to start7 from a certain operative framework, i.e., the presumptions8 that the panel is aware of the contents of the application9 and essentially measures the contention alongside of what10 the application states on the subject. I guess our11 position as Petitioners is that it's not filling in but,12 because otherwise, you're talking about this panel being13 constrained to make a rote determination that a checklist14 has been followed or not and the contention is allowed in15 or not. And I believe that the policy of the NRC16 historically has been, when possible, to make17 determinations based upon merits, not upon simply18 procedural defects and deficiency.19 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Could you -- did you20 have anything to add?21 MR. LODGE: No, thank you.22 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Could you address the23 Staff's argument that the statements you make in support of24 your contention are generic? You said earlier that --25 MR. LODGE: Right.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* ... -...;.. 41I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: You referred to what2 made the Palisades unique and you're alleging that the3 identification is prone to early embrittlement.4 MR. LODGE: Right.5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But the Staff is6 arguing that what you have provided is generic and applies7 to, in effect applies to all plants.8 MR. LODGE: I believe what your Honor is9 referring to is the more embrittled a plant becomes -- the10 longer it operates, the more embrittled it becomes. That11 is generically true. The issue is whether there are12 decreasing safety margins in the event of initiation of13 emergency operating procedures which can be kind of a14 generic truism. But I don't think the Utility nor the15 Staff are admitting that that is a generic truism by a long16 shot.17 And please forgive me, I'm not trying to sayi8 that the panel is quibbling over a sentence structure, but19 we succinctly point out that our expert opinion is that20 that is true as to Palisades. So, yes, it's plucking from21 the land of generic truisms a statement that is then22 applied to Palisades. And we do believe that that23 adequately articulates an admissible contention, that the24 longer it operates, the more dangerous it is, and that an25 expert has analyzed the facts, an expert that presumably atNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433"" " *'" :"""" --" ".... ' " ... ......" " " i ". ' .. 42I this point is familiar enough with the plant has made that2 statement, offered that opinion as to Palisades.3 This plant does not have a thermal shield and4 we also believe that that is one of the facts that makes5 Palisades truly unique, as I say a poster child for the6 embrittlement problem.7 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I guess what I wouldS like you to focus on, I mean, what I took, reading your9 contention and the basis or the support, I'm reading your10 contention as being the bolded, let's see, the bolded11 statement after the number one, and then the support for it12 being the paragraph that follows that.13 MR. LODGE: Right.14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And when I look at15 that, the thing that strikes me as the unique thing that16 you're alleging is that the Palisades Plant has been17 identified as prone to early embrittlement.18 MR. LODGE: Right.19 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And you raise the20 issue of timely by reference to, by use of the word21 untimely and continuing crises.22 MR. LODGE: Correct.23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: So, could you address24 that a little bit more? I mean, maybe I'm overlooking25 something, but the uniqueness that you appear to beNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433.* . 43I alleging is the early, being identified as prone to early2 embrittlement presumably3 and in comparison to other plants.4 MR. LODGE: Yes. Several questions there.5 Please let me organize my thoughts. Number one, while the6 assertions may appear to be generic, the response and the7 numerous Staff meetings, pardon me, conferences with the8 Utility, between Staff and Utility engineers and other9 experts has been very plant specific. It may have, the10 result of how the embrittlement problem is handled at11 Palisades might have replicability within the industry.12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I'm really not, I13 don't necessarily see any problem with -- if you raise some14 facts that may be true for other plants, that is not15 necessarily a reason to throw out a contention. What I'm16 trying to get you to focus on though is the one thing that17 you allege that, appears to be alleging that Palisades is18 different is the reference to the timing and the being19 prone to early embrittlement. And the Staff is arguing, as20 I understand it, that that in addition to the other things21 that you're talking is generic.22 MR. LODGE: And of course --23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: What is the24 significance of it being prone to early embrittlement?25 MR. LODGE: May I discuss things brieflyNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 44I please?2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay.3 MR. LODGE: Thank you.4 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But just before you5 confer any further, let me ask another question that I was6 going to ask, and you might refer to the first one in this7 context. NMC talks about, under 54.21, that it intends to8 demonstrate that the effects of aging on the intended9 functions will be adequately managed for the period of10 extended operation, and then gets into a discussion of11 50.61 in addition. In your reply, you made reference to12 50.61 as well.13 And so, what I'm trying to get you to focus on14 is in that context and in the context of your alleging that15 the Palisades Plant is prone to early embrittlement, what16 is important about your allegation or your allegations that17 makes this an issue that should be admitted for litigation?18 What is unique in response to the Staff's argument?19 MR. LODGE: Thank you.20 (Whereupon, Mr. Lodge confers with21 the other Petitioners.)22 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Another way to look at23 this, Mr. Lodge, another way to look at this --24 MR. LODGE: Yes?25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I know you've referredKNNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433: ..= .., .. . 45I to some types of evidence that were this contention -- you2 would present, but obviously if this contention were to be3 admitted, it wouldn't make sense for you to just come and4 give a lesson on what are the effects of embrittlement5 generally.6 MR. LODGE: Right. Yes. I agree wholly with7 you on that point, your Honor. Pardon me.8 One of the unique factors about Palisades is9 that it has been lost to the shifting sand dunes of time.10 The mix of copper and nickel in the reactor vessel --11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Let me stop you, okay?12 MR. LODGE: Okay.13 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Because I do not want,14 by my question, to invite you to provide additional facts.15 MR. LODGE: Right.16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: What I'm trying to get17 you to do is provide a legal argument in the context of the18 contention admissibility standards and in the context of19 the contention and basis or support that you provided in20 your original petition to respond to the Staff's concern21 about everything being alleged in the contention and in the22 support for it being generic. In other words, I don't want23 you to just give me additional facts that weren't there24 originally. But looking at your original contention, the25 thing I see that stands out as sounding as though it'sNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 46I unique is the identification of the Palisades Power Station2 as being prone to early embrittlement.3 MR. LODGE: One moment.4 (Whereupon, Mr. Lodge confers with5 the other Petitioners.)6 MR. LODGE: From the application, we believe7 that the copper and nickel content, and I understand your8 hesitation that I venture into that, is higher than other9 plants which makes the Palisades reactor vessel unique.10 Furthermore, as to the 10 CFR 50.61 issue, the alternatives11 that are portrayed in the application are not exactly12 properly explained by the Utility. The Utility13 references --14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Now, again, I don't15 want by my questions to invite you to say things that you16 might have said in your original contention. What I'm17 trying to get you to focus on is your original contentionIS and how the original contention raises issues that should19 be admitted through litigation. And one of the things that20 the Commission said in Turkey Point was that the purpose of21 the -- hold on just a second. "The hearing should serve22 the purpose for which they are intended to adjudicate23 genuine substantive safety environmental issues placed in24 contention by qualified intervenors. While intervenors25 need not be technical experts, they must knowledgeablyNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433.. .. ..... .......*. ... ...*

• 47I provide some threshold level of factual basis for their2 contention."3 Now, you have identified an expert who is4 retired from the NRC, and presumably that expert would be5 able to say things other than just give us a lesson on the6 dangers of embrittlement. The only thing I read in your7 contention, and not to say that the other facts that you've8 alleged aren't sufficient to support a contention on their9 own, but the thing that you have identified as unique is10 identification of the plant as being prone to early11 embrittlement.12 Why is that an issue that is substantive enough13 that we should admit a contention on it? Without getting14 into specific facts, why is that issue, one, how does that15 raise a substantive that makes this contention admissible?16 MR. LODGE: Excuse us.17 (Whereupon, Mr. Lodge confers with18 the other Petitioners.)19 MR. LODGE: What your Honor is getting at, I20 gather, is that we have articulated an expert opinion, a21 conclusion without the underlying factual basis.22 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: No.23 MR. LODGE: No? I'm sorry.24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Are you referring25 to, I mean, the rule that your clients have spelled out inNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433.. .. .. ... ...... ......... :*:. .....: /. .-

48I here, is this sufficient information --2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: No, no. What I'm3 getting at is if we were to admit this contention --4 MR. LODGE: Right.5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: You have an expert,6 the expert can talk about what happened at the Palisades7 Plant.8 MR. LODGE: Right.9 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. What's the10 impact of that? What difference does that make considering11 the standard that, if we look at, for example, 10 CFR12 2.309(f) Subsection 4, "You must demonstrate that the issue13 raised in the contention is material to the findings the14 NRC must make to support the action that's involved in the15 proceeding."16 Now, the findings that we must make are defined17 at 10 CFR 54.29, Standards for Issuance of a Renewedis License.. "A renewed license may be issued by the19 Commission up to the full term authorized by 54.31 if the20 Commission finds that actions have been identified and have21 been or will be taken with respect to the matters22 identified in paragraphs (a)l and (a)2 of this section such23 that there is a reasonable assurance that the activitiesf -....24 authorized by the renewed license will continue to be25 conducted in accordance with the current licensing basisNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433, .. ....... .-. 49I and at any changes made," and so forth. And then it refersKJ2 to certain matters which are managing the effects of aging3 during the period of extended operation on the4 functionality of structures and components that have been5 identified to require review under 54.21(a)1 which is6 referred to by NMC in their answer.7 So, I'm asking you not to discuss the facts but8 what's the legal impact of whatever facts you would present9 in support of your contention were it to be admitted?10 Because we don't just, I mean, if we were to admit it, we11 wouldn't just decide based on what we think. We would look12 to the rule that governs what are the standards for renewal13 of a license in determining what the significance of those14 facts were and whether they demonstrated that the license15 should not, I would assume your argument would be, should16 not be granted. And what we would look to in determining17 whether NMC has shown that it should be granted or whether18 you have shown that it shouldn't be granted is 54.29 and19 the standards set forth there.20 In addition to that, NMC has made arguments21 based on 50.61 in terms of what it plans to do. So, I'm22 really asking you to focus your argument on the legal23 impact of the facts that you have alleged and how that is24 substantive, how that is material to the findings that we25 need to make.NR)NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 50I MR. LODGE: Among the findings that the Board2 has to make are that the timing of aging analyses offered3 by the utility company are adequate essentially to protect4 the public health and safety.5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, now, I really6 want you to focus on the actual standard which is 54.29.7 That, we don't just say, we don't just make a general8 finding on the public health and safety.9 MR. LODGE: Right. If you'll indulge me for a10 moment, within that finding is that the earlier analyses11 that are rendered by NMC will remain valid for the 20-year12 extension period. We don't believe that the application13 provides that kind of assurance. Certainly the history14 doesn't. But even the facts as articulated in the15 application show that Palisades' management plan is behind16 the curve, if you will, in terms of getting a grasp on the17 embrittlement problem --18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Now, you're19 getting back into the facts. And what I'd really like you20 to do is look at the facts that you've alleged in support21 of your contention and the fact that you are alleging that22 this plant is identified as prone to early embrittlement.23 How does that relate to the findings that we need to make?24 How does that relate to whether or not a renewed license25 should be granted, whether or not the effects of aging areNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 51I going to be managed for the term, for the extended term of2 the license?3 MR. LODGE: Are you saying if the panel accepts4 for purposes of argument that it is prone to early5 embrittlement --6 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right.7 MR. LODGE: Then, well, if it's prone to early8 embrittlement, it means that it underscores our contention9 that Palisades is unique, that Palisades is in essence10 cutting edge, and that the very close scrutiny needs to be11 given to the analysis offered by the Utility as to how it's12 going to manage that problem during the 20-year period of13 license extension.14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And you're saying that15 that analysis is inadequate?16 MR. LODGE: Yes.17 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Because, why?18 MR. LODGE: Well, if I say why, that gets into19 the factual --20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, why in the21 context of the standards that we must follow in making a22 determination in 54.29?23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: What is it that's24 unique about it that makes this the appropriate form for25 litigation of that issue? Because I, at least that's theNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 52I question that I'm trying to get answered.2 MR. LODGE: Is what your Honor is asking what3 does the contention say is unique?4 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Well, I don't want5 to climb on Judge Young's issue. I have my own questions6 with respect to that. I was just trying maybe to give you7 something to think about.8 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: You would be arguing9 presumably, if this contention were admitted, okay, you'd10 be presenting facts to illustrate how Palisades is prone to11 early embrittlement.12 MR. LODGE: Right.13 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And then, you would14 presumably make some legal argument as to the relevance of15 that to the standards that we need to apply in determining16 whether NMC has shown that the renewed license should be17 issued based on actions having been identified that have18 been or will be taken with respect to managing the effects19 of aging during the period of extended operation, et20 cetera. Now, what would your legal argument be assuming21 that you have shown that Palisades Plant is prone to early22 embrittlement and taking into account the legal argument23 made by NMC that under 50.61, they will be submitting24 information to show, they will be providing information to25 the NRC three years in advance of the projected date thatNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433...................................,......... 53I the plant will exceed the PTS criterion?2 So, what legal argument would you make to say3 these facts show that the standard defined in Section 54.294 has not been met by NMC with regard to the Palisades Plant?5 You couldn't just rely on the facts and say it shows it --6 so you need to demonstrate to us that the legal standard7 set in 54.29 which refers back to 54.21 I believe which is8 cited by NMC in its argument, what legal argument would you9 make to support denying the renewed license based on the10 standards in 54.29? Do you need a copy of that to look at?11 MR. LODGE: If you have it, please.12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And if you want to13 look also at 54.21 and 50.61?14 MR. LODGE: Right. We have that, thank you.15 Our legal argument would be to pose the question: How can16 the Utility presume to say that they will have a plan three17 years ahead of its implementation based on the fact that18 the Utility cannot demonstrate at this point that it19 understands, has it arms around the problem of20 embrittlement? Our legal question is what's going to21 change between now and that indeterminate point in the22 future whereby the utility can demonstrate that it finally23 does have a grasp?24 As I've indicated, the facts are going to show25 some very deleterious problems that tend to undermine theNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433S."...[_ .. .. 54credibility of projections. And we're at a loss to2 understand how the Utility has explained in this3 application that it's going to be able to come up with4 credible science and engineering based projections on which5 to base its three-year advance notice.6 The embrittlement problem in some hasn't been7 managed to date. And if history is any indicator, it's not8 going to, the Utility is not postulating any means by which9 it proposes to really manage the problem. It's just saying10 we'll be fine, we'll give you three years advance notice,11 we'll select among the options and come up with some sort12 of combined strategy. They really haven't articulated what13 that management strategy is. They have explained in the14 application what their options are.15 We already, and I know, I just want to give you16 a for instance. We know that they say annealing is in17 there and it's one of the things we could do. But we also18 happen to know off the record between us that they aren't19 going to anneal, possibly because of the cost of doing so.20 We don't know. But the point is the Utility is actually21 saying we plan to have a plan.22 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And so, you're arguing23 that that does not constitute an action that's been24 identified that has been or will be taken --25 MR. LODGE: Exactly.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* '."z *'"" ". .... :.. .:-.... I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- with respect to2 managing the effects of aging during the period of extended3 operation?4 MR. LODGE: Yes. Yes, your Honor.5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: But what is the6 basis for that not being an action though? I mean, if I7 say that I'm going to do something that I have identified8 an action, what is the legal basis for that not being an9 action I guess is what I'm saying.10 MR. LODGE: We would have no case if the11 Utility could credibly argue that it has managed the12 embrittlement problem today. We don't believe the Utility13 can make that argument. This is an evolving analysis.14 What you're watching, and again, I'm not going to plough15 deeply into the facts, but if you're looking at a16 circumstance where the original anticipated danger, you17 know, red lights, bells going off date was 1995, yet nowis it's 2014, that's a generation estimate.19 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But let's say, let's20 just assume for the sake of argument that there haven't21 been any problems up to this point, because you don't22 really allege that in your contention. What you allege is23 that it's subject to, or it's been identified as being( 24 prone to early embrittlement.25 MR. LODGE: Right.NJNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 56I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And then, in response2 to that, NMC has said, well, what we're going to do is3 we're going to do what 50.61 requires and we're going to do4 that, we're going to provide the information three years5 before the PTS criterion is exceeded which I believe, I6 don't think there is any dispute that that would be 2014.7 MR. LODGE: Right.8 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: So, I think what Judge9 Baratta is asking is how is identifying the action of10 providing information to the NRC, and I guess it would be11 2011 with regard to what they're going to do in 2014, how12 should that be evaluated under 54.29?13 MR. LODGE: I would just make the observation14 first that 2011 is the expiration year for the current15 license. So, 2014 is three years into the extension16 period. So, the fact that the Utility is saying at the end17 of our current license we'll provide you with a plan, theIS Utility has not demonstrated the capability of managing the19 embrittlement to date and is essentially in its application20 saying --21 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But what I ask you,22 let's assume that it has. Let's assume that it has. Is23 there anything wrong with saying we're going to tell you in24 2011 what we're going to do in 2014?25 MR. LODGE: Assuming the Utility has managed itNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 57I to date?I2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right.3 MR. LODGE: Or that there simply has not been a4 crisis to date?5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Let's assume there is6 no problem to date. Let's assume what you have alleged,7 that it's been identified as being prone to early8 embrittlement.9 MR. LODGE: All right.10 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: That's the unique11 situation that you allege here to support your contention12 that the application is untimely and incomplete for failure13 to address the continuing crisis of embrittlement.14 MR. LODGE: We are alleging that the Utility15 itself has identified a proneness to early embrittlement.16 We're taking public domain facts and essentially saying17 that that is not enough. As I was saying, the plan to haveIS a plan, the fact that the Utility has not yet19 articulated --20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Why is the plan to21 have a plan not enough?22 MR. LODGE: Because the Utility carries the23 burden of demonstrating, of running the problem to earth,24 of having actual facts instead of multiple inconsistent25 projections about the embrittlement problem in order toNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433.. : .: ..... .. , .../ ' .. .." .... ... ....... 58I have a plan. And they do not, they cannot articulate that2 at this point.3 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: This question is4 for Mr. Lodge and Mr. Lewis, but please feel free to chime5 in. You state in your reply that, and I'll read it for6 you, "Flux reduction of the magnitude required at Palisades7 would require far more extraordinary measures such as the8 installation of neutron shields on the exterior of the core9 support barrel. It is unlikely that a plant modification10 of this magnitude would be cost effective." That's quoting11 from the application. And then you go on to say --12 MR. LODGE: What page are you in, sir?13 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Page 6 of your --14 reply. You go on to say that "The Petitioners submit that15 an effective and reliable management plan for a 20-year16 extension must begin with the incorporation of all NRC17 management strategies as outlined in 50.61 including18 fluence reduction efforts, not just the company's perceived19 cost effective ones.0 And you just mentioned a few moments20 ago a comment regarding annealing and cost.21 It appears that your interpretation of 50.61 is22 such that cost should not be a consideration or should be a23 minimal consideration. I'd like to understand more about24 that and I'd like to hear what others have to say as well.25 MR. LODGE: Well, our understanding of theNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 59I Atomic Energy Act is that sheer economics are not an2 appropriate rationale when the issue is to protect the3 public health and safety.4 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: The word5 practicable in 50.61 is included. In fact it says6 reasonably practicable, if I remember correctly.7 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: You say on page 9, if8 you don't mind my sort of amplifying on that, you say on9 page 9 of your reply, "There is a grave issue of law here,10 whether the economically dictated priority of Palisades or11 the health and safety concerns of the Petitioners conform12 to NRC regulations.* Which regulations -- I assume that13 you're referring to 50.61?14 MR. LODGE: Yes. Correct.15 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And the licensing16 renewal regulations. And I think the term reasonably17 practicable is where the --18 MR. LODGE: Can you tell me please what19 subsection that is in?20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: That is in 50.61.21 MR. LEWIS: (B)3 and (b)4.22 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right. (B)3 is where23 it first appears and then (b)4. I mean, in effect, what we24 have here is that as explained in NMC's answer, what they25 plan to do and what they rely on is their action that wouldNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 60I demonstrate that they will adequately manage the effects of2 aging during the extended period of operation under any3 renewed license is that they will comply with 50.61. And4 it seems like you're raising an issue, one, as to whether5 the plan to have a plan meets the license renewal criteria,6 but also you're raising a question about what reasonably7 practicable means and whether cost concerns can be taken8 into account in looking at what's reasonably practicable.9 Is that --10 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Yes. I mean, in11 essence, they have not identified what will be in their12 plan, but they have in at least one instance in the13 application identified what will not be in the plan. And14 what will not be in the plan or at least what is unlikely15 in their own words to be in the plan is the addition of16 neutrons shields on the core support barrel. You seem to17 be taking exception to that interpretation of 50.61 that18 allows them to make that assertion. I'd like to understand19 more about that interpretation of 50.61.20 MR. LODGE: Please give me a moment.21 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Would it be useful to22 take a break at this point and give you some time to --23 MR. LODGE: That would be fine. Thank you.24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Then, let's25 take a ten-minute break, 15 minutes. Come back at 10:30.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433*. .....* ... 61I (Off the record.)2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Should I repeat3 the question I asked prior to the break?4 MR. LODGE: If you'd like.5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: The question dealt6 with the statement in the application regarding the, that7 it was not cost beneficial to install the modification --8 MR. LODGE: Correct.9 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: -- that would be10 sufficient to mitigate the consequences of the11 embrittlement, namely, neutron absorption plates on the12 core support barrel. And I was asking the question13 regarding your interpretation of 50.61 in which you14 indicated that such considerations are not to be made.15 MR. LODGE: I agree somewhat that 50.61 and the16 reasonably practicable wording in the 50.61 would certainly17 seem to allow some consideration to be given to economics.18 And we, therefore, I believe agree that, yes, that's within19 the panoply of options. However, 50.61 is rather, in our20 estimation as Petitioners, ahead of the game. The Utility21 has the burden of demonstrating that they have a right to a22 license extension. The 2014 date that we've been talking23 about is a date that's been moved back four or five times.24 The Utility has never demonstrated before and we believe25 it's going to have great difficulty demonstrating presentlyNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* .. ..........*.. .... 62I the basis, the justification even for the 2014 date.2 The fact issue for hearing is establishing the3 early embrittlement, when it began or where it is or what4 degree embrittlement has set in at Palisades. That isn't5 the Petitioners' burden at hearing. We believe that,6 again, the plan to make a plan is the argument looking7 through the application. The Utility has essentially made8 the statement that it's probably unlikely that we're going9 to do a technological fix or correction, the shields, the10 core barrel, which is a signal now to the Licensing Board11 that there is at least that option off the table in all12 likelihood.13 We believe that since the Utility is not going14 to be able to establish a date certain, can't establish it15 now, that the Utility is going to have to explain that at16 hearing. That is the issue of fact. Our arguments about17 50.61 are essentially academic until the license extension18 has been determined to be grantable.19 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Are there any20 other comments regarding the use of cost effective21 arguments?22 MR. LEWIS: We believe that reasonably23 practicable implies consideration of cost, and what is24 practical necessarily includes what can you do and how does25 it cost and is it reasonable. Reasonably practicable hasNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433... , ... .. .. 63I been used in other context by the NRC to include2 consideration of economics. There is a Seabrook case,3 ALAB-422, 6 NRC 33 where the --4 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: You've cited that,5 right? I think you have already --6 MR. LEWIS: I'm not sure we have.7 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Could you give that8 citation again please?9 MR. LEWIS: It's Public Service Company of New10 Hampshire, Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2, ALAB-422, 6 NRC11 33, 1977. Now, that's a case where the Appeal Board was12 considering whether certain mitigation measures, not for13 pressurized thermal shock but just to mitigate14 environmental impacts was reasonably practicable and15 indicated that standard, you know, let's just say in16 consideration of costs.17 In addition, when the Commission was18 establishing the pressurized thermal shock rules, there19 were a number of SOCE papers that led up to it which20 considered what were reasonably practicable measures for21 reducing flux reduction. The SOCE paper is SOCE paper22 8379, February 25th, 1983. It was actually cited in the23 statement of consideration for the pressurized thermal24 shock rule and this is replete with references to the25 consideration of how much different options would cost.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433...,. .... ..., 64I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: What's the citation2 for the SOC?3 MR. LEWIS: It's 49 Federal Register at 4500.4 I don't know what the first page of the Federal Register is5 but it's at page 4500.6 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Thank you. Thanks.7 MR. LEWIS: So, we think clearly reasonably8 practicable requires consideration of economic. And we9 believe that Petitioners just submitted that also. We10 would agree.11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Do you consider12 annealing also too costly at this point?13 MR. LEWIS: No, it's one of the options under14 the rules, both the pressurized thermal shock rule and the15 annealing rule three years before you exceed the screening16 criteria and you have to submit an analysis if you want to17 operate past that screening criteria. And you need to18 submit a nealing plant if you want to anneal. Those are19 both options that are identified in our license renewal20 application as part of our program. And so, we intend to21 follow the regulations and make those submittals and22 determinations at that time.23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: So, you're not24 ruling out the issuance of an annealing report three years25 prior to 2014?NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 65I MR. LEWIS: No, we're not.2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Do you want to add3 anything on that?4 MR. LODGE: I would just like to stress that,5 again, we don't vociferously at this point disagree that6 reasonably practicable includes economic balancing. The7 point is look at the regulatory environment right now.8 There is no NRC rule on PTS. There is not a binding one.9 There's one that has been under discussion and is out there10 and is being revised. But there is not a standard that11 this Board can apply and you're faced with an applicant12 that's saying, reading between the lines, we can't tell you13 very accurately that there is embrittlement, only the14 degree of embrittlement, we can tell you there is15 embrittlement. And that's why we are very skeptical,16 looking very askance at this 2014 date because it's about17 as established as the earlier screening dates were.Is So, who is to say in 2011 that the then19 projected date isn't 2032?20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: You made a statement21 earlier that what they have is a plan to make a plan. And22 I think you were arguing that that doesn't meet the23 standards for license renewal.24 MR. LODGE: Right.25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Can you point me to,NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 66I or sort of spell out for me your argument on that? What2 authority? I mean, we need to make any findings that we3 make based on the standards set forth in the rules.4 MR. LODGE: Sure.5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: So, could you tell me6 what authority you would rely on in those rules or7 elsewhere to support your argument that a plan to make a8 plan, taking all your other arguments and your facts as9 alleged to be true? How does that, what impact does that10 have on the findings that we would need to make ultimately,11 the legal conclusions that we would need to draw12 ultimately?13 MR. LODGE: Well, the requirements in the14 54.21(c)l as to the analyses that must be demonstrated by15 the applicant, and I would say that the --16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I think what NMC is17 relying on is 54.21(c)l(iii), that they are going to18 demonstrate --19 MR. LODGE: Right. Right.20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- through the21 information to be provided to the NRC.22 MR. LODGE: That's correct.23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: That the effects of24 aging on the intended functions will be adequately managed25 for the period of extended operation.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 67I MR. LODGE: That's correct.2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And what's your3 argument on that and with regard to the standards of 54.29?4 MR. LODGE: That the Utility historically has5 not, and again, I'm sort of delving into facts a moment,6 that the history up to this point, up to the time of the7 hearing in effect is that the Utility has not demonstrated8 any ability to manage the embrittlement problem and we9 believe the issue of fact is that the Utility has to10 demonstrate what's changed, how firm is the 2014 date,11 based upon what as opposed to the past.12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And if the 2014 date13 is correct, what's your argument?14 MR. LODGE: That's the issue of fact that would15 have to be decided and adjudicated by the Board.16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Let's say we find that17 that date is correct just for the sake of argument, what is18 your argument as to how that affects the legal conclusions19 that we would need to draw? And I guess what I'm getting20 to, you say, you characterize the argument of NMC as being21 a plan to make a plan?22 MR. LODGE: Correct.23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: What's wrong with24 that, under the legal standards of 54.21 and 54.29?25 MR. LODGE: What's wrong with what? TheNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 68I uncertainty in our estimation is the, is the issue of fact.2 If you're saying what's wrong with a plan to make a plan3 the requirement by the Board is to find there is a4 demonstration that the effects of aging will be adequately5 managed in the renewal term.6 In essence, you will be making a finding that,7 that they might be managed in the renewal term but there8 will not be the requisite degree of certainty that they9 will be, you will be granting an open season type of10 license.11 You'll be allowing the utility to continue12 operating under the current ages of no PTS standard, no,13 it's under revision and the ad hoc generation long setting14 and resetting of the date that the screening criteria are15 breached or surpassed.16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: From a regulatory17 standpoint, you seem to apply that this is ad hoc but the18 regulations, specifically the EDS regulations and NMC19 statement that they will comply with those, I don't quite20 understand where the uncertainty comes in. I mean, that21 rule, EDS rule does allow some, different courses of22 action.23 MR. LODGE: Right.24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: But they're all very25 specifically described.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433......... .... 69I MR. LODGE: Right.2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: And their indication3 is that they will comply with the rule. How is that any4 different than, for example, statements which they might5 make with respect to say complying with Appendix B criteria6 or a quality control system? Or complying with Part 20 for7 the dose?8 MR. LODGE: All the utility is saying by9 promising to comply with the regulation is that whatever10 requirements we have to follow in, let's say 2011, we will.11 And we'll postulate our 50.61 option and our choices.12 We'll make our decision then.13 The issue of fact is what will have changed14 from the point in time that the Board and the Commission15 issue a license extension until --16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Let me stop you there.17 Don't assume what the Board's going to do.18 MR. LODGE: No, no. I'm saying, for purposes19 of discussion that --20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: If the Board were to21 grant the renewal license then --22 MR. LODGE: I can correct, I mean no disrespect23 at all.24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Now continue25 your --NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 70I MR. LODGE: That was kind of implicit in my2 point of argument. The problem is is that the issue of3 fact here is, is a gaping issue of fact. And that's why we4 believe that it is up to the Board to establish whether or5 not the embrittlement management history warrants and6 conjectures by the utility as to the near term, whether7 that warrants a license extension.8 Not, I think it is this, the panel cannot9 simply pass on the adequacy by saying, well they've10 committed to following the regs that might be in effect at11 that time. We don't even know if there will be a PTS12 revision, a final one even by then.13 So, in essence, we think that the issue in one14 respect is that the utility is requesting continuation of15 the status quo. They've already said we aren't going to16 make a technological fix in all likelihood, so we're going17 to continue to rely on the paucity of data and the18 proliferation of computer projections and inferences.19 And maybe occasionally we can get some data on20 embrittlement problems at other reactors and maybe we will21 use surveillance capsules that have some stepped up22 accelerated embrittlement features to them. All of which23 we'll use to try to figure this out. But they cannot24 explain that they have figured it out, that there's25 certainty that they are working essentially from a ratherNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* .°.. ... .. 7112345678910111213141516171819202122232425hard science and a hard engineering basis.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: So what you're sayingis that the licensee may demonstrate the effects of, thatthe effects of aging on the embrittlement issue will, thatthe licensee can demonstrate that it may be adequatelymanaged but not that it will be adequately managed?MR. LODGE:Correct.ADMIN. LAW JUargument is and then thatMR. LODGE: YADMIN. LAW JUhave any questions for hi,ADMIN. LAW JU]coming back after I --ADMIN. LAW JUlDGE YOUNG:es.DGE YOUNG:M?DGE BARATT,That's what yourAll right.Do youI'd like to reserveDGE YOUNG: We may have more.Okay.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: I think there aremore questions.ADMIN. LAWADMIN. LAWJUDGEJUDGEYOUNG: You want to ask now?TRIKOUROS: I do have onequestion --MR. LODGE:ADMIN. LAWstatement that NMC hasembrittlement effect.Yes, sir.JUDGE TRIKOUROS: -- regarding your(,not properly managed theCan you elaborate on that?The, INEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433-..,.-i .". * .-..- :.i " '...'..... ..-"---.. ."* *. " " 72mean certainly they haven't introduced flux reduction2 programs where, what have they not done?3 MR. LODGE: They've never established and4 apparently cannot establish the precise mix of copper and5 nickel, that data is lost to time.6 The surveillance coupons or capsules were used7 up, we believe, as of the ninth refueling which was in the8 early 1990's. I'm sorry. And in essence they are delaying9 the, they're using fuel bundles to try to reduce the10 irradiation effects on the reactor pressure vessel.11 I don't know, so far as I understand, those are12 at least three of the facets that we question in terms of13 management practices.14 I, perhaps I should frame it as we, it's the15 petitioner's contention that the problem, yes, there are16 management measures being taken. But, once again, there's17 a, it's guess work, it's based upon paucity of information.18 There's an argument in fact that, based upon19 one of the conclusions the Board could reach is that based20 upon the history that the only certain way of meeting the21 standard is for replacement of the RPV.22 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: In light of 50.6123 though --24 MR. LODGE: Right.25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: The way, does not,NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* "" " " .... .'. . 7312345678910111213141516171819202122232425doesn't that dictate the way that you can manage theeffects of embrittlement?MR. LODGE: Indeed it does. And as I indicatedearlier, we don't particularly dispute the reasonablypracticable wording but I think that that is, that's adetermination that gets made, is allowed to be made onlyafter the 54.29 determination is made.The utilities previously pledged, in about1996, that they would nail the reactor vessel and have notdone so. We don't know why, but that again is one of thefacets of this that would be explored we believe at a facthearing.But yes, sir, you're correct, 50.61 says whatit says. And it does allow for the selection, theoutlining and selection of options. But that is not adetermination that's being made right now.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: All right. Welllet's take this a step further then though. Thedetermination now is whether or not they will manage theeffects of aging?MR. LODGE: Right.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: That's 54.20,ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: 21.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: 21. 54.21.60.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well actually, 54.29.<-INEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433.. 7412345678910111213141516171819202122232425ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Okay. 54.21 and54.29 require. Now I guess I'm still at a loss tounderstand why a statement that I will comply with theapple requirements for PTS screening criteria which is50.61 is not satisfy that I will manage, the statement Iwill manage the detrimental effects of aging.Because again if I use your argument that astatement that I will comply with the regulations isinsufficient to demonstrate that I've taken an action whichwill deal with the detrimental effects then any statementthat I will comply with any other part of the regulationswould come into question as well.And seems that to lead to an illogicalconclusion.In other words, I'm trying to get back to theissue of, we have to, when we're all said and done on thislicense renewal, we have to come to a conclusion thatthey've met the regulations. And the regulations are 54.21and 54.29, require that they have a plan.MR. LODGE: Um-hum.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Okay. And how, whatis it that, in the regulations that says a statement that Iwill comply with the regulations is not a plan?You know what, where in all of the, you know,the part 50 would that not satisfy?NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 75I MR. LODGE: I think that what the utility is2 actually saying is we intend to comply, we think, with the3 regs that might be in affect at the time.4 The company's operating from a lack of actual5 data based upon surveillance capsules or coupons. We6 believe that the standards in part 54 require a much higher7 degree of actual knowledge, actionable knowledge than that.8 And that, again, to state that you intend to9 make decisions seems to abrogate what this Board's, the10 scope of this Board's responsibility is. That in essence,11 I mean I take that to suggest that why couldn't just12 ongoing regulatory powers of the NRC address this13 embrittlement problem.14 Well, there is not an external NRC defined15 standard and the utility keeps moving its own goal posts16 back based upon what amounts, in some respects, to17 speculative inference, not hard data.18 I, it's the petitioner's position that at some19 point and especially when they're making projections now,20 several years into the anticipated 20 year extension period21 that it, the buck has to stop, the determination has to be22 made here, in 2005 or '06 as to exactly what are they23 operating from when they say 2014, when they, when there's24 any representation made as to the decision.25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Well, let me takeNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 76I that point that you just made though. If you're taking2 issue with their statement, which they are currently3 operating on, under, that PTS is not a problem, isn't that4 a challenge to the existing licensing basis and therefore5 is specifically excluded from this license renewal hearing?6 MR. LODGE: No, sir. Because they're making a7 representation to the Commission that we believe we're8 going to be able to manage this and here's how.9 When you examine the basis for their10 assumptions, it starts to come apart, the wheels start to11 fall off. But that's the basis under which they're12 currently operating.13 It's the basis under which they propose to14 continue operating until 2014, perhaps.15 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: See, my problem is16 I'm bound by what the Commission said in Turkey Point,17 okay.18 MR. LODGE: Right.19 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: I mean that's --20 MR. LODGE: Yes.21 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: -- you know,22 anything that we do has to be consistent with that. That's23 our governing, one of our governing case logs. And one of24 those, the aspects is I can't challenge the existing25 licensing basis in a license renewal here.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 77I And it sounds like that's what you're doing.2 MR. LODGE: Well.3 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Could you explain to4 me how that isn't?5 MR. LODGE: Sir, the Turkey Point also says,6 left unmitigated, the effects of aging can overstress7 equipment, unacceptably reduce safety margins and lead to8 reduction of required plant functions, including the9 capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in the10 shut down condition.11 And, and that's in the same paragraph that12 mentions embrittlement as a, certainly a legitimate topic13 as an adverse aging effect.14 That's why we believe, yes, it is a current15 operating circumstance but the utility is also telling you16 that we're going to maintain the status quo for the rest of17 our current license and perhaps even into the license18 extension period.19 It is up to this Board to examine the adequacy20 of that proposition as a management plan.21 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Okay. I think I22 understand now what you're saying. Thank you.23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Your assertion24 that there had been different analyses leading to different25 conclusions over time, all of these, I assume, have beenNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* .... .i". " -!* i. .' .' : 78I done with approved methods under the auspices of the2 Nuclear Regulatory Commission or is that, is there3 something missing there?4 These are just different analyses with using5 different methods?6 MR. LODGE: I don't know if the NRC has7 promulgated a very clear guideline for what are approved8 methods.9 I guess I'm not prepared to answer that unless10 you have, can help me a little bit.I1 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Well within the12 allowances of say regulatory guides, specific regulatory13 guides that identify methods. I'm trying to understand if14 what you said regarding the various analyses is implying15 something that we should be considering of this was a new16 part of the normal plant licensing basis.17 MR. LODGE: Um-hum. One moment, please. In18 our reply to the motions to strike we point to, repeatedly19 to an NRC staff memo that suggests that the staff itself20 does not necessarily concur with the 2014 date.21 So the question of whether or not these are,22 the deliberations that have been ongoing since the late23 '80's or even earlier are an acceptable practice, which I24 take to be your question.25 Pardon me. We questioned whether or not anNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433.. ., .... 79I appropriate confidence level has been established through2 all of that, all of the computations and projections. The,3 again, the problem is that there's a PTS revision out there4 that is not yet promulgated into formal policy.5 This is very much an ad hoc circumstance6 dealing with a plant that has unique engineered and lack of7 engineered features, if you will, the radiation shield.S And incidently, it, I actually suppose maybe9 the answer to your question, sir, is that maybe it is, it's10 up to the Board to make the determination because of the ad11 hoc nature of this ongoing technical dialogue that has been12 going on now for a generation as to whether for another13 generation it's going to be adequate to provide the14 assurances that the Board has to find the utility to have15 made.16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: I was unaware that17 2014 was in question. At least from all of the readingIS that I have done, I could not see the 2014 was in question.19 MR. LODGE: We actually recount the contents of20 a staff memo at page 15 of our reply to the motion to21 strike. I think it's mentioned, one or two times later.22 It's mentioned at page 20.23 It's also in our, yeah, it's in our appendix of24 evidence that was provided to the actual memo, as an25 exhibit, accompanying the same response.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 soI ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Do you --2 MR. LODGE: Yes?3 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Do you have anything4 further you want to add?5 MR. LODGE: No, sir. Or no, ma'am. Sorry.6 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: All right.7 MR. LODGE: Sorry.8 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: If there are no more9 questions now, should we move, all right. Let's move on to10 you, Mr. Lewis and/or Mr. Gaukler.11 MR. LEWIS: Thank you. Let me start by12 addressing the assertion I heard a number of times that13 we're working under ad hoc standards. And I think I heard14 petitioner say at one point that there's no rule on15 pressurized thermal shock, that there's no standard, that16 everything's under revision.17 It is true that there is an NRC effort under18 way to consider revising the pressurized thermal shock rule19 and about a half of what the petitioners cite in their20 reply are ACRS statements that relate to potential changes21 in the future of the pressurized thermal shock rule.22 But we're not relying, in our license renewal23 application, et al., on a potential revision to the rule.24 There is a current rule and that's at 10-CFR-50.61 and25 there's current interpreting guidance in Reg Guide 1.9 thatNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 81I explains how you apply the rule.2 And we are applying and being judged under the3 current standard, not on any potential future revision. So4 this is not an ad hoc approach.5 We are demonstrating that we're managing aging6 in accordance with Very precise, current regulations. The7 number of questions about the significance of the early8 embrittlement assertion that is in the petitioner's reply,9 let me try and address that and make a number of points.10 First is that the plant's not unique. There11 are other plants that will reach the screening criterion12 before the period of extended operations. So this is13 not --14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I'm sorry. I thought15 I had turned that off. Go ahead.16 MR. LEWIS: We're not the only plant that has17 this circumstance. And there was a May 27th, 20041i memorandum from the executive director of operations to the19 Commission that identified how the license regulations20 would apply to plants that would exceed the screening21 criterion before the period of --22 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Repeat that statement,23 please?24 MR. LEWIS: There was a May 27th, 200425 memorandum from the executive director of operations to theNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433....- 82I Commission that explained how the license regulations would2 apply to a plant that would exceed the screening criterion3 before the period of extended operations had expired.4 In other words, would not be able to show that5 they would meet the screening criterion for the entire6 extra 20 years of operations. And that memorandum7 identified other plants that were in the same circumstance.8 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: With, just to, on the9 prone to early embrittlement, that, as compared to the10 other plants is this Palisades earlier or you're saying11 it's not, I mean, there's, there would seem to be a12 difference between three years into a term and say 18 or 1913 years into a term, is there?14 MR. LEWIS: I don't know the answer to that15 question. I don't know when the other plants would expire.16 With respect to early embrittlement, 54.21(c)i17 gives three methods for managing a time limit aging18 analysis. One is to show the current analysis extends19 through the period of operation.20 The second one is to revise the analysis to21 make it extend. And the third is to establish a program to22 manage aging.23 The petitioners have suggested we're just24 saying we're going to comply with the rules. That's not25 really correct.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 83I The pressurized thermal shock regulation is a2 regulation that tells you exactly what you have to do at3 every step of the way. It says, here's exactly how you4 determine what your reference temperature for -- transition5 is and if you're going to exceed it, here's exactly what6 you're going to do.7 So to a certain extent we are saying we're8 following the rule. But we're saying we're following the9 rule because it tells us what you do at each step to ensure10 that the plant is safe.11 And by saying that we meet each of these steps12 that are specifically required by the rule, we are in fact13 showing that there is no safety issue in the period of14 extended operation. Because the rules do allow you to15 operate in exceedance of the screening criterion without a16 further NRC approval, either of annealing or further17 analysis three years, you know, to be submitted three yearsis before the screening criterion has exceeded, demonstrating19 that pressurized thermal shock is not a safety concern.20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Could I, I'd just21 like to interrupt you. I just want to ask a quick question22 because we had some discussion about this, on the point of,23 if you exceed, if your calculations show that you are going24 to exceed it and, hypothetically at this point, okay, that25 you do some new calculations and you're still going toNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433.......*.. ... . 841 exceed it at some point, be it 2014, 2016 or whatever.2 And you then had to come in under the rule to3 request continued operation. Would that result in a4 modification to your tech specs and as a result a, you'd5 have to apply for a license modification?6 And I'd like to ask that both of NMC and also7 the staff.8 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And I guess going9 along with that, if it would then that would mean that10 there would be the right to a hearing because you would be11 essentially proposing to amend your license.12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: That was my next13 question to.14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Is that a situation?15 MR. LEWIS: Yes.16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Is that the situation?17 MR. LEWIS: I would like to, I'll give you what18 I believe the answer is but I would like to consult later19 on and if I've said something wrong I will come back.20 But I believe that that revision would change21 your pressure temperature curves that I think are part of22 your tech specs and as a result, I believe there would be a23 need for a license amendment.24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Just. Did we want to25 take a break at this point and see if the staff agrees withNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* ... ..., .% . 8512345678910111213141516171819202122232425that? I mean, not take a break but switch over to thestaff at this time.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: If you don't mind.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Yes.MS. UTTAL: I'm trying to find out right now.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay.MS. UTTAL: I don't know if we have an --MR. LEWIS: Shall I proceed or?ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: If we can get ananswer from the staff quickly, otherwise --ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Or we could comeback to this in two minutes, or whatever you'd like to do.MS. UTTAL: It will take us a couple ofminutes.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. We'll, do youwant to take a break?ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Why don't we giveyou about five minutes and you can consult and then we'llget the answer to that. Okay? Is that all right?MR. LODGE: May I just for record purposes dosomething to get something accomplished here for you. Mr.Trikouros the memo I was referring to is Exhibit I-G in theappendix of evidence that we provided along with our replyto the motions to, the combined reply to the motions tostrike.INEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 86l It's a memo from Stephanie Coffin to Stephen2 Hoffman who are NRC staff people, dated 11/24/2004.3 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Can, I'm sorry,4 can, I'm having trouble. Could you --5 MR. LODGE: I'm very sorry. My apologies.6 It's Exhibit I-G, a memorandum, an internal NRC memorandum7 from Stephanie Coffin, C-o-f-f-i-n to Stephen Hoffman datedS November 24th of 2004.9 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: All right. Let's take10 a five minute break. Looks like we might be able to get11 that information.12 (Off the record.)K 13 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Yes, thank you. Okay.14 Let's get started.15 MS. UTTAL: There's no direct requirement in16 that, in 50.66 but if you --17 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: In, I'm sorry?IS MS. UTTAL: In 50.66.19 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: 61?20 MS. UTTAL: 61, excuse me. But if you have to21 change the analysis and change the dates, this would22 require several things.23 You'd probably have to change the power* 24 distribution limits which would affect the safety limits.25 You would have to change the level of power, the licenseNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* " " : : " " " ... .* .; " ..* * * .... -" "' -"* * :,,. .*. ....

• 871234567891011121314151617i819202122232425condition that delineates the power level that the plantoperates on and if there are any new material property, anynew material property data, then you would have to do atech spec change for all those things.So that it is likely that a license amendmentor several license amendments would be required on thatdata.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Which would involve anotice and opportunity to request a hearing on those atthat point, right?MS. UTTAL: Yes.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay.MR. LEWIS: And Judge, I'm, I did ask andconsult my understanding what I said was correct aboutchanging the pressure temperature groups and the licensewhich are based on RDNDT.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And so you're sayingthat that would involve --MR. LEWIS: There would be a license amendmentalso.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right. Okay. Beforeyou continue on, let me just as another question for you toput in the mix.Basically what, well let me back up. Clearlythe no regulation can be challenged in an adjudicationNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 88I proceeding, there are other avenues to petition for rule-2 making and so forth.3 And clearly during, during the time that a4 plant is licensed, if they follow 50.61, then that takes5 care of the issues addressed under 50.61 during that period6 of licenseship.7 What's at issue in this proceeding is whether a8 new, a renewed license should be issued for an additional9 period of licenseship for 20 years.10 And as I understand at least part of the11 argument of the petitioner's, what you're proposing in12 saying that you will, in 2011 I think it would be, provide13 information to the NRC as to whether you'll be annealing or14 whether you are going to be doing a recalculation which I15 think everyone now agrees would involve a, the necessity16 for a license amendment and a new hearing.17 But apart from that, what you're saying is that18 at that point, in 2011, you would provide that information19 to the NRC as to what you propose to do in 2014 and that's20 been characterized as a plan to make a plan.21 And the argument is that the plan to make a22 plan would not demonstrate that the effects of aging would23 be adequately managed throughout the term of the renewed24 license.25 Which is sort of a different issue than whetherNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* " .: .'. *-.- ." " ..'" " -" ' *.. .........

89I you will be complying with 50.61 by not providing that/2 information until 2011.3 That issue is whether, assuming the4 contention's admitted, the licensed, the renewed license5 that, which you seek for 20 years should be granted based6 on your demonstration that the effects of aging will be7 managed during, throughout the entire term.8 And from what I understand you saying, you're9 not sure what information you'll be providing in 2011. And10 so it's really not known what will take place after,11 starting in 2014.12 Can you address that argument? And I think it13 also gets into the, to whether that's a sufficient action,14 identification of an action that will be taken, that has15 been or will be taken.16 And as I understand your argument, you're17 saying that the action that will be taken is that you will18 tell the NRC in 2011 what you intend to do in 2014?19 MR. LEWIS: That's correct. I would take a20 little issue with saying this is just a plan to make a21 plan. I mean, this is a program and we've described the22 steps that we would do.23 What we have not stated is what would be the24 technical solution in 2014. What we have described is, the25 reasonably available options that we could pursue and INEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433...............o.................... ... *.....o.. 90believe that's all that was required by the rules.2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: It's all that's3 required by 50.61.4 MR. LEWIS: I believe it's all --5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But in terms of --6 MR. LEWIS: -- that's required by --7 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- in terms of 54.218 and 54.29, demonstrating that the effects of aging will be9 adequately managed during the extended period of operation.10 In other words, during the whole 20 years that you're11 sinking.12 That I think raises a different question which13 is not quite so simply resolved by saying we will comply14 with 50.61 by telling the NRC at that point which of these15 two options we we're saying at this point we might take.16 MR. LEWIS: I understand your question, Judge17 on, I would say several things. First I would refer you18 back to the May 27th, 2004 memorandum from the EDO to the19 Commissioners.20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Do you have a copy of21 that with you?22 MR. LEWIS: I do have a copy of it with me.23 Can I find it at a --24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Sure.25 MR. LEWIS: -- on break?NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* ' ."- * : ' 'i '. " ' ."" " " -" ..". 9'I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Sure.2 MR. LEWIS: In describing what would be an3 adequate program under 50.21(c)3, that memorandum4 specifically refers to the fact that these reports are only5 required to be submitted three years before the screening6 criterion is exceeded.7 Second one is an adequate program I think8 should be judged in, you know, what protects the public9 health and safety. Here you have a hard limit screening10 criterion that cannot be exceeded without a Commission11 approval, so there really is no safety issue.12 And there's a requirement for a determination13 later that these, whatever the technical solution is has to14 be effective.15 So this is a program that ensures safety. And16 if it's a program that assures safety, I would submit to17 you that it is an adequate program under 54.21(c)1.III.is ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, so are you19 saying if you get to 2011 and you, for example, may have20 decided that you're not going to do the annealing, you21 proposing as an alternative that you'll do a recalculation22 and, and am I correct in assuming as part of that, that if23 you cannot show that you can extend that date to X date24 that you will no longer operate after X date?25 MR. LEWIS: You're asking me what is the safetyNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433." ' " * " " .'" -" .." ". * * .' ." " ' "" " '. .'* ..." '. ": ... ..-", ." .." ' ' " 92I analysis that would be submitted in 2011? If we could2 extend the screening, not extend that screening criterion,3 if we could extend our RTPTS by further flux reduction4 measures or modifications or better defined methods of5 calculating fluids, you know, those are all permissible and6 they extend the, when the screening criterion is exceeded.7 The analysis that is permitted by 50.61, I8 believe is more in the nature of a fracture or -- analysis9 that shows there's a lot of conservatism in the pressurized10 thermal shock rule and you could come in with analysis that11 showed that in fact that your reference temperature12 measured by other methods is better than that is predicted13 by the PTS rule.14 Or you could do other types of analyses to show15 that even exceeding this, the screening criterion that16 there's no safety issue.17 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, but the issue18 I'm trying to get you to address is, that would either show19 that you could continue operations safely or theoretically20 it might show that you could not.21 MR. LEWIS: And --22 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: In which case you23 would agree to shut down, basically.(. 24 MR. LEWIS: Not just agree to shut down, we25 would not be permitted to operate.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433........... ....... .......:............. 93I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right. Okay.2 MR. LEWIS: We could not operate past the3 screening criterion without NRC approval. So it's --4 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right. Okay. So,5 however we want to put it, you would, you could not break6 past that point. So I guess the point I'm trying to get7 you to address is, at this time, you don't know what that8 calculation would show.9 You're saying, basically you're saying you have10 a program but the part of the program that's at issue in1I this contention is that part in which you say in 2011 we'll12 tell the NRC we'll provide information to the NRC whether13 we will do the annealing or whether we'll do this14 calculation.15 And at this point, you don't know whether any16 calculation that you would do, should you go in that route,17 would take you throughout the 20 year term, is that18 correct?19 MR. LEWIS: I believe that's correct. I think20 there's a lot of confidence that these options are21 available. I think there's --22 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well I'm not --23 MR. LEWIS: -- annealing is possible.( 24 Annealing has been demonstrated in other countries. It's25 been demonstrated in Russia and Eastern Europe.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 94I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right. But what I'm2 trying to get you to address is the sort of essence of what3 the petitioners are saying in saying that it's a plan to4 make a plan. That you don't really know at this point what5 will occur after 2014 and yet you're asking for a license6 for 20 years, starting in 2011.7 And so I guess the question of whether your8 intent to provide the information to the NRC in 2011, how9 that really does jibe with the requirement that you have to10 identify actions. I don't know. I mean, in a, the11 argument that action implies more than later telling the12 NRC what you will do and managing the effects of aging13 during the extended, period of extended operation.14 Now I understand the memo that you referred to,15 which I haven'.t read, obviously would be something that we16 could refer to for guidance and that would be entitled to17 some differences as, just as any policy type statement or a18 similar document would be entitled to.19 But apart from that, just in the normal, plain20 English understanding of the terms, managing the effects of21 aging during the, during the period of extended operation I22 think suggests something more than saying how you would,23 what, that you will later give the NRC information on what24 you will do three years later than that.25 And when that's, but that's year one and yearNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 95I three of a proposed 20 year term of operation. I mean, I2 think you can see what I'm saying. That, I think the3 normal understanding of those words implies more than4 telling the NRC something later, doesn't it?5 MR. LEWIS: No, I would respectfully disagree.6 I believe that actions are one of the measures and steps7 that you're going to take to make sure that this agingS mechanism, embrittlement is being managed in a way that9 protects the public health and safety.10 And we are saying that we will continue to11 apply the screening criterion and we will no operate past12 the screening criterion without meeting the submittals and13 getting NRC approvals. And these submittals, you know, do14 address options that are permissible under the, NRC15 regulations and are reasonably available.16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But isn't there17 reasonable interpretation of the rules that says you needIs to say at this point what you will do to ensure you can19 operated the entire 20 years?20 MR. LEWIS: I don't think it would be a21 reasonable interpretation because it would be saying that22 the current regulations which assure a public health and23 safety in the current terms somehow aren't good enough for24 the renewal term when it's the same effect that's being25 managed in both.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* .. .'.. .., ..- .*. 96I If the, if this structure in 50.61 and 50.662 which is the annealing rule, is, protects public health and3 safety in the current term as it does, as you must accept4 you know, by, you know, accepting the NRC regulations.5 There's also an acceptable approach and program6 to implement during the period of extended operations.7 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I think you're, in8 terms of 50.61 and following that, during a period when9 you're already licensed, there's no question you'd follow10 that.11 But what I'm trying to get you to look at is12 not just following 50.61 during a period when you're13 licensed but the different question of the determination of14 whether you should be granted an additional 20 years in a15 renewed license when the standards for that suggest perhaps16 something more substantive than saying we will say later17 how we're going to handle something.18 And I guess the other concern I have is, we're19 talking about a context that's probably, if not the,20 certainly an extremely significant aging issue which the21 Commission has over and over said is the very type of issue22 that licensed renewals are to address.23 Back in 1991, the Commission talked about the24 types of measures that needed to be demonstrated with25 regard to pressurized thermal shock, for example.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 97I And talked about situations needing to be2 analyzed for the period of extended operation as a basis3 for determining any additional aging management actions4 that may be required for license renewal.5 I mean, in Turkey Point the Commission talks6 about detailed, let's see if I can find this, detailed, I7 can't find the exact language it was talking about, but8 detailed plans for how the effects of aging are going to be9 managed.10 Now, the Commission did, in a footnote in11 Turkey Point, talk about some aging related issues being12 adequately dealt with by regulatory processes. Which13 therefore might not need to be subject to further review14 during the license renewal proceeding.15 But the example they gave in footnote two were16 structures and components were that already must be17 replaced at mandated specified time periods. And isn't18 pressurized thermal shock relating to the reactor vessel of19 a fundamentally different sort than the example given by20 the Commission at that point?21 I mean, isn't this the exact type of issue that22 is within the scope of licensed renewal?23 MR. LEWIS: Well I agree that embrittlement's24 within the scope of license renewal. I simply disagree25 that in order to establish an acceptable program thatNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433.......... ...... 98I manages aging a way that protects public health and safety2 that it's necessary to provide a technical solution out of3 several available options at this juncture.4 The regulations allow you to submit those5 programs and proposals three years before you even reach6 the screening criterion because, quite frankly that's the7 more appropriate time to do it.S You have better data.9 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right.10 MR. LEWIS: You're much more able to determine11 what is, I --12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But wouldn't you need13 to show us, I mean if your analysis -is correct, pressurized14 thermal shock and embrittlement are aging issues that are15 within the scope of review in a license renewal proceeding.16 And yet, you can address them by saying we17 will tell you what we're going to do when the time comes,18 namely three years before we exceed the PTS criterion, if19 I'm saying that right.20 I mean would, doesn't that sort of give with21 one hand take away with another?22 MR. LEWIS: Well, Judge, it is more than that.23 I mean there is a program of surveillance and, you know,24 calculating when the screening criterion will be exceeded25 and --NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433........ *.. ... ,. ..' .. 99I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right.2 MR. LEWIS: -- implement flux reduction3 measures. I mean this is --4 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But --5 MR. LEWIS: -- parcel of the whole program.6 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But as to a situation7 which you said was not unique, namely that a plant would8 reach that point of exceeding the criterion, what you, what9 I hear you saying is that even though aging of the reactor10 pressure vessel is a legitimate issue within the scope of11 license renewal that as to that period, starting at the12 point that the criterion is exceeded, that that period can13 adequately be addressed by an applicant by saying we will14 follow 50.61.15 And three years before that date we'll deal16 with it by telling the NRC what we're going do to at that17 point. And I'm not following how we --18 MR. LEWIS: Judge?19 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- reach any other20 result?21 MR. LEWIS: Judge, I would say this is not22 unique and it's not the only example of how regulatory23 established programs manage aging, environmental24 qualification presents a very similar example. There is --25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But let's stay onNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433.'. .: ' ......* , ., *- : .. 1002345678910111213141516171819202122232425this --MR. LEWIS: I could --ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Let's, before you, no,before you get into other examples, let's stay on this one.That, isn't, wouldn't it be possible for any plant to doexactly what you're doing and argue that that takes it outwhat could be an admissible contention on the issue ofaging of the reactor vessel?I mean, how else, what other result could therebe on this particular issue? This particular issue ofaging?MR. LEWIS: What I would say is a veryimportant factor in this is that the regulations don'tpermit you to operate exceeding the screening criterion.So this isn't a matter of just saying trust us,we'll do something right and it never gets looked at again.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But if it doesn't --MR. LEWIS: This is a hard limit that preventsoperation past the screening criterion without NRC approvaland therefore prohibits you from ever being in a situationthat --ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But I don't, I don'tthink --MR. LEWIS: -- endangers the public health andsafety.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433*. .~* ..* ... 101I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I don't think you're2 answering my question. My question is this, the Commission3 has said that these types of aging issues are the only4 thing that are relevant in a license renewal proceeding.5 And aging of the reactor vessel is clearly a6 significant aging issue that's within the scope and you7 agree with that. But what you seem to be saying is that,8 what you're saying with regard to the Palisades plant, that9 your identification of the action that will be taken to10 manage the effects of aging during the period of extended11 operation, in other words, during the entire 20 years, is12 that three years before you exceed the criterion in 2011,13 you'll tell the NRC which course of action you intend to14 follow.15 And at that point, you'll provide the16 calculation, if that's the road you intend to follow.17 What I'm not seeing is how any contention could18 ever be admitted on aging of the reactor vessel and19 pressurized thermal shock if all an applicant has to do is20 say we will follow 50.61 in the future. That's what I'm21 not seeing because it seems like you let it in but as soon22 as you let it in it's out by what you've identified as23 something that should be considered a sufficient action.24 And what the allegation in this contention is,25 and I'm just speaking of the original contention, is thatNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 102*1K12345678910111213141516171819202122232425the application is. not complete because it doesn't addressthe continuing issue of embrittlement.And that this plant has been identified asprone to early embrittlement. I'm not seeing how anycontention could ever come in if a licensee simply sayswe're going to comply with 50.61 by providing informationthree years before we are now projected to meat the, orexceed the PTS criterion.So if you could address that issue, I wouldappreciate it. Thanks.MR. LEWIS: The reports that are submittedthree years before the screening criterion are, is exceededis one part of the program. And there are other aspects ofthe program --ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right. But those,we're just -- it's pass --MR. LEWIS: I'm saying you can have contentionsthat address them, they haven't been challenged in thisproceeding.But, you know,of the program that can beThe only issuereports have to come in.the rules say that those years before and that is sithere are aspects, other aspectchallenged with a proper basis.is when do these additionalAnd what I am saying is those,eports only have to come in threeufficient to protect the publicNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 103I health and safety --2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Assuming you've3 already got a license.4 MR. LEWIS: -- because you can't operate, you5 know, beyond the screening criterion without approval.6 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well it's, but that's7 assuming you already have a license. If you've already got8 the license, clearly all you have to do is follow 50.61.9 And all you have to do under that, after you've10 done the surveillance and fluence reduction and all theII other things that you can do, when you get to the point12 where you know you're going to exceed or the current13 calculations say you're going to exceed the criterion on X14 date.15 Then in that situation, you're saying all you16 have to do in order to show that you should be granted a17 new license for 20 years, even though those 20 years might18 go well beyond the date at which you are projected to19 exceed the criterion, that all you have to do it say we20 will provide information to the NRC three years in advance21 of our projected date.22 MR. LEWIS: I am saying that a contention that23 asserts that these, that you have to make a demonstration24 now on how you would address the situation is a challenge25 to the rule, it is not a permissible contention in thisNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 104I proceeding.2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But why would you3 need to assume that the things that you would need to4 demonstrate, at this point let's say, taking the5 petitioner's argument, that the things that you would need6 to demonstrate at this point to show that you will7 adequately manage the effects of aging would be exactly the8 same type of information or the exact same extent of9 information, let's say that you would need to provide the1o NRC three years in advance.11 I mean, couldn't there be, wouldn't, couldn't12 there be an argument made that even though you might not13 provide the complete calculation that you would provide14 later with benefit of state of the art information and so15 forth, that you would at least need to show something to16 demonstrate that you actually will manage the effects of17 aging during the entire period of extended operation,IS rather than just saying, well, if we don't, then we won't19 operate anymore?20 But then. the question arises then why are you21 asking for a 20 year license now and saying that the only22 demonstration you have to provide is we'll tell the NRC in,23 three years before we exceed the criterion?24 MR. LEWIS: Because with respect to this25 pressurized thermal shock issue and how this matters, thereNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433.o.. ....* ,.. '... ...'!. *. ... .. .. ..: 105I really is not a difference between the license renewal term2 and the present term. And the current term embodies those3 measures and actions that are necessary to protect the4 public health and safety and -- on basis to distinguish the5 license renewal term.6 I believe that the provisions of the current7 rule, you know are indicative of what protects the publicS health and safety and must be accepted as sufficient.9 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well then you seem to10 be agreeing with the staff that this is outside the scope11 of license renewal because this is one of those things that12 falls under footnote two?13 MR. LEWIS: No. Again, I think there are, as I14 said there are a number of other aspects of the15 embrittlement issue that are addressed by different16 programmatic steps, they just haven't been challenged in17 this case.18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right. But --19 MR. LEWIS: But I'm saying, the portion I'm20 saying is not a legitimate issue is the assertion that you21 have to submit an annealing plan now, nine years before the22 screening criterion is exceeded.23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, but that's not24 the question.25 MR. LEWIS: And commit to annealing now.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 106I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But that's not what,2 that's not the situation I posed to you to consider which3 is that you might not need to submit everything that you4 would need to submit three years prior to exceeding the5 criterion, but that you would need to demonstrate something6 more than just saying you're going to comply with the rule.7 Now, you raise another point and that is you're8 saying other parts, other aspects of embrittlement could be9 challenged. But really the most significant one, isn't it,10 the point at which you are expected to exceed the11 criterion? That's the most critical point in the --12 MR. LEWIS: I'm going to accept that it's the13 most critical because you can't operate past that term, as14 far as protection of the public health and safety --15 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Doesn't that make it16 the most critical?17 MR. LEWIS: -- that's certainly, without --18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: The fact that you19 can't operate past that time, doesn't that make it the most20 critical?21 MR. LEWIS: What it means is that in fact there22 is no safety issue because you can't operate that, past23 that limit and before you can continue to operate, you will24 have to submit to the NRC a solution which will be approved25 at that time.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 107I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: All right. Let me2 pose a slightly different, came at it from a slightly3 different aspect.4 Suppose, hypothetically that you own a plant5 that based on your calculations and such is good for6 another 50 years and you're coming in for a 20 year renewal7 and that you won't, you calculate you won't exceed the PTS8 criteria and you say that and you say that you'll just9 comply with 50.61.10 Couldn't an intervenor in that case use the11 same argument that they're using to challenge that12 statement, that you don't have a specific plan to deal with13 it? If we accept this that an action to comply with the14 regulations at some future date is not an action?15 MR. LEWIS: I think the intervenor, if you have16 an analysis that shows that you won't meet the screening17 criterion for 50 years, the intervenor could challenge that18 analysis. They can only challenge the analysis on grounds19 that it doesn't comply with the NRC regulations that govern20 how the analysis is done.21 For example, the method of calculating what the22 reference temperature of PTS is, is established in an23 equation and it provides a number of parameters and you24 have to determine the chemistry factor of the samples as25 one of the inputs to that, the calculation.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 108I A contention that says you've got to do2 something else beyond what's in that formula would3 challenge the rules.4 And for example, the intervenors in their reply5 refer to uncertainties in the flaw distribution on the6 vessel and they refer to uncertainty in the frequency of7 over-cooling events.8 Those assertions are irrelevant because the9 current PTS --10 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Irrelevant orII relevant?12 MR. LEWIS: Irrelevant.13 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Thanks.14 MR. LEWIS: Because the current PTS rule and15 the calculation assumes the worst case flaw and assumes16 that over-pressure event, over-cooling event will occur and17 gives this equation which kind of establishes the screening18 criteria, which if you're below, you're safe.19 So those kind of assertions would not be20 legitimate contentions. But one that says you do have the21 wrong chemistry factor for some specific reason, you know,22 would be a good contention. Or one that says you've got23 the wrong fluence estimated with a real technical basis24 would be a good contention.25 So yes, there are ways that, simply saying, youNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 109I know, we're going to follow the regulations on estimating2 when the screening criterion will be exceeded is not immune3 from challenge.4 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But what you're5 talking about and what you say is not unique. You don't6 know that where during 20 year periods all the various7 plants would fall. But what you are saying is not unique8 is that plants would exceed the PTS criterion during the9 term.10 And in your situation, it's three years into11 the term. And what you're saying is that with regard to12 that situation, which is sort of the last, the last thing13 that comes in a succession of events, you're saying that,14 saying that the company will notify, provide information to15 the NRC down the road is sufficient.16 MR. LEWIS: When it's coupled with the17 requirement that you cannot operate with the screening18 criterion being exceeded, you know, without an approval of19 these measures by the Commission, yes, that's sufficiently20 protective of the public health and safety.21 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: So I guess there could22 be a couple of different ways of looking at this. The23 license renewal rule says that the license can be issued up24 to the full term, if the Commission finds et cetera, et25 cetera.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 110I So you could just say, well, right now we can2 only show that we're going to operate up to, up through, up3 to 2014, sometime in 2014. So we want a renewed license4 for that period.5 Alternatively, I think what I'd heard earlier6 is that if you reach, if at the point of having to provide7 that information, 2011 in your case, you decide that8 instead of annealing you're going to do a recalculation9 and, well, you're going to do a recalculation.10 What you're saying is at that point there would11 be another right to a hearing to challenge how, to12 challenge your calculation at that point? If it extended13 the date further on down the line?14 MR. LEWIS: I think it depends on what you mean15 by a recalculation.16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well.17 MR. LEWIS: The reference temperature PTS is18 determined under the rule by a very specific formula and19 it's based on, you know, specific data entries and one of20 them is fluence.21 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well I mean doing a22 calculation --23 MR. LEWIS: If we --24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- with new25 information.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 IIII MR. LEWIS: Yes. But for example, we could, if2 it were possible to further reduce fluence, you know, we3 could extend the screening criterion, that wouldn't be a4 license amendment, that would simply be operating under the5 current rule.6 The, what would require approval is the7 analysis that would be required if you were going to exceed8 the screening criterion, if your reference temperature for9 -- transition is, at any point, in excess of the screening10 criterion.11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: So what you're saying12 is if you discover some additional means of reducing13 fluence that you don't know about now, and then you provide14 that information in 2011, such that that would extend the15 date, the 2014 date to a later date, then there wouldn't16 need to be a hearing.17 If you couldn't further reduce fluence, that18 would involve the types of power distribution limits, power19 level of operation, there, the information that we talked20 about earlier, that those things would involve a licensed21 amendment such that there would be a right to a hearing at22 that point, right?23 MR. LEWIS: Yes. If you submit analysis that24 shows that it's safe to operate even thought the screening25 criterion is exceeded.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 112I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: So are there any other2 things that would fall within the same categories, further3 reducing the fluence, such that there would not be the4 right to a hearing at that point?5 MR. LEWIS: The reference temperature of6 pressurized thermal shock is determined by an equation in7 50.61(c), 50.61(c) and the, it is a factor of the8 unirradiated reference temperature for -- temperature of9 the material, the chemistry factor of the material and the10 fluence that material has received.11 Any one of those three inputs, if there was new12 information, you know, could affect when the screening13 criterion will be exceeded.14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: The fluence in the15 chemistry and what was the first one?16 MR. LEWIS: The initial unirradiated reference17 temperature for the material.18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Could that change?19 Doesn't sound like it could but maybe I'm, I don't --20 MR. LEWIS: I don't know how it would --21 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay.22 MR. LEWIS: I'm sorry. You're asking now a23 technical question that I don't know the answer to.* 24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: You and me both. I25 guess what I'm getting at is, if we're talking aboutNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 113I changes in the chemistry or further reducing the fluence,2 that would seem to me, especially if there's no right to a3 hearing on that later, that would seem to me to be the type4 of thing that, while you might not provide information in5 the level of detail that 50.61 would require you provide6 three years prior to the exceeding date, 2014 in this case,7 that you should be able to provide some information on8 that, at this point, sufficient to demonstrate that you9 will adequately manage the effects of aging during the10 period of extended operation, more than just saying that11 we're going to tell the NRC that information three years12 before that date.13 Does that make sense? Doesn't that make sense?14 MR. LEWIS: No. And I'm not sure that's even15 possible. We have, we are, we applied the equation in16 50.61(c) to determine what the reference temperature --17 transition is.18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right. But you said19 you could, you could further reduce fluence, why wouldn't20 you be able to have --21 MR. LEWIS: I'm talking, you know--22 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- some knowledge of23 that --24 MR. LEWIS: -- theoretically, I mean, you're25 asking is there anything you can do. None of those thingNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 114(2345678910.11121314151617is19202122232425K-,we've identified would be reasonably practical.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay.MR. LEWIS: I mean, quite frankly I think youwould deal before you would try and do so.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Yes. I think that'swhat you application actually says?MR. LEWIS: Yes, it does.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Because, does it?Because that's the very first paragraph --MR. LEWIS: Yes.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: -- in the, in that.MR. LEWIS: And I was just responding earlierto --ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Yes.MR. LEWIS: -- when the Judge said could you,you know, could you extend the --ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay.MR. LEWIS: -- calculations. I mean you can'tbuy Herculean efforts. But there's no proposal to.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. So basically --MR. LEWIS: And we have a calculation and it'sout to 2014 and we said that is what it is.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: So basically whatyou're saying is that it's, it's reasonable to assume thatif you decided to do anything other than anneal that thatNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433( 115I would involve changes of the sort that would require the2 right to a hearing aE that point, is that right?3 MR. LEWIS: I believe that's right. And I4 think what I was reacting to was your earlier statement5 that one of the options is simply to recalculate the RTPTS.6 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay.7 MR. LEWIS: With the safety analysis that's8 required in 50.61(b)4 I believe, is not just a9 recalculation of the RTPTS, it's an analysis that says you10 can continue to operate even though you're exceeding the11 screening criterion for the following reasons.12 And one might be a probabilistic fracture13 mechanics analysis that says it's still safe. It's not14 just, you know, I've just sharpened my pencil and I've15 added, you know, a couple more years to my calculation.16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. I guess later I17 want to hear more from the petitioners on that as to why,18 if there would be a right to a hearing at that point, how19 that impacts your contention.20 Unless you want to say something quickly,21 briefly right now?22 MR. LODGE: A hearing --23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I mean that may --24 MR. LODGE: -- a hearing in 2014?25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, I guess ifNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 116I you're proposing to, the information would need to be2 provided in 2011.3 MR. LODGE: Right.4 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And if they're5 proposing to do anything other than anneal, then that would6 involve the proposal to amend the license such that there7 would be a right to a hearing at that point. Am I right,S Ms. Uttal?9 MS. UTTAL: It depends on what the new analyses10 touches upon.11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But based on --12 MS. UTTAL: Whether it's change --13 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- what Mr. Lewis just14 said, it sounds as though --15 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: It's highly unlikely16 that it wouldn't require.17 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right.is MS. UTTAL: Okay. But, of course I have no19 technical knowledge --20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: I mean, we can't say21 for certain, but.22 MS. UTTAL: -- of anything. Yes. But the, the23 aspects that I spoke about before, if any of those are24 changed then there would be a license amendment required.25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. And you mayNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 117I want to consult on that. But I'm just wondering what that2 does to the, this contention and to your interests in the3 subject matter of this contention, based on what you said4 earlier.5 MR. LODGE: We're prepared to respond now.6 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Go ahead. I7 mean, do you mind, Mr. Lewis?8 MR. LEWIS: No. I do have other points in the9 argument I want to come back to later.10 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Sure. We do want to11 come back to you.12 MR. LODGE: Right.13 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But I just thought if14 we'd gotten to a point that might provide some resolution,15 maybe we could just, go ahead.16 MR. LODGE: The regulation 50.61(b) subsection17 6 only requires that the utility apply to, if they're about18 to exceed the criterion, that they essentially communicate19 with the director of NRR, not, in other words, it's a sub-20 licensing, it's less than license modification.21 I understand that the counter to that is, well,22 there will be some effects for the licensing parameters.23 My concern is, number one, if this panel finds that this is24 not currently a -- issue, isn't there a -- problem for25 intervenors in 2011 or '14 or '16 or whenever to try to getNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 118I around.2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: You mean that they3 wouldn't have the right to a hearing then based on --4 MR. LODGE: They wouldn't be able to, they5 wouldn't be able to raise the type of challenge to the6 adequacy of the basis at that point. They wouldn't be able7 to --8 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: The adequacy of the?9 MR. LODGE: They wouldn't be able to attack the10 lack of hard engineering or scientific knowledge about the11 state of embrittlement.12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well I guess, when you13 raise that, I mean, the problem you've got is that you14 didn't do that in the initial contention. You provided15 additional information subsequent to that.16 And it used to be that we always allowed17 amendments to petitions to flush out contentions. But18 we're operating under new rules now which you understand19 and obviously the whole basis of our integrity as a board20 is that we rule based on the law and regulations, not on21 our personal viewpoints or influence or whatever.22 And so under the current rules, the Commission23 has said that you have to submit the contentions full blown24 at the outset and that the only thing that you can include25 in a reply is information that's specifically focused onNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 119I issues raised in the answer.2 So I'm not sure that your statement about what3 petitioners can or cannot do at this point --4 MR. LODGE: At a future point.5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: With -- at a future6 point based on what's happening now with regard to data and7 so forth would be affected at all. I mean it, because you,8 because in your initial contention you didn't make9 reference to those. Did not make reference to those.10 And it, you know, you don't have to, you don't11 have to give an answer right away. And if it's anything12 other than a quick answer, maybe we should just go back to13 Mr. Lewis --14 MR. LODGE: All right.15 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- at this point and16 then later --17 MR. LODGE: Let's do that.Is ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. We'll probably19 have to break for lunch before you come back in any event.20 So maybe we could finish up with Mr. Lewis, then break for21 lunch and then continue on with the staff.22 And then obviously as I said before, we don't23 expect that the other contentions will take anywhere near24 this amount of time. But we did want to focus on this one25 because it does deal with an aging issue, a significantNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 120I aging issue that we think deserves the time to consider it2 fully.3 Go ahead, Mr. Lewis.4 MR. LEWIS: Just to address a number of other5 points. One is with respect and -- issue. The petitioners6 asserted that, and this is a variation of the issue that7 Judge Trikouros raised that you have to do whatever you can8 without regard to cost.9 They've also asserted that you have to maintain10 the largest margin possible below the PTS screening11 criterion. And I would submit that that's simply12 inconsistent with the pressurized thermal shock rule that13 the Commission has in fact explained that the pressurized14 thermal shock screening criterion is not a safety limit,15 it's a trip wire which triggers a plant specific safety16 analysis.17 It defines which licensees need to do that18 analysis and when it should be done. And I'm citing 5619 Federal Register 22.300 at page 22,302. This statement's20 also in the Yankee Atomic case, CLI91-1134NRC3 at page --21 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I'm sorry. At, the22 last one, repeat again?23 MR. LEWIS: Yankee Atomic case CLI91-1124NRC324 at page 10. Similarly the NRC has said in promulgating the25 pressurized thermal shock rule that generic PTS studiesNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433" .. ." .i ' .. ... .. 1211234567891011121314151617181920212223already performed provide reasonable assurance thatoperation of PWR pressure vessels with RTNDT values belowthe screening criterion does not result in undue risk tothe public health and safety. That's 50 Federal Register29937 at 29939.And finally, the PTS rule establishes ascreening criterion with conservative margin to allow foruncertainties below which the Commission has concluded thatPTS risk is acceptable for any PWR 50 Federal Reg, 50Federal Register 29937 at 29941.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: So let meunderstand. You're defining safety margin or margin ofsafety differently. The, on the one side, the petitionersare saying that the margin of safety is above the RTPT orthe screening criterion.You're saying that even if I were at thescreening criterion, there's a margin of safety that'sbuilt into that point.MR. LEWIS: Absolutely right. And theCommission has unequivocally said as long as you're belowthat screening risk is acceptable.In fact, they said the risk may be acceptablewithout that screening criterion, but that's what requiresfurther analysis.The petitioners have said a number of times2425NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 122I that we've demonstrated an inability to manage the2 embrittlement to date and therefore what we're saying is3 all subject to questions.4 They have not provided any basis for that5 assertion and in fact that wasn't even part of the original6 contention.7 But if you do consider it, I would submit that8 there is no basis. In fact, the changes in our RTPTS9 demonstrate that we have managed the issue. And there are10 a number of things that have changed the date over time.11 One is that the chemistry factor that is12 applied in the equation is under the NRC regulations13 determined by the mean of the average of industry data for14 the way it weld with the same heat.15 In other words, in determining what the16 chemistry factor is, you don't just look at your own17 specimen, you look at the specimens that are obtained by18 other licensees and you do an average of what are the19 chemistry factor and you apply that. And that is20 prescribed by the regulations.21 There is an NRC database that has the day that22 that should be used. And when additional data is collected23 and there was additional data that was collected when24 Palisades did some additional analyses of steam generator25 welds, it affects the average, that is affects the PT, theNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 123I RTPTS. So that could lower the PTS and did in the past.2 In addition, the company has been extremely3 aggressive in reducing flux over the life of the plan is to4 reduce the fluence by a factor of three, an enormous5 amount.6 It has been very effective that fluence7 reduction methods. And has, you know, spent a very large8 sum doing so and has applied a lot of state of the art9 methods.10 That has move the reference temperature back11 up. And in addition there are also some refinements to how12 fluence was calculated.13 So the fact that there has been different14 estimates of when the screening criterion would be exceeded15 at different times, in no way suggests that we are unable16 to manage the embrittlement issue. It simply means that17 over time there have been different changes including very18 effective fluence reduction.19 And the extent that the intervenors are saying20 at one time it looked like it was going to be 1995 and now21 it's 2014, you know, their implication is, you know, there22 must be something wrong. I would submit to you that what23 it means is that we've been very effective at reducing flux24 in managing this issue. And if intervenors want to suggest25 that, in effect, there is a problem with our management ofNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 12412345678910111213141516171819202122232425embrittlement, they need more than to point to differentdates, they need to go back to the very, very manysubmittals that are on the docket, including NRC safetyevaluations that address how we have done the calculationsat different point.Our current projection of, that the screeningcriterion will be exceeded in 2014 is based on an NRCsafety evaluation which is on the docket, in Adams, onNovember 14th, 2000 safety evaluation which approved ourmethod of calculating fluence and approved the chemicalproperties, the chemical factors that we're using incalculating when, what our RTPTS is.So there is a wealth of information that youcould book to the challenge is they wanted to come look,with a basis.That's simply asserting the numbers must havechanged and therefore the company can't do its business isnot a valid basis.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Is, just to get backto what you were saying earlier. I think you said earlierthat you thought it was extremely unlikely that you would,that that would change again, didn't you?MR. LEWIS: Yes.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. So, but just tomake sure I understand, if it did, if you got newNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 125I information about the low temperatures in the chemistry and2 the, or the new fluence reduction methods that that would3 not lead to a hearing, am I right?4 MR. LEWIS: I'm not aware of any further data5 that's going to change the chemistry factor. I mean there6 are a number of utilities that have weld wire with the same7 heat and the chemical composition of those weld wires has8 been examined and they're in a database and the rules say9 that you use best estimates, which are based on the mean of10 this industry data to determine what the chemistry factor11 is for your weld wire.12 So that's what's been done. So, you know, is13 it possible, theoretically that somebody could find a lot14 more weld wire that's never been examined and isn't in the15 industry database and it could affect the calculation, yes.16 But I don't know of any basis that that would occur.17 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: That, looking at the18 three factors, the only one that could change and I agree19 with you that in all probability down all the weld wire, so20 you know the chemistry, originally there was some21 information on the RTT for the material, so that's null.22 And the, that's leaves of the three factors,23 the fluence, estimate of the fluence of the vessel is about24 the only one that could be, could change at this point in25 time, with any, that would be the most likely of the three.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 126I Not saying that it is likely, but of the three,2 it would be the most likely.3 If you were to do that though, but say that4 some methods out there that you have which leads you to a5 different estimate of the fluence, okay, it would have to6 be a pretty dramatic reduction in the fluence to get you7 from you know, not talking factors of two or three, I'm8 talking maybe --9 MR. LEWIS: I think it would have to be, yes,10 it would be an instance to get you all the way out, I mean,11 it would be a very significant fluence reduction. I mean I12 think you'd have to --13 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: "All the way out"14 meaning?15 MR. LEWIS: Another factor of three?16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: 20 years.17 MR. LEWIS: I think you'd have to reduce your18 fluence by a further factor of three to get out to the end19 of the period of extended --20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: And that type of a21 recalculation isn't likely based on the state of the art --22 MR. LEWIS: I can certainly see nothing that's23 indicated that I believe that are current methodology which24 was approved in that November 14th, 2000 SAR, really is25 state of the art at this juncture.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 1271 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Is it possible that2 rather than one that took you all the way out, took you a3 year to and then a year or two more and so forth?4 I mean, I guess what, what they're concerned5 about is that they want an opportunity to raise questions6 about anything that could have an impact.7 MR. LEWIS: Judge, all I can say is that we8 don't have a proposal to, you know, revise our fluence9 prediction method. We, we stated in our application we10 have a current calculation and it's good to 2014 and it, it11 is based on the chemical content of the weld wire and the12 fluence prediction method that was approved by the NRC as13 part of our current licensing basis in the November 14,14 2000 SAR.15 And we've said that three years before that16 screening criterion is exceeded we will have to either17 submit an annealing report or a further analysis. But18 we're not going to be able to operate, you know, past that19 screening criterion without being, you know, without NRC20 approval.21 That is the proposal, I mean that's what in our22 application and I guess you're asking is could things23 change later and is there any possibility, I, yes, but it's24 not part of our proposal and it's not part of what we25 addressed in our application.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 128I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: It's not part of2 your management plan as, or is that, your license3 application.4 MR. LEWIS: Yes. Yes.5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But you could6 understand that, you said that would take you to 2014, you7 could understand that while there might be a right to a8 hearing with regard to any decision to let you continue9 operating without those changes, that should there be any10 changes, major or minor that would just extend the11 period to --12 MR. LEWIS: Judge, I'm --13 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- a time that --14 MR. LEWIS: That's not an issue that can be15 addressed in the hearing at this juncture either. I mean16 there is no proposal, there is no revisions --17 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well I understand18 that, I understand that. But what I'm trying to get at is19 the issue of what we're supposed to determine is whether20 you demonstrated that you will adequately manage the21 effects of aging for the, for the extended term.22 And the concerns that are raised in contention23 one have to do with whether you've done that since what24 you're saying is we'll provide this information later.25 If there is a right to a hearing later, onNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 129I anything that would allow you to operate past 2014, then to2 some degree, as a practical matter, let's say, it sort of3 mitigates the concern.4 Whereas if there are changes that could be made5 that would not lead to the right to a hearing, it doesn't6 provide the same type of mitigation of the concern as a7 practical matter, whatever legal significance it may or may8 not have.9 You understand what I'm getting at?10 MR. LEWIS: No, I do understand, Judge.11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Do you have12 anything more?13 MR. LEWIS: I do have other points. If --14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: If you want --15 MR. LEWIS: I probably have four or five and16 it's probably another, you know, 20 minutes.17 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Maybe we should take a18 break, would you rather go on and finish yours?19 MR. LEWIS: No. I think, I suspect that it's20 probably appropriate time for a break.21 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: What do you think?22 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: A break is fine with23 me.24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: So, be back at 1:30?25 (Off the record.)NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* .. .-' ..'. "" -"..7 ..* ... " ... ... -V...... : ..*. ... 130I ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Mr. Lewis, go2 ahead.3 MR. LEWIS: Judge, just for the record we've4 passed out a copy to each of the judges, to the, wires for5 each of the parties and to the reporter a copy of the May6 27th, 2004 memorandum from the Executive Director of7 Operations, the one we discussed earlier.8 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. And this will be9 Exhibit 2 for the court reporter. Thank you10 MR. LEWIS: Proceeding there were a number of11 statements by the Petitioners that Palisades no longer has12 specimens and does not have samples.13 Just to correct those statements there are14 still capsules in the representative surveillance program15 with base metal and with weld material. I believe there's16 three capsules left. The, I think what would have been the17 more correct statement is that the weld material in those18 capsules is no longer considered representative of the19 critical welds because of changes in standards and changes20 in recognition of what that critical weld is over time.21 But the assertions that we no longer have a22 representative surveillance specimen for weld material in23 our program is really irrelevant to the PTS issue for, for24 this reason.25 The NRC rules do not require that the referenceNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 131I temperature for neal ductility transition be based on2 surveillance materials.3 50.61C establishes the equation that's used to4 predict what the RT and DT is.5 50.61 C1 talks about the unirradiated reference6 temperature for the material and says if a measure of value7 of that RT and DT, which stands for unirradiated, is not8 available a generic mean for the class of material may be9 used and 50.61 Cl ii gives the generic mean to be used for10 welds. It's minus 56 degrees for the Palisades weld so11 it's specified in the rules.12 50.61 Cl iii A through B give the standard13 deviations that are then used to account for the margin of14 uncertainty. They're specified in the rule.15 50.61 Cl iv-A establishes the chemistry factor16 that is to be used. And it establishes several permissible17 methods. One is to use the best estimate values which are1i the means of measure values for weld wire with the same19 weld wire heat numbers as the critical welds.20 As I explained earlier there is an industry21 database with the chemistry factors for the welds that have22 the same weld wire heat number.23 So in every step of the equation 50.61 Cl24 specifies the parameters to use in the absence of a25 surveillance specimen.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 132I And that's exactly what we're doing. This is a2 very conservative approach.3 There was a statement that Palisades has higher4 copper content in its weld than other plants. I believe5 that's incorrect. I think we're in the middle of the road6 and I don't know of any basis for the Petitioners7 assertion. Certainly it was, no basis was given in either8 their original petition or their reply.9 Finally there was an assertion that our10 prediction of exceeding the screening criterion in 201411 cannot be counted on because of a statement in an NRC staff12 email by Stephen Hoffman and the assertion in that email13 was simply that we had indicated that we would exceed the14 screening criterion in 2014 and the statement was I don't15 know whether we agree with that.16 That does not undercut our assertion. It's17 simply a statement by a member of the staff doesn't knowis whether that's right or wrong. So I submit that does not19 provide a basis to contradict our estimate.20 And as I mentioned earlier our current21 prediction of when the screening critieria will be exceeded22 is based on the method of fluids and the chemistry factors23 that were approved by the NRC in the November 14th, 200024 SAR.25 So the only thing we applied is our approvedNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 133I methodology is in making that statement.2 By that I would add that the accuracy of that3 assessment was never mentioned in the original petition and4 I think was, is one of the areas where it's simply a brand5 new allegation that's appearing for the first time in the6 reply.7 That's all I have.8 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: All right. Any9 questions for him before we move on. Okay. Ms. Uttal.10 MS. UTTAL: Yes. Thank you, your Honor.11 It's --12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And actually before you13 start let me ask you to in your remarks please focus on the14 footnote to, in Turkey point in your argument about whether15 or not this contention is within the scope.16 You seem to be basing it on footnote two in17 Turkey point --IS MS. UTTAL: I don't know if I have that with me.19 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: That was the one that I20 read where they said that some aging related issues are21 adequately dealt with by regulatory processes and need not22 be subject to further review during the license renewal23 proceeding.24 An example might be those structures and25 components that already must be replaced at mandatedNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433., ..... .... .. . 134I specified time periods.2 MS. UTTAL: That's the footnote?3 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Uh-huh.4 MS. UTTAL: Well, I guess I should have, we5 should have been more precise in our brief. I mean what6 is, what is out of scope is anything having to do with7 current licensing basis. So that compliance with 50.618 would be out of scope.9 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But that, I mean in10 several places the Commission talks about PTS and I mean11 certainly this is an aging issue. So unless you rest it on12 footnote two I don't, I don't really quite understand your13 argument.14 Because I mean what would not fall within that?15 I mean isn't virtually everything that could conceivably be16 related to aging also currently regulated? I mean that17 seems to be a pretty wide sweeping argument.18 MS. UTTAL: I think that in terms of what can be19 attacked in, in license renewal would be the adequacy of20 the TLAA.21 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. And the22 management of --23 MS. UTTAL: The management of, of aging issues.24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right.25 MS. UTTAL: But what can't be attacked is the,NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 135I is this Turkey point, the current licensing basis.2 Judge, I don't have Turkey point with me and3 it's probably a failing on my part not to have reread IT4 before I got here so. I don't know if --5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, let me read you6 what I'm, in sum, this is, I don't know which page it's7 from but in sum our license renewal safety review seeks to8 mitigate the "detrimental effects of aging resulting from9 operation beyond the initial license term citing 60 Federal10 Register at 22463.11 To that effect our rules focus the renewal12 review on plant systems, structures and components for13 which current regulatory activities and requirements may14 not be and that's emphasis of the Commission, be sufficient15 to manage the effects of aging in the period of extended16 operation.17 And then there's footnote two which states:18 some aging related issues are adequately dealt with by19 regulatory processes and need not be subject to further20 review during the license renewal proceeding.21 An example might be those structures and22 components that already must be replaced at mandated23 specified time periods.24 MS. UTTAL: Okay, well, there's no requirement25 that this one be replaced at, at mandatory specified timeNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 136I limits. But there is a regulatory scheme for dealing with2 the embrittlement of the vessel and that's in 50.61.3 So I guess it's kind of a hybrid. I mean part4 of is current licensing basis and part of it is, is an5 aging issue.6 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, can you give me7 an example of, of something that would be subject to agingS that would not be covered in the current licensing basis?9 MS. UTTAL: Would you have a copy of Turkey10 point?11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Yeah. We have a copy12 of Turkey point if you'd like to look at it.13 MS. UTTAL: Yeah.14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Thank you.15 MS. UTTAL: If we could get back to it after16 I've a time --17 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay.18 MS. UTTAL: -- a chance to look at it. It is19 the staff's position that compliance with 50.61 is20 sufficient to meet the TLAA and to meet part 54.21 The licensee has indicated that they will22 comply with it. They put a program in place that shows23 the, the steps that they will take and it's our position24 that nothing more is required under part 54 other than25 demonstrating compliance with 50.61.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 1371 They can't operate if they're out of2 compliance. And 50.61 in addition to having all the3 specifications of, of how you would do the analysis and4 things like that also has a requirement that if there are5 any changes in anything that, that has to be reported and a6 new analysis has to be done. That's 50.61 IBI --7 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right. Well, let meS ask you the same question I asked Mr. Lewis and that is,9 that would essentially mean it seems that while aging10 issues are the only types of issues that can be raised in,11 and non, non generic environmental issues that can be12 raised in a license renewal proceeding that when you're13 talking about PTS and embrittlement and you've got a14 situation where a plant is projected to exceed the PTS15 critierian within the license renewal term, which I'm told16 is not unusual, that the way to exclude a contention under17 your argument would simply be to say we will provide thatis information three years before the date we projected, see19 the criterion.20 And that would under your argument21 automatically exclude any contention --22 MS. UTTAL: Now there, there --23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- related to that.24 Related to --25 MS. UTTAL: Well, probably other contentionsNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 1381 that can be formulated. And I don't want to be in a2 position of giving ammunition to people about contentions.3 But I suppose someone can say compliance with 50.61 is not4 sufficient under 54. I mean this is the staff's position.5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: It --6 MS. UTTAL: But we see that as --7 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Not sufficient, what8 do you mean not sufficient?9 MS. UTTAL: I'm, that there was some, as you10 were postulating before that there's something else that11 must be done other than compliance with 50.61 which is not12 the staff's position.13 The staff's position is, compliance with 50.6114 is sufficient to meet part 54. But I guess that a15 contention could be formulated that would say compliance16 with 50.61 is not enough to meet part 54.17 But that's not the contention here.18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, in effect, in19 effect it really is in the sense that what the contention20 says is that the license renewal application is untimely21 but incomplete for failure to address the continuing crisis22 of embrittlement.23 And that the, in essence what we have here is a24 situation where the alliation is that, that Palisades is25 prone to early embrittlement and that the application doesNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 139I not address the continuing crisis of embrittment.2 The, the defense to that as it were is well,3 yes, we do because we address it in 50.61. But the4 contention is that it's not addressed and, and the, the5 argument as I understand it is 50.61 under what, what NMC6 has, has proposed under 50.61 is a plan to make a plan.7 And that that does not address --8 MS. UTTAL: Well, I don't agree that it's a plan9 to make a plan. They've shown, they've shown that they10 will comply with 50.61. 50.61 has certain requirements.11 The requirements are that three years before12 you'll reach the criterion that you tell, that you send13 your plan in, you send your SE in or tell us that, that14 you're going to aneal and you, and you comply with the15 reporting requirements.16 But I think that the, that in, in posing your17 question you're reading a lot into this contention that'sIs just not there.19 I mean they say that the application is20 fundamentally deficient because it does not adequately21 address technical and safety issues arising out of22 embrittalment etcetera etcetera.23 So where is it, where is it insufficient, what24 page, what section. Why is it insufficient. What would,25 you know, what is, what is the allegation.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 140I Then they allege that Palisades is prone, has2 been identified as pone to early embrittlement. Where is3 it identified? Who identified it? What's the basis for4 making --5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Is there really any6 dispute about that though? I mean is there? Every, I mean7 it's, it's pretty well recognized by everyone here that the8 date projected to exceed the criterion is 2014.9 MS. UTTAL: That's true but, you know, the basis10 for saying it's prone to early embrittlement may be because11 it's older than a lot of the other plants. I mean the, the12 statement without, without any support is, is not13 admissible as a part of the contention.14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, now --15 MS. UTTAL: And that --16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- let's back up for a17 second. The contention as I understand it is the bolded,18 the bolded sentence at the --19 MS. UTTAL: Right. And the other stuff is the20 basis.21 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right. And so --22 MS. UTTAL: That --23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And so what you seem24 to be arguing is that the basis needs to have a basis.25 MS. UTTAL: No. What I, what I'm arguing is isNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 141I that the basis, the contention doesn't meet the contention2 pleading requirements. And the basis do not, there's3 nothing in the contention that gives us the factual basis4 which is required or the basis for this expert's opinion.5 We don't, I don't know what he's an expert in.6 He could, he could have been in, in the CIO's office for7 all I know. I mean there's no, there's no facts that he's,8 that this expert is basing his opinion on.9 The, the statement itself is not enough. I'm1o not saying that the basis needs a basis. I'm saying that11 the contention and its basis have to meet the contention12 rule. It has to have facts, expert opinion. It has to be13 shown to be material etcetera.14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Then so it's your15 belief that this does not rise above a mere allegation16 which the Commission has specifically highlighted as not17 being admissible in, I forget which ruling it was but they,18 they said that our admissibility rules are strict.19 MS. UTTAL: By design.20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: By design?21 MS. UTTAL: Yes. This, this contention is, is22 insufficient under our contention pleading rules and should23 not --24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Let me see, I'd like to25 see if you could help me with that a little bit. Let's goNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* -" " " -"-" * ~.... .. '.. *.......... .-: "" ,..... 142I through the, the admissibility criteria under 2309F.2 First the need to provide a specific statement3 of the issue of law or fact to be raised or controverted.4 I don't think you dispute that part. Let me5 get your, right.6 MS. UTTAL: I don't, I don't see it there, no.7 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I'm sorry, what?8 MS. UTTAL: I don't see anything addressing9 that.10 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: In your, in your?11 MS. UTTAL: In my pleading.12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay.13 MS. UTTAL: Okay.14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. So then we15 assume that it does do that.16 Provide a brief explanation of the basis for17 the contention.18 You're arguing that this brief explanation has19 not been provided?20 MS. UTTAL: Well, it's, it's very brief but.21 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: It is very brief22 there's no doubt about that.23 MS. UTTAL: I mean there's no --24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Could you, could you25NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433, ..... .. , .., ... ... * . 14312345678910111213141516171819202122232425MS. UTTAL: There's no requirement of how longthe brief one has to do.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Could you bespecific as to what sentence provides that briefexplanation of the basis?MS. UTTAL: Well, they don't cite where theirproblem is with the, the licensee's application.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, let's save --MS. UTTAL: They just say the general --ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- that for when wegot to the part --ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: There's anotherone --MS. UTTAL: Okay. They, they, they make a basicgeneric statement that the prone to early embrittlement.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But isn't that a fairlysignificant statement to make in the context of a licenserenewal where they're asked where the, what's being soughtis a 20 year license renewal and the, and there's anallegation effect that the, that the plant has beenidentified as prone to early embrittlement to support acontention that says that the application is incomplete forfailure to address the continuing crisis of --MS. UTTAL: But it --ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- embrittlement --NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433....-.. 144I MS. UTTAL: It's, it's not sufficient because2 it has, it doesn't have any support. It's just a statement3 with no support showing the basis for this, now I'm getting4 the basis to the basis.5 But, but to, to say that, that this basis is6 sufficient because it's, it's, the basis doesn't address7 the fact that there are no facts or expert opinion --8 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, any fact --9 MS. UTTAL: -- to support --10 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- in a, in a11 contention or in a basis for a contention is alleged,12 right? I mean it not, it's not proven.13 MS. UTTAL: Yeah, because it's a contention but14 there are, there are no facts here. There's nothing here.15 These are general statements that it's prone to early16 embrittlement. No --17 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Isn't that, isn't that18 an alleged fact?19 MS. UTTAL: Not without support. i could say20 the moon is made out of green cheese. I mean it, it, I'd21 have to prove that somehow or at least show where I got my22 information from.23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Well, my question24 there on that is I've looked at the, those sentences and,25 and what I'm having trouble with and that's why I asked Mr.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 1451 -- there is, is how does that act a, a foundation of a2 theory or process or a principle according to which the3 hypotheses is, is based.4 In other words the hypotheses is that the5 application is untimely and incomplete because it doesn't6 address embrittlement. And, and the statement that the7 Palsadies Nuclear Power Station is identified as prone to8 early embrittlement of the reactor pressure vessel.9 How does that support or provide a foundation10 for the hypotheses that the license renewal application is11 untimely and incomplete?12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I think her --13 MS. UTTAL: I don't think --14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- argument is does15 it.16 MS. UTTAL: I don't think it does because17 there's nothing in the basis that shows that this18 application is untimely. And in fact the licensee has19 addressed embrittment in the application so the, the, the20 contention itself is incorrect.21 I mean there, there can be no denying that22 embrittment is, is addressed in the license application. So23 this, this statement to begin with is incorrect.24 Therefore I don't see where there's any support25 for what they say the contention is.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 146I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. That's your2 position on, on subsection two. You're arguing that it's3 not within the scope of the, of the license renewal4 proceeding for the reasons you gave earlier.5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: I'd like to explore6 that further.7 MS. UTTAL: Well, let me the read the Turkey8 point and then.9 ADMIN. LAW.JUDGE BARATTA: Okay. Go ahead,10 sorry.11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Demonstrate that the12 issue raised in the contention is material to the findings13 the NRC must make to support the action involved in the14 proceeding which takes us to 5429.15 I think your, I think you argue that it's not,16 let's see. You may not raise a question about that one.17 MS. UTTAL: I can't get them all.18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: You raise a question19 about whether an genuine issue, a genuine dispute exists on20 a material issue of law or fact.21 MS. UTTAL: Right. Again the, the contention22 says that they failed to address embrittlement. And they23 have addressed embrittlement. Therefore there is no24 material issue because they're, they're incorrect in their25 initial supposition.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 147I Initial thesis is wrong.2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: What about the part of3 the initial thesis that alleges that it's incomplete and,4 and raises the timeliness issue in conjunction with the5 allegation that the plant's been identified as prone to6 early embrittlement?7 MS. UTTAL: This, there is nothing, first of all8 there's no explanation about what they mean is untimely.9 If I see that, something that says the license renewal10 application is untimely that means it's filed late.11 There's nothing about that in, in the support for this12 contention. And incomplete not because they didn't13 adequately address the continuing crisis of embrittlement.14 But incomplete for failure to address it. And there is no15 failure to address here.16 And then again the, the statements made in the17 basis are without support. There are no facts to support18 them. There's no opinion to support them. They don't19 point to anything specific sources. They're supposed to20 provide a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert21 opinion which supports the requestors petition, the22 reguestors position on the issue and how much the23 petitioner intends to rely together with references to the24 specific sources and documents on which the requestor25 intends to rely to support its position. There's none ofNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 148I that in there. So they completely failed on five.2 And if they fail to meet one of the criterion3 in 2.309 then the contention is inadmissible. And I think4 they've --5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: No doubt, you're right.6 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: On, on 309 step six,7 okay. I heard did you say that you feel their, their8 statement is that it's incomplete for failure to address is9 wrong?10 MS. UTTAL: Yes, because they've addressed11 embrittlement in their TLAA. In addition to, to that12 problem they're supposed to provide, the intervenors, are13 supposed to provide references to specific portions of the14 application including the applicant's environmental and15 safety report that the Petitioner disputes and the16 supporting reasons for each dispute or if the Petitioner17 believes that the application fails to contain information18 on a relevant matter as required by law the identification19 of each failure and supporting reasons for the Petitioner's20 belief.21 Well, as to pointing at specific portions of22 the application that they completely failed to do that and,23 in, well, it's a requirement under, under --24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Well, there's only,25 there's only one page in the application that it could beNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* ..,,', :: .,...... : .. .... *<. ." ... 149I referring to though I mean. That was, I thought that2 was --3 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay --4 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Yes, that's why I,5 you know, to me they did.6 MS. UTTAL: I've, I've been, I've been asked to7 show why, why --8 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Yeah, I understand, I9 understand --10 MS. UTTAL: -- it doesn't comply with our, with11 our regulations.12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, now I believe13 that the reply to that though was that their argument is14 that this, this involves a failure, a failure of the15 application. That the application is incomplete. And that16 it's incomplete because it doesn't address the continuing17 crisis of embrittlement and, and they tie that to the1S allegation of fact that it's been identified as prone,19 being prone to early embrittlement.20 There is case law that says a petitioner, a21 petitioner must provide documents, expert opinion or at22 least a fact based argument.23 And there's also case law that says the24 contention rule should not be used a fortress to deny25 intervention that what you need is enough to indicate thatNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 150I further inquiry is appropriate. That what you need is2 indication that the purpose of the contention rule which I3 think was quoted in Turkey point.4 Basically something to indicate that the5 petitioners are qualified, able to litigate the issue that6 they raise.7 So what we have here is we have an allegation8 that the application is incomplete for failure to address9 the continuing crisis of embrittlement supported by this10 factual allegation about early embrittlement and the11 identification of an expert who used to work with the NRC.12 So on the face of that it would seem that that13 provides something to indicate that further inquiry might14 be appropriate.15 Under, under the case law that I've just cited16 to you, and I understand it's your position that they17 haven't met any, haven't met these things and, and that18 there should, but what I'm trying to get you to address is19 the general issue that they've raised.20 The brief statement, very brief, but, but it's21 a concise and brief statement of, of their concern.22 They're supporting it with the reference to an expert who23 used to work at the NRC. Whose obviously I, I think it's,24 can be assumed that they're not going to bring a financial25 expert in.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 151I So let's get past that point.2 What I hear you saying is that not only have3 they not satisfy some of the technical requirements of the4 contention and admissibility rule but that this is not even5 a significant issue that, that's within the scope of6 license renewal.7 And you sort of start to lose me there --8 MS. UTTAL: Okay.9 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- at least.10 MS. UTTAL: Even, put aside the issue about11 outside the scope. And let's just talk about the12 contention itself because I disagree very strongly with all13 due respect with what you've said. There is, this is --14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, I'm asking you15 questions so.16 MS. UTTAL: Oh, okay.17 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: You don't need to agreeis or disagree because you can attack everything I'm saying as19 question and --20 MS. UTTAL: Okay. Well -- well, this contention21 as it was submitted in, in the, the first pleading does not22 contain what is expected, what the Commission expects to23 see in contentions.24 It contains a lot or a few unsupported25 statements. The statement that it's identified as prone toNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433.. .'....-. ... .. " ... .. ." .... .... .... ... ...: ..

• 152I early embrittlement is not supported. It is not up to the2 Board or even any of the other parties to come in and, and3 fill in the blanks of who said it and whether it's general4 knowledge and, and things like that. Then --5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But if you look at the,6 let's stop right there.7 If you look at the case law that says a8 document, documents, expert opinion or at least a fact9 based argument.10 I mean in a license renewal proceeding where11 there's an allegation of a plant being prone to early12 embrittlement doesn't that at least raise your antenna a13 little bit --14 MS. UTTAL: What --15 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- that, that is, that16 this might be, might warrant further inquiry? And then17 when you read on and you see we've got an expert who used18 to work at the NRC.19 I mean doesn't that even cause you to wonder20 whether there might be cause for further inquiry?21 MS. UTTAL: Judge, I think the issue is the92 burden is on the Petitioner to provide a sufficient --23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right.24 MS. UTTAL: -- a sufficient contention --25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But what I'm askingNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 153I you to do is answer the question I just asked. Based on2 what's here like I said I don't know who Demitrios Bezdekas3 is and what his expertise and what his connection with this4 plant is. So I can't comment on whether he has any5 expertise and whether this very general statement has any6 meaning.7 And I don't think the, the Board can read into8 it that just because he worked at the NRC that he's an9 expert in this particular field that we're talking about10 here because there's no support provided.11 And the general statement that it's prone to12 early embrittlement without more is not enough to raise13 this, this proposed contention to the level that's required14 by our stringent pleading rules to allow it to be admitted.15 Now the, the quotes that, that you quoted from16 the cases are general, are general quotes and, yes, there17 are cases where you don't rely on technicalities. Some of18 the cases that were cited by the Petitioners point that19 out.20 But when they're talking about technicalities21 let's say in the Sequoia Fuels case. In the Sequoia Fuels22 case the technicality was that a another intervenor had23 copied the contentions from the first intervenor, had not24 copied the basis in. So the Board allowed them to amend,25 to put the basis in.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 154I That was felt to be a technical thing. There2 was another one where they failed to sign the pleading and3 that was felt to be technical.4 In here there's a complete failure to comply or5 almost complete I guess, it's not complete but almost6 complete failure to comply with our pleading requirements.7 And I don't think that we can pull it up and make it a good8 contention by, by reading things into it that are just not9 there.10 ADMIN. LAW ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: I have a11 question. The, the, again I'm back on the reasonably12 practical able question.13 The applicant said that they were not going to14 make a modification as we discussed earlier because it was15 not reasonably practical able.16 How, do you, does the NRC do an evaluation of17 that and make a determination that indeed that is not18 reasonably practical able?19 MS. UTTAL: I'm not sure we have the person here20 that can answer that question because it would be done by21 the, the people that are reviewing the, the request, done22 by the people that are reviewing the request under 50.6123 not the people that are reviewing the license renewal24 because they have not made that, that, they have not sent25 their program in as we know because we've been discussingNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433-.. ......... .. .. ..... .... .....' : ..

155I it.2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay.3 MS. UTTAL: But I do agree that it involves a, a4 cost benefit analysis and considering safety --5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Right. And we have6 this May 2 71h letter which indicates that the first thing7 to do is the flux reduction program. That's reasonably8 practical able. And if that program doesn't prevent the9 problem then you move on to the, the other two areas that10 are identified in here.11 Right now as I see it the, there's only one12 statement in the application that says it's very costly13 and, and let's move on. And so that's where I am right14 now.15 MS. UTTAL: I think I lost you. I'm going to16 assume that the staff checks the figures because I've seen17 things like SAMA analysis where they do cost versus SAMA18 severe accident mitigation alternatives where they, they19 measure the cost versus the, the benefit in deciding20 whether it's worth while to do the SAMA.21 So maybe that they do something like that. And22 the staff looks at the analysis. But that's a guess I23 don't know for sure.24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: And again this all25 comes back for me to the question of reasonable assuranceNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433.. ..-".. *.. ,.. , .*. ... 156I under, under 54.29.2 MS. UTTAL: Uh-huh.3 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Whether or not you4 can simply put 50.61 and that, and that's reasonable5 assurance.6 The May 271h letter does say that.7 MS. UTTAL: And that is the staff's position.8 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: And we have that9 but.10 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: I'd like, I'd like to11 just ask a couple questions relating to the concept of cost12 and benefit.13 Are there places in the regulations that you're14 aware of where cost and safety are specifically balanced?15 MS. UTTAL: No, I'm just, I'm just saying I was16 aware when they do a SAMA analysis that they do some kind17 of analysis like that.IS ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: So, so you're not19 familiar with other parts of the regulation whether they20 might be done?21 MS. UTTAL: Well, I think there's a cost benefit22 analysis that's done in the environmental area.23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: But not in the24 safety, right?25 MS. UTTAL: I don't know offhand, I'm sorry. INEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 157I don't know if this is exactly on point but in, in the2 environmental area cost benefit analysis specifically3 excluded except for the SAMAs that --4 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: No, I was looking --5 MS. UTTAL: -- answer your question at all --6 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: I was wondering if7 in the, in the safety area whether there was any, whether8 it be in part 50 or some other part of the --9 MS. UTTAL: I, I just don't know, I'm sorry.10 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: The, with the11 exception of Appendix K the prescriptiveness of this 50.6112 the only other place I can think of that I've seen that13 type of prescriptive requirement is in and is in Appendix14 K.15 Is this, am I wrong in that or are there, or is16 that frequently done where they, they really lay out in17 detail what you have to do as opposed to providing more18 general requirements which you then develop a methodology19 as to how to meet those?20 MS. UTTAL: I know in decommissioning funding21 they lay out a formula that you have to follow but that's,22 you're probably asking from a technical basis for saying --23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Well, even, even in* t'24 the decommission funding, what I'm trying to get at is, is25 it, it doesn't seem like this is typical. It seems likeNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433t .....* ..... .: .." ..... ....7 - 158I this is very prescriptive.2 MS. UTTAL: Yes.3 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: The way to put it.4 And that that's not typical of most of the regulations.5 MS. UTTAL: I, you, you're probably correct6 because in a lot, and if you read the, the SRP's in various7 areas things are, are told this is the way we'd like to see8 it but if the licensee comes in with a different method and9 as long as it meets the regulatory criteria then, then10 that's acceptable.11 I think that a lot of our regulations are12 becoming performance based./-13 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: This, this one14 definitely isn't though. This is not a performance15 based --16 MS. UTTAL: Well, you have to meet certain17 criteria, certain, you have to meet the criterion and theyis tell you how you're going to get there. What you have to19 do.20 I, I would have to ask the staff about, I'm21 looking here.22 Well, in terms of 50.61 there's this specific23 three year time period and that's so that there's24 sufficient time to review the plan to make sure that it's,25 it's sufficient.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 159I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Sufficient to what?2 MS. UTTAL: You don't, to meet, to, so that they3 will be able to meet the criterion when they finally, so4 they will not go over the criterion when they, when they5 finally reach that year.6 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: So that they'll be able7 to manage the effects of aging?8 MS. UTTAL: Yes, exactly. And there are a few9 other regulations that involve these kind of time limits.10 Again the decommissioning funding one is one.11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: So my point being is,12 is that, could that possibly, because of prescriptiveness13 of the regulation could that possibly be something that14 would fall under that note two that was mentioned earlier15 in Turkey point?16 MS. UTTAL: I don't, I'll have to think about17 that.18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Okay. That's fair.19 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Any more questions.20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: I want to discuss21 margin of safety but I don't know if I should do it now or22 later.23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I think so. Do you24 have anything more that you want to argue unless we have25 questions?NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 160I MS. UTTAL: No, I think that most everything has2 been covered.3 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: I'd like to just4 take a few minutes to make sure I understand if there's a5 consensus on what margin of safety means.6 When I read the Petitioners documentation I7 seem to see the definition of margin of safety as being8 having a, a temperature that's, that's above or below if9 you will the screening criterion. And that the margin of10 safety is that temperature difference from the screening11 criterion.12 I, when I, when I hear the applicant's13 arguments I, I hear a, that the margin of safety is14 actually embedded at the point of the screening criterion.15 That even if you were there there's a margin of safety16 that, that's, that's built into that number.17 Am I, am I reading incorrectly or is there two18 different, are there two different margins of safety here19 that I'm hearing?20 MR. LODGE: Probably. The --21 MR. LEWIS: The, sorry.22 MR. LODGE: Sorry.23 MR. LEWIS: You're certainly correct in our view24 and we cited the NRC's statement of consideration where25 they indicated that the margin of safety was inherent inNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 161I the screening criterion and as long as you're below the2 screening criterion the risk is acceptable to those safety3 issue.4 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: That's your5 definition?6 MR. LEWIS: And that's based on the statement of7 consideration and explaining the rule.8 MR. LODGE: We believe that the margin of safety9 also implicates the concept of confidence levels. I mean10 is there a 90 percent degree of confidence in that margin,11 a 25 percent. So, yes, the numerical temperature is a12 beginning point.13 But the, the degree with which you can rely on14 that level is significant.15 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Okay. Could you16 explain that a little bit more. I didn't, because the,17 the, I understand what you're referring to about confidence18 level.19 MR. LODGE: We question the degree of confidence20 that can be ascribed given the lack of knowledge about the,21 the mystery metal that the reactor vessel is made of. The,22 the mix of copper and nickel.23 The, rather than relying on generic industryS.24 standards that may or may not have much direct relevance to25 the facts at Palisades.K_>NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 162I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: I, I thought I heard2 earlier that the, the regulation prescribes what you're3 supposed to do in that case. And that that'swhat was4 done.5 MR. LODGE: Insofar as --6 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: In so far as the7 composition of the material when you don't have the actual8 material for that particular weld then you are to use9 values that are contained in the table. And that's10 dictated by the regulations.11 MR. LODGE: One moment please.12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: 50.61 C1 it's small13 Roman numeral iii, is that what you're?14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Three.15 MR. LODGE: Yes. The, we think that the Exhibit16 2 has, offers a very useful interpretation of what the17 expectations are of a licensee. And it particularly18 addresses the 50.61 C1 iii option. The, on the first page19 it indicates that the third option, which is the C1 iii, if20 the licensee demonstrates that the effects of aging on the21 intended functions and systems will be adequately managed22 for the period of extended operation, which of course is 2023 years.24 On the second page it states that the license,25 is that, the second full paragraph --NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 163I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Excuse me, the second2 full paragraph of?3 MR. LODGE: The second page, pardon me. Page4 two of the May 27th 2004 --5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: May 27th, letter, okay.6 MR. LODGE: The, the Exhibit 2.7 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay, say that again.S MR. LODGE: I'm sorry. The, the first sentence9 of the second full paragraph page two indicates that the10 license renewal applicant that chooses the C1 iii option11 must provide an assessment of the current licensing basis12 TLAA for, for pressure thermal shock, a discussion of flux13 reduction program, you can read it. I'm, I'm not going to14 go through all that.15 And identify the viable options that exist for16 managing the aging effect in the future.17 What you've heard, what we've heard today from18 the applicant is their plan is we'll get you a plan19 sometime in the future and plan D the plan to provide a20 plan, plan B is we'll shut down if we exceed the criterion.21 Then on page three at the top, the first full22 paragraph it indicates if a reactor vessel is projected to23 exceed the PTS screening criteria B3 50.61 B3 requires the24 licensee to implement a flux reduction program that is25 reasonably practical able to avoid exceeding the PTSNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 164I screening criteria.2 The operative word in that sentence to us is3 implement a flux reduction program not plan to provide a4 scheme to implement.5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: But you're, the6 second sentence though goes on if the program does not7 prevent which evidently they've concluded that it's notS reasonably practical able to do then, then the licensee can9 choose between other options.10 MR. LODGE: Correct, sir. That's --11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: And that's what they12 said they're going to do.13 MR. LODGE: Well, I, I guess I don't follow14 your, your logic there. And I --15 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Well -~16 MR. LODGE; Well, in the, in the application17 they state at page 4-10 the flux to the reactor vesselis would have to be reduced by an additional factor of three19 in order to reach March 24, 2031.20 Mr. Lewis has acknowledged that they're not21 going to be able to achieve that with current technological22 capabilities. So --23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: So there's, there's24 no dispute that it's not reasonably practical able to do25 that.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 16512345678910111213141516171819202122232425MR. LODGE: Correct. And in fact all they'resaying, all the, all the utility is saying to you today iswe can get we think to 2014 three, seventeen years short of2031.And so the two options that are specified, yourHonor, in, in that sentence you just referred to, areannealing --ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Uh-huh.MR. LODGE: -- or providing safety analysis todetermine what modifications are necessary to preventfailure of the reactor vessel.It appears to be taken in context, it appearsto us, that that is to be done now. If they, they'veadmitted now today, 2005, they can't otherwise achieve theflux reduction by a factor of three.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: But I, what I'mgetting hung up on is, is I don't understand how that, thatdoesn't meet, you know, the, first off this letter althoughit, it should be given deference is not binding.MR. LODGE: I understand, sure, sure.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Okay. I mean it'snot --MR. LODGE: Certainly.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: -- it is not aregulation.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433..< ..- -.' .. -....." ...... ... ." " ' ." " " 166I MR. LODGE: Right.2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: All right.3 MR. LODGE: But it's, this --4 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: So we're all clear on5 that.6 MR. LODGE: Correct.7 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: But it should be8 given deference and I'd like to, I would like to explore9 your, what you're saying because I, I'm having trouble10 seeing that.11 MR. LODGE: Well --12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Can I ask a question to13 see if I understand it.14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Sure. And if he can15 help --16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Let me see if I17 understand what you're saying.18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: All right.19 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: You're saying that what20 this letter says on page two is that the selection of which21 of the other two options they're going to follow needs to22 be done at this point and that then later details of the23 approach selected are to be submitted at least three years24 before the projected date?25 MR. LODGE: Yes, your Honor.. And --NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 167I ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And you, I guess notice2 that, I would assume that you're basing that on the3 sentence that says details of the approach selected are4 required to be submitted at least three years before5 implying that.6 MR. LODGE: And also the second sentence of that7 same paragraph, your Honor, that says, if the flux8 reduction program does not prevent the reactor vessel from9 exceeding the PTS screening criterion at the end of life.10 And now is that the projected 2031 end of life?if Because we know today, we know now, that the utility admits12 that they cannot provide that confidence level. And, and13 it says the licensee can choose between the two options.14 And, and annealing appears arguably to be off the table so15 the other analysis --16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Off the table?17 MR. LODGE: Not, not an option.i8 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But haven't they said19 they --20 MR. LODGE: They said they --21 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: That's the second22 time you've said that. I'm, I don't, I specifically asked23 that question and I was told that it is not off the table.24 So I don't understand --25 MR. LODGE: Well, there was a rather resoluteNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 168I assertion made by the utility approximately eight or nine2 years ago, 1996 or 7 their intention to perform a nealing.3 And it hasn't happened. No step toward it beyond some4 public assertion to that effect has been made.5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Well, there is a6 very clear statement on page 4-10 of the license7 application.8 MR. LODGE: Right.9 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: And it says other10 alternatives that would be considered would include11 completion of safety analysis as specified in 50.61 B4 and12 thermal and nealing treatment as specified in 50.61 B7.13 And I, i get back to looking at the letter that14 we're talking about. It says license renewal applicant15 that chooses to use C13 option for managing must provide an16 assessment of the current licensing basis which it seemed17 like they did.18 They said hey, you know, we're, we can't meet19 it beyond 2014 a discussion with flux reduction program20 which is in the beginning section there that they began a21 low leakage core etcetera and they, they still ran out of22 room in 2014.23 And then it goes on, the letter says that an24 identification viable options exist for managing the aging25 effect in the future which seems to be what they did inNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 169I that part I started out with a few minutes ago.2 So I guess I have trouble understanding why,3 what they're required to do in this letter or what the4 staff letter to the chairman said isn't what they're doing5 which seemed to be what you were saying a few minutes ago.6 MR. LODGE: Well, the Petitioner's position is7 that we know today that the utility is not going to be able8 to implement a flux reduction program that can avoid9 exceeding the, the PTS screening criteria through 2031.10 And that the, essentially the utility is saying11 if assuming things don't change we'll be making some12 proposal by 2011.13 We return to our arguments made earlier today14 that what data, what degree of, of confidence, what, what15 science, what engineering that is based on relatively firm16 facts can the utility produce then that they can't produce17 now.18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: But we only have the19 regulations to go by.20 MR. LODGE: Right.21 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: That we are required22 to follow and I don't see the basis for your claim that23 they're not doing that particularly in light of this24 letter.25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: This letter is notNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 170I a regulation and it wouldn't be surprised to be that the2 timing issue is left out of here that it's trying to make3 its, whatever point it's trying to make so I, I wouldn't4 read it as a regulation. I don't think it was meant for5 that purpose.6 And there is a three year requirement then that7 is in 50.61. So --8 MR. LODGE: Well, that sentence beginning, and I9 understand this is, this is an interpretation, an10 enlightened interpretation but, but it's a take.11 But it says that the license, the license12 renewal applicant that chooses the C-13 option must provide13 an assessment of the current licensing basis, discussion of14 the flux reduction program implemented, implemented not15 planned to be explained later, in accordance with 50.61 B316 and an identification of the options that exist for17 managing.18 Yes, they've identified what the options might19 be but they have not specified, discussed the flux20 reduction program implemented in accordance with 50.61 B3.21 MR. LEWIS: May I address that point. The22 application does specifically address the flux reduction23 program that's been implemented in the second paragraph in24 4.2 and specifically the core redesign which went from a --25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Are you referring toNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433... , .- 171I where it says Palisades began the use of a low leakage core2 design?3 MR. LEWIS: Yes.4 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: That's again on page.5 4-10 of the --6 MR. LEWIS: That's correct, I mean we've7 implemented an ultra low leakage core which took a8 considerable time and engineering analysis and effort to9 redesign the core so that new assemblies are, the inside10 the core instead of around the periphery to further reduce11 flux by using third and fourth cycle assemblies in the12 periphery.13 And further by putting shielding simply, each14 shielding assemblies in front of each of the six critical15 axial welds. It's described in the FSAR and in many16 documents, the shielding assemblies are assemblies where17 the first four rows are steel tubes, the assemblies are 15IS by 15 rods.19 On the other side there's another four rows of20 steel tubes in the middle are basically depleted uranium21 tubes. Those assemblies shield each of the critical axial22 welds.23 It's a very aggressive and extensive flux24 reduction program that has been implemented.25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: I, I think there'sNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433S. .. ., .;.... ?.. '.... -.:- * . 172I no doubt that there's been a, a, the implementation of a2 flux reduction program. Not, not an issue in my mind.3 MR. LEWIS: Right.4 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: And it says clearly5 in the application. Howevet, the, the, this issue of6 reasonably practical able efforts is still, is still out7 there in terms of additional modifications. Who makes the8 determination as to what is reasonably practical able and9 trying to balance that with the comments of the Petitioners10 that economic factors are perhaps being cavalierly11 brutalized.12 That's where I was coming from before. I13 still, we still don't have closure on that.14 MR. LEWIS: There, there are two elements of15 that. It's, it's those measures that are reasonably16 practical to avoid exceeding the screening criterion during17 the period of extended operation or during the, before the1i end of life.19 So in order to raise a genuine issue here I20 would submit that the intervenors would have to show that21 there is some measure that we haven't considered that is22 both cost effective and capable of getting you all the way23 out to the period of extended operation and they certainly24 have not done that.25 MR. LODGE: We, 50.61 B3 requires the licenseeNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 1731 to implement, implement a flux reduction program reasonably2 practical to avoid exceeding the PTS screening criteria.3 The utility can get the plant as far as 2014 not 2031.4 And we believe that there has to be a plan, a5 plan to fail, a plan to shut down at 2014 or at such point6 as the criterion is exceeded is not a plan to manage.7 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: We started out with you8 answering a question. Do you, or do we need to follow up9 on that any more at this point or?10 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: No. I think, I11 think we have an answer to the question.12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. So you're, you13 can also respond to any of the other arguments --14 MR. LODGE: Thank you.15 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- of the other two16 parties.17 MR. LODGE: I did want to bring the panel's --18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Did you have something19 else you wanted to say first?20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: I never quite got the21 answer to my question about the uncertainty. That's what I22 was trying to get out originally.23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Do you want to?24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: I, I just, it, it,25 you made that, that statement several times but from whatNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 174I we've heard I, I gathered that, you know, again that these2 regulations were prescriptive as to what you have to do if3 you don't have this or you have that.4 So how, how does the, how you, what's the basis5 for your statement that the uncertainties are unknown if6 the regulations tell you you've got to do something?7 And specifically the regulations tell you you8 have to do something with respect to the makeup of the weld9 material if you don't have the weld material.10 MR. LODGE: One moment please. I wonder if we11 might have a five minute break in order to formulate it.12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay.13 (Off the record.)14 MR. LODGE: Sorry, not trying, not trying to be15 cute or misleading with the response.16 But it's very difficult to answer your question17 Dr. Baratta, without understanding whether or not it's18 backed up by data from original actual irradiated material19 as opposed to accelerated aging samples of as, as opposed20 to computer projections.21 The representations that Mr. Lewis made about22 the capsules were that, did, did not indicate they were23 actual bits of metal of the same material that the RPV at24 Palisades was actually constructed from.25 A 1992 NRC interim safety evaluation that weNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433-: .. ... .....-.. .." ... .. " ...' .. " *. . 175I don't have extra copies of that I will certainly provide2 the, the panel as well as a 1991 letter from Consumers3 Power to the NRC indicate that Consumers Power, and I'm4 reading from the 1991 letter, Consumers Power Company does5 not have chemistry measurements for the Palisades vessel6 specific belt line welds nor does it have a surveillance7 specimen made with the same material and heat of wire.8 Consumers Power Company does have copper and9 nickel measurements for the actual vessel belt line10 material.11 In the staff, the, the interim safety12 evaluation dated 1992 the staff concludes the surveillance13 plate material was removed from plates that are in the14 Palisades belt line, however, the surveillance weld15 material is not from a Palisades belt line weld hence it16 has no value in determining the effect of neutron17 irradiation on the Palisades belt line welds.18 We believe that there are significant19 uncertainties that, that pose the issue, that pose the20 issue of fact that we believe should be heard by the panel.21 Issues of, of public confidence in the margin22 of safety are not obviated simply because regulations are23 being followed in some fashion.24 We differ of course with whether or not the25 regulations are, are truly being followed that 50.61NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 176I according to the executive director for operations it2 appears to me that the details of the approach selected are3 what, are the subject of that three year notice.4 But that the, the, the plan and the5 implementation of the plan begins at an earlier point6 outside of that three year time period. And we believe7 that the only meaningful way that that regulation can be8 interpreted is that in, because, because the utility does9 not provide confidence that it can implement a flux10 reduction program out to 2031 but only to 2014 and that if11 they don't make it they will shut down is not a plan. It12 is, it is a failure. And the Petitioners believe that that13 has to be, the subject has to become then the subject of14 hearing.15 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Before you go on and16 this may give you something to focus on in your remaining17 argument. But I want to make sure I ask you this before,18 before you go on from contention one.19 First a simple question, maybe not a simple20 answer. But you've provided a lot more with your reply21 than you did in your original contention. And we've22 discussed what we'll consider and what we won't consider.23 But why did you not provide that at the outset?24 Can you, I mean just explain that. What, what the25 situation was. What your reasons were.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 1771 And then if you could also in your remaining2 time expand a little bit on if there were a hearing what3 you would anticipate litigating.4 And also if you could address that in the5 context of there being the right to a hearing at a later6 point if anything proposed would involve the types of7 issues that were discussed before that would require an8 amendment to the license.9 And we heard discussed the things that would10 and the things that might not or would not.11 I just want to make sure that, that you address12 those sort of basics --13 MR. LODGE: All right.14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- in addition to15 anything else.16 MR. LODGE: Well, the, I guess the --17 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And I should say, I'm18 sorry, I did interrupt you again.19 But for you and all, and the other parties as20 well, I don't think anything that any of us say should be21 taken to indicate that, you know, we have made a decision22 one way or the other, that we see things one way or the23 other.24 But obviously we do see the issues being25 significant enough to, to warrant full discussion and it'sNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 I345678910111213141516171819202122232425178in that context that, that I ask these questions and theothers that we've asked as well.MR. LODGE: As a grassroots interventioncomprised of volunteers it is a logistical difficulty tocome up with the type of response that we ultimatelyreplied with at the beginning of the process.We took our interpretations at the face valueof, of the NRC regulations to mean that a short, a, a briefconcise statement would probably be a preferable item forthe Board to consider.And also we were mindful of the Turkey pointobservation that to trigger full adjudicatory hearingPetitioners must be able to "proffer at least some minimalfactual and legal argument in support of theircontentions". That cites to a Duke Energy Corporationcase.We believed that part, the law of parsimity wasperhaps preferable in terms of setting up the outlines ofwhat the intervention would be.I confess to some misunderstanding of exactlywhat the expectations were and we, as I say, put ourcontentions together as a committee involving many manydozens of volunteer hours in assessing a great deal ofpublic domain material.I don't know how responsive that is to yourNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433... ... ..A 179I first question. As to --2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Did you, did you have,3 I presume that you did have access to the expert you've4 cited?5 MR. LODGE: Yes. oh, yes.6 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay.7 MR. LODGE: And we consulted with him8 actively --9 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay.10 MR. LODGE: -- in the weeks before, correct.11 Your second question was essentially what would12 we anticipate educing or, or contending evidentiarily at a13 hearing on this issue.14 Well, obviously we would attempt to through the15 discovery process as well as the adjudication try to16 establish, pin down exactly what efforts to the extent that17 there are, have been deliberations that are a matter ofis public record, to get to the bottom of the embrittlement19 computations.20 We would also expect to establish the21 uncertainties that we've talked about today by way of22 proving them as indisputable or maybe disputed but, but23 fact.24 And furthermore presumably if the Board were to25 admit this contention then the Board is considering whetherNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433..... ... ....' ISOI or not 2014 projection of exceeding the criterion is2 acceptable from a regulatory standpoint.3 So we would certainly be attempting to make the4 argument that it is not and that a plan in, announced,5 enumerated in 2011 is not an adequate regulatory, doesn't6 address the regulation.7 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And which regulationS are you referring to?9 MR. LODGE: 50.61. Essentially along the lines10 of, of the Exhibit 2 discussion.11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: The Exhibit 212 discussion being that 50.61 is a, is a, is a way to resolve13 the 54.29 --14 MR. LODGE: In, in 21 C iii, C-13 --15 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- and 51 and 21 --16 MR. LODGE: Yes, your Honor.17 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- issues?18 MR. LODGE: Yes. Finally you asked and I don't19 want to, pardon me if I'm not couching this.20 You essentially asked if, if, what's, what's21 the problem in just waiting until a plan is promulgated and22 objecting to it then, i.e. 2011.23 Number one there might be a change in the24 regulation, might by that time. Number two that's a25 independent decision that we believe is, it's an ongoingNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* -.--: .... ...... .. .... ........ 181I licensing type of determination.2 I believe that the scope of an objection which3 could be raised at that time as I hinted this morning, may4 not allow a litigation of the adequacy of the, of the5 decision, the underlying basis for the ultimate decision6 that's made may not, we may not be able to reach through7 that proceeding to get to the, the underlying computations8 of, calculations, margins of error discussions, that sort9 of thing.10 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I'm sorry, I didn't11 follow you.12 MR.LODGE: Well --13 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: You made references to14 the decision and, and --15 MR. LODGE: When, all right --16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- when you were17 talking about the decision --i8 MR. LODGE: In 2000, let's say --19 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- decision --20 MR. LODGE: -- the decision we would anticipate21 presently to be made in 2011 by the utility. The election22 of, of options.23 We, I'm, I'm not, I don't believe having24 litigated before the NRC before in ongoing licensing25 proceedings we do not believe that from a legal standpointNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 182I it would be possible to get to this issue of --2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Which issue?3 MR. LODGE: The issue of, of adequacy of the4 solution, the resolution proposed by the, by the company5 in, in that type of proceeding.6 The, the basis, as I understand the NRC regs7 for that type of proceeding and I'm by no means expert and8 I didn't review them today or yesterday, it would appear to9 me that all that need be proven by the NRC and/or utility10 is that we've considered various technical criteria and11 here's our resolution, our proposed resolution.12 It, it is difficult to get behind or into the13 basis of the computations at that point because it's a,14 it's a narrow selection of alternatives as opposed to15 laying out a long term plan to manage embrittlement which16 is the scope of the 20 year proceeding.17 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, let me, let say18 something and then anybody can correct me to the extent19 that they think I'm wrong.20 If there were a, a situation where the plant or21 the company is, were to proposed to amend its license then22 the standard that comes in at that point is essentially the23 same standard as for the initial grant of initial license24 of showing that whatever you propose to do is, is in25 keeping with the safety and security and I can't rememberNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 183I the exact language. But it's actually a broader standard2 than the license renewal standard as I understand it.3 Now anyone can speak to that.4 Mr. Lewis, do you want to speak to that?5 MR. LEWIS: I really don't understand the, the6 assertion that, you know, subsequent proceeding challenging7 for example the efficacy of annealing that, the efficacy ofS annealing would not be able to be looked at.9 I mean I just don't understand the legal10 argument, I'm sorry, your Honor.I] ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: There would be a, there12 would be an application to amend the license and in that13 application the applicant, and again feel free to add,14 correct, whatever, the application, the applicant would15 have to demonstrate that what they were proposing to do16 was, met the, the general standard for safety and the17 protection of the public.18 And they would have to back that up and, and19 there would be notification to the public and the public20 would have the right to petition for a hearing to challenge21 anything that was said in the application.22 'Now that's sort of a summary but.23 MR. LODGE: Well, I think that, what would24 actually be afoot here is the NRC would render a proposed,25 or a decision or a proposed decision which then could beNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 184I challenged by someone petitioning for a hearing.2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Actually that's not3 generally the way it occurs in my understanding and again4 subject to correction.5 But generally what happens with a license6 amendment is that there's an application to amend the7 license and before the staff may or may not make a decisionS before any ultimate decision is made and any adjudication9 that may be granted based on an inadmissable contention.10 If a, if a contention is admitted then the11 applicant would have the burden of showing with respect to12 the issue in the admitted contention that their application13 of, meets the standard, the same standard for issuance of14 an initial license mainly, mainly safety and the protection15 of the public. And I'm not using the precise language.16 But I'd ask counsel for the other parties have17 I misstated anything or left anything out in your view?18 MS. UTTAL: You're correct that when a license19 amendment comes in it's noticed with an opportunity for a20 hearing. But if there's no significant hazards then the21 amendment may be granted prior to the hearing or prior to22 the, to the finishing of the hearing.23 But if not then you'll wait until, until24 everything --25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 185I MS. UTTAL: -- is resolved. Once the federal2 registry notice is published then they would have 60 days3 to get their application, their intervention, petition and4 contentions in.5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: You would not be6 challenging any action that the NRC took. The NRC, what7 the staff does on a separate track whether they made a no8 significant hazards determination or, or had not made a9 determination by the time this, the, the adjudication10 proceeding were underway.11 The issue is not whether what the NRC has done12 is correct. The issue is whether the license amendment13 sought by the applicant should be granted.14 MR. LODGE: Well, your Honor, we're not clear15 sitting here in 2005 what the license amendment16 implications of selection of an alternative would be.17 Because obviously among other things the alternative has18 not been chosen.19 And what I was hearing by way of discussions20 before the lunch break was, well, there might be21 implications for changing the operating, the previncable22 operating temperature or some other feature.23 That is a very indirect way to get at the heart24 of the issue which is the adequacy of the, the computations25 underlying the selection of that alternative.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 186I If, if it would help the panel I wonder if we2 might request to maybe respond briefly on this tomorrow if3 we're, if we meet tomorrow.4 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I think we probably5 will meet tomorrow. Yeah, I don't see any problem with6 that, do you? Okay.7 Okay. Well, why don't you finish up whatever8 argument you want to make today and then we can move on9 and, and do as much of the other contentions.10 MR. LODGE: I have one last observation --11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: We're, we're going to12 let him respond tomorrow then, right?13 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Yes, if he, and then if14 you --15 MR. LODGE: I just have --16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- want to add17 anything tomorrow --18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Oh, all right, all19 right.20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- I can, as well.21 But I mean, I didn't mean to imply that you couldn't22 also --23 MR. LODGE: There's one additional response I'd24 like to make today. I, as I understand it, please correct25 me if I'm wrong.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* ........ ,.. ... ."" '.: ..'....- *..b '- .[ -. '. t " "- " " "" .. 187I Tomorrow my intention would be to, to elucidate2 a little bit more our objection if you will to the3 possible, having to wait and see in 2011, okay.4 My one final observation today is that it's5 unfortunate that the NRC staff doesn't recognize Mr.6 Bezdekas' qualifications. He was the, one of the in-house7 engineering experts who identified Palisades as being one8 of the embrittled plants as early as 1981 according to a9 not man apart for instance the earth article we've read10 that is based on upon a number of hard news sources in the11 American Physical Society.12 Mr. Bezdekas identified, was one who identified13 in the first ten years of operation the Palisades plant as14 having early earmarks or hallmarks of an embrittlement,15 serious embrittlement problem among 14 other, 13 other16 reactors.17 And I think that his qualifications would be18 readily discernable possibly in information that's not a19 matter of public domain information but available to the20 NRC staff as it was evaluating how to respond to the21 contention.22 Thank you.23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. All right.24 Let's move on to , it's ten to two. If anyone25 wants to take a minute to reorganize their papers to theNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433................................... ........."". .."........ 188I appropriate point, actually, it might be good to hear from2 the, hear from all of you as to whether proceeding in the3 order, the numbered order as they were submitted is the4 best way to do it, or whether another order might be5 appropriate, doing some of them together.6 For example, it's been suggested maybe there's7 a relation between 2 and 7. Anything, anybody have any --S MR. LEWIS: I would suggest we just go in9 numbered order, your Honor.10 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Go ahead, then,11 on Number 2. And I guess, I guess with regard to all these12 remaining contentions, I think it would be helpful if you13 focused a good, at least a good part of your argument on14 the, particularly the next three; 2, 3 and 7, on the scope15 issues in light of the Commission's Turkey Point decision16 and subsequent case law on scope, because I think you have17 a harder row to hoe with these on the scope issue.18 MR. LODGE: Well, with respect to Contention19 Number 2, we believe that the, our assertion, of course, is20 that the natural process, if you will, of aging of the21 reactor systems, including pipes, the plumbing,22 essentially, and the inner and outer loops, is going to23 increase routine licensed releases of radiation, and24 possibly other toxic material.25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But, the thing is,N(NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* " ." .." " ... ... ..A " .. ..-.:. ' *" .." .*

• 189I you, to be within scope you need to allege that there's2 something related to managing the actual effects of aging3 or the time limited aging analyses, if you're talking about4 the two being, it would have to address that directly. And5 I think the arguments to be made are that these issues are,6 if they haven't been pretty specifically identified as not7 within the scope, I think it's pretty clear that you need8 to have something that's directly related to aging in order9 to be within the scope.10 MR. LODGE: As we understand it, the drinking11 water supply intake for the City of South Haven is not12 currently operating as that; but within approximately a13 decade, it will be turned on and will be integrated into14 the local portable water supply system. And our contention15 is that there is no management plan that takes into account16 the potential for incremental radiation and toxic chemical17 leakage from the plant, given that we believe that National18 Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration models confirm19 the water flow in Lake Michigan toward that intake pipe.20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Hasn't, didn't the21 Commission in Turkey Point, though --22 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Yeah, that's what23 I'm looking for, I thought, the problem I, excuse me for24 interrupting, but the problem that I had with this one is25 that it was so close to what the Commission ruled on inNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 190I Turkey Point, that it has to be already outside the scope.2 That's --3 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: There was a contention4 in Turkey Point that alleged that aquatic resources at5 Biscayne National Park will become contaminated with6 radioactive material, chemical waste and herbicides during7 the license renewal term, and consequently will endanger8 those who consumer aquatic food from the area.9 And, the second one had to do with allegations10 that severe and unusual challenges to the safe storage of11 high level radioactive spent fuel, whether in spent fuel12 pools or at dry cask storage, presented a problem. And the13 Commission found that both were outside the scope of a14 license renewal proceeding.15 And again, you know, our job is to be16 independent adjudicators and base our decision on the law,17 on the alleged facts; and doing that, make sure that we are18 fair to all parties. In other words, we don't sway in19 favor of any party, we base our decision on the law and the20 regulations. And in these instances, the Commission has21 been pretty clear in what it said, in case law precedent22 that's based on the license renewal regulations.23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Why doesn't -- I24 guess in Turkey Point, the Commission said that the issues25 raised in Contention 1, which is the one dealing with aNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* : ~~~~.... .".. ... .. ..... * .....*..* ....... .........

191I similar topic, raises only topics that are -- Part 51 is2 generic Category 1 issues, and the contention therefore3 grants as no dispute material to the NRC's license renewal4 decision on Turkey Point, and therefore it's not liticable.5 And if I could understand what, how yours differs from6 that --7 MR. LODGE: Differs factually in that we're8 talking about a water line intake that would be a component9 of a portable public water supply versus more indirect10 seepage pollution into bodies of water.11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Is there a Category 212 issue that identifies that as, basically for environmental13 issues, if they're Category 1, they're generic; if they're14 Category 2 then you, that would, might warrant a hearing if15 there's a contention this otherwise meets the admissibility16 standards.17 MR. LODGE: Well, we believe it's a plan-18 specific, I mean, it's a very fact-specific circumstance,19 specific to the Palisades Plant in that, as I say, it's,20 yes, we understand that, the Category 1 and Category 221 differentiation. Yes, it's very site-specific in that the22 water intake is less than a mile from the shore, and it is23 oriented in the explicit direction of the Palisades Plant.24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I'm sorry, repeat that25 again.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 192123456789MR. LODGE: The pipe is less than a mileoffshore and aimed, if you will, oriented in the directionof the Palisades Nuclear Plant; and as well, the, what weunderstand to be the currents of Lake Michigan have atendency to flow in the direction of the intake pipe.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Issues involvingimpacts -- impacts --MR. LEWIS:51.53.(c)4, I believe;Category 2 issues are at51.53(c), and they're all listed10 in --111213141516171819202122232425ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Appendix B, aren'tthey?MR. LEWIS: Appendix B, I think Table B-I.51.53(c) --ADMIN. LAWB talks aboutJUDGE YOUNG: The beginning ofimpacts of -- Table B-i, summary ofAppendixfindingsPlants.Categoryon -- issues for license renewal Nuclear PowerImpacts of refurbishment on surface water quality,1; impacts of refurbishment on surface water use,water use conflicts, ground use, impacts of refurbishmenton ground water use and quality, generic issue, and theirvarious types of ground water quality degradation.The ones that are, that are not generic arelisted as ground water use conflicts, portable and surfacewater and D watering plants that use greater than 100NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 193I gallons per minute, ground water use conflicts plants using2 cooling towers withdrawing makeup water from a small river,3 ground water use conflicts -- wells, ground water quality4 degradation cooling ponds at inland sights, those are the5 ground use water and quality ones that would be site-6 specific.7 And as I understand the reasoning, the ones8 that are identified as generic that they would be generic9 to all plants, and so they are dealt with on that generic10 basis. So, I guess my question would be, what authority11 would you have that, you're saying that they're unique12 aspects, but what legal authority would you have that this13 could be argued to be within the scope, because of. any14 unique aspects, if not found in Appendix B or 51, any part15 of 51, I guess, 51.53 was the one that Mr. Lewis mentioned.16 MR. LODGE: I would need a few minutes to17 review the regs to possibly be able to respond to that.18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, the question19 relates to 2, 3 and 7, and then on 8 the environmental20 justice, there may be some other questions. Have you read21 the case law about environmental justice and the policy22 statement on environmental justice?23 MR. LODGE: Yes.24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. You want to25 take a break and then we'll come back and start goingNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 194I through these after you've had a chance to look at it?2 MR. LODGE: All right.3 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay, let's come back4 at 4:00, we'll go for another hour or so, and then 5:30 we5 start the Limited Appearance Statements.6 (Off the record.)7 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Mr. Lodge, go ahead.8 MR. LODGE: What was the pending point in our9 discussion?10 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, the scope. The11 scope issue is a significant one --12 MR. LODGE: The scope on the water intake13 issue.14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right.15 MR. LODGE: We believe that the, that this is a16 Category 2 issue in two possible respects, and in looking17 at the Appendix B of Part 51, one of them, one reason is18 that we believe that the lake is comprised in part of19 ground water, but there is a ground water use conflict20 involving a portable water supply, which is, shows as a21 Category 2 matter of concern.22 Further, I would point out that one of the23 other facts specific to this controversy is that when the24 water intake was planned and approved and constructed by25 South Haven, it was presumably based upon the belief thatNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 195I the plant, that Palisades, would not be operating in the,2 at the end of the period of ten years from now. And --3 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Could I just ask you,4 do you know whether the plant uses more than 100 --5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Gallons per minute.6 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- gallons per minute?7 MR. LODGE: No, I do not.8 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Because that9 determines whether it's one or two.10 MR. LODGE: Right.11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: What, it's my12 reading of, and please, somebody, if this is an incorrect13 reading, when we talk about a conflict, what we talk about14 is, the plant and some other entity are using a water15 source for the same purposes, and as a result causing the16 other entity to be denied use of that water.17 In other words, if we're both, the example18 that's given in Turkey Point is the plant's using it for19 whatever reason, for irrigation, okay?20 MR. LODGE: Right.21 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: And somebody else is22 using it for irrigation, and then there's a drain on the23 source so that there's a competition going on there, as24 opposed to what you were alleging in the contention which25 is, it's not a competition, it's a contamination issue.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 196I MR. LODGE: Right.2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: The conflict here is3 two entities trying to use the same water for the same4 purpose and because of, there's not enough, you can't get5 there from here. And that's why there's distinction6 between less than 100 and greater than 100. So, it's not7 clear to me how that would move your contention stated into8 a Category 2, versus a Category 1, in other words, become a9 plant-specific issue, a generic issue.10 MR. LODGE: Right.11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: And my, if anybody,12 the staff of the applicant, if I'm misquoting what it, the13 regulations are saying --14 MS. UTTAL: That's correct, you're, you are15 correct.16 MR. LODGE: May I articular what we believe the17 second part of .Appendix B? That might apply here.18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Sure, yeah, please.19 MR. LODGE: It is under the socioeconomic's20 section of the appendix, and is entitled, "Public Services21 and Public Utilities", describes as a Category 2, an22 increased problem with water shortages at some sites may23 lead to impacts of moderate significance on public water24 supply availability. As I was indicating, at the time that25 the water intake was conceived and constructed, it wasNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 197(2345678910111213141516171819202122232425anticipated, the public record indicated that the plant wasgoing to be operating, I guess, through 2011.And we believe that this is actually a late, alater developing controversy as a result, because of thefact that the plant may now be operating through 2031. Inother words, it was conjectured that the plant would not beoperating and would not be posing a risk of contaminationat the time that the water intake would go into service asa portable water supply source.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: What was thesocioeconomic, what section of the regulations is that, Imissed it.MR. LODGE: It's in Appendix --ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: It's in this next one.MR. LODGE: Yeah, it's in Appendix B, right,the following page.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: It was that page.This one, I think.MR. LODGE: It says, Public Utilities.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: No, no, I'm sorry,it's this one here I think you're talking about, the thirdone down?MR. LODGE: Yes.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: Okay, but --MR. LODGE: We anticipate that there might be aNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433....... 198I different view on the community's part as to the safety and2 security of their water supply as a result of an extended3 operation.4 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: So what you're5 interpreting as the reference to water shortages as, are6 you implying that that, water, a shortage of clean water or7 something, is that what you're implying that that means?8 MR. LODGE: That the South Haven community may9 view it as an undesirable and unanticipated contamination10 source.11 MS. UTTAL: Judge; I believe that that section,12 the staff tells me, relates to the use of water by the13 staff of the plant, by the addition of however many more14 people are working there, not use of other entities.15 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, why don't you go16 ahead and make your argument, and then we'll just move on17 and hear the arguments of the, of the NMC and the staff.IS MR. LODGE: The argument on this point?19 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Yes, Number 2.20 MR. LODGE: I believe we've essentially made21 it, that the, it falls within the scope because it is a22 site-specific type of problem and matter of public,23 portable water supply concern.24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Do you want to address25 the other --NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 199I MR. LODGE: May we address them separately?2 You're -- with the other contentions?3 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I wasn't going to say4 the other two contentions --5 MR. LODGE: Oh, sorry.6 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I was going to say the7 other arguments about the vagueness and lack of8 specificity.9 MR. LODGE: The BEIRS VII report, we believe,10 changes the parameters. The BEIRS VII report was co-11 sponsored among other entities by the Nuclear Regulatory12 Commission, and it's conclusion suggests very strongly that13 there is not a safe level of radiation when you're talking14 about human exposure.15 We believe that that figures into the16 assessment of this particular threat to the public water17 supply. We believe that --18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But does -- how does19 that bring, how would, are you saying that would somehow20 bring it within the scope, or --21 MR. LODGE: We think that in a practical sense22 that the municipality of South Haven, the citizens of South23 Haven and any other users of the municipal water supply,24 are, once they're better educated about the, about the25 findings of the BEIRS VII study, may well reject the use ofNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 200I that particular part of the system to draw water from Lake2 Michigan.3 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: The question I had4 asked, and I don't want to, you can make that argument,5 but, was, my question related to the specificity and the6 arguments that your contention and basis were vague, and I7 don't, I know you didn't mention the BEIRS VII report in8 the original contention.9 You, basically the allegation you make,10 assuming scope, is that due to the direction of the flow11 and the close proximity to the drinking water intake, that12 there would be contamination. And then you say you hope to13 produce public records of toxics and radiation testing.14 MR. LODGE: Which we, some of which we provided15 in the reply to the contentions.16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And again, you know,17 your other, a strict requirement that's been made stricter1819 MR. LODGE: Correct.20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: But those are the21 requirements that govern, so I don't want you to rely on22 what you provided in your reply and assume that we're going23 to consider that --24 MR. LODGE: Correct, I understand.25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Because -- say whatNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 201I we're going to do on those types of issues.2 MR. LODGE: Getting current data on the3 radioactive content of the water in and around the intake,4 it's not possible at the present time because of it's5 current use. It is owned by Pacific Gas and Electric and6 is a natural gas facility, and we don't have permission,7 nor is there public domain data available, but we don't8 have permission to obtain any kind of raw data, any kinds9 of samples that we could provide data to the panel with,10 and the parties.11 We have no further argument on this contention.12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Mr. Lewis?13 MR. LEWIS: Thank you. Petitioner has offered14 this contention as a safety issue. They divided their15 contention from the safety issues and environmental issues16 and this is one they listed as a safety issue, which I17 assume means that they're challenging the required showing18 in Part 54 as opposed to the Environmental Review. Clearly19 this is not a contention that has anything to do with the20 management of aging.21 Petitioner's saying, well, contamination can22 result from leaky systems, but they do absolutely nothing23 to identify any error in our integrated plan assessment,24 they don't identify any component within the scope of the25 rule that may leak, or any inadequacy in any of the agingNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433..... -...". .. .:. .." ' .... 202I management programs. So, they clearly do not raise an2 issue within the scope of Consumer Part 54.3 With respect to the environmental issues that4 are within the scope of this proceeding, it clearly falls5 within none of those. The better place to look for, one of6 the issues that can be raised is 50.51.(c)3, those define7 specifically the issues that have to be addressed by an8 applicant --9 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: 50.51 or 51 --10 MR. LEWIS: Sorry, 51.53.(c)3, excuse me --11 1OC4-51.53.(c)3 raises the environmental issues that have12 to be examined in the license renewal procedure. And, the13 contention that the Petitioners are raising does not fall14 within the scope of any of those issues.15 Petitioner's have referred to two issues now16 for the first time. They've referred to the, an issue17 concerning ground water use conflict, which is addressed in18 51.53.(c)3C, that issue has to do with whether a plant is19 withdrawing groundwater, and groundwater does not mean20 surface water, groundwater means water in the aquafirs,21 whether they are pumping so much water that they are22 depressing the aquafirs, and they're creating a zone of23 influence that then prevents other people from withdrawing24 water from wells. That's clearly nothing to do with the25 assertion of how the contamination of intake for a waterNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433~~~~~~~~. ........... ..-....... .. .....*. .. *. -.. 203I supply system.2 The second reference they made is to3 socioeconomic impacts on public utilities with water4 shortages. That issue is defined more specifically in5 51.53(c)3I, the issue has to do is whether license renewal6 is going to cause such a population increase because of a7 large refurbishment task force that has to come on to8 refurbish the plant. They can get a great influx of9 workers and the local water supply can't serve those10 increased number of workers and their families and whatever11 secondary increases in population might result from a large12 increase in the workforce.13 51.53(c)3I specifically refers to the impacts14 from the population increase. This has nothing to do with15 a contamination of the water supply system, so neither of16 those Category 2 issues encompass this contention.17 Petitioner has suggested that, this site-specific aspect so18 they can raise it, but a Petitioner cannot raise a Category19 1 issue as the issues that the NRC has resolved generically20 just by saying, there's some site-specific aspect.21 The Category 1 issues are resolved by rule, and22 therefore they can only be reopened by a petition for a23 waiver of those rules, and certainly the Petitioners have24 made, filed no such petition in this proceeding. The25 Petitioner has also referred to the BEIRS VII report, I'mNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433'. : .... ....' ..*. .,. ...-. ."i ; ,. i ...* .* * "'", ., ."... .... .. 204I not sure what their assertion of the significance of that2 report is.3 The releases from the plant are governed by4 Part 20, there's been no showing, this really goes to5 basis, this is outside the scope, but there's been no6 showing that there's any releases in excess of the Part 207 limits, and that alone is a basis for denying this8 contention.9 The only assertion that I've heard recently10 about the BEIRS VII report from the public interest groups11 is that it's reaffirmed the appropriateness of the linear12 no threshold hypotheses for establishing radiation13 protection standards. The Part 20 limits are, in fact,14 based on the linear no threshold hypothesis, so there's no15 inconsistency between the BEIRS VII report that I'm aware16 of and the NRC's current regulations. If there were, that17 would require away from the ruling, the Part 20 regulations18 are certainly not subject to attack in this proceeding,19 absent permission from the Commission.20 Finally, I do want to clear up about the intake21 that the Petitioners seem to be referring to. I think22 there may be some confusion from what it's, what's been23 referenced. The current intake for the South Haven water24 supply system is, operational I think it's about four miles25 north of the plant and about a mile out to the lake.NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433...0 ...*. 205I That intake is subject to sampling of the2 Palisades REMP program, the Radiological Environmental3 Monitoring Program. The Petitioners say, well, that's like4 the fox guarding the henhouse, but this is an NRC mandated,5 NRC inspected program, and there's no basis for suggesting6 that the ongoing laundering of that current intake is in7 any way inadequate.8 There is a new plant that was built adjacent to9 Palisades, it's the Covert Generating Plant, I think is the10 name of it. It's a, I believe it's a combined cycle plant,11 and it built a new intake for that plant. My understanding12 is the city of South Haven asked the Covert Generating13 Company, which is an LLC, to design the intake so that it14 could be used in the future to supply old water to a new15 public water supply system if one is built.16 But that is not currently the case, so it has17 the capacity, I think the pumps have the capability to1S provide intake, provide a water supply, new water treatment19 facility in the future. But currently it's not serving in20 that capacity, it's only providing water to the Covert21 Generating Plant.22 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Is the plant use, does23 the plant use more than 100 gallons per minute or less? Do24 you know?25 MR. LEWIS: Does Palisades withdraw groundNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 2061 water at more than 100 gallons per minute?2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Mm-hmm.3 MR. LEWIS: I'm told no; I'm sorry, I wasn't4 ready for that question.5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Well, that6 distinguishes under the ground water use and quality which7 are generic and which, you say no they, it does not --8 MR. LEWIS: That issue will be addressed in our9 environmental report. It is a Category 2 issue, we will10 explain --11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Category 2?12 MR. LEWIS: Yes, that ground water conflict13 issue is a Category 2 issue, and therefore our14 environmental report has to explain why it's applicable or15 not.16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Why it's what?17 MR. LEWIS: Applicable or not to our plant. A18 number of the Category 2 issues are not necessarily19 applicable to each plant.20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well actually, if it's21 less than 100 gallons per minute, it's a Category 1 issue.22 MR. LEWIS: It's really a Category 2 issue, but23 what the generic environmental impact statement determined24 is if plants are drawing less than 100 gallons per minute,25 there should be no significant environmental impact. WeNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 207!2345678910111213141516171819202122232425don't know what old plants are, therefore we require eachapplicant, in their environmental report, to explain ifthey are above this limit. If there is, there's a furtherassessment, if they're not, then everything is within thescope of the GEIS.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And, just one other,you referred to 51.53(c)3 --MR. LEWIS: I, capital I.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right, and then, butwhat I was looking at, under C3, small Roman Numeral 2.MR. LEWIS: Have I missed a Roman 2, yes, I'msorry, it's 51.53(c)3, small double i, I missed the smalldouble i.ADMIN. LAWMR. LEWIS:ADMIN. LAWJUDGE YOUNG: And then --Big capital I.JUDGE YOUNG: And then B or I, yousaid I?MR. LEWIS: I.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Big, large I?MR. LEWIS: Large I. Too many sub-sectithat regulation.ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: So you don't faunder any of the --MR. LEWIS: The specific provision I wasreferring to in 51.53(c)3ii, big capital I is theons in11NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433....' ... 208I statement, "Additionally, applicant should provide an2 assessment of the impact of population increases3 attributable to the proposed action on public water4 supply". That is the issue that is a Category 2 issue, and5 again, it has nothing to do with a contamination scenario,6 it has to do is, is there going to be a large population7 increase from a great increase in the workforce at the8 plant, that then taxes the local public services.9 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Anything10 further?11 MR. LEWIS: No.12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Ms. Uttal?13 MS. UTTAL: Staff has nothing to add.14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Anything15 further from you on this one?16 MR. LODGE: No, your Honor.17 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Then let's goIS onto Number 3, which is the fuel storage, storage pads --19 MR. LODGE: Yes.20 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- issue. Which is, I21 believe, also comparable to the second contention and22 Turkey Point, that we wanted to hear from you on.23 MR. LODGE: Very good. I believe that from a24 drafting standpoint, based on it's face, this particular25 contention has fewer problems than we have discussed,NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433* ..* ... ...,. ... 209I expecting other contentions. Our contention is that, I2 believe I understand that the objection is going to be that3 this is a separately regulated type of facility.4 We believe that this is a structure on-site,5 under the exclusive control of the utility company, and I'm6 talking about the concrete pads, on which dry casks are7 located, that is certainly something that poses a potential8 problem because of the passage of time. And with the9 passage of time comes the increasing possibility of an10 earthquake.11 What you have, of course, is a second floor NRC12 technical person --13 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Back up for a second.14 MR. LODGE: Yes.15 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Let me hear that, you16 just made a statement that, that I thought was going to end17 one way, and it ended with increasing possibility of -- Iis thought you were going to end it by referring to increasing19 aging somehow, but you ended it by saying, increasing20 possibility of earthquakes. Is that what you said?21 MR. LODGE: Yes, it is.22 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay, so I guess --23 MR. LODGE: The gist of Dr. Landsman's24 objection as articulated while he was an official at the25 NRC, was that there is not an adequate safety margin in theNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433.... .. .. .. ... 210I design and construction of the second concrete pad, in2 particular.3 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Which, and again, I4 don't want to cut you off --5 MR. LODGE: Right.6 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- but I am for a7 moment, and then you can start up again, but if it's an8 aging issue, then it may be relevant in a license renewal9 context.10 MR. LODGE: Correct.11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: If there's another12 issue, it may be a serious issue for which there may be13 other avenues of challenge, but they wouldn't fall Within a14 license renewal proceeding if they didn't relate to aging15 or it didn't, weren't a site-specific environmental issue.16 MR. LODGE: Sure.17 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: So, that's why I18 interrupted in the first place, because I wasn't sure how19 the increased possibility of an earthquake by virtue of20 passage of time would fall within either of those.21 MR. LODGE: I understand that. Let me finish22 the thought here.23 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay.24 MR. LODGE: Perhaps it will help.25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: If you want to startKNNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433.,.... .... -.. .. 211I over again, I apologize.2 MR. LODGE: No, that's all right.3 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I'm interrupting your4 train of thought.5 MR. LODGE: The surge pads are part of a6 continuum of waste, spent fuel management at the site. The7 spent fuel pool at Palisades was full to capacity by 1993,8 which necessitated the resort to the use of dry cask on-9 site storage. That prospect appears inevitably that dry10 casks will continue to be used in an on-site storage factor11 into the renewal period, probably, possibly, let's just put12 it at that, possibly for the entirety of the 20-year13 period.14 I think functionally there is very little15 distinction that can be made between the spent fuel16 facility and the dry cask storage facility in terms of the17 fact that there's a musical chairs type of process that18 occurs when there is a periodic refueling. There will be19 periodic refuelings of the plant during the 20 year20 extension period, of course; there will be additional21 motion movement of, after the five year holding period in22 the spent fuel pool, of spent fuel into dry casks that will23 be erected on the second pad.24 The second pad is not the only focus of our25 concern, but for purposes of discussion it is particularlyNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 212I important, because Dr. Landsman, while an NRC employee,2 identified and, in a public record type of fashion,3 registered objections to the conformants of that pad's4 construction design with, and location, with earthquake5 safety regulations.6 We believe that since this is a structure, on-7 site, and I understand, and the Petitioners understand8 well, that there's a separate licensor, if you will, that9 has allowed the use of the pads to hold dry storage casks.10 But we're not talking about the casks, we're talking about11 the structures, the dry, pardon me, the concrete pads12 themselves.13 We believe that it is within the scope, as14 delineated in Turkey Point, spent fuel is within the scope,15 arguably, subject matter jurisdiction, if you will, of, the16 Commission mentioned that in the Turkey Point decision, we17 believe that this is simply another stage of the spent fuel18 storage process.19 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: How would the spent20 fuel come in? You're, I think you're saying this is an21 environmental contention, how would that, if you were to22 allege that, how would that come into, how would it be23 within the scope?24 MR. LODGE: Well, spent fuel, the spent fuel25 pool is something that the panel can consider theNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433S. ......... 213I management capability of NMC in, for the license extension2 period. We believe that part of that management entails3 emptying the spent fuel and moving it elsewhere on-site.4 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Are you, when you're5 talking about management, are you talking about management6 effects of aging? And if not, are you talking about any7 site-specific environmental issue?8 MR. LODGE: It is a site-specific environmental9 issue, we believe.10 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And, can you help me11 by pointing me to --12 MR. LODGE: Once again, 51.53.13 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- resources --14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: I guess I'd like to15 understand, when you do that, again, going to Turkey Point,16 the, in that instance, the intervener maintained before the17 License Board that the possibility of catastrophic18 hurricanes justified this plant-specific contention on19 spent fuel accidents. If I substituted catastrophic20 hurricanes, if I substituted the word catastrophic21 earthquakes, what would be the difference?22 Because it just seems like the two are so23 parallel and the Commission already rejected it, then, you24 know, what is unique about your contention that25 differentiates it from the one in Turkey Point, which wasNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 214I rejected?2 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: And I think what we're3 looking at here is, you know, there may be serious issues4 raised, but the question for us has to be, and is limited5 to, whether it falls within the scope of this proceeding in6 addition to meeting the other requirements, but if it's not7 within the scope of this proceeding, then any remedy would8 be through the main, the other two would be the 22.06 and9 the rule making under 28.02, I think it is, I'm not sure.10 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE BARATTA: 28.11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: 22.06 and then 22.8012 or something, let's see. 22.06 or 28.02, either one. I13 think the Commission discussed those recently in a decision14 in the Millstone case that was issued just last week.15 MR. LODGE: The characteristics of the sand at16 the Palisades site, is such that it's been referred to by17 geologists as singing sand. It, dunes can move very18 quickly, erosion over the period of the license extension19 is a very unpredictable phenomenon that has not been20 quantified adequately in the application at all.21 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Well, again, I'm sorry22 to keep interrupting you, but I really want to try to get23 us focused on this, you may be raising a very serious24 issue, I don't know. You may be raising a very serious25 issue that needs to be addressed, and certainly everybodyKJNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 215I knows that what happens with -- has a big effect on the2 management of high level waste and spent fuel, but all we3 have jurisdiction over here are things that would be,4 relate to aging issues or site-specific environmental5 issues that would not be generic issues under Appendix B of6 51.53, Appendix B 51, Part 51.7 So, we need to, I guess, go through the same8 process that we did for the last one in terms of, just9 saying that it's site-specific, or talking about the10 dangers of the sand movement is a little general in terms11 of giving us the assistance we need to see how this would12 fall within or not, the scope of the license renewal13 proceeding.14 MR. LODGE: May I have a moment, please?15 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Particularly in light16 of Turkey Point. And you might want .to look under Uranium17 Fuel Cycle and Waste Management Section of the Appendix B.18 Part 51, sub-Part A, Appendix B, yeah.19 MR. LODGE: The erosion potential is a function20 of time. I would point out that one of the circumstances,21 the circumstances enumerated in the Landsman declaration,22 and I understand that that came in as part of the reply to23 contentions, but the Landsman declaration points out that24 the, a major problem with the second pad in particular,25 neither was constructed in contact with bedrock, and inNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 216I fact, there's a, perhaps a 100 or even 150 feet of sand2 that, in the case of the second pad, was mechanically3 tamped down, pressure tamped, to make a foundation for the4 construction of the pads.5 Concrete ages over time, erosion can change the6 distribution of stress from the great weight of the casks7 themselves over time. Even in the absence of an8 earthquake, there can be changes in short in the9 structure's capability to adequately hold the great weight10 of the dry casks.11 We believe that it falls within the scope of12 Turkey Point in this way that in the decision it says,13 "Left unmitigated, the effects of aging can overstress14 equipment, unacceptably reduce safety margins, and lead to15 reduction of required plant functions, including the16 capability to shut down the reactor", whatever, "and17 otherwise prevent or mitigate the consequences", basically18 to make it impossible to mitigate consequences of accidents19 with a potential for off-site exposures. So, we believe20 that it is within the scope.21 And finally, we've not, admittedly have not22 filed a motion for this, but certainly have been23 considering the possibility of a 10-CFR-2.758 request for a24 waiver based upon the exception, the exceptional25 circumstance here, where you have what we believe to be,NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433... ....', " " .... .. .-. ..., ."" ... ... : ... .." ..' ." 217I and suggest prima facie, is an authoritative expert opinion2 that was rendered while the employee was an employee of the3 NRC, and which still is, the controversy exists as an4 unresolved issue, that is to say that the potentially5 defective designer construction of the pads persists as a6 problem today.7 We've learned from a federal register notice8 that permission has been granted to the utility to load9 seven additional dry storage casks on the second pad during10 the month of October, I don't know if that's actually11 happened, but the prospect is very distinct. And the12 Commission, as a regulator, has appeared to have committed13 itself in the face of an unresolved issue with effects for14 a public health safety with index.15 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: So, which rule is,16 you're asking for an exemption from a particular rule?17 MR. LODGE: From, if indeed the panel were to18 find that this issue, on it's face falls outside the scope19 of, I guess, Part 54, that we would, we would respectfully20 request that a waiver be considered to allow the issue in.21 I will, tonight, look at, follow the panel's suggestion and22 I'll look up the Millstone discussion. I'm very curious to23 see that.24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Right. And actually,25 what's, I'll just tell you briefly that, what appears to beNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 2181 the bottom line on this, apart from pointing to the2 alternate routes of 22.06 and 28.02, the Commission says3 that you have to meet all four factors of, let's see -- if4 someone could help me with the exemption, what's the5 section, 2 --6 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: 758.7 MR. LEWIS: Not any more.8 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: 2.758 -- pardon?9 MR. LEWIS: 2.390 now, I can't remember. It's10 changed.11 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: I know. Let's see,12 3.09(c) I think maybe. 3.09(c), let's look at that.-13 MS. WOLF: That's non-timely filings.14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: No, that's non-timely15 filings, I'm sorry, the exemption rule, the rule that16 governs exemption of. rules.17 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE TRIKOUROS: It's 2.335.18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: 335, okay, okay, what19 the Commission points out is that in order to grant an20 exemption or waiver, you must meet four factors, all four.21 The rule's strict application would not serve the purposes22 for which it was adopted; the movement has alleged special23 circumstances that were not considered either explicitly or24 by necessary implication as a rule-making proceeding25 leading to the rule sought to be waived, and we're talkingNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 219I about the license renewal, scope rule.2 Three, the circumstances are unique to the3 facility rather than common to a large class of facilities,4 and by waiver of the regulations necessary to reach a5 significant safety problem. And then, the, I believe the6 Commission ends up its discussion by referring to the 28.027 alternative brief that could be taken, and you probably doS need to read that if he's give it to you.9 MR. LODGE: Absolutely will.10 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: If you need a copy we11 can --12 MR. LODGE: That would be, that would be great,13 thank you.14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Because that, that15 case involved a certified question to the Commission,16 suggesting that the Commission might consider whether a17 waiver was appropriate in that case.18 MR. LODGE: Is, I mean, was the Commission --19 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: They're responding to20 the Board's certifications.21 MR. LODGE: Okay, all right. Thank you.22 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: So, if you want to23 address that tomorrow --24 MR. LODGE: Yes.25 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: That's fine, but itNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 220I sounds as though what you're saying is that unless we2 somehow found this to be a site-specific issue, that would3 bring it under some Category 2 --4 MR. LODGE: Right.5 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: -- and exclude it from6 all the Category 1 issues, that you would ask to have the,7 an exemption from the rule.8 MR. LODGE: That is correct.9 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Do you have anything10 else to say on this point?11 MR. LODGE: No, not at this point, thank you.12 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Mr. Lewis?13 MR. LEWIS: Thank you, your Honor. The Turkey14 Point decision is squarely on point. I agree with Judge15 Baratta, it couldn't be closer unless it had referred to an16 earthquake instead of hurricane. The storage of spent fuel17 on-site is a Category 1 issue, and in fact the Category 118 determination was that spent fuel could be stored safely19 and without environmental impact during the period of20 extended operation. So it's absolutely clearly barred in21 this proceeding absent a waiver, and there has been no22 request for a waiver in this proceeding.23 The Petitioners raised this as an environmental24 issue, and that's why the Turkey Point decision applies,25 but it's also clearly not a safety issue under Part 54, theNEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 221I contingent has absolutely nothing to do with aging2 management, and it does not relate to any component within3 the scope of the rule. Those components are defined in4 54.4, and it's just, it does not fall within any of those5 provisions because it is a separately licensed facility.6 Just one last point, I did hear Petitioners7 refer to erosion being time-related. To the best of my8 recollection erosion isn't mentioned anywhere in the9 original petition, the reply, or Dr. Landsman's affidavit.10 The issue had to do with liquefaction and amplificationII from earthquakes, and so my belief, based on a quick check,12 is that this is a brand new assertion that's just popping13 up for the first time in the pre-hearing conference.14 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Anything further?15 MR. LEWIS: That's --16 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Ms. Uttal?17 MS. UTTAL: I have nothing to add, your Honor.18 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Okay, it is almost ten19 to 5:00, do you think that that's enough time to get into 720 or do you want to save 7 and 8 for tomorrow and take a21 little bit longer break before the Limited Appearance22 Statements?23 MR. LODGE: I would request that, your Honor.24 ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Any objection?25 MR. LEWIS: Not --NEAL R. GROSS (202) 234-4433 22212345678910111213141516171819202122232425ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: All right, then we'llcome back tomorrow and finish 7 and 8 along with youradditional comments on Contention 1 and Contention 3. And,we will reconvene here at 5:30 to hear Limited AppearanceStatements, and all, counsel for all the parties arewelcome to stay up here, the only thing I would ask is, Mr.Lewis, if you wouldn't mind moving one direction or anothersince the, or at least we, somehow get the podium for theLimited Appearance Speakers.MR. LEWIS: I'll have to move into the --ADMIN. LAW JUDGE YOUNG: Yes, so that we canmaybe pull that forward and be able to see and heareverybody. Okay, thank you.(Whereupon at 4:48 p.m., the meetingwas adjourned.)NEAL R. GROSS(202) 234-4433 CERTIFICATEThis is to certify that the attached proceedingsbefore the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commissionin the matter of:Name of Proceeding: Nuclear Management CompanyPalisades Nuclear GeneratingStation License RenewalDocket Number: 50-255-LR;ASLBP No: 05-842-03-LRLocation: South Haven, MIwere held as herein appears, and that this is theoriginal transcript thereof for the file of the UnitedStates Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and,thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under thedirection of the court reporting company, and that thetranscript is a true and accurate record of theforegoing proceedings.Ronald erplOfficial Reporter* Neal R. Gross & Co., Inc.NEAL R. GROSSCOURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.(202)234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com}}