05000456/FIN-2015003-02
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Finding | |
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Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
Description | Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions. Procedures, and Drawings, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. Contrary to the above, from April 23, 2015, to June 24, 2015, the licensee failed to translate specific acceptance criteria into procedures and instructions. Specifically, when the licensee modified the DG fuel oil system in a manner that reduced the DG fuel oil system train separation from two isolation points to one isolation point, the licensee failed to establish quantifiable acceptance criteria in the post-maintenance test, and failed to establish performance monitoring with acceptance criteria, as specified in the design change. This issue was entered into the CAP as IR 2519208 with immediate corrective actions of re-establishing the dual isolation point. The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, because the issue was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, dated June 19, 2012, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green), because the issue did not prevent the 2B DG from operating for its specified probable risk assessment mission time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. |
Site: | Braidwood ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000456/2015003 Section 4OA7 |
Date counted | Sep 30, 2015 (2015Q3) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
Inspection Procedure: | |
Inspectors (proximate) | A Schwab D Betancourt D Mcneil D Reeser J Benjamin J Mcghee L Rodriguez M Jones T Go |
Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Braidwood - IR 05000456/2015003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Braidwood) @ 2015Q3
Self-Identified List (Braidwood)
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