05000341/FIN-2012002-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | TS 3.3.1.2, Table 3.3.1.2-1 requires functional testing of TS 3.3.1.2. Table 3.3.1.2-1 requires functional testing of the source range monitors (SRMs) to be conducted within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> following shutdown. Enclosure A, Section 2.E.1 of MWC 13, Outage Nuclear Safety specifies requirements that, in Mode 4, at least three SRM channels are maintained operable. Enclosure D, Risk Assessment, of MWC 13 requires written risk management actions to operate with less than three operable SRMs. Contrary to the above, on March 26, 2012, the licensees operators failed to properly assess the risk impact of losing three SRMs in Mode 4 due to a failure of the SRM drive-in pushbutton in accordance with Title 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). Specifically, the licensee did not properly recognize the risk impact on the outage defense-in-depth requirements of declaring three SRMs inoperable that led to orange nuclear safety risk for reactivity management. The inspectors reviewed this issue using the guidance contained in Appendix B, Issue Screening, of IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Report. The inspectors determined the violation was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Configuration Control and was similar to the not-minor-if statement of example 4.e of IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues. Specifically, the inoperability of three SRMs placed the overall plant risk in a higher licensee-established risk category. The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the Significance Determination Process in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix K, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management Significance Determination Process. The finding screened as very low safety significance (Green) |
| Site: | Fermi  |
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| Report | IR 05000341/2012002 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2012 (2012Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Dahbur T Bilik M Mitchell R Morris A Wilson R Jones J Cameron P Smagacz S Bell |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Fermi - IR 05000341/2012002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Fermi) @ 2012Q1
Self-Identified List (Fermi)
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