05000443/FIN-2009007-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requires that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measure shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action is taken to preclude repetition. The Florida Power and Light (FPL) Energy Quality Assurance Topical Report (QATR) was written pursuant to the above and states in Section A-6 that FPL implements a corrective action program to promptly identify and correct conditions adverse to quality. Procedure PI-AA-205 requires that significant conditions adverse to quality be resolved through corrective actions to prevent recurrence. Contrary to the above, NextEra Nuclear Oversight issued a finding on April 9, 2009, (QR 090-017) after determining that past corrective actions for B EDG turbocharger vibration issues were inadequate and have not been effective based on a past and recent history of increased vibration, bolt failures, bolt loosening, turbocharger related coolant piping weld failures, coolant system leaks and a failure in some instances to document these conditions in the condition reporting system. The failure to resolve long standing and increasing vibration and related issues for the B EDG constituted ineffective corrective action. The finding was more than minor because the ineffective action to resolve turbocharger vibrations impacted the availability and reliability of a mitigating system. Further, turbocharger vibration was causal to the B EDG failure on February 25, 2009 (reference Section 1R18 above). The finding had very low safety significance because it did not involve a loss of safety function or impact the safety function for a time greater than the allowed outage time in the technical specifications. While increased vibrations were causal to the February 25th B EDG failure, they were not the root cause since the cooling water system would have failed due the inadequate gasket design and irregular flange conditions. Further, the finding identified in QR 09-017 is separate from NRC Violation 20090701 since the inadequate design change resulting in the February 25 B EDG failure occurred during the discrete time period of January 29-31, 2009, whereas the corrective actions for the B EDG turbocharger vibrations have been ongoing for a longer period of time (reference 2001 CR 200107312). The inspectors determined that the Criterion XVI violation was licensee-identified. NextEra entered the issue into the corrective action program as CR 00194370. |
| Site: | Seabrook  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000443/2009007 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2009 (2009Q3) |
| Type: | TEV: Severity level IV |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Cahill D Lew E Burket J Heinly J Rady K Mangan R Moore W Raymond |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
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Finding - Seabrook - IR 05000443/2009007 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Seabrook) @ 2009Q3
Self-Identified List (Seabrook)
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