05000461/FIN-2008002-06
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Evaluate Hydraulic Power Unit Piping for Impact with Containment Atmosphere Monitoring Line |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding and an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, having very low safety significance, in that, in evaluating whether the reactor recirculation flow control valve A hydraulic power unit (HPU) piping was adequately supported in response to concerns raised in two condition reports, the licensee did not adequately address that the as-built support configuration had not been properly verified from a design standpoint. In particular, the licensee did not consider the safety-related classification of nearby containment/drywell atmosphere monitoring tubing and that this tubing could be impacted if the HPU piping failed during a postulated design basis seismic event. Hence, the licensee did not implement the additional evaluation/calculations required to demonstrate the HPU piping met more stringent design requirements and was adequately supported. The primary cause of the violation was related to the cross-cutting component of Human Performance, Resources (H.2(c)) because the licensee failed to maintain complete, accurate, and up-to-date design documentation. Subsequently, the licensee performed evaluations/calculations demonstrating that the HPU piping will not adversely impact the safety-related containment monitoring tubing during a design basis seismic event. The licensee entered the finding in the corrective action program as Action Request 723620. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of maintaining functionality of containment due to the potential impact on the safety-related containment atmosphere monitoring system which was needed to monitor and to take actions to mitigate challenges to containment integrity. The finding was of very low safety significance because the licensees preliminary results based on conservative calculations indicated that the design basis requirements were met, and hence field modifications were not necessary |
| Site: | Clinton  |
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| Report | IR 05000461/2008002 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2008 (2008Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Jickling J Cassidy D Tharp B Dickson M Mitchell J Neurauter M Ring D Jones V Meghani S Mischke R Russell |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Clinton - IR 05000461/2008002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Clinton) @ 2008Q1
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