ML17157C140

Review of Fuel Pool Cooling During Postulated Off-Normal & Accident Events SSES Units 1 & 2.

ML17157C140
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	08/31/1992
From:	BRINKMAN K W PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO.
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ML17157C139	List: ML17157C138 ML17157C140 ML17157C141 ML17157C142 ML18026A248
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NUDOCS 9301050145
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REVIEWOFFUELPOOLCOOLINGDURINGPOSTULATED'OFF-NORMALANDACCIDENTEVENTSSusquehannaSteamElectricStationUnitsla2Augustl992Preparedby:KevinW.BrfnckmanPro)ectEngineer-NuclearSystemsP39105Df45921127PDRADOCK05000387 PrefaceThispaperpresentsthefindingsofareviewoftheadequacyofspentfuelpoolcoolingatSusquehannaSESduringoff-normalandemergencysituations.Theintentofthereviewistodetermineifplantsafetycanbemaintained.Thispaperisnotarevie~ofthelicensingrequirementsforspentfuelstorageatSusquehannaSES.Thedesignofthespentfuelpoolcoolingsystem(FPC)wasexaminedtodeterminetowhatextentitsoperabilityandintegritywouldbeaffectedbypostulatedoff-normaloraccidentconditions.Theavailabilityofothermeansofspentfuelpoolcoolingwasresearched,andthefunctionandaccessibilityofthealternativeswasevaluated.Thedesignofthespentfuelpoolinstrumentationwasreviewedtodetermineifspentfuelpoolmonitoringcouldbemaintainedinanoff-normaloraccidentcondition.Theconsequencesofaboilingfuelpoolwereconsidered.Itwasassumedthatsufficientdecayheatwouldexistinthestoredspentfueltoproducepoolheat-upandeventuallyaboil-offconditionifcoolingwasnotprovided.tNodetailedcalculationswereperformedaspartofthiseffort.Conclusionsaredrawnfromcurrentdesignandlicensinginformation.Analysisorre-analysisofissuessuchaspost-LOCAradiationlevels,probabilityandconsequencesofcladandfuelfailure,andequipmentqualificationcouldaltersomeoftheconclusions.Basedontheresearchdonetocompilethisreport>itistheauthor'sopinionthatfurtherevaluationoftheconcernsdiscussedinEDR620020andthisreportarewarrantedtoassurespentfuelstorageatSusquehanadoesnotreduceplantsafety.

TABLEOFCONTENTSPacaePreface.............-.-.-.-..---.~.~-~~~~~~.~1.0Introduction............-.---.--...-~~~~~~~~.~~~~~~~12.0PostulatedEvents23.0SafetyEvaluation....................................-.-.54.0Recommendations................,........................17lf5.0Conclusions6.0References..............................................21 Page11.0IntroductionThepurposeofthispaperistoprovideareviewofspentfuelpoolcoolingcapabilityatSusquehannaSESfollowingapostulatedoff-normaloraccidentcondition.AseriesofeventswasconsideredtodeterminewhetherpotentialsituationsexistatSusquehannaSESwhichcouldresultinfuelpoolboiling.TheseeventsarediscussedinSection2.0.Section3.0providesasafetyevaluationofthepostulatedeventsinSection2.0anddiscusseswhataspectscouldbefurtherevaluatedtoassesstheconsequencesoftherespectiveevent.'PotentialproblemswithalossoffuelpoolcoolingandsubsequentalignmentoftheRHRfuelpoolcoolingassistmodearefound.AccesstotheRHRvalvesnecessarytomanuallyalignRHRinthefuelpoolcoolingassistmodewouldbehinderedbyaneventwhichcausedcoredegradationandfissionproductreleasetotheprimarycoolant.TheconsequencesofusingECCSequipmentforRHRfuelpoolcoolingassistduringanaccidentneedtobeconsidered.APMEAiswarrantedtodetermineifECCScanprovidefuelpoolcoolingandlongtermpost-LOCAcontainmentcoolingwithpostulatedsinglefailuresandbreaks.OperatorguidanceforimplementingRHRfuelpoolcoolingassistpost-LOCAshouldbedeveloped.IffuelpoolboilingweretooccurduringaLOCA,theenergyandmoisturereleasedtothereactorbuildingwouldcreateasevereenvironmentforwhichmuchofthesafetygradeequipmentmaynotbequalified.TheentrainedwatercouldoverloadtheSGTSmoistureremovalequipmentandreducetheiodineremovalefficiencyofthecharcoalbeds.Theeffectofalossoffuelpoolcoolingduringrefuelingwithafullcoreoffloadisevaluated.ThelackofoperableRHRequipmentistheconcerninthissituation.AfuelpoolboilingeventalongwithaLOCAontheotherunitwouldputtheplantinanunanalyzedcondition.

Page22.0PostulatedEventsInthissectionoff-normaloraccidenteventsarediscussedinwhichthenormalspentfuelpoolcoolingsystem(FPC)islostandalternatemeansarerequiredtoremovethedecayheatfromthefuelpool.TheeventschosenareconsideredtoprovideanenvelopeofsituationswhereFPCislostandtheplantisinadegradedcondition.Events1to5arep'resentedinorderofwhatisconsideredhighesttolowestprobabilityofoccurrence<althoughfrequencieshavenotbeenresearchedaspartofthiseffort.ThelasteventconsideredisalossofFPCwithafullcoreoffloadtothespentfuelpool.Itistheonlyeventevaluatedwhichisnotconcerned'withdecayheatinthereactorvessel.2.1Event41:LossofOffsitePowerLOOPEvent41postulatesadualunitLOOP,whichcausesalossofpowertothefuelpoolcoolingsystem(FPC)pumpsandlossofservicewaterforcoolingoftheFPCheatexchangers.Theeventassumesbothreactorsarestabilizedandnofuelfailureoccurs.2.2Event2:LOCAWithoutFuelFailureEvent42postulatesaLOCAononeunit.Itisassumedthattheemergencycorecoolingsystemsperformtoprovidesufficientcorecoolingtomaintainfuelandcladintegrity.Noseismiceventispostulated,however,hydrodynamicloadsduetosteamdischargetothesuppressionpoolmustbeconsidered.SinceportionsoftheFPCarenotseismicallydesigneditisindeterminatewhethertheFPCpipingandequipmentwillbedamagedbythehydrodynamicloads.ItisassumedthatFPCislostforthedurationoftheaccident.Thenon-1Efuelpoollevelandtemperatureindicationisalsoassumed"lostduetostructuraldamageresultingfromthehydrodynamicloads.Ifstillfunctional,thefuelpoolcoolingpumpsshouldbeshutdownbythenon-essentialloadshed24hoursaftertheLOCA,ifimplementedperEP-IP-055.Topreventfuelpoolboiling,RHRfuelpoolcoolingassistmustbeinitiated.

Page32.3Event¹3:LOCA<<LOOPWithoutFuelFailureEvent¹3postulatesaLOCAononeunitcoincidentwithaLOOP.Itisassumedthattheemergencycorecoolingsystemsmaintainadequatecorecoolingtopreventfuelorcladdamage.FPCislostforthedurationoftheaccidentduetothemechanismsdiscussedinEventsNland¹2.It"isassumedthathydrodynamicloadswilldisablethefuelpoolinstrumentation'.2.4Event¹4:LOCAWithFuelFailureEvent¹4postulatesaLOCAononeunitwithfuelfailureasdescribedintheaccidentanalysisofFSARChapter15.6.5,whichspecifiesreleaseofradioactivematerialinaccordancewiththeassumptionsofRegulatoryGuide1.3.Radiationdoserateswithinthereactorbuildingforthisscenariohave'beencalculatedinFSARChapter18.1.20pertheguidelinesofNUREG-0737,whichappliestheassumptionsofRegulatoryGuide1.3tospecifythereleaseofradioactivematerialstotheprimarycoolant.eFPCislostimmediatelyduetotheservicewaterLOCAloadshedanditisassumedthatthehydrodynamicloadsduringtheLOCAblowdowncausethenon-seismmicportionsofFPCtofail.FPCislostforthedurationoftheaccidentandRHRfuelpoolcoolingassistmustbeplacedinservicetoremovethe'decayheatfromthespentfuelpool.2.5Event5:LOCA-LOOPWithFuelFailureEvent¹5postulatestheLOCAdiscussedinEvent¹4coincidentwithaLOOP.FPCislostfor,thedurationoftheaccidentduetothemech-anismsdiscussedinEvents¹1and2.Itisassumedthathydrodynamicloadswilldisablethefuelpoolinstrumentation.

Page42.6Event¹6:LossofFPCWithFullCoreOffloadThiseventpostulatesalossofFPCduringrefuelingwhentheentirecoreisoffloaded.TheemergencyheatloadasdefinedinFSARChapter9.1.3isconsidered,aswellasalesserheatloadwhichwouldnotnormallyrequireRHRfuelpoolcoolingassist.

Page53.0SafetyEvaluation3.1Event01:LossofOffsitePowerLOOP3.1.1EvaluationIntheeventofaLOOP,thespentfuelpoolcoolingsystem(FPC)isdisabledduetolossofpowertotheFPCpumpsandlossofservicewaterforcoolingoftheFPCheatexchangers.AssumingthereactorisstabilizedandnofuelfailureoccursspentfuelpoolcoolingcanbeprovidedusingtheRHRfuelpoolcoolingassistlineup.Operationshasatleast19hourswiththedesignheatloadonthefuelpooltoinitiateRHRfuelpoolcoolingassistbeforefuelpoolboilingiscalculatedtooccur.SincenofuelfailureresultsfromtheLOOP+accessisavailabletothereactorbuildingandthemanualoperationsrequiredtoestablishRHRfuelpoolcoolingassistcanbeperformedwithoutexposingoperatorstodosesabovestationlimits.RHRfuelpoolcoolingassisthassufficient1coolingcapacitytoremovethepro)ectedspentfuelpoolemergencyheatload.asdefinedinFSARChapter9.1.PertheactionstatementofTechSpec3.8.1.1,thereactormustbeincoldshutdownwithin108hoursaftertheLOOPifatleastonesourceofoffsitepowertotheClasslEdistributionsysteminnotoperable.TheECCSdesigncontainssufficientredundancyandflexibilitythatthereactorcouldbebroughttocoldshutdownwhileoperatingRHRfuelpoolcoolingassist.FuelpooltemperatureandlevelindicationareprovidedonpanelOC211locatedontherefuelingfloor.PanelOC211ispoweredoffofthedieselgeneratorsandwillhavepoweravailableduringtheLOOP.Thefuelpoolinstrumentationisnon-1Eandisnotenvironmentallyqualified.WhiletheLOOP.environmentisnotexpected'tobesevereontherefuelingfloorandtheinstrumentationshouldremainfunctional, Page6thiscannotbeguaranteed.AgroupalarmforOC211existsinthecontrolroom,butthehistoryoftroublewiththisalarmisextensive.OperatoraccesstotherefuelingfloorcouldbelimitedduetoairborneradioactivityfromevaporationoffofthefuelpoolsurfaceorelevatedairtemperaturesduetothelossofHVAC.Therefore,theoperatorsshouldbe-givensomeguidanceontheamountoftimetheyhaveafteralossoffuelpoolcoolingtoinitiateRHRfuelpoolcoolingwithouthavingtorelyontheOC211instrumentation.ON-135-001doesinformtheoperatorsthattheyhaveatleast25hoursuntilthefuelpoolboilsafterlossofFPC.Thistimecouldbeextendedconsiderablybyacyclespecificanalysis.Sincethefuelpoolwillnotboilforatleast19hours,electricalloadsrequiredtosupportRHRfuelpoolcoolingassistwillnothaveanyimpactonshorttermrecoveryfromtheLOOP.312~Sllss&l'LOOPdoesnotpresentasignificantchallengetoprovidingfuelpoolcooling.RHRfuelpoolcoolingassistcanbealignedandhasampleheatremovalcapacitytohandlethespentfuelpoolheatload.However,adequateindicationoffuelpoolconditionsmaynotbeavailabletotheoperatorsanditwouldbeadvantageoustoprovideadditionalguidancetotheoperatorsonhowlongtheyhavetoestablishRHRfuelpoolcoolingassistafteralossofspentfuelpoolcooling.3.2Eventf2:LOCAWithoutFuelFailure3.2.1EvaluationIftherecirculationdischargelinebreakispostulated,oneloopofLPCIislost.WiththeotherloopofLPCIfunctionalasubstantial Page7makeupsourcetothereactorvesselismaintainedandextendedfueluncoveryandcladdingdamagecanbeavoided.TopreventfuelpoolboilingRHRfuelpoolcoolingassistmustbeinitiated.Sincenofuelfailureispostulated,accesstoRHRvalvesnecessarytoalignRHRfuelpoolcoolingassistisavailableandcanbeaccomplishedwithoutlargedoserateexposurestotheoperator.Withthedesign'eatloadonthefuelpool<Reference2calculatesthatoperatorshaveapproximately19hourstoprovidefuelpoolcoolingtopreventfuelpoolboiling.RHRfuelpoolcoolingassistisalignedwithRHRloopAsuctionoffofthefuelpoolskimmersurgetankanddischargethroughtheloopARHRheatexchangerbacktothefuelpool.IfthepostulatedbreakisinthereactorrecircuationloopBdischargeline,RHRloopALPCIisrequiredforvesselreflood.Therefore,toalignRHRfuelpoolcoolingassist,RHRloopAdischargetothevesselwouldneedtobeterminatedafter19hours.PSARChapter6.2analysesforlongtermcoolingafterthecontainmentdesignbasisLOCAassumesatleastoneLPCIpumpisavailableforvesselmakeuporcontainmentspray.ApotentialproblemexistshereifthebreakinrecirculationloopBdisablesloopBLPCIandasinglefailureoftheloopBcontainmentsprayvalveispostulated.Withthisscenario<loopARHRflowmaybeneededforcontainmentpressure/temperaturecontrolandwouldnotbeavailabletoprovideaclosedloopofRHRfuelpoolcoolingassist.Ifthehydrodynamicloadsresultingfromsteamblowdowntothesuppressionpooldonotdamagethefuelpooltemperatureandlevelinstrumentation,powerisavailablefromthedieselgeneratorstokeeptheequipmentoperable.However,asdiscussedinSection3.1,theoperationofthisinstrumentationcannotbeguaranteed.Therefore,ititisassumedthatfuelpoolconditionswillbeindeterminateduringaaLOCAunlessaccesstotherefuelingfloorispossible.

Page83.2.2~SusmarWithoutfuelfailureresultingfromtheMCA,accesstothereactorbuildingandrefuelingfloorisavailableandthenecessaryoperationsrequiredtomonitorfuelpoolstatusand-initiateRHRfuelpoolcoolingassistcanbeperformed.However<theavailabilityoffuelpooltemperatureandlevelindicationcannotbeguaranteedandalternatemeansoffuelpoolmonitoringorspecificguidanceontimetoinitiateRHRfuelJpoolcoolingassistisrecommended.ConsiderationmustbegiventotheabilityofECCS'toprovidelongtermcoolingtoboththecontainmentandfuelpoolwithpostulatedpipebreaksandsinglefailures.AmoredetailedPMEAiswarrantedforthisevent.3.3Event%3:LOCA-LOOPWithoutFuelFailure3.3.1EvaluationTheconsequencesofthisLOCA-MOPonfuelpoolcoolingarenodifferentthanthosediscussedforaMCAwithoutfuelfailure.Fuelpoolcoolingisnotneededintheshort~termwhenrecoveryfromtheLOCAistakingplace.Bythetimethefuelpoolapproachesboiling(>19hoursperReference2),theMCArecoveryshouldbeinthelongtermcoolingphase.RHRpumpswillbeoperatingwithRHRheatexchangersvalvedintoremovedecayheatfromthecontainment.ZtisassumedthatsufficientECCSwasavailabletomaintaincorecoolingandprecludefuelfailure.Therefore,theRHRequipmentareawillbeaccessibleforaligningtheRHRfuelpoolcoolingvalves,andthefuelpoolcanbemaintainedinasafecondition.ThisevaluationisagaincontingentonsufficientECCSequipmentremainingavailabletoprovidebothlongtermcontainmentandfuelpoolcooling.TheavailabilityoffuelpoollevelandtemperatureindicationisthesameasdiscussedinSection3.1.

3.4Event44:LOCAWithFuelFailurePage90Thepostulatedfuelfailureforthiseventchangesthesituationconsiderably.Inthepreviouseventswithoutfuelfailure<thereactorbuildingremainsaccessible.Theoccurrenceandextentoffuelfailurearethemajorfactorsindeterminingtheoptionsavailableforrespondingtoalossoffuelpoolcooling.Thiseventisevaluatedbelowforseveraldifferents'ituations.3.4.1NUREG-0737PostulatedFuelFailureForthepostulatedLOCAscenario,FPCislostandRHRfuelpoolcoolingmustbeestablishedtoavoidfuelpoolboiling.ToalignRHRforfuelpoolcoolingfivevalvesmustbemanuallyopened(151060,151070,153021<and153070A,BforUnit1,ortheircounterpartsforaUnit2event).ThreeofthesevalvesareinroomI-514andtwoareinroomI-202.Accesstothereactorbuildingisrestrictedbythepost-LOCAradiationdoserateswhichareadependentupontheextentofpostulatedcoredegradation,systemoperationswhichtransporttheradioactivitythroughoutthereactorbuilding,andshieldinginplacetoisolatethesources.ASusquehannaspecificplantshieldinganalysiswasperformedinresponsetooneoftheactionplanrequirementsofNUREG-0737NUREG-0737requirestheuseofRegulatoryGuide1.3assumptionsforreleaseoffissionproductsfromthefuel.Theshieldinganalysis,presentedinFSARChapter18.1.20,calculatesradiationlevelsinthethereactorbuildingandprovidestheresultsasradiationzonemapsonehouraftertheLOCAinFigures18.1-2to18.1-8.PerthisanalysisroomI-514isaradiationzoneV(<50R/hr)andI-202isaradiationzoneVIII(>5000R/hr)withthepostulatedfuelfailureperRegulatoryGuide1.3.Theseradiationlevelsmakethevalvesinaccessibleuntilsufficientdecayhasoccurred.FSARFigures18.1-9and18.1-10 Page10providedecayfactorsasafunctionoftimewhichcanbeappliedtothedoseratescalculatedintheshieldinganalysis.Thesecurvesshowthatanorderofmagnitudedecreaseinradiationdoseratescanbeexpected19hoursaftertheLOCA<bywhichtimeRHRfuelpoolcoolingassistmustbeestablishedtoavoidfuelpoolboilingassumingthedesignheatload.ThisreductionindoseratesmakeszoomI-514accessibleforthevalveoperationsrequiredwithinthe5Remperactivityguidelineof10CFR50'ppendixAGDC19.However,anorderofmagnitudereductionintheroomI-202calcuateddoseratewillnotallowaccesstotheRHRvalves.Therefore,withfuelfailurepostulatedpertheguidelinesofNUREG-0737,thenecessarymanualvalvealignmentscannotbeperformedtoestablishRHRfuelpoolcoolingassistandifasufficientdecayheatloadexistsfuelpoolboilingwilloccur.AfurtherexaminationofroomI-202showsthatithousesmuchoftheRHRpipingrunningfromtheRHRLoopApumpstothecontainment.TheDBALOCAwhichisanalyzedforpeakcladtemperatureistherecirculationloopdischargelinebreakwithafailureoftheLPCZinjectionvalveontheotherloop.WiththelossofbothLPCZloops.coreuncovery,resultsforasufficienttimetoexpectcladdamageandreleaseoffissionproductstotheprimarycoolant.TransportofthesefissionproductsthroughoutthereactorbuildingcreatestheradiationsourcesintheroomshousingtheRHRvalves.SinceroomI-202housestheRHRLoopApumpdischargepipe<thewaterdrawnfromthesuppressionpoolbyLoopAwilltravelthroughthiszoom.Fissionproductswithinthepipewillsustaintheradiationsourceintheroom.Valves151060and151070areincloseproximitytotheRHRdischargepipeandtheoperatorwouldhavenopermanentshieldingifrequiredtomanuallyopenthevalves.Therefore,withoutareducedsourceterminroomZ-202,accesstoRHRvalvesnecessarytoestablishRHRfuelpoolcoolingisnotpossibleintimetopreventfuelpoolboilingatthedesignfuelpoolheatload.

Page113.4.2PuelPoolBoilinandMakeuWithoutFPCorRHRfuelpoolcoolingassistavailable,fuelpoolboilingwilloccuratatimedependentonthedecayheatloadinthespentfuelpool.EmergencymakeupwaterisavailablebydesignfromtheESWsystembyperformingmanualvalvealignmentsinroomsI-105andZ-514.TheseroomsarereportedasradiationzonesVIIZandVrespectivelyinthePSARChapter18anaiysisdiscussedaboveandthesameaccessibilityproblemwillexistwithroomI-105asfoundwithI-202.Abetteralternativeforfuelpool'makeupwithadegradedcozeconditionisviaafirehoseontherefuelingfloor,ifitisestablishedpriortothefuelpoolreachingboilingtemperature.Thisalternativecouldbeimplementedwithminimaldosetotheoperator.However,thepost-LOCAconditionofthenon~fireprotectionsystemisuncertainandaccesstotheESWvalvesmayultimatelyberequiredforemergemcymakeuptothefuelpool.Appendix9AoftheFSARanalyzestheconsequencesofalossofspentfuelpoolcoolingtodeterminethetimetoboiling,capabilitytoaddmakeupwater,andoffsitereleasesintheeventoffuelpoolboiling.Aproblemwithrespondingto.alossofspent.fuelpoolcoolingwithmakeuponlyisthatthedecayheatgeneratedbythespentfuelisultimatelytransferredtoZoneZIIandtheLOCAunit'sreactorbuilding.Thedesignspentfuelpoolheatloadis12.6E+6Btu/hrwhichistwotothreetimesthecalculatedpost-LOCAheatloadontheLOCAunitplusZoneIZI.Theextremeamountofenergyandmoisturedepositedintothereactorbuildingfroma-boilingfuelpoolwouldundoubtedlycreateanenvironmentwhichcould)eporadixeequipmentoperabilityandmakethereactorbuildinginaccessible.MoisturecarryovertotheSGTSwouldreducetheiodineremovalefficiencyofthecharcoalbedsiftheentrainedwateroverloadedthemoi.stureremovalequipmentintheSGTStrains.Thiswouldeffectoffsitereleasesandtheassumedefficienciesusedinoffsitedosecalculations.

Page123.4.3ECCSDesinBasisIOCATheECCSdesignbasisLOCAconsidersthebreakintheprimarycoolantboundaryalongwiththeworstcasesinglefailurewhichresultsinthehighestfuelcladdingtemperature.ForSusquehannaSES,theECCSDBALOCAistherecirculationdischargelinebreakwithafailureoftheLPCIinjectionvalveontheotherloop.LossofbothLPCIloopsresultsincoreuncoveryforasufficienttimetoexpectcladdamageandreleaseoffissionproductstotheprimarycoolant.TheLOCAanalysisperformedtodeterminethepeakcladtemperatureandcladoxidationdoesnotpredictthefissionproductreleasesincethe10CFR100offsitedoseanalysismustbeperformedusingthereleasesspecifiedinRegulatoryGuide1.3.However,perNUREG-1228,thefuel6fissionproductreleasefromtheDBALOCAwouldbesubstantiallylessthanthatspecifiedinRegulatoryGuide1.3.Forexample,iffuelcladtemperatureismaintainedbetween1300Fand2100F,NUREG-12286assumes2percentof.theiodineinthecoreisreleased.ThisvalueisbasedonestimatedgapreleasevaluesderivedinWASH-1400for7situationsofcoredegradationwithcladdingfailure.'hepositionofNUREG-0737isthat50percentofthecoreiodineistransferedtotheprimarycoolant.IfthepostulatedcoredamageislimitedtocladdingfailureandtheguidelinesofNUREG-1228areapplied,theradiationlevelswithinthereactorbuildingduetoactivitywithintheprimarycoolantcouldbereducedbyanorderofmagnitude.However,evenatthereducedradiationlevelsitisuncertainwhetheraccesstotheRHRvalvesispossiblewhileremainingwithinthepost-accidentoperationdoseratecriteriaofNUREG-0737.Analysisofthesourcetermexpectedfromcladfailureandthedecayfactorwouldhavetobeperformedtodetermineradiationlevelsforthisscenario.ConclusionsontheaccessibilityofRHRvalvescouldthenbedrawn.

Page13Again,considerationmustbegiventotheabilitytoprovidelongtermcoolingofthecontainment.IfRHRloopAcouldbeplacedintoRHRfuelpoolcoolingassistmode<RHRloopBwouldberequiredforreactor/containmentdecayheatremoval.SincethesinglefailurehasalreadybeenpostulatedfortheLPCIinjectionvalve,RHRloopBwouldbeavailableforcontainmentspray.CaseCofthelongtermcoolinganalysisin-PSARsection6.2.1.1.3.3.1.6boundsthisscenario.3,44~SU@El&lIfaLOCAispostulatedwhichproducescoredegradationandfissionproductrelease,thevalvesrequiredtobemanuallyopenedtoalignRHRinthefuelpoolcoolingmodeandESWforfuelpoolmakeupwillbeinaccessibleunlesstheextentofcoredamageissmall.Analysisdoesnotcurrentlyexisttoquantifywhat"small"is.TheplantshieldinganalysisinPSARChapter18predictsLOCAradiationlevelswhicharetoohightopermitaccesstotheRHRvalvesintimetopreventfuelpoolboilingwiththespentfuelpooldesignheatload.Although,fuelpoolboilingisanalyzedinAppendix9AoftheFSARforoffsitedosereleases,analysisoftheconsequencesonreactorsafetycouldnotbefound.Itisnotsufficienttomerelymakeupthewaterevaporatedfromthepoolsurface.Thismodeofoperationusesthereactorbuildingandrefuelingfloorasaheatsinkforthespentfueldecayheatandreservoirforthecondensate.Indoingso,anenvironmentisimposedontheplantforwhichitisnotanalyzed.ItisnotcertainifrealignmentofRHRloopAtofuelpoolcoolingmodewillleavesufficientECCSequipmenttoprovidelongtermcontainmentheatremovalasanalyzedinFSARChapter6.2..Further'valuationofthisissueiswarranted'i:~"~~"

Page143.5Event45:LOCA-LOOPWithFuelFailureTheLOCA-LOOpwithfuelfailurecausesthesameconcernsastheLOCAwithfuelfailure.TheradiationlevelscurrentlyanalyzedintheroomswhereoperatoraccessisrequiredtomanuallyalignRHRfuelpoolcoolingassistaretoohightoallowtherequiredaction.Sinceoperators'haveatleast19hourstoestablishRHRfuelpoolcoolingassistbeforepoolboiling,shorttermrecoveryfromtheLOCAisnotanissud.However,theeffectofremovingaloopofRHRfromthelongtermLOCArecoveryandtheadditionalimpactoftheLOOPonequipmentavailabilityshouldbeevaluated.3.6Event%6:LossofFPCWithPullCoreOffload3.6.1EmerencHeatLoadIfthefullcoreoffloadproducestheemergencyheatload(EHL)onthespentfuelpoolasdescribedinPSARChapter9.1>thenRHR.fuel.poolcoolingisrequiredtoremovetheheatloadonthepool.Inthissituation,RHRwouldbealignedinthefuelpoolcoolingconfigurationandsafetyismaintained.Sinceallofthefuelisoffloadedfromthereactorvessel,RHRisnotrequiredforcorecoolinganduseoftheRHRequipmentforfuelpoolcoolingisthepriority.3.6.2MaximumNormalHeatLoadIfthefullcoreisoffloadedforrefuelingwithdecayheatloadsatcurrentlevels<FPChassufficientcapacitytoadequatelycoolthefuelpool.TechncicalSpecificationsforrefuelingoperations(3.9.11)requireRHRshutdowncoolingbeoperablewhenirradiatedfuelisin~thereactorvessel.Withafullcoreoffload,applicabilityofthisrequirementisremovedandbothloopsofRHRmaybeinoperable.If Page15FPCislost,operatorshaveatleast19hourstogetaloopofRHR(onepumpandheatexchanger)intoserviceforfuelpoolcooling.Nineteenhoursisthetimetoboilwiththemaximumnormalheatload2.TheemergencyheatloadneednotbeconsideredinthisscenariosincealesserheatloadwhichnormalFPCcouldcoolwaspostulated.0OffnormalprocedureON-135-001providesoperatorswithactionsfordealingwithalossofspentfuelpoolcooling.TheyarefirstinstructedtooperateRHRinthefuelpoolcoolingassistmodeifavailable.Zfallmeansofcoolingarelost,theprocedureinstructstheoperatorsto"ALLOWwaterinFuelPooltoboil",andprovidesacautionthatevacuationoftherefuelfloormaybecomenecessaryduetoincreasingradiationlevels.Anoteisalsoincludedwhichinformstheoperatorthatboilingshouldnotoccurbefore25hoursafterlossofcooling.Themajorconcernwiththiseventisradiationreleaseduetotheboilingfuelpool.Sincethecoreis,offloaded,degradationofequipmentinthereactorbuildingduetothesevereenvironmentimposedbytheheat,moisture,.andradiationreleasedfrom.thefuelpool.isnotaconcernprovidedamakeupwatersourcecanbemaintainedtothefuelpool.FSARAppendix9Aanalyzestheconsequencesofaboilingfuelpoolandfindsthattheoffsitereleasesarewithin10CFR100limits.Anotherconcernistheeffectontheequipmentoftheotherunitwhichifnotalsoinrefueling,mayneedtorespondtoaLOCA.ALOCAontheoperatingunitwouldinitiaterecircualtionwithZoneIZZandtheLOCAunit'sairspace.TheeffectsoftheboilingfuelpoolcouldthenbeimposedontheLOCAunitandcreateequipmentqualificationandoperabilityquestions.%a)r~~

Page163.6.3~SuauaaeIfbothloopsofRHRarerenderedinoperableduringrefuelingwithafullcoreoffload,theplantisnotplacedinanGCO.However,alossofFPCwouldrequirealoopofRHRandRHRservicewaterbeplacedbackinserviceforRHRfuelpoolcoolingassistbeforethefuelpoolboils.Iffuelpoolboilingoccursononeunit,equipmentdegradationontheotherunitcouldresultandplacetheplantinanunanalyzedcondition.

Page174.0RecommendationsThissectionprovidesseveralactionswhicharerecommendedtoprovideabetterunderstandingoftheconsequencesofalossoffuelpoolcoolingandprovideOperationswithguidanceonoperatorresponsetotheevent.1)ALOCAwhichresultsincoredegradationandreleasesofradio-activitytotheprimarycoolantisaneventwhichalso)eporadizestheability'ocoolthespentfuelpoolwithsystemscurrentlyintendedforthatfunction.IfoperatorsarerequiredtoimplementRHRfuelpoolcoolingduringaLOCA,analysisiswarrantedtodeterminewhatdoserateswouldbeencounteredtoaccesstheRHRvalvesforarangeofdegradedcoreconditions.WiththisinformationitwouldbepossibletodetermineifalignmentofRHRinthefuelpoolcoolingmodeisfeasibleduringaLOCAwherecoredamageispostulated.2)APLEAshouldbeperformedtodetermingifalignmentof,RHRinthefuelpoolcoolingmodeduring,aLOCA(orpost-LOCA)wouldplacetheplantinanunanalyzedconditionwithrespecttolongtermpost-LOCAcontainmentheatremoval.OperatoractionshouldbedevelopedtorespondtoalossoffuelpoolcoolingwithaLOCA.3)Ifnon~equipmentisassumedunavailableduringaLOCA,thenspentfuelpooltemperatureandlevelindicationislost.Therefore,itwouldbeprudenttoprovidetheoperatorswiththeanticipatedtimetofuelpoolboilingonlossoffuelpoolcoolingonacyclespecificbasis.Thiswouldallowmaximumtimeforsourcetermdecaypriortorequiredaccesstohighradiationzones.4)ThepreferredresponsetolossofFPCistoestablishanalternativemethodofdecayheatremovalsuch,thatthe,totalenergydoesnotgettransferredtotheZoneI,II<andIIIatmosphere.Otherwise,thekconsequencesoffuelpoolboilingontheplant'sabilitytosafely Page18shutdownshouldbeanalyzed.OnealternativetobeconsiderediscrosstyingtheUnitland2fuelpoolsbyfloodingtheshippingcaskstoragepitandremovingthegatestobothfuelpools.ThenbyinitiatingRHRfuelpoolcoolingassistonthenon-LOCAunit;coolingcouldbeprovidedtobothpools.FurtherevaluationofthisalternativeshouldaddresswhetherpowerwouldbeavailabletotheoverheadcranetoremovethegatesinaLOCAorLOOPscenario,theabilityofRHRfuelpoolcoolingassisttocoolbothpools>sourcesofwatertofloodthecaskpit,andallowableoperatorresponsetimetoinitiatethisprocedure.

Page195.0ConclusionsFollowingisasummaryofthemajorobservationsandconclusionsresultingfromtheevaluationsperformedtocompilethisreport.1)InaLOCAcondition,postulatedpipebreaksandsinglefailurescandisableenoughRHRequipmentthatoperators,maynotbeabletoalignRHRLoopA'forfuelpoolcoolingassistandstillmaintainadequatecoreandcontainmentheatremoval.Currently,Operationshasnoclearinstructionsonhowtohandlethissituationandwouldlikelybehesitant"toremoveequipmentfromcore/containmentcoolingservicefollowingaLOCA.Whilealternatesh'utdowncoolingandothermeansofdecayheatremovalmay-exist,theemergencyoperatingprocedurescontainnoinstructionsdirectingtheoperatorstoredirectECCSequipmenttospentfuelpoolcoolingservice.RemovingallRHRpumpsfromeitherLPCIorcontainmentspraydutywouldplacetheplantinanunanalyzedconditionforlongtermpost-LOCAcooling.2)TwooftheRHRvalvesrequiredtomanuallyalignRHRfuelpoolcoolingassistareinaroomwhichcontainsmuchoftheRHRLoopApiping.Inordertoaccesthevalves,operatorswouldbeinthedirectlineofsiteandincloseproximitytoRHRpipingcontainingprimarycoolant.ALOCAwhichproducescoredegradationandfissionproductreleasewillmaketheRHRvalvesinaccessibleduetothesourcetermfromtheprimarycoolant.Decayofthissourcetermisnotexpectedtobesufficientenoughtoallowaccesstothevalvesbeforethepredictedtimetofuelpoolboiling.3)Ifthefuelpoolwasallowedtoboil,moistureandenergyreleasedtothereactorbuildingduringaLOCAwouldcreateasevereenvironmentforwhichmuchofthesafety-gradeequipmentmaynotbequalified.Thiswouldputtheplantinanunanalyzedcondition.

Page204)FuelpoolmonitoringequipmentislocatedonpanelOC211ontherefuelingfloor.Theinstrumentationisnon-lEbutispoweredoffofthedieselgenerators.Thenon-1Eequipmentisnotqualifiedtobeoperableinanaccidentcondition.Therefore<thetroublealarminthecontrolroomcannotbereliedon.Accesstotherefuelingfloorisrequiredtomonitorfuelpoolconditions.5)LossofFPCduringrefuelingwithafullcoreoffloadisaconcernifbothRHRloopsareinoperable.RHRequipmentmustbeplacedbackintoservicequicklyenoughtocoolthefuelpoolbeforeboilingoccurs.AboilingfuelpoolontherefuelingunitalongwithaLOCAontheotherunitcausesequipmentqualificationandoperabilityconcernsontheLOCAunit.6)Off-normalprocedureON-149-001notesthatoperatorshave25hoursbeforefuelpoolboilingoccursonalossofFPC,andinstructsthemtoinitateRHRfuelpoolcoolingassistifavailable.Otherwise<theoperatorsaretoldtoallowthefuelpooltoboilandprovidemakeup.

Page216.0References1)BechtelPowerCorporationDrawingE10-1,"SingleLineMeteraRelayDiagram125VDC,250VDC,120VACSystemsUnits1a2",Revision18.2)PennsylvaniaPoweraLightCo.CalculationM-FPC-009Revision0,"SpentFuelPoolBoilingAnalysis".3)PennsylvaniaPoweraLightCo.ProcedureEP-ZP-055Revision0,"PostAccidentResponsetoLossofReactorBldgHVAC(ReactorBldgNon-1EElectricalLoadShed)".4)U.S.AtomicEnergyCommisionRegulatoryGuide1.3,Revision2,"AssumptionsUsedForEvaluatingThePotentialRadiologicalConsequencesofaLossofCoolantAccidentforBoilingWaterReactors",June1974.5)U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission,NUREG-0737,"ClarificationofTMZActionPlanRequirements"<November1980.6)U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission,NUREG-01228,"SourceTermEstimationDuringZncidentResponsetoSevereNuclearPowerPlantAccidents">October1988.7)U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission,WASH-1400(NUREG-75/014),"ReactorSafetyStudy:AnAssessmemntofAccidentRisksinU.S.CommercialNuclearPowerPlants",October1975.

~~~SeptemberI,1992GeorgeT.JonesA6-2SUSQUEHANNASTEAMELECTRICSTATIONREVIEWOFFUELPOOLCOOLINGPI-788FiA

Reference:

EDR-G20020.Ihavecompletedareviewoftheconcernsovertheadequacyoffuelpoolc'oolingandtheconsequencesoffuelpoolboilingatSusquehannabroughtaboutbythereferencedEDR.Theintentofthereviewistodeterminetheconsequencesofoff-normalandaccidenteventsontheabilitytomaintainfuelpoolcooling,andtoevaluatethesafetyimplicationsofalossoffuelpoolcooling.ThereviewisnotanevaluationofthelicensingordesignbasisoffuelpoolstorageandcoolingatSusquehanna.Attachedisareportwhichdocumentsmyevaluationandfindings.ItismyopinionthatfurtherevaluationoftheconcernsdiscussedinthereferencedEDRandmy'reportarewarrantedtoassurespentfuelstorageatSusquehannadoesnotreduceplantsafety.Section4.0ofthereportprovidesrecommendationsandSection5.0detailsmyconclusions.Providedbelowisasummaryoftheseconclusions.I)TheuseofRHRinthefuelpoolcoolingassistmode,postLOCA,occupiesECCSequipmentwhichisaccountedforinthelongtermcoolinganalysisofFSARChapter6.2.IbelievepostulatedbreakandsinglefailurecombinationsexistwhereRHRequipmentisneededforcore/containmentcoolingtoremainwithintheanalyzedconditionsoftheFSAR.2)ALOCAwhichresultsincoredegradationandfissionproductreleasewillmaketheRHRvalvesrequiredformanualalignmentofRHRfuelpoolcoolingassistinaccessible.Thiscombinedwithalossofnormalfuelpoolcoolingwillleadtofuelpoolboilinggivensufficientspentfueldecayheat.3)Ifthefuelpoolwasallowedtoboil,moistureandenergyreleasetothereactorbuildingduringaLOCAwouldcreateasevereenvironmentforwhichthesafety-gradeequipmentmaynotbequalified.DegradationoftheiodineremovalefficiencyoftheSGTScharcoalbedsduetomoisturecarry-overcouldeffectoff-sitereleasecalculations.4)Thefuelpooltroublealarminthecontrolroomcannotbecountedonforreliableindication.Accesstotherefuelingfloorisrequiredtomonitorfuelpoolconditions.5)Lossoffuelpoolcoolingduringrefuelingwithafull'oreoff-loadisaconcernsincebyTechnicalSpecifications,bothRHRloopsmaybeinoperable'.AboilingfuelpoolontherefuelingunitalongwithaLOCAontheotherunitcausesequipmentqualificationandoperabilityconcernsontheLOCAunit.

G.T.JonesPage2SeptemberI,1992PLI-72288IfalargebreakLOCAoccurredatSusquehanna,Iamconfidentthatourcurrentprocedures,equipment,andpracticeswouldmaintaintheplantinasafecondition.However,combinedwithalossoffuelpoolcooling,theoperatorswouldbeputinapositionwheretheywouldberequiredtomakedecisionsonremovingECCSequipmentfromcontainment/corecoolingservicetocoolthefuelpool.Itismyopinion.thattheseevaluationsneedtobedonebeforehandsothatmethodsarein'placetohandlethesituationffitarises.FromtheresearchIhavedoneoverthepastseveralweeks,IhavefoundthattherearemanyissueswhichwarrantamoredetailedevaluationthanIwas.capableofinthisshorttime.Ihavetriedtocapturethemajorissuesandprovideaquickassessmentofeach.KevinM.BrinckmanAttachment'C:J.E.AgnewF.G.Butler'.G.ByramM.H.CrowthersG.D.GogatesG.J.KuczynskiD.A.LochbaumS.M.HausmanD.C.PrevatteG.D.MillerJ.R.MiltenbergerM.R.MjaatvedtC.A.MyersJ.G.ReflingT.J.SweeneyJ.A.ZolaNuclearRecordsA6-3w/aA6-3w/aA6-Iw/aA6-3w/aSSESw/aSSESw/aEnerconw/aA6-2w/aA6-3w/aA6-3w/aA6-Iw/aA6-3w/aA2-4w/aA6-3w/aSSESw/aA6-3w/aA6-2w/a Attachment16PP8LMemofromJ.R.MiltenbergertoG.T.Jones,"SpentFuelPoolCooling",September9,1992(PLI-72367)Note:ThismemowaspreparedbythePP&LManageroftheNuclearSafetyAssuranceGroupattherequestofthePP8LManagerofNuclearPlantEngineering.ThememoacknowledgestheconcernsinEDRG20020needtoberesolvedandsuggeststhatEngineeringgobeyondtheEDRconcernsandconductanin-depthdesignreviewofspentfuelpoolcoolingoperations.Bythisdate,-theManagerofNuclearPlantEngineeringhadtwo(2)independent,in-houseevaluationsoftheconcernsraisedinEORG20020whichdidnotrefutetheprimarysafetyissuesintheEDR.

,September9,1992G'.JonesA5-2TM-N<</oAd1<</oSSES<</oAZ-4<</oSSKSw/o'QRK/~cc:H.M.KefserR.G.ByraaH.G.stanleyC.A.NyersA.J.OomfnguezMIWtSOIwwNISuSqvEHANNASTaea.ZCTR1CSTATioNSPENTFUKl.PGQLCOOLlNGCeorga:OnAugust19yourequestedthatIprovideyaucopiesofthe<<arkthatNSAGhasdanean'thefuelpoolcoolingissueandthatIstateprecise'lywhatmyconcernsareregardingthefuelpoolcoolfngsystemanditsemployment.lfyconcernsandissuesare<<sfolio<<s:1.Thecampanydoesnothaveanofficialcalculationofthedecayheatloadstobeexpectedunderoutagecandftions.Acalculationprospectedaheadforseveralyearsfsneededforoutageplannfng.Theprospectionfsnecessarytoaccountfortheaccumulat1anaffuelinthepaal.2.Thestationfsvulnerabletolossofdecayheatremovalcapabi11tyduringtheservice<<<<teroutageperiodofarefuel1ngoutage.Duringthist<me<<erelyupontheoperatingunitspentfuelpoolcoolingsystemfardecayheatremoval.8ackupmethodsofdecayheatremovalare:1)useafanOperatingVnftRHRsystemintheFuelPoolCaolingAssistNodeandR)ba11ing.Neitherbackupmethod1s'attractive.aBoiling,althoughsafe,isnataviablealternativeforpolftfcalreasons.3.oVseafanRHRsystemfrmstheoperatingunitinthefuelpoolcoolingassistmodeisnotattractiveforoperationalreasans.oRHRhasnotbeentestedinthefuelpoolcaal1ngassistmade.HSAGhasarguedandwillcontfnuetoarguethattheriskisacceptable.Ha<<ever,astudyshauldbemadetodetermfne<<hetheramareviablemethodofbackupdecayheatremovalduringserviceeaterautagesisfeasible.CalculationsshouldbemadeaftheradioactiveeffectsoflossoFwaterfreethespentfuelpool.Necurrentlydonatknowtheeffectsonthepa<<erplantoruponthepublic.Also,<<edonathaveaprocedureinplacedealingwiththeradfolag1calconsequencesoflosingwaterfromthespentfuelpool.

lG-23-189218:83V.sara;'Hr.8.T.JonesPage2September4,1992PL)-j2361~~4.Indicationsareneededtoen>>bletheoperatorsfnthecontrolroomtodirectlymonitorconditionsinthespentfuelpoolsundernormaloperatingconditionsandundercasualtyconditions.TheaboveitemsarebaseduponabodyofworkdonebyNSAGovertheyears.TheyarealsobaseduuonreviewofNVNRC91-05NIDKLINKSFORINDUSTRYACTIONSTOASSESSSNlfNNNANAtlENENTanduponaurpartfcfpatfonfnvariousindustryIneetfngs-thelatestofwhichwastheIHPQOutagehen>>ger/OperationsNanagertfeetfngfnAugust92.Theypara1'le'Isaeibutnata'lloftheconcernsraisedbyDanPrevatteandDaveLochbaut>>fnthefrpaper,SAFETYCONSKOUENCKSOFABOILINGSPENTFUELPOOLATTHKSUSqUEHANHASTENfKLKCTRIGSTATION.IbelievethatalloftheNSAGitemscanbeaddressedduringtheprocessofresolvfnatheKngfneeringDiscrepancyReportandsubsequentcorrespondencesubaftta9byPrevatteandLochbaui.IhaveattachedtherelevantNSAtlReportsandcorrespondence.Thefo1lowfngsectionsprovidesu>>i>>riesoftheNSAl:Reportsandothe~pertfnantdocumentsandsomesupportingarguments.).0NSACREPORTS1.)Report13-84,Implfcat1onsofLossofMaterframtheSpentFuelPoolDuetoReactorCavityFailureorOtherCauses.Thisrepa~twasueneratedfnresponsetotheHaddauSickCavitySealFailure.Thema3arrecoim>>endatfonshavebeen1mplementedandHSAGconsidersthereporttohavebeenclosed.Thefollowingfteeswarenot,daneandshau1dbereconsidered:5.2.1Theimplicationsoflassofspentfuelpoolleveluponradiationshieldingbethoraugh1yanalyzed.ThisanalysisbeaddedtotheFSAR.5.2.3Provideadditionalfnstreaentsthatwouldf>>tprovetheoperator>sabilitytorespondtoalossot'evelfrat>>thespentfuelpool.l.evel,temperatureandradiationfnstr~ntsshouldbeconsidered.TheessenceofbothoftheaboverecaeiaendatfonswasrepeatedinHSAGReport1-88.Seebe1aw,5.2.4Insta'l1awatertightdoorbetweenthereactorbuildingsumproN>>andthed1vfsfonIIcaresprayroam.

10-23-'99216-84I~U4i'1"S~'4~':.';Hr,'.T.Jones.Page'.3September0,1992PLI-723614I~~~1.21.3NPEdfdanana'lys1sandconcludedthatthertskofflaodfngdfdnatwarrantinstallationofadoortoprotectthe91vfsfonIIcaresprayroaal(Pl.I-46640ofAugustI,1986).ThiswasnotpursuedfurtherbyHSAG.AstudywasdanebycompetentelgfneersandHSAGacceptedtheresults.TheissuemaybeworthreconsideringfnlightofthePrevatteconcern.Report2-86,AnalysisofOperationsMfthPatantfalforDrainingtheReactarVessel.ThisreportwasafollowontaReport13-84.ItanalyzedtheTechnicalSpecfffcatfons,potentialdrainagepathsandindustryevents.Itreceenendedthatan1nstructfonbawrfttendeiin1ngOperationswithPotential'orOra1nfngtheReactorVessel.AQ-gA-326,OperationswithPotentialforDrainingtheReactorVassal/Cavity,waswrittenandwantthroughe1ghtrevisions.ItxasreissuedonMarch3D.I992asOP-AO-326.Itfsact1velyuseddurfngoutageplanningandexecution.TherearenaopenliSACissues.Report,1-88,InadvertentOrafnfngof'NaterfromtheSpentFuelPoo'lsonSeptember12,1987viatheCaskStoragePft.Thiswasaresponsetoadrainagefncfd!nt.TheeventofSeptember12,1987uncoveredavulnerabilitytofuelpooldrainagethathadnotbeencansideredinNSAGReports13-S4and2-86.Hfscellaneouspragramuatfcrecaslaendatfonswereimplementedincludingapolicythatthegatesw111bekeptinstalledasmuchaspossible.Thispolicy,bytheway,hasbeenfollowedfafthfu11y.Tworecoaeendatfonsregardingthephysicalinstallationrema1nopen.6.1.3Carrecttheproblemswiththefuelpoolcoolingsystemalarms.Theseinclude:~~3.5.3.lb.TheUnit2sideoftheDC211panelhasnoreflashcapability.(DC2111sthelacalfuelpoolcoalfngpanel.)Upgradethefnfonatfanconcerningthefuelpoalsandfuelpoolcoolingsystemthatfsavailabletothecontrolroamoperator.residertheengineeringworkrequestsubmittedbyOperationsmanagementthatcallsforthecriticalparameterstobe<<adaavailabletatheoperators.

10-23-"99216-84V'Idb/l1!~~>4!;a,~,,~~=.;::.",.'"Nr;:.'Co.Te"Jones..Page4:'.September9,199K:PLI.,723Hh!~Recommendation3.5.3.4lsessentiallyarepeatofrecoamendation5.2.3ofReport13-84.ICisthesubjectofRSB~smemotoGTJdatedJune30.Copyattached.AChirdrecommendationisofinterest.Itreadsasfollows:5,2.2AssesstheadequacyofthefuHpooldraininganalysisintheFSARconsideringtheconditioninwhichthecaskstorageitgatesareremoved.PrepareasafetyevaluationandOCFR50.59reviewbeforethegatesarerenaved,Considerthepossibilityofuncoveringspentfuelbydrain1ngandorsiphon1ngthecaskstoragepit.Thisrecommendationlsareattackontherecommendationforsuchanana1ysisinReport13-Sh.ThesafetyevaluationwaswritCenandacceptedbythePORCandbytheNC(PLI-5453I).Itookissuewiththe,fact,thattheshinefromthespentfuelpoolwasnotaddressedandwroteamemotoayers(dated55arch10,1988)strong1yreconsendingthatashineanalysisbedone.(Seeattached.)However,noactionwastaken.Iclosedthe1tem.TherewasnoquestioninmymindthatCheevolutionissafeandotherChantheshinequestion,whichseemedtobothenoonebutme,thesafetyevaluationansweredthemail.Report4-90,OutagePlanninginformat)on.TheintentofthisreportwastoconsolidatetheknowledgegainedbyHSAGduringthecourseofreviewingoutagesafety.Theprincipa1userwasintendedtobeNSAG.However,theinformat1onwasmadeava11abletoeveryoneconcernedwithoutageplanning.Thevariousheatremovalpaths,includingspentfuelpoolcoo11ng,havebeenanalyzedandthecapabilitiesand11aitationsofeachhavebean11sted.Everyeffortwasmadetocitedesignbasereferences,focaltestresultsandapprovedcalculations.Nennocalculationsexisted,NSAQdidtheirown.Adetailedanalysishasbeenmadeforeachmilestoneafanoutagewithrespecttodecayheatremoval.Atablehasbeendevelopedshowingtherequirementsforeachcondition,theprimaryandChebackupcool1ng-methodsavailable.AdiscussionoftheservicewaterouCageandtheimp'llcationsofusingthespentfuelpoolcoolingsystemslsfoundonpages28-25.Thecapabilitiesofthespentfua1poolcoolingsystemsarefoundinhppendixC.Therearenoreceeendationsperse.TheprincipalproblemwithChereportisthatthedesignheatloadsareoutofdate.htthetimethereportwaswrittenHPEdidnothaveanapprovedheatloadcalculaCion.Theheatloadfiguresweretakenfroma 18-?.5-199?18:ASI'r.C.TiJonesPage5S<<ptaiber9,1992PLI-12351~~calculatfonmadebyJackReflingfor8X8fuel.HSAGintendstoupdatethereport.Mehave'gainedknowledgesfncether<<portwaswritten,particularlyabouttheeff<<cpsofboflfng,andwehavefoundsomemfnorerrorsthatn<<<<4tobecorrected.Also,wewanttoincludeachapteroncontainment,whichwasnotreadywh<<nthereportwaspublfshed.TheprincipalobstacletoupgradingHSAG4-90istheabsenceofadefinitivedecayheatloadcalculatian.TheReflfngcalculationisaoodenoughapproxfmatfontopermitgeneraloutageplanning.However,tunderstatestheheatloads,partfcularlyfntheearlydaysofanoutageIwouldliketoupdateReport4-90.ItisusefultoNSAGandtootherplanningentitieswithinPPCL.Ithasbeendistr1butedtotheNRC,toINPOandtointerestedpart1esintheindustry.IthasbeencitedbyboththeNRCandbyINPOasevidenceofPPAL<sleadershipintheoutagestanagementfield.IwasinvitedtoaddresstherecentINPOOutage/Operatfonstfanagers~HeetfnglargelybecauseIhadgoneoverthisreportindeta11withtheINPOOutagefolkslastswor.Idonot1ntandtoupdatether<<portuntilIhaveacalculationsignedbytheappropriateangfn<<<<ringauthorityfnhand.NSAGtsintent1onIsnottodooriginalangfnearfngwork.R<<port4-90consolfdatesexistingknowledgeinaforethatisusefultopersonsplanningandreviewingoutagesafety.Iwanttobesurethatanyinferencesfn4-90arebas<<duponoff1cialPPQ.heatloadcalculations.NSAG,afcourse,isawarethatacalculationfsdonebyNuclearFuelsbeforeeachoutage.SuchacalculationwasusedasthebasisforNSAGReport5-90,ANALYSISOFALTERNATESHUTNNNCOOLINO.However,thecompanydoesnothaveanofficialcalculationofthedecayheatloadstobeexpectedunderoutageconditions.Astudypro)ect<<4aheadforseveralyears1sne<<dadforoutageplanning.~ly~~~~2.0NUNRC91-06Asyouknow,HNheadedaNUNARCtaskforcetoaddressoutage1ssuesTheresultwasNNfARC91-06,GVIOELINKSFORINUSTRYACTIONSTOASSESSSWTDOXNNNAGENENT.HNARC91-06is,fnlejudgment,anexcellentpieceofworkand1tb<<hoovesustofmpl<<a<<ntitexp<<dftiously.NSAQ.hasreviewedthestatusofourpol1ciesv1s-a-visNNARC91-06.Thefindingfsthatweareingeneralcomp)fancewiththeguidelines.However,alargenumberofourpoliciesan4practicesarenotcapturedindirectives.Also,anumberoftheissuesarenotwellcoveredbyourprocedures.OetaflsarefoundfnPLIS-39784ofJuly24,1992.%NARC91<<06containsthreesectionswhfcharepertfnanttothisdiscussion.Theyares lO-23-'S9216:86P"..:.;-.:Nr..Q.T;JonesPage6September9,1992PL'l-72367I-4.1.ILossofOecayHeatRoloval4.1.3LossofSpentFuelPoolCoolingI.2.5ReactorCavitySealFailureIwillsayafewwordsabouteach.2.1LossofDecayHeatReeovalTheguidelinereadsasfollows:AprocedureshouldbeestablishedtoaddressthelossofnormalOHRcapabilityduringshutdownconditions.Theprocedureshouldprioritizethealternatecoolingmethodsavailable(e.gqrav1tyfeedandbleed,lowpressurepumpfeedandbleed,highpressurepumpbleedandfeeds.refluxcooling,etc.)andthatwouldbeemployedforagivensetoi'onditionsthatareplannedfortheoutage.Theprocedureshouldhaveasoundtechnicalbasisthatincludesthefollowing:oinitialmagnitudeofdecayheatotioetoboilingotimetocoreuncoveryoinitialRCSwaterinventorycondition.....oRCSconfigurat1onsI~~~~~~~~~TheSSESprocedureforalternatedecayheatraovalisDH-149-00I,l.OSSDFRHR.SHUTDNNCOOLINQNDE,Th1sprocedurewasinpartbaseduponNSAGReports,2-90,4-90and6-90.Itwasrecentlyrev1ewedbyEngineeringandfoundtobeacceptab1e{PL!-71670ofJune19,1992).NSAQagreesthatN-149-001istechnicallycorrect.Thenecessary1nformationhasbeenincludedtoenableOperatorstoexecutethevariousheatremovalpaths.However,ourreviewshowedthattheproceduredoesnotref1ectalloftheguidanceofNNRC91-06.Itneedstobeupdatedtoincludethe1nitialmagnitudeofdecayheat,timetoboiling,capab111tiesofthevariousheatreIOValoathS,OtC.HuChOftheneCeSSaryinfarmatiOn1SfOundinNSAQRepOrt4-90,{NONAGEPLAHNlKGIKFDRNTIN.HoweverNSAGl-90isbasedonadecayheatcalculationassuming8X8fuel.Thiscalculationneedstobeupdatedto~reflectcurrentconditions,InordertoproperlyimplementNUHARC91-06adecayheatcalculationpro)ectedaheadforseveralyearsisneededfor1nputintoOH-li9-001.

18-23>>i993i8:87HpG.ToJonesPage7September9,1992PLl723672.2LassafSpentFuelPoolCoo1$ngThegu1del1nestates:Hanyut1llt1>>shavechosentooff-loadih>>caretothespentfuelpool(SFP}duringthe1rrefuelingautages.Th1spracttceshfftsdecayneatremovalrequ1reeentsfromtheRCStothesFP.Aneventthatresults1nthelassafSFPcool1ngmayhavethesamundeslrah1eeff>>ctsasalossofDHReventtfappropr1atecompensatorymeasuresarenottaken.Gu(d>>lan>>sI)Theautag>>scheduleshouldprov1deaDEFENSE?NDEPTHceaaensuratew1thther1skassociatedw(thlossofSFPcool1ng..2)Aprocedureshouldbeestabl1shedforrespons>>toalossofSFPcaol1ngeven'to2.2.1PracedureMewil1constdertheprocedurefirst.ON-135-001,LOSSOFFllKLPOOLCOOLIN/COOLANTINENTORYprov1desguidanceonhawtorestor>>fuelpoolcooling1ntheeventofvar1auscasua'lt1>>s.Iffuelpoolcao11npcannatber>>stored,theoptionsar>>toplaceRHR1ntheFuelPoolCaol1ngres1stNod>>1naccordancewithOP>>lh9-003,RHROPERATIONINFUELPOOLCOOt.NGASSISTortaa11ovtheiaoltobatl.Theprocedurestatesthatbofl1ngshau1dnatoccurbefore25fioursafterlassofcool1ngand<tspecff1>>svar1ousmethodsofaddingwater.Theproceduredoesnotd1scusscrossconnect1ngthefuelpaolsv1athecaskstoragepitandremov1ngtheheatus1ngtheotherun$tfuelpoolcanl1ngsystem.Heatcanb>>removedbyforcedcanvecUan(Theprocedure1s1nOP-135-001.}orbynaturalcanvect1on.Cool1ngbynaturalconvect)anwasdoneforan~1ghtdayper1addurknitheVnft22RIO.(SeaNSAGRepart4-90).It1salsaposs1bletocooltheunaffectedfuelpoolus1ngRHR1nfuelPaalCoo11ngAss1standremveheatfreatheaffectedpoolbynaturalconvect1anviathecaskstoragepit.Thismethod$snatdiscussed1nON-185-001.Insumaaryaviablearacedureaddr>>ssesthelassofspentfuelpoolcool1ng.Herer,alloftheleodbac'kupmethodsarenot1ncluded.2.2.2Defense1nDepth~Duringoutag>>olann1ngreviewsNSAGtakescreditforthefollox1ngmethodsafspentfuelpoo)cool1ng:I)Normalop>>rat(onafth>>outageun1tfuelpoolcool1ngsystem.

Io-ay3-:SBoy18:8>g,C.T.JonesPage8Septemberg,lgg2PLI-F23N'seofbothfuelpoolcoolingsystemsinparallel.Flowbetweenpoolsisbynaturalcanvectfonviathecaskstoragepit.ThiswastestedduringtheVnft21RIOnSeeNSAG4-N,CoolingbothfuelpoolsusingtheoperatingunitfuelpoolcoalfngsystemperOP-135-001.CoolingtheoutagefuelpaalusinganoutageunitRHRsysteminfuelpaalcoalingassist.CoolingiheoperatingfuelpoolusinganoperatingunitRHRsystem1nfuelpoolcoalingassistandcoolingtheoutageunitbynatura)convectionvfathecaskstoragepft.6)Soiling0ringrefuelingoutagesthestationroutinelyremovestheentirestationdyelosingheopa1guunitfuelpoolcaolingsystem.edsrvfcewateroutageandtoeleanthecaalingian1sthatthecarehasbeenoffloaean4ofservice.Inoeraoeetowers,theoutageunitfuelpoolcoolin9systemmustbedisabed.9a1.'Arationalizedoingthisbaseduponthefo)lawfngf1)PriortodisablingtheSMsystemwerunatestandprovethattheoperatingfuelpoolcooling'systemwf'llhandletheheatloa,etestresultsareapprovedbythePORC.2)TheappropriatePHshavebeendanetothefue1poolcaolingsystemspriortotheoutage.3)Theoperatingfuelpaolcoolingsystemcanholdfuelpooltemperaturebelow200'FHthoneheatexchangerautofservce.4)TheoperatingunitRHRsystemcanbeusedfnthefuelpoolcoolingassfstmodeifnecessary'tacoolthepool.caseba111wfl'laccur.Ifthishappenstherewfl)gtthtattonandnahaTmfuleffectuponbenos1gnificantdamageoesthepublic.5)Ampletimeexiststoinitiatecorrectiveaction.TheFSARstatesthatavet'lhourswfllelapsebeforeboflfngbegins.sstemsareoutofserviceforabout10daysnthisperiodthebackupcoolingmethodsareunitRHhLossinfuelpooluooiinuassistorhoi'iinu.f,n,,fth,,th,n,ve.SoilfnviolatestheTechnicalSp~fifcationsuninhahitahfu.Useopthaoparatinuunithuhandmakesthe815eleaonLcotheoperating~fta~itreu~sthehftsyntoneneededtosupportoperations.1liestakinatihouronecapabilityafthesaeys Hr.G,T.JonesPage9September0,1992PLI~72367Apointtoconsider1sthatatSSEStheRHRsystemhasneverbeenfullytestedinthefuelpoolcoolfnoassistmode.Ouringthetestprogratsflowxasestablishedatabout2000gpe.Higherflowswerenotattainedbecausetheskfsssersurgetankkeptrunningdry.OP-149<05callsforamax1mumflowof6000gpminthefuelpoolcoolingass1stmode.RHRxasactuallyusedinthefuelpoolcoolingassistmodeatBrunswick1n1983.However,theywereunabletomaintainflawabove2000gpssbecauseathigherflowratesthepooloverflowed.hflowof2000gpsswillcarryawaytheheatloadduringservicewateroutageconditions.Fuelpoolcoolingflawisaboutl800gpmandthedeltaTswouldbesiailar.BasedupantheaboveIbelievethatastudyshouldbemadetodeterminewhetherwsoreviablemethodofbackupdecayheatremovaldur1ngservicexateroutagesisfeasible.3.0HRCInputOnAugust27GTJissuedPLI-72267taGlennMilleraddressingthePrevatte/Lochbauwconcern.Theletterstated,Therearetwenty-eightopenitetssresultingfrosNAGReviewofFuelPoolCooling.Theseneedtobeincludedinthisreview.IpresumethatthisstatementisbasedandimKennytsNemoofAugust25documentinghisconversationwithScottBarberandJimRaleighortheHRC.OnSeptember2AndreOaminguezdiscussedtheNSACitemswithScottBarber.Scottsu¹ssarizedhisconcernsasfollows')PPEi.hasreeva'iuatedtheseallivesfreafiveyearsreconeendedbythevendarto12yearsfarthelowerand24yearsfortheupper.2)t.ackoifuelpoolcoolinginstrumentatian)nthecantrolroots.3)Adequacyofoperatortraining.Isitadequate?Isitstillbe1ngdane?l)'Iheeffectsofradiationfallowingadraindowneventhavenotbeenaddressed.OolinguetdiscussedBarber>sconcernswithJoeZola,JimAgnewandHarkKfaatvedtlateronSeptember2.Theywillbeaddressed.AgnewandOeminguezplantodiscusstheitemswithBarberonOctoberS.Barber~sitem21sthesub)actofNSAG'sonlyoffic1alopenitemsinthespentfuelpoolarea,

}.0-23-"99816-89Pa11/1'}Q,,~~','",gp,'}t...w,~;r~~,~~'...~'Ir~\I~~V~IHr.Q.T.JonesPage]0Septeaber9,199?PL)-72367410CNCLVSIONSThfsnapar~aswfttenfnresponsetoyaurrequestChatIsunn}arfzetheftes}sralathetofue'IpaalcoolfngChaCareafcancerntoNSALThesenaryfsfoundfntheapenfn'gparagraph.Thesuccaedfngpagespravfdebackgroundandgustfffcatfan,1suagestadabovethattheHSASftemscanbeaddresseddurfngtheprocessafresobfngtheKDRsub}afttadby.PrevatteandLochbaui.Iln}usedalsalfketosugaestthatKngfneerfnggohayandresolvfngChespacfffcconcerns.Thefuelpoof'oolfngsysta}ssareavftalpartoftheSSESoutageprocess.Engfnaarfngshouldtakethfsopportunftytodoanfn<epthanalysfsofthefuelpaalcoolfngsftuatfonfncludfngrevfnrfngourIxfstfngpractfcasandprocedures.EnofnearfngshouldthenpravfdeChaCechnfcalfnforaatfonnecessarytofnEellfgantlyoperatethefuelpaolcoolfngca}aplexundernormalandupsetcondftfons.Veryrespectfully,Attac Attachment17PP8LLetterfromJamesE.,AgnewtoDavidA.Lochbaum,"EDRG20020,SpentFuelPoolDesignDiscrepancies",October7,1992(ET-0785)Note:ThislettertransmittedtheformalevaluationperformedbythePPSLEngineeringDiscrepancyManagementGroupforEDR620020.ThisevaluationdeterminestheissuesintheEDRtohaveminimalsafetysignificancewithnoaffectonplantoperabilityusingtechnicalreasonswhichcontradictthoseexpressedintheEDRandintheindependentPP8Lengineeringreport(Attachment15).

October7,1992PennsylvaniaPower&.LightCompanyTwoNorthNinthStreet~Allentown,PA18101-1179~215I774-5151Mr.DavidALochbauaEnerconServices,Inc4115WilliamPennHighwayOneFranklinCentreMurrysville,PA15668EngineeringDiscrepancyManagementGroupEDRG20020,SpentFuelPoolDesignDiscrepanciesPleasefindenclosedcompletedcopiesofthe'ScreeningEvaluation,ReportabilityEvaluation,andOperabilityEvaluationforthesubjectEngineeringDiscrepancyReport(EDR).Theevaluationresultsanddispositionaresummarizedherein:lmml1aaiiilmii*iiiiWdeterminedtobeminimal.However,thepriorityofimplementationhasbeenelevatedtoensurepromptresolutionofthediscrepancies.ireportable.However,IhavespecificallyrequestedanindependentreviewofreportabilitybyNuclearLicensing.iiiimpactontheoperationofSusquehannaSES.Thediscrepancyevaluationfunctionisconsideredacontinuousprocess.Are-evaluationoftheSafetySignificance(Screening),Reportability,and/orOperabilitystatuswillbeperformedatanystageofEDRprocessing,includingimplementation,asadditionalinformationbecomesavailable,inaccordancewiththeDiscrepancyManagementProgram.Ifyouhaveanycommentsorquestionsontheattached,pleasedonothesitatetocontactme.JamesE.Agnew(215)774-7777 cc:G.T.JonesG.D.MillerC.A.MyersEDRFileETMemoFileNRFileA6-2A6-3A2-4A6-3A6-3A6-2 Attachment18PP8LHemofromG.D.MillertoG.D.Hiller,"AssignmentofEDR",October7,1992(ET-0780)

GDMillerA6-3Date:10/07/92EngineeringDiscrepancyXanageaentGroupkssignILentofBDRThisistoassignyouEDRNo.G20020Rev.0forimplementationinaccordancewithEPM-QA-122,Revision3.

SUBJECT:

LOSSOFSPENTFUELPOOLCOOLINGEVENTDESIGNDISCREPANCIESACTIONITEM:Establishoriginaldesignbasisforfuelpoolcoolingsys,determineappropriatedesignbasisforspentfuelpoolcoolongsys,comparethedesignbasisEresolveasnecessaryINITIALUNITACTIONDATE:11/19/93(CycleU17}TheEDRCLOSUREDATE:.05/20/94ThePriorityClassificationis:gTheINITIALUNITACTIONDATEisforEDRswrittenagainstbothunitsandreflectsthedateandcycleforwhichactionisrequired.Allactivitiesassociatedwiththisissueforthatunitshallbecompletedbeforetheendofthecycle.(CycleU26)TheEDRCLOSUREDATEreflectsthedeadlineforcompleteEDRclosure,includinthedispositionofallrelatedactionsrequiredtoresolvethedeficiency.EnclosedisacopyofthesubjectEDRandcopiesoftheappropriateevaluations.PleaseensuretimelyimplementationofthisEDRandkeepmecurrentofdevelopmentsleadingtoEDRclosure.TheEDMGPlannerwillvisityourassignedengineer/planneronaroutinebasisforstatusupdating.Youwillbealertedatregularintervals(90,60,30and10daystoclosure),ifapplicable,toallowyoutimeforanorderlyimplementationoftheEDR.UponimplementationoftheEDR,pleasenotifyEDMGofcompletionofrequiredworkandofanydocumentationgenerated.DMillerAttachmentscc:JEAgnewMRMgaatvedtJAZolaDLochbaumDFMcGannEngrTechFile(JW)EDRFile(MSS)NRFileA6-3A6-3A6-3A6-3SSESA6-3A6-3A6-2w/ow/aw/ow/EDRformw/aw/ow/aw/a Attachaent19LetterfromDavidA.LochbaumandDonaldC.PrevattetoGeorgeT.Jones,"ReportabilityofBoilingSpentFuelPoolConcerns",October9,1992Note:Thisletterwashanddeliveredinameetingrequestedbytheauthors.TheauthorshadnotreceivedthePP&Lformalevaluations(Attachments17and3)forEDRG20020untilminutesbeforethemeeting.ThisletterdeclaredtheauthorsintentionstoreportthismattertotheNRCifPP&LdidnotproperlyevaluatetheconcernsbyNovember2,1992.OnJuly27,1992,theauthorshadescalatedtheirconcernstothePP&LManagerofNuclearPlantEngineering(Attachment8).Onthisdate,theauthorsescalatedtheirconcernstotheSeniorVP,Nuclear,theSSESPlantManager,and~amembersoftheSafetyReviewCommitteebycopyofthisletter.

GeorgeT.JonesPennsylvaniaPower&Light,CompanyTwoNorthNinthStreet,A6-2Allentom,PA18101-1179October9,2.992SUMECT~REPORTABZLZTYOPBOZLZNGPUELPOOLCONCERNS

DearMr.Jones:

OnApril16,1992,EngineeringDiscrepancyReportEDRG20020(Attachment1)wasinitiatedinaccordancewithPP&LengineeringprocedureEPM-QA-122bythetwosignatoriestothisletter,Mr.DavidA.LochbaumandMr.DonaldC.Prevatte,toaddressninenuclearsafetyconcernsrelatingtotheboilingspentfuelpooleventattheSusquehannaSteamElectricStation.Thisletterisbeingwrittentoformallyreiterateourbeliefthattheseconcernsareveryrealandverysignificantnuclearsafetyissues,andtoconveyourconcernthattheyarenotbeingaddressedinaccordancewitheithertheletterortheintentofPP&LproceduresandFederalregulations,andtoexpressourdeterminationthattheymustbeacknowledged,reported,andresolvedinamannercommensuratewiththeirsignificance.TheseconcernsdevelopedfromMr.Prevatte'sevaluationofthereactorbuildingventilationsystemsforpoweruprate,Mr.Lochbaum'sevaluationofthespentfuelpoolcoolingsystemforpoweruprate,andourtechnicalreviewsofeachother'swork.TheseconcernswereinitiallydocumentedinourmemodatedMarch19,1992tooursupervisor,Mr.MarkMjaatvedt(Attachment2).Mr.Mjaatvedtroutedthismemotohissupervisor,Mr.GlennMiller.OnApril15,1992,Mr.MjaatvedtdirectedustoinitiateanEDRbaseduponMr.Miller'sreviewofourmemo.ItwasnotuntilJune11or12,1992thattheEngineeringDiscrepancyManagementGroup(EDMG)engineer,Mr.JoeZola,contactedoneofus,Mr.Lochbaum,toreportthatfromhispreliminaryassessmentofEDRG20020,theconcernshadnosafetysignificance.Mr.Lochbaumindicatedatthattimethathesincerelyconsideredeachofthenineconcernstohaveadversenuclearsafetysignificancebothatthepresenttimeandinthefuture.Mr.ZolaarrangedameetingonJune18,1992todiscusstheconcerns.AttendeesatthismeetingwereMr.Zola,theEDMGsupervisorMr.JimAgnew,Mr.CharlieBrown,Mr.KevinBrowning,Mr.DavePai,andbothofus.Wefeltthemeetingwassuccessfulinthatthesystemengineers(Mr.BrownandMr.Browning)concededthatthespent.fuelpoolwouldboilfollowingreasonablescenarios withintheSSESdesignbases.Mr.Paireportedthatthestandbygastreatmentsystemwasnotdesignedfortheconditionsresultingfromaboilingspentfuelpoolandwouldisolateonhightemperature.WeissuedasupportingdocumentforEDRG20020onJune22,1992(Attachment3)providingadditionalinformationonthenineissues.ThisdocumentexplicitlystatedtheregulatoryrequirementswhicharenotbeingsatisfiedforeachofthenineconcernsinEDRG20020alongwiththeassociatedadversesafetyimplications.AnonsitemeetingwasheldonJuly8or9,1992todiscussEDRG20020.Welearnedabout.themeetingthedaybeforeandaskedtoattend,butthisrequestwasdenied.WeweretoldthatourpositionatthemeetingwouldberepresentedbytheEDMGengineer(Mr.Zola).BaseduponfeedbackfromMr.Mjaatvedt,Mr.ChrisBoschetti,andMr.paulWeaver,thismeetingwasnotproductive.AfterMr.Mjaatvedttoldusabouttheonsitemeeting,welookedattheEDMGfileonEDRG20020.OtherthantheEDRitself,theonlycontentsinthefilewereapagefromamemodatedApril23,1992(Attachment4)inwhichEDRG20020wasdeterminednottoaffectUnit1operabilitydueto"noapparentimpactonplant.DBDissue"andadraftscreeningworksheetforEDRG20020preparedbyMr.ArtWhite(Attachment5).Thescreeningworksheet,whichstated"thisdiscrepancyhasnobasisinfact"andotherblatantfalsehoods,convincedusthatEDRG20020wasbeingdismissedimproperly.WeprotestedimmediatelytoMr.Mjaatvedt,whopromisedtoconsultwithMr.AgnewonthestatusofEDRG20020.OnJuly10,1992,Mr.MillercametousandaskedifwehadproblemswiththeEDRprocessingeneralandEDRG20020inparticular.Afteradiscussionlastingseveralhoursinwhichweexpressedourstrongconcernwithboth,Mr.MillerpulledEDRG20020fromitsfileand"Verified"theidentifiedconcerns.Mr.MilleralsodirectedtheEDMGtoarrangeameetingwithallconcernedpartiestoreviewEDRG20020andobtainitsresolution.ThislargemeetingwasconductedonJuly15,1992.Wepreparedsupplementalinformationwhichwasdistributedatthismeeting(Attachment6).Thisinformationaddressedtheregulatoryrequirements,licensingrequirements,anddesignevolutionhistoryfortheitemsinEDRG20020.AttendeesatthismeetingincludedMr.MikeDetamore,Mr.Miller,Mr.JimKenny,Mr.RockySgarro,Mr.Zola,Mr.JohnBartos,Mr.Mjaatvedt,Mr.TonyRoscioli,Mr.White,Mr.Agnewandbothofus.Themeetingwasnotproductive.Basically,weweretoldthatourconcernswereunfoundedbecausetheSSESdesignbaseswerenotrequiredtohandleaLOCA/LOOPeventcoupledwithalossofspentfuelpoolcoolingevent,andoperatorswouldtakethenecessaryappropriatecorrectivemeasuresanyway.Westronglydisagreedwithbothofthesepositions.

OnJuly17,1992,Mr.LochbaumwasinformedthathiscontractwouldnotbeextendedbeyondJuly31,1992.OnJuly23,1992,Mr.LochbaumaskedMr.MjaatvedtforafinalmeetingwithMr.AgnewtoupdatehimwiththestatusofEDRG20020priortohistermination.Whenthescheduledmeetingwascancelledandnot.rescheduled,wecametoyouonJuly29,1992toexpressourconcernswiththeEDRprocessandEDRG20020.Wepreparedanothersummaryoftheboilingspentfuelpoolconcernswhichweprovidedtoyouatthattime(Attachment7).ThissummarycoveredthefourmajorsafetyconcernsinEDRG20020withtheirrequirementsandconsequences.Mr.LochbaummetwithMr.JimMiltenbergerlaterthatdayatyourrequest.OnAugust18,1992,Mr.MillerissuedaletteraddressingEDRG20020(Attachment8)andstatingthatitssafetysignificancewasminimalbecausetheNRChadreviewedandapprovedthefuelpoolcoolingsystemdesignatSSES.Mr.PrevatterespondedtoMr.Miller'sletter(Attachment9)andMr.LochbaumcalledyoutoregisterdisagreementwiththepositionoutlinedbyMr.Miller.OnAugust27,1992,youissuedaletter(Attachment10)toMr.MillerdirectinghimtoreconsiderthesafetyclassificationforEDRG20020andprovideaschedulebyAugust31,1992.OnAugust31,1992,Mr.Millerrespondedtoyourletter(Attachment11)byclarifyinghispositionandreportingthataschedulewasstillunderdevelopment.Inthemeantime,Mr.KevinBrinckmancompletedhisindependentappraisaloftheboilingspentfuelpoolissuesandreleasedhisreport(Attachment12).Mr.Brinckman'sstudyessentiallyendorseseveryconcernidentifiedinEDRG20020andevenpointsoutthatthe.probabilityand/orconsequencesofsomeconcernsmaybegreaterthanpresentedintheEDR.AnumberofinformaldiscussionsbetweenMr.MillerandMr.PrevatteandMr.LochbaumonOctober5and6,1992addressedPP&L'sreportabilityandoperabilitydeterminations.Mr.Millerstatedthatthesedeterminationswereabouttobeformallyissued..Mr.MillerindicatedthatPP&LdeterminedtheconcernsinEDRG20020nottobereportableunder10CFR50.72andnottoaffectoperability.BothMr.PrevatteandMr.LochbaumregisteredstrongobjectionstothejustificationofferedbyMr.Millerforthesedeterminations.Mr.MillerindicatedtheissuewouldbediscussedwiththeNRCatthequarterlymeetingonOctober7,1992.Mr.LochbaumaskedMr.MillerifhecouldattendthisNRCmeetingandwastolditwouldbeinappropriate.Mr.LochbaumadditionallyrequestedthatMr.MillerinhispresentationbeforetheNRCclearlystatethattheoriginatorsofEDRG20020havenotyetbeenprovidedwithdocumentationofPP&L'soperabilityandreportabilitydeterminationsandhavestronglydisagreedwiththejustificationsofferedinformallybyMr.Miller.Mr.MillertoldMr.PrevattethathewouldprovidetheNRCResidentInspectorwithacopyofEDRG20020,itsreportability/operabilitydetermination,andallrelatedcorrespondence.Page3 0

Mr.LochbaumdiscussedthismatterwithMr.GeorgeJonesbytelephoneonOctober8,1992.Mr.JonesstatedthefuelpoolconcernshadbeendiscussedwiththeNRCduringthepreviousday'meetingandthattheSSESNRCResidentInspectorwouldbegiveninformationonEDRG20020thatday.WhiletherehavebeensomeinformaldiscussionssinceAugust31,1992,therehasnotbeenanydocumentedprogressmadeonthisissuesincetheendofAugust1992.InEDRG20020andthesupplementalinformation,weprovidedPP&LwithacomprehensivepackagedetailingnineproblemswiththeboilingspentfuelpooleventatSSESalongwiththeirassociatedadversenuclearsafetyimplications.Todate,noneofthesenineitemshasbeenformallyrefutedbyPP&L.ItappearstousthatPP&Lisunwillingtoconcedetheseareproblemsuntilithascompletelydefinedthemeasuresrequiredtoresolvetheproblems.Thiscourseofactiondoesnotsatisfytheproceduralrequirements'ofEPM-QA-122orthereportingrequirementsof10CFR50.70.NuclearsafetyconcernsmustbeformallyreportedtotheNRCinorderforothersiteswithsimilarconditionstobealerted.WeconsidertheproblemsidentifiedinEDRG20020tohavesignificantadversenuclearsafetyimplications.AdesignbaseseventatSSESisaLOCAwithaconcurrentLOOP.EveninthecaseofaLOCAwithoutaLOOP,SSESproceduresmayinitiateasheddingofnon-Class1Eloadsinsidethereactorbuildinginordertolimitroomtemperatures.Sinceitisanon-safetyrelatedsystemnotpoweredfromClass1Esources,thefuelpoolcoolingsystemwillnotoperate.Withoutthefuelpoolcoolingsystem,eitherthefuelpoolcoolingassistmodeofRHR(anon-safetyrelated,non-singlefailureprooffunction)mustbeinitiatedtoprovidefuelpoolcoolingorESWmakeuptothefuelpoolsmustbeinitiatedtomaintainwaterlevelintheboilingspentfuelpool.EitheroperationwouldrequireoperatorentryintoradiationfieldssignificantlyhigherthanreportedinFSARChapter18andpermittedby10CFR50.Ifthespentfuelpoolboils,theeffectsofthelatentheatloadonreactorbuildingroomtemperaturesandofthecondensation/overflowonreactorbuildingequipmentoperationhavenotbeenevaluated.TheboilingspentfuelpoolthereforerepresentsthepotentialforprovidingthemeansforthecommonmodefailureofallECCSandsafetyrelatedequipmentinthereactorbuilding.IfESWmakeuptotheboilingspentfuelpoolcannotbeachieved,thereisalsothepotentialforthemeltdownofirradiatedfueloutsideoftheprimarycontainmentwiththeconcurrentfailureofthestandbygastreatmentsystem.ThenineconcernsidentifiedinEDRG20020indicatethatPP&Lhasnotperformedanintegratedengineeringevaluationoftheboilingspentfuelpooldesignevent.TheresolutiontoEDRG20020mustPage4 includeathoroughengineeringassessmentofthelossofnormalspentfuelpoolcoolingeventoncomponent,systemandplantlevels'oensurethatadverseconsequencessuchaspressurizationwithinthereactorbuildingduetospentfuelpoolboiloffdonotjeopardizesecondarycontainmentintegrityandECCSperformance.WeareveryconcernedthatthenuclearsafetyissuesraisedinEDRG20020arenotbeingevaluatedforoperabilityandreportabilityinapropermanner.YouhavestatedthattheNRCResidentandRegionIpersonnelhavebeeninformallynotifiedaboutthisissue.However,wehavenotyetseenadocumentpreparedbyPP&L,otherthanMr.Brinckman'sstudy,whichpresentsthisissueinacompleteandaccuratemanner.Todate,wehaveseennoactiontakenonMr.Brinckman'sstudy.Mr.MillerandtheEDMGhaverepeatedlyattemptedtonarrowthescopeofEDRG20020byfocusingsolelyonthefuelpoolcoolingsystemdesignbases.DuringouronlycontactwithNuclearLicensing,Mr.KennyclaimedourconcernswereunfoundedsinceSSESwasnotrequiredtodesignforbothaLOCA/LOOPandalossofspentfuelpoolcoolingevent.Therefore,wedoubtthatPF&LhaspresentedtheNRCwithathoroughunderstandingoftheissuesraisedinEDRG20020.Consequently,wediscountanyclaimbyPP&LthattheNRChasindicatedthattheseissuesarenotreportable.BecauseEDRG20020wasinitiatedoverfivemonthsago,becausewemeetwithyouovernineweeksago,becauseMr.LochbaumisnolongerworkingatPP&LandbecauseMr.PrevattemaynotbeworkingatPP&Lformuchlonger,werespectfullyrecpxestthatPP&LprovidetousinaccordancewithEPM-QA-122Sections4.4and4.5writtendocumentationof:1a)Atechnicaljustificationfor~eacofthenineitemsidentifiedinEDRG20020indicatingwhyeachitemisnotanuclearsafetyconcern,-OR-1b)AcopyofthereportmadetotheNRCaddressingtheitemsraisedinEDRG20020.2)AfinalapprovedscreeningworksheetforEDRG20020perEPM-QA-122andEPM-703.3)AfinalapprovedReportabilityEvaluationforEDRG20020perEPM-QA-122andEPM-704.4)AfinalapprovedOperabilityEvaluationforEDRG20020perEPM-QA-122andEPM-705.We.requestyourresponsebynolaterthanNovember2,1992.Page5 Ifweconsiderthetechnicaljustificationtobeinadequate,theNRCreporttobeincomplete,orifPP&Lfailstorespondbythespecifieddate,weintendtoproceedwithourownreporttotheNRConthissubject.ThisreportwouldcoverthenineconcernsidentifiedinEDRG20020andindicatethatseveraloftheseconcernshadbeenraisednumeroustimesinthepastbutneverresolvedbyPP&L.ItwouldalsoexpressourconcernsthatPP&LdoesnothaveaneffectiveprogramforhandlingandresolvingquestionsofnuclearsafetyasevidencedbyPP&L'streatmentofEDRG20020andotherrecentEDRsandsafetyissues.WeacknowledgeyourstatementthatyouarenotsatisfiedwiththeEDRprogram,buttheexistingprogramisseverelyfaultedandnosubstantivecorrectivemeasureshavebeeninstitutedsinceourmeetingwithyouonJuly29,1992.Wedeeplyregrethavingthisissuereachthisstage,butweknowofnolegitimatealternateactionswecouldhavetakentoavoidthispoint.Infact,wesincerelyfeelwehavebeenextremelypatient,professionalandopen-mindedinourdealingswithPP&Lonthisissue.WeurgePP&Ltoproperlyresolvethisissuesothatournextstep.neednotbetaken.Sincerely,DavidA.LochbaumDonaldC.PrevatteAttachments:1)EngineeringDiscrepancyReportG20020,"LossofSpentFuelPoolCoolingEventDesignDiscrepancies",April16,19922)MemofromDaveLochbaumandDonPrevattetoMarkMjaatvedt,"SusquehannaSteamElectricStationSpentFuelPoolBoilingIssues",March18,1992(ET-0149)3)MemofromDaveLochbaumandDonPrevattetoJoeZola,"SupplementalInformationforEDRG20020onBoilingSpentFuelPool",June22,1992(ET-0471)4)OperabilityStatementPage63,EDRgG20020,April23,19925)ScreeningWorksheet,EDRG20020,DraftbyArtWhite6)EDRG20020References,July15,1992Page6 7)WhitePaperpreparedbyDavidA.LochbaumandDonaldC.Prevatte,"SafetyConsequencesofaBoilingSpentFuelPoolattheSusquehannaSteamElectricStation",July27,19928)MemofromG.D.MillertoG.T.Jones,"FuelPoolCoolingDeficiencies",August18,1992(ET>>0586)I9)MemofromD.C.PrevattetoG.T.Jones,"FuelPoolCoolingDeficiencies",August20,1992(ET-0587)10)MemofromG.T.-JonestoGlennD.Miller,"FuelPoolCoolingEDR'sG20020,G00005",August27,1992(PLI-72267)11)MemofromGlennD.MillertoGeorgeT.Jones,"FuelPoolCoolingEDR'sG20020,G00005",August31,1992(PLI-72297)'2)MemofromKevinW.BrinckmantoGeorgeT.Jones,"ReviewofFuelPoolCooling",September1,1992(PLI-72288)Copies:H.W.R.G.HG.'W.R.KeiserByramStanleyCorcoranJ.S.KemperR.L.A.F.A.R.W.R.J.S.J.R.C.A.J.M.F.G.G.D.J.E.J.A.M.R.G.J.C.A.T.J.G.D.M.J.J.D.DotyIorfidaSabolLichtStefankoMiltenbergerMyersKennyButlerMillerAgnewZolaM)aatvedtKuczynskiBoschettiSweeneyGogatesManskiRichardsonA6-1SSES21BroadleafCircleWindsor,CT06095115PolecatRoadGlennMills,PA19342A9-3SSESA2-5A6-1A9-3A6-1A2-4A2-4A6-3A6-3A6-3A6-3A6-3SSESSSESSSESSSESEnerconEnercon(w/a)(w/a)(w/a)(w/a)(w/a)(w/o)(w/o)(w/o)(w/o)(w/o)(w/o).(w/o)(w/o)(w/o)(w/o)(w/o)(w/o)(w/o)(w/o)(w/o)(w/o)(w/o)(w/o)(w/o)Page7 Attachment20PP8LMemofromD.A.LochbaumandD.C.PrevattetoGeorgeT.Jones,"EDRSystemConcerns",October13,1992(PLI-72365)Note:ThismemofollowedupontheconcernsvoicedbytheauthorsinameetingwiththePP8LManagerofNuclearPlantEngineeringontheoverallhandlingofnuclearsafetyissuesbyPP8L.'

~~~October13,1992GeorgeT.JonesA6-2SUSQUEHANNASTEAMELECTRICSTATIONEDRSYSTEMCONCERNSPLI-72635FILEA45-1AThisletterisbeingwrittentofollowuponthemeetingonFriday,October9,1992betweenyourself,Mr.ChuckMyers,Mr.GlennMillerandthesignatoriestothislettertodiscusstheevaluationofEDRG23323.InthismeetingandotherpreviousconversationswithyouandMr.Miller,wehaveexpressedourconcernsthattheEDRprocessisnotworkingasrequiredbytheproceduresandfederalregulations.Thefollowingisalistingofthemostsignificantconcernswehavedevelopedinattemptingtoworkwiththesystemalongwithsomesuggestionsonhowwefeelthesystemcouldbeimproved:CONCERNSMITHCURRENTEDRSYSTEMANDAPPROACHTheEDRGroupisapartofthesameorganizationwhichhastheprimaryresponsibilityfortheplantdesign,therebycreatingabasicconflictofinterests.TheEDRGroupshouldbeindependent.2.InadequateresourcesareearmarkedforthedispositionofEDRs.3.The"presumptionofoperability"philosophyiscarriedtotheillogicalextreme,totheendthat,formanyEDRsanadves-rialciaionssipresultsot>>'.8EDin'crandthesystem.Althoughthe"presumptionofoperability"shouldexistuntilprovenotherwise,hand-in-handwiththisphilosophyshouldbea"presumptionofvalidity"inanyconcernraised.TheEDRprocessshouldbeasearchforthetruth,notaprocesstomakeproblemsgoaway.Thediscovererofaproblemshouldnothavetomakeanair-tightcasefortheprocesstowork.Allheshouldhavetodoishavereasonableindicationandbeliefthataproblemexists,andtheprocessshouldthenresearchtheissueonbothsides,andthenlettheissuestandorfallonitsowntechnicalmeritsorlackthereof.4.Everystepintheprocessshouldbeperformedtoaclock.EDRsmustnotbeallowedtolanguishastheysometimesdotoday.

G.T.JonesPage2October13,1992PLI-726355.Thesolutionstothereportedproblem,theanticipatedsolutions,orthelackthereofshouldbeentirelydivorcedfromtheevaluationsoftheEDRs.ItshouldnotbetheresponsibilityoftheEDRGrouptoresolveEDRs,onlytoevaluatethem..6.Althoughnotsanctionedbyprocedure,thepresentpresumptionseemstobethatifanitemisreportable,itisnotoperable.Thisisnotnecessarilytrue.AJ.I.O.canbegeneratedto.continueplantoperati"ninmostcas.=wheeanitem.is.reportable.Thetwodeterminationsmustbeindependent.7.Thedeterminationofoperabilityandreportabilityshouldhavelessrelianceonthelegalisticaspectsoftheissueandmoreonthetechnicalvalidityorlackthereof.Ifthereisaconflictbetweenthelegalandthetechnicalevaluation,thetechnicalshouldprevail.ThereisoverwhelmingevidencethatthisistheintentoftheNRCinalloftheCFRreportingrequirements.8.9.Potentialcostofresolutionshouldhaveabsolutelyzeroconsiderationinoperability/reportabilitydeterminations.ResponsestoconcernsinEDRsshouldbemadeonapoint-by-pointtechnicalbasis,notmotherhoodtypestatementsthataremoreappropriateforpressreleasesthantechnicaldocuments.10-ThefollowingreasonsandothersimilarreasonsfordismissinganEDRconcernshouldbeabsolutelydisallowed:a~b.c~d.e.g,h.TheNRCapprovedit,.Wehave(had)anunderstanding(undocumented)withtheNRC.Thereare(x)numberofbackups.Therefore,theweaknessinthisitemwillbemadeupforinthebackups.We'eallowedasinglefailure.Theoperatorswilltakewhateveractionisnecessarytomakeupfortheweakness.TheEOPs,EPsandothersimilarfeaturesofourdefense-in-depthmakeupfortheweakness.PRA(appropriateforJ.I.O.s,notforreportability/operabilitydetermination).TheissuewillbeaddressedinanupcomingDBD.TheEDRprocessistoocomplexandconvoluted.Theprocessandformsshouldbesimplified.TherearetoomanygatesthatEDRsmustpassthrough.

G.T.JonesPage3October13,1992PLI-7263512.TheeffectivenessoftheEDRprocessshouldnotbejudgedonthevolumeofEDRsthatpassthroughthesystem,butratheronthetechnicaldepthandqualityoftheevaluations.13.TheargumenthasbeenraisedthattheNRCdoesnotwantusreportingtoo.much,andthispositionhasbeenusedtorationalizenotreportingconditionswhichprobablyshouldhavebeenreported.Itshouldbeborneinmindthatthepenaltyforreportingtoomuchisessentiallynothing;thepenaltyfo-reportingtool'ttleŽanbecatastrophic,forthecompany,fortheindividual,forthecustomer,andintheextremecaseforthecommunitiesaroundtheplant.Wehaveeverythingtoloseandnothingtogainbynotreportingwhenweshould.Fromeverypointofview-cost,reputation,safety,ethics,credibility-weshoulderronthesideofreporting.14.AstepintheEDRevaluationprocessshouldbethewrittenconcurrenceornon-concurrenceoftheoriginatorwiththeevaluations.Wearesubmittingthiscritiquewiththehopethatitcanbeusedconstructivelytoimprovethequalityandeffectivenessofthesystem.Ifwecanprovideanyfurtherinput,pleasedonothesitatetocalluponus.D.A..Lechbaum~D.C.PrevatteJ.E.Agnew,Jr.G.D.MillerC.A.MyersEDRFileNRFileA6-3A6-3A2-4A6-3A6-2EDRCON.DCP/kbw Attachment21PP8LMemofromGeorgeT.JonestoG.D.Miller,"SpentFuelPoolIssue",October14,1992(PLI-72640)Note:Inthismemo,thePP8LManagerofNuclearPlantEngineeringdirectsacoordinatedengineeringefforttobeinitiatedtoaddresstheconcernsinEDRG20020.Thisactioncomesapproximatelysix(6)weeksafterreceiptofanin-houseengineeringreport(commissionedsolelytoassesstheconcernsinEDRG20020)whichdidnotrefutetheprimarysafetyissuesraisedinEDRG20020.

10-26-f99209:58P.02/03OCtoberX4,1992Nr.C.D.MillerSUSQURSRMIOTNMKECIRIC5%hTINOPSISÃJNLPOOLZSSUIYouaretoimmediatelyforaateamothiohinc)udaarepresentationfromTechnology,Modifications,Fue)s,SystaasEngineerinq,OperationsandXJ.censing.1.Developan4updateoftheoperabilityandthereportabilitydeteriinationthatapecifica)lyaddressalloftheissuesraisedinthesub)octEDR.ThisactionistobeccapletedbyOctober21,1992.2.Developa)ustificationfoxinterimoperationthatclearlyaddressesalloftheissuesraisedinSDR-20020'hisactivityistobecompletedbyOctober21,1992.3.Developanylongteraactionsneededtoccaapletslyresolvetheissuetothepointofiaplaaentation,i.e.proceduresrevisionreadyforPORCreview,modificationsreadyforstartofdesign.TheinitialscopeofanyactionsistobacompletedbyOctober2$,1992,ThisactionistobecompletedbyNovaaber11,1992.BycopyofthislettertoC.A.Hyers,J.8.Stefanko,C.Z.Kuosyneki,H.C,StanleyandN.W.Simpson,youarerayxestodtosupplyindividua)participantsinthiseffort.Caortae.onescc!Q.8.Xeasynaki-SSESC.k.ayersA2-iN.I.Shannon)El2H.C.Stanley-SSESZ.8.Stefanko-N-3NuclearRecords-A5-2RECEtV<>OCT15>9~Igu-~rm

Attachaent22PP&LMemofromGeorgeT.JonestoG.0.Miller,J.S.StefankoandM.M.Simpson,"SpentFuelPoolCoolingIssue",October14,1992(PLI-72641) 18-26-199289:S9~~~-~WP.83i83octoh>>r14,1992Mr.a.D.MillerKr.J.S.St>>fankoMr.H.sr.8&peonIQOQUXRLlQRSTYXIIICTRXCSTATXOSSPkÃ%ÃUSfAXLECOOLZÃ078$UEWhilewehav>>analys>>4theheatloadsintheSpentFuelPoolsduetonewr>>loadsandoperatingstrat>>gies,wehavenotupdatedcertaindesignanalys>>sforSpentFuelPoolCoolingSystemD>>signBasisEvents.Talsoneedtoknowiftherear>>otQ~similarsituations.Youar>>assignedthefollowingactionsi1.Do'cumonttheh>>atloadsthatne>>dtobeconsideredduringnormaloperation,singleunit(fu11careoffload)outag>>s,and,a2unit(2fullcoreoffloads)outag>>sforusebyNucleaiTechnologyinupdatingdesignbasisanalysis.Lead-AS.it>>texaco.R.Updateourd>>signbasisanalysesfortheSpentFuel'Pools(andtheappropriat>>FBARs>>ctions)usingth>>abov>>information.Lea4-I.O.Xi11>>r.3.Updat>>ourradiologicalanalysisforthegentFuelPools(andtheappropriat>>FShRsections)usingth>>abov>>information.Lea4-0D.Mill>>r~Mentlfyallcaseswerechangesinfu>>ld>>signorcoreloadingstrategymayQapaotsubstantiallyth>>d>>signoftheplantincludingchangesindesignanalys>>s,operationproaedur>>sorbardwar>>.Xdentifywhichitemsarenothandledasanormalpartofr>>loadanalysisanddesign.heao-J.I.Nt>>fauRoS.Provid>>proc>>inuresrevisionthatprovideclearinstructionforreviewofmodificationhyFu>>lsCroupandada@cateinputplantdesignmodifications.Leadx.1.slayaoaZ>>rryStefenkohastheov>>rail1>>adforthis>>ffortandforaasuringthatPPKtakesallofthemeasurearepairedtoref1>>ctthehgectotfuelreloadsintoourdesign,proc>>dureandr>>gulatorysystem..REQElYENocT16$9Z Attachment23PP8LHemofromGeorgeT.JonestoAllNuclearEngineeringHanagersandSupervisors,"EngineeringDiscrepancy(EDR)Program",October14,1992Note:ThismemodirectsPP&LsupervisorsandmanagerstoreviewthePP8LEDRprogramwiththeirpersonnel.ItstatesthatforEDRsinitiated,"thepresumptionisValidityuntilprovenotherwise."ThePP&LSupervisoroftheEngineeringDiscrepancyHanagement6rouptoldoneoftheauthors(Lochbaum)thatthereasonhedidnotactivelypursuetheEDRfromApril1992toJuly1992wasthattheconsequencesofEDR620020weresolargethatitwasincomprehensiblethattheycouldhavebeenmissedduringdesign.

~~~Date:To:October14,1992TOALLNUCLEARENGINEERINGMANAGERSANDSUPERVISORSFrom:GEORGET.JONESg

Subject:

ENGINEERINGDISCREPANCYEDRPROGRAMIwouldliketosharesomethoughtswithyouontheEngineeringDiscrepancyProgramandIwantyoutosharethemwithyourpeoplewithinthenexttwodaysandsupplymewiththeattendeesandresultingcomments.Itisimportanttokeepinmindthatanessentialelementofanysafetycultureisensuringthatconditionsadversetoquality,plantsafetyandreliabilityarepromptlyidentified,reportedandcorrected.OurpurposeinestablishingtheEngineeringDiscrepancyProgramandtheGroupwhichsupportsitistoassurecontinuedattentiontothisessentialelement.Inadditiontoestablishingthegroup,weestablishedaperiodicreviewoftheprogressincloseoutofEDRswithbothPORC,SRCandERC.IalsoreviewourprogressinthisareawithSeniorManagement.Itisanitemoftheircotinuininterestandwillwhichmostofyouattended.Ifyouoryourpeoplehavenotattendedtraining,pleasecontactWaltRhoadesandschedulethistraining.Itisyourresponsibilitythatyourpeoplearetrained.Wehaveachievedsuccessinidentifyingpotentiallysafetysignificantitemsandhaveimprovedourperformanceinresolvingtheseissuesinatimelyfashion.Wehavealsoachievedsuccessatidentifyingandseparatingthoseitemsnotconsideredtohavesafetysignificancebutimportanttodo.Itisimportanttounderstandeveryone'sobligationtothisProgram.InPolicyLetter90-003,signedbyHarryKeiser,itstates:Aclodsfghu4DIIICcfRPPokf5"OurexpectationsofNuclearDepartmentPersonnelarethattheywill:IdentifyandreportanyknownorperceiveddeficiencyinthedesignoroperationofSusquehanna,oranysignificanteventwhichoccursatSusquehannainaccordancewithestablishedprocedures."~~t=)gpgoaLpals~pgpg)/oct=$'SC~A<p,p5fopRo6~~~theCame Insection4.2ofEPM-QA-122itdescribesyourresponsibilitiesasanoriginatorofanEDR.InitiatetheEDRform,makinganinitialassessmentofwhetherthepotentialdiscrepancyisaSafetyConcernorimpactsaTechnicalSpecificationActionStatement(TSAS),determiningifaSOORiswarranted,andnotifyinghisorherSupervisorofthepotentialengineeringdiscrepancy.Provideaclear,concisestatementofthediscrepancybydescribingboththerequirementandtheexistingconditionsothatthedifferenceisclear.Thediscrepancyistobedescribedinaconcisemannersuchthatitmaybeunderstoodbyanindividualwhoisnotintimatelyfamiliarwiththetask,specialprocess,item,etc.,whichconstitutesorisassociatedwiththeciteddiscrepantcondition.Thedescriptionshallprovidefordirectreferencebacktothematerial,equipment,systems,activitiesorservicesassociatedwiththediscrepantcondition.Inherentintheresponsibilityoftheoriginatoristheobligationtoreviewanypotentialadverseconditionwithhissupervisor,ortheEDMG.IfpossiblethisshouldbedonebeforeinitiatinganEDR.Thispermitsinformationtobeexchangedwhenitismostcurrentintheoriginatorsmindandisanaidtothosewhoneedtoresolvetheissue.ItshouldnotbeacauseofdelayinpreparingtheEDR.Theoriginatorisinthebestpositiontofullydescribethecondition,andthustheorganizationcanbenefitfromtheresearchalreadyperformedandallowformoretimelyevaluationsofsignificance.TheoriginatorwillbecontactedbyEDMGandrequestedtoparticipateinEDRevaluationstoensuretheconcernisadequatelyaddressed.Oncetheoriginatorcompletestheformitisbroughttotheirsupervisor.Thesupervisorwill,withinoneday,determinethevalidityoftheEDR(processiscalledvalidation)anddocumentthebasisofthedeterminationonanEDRContinuationSheet.Thesupervisorwillthenperformthefollowing:Explainhis/herdeterminationtotheOriginatorandassuretheindividualfullyunderstandsthebasisforthedetermination.Legiblysign,dateandprintfullname.TransmittoNE-EngineeringDiscrepancyManagementSupervisor(JamesE.Agnew).Thepresumptionis"Validity"untilprovenotherwise.TheEngineeringDiscrepancyGroupisresponsibleto:Verifytheaccuracyofthevalidationprocess(calledVerification).

AcceptanddocumenttheEDR.Track,screen,performinitialandsubsequentoperability/reportabilitydeterminationwithLicensing,SSES.complianceandplantsupport,prioritize,evaluatetheEDR.Assureassignmentandacceptanceofthatassignment,ofevaluationandresolution.PrepareSOORswhenappropriateandnotifytheOriginatoroftheresultsofvalidationandresolution.ReviewandreportstatusofoutstandingEDRscommensuratewiththeirsafetysignificanceandage.MonitortheaccuracyoftheEngineeringDiscrepancyListandDatabase.DrivetheimplementationandcloseoutofEDRs.TransferEDRrecordstoSRMS.Theprocesshasrecentlybeenrevisedto:Provideanappealpathwhenevertheoriginatordisagreeswiththeresultsofthevalidationevaluation,theoperabilityevaluationorthereportabilityevaluation.Eachoriginatorandsupervisorisexpectedtoutilizethisappealprocess.Whenevertheappealprocessisutilized,Iexpectthesupervisortoassistandsupporttheoriginatorinmakingtheappeal.Letmeemphasizemycommitmenttothisprogram.Itisimportantforallpersonneltorecognizetheuseofthisprocedure(EPM-QA-122,Rev.3)isnotoptional.Ourvaluesdemandweutilizeproceduresbecausetheyrepresenttheconsensusbestwaytodothejob.Pleasereinforcewithyourpersonnelthisprocedureisexpectedtobeusedinidentifyingdiscrepancies.

Attachaent24LetterfromDavidA.LochbaumandDonaldC.PrevattetoGeorgeT.Jones,"DisagreementwithScreening,ReportabilityandOperabilityEvaluationsforEDRG20020",October14,1992Note:Thislettertransmitstheauthors'ointbypointrebuttalofthetechnicalreasonsformulatedbyPP8LindeterminingthattheconcernsinEDR620020hadminimalsafetysignificance.

Mr.GeorgeT.JonesPennsylvaniaPower&LightCompanyTwoNorthNinthStreet,A6-2Allentown,PA18101October14,1992

SUBJECT:

Di.sagreementwithScreening,ReportabilityandOperabilityEvaluationsforEDRG20020

DearMr.Jones:

InthemeetingonOctober9,1992betweenyourself,Mr.GlennMiller,andMr.C.A.MyersofPP&Landthesignatoriestothisletter,weprovidedPP&Lwithseveraltechnicalproblemswiththescreening,reportabilityandoperabilityevaluationscompletedbyPP&LforEDRG20020.Thispurposeofthisletteristoformallytransmitourcommentsontheseevaluationsandtoclearlyst'atethatweconsiderthetechnicaljustificationsofferedinthesedocumentstobeinadequatewithrespecttotheitemsoutlinedinourletterdatedOctober9,1992toyou.PP&L'spositiontodatehasbeenthatrestorationofoffsitepowercan.beaccomplishedintimetopermitoperatoractionstoprovideadequatecoolingtothespentfuelpoolsand'reventfuelpoolbpjljng~EDRG20020,itssupplementalinformationandMr.KevinBrinckman'sreportallclearlyidentifyexistingSSESdesignconditionsinwhichnormalfuelpoolcoolingislostandwhenmanualvalvesinthereactorbuildingusedtoinitiateESWmakeuporRHRfuelpoolcoolingassistareinaccessible.Lossofoffsitepowerisonlyoneofthesecases.PP&LhasnotyetshownthattheNRChasreviewedandapprovedadurationof<20hoursforthelossofoffsitepowerdesignevent.Bycomparison,PP&LdefinedthedesignbasisLOCA/LOOPeventtobetheLOCAwithaconcurrentLOOPandconsistentlyappliedthisdesignassumptionincalculations,reports,FSARdiscussions,andlicensingcorrespondence.PP&L'spositionalsoreliesuponoperatoractionstopreventfuel.poolboilingifnormalfuelpoolcoolingislost.Whilealternatefuelpoolcoolingmethodsmaybeutilizedundercertainconditions,PP&LhasnotyetshownthattheNRChasreviewedandapprovedmethodstocoveralloftheoperatingandpostulatedaccidentconditionsrequiredwithintheSSESdesignbasis.ThelicensingbasisforSSESintheeventoflossoffuelpoolcoolingasdescribedintheSSESFSARandintheNRC'sSERistopermitfuelpoolboilinganduseESWmakeuptomaintainwaterlevel.AsdetailedinEDRG20020andinMr.Brinckman'sreport,theboilingspentfuelpoolconditionrepresentsanunanalyzedstatewithpotentialsevereadverseconsequences.Inaddition,theuseofRHRfuelpoolcoolingassistincasenormalspentfuelpoolcoolingislostisnotdescribedintheSSESFSARorNRC'sSERandcouldadverselyaffectcoreandcontainmentcoolingfollowinganaccident.TheboilingspentfuelpoolconditionisclearlynotadequatelyanalyzedintheSSESdesign.

Therefore,weconsidertheconcernsidentifiedinEDRG20020towarranta"Considerable"safetysignificancedeterminationandtobereportableunder10CFR50.72.Inaddition,theoperabilityofSSESispresentlyadverselyaffectedbytheproblems.WeareconfidentthatajustificationforcontinuedoperationcouldbewrittentopermitSSESoperationuntilnecessarymodificationsareimplemented.WeremainhopefulthattheongoingreviewsbytheSRCandNuclearLicensingwillresultinaproperresolutiontoEDRG20020.Weareavailabletorespondtoanyquestionsregardingourpositiononthisissue.Thankyouforyourcontinuedpersonalattentiontothismatter.Sincerely,DavidA.LochbaumDonaldC.PrevatteAttachmentDistribution:C.A.Myers(w/a)G.D.Miller(w/a)J.E.Agnew(w/a)A2-4A6-3A6-3 October13,1992AttachmentDocumentSectioCommentGeneralGeneralGeneralThescreening,reportabilityandoperabilityevaluationslackreferencestocitedinformationwhichmakesverificationdifficult.ConsideringthelevelofdetailthatwentintodocumentingtheconcernsinEDRG20020,itisinappropriatetojustifydeterminationsonnuclearsafetyissueswithvague,uncitedreferences.Thescreening,reportabilityandoperabilityevaluationsplaceundueemphasisonthefuelpoolcoolingsystemdesign.EightoftheconcernsidentifiedinEDRG20020hadnothingtodowiththedesignrequirementsofthefuelpoolcoolingsystem.PP&LhasrepeatedlyattemptedtodivertattentionfromtherealproblemsidentifiedinEDRG20020byfocusingsolelyonthefuelpoolcoolingsystemdesign.Thescreening,reportabilityandoperabilityevaluationsrelyprimarilyupontimelyrestorationofoffsitepowerandoperatoractionstopreventfuelpoolboiling.ThebasisforlimitingthedurationoftheLOOPhasneverbeenreviewedandacceptedbytheNRC.OperatoractionscannotbeperformedfortheposulatedDBALOCAwiththeradiationlevelsreportedinSSESFSARChapter18,whichdonotincludeairbornecontributions.Ifairborneactivityisconsidered,theconditionsaresignificantlyworse.Screening/Page2ThecharacterizationoftheconcernsinEDRG20020istoosimplistic.Ratherthana'lackofsuitabledocumentation',EDRG20020reportedseveralcasesinwhichexistingdocumentationwasnon-conservative.Screening/Page2ThefivequestionsinthescreeningarenotaddressedforeachofthenineconcernsraisedinEDRG20020.ThefivequestionsinthescreeningarenotevenaddressedforthemostsevereormostlimitingofthenineconcernsraisedinEDRG20020~Screening/Page2Althoughnoselectionisspecified,itisassumed,thatPP&L'sanswertoItemIis"NO".Screening/Page2Lastparagraphstatesthatthemostcommonfailuremodeforacompletelossofspent,fuelpoolcoolingisalossofoffsitepower.SSESFSARAppendix9Banalyzedacompletelossofspentfuelpoolcoolingduetoaseismicevent.WhatisthebasisforaLOOPbeingthe'mostPage1 October13,1992AttachmentScreening/Page2Screening/Page2Screening/Page2Screening/page3commonfailuremode?'naddition,eveniftheLOOPcaseisthemostcommonfailuremode,allotherfailuremodesmustbecoveredinthedesign.Lastparagraphstatesthat"theestimatedtimetorestoreoffsitepowerrangesfrom15minutesto20hours...".Nobasisisprovidedforthisestimate.Inreality,numerousexamplescanbecitedofLOOPsthathavelastedlongerthan20hours,mostrecentlyTurkeyPointasaresultofHurricaneAndrew.Additionally,threecrediblecausesofLOOPwhicharerequiredbyFederalregulationstobedesignedforcancauseLOOPswhichcouldlastlongerthan20hours.Theyaretornado,earthquakeandsabotage.Lastparagraphspecifiesa25hourtimetoboilforthespentfuelpool.EDRsG00005andG20020andKevinBrinckman'sreport(PLI-72288)allchallengethevalidityofthe25hourtime.Lastparagraphconcludesthatifoffsitepowerisrestoredinatimelymanner,thenspentfuelpoolboilingwillnotoccur.Thisresponsedoesnotaddressanyoftheotherfailuremodesforthenon-safetyrelated,non-seismicallydesignedfuelpoolcoolingsystem.Aseismicevent,randomfailureofthenon-safetyrelatedequipmentinthesystem,orcommonmodefailureofthenon-safetyrelatedequipmentinthesystemhasthepotentialtoincapacitatethefuelpoolcoolingsystemsforlongerthanthetimerequiredforthepoolstoachieveboiling.Inaddition,currentSSES,emergencyproceduresfollowingaLOCArequiretheoperatorstode-energizethenon-1Ereactorbuildingelectricalloads(whichincludesthefuelpoolcoolingequipment)ifthereactorbuildingtemperaturesareascurrentlyanalyzed.FirstparagraphmisrepresentstheconcernsofEDRG20020.TheseverecoredamagewhichrendersthereactorbuildinginaccessibleisrequiredbyFederalregulationstobeincludedinthedesignbasisasdocumentedinSSESFSARChapter18.WiththereactorbuildinginaccessiblefordaysafteraLOCA,spentfuelpoolboilingwilloccurfollowingalossoffuelpoolcoolingcausedbyaLOOP,anon-1Ereactorbuildingloadshedrequiredunderemergencyprocedures,aseismicevent,orafailureduetotheconsequencesoftheLOCAitself(PLI-72288).Thisdiscrepancycanthenadverselyaffectcoolingoffuelinthecoreandinthespentfuelpoolsaswellassecondarycontainmentintegrity.Page2 October13,1992AttachmentScreening/Page3Althoughnoselectionisspecified,itisassumedthatPP&L'sanswertoItemIIis"NO".Thecorrectansweris"YES".Screening/Page3Screening/Page3Screening/Page3TheresponsetoItemZIistechnicallyincorrect.ThediscrepancyhasthepotentialforcausingthecommonmodefailuresofECCSequipment,thestandbygastreatmentsystem,andothersafetyrelatedequipmentrequiredtomitigatetheconsequencesofdesignbasisaccidents.ThelastparagraphinItemIImisrepresentstheconcernsofEDRG20020.EDRG20020doesnotstatethatfuelpoolboilingwillcausefueldamageinthecore.However,EDRG20020doespointoutthatforthepostulateddesignbasisLOCAwiththecoredamageconditionsdocumentedinSSESFSARChapter18,theoperatoractionsrequiredtoaligneitherESWmakeuporRHRfuelpoolcoolingassisttothefuelpoolswillnotbepossibleanddamagetothefuelinthefuelpoolsmayresult.KevinBrinckman'sreport(PLI-72288)supportsthepositioninEDRG20020.TheresponsetoItemZIZisoverlyrestrictiveinthatitonlyaddressesthefuelpoolcoolingsystem.Withtheexceptionoftemperatureandlevelinstrumentationinthefuelpools,EDRG20020doesnotquestionorchallengethedesignandoperationofthefuelpoolcoolingsystem.TheconcernsinEDRG20020arethattheboilingspentfuelpoolisaninadequatelyanalyzedeventwiththerealpotentialforcausingthefailureofeverysafetyrelatedsysteminthereactorbuilding.ThesesystemsareexplicitlylistedintheTechnicalSpecifications.Therefore,theanswertoItemZZZshouldbe"YES".Screening/Page4TheresponsetoItemZVdoesnotaddresstheconcernsidentifiedinEDRG20020.Withtheexceptionoftemperatureandlevelinstrumentationinthefuelpools,EDRG20020doesnotquestionorchallengethedesignandoperationofthefuelpoolcoolingsystem.EDRG20020specificallyquestionstheabilityoftheESWsystemtoprovidemakeupflowtotheboilingspentfuelpoolandofothersafetyrelatedsystemsinthereactorbuildingtooperateintheconditionsresultingfromaboilingspentfuelpool.Therefore,theanswertoItemZVshoul'dbe"YES".Screening/Page4ItshouldbenotedthatEDRG00005waswrittenin1990andhasyettoberesolved.AtimelyandcompleteresolutiontoEDRG00005wouldhavePage3 October13,1992AttachmentScreening/Page4removedsomeofthe'complexity'ftheissuessurroundingEDRG20020.TheresponsetoItemVisincorrect.TheSSESFSARandtheNRC'sSERdonotdiscusstheuseofRHRfuelpoolcoolingassist,tocopewithalossoffuelpoolcooling.TheSSESFSARandtheNRC'sSERonlydiscusstheuseofRHRfuelpoolcoolingassisttohandletheconditionofafuelcoreoffloadduringarefuelingoutage.AsstatedinKevinBrinckman'sreport(PLI-72288)gtheuseofRHRfuelpoolcoolingassistforfuelpoolcoolingfollowingaLOCAisanunanalyzedevent.TheSSESFSARandtheNRC'sSERstatethatthedesignprovisionforthelossofspentfuelpoolcoolingeventisfortheESWsystemtoprovideadequatemakeuptotheboilingfuelpools.EDRG20020identifiesconcernsthatsuchmakeupmaynotbeavailable,andifmadeavailablemayadverselyaffectperformanceofothersafetyrelatedequipment.Therefore,theanswertoItemVshouldbe"YES".Screening/Page5TheresponsetoItemVIisbasedonoperatoractionstopreventfuelpoolboiling.Theresponsestates"itisnotreasonabletoassumethattheoperatorswilltakenocorrectiveactionandallowthepooltoboil."Theregulatorybasisfordesigningtosatisfypostulatedaccidentsistoprovideassurancethatactualplantresponsesarebounded.EDRG20020doesnotstateorimplythateverylossofspentfuelpoolcoolingeventmustresultinspentfuelpoolboiling.However,theonlysafetyrelateddesignprovisiontocopewithalossofspentfuelpoolcoolingatSSESisuseoftheESWsystemtoprovidemakeuptotheboilingfuelpools.Theothernon-safetyrelatedmethodsofcoolingthespentfuelpoolhavenotbeenfullyanalyzedforuseunderallrequiredconditions.Therefore,theconcernsidentifiedinEDRG20020representatleast'moderate'afetysignificanceifnot'considerable'afetysignificance.Reportability/Pg2ThelastparagraphofSectionIZstatesthateachoftheninediscrepanciesinEDRG20020areaddressedseparatelyandingreaterdetailinthe"EDREvaluation".Ifthisdocumentisthescreeningdocument,thenineconcernswerenotaddressedseparatelyinRevision1ofthescreeningdocumentandwedidnotseeRevision0ofthescreeningdocument.Ifthisdocumentisanotherdocument,wehavenotseenit.Page4 October13,1992AttachmentReportability/Pg3Reportability/Pg3Reportability/Pg4Reportability/Pg4Reportability/Pg4TheresponsetoItemIIIismisleadingandtechnicallyinaccurate.EDRG20020raisedquestionsconcerningtheradiologicalreleaseanalysisforaboilingspentfuelpoolandidentifiedseveralnon-conservatismsinthisanalysis.Therefore,the10CFR100limitsarechallenged.TheresponsetoItemIIIstatesthatthespentfuelpoolcoolingsystemhas"two(2)safetygradeindependentsourcesofwatersystemsformakeupandcooling,theESWandRHRsystems."TheRHRfuelpoolcoolingassistmodeisnon-safetyrelated,non-singlefailureproof.AsdetailedinKevinBrinckman'sreport(PLZ-72288),useofRHRfuelpoolcoolingassistfollowingaLOCAisanunanalyzedconditionwiththepotentialforadverselyaffectingcoreandcontainmentcooling.AsdetailedinEDRG20020,useofESWmakeuptoaboilingspentfuelpoolisaninadequatelyanalyzedconditionwiththepotentialforadverselyaffectingperformanceofsafetyrelatedequipmentinthereactorbuilding.TheresponsetoItemIIIdescribesanalternatecoolingmethodusingESWsupplytothefuelpoolwithdraindownofwatertotherefuelingwaterstoragetank.TherecentESWflowbalanceconcludedthatsufficientflowwasavailabletomakeuptocompensateforboiloff,butdidnotindicatetheflowmarginnecessarytomaintainthefuelpoolbelowboiling.Additionally,thereisnoevaluationindicatingtheRWSTcanhandletheheatrejectedbythismeans.Itishighlyinappropriatetojustifyawayconcernsaboutanunanalyzedconditionbyrelyinguponanother.equallyunanalyzedcondition.'heresponsetoItemIIIstatesthatthefuelpoolinstrumentationareexpectedtobeavailableduringalossofoffsitepower.AsdetailedinKevinBrinckmansreport,thisinstrumentationwouldprobablynotbeavailablefollowingaLOCA.Thisinstrumentationisnon-lE,non-safetyrelatedandnon-seismicallydesigned.TheresponsetoItemIVistechnicallyinaccurate.Theresponsestatesthatthe"analyzeddesignbasisaccident(DBA)isaLOCAwithaconcurrentlossofoffsitepower."SinceeitheraLOOPortheconsequencesoftheLOCAcanproducealossofspentfuelpoolcooling,thecombinedeffectofaDBALOCAandalossofspentfuelpoolcoolingmustbeanalyzed.Hence,EDRG20020waswritten.Page5

October13,1992AttachmentReportability/Pg5Reportability/PgReportability/PgReportability/PgIntheresponsetoItemIV,theuseofRHRfuelpoolcoolingassistisdiscussed.AsdetailedinKevinBrinckman'sreport(PLI-72288),theuseofthisRHRmodefollowingaLOCAisanunanalyzedconditionswithpotentialadverseimpactoncoreandcontainmentcoolingfunctions.RelianceuponthisunanalyzedRHRfunctionisinappropriate.ZntheresponsetoItemIV,itisstatedthatthepost-LOCAradiationlevelsreportedinSSESFSARChapter18areforEQrequirements.However,theseChapter18requirementsareforDBALOCAconditionscoveringpersonnelaccess.TheESWandRHRsystemmanualvalvesinthereactorbuildingsonbothunitswouldbeinaccessiblepost-DBALOCAduetothecontainedradiationdosewhichisreflectedinSSESFSARChapter18andtheairbornecontributionwhichisnotaddressedinSSESFSARChapter18.TheparagraphatthetopofPage6statedthat"ananalysishasbeenperformedthatconcludestheequipmentcanwithstandthetemperatureeffectsofalossoffuelpoolcooling."However,nosuchvalidanalysishaseverbeenfound.SomeoftheexistinganalysesofreactorbuildingtemperaturesfollowingaZOCAdoassumeafuelpooltemperatureof212Fandaccountforthesensibleheatfromaboilingpool,butnoneofthesecalculationsaccountforthesignificantlatentheattransferredfromaboilingfuelpool.Znaddition,therearenoanalyseswhichshowthesafetyrelatedequipmentinthereactorbuildingcanwithstandeffectssuchashumidity,flooding,condensation,etcfromaboilingspentfuelpool.Thethirdparagraphonpage6ismisleading.Asstatedabove,theexistingcalculationsatbestonlyconsideredthesensibleheatfromaboilingspentfuelpool.Theneglectedlatentheatrepresentsalmost5timesthecalculatedreactorbuildingheatloadandwouldclearlyadverselyimpactreactorbuildingroomtemperatures.Reportability/Pg7TheresponsetoItemVZZisinaccurateandmisleading.TheSSESplantdesignfortheboilingspentfuelpoolconditiondoesnotmeet,.alltheFederalregulationsifsystemsbeyondthefuelpoolcoolingsystemareconsidered.Inaddition,designevolutionsatSSESsincetheinitialdesign,suchasforhighdensityspentfuelstorageracks,9x9fuel,andthenon-1Esheddingofreactorbuildingloads,shouldhavebeenopportunitiestodetectandcorrectthedeficienciesidentifiedinEDRG20020.Page6 October13,1992AttachmentReportability/Pg7ZntheresponsetoItemVIZ,theEmergencyPlanisrelieduponheavily.Heroicoperatoractionsareappropriatetomitigateeventsoutsidetheplant'sdesignbasissuchasATWS.Thepost-LOCAscenariosareanalyzedanddocumented,buttheyaredeficientasdetailedinEDRG20020.Itis'inappropriatetorelyonoperatoractionstofulfillrequirementsimposedontheplantdesign.Reportability/Pg7IntheresponsetoItemZZX(sicVIZZ),itisstatedthat"aspartofthedesignrequirementstheequipmentlocatedinthesecondarycontainmentmustbeabletowithstandtheeffectsofalossoffuelpoolcooling."Asstatedpreviously,EDRG20020waswrittentoreportseveralconditionsinwhichthesedesignrequirementsarenotsatisfied.Onceagain,operatoractionscannotbereliedupontosatisfythedesignrequirementsunderpostulatedDBALOCAconditions.Reportability/Pg9EDRG20020isdeterminednottobereportablebasedprimarilyuponrelianceonoperatoractionandrestorationofoffsitepowerwithinthetimetoboil.SufficienttechnicaljustificationhasnotbeenprovidedwhichwouldsupportthisdeterminationfortheDBALOCAwiththeradiationlevelsreportedinSSESFSARChapter18.OperabilityThecommentsforthescreeningandreportabilityevaluationsapplytotheoperabilityevaluationaswell.Page7 Attachwent25MemofromCharlesA.MyerstoGeorgeT.Jones,"FuelPoolCoolingIssues-Reportability/Operability",October20,1992 28October19924ugran.v~9e.H~3To:GeorgeT.JonesAS-2Copy:GlennMillerRockySgatraJbnKennyJimhgaeeDaaMcGNIM-3SSESS&k&From:CharhsAMyersAZ-4Suhject:FuelPoolCoolhshmes-ReyortabNiy/OpersLSNtyFeryourrequest,Ihavereviewedthesubjectnatter.IdMnotidentifyanysinglematterthat,atthistimewiththeinformationavailabla,appearedtomeettherequirementsforreportinatoNRC.Sonicofissuesare,however,ofsafetysignificance;theyshouMbepursuedmorenyeditiouslythanhasbeenthecaseandtheyshouldbeformallybroughttoNRC'sattention.ScopeThescopeofmyreviewincludedreview'fdocunuadationassochtedwiththesubjectanddiscussionswithmystaff{RockyS8arroandDanMcGann).ldidnotperformanyin<epthinterviewsbutdidobtainsomeadditionaldataandinputfromsomeofthepeopleinvolved..SinceIwantedtheefforttohaveadegreeoffromtheworkdonebyyourstaff,Ididnotdiscusstheirassessmentwiththemnorrelyonthelogictheyhadusedintheirdeterminations.RockySgarrohasreviewedtheirdeterminationshdetailandwi11providefeedbadr.directlytoJimAgnew.MyfocuswasonwhetherthemattersinvolvedwerereportableornotandtheirimpactontheoperabilityofpIantsystems.IusedEDRG20020asthebasisforthescopeofmyreview;IrecognizethatcertainmatterswitMnthatEDRarebeinghandledunderanotherEDR(andappropriatelyso).Ithaughtitprudenttocon.'Neertheentireissuehere.Indeteminingreportability,Ihavebas64myreviewontherephementscontainedin10CFRK.72ani.73andon10CFR60.9(references1-7).Zl/28'dT0:Q82667-Z~T indoingthisreview,IhavenotgivenspecificconsiderationtotheimpactsoftheFewerUprateprojectsincevehavenotyetreceivedNRCapproval.Ididconcludethateh/letheprojectmouldhavesomeimpactonthenumbersproducedbyvariousanalyses,it@asunlikelythatthechangeswouldchangethebasiccourseofanydesignbasisevents.Thatistheimpactappearstobeoneofslightlyreducingtimemarginsorsmallincreasesindoseconsequencesontheorderof5%.OvervievEDR620020andsupportingdocumentationgiveagenerallyaccurateidentificationoftheissues.1'vegroupedthesehmsinto5generalconcernsasdescribedbelow(parentheticalrel'erencesaretothespecificparagraphsinsection9oftheEDR).1,ThedesignbasisfortheplantandtheFSARhavenotbeensufBcientlyupdatedtoreflectchangesinfueldesignandoperation,particularlyinregardstotheSpentFuelPoolCoolingsystemdesignanalysis(Referencei1)an6theSpentFuelPooleventssuchasdescribedinFSARAppendix9A(Reference12).Theremaybaadditionalconsequancesbecauseofthesefueldesignan4operationalchangesthathavenotbeenadequatelyanalyzed.Theprincipalchangesinthefueldesignandoperationincludeincreasedburnup,changingfroma12morrthtoan18monthfuelcycle,andusing9X9fueldesigns{EDRSection9E,9F,9Gand9H)2.ThedesignbasisfortheplantandtheFSARhavenotbeenupdatedtoreflectthechangesinhowtheSperrtFuelPoolisoperatedduringoutages.TheremaybeadditionalfaUuremodesand/otadditionalccnseguences,becauseofthesechanges,thathavenotbeenader@atelyanalynxLTheprincipalduegesareroutinelyoEoadingtheentirecoreeachoutage,intertieingthetwofuelpools{usingonefuelpoolcoolingsystemforbothduringservicevateroilers),andusingtheRHRsystemindecayheat.removalmodeasanassisttofuelpoolcoolingtohandlepoo)heatloadsgreaterthanthefuelpoolcoolingsystemdesign.NDRSection9F.,9F,9G,9H,and9l)3.ThedesignbasisoftheplantandtheFSAR(fornormaloperation)donotaddresstheeffectofSpentFuelPoolboilingontheertuipmerrt,principallytheStandbyGasTreatmentSystemasidentifiedinNRCRegulatoryGuide$.29,thatmightbeusedtoreducetheccnsetymcesoflossofSpentFuelPoolcoolingsystems.(KDRSection98).4.ThedesignbashoftheplantandtheFSAR(fornormaloperation)donotaddresstheeffectofSpentFuelPoolboilingontheequiprrientneededtoachievesafeshutdown.particularlyinregardtomoisturecontentintheair,handlingofcondensation(includingQoodingprotection),andtheadditionalheatloadontheseccndarycoetainmentventQationsystems.(EDRSection9A,9B) 0 5.ThedesignbashoftheplantandtheFSARaddressMlthertheeffectofSpentFuelPoolbailinganequipmentneededtomitigatethedesignh&sLOCA/LOOPevent(samehazardsasabove)normeasurestorestorecoolingtopreverrttheSpentFuelPoolfromboilingduringtheI.OCA/LOOP.(TheSpentFuelPaolCoolingSystemsisoneoftheloadsshedduringtheevent.)(EDRSection9A,9B,9C,9D)DiscussionInmyreview,Icarefullyconsideredeachof'he9items(EDRG20020,itAMns9Athrough91).Fareaseofhandling,Iwilladdressthenintbe6groupsidentifiedabove.AsindicatedintheEDRitems9Gand9HanumberofclMegesinthedesignofthefuelarhowitoperateshavebeenmadesincethetablesassociatedwithFSARSection9.i.3andFSARAppendix9Awereprepared.Theseincludeachangeto9X9fuel,higherburnup,alongerfuelcycle,andfixingoftheoutagesinspringandfall.ClearlytheseFSARportionsrequireupdatingtoaccommodatethesechanges.Myreview,however,hdicatedthatnoneofthesedrargeshaveasubstantialirrrpactonthesafetyofthespentfueLTheprincipalisotopeofconcernisI-131,ThisisotopebuiMstoanequiBbriurnwlQQnafewweehafthestartofacycleandtheinventoryin.thespentfuelisrelativelyinsensitivetoburnnp,cyclelength,orthesizeofthethaipellet.TheremaybesomssmaHchejngesinproductionrateduetoadditionalPlutoniumfisslanwithincreasedburnup,orsamechangesinthethearetlcalreleaseoffissionpretextsfromleakingfuelrods(theescaperatecoefTicient)but,heretoo,1expecttheimpacttobesmall.ThereisgoadreasontobelievethattheexistinganalysisresultsarestiQbounding.Longerrefuelingcyclesleadtolargerdischargesoffueleachoutage;thisisaddressedbelowwithotherEelpaaloperationalissues.Theretoolapplicationsmadeeachcycleappeartoaddressproperlytheotherissues(i.e.issuesotherthantheimpactonthesperrtfhslpool).QDa&iaa-Whiletheslec5cfueldraractetisticsarenotthesameaswhatisaddressedintheFSARinregardtospentfuelstorage,theresultsaftheFSARanaiysasarejudgedtoremainaccurateandthecondltianisjudgedto~signiQcantlycompromiseplantsafety.Items9E,9F,96and9HdiscusschangesinhowthespmtarelisoperatedthathavenotbeenaddressedinFSARSection9.i..3andAppentBx9A.ThesechN~hcludemorefuelassembliesdischargedperfuelload.becauseafthelongercycle,falloEaadofthecoreeachrefbelingoutage,routineoperationinoutageswiththekaipoolsintertiedwithaneFuelPoolCoolingSysteminservtce,androutineoperationinoutageswithRHRindecayheatremovalmodetoassisttheFuelPoolCoolingSystemduring5diaEaad.

MyreviewindicatedthatthenormalpracticeoffullyoNoadingthecoreeachoutageresultsaconditionmoreseverethanthebasisforthe"MaxmrumNormalHeatLoad"caseaddressedinFBAR9.1.3andmoreseverethantheInitllconditionsassumedinthePSARAppeuBx9A.Usingbothactualnumbersforthecurrentoutage(seeReferenceS)andreviewoftheoperationalchanges,Iestimatethattheactualheatloadisabout4timesthatusedintheFSARanalysisforthesetwosituations.ThisincreaseinheatleadincreasesthetotalheatloadgiveninFSARtab1e9.1-2aand-2bbyincreasingtheheatloadduetothemostrecentlydischargedfhel(theamountofheatduetopreviouslydischargedassinbliesislowandisrelativelyunaffectedbytheconcernsIdentifiedinthisKDR.)Thesetablesareprovidedforinformation,only.Myreviewindicatedthatwecurrentlydonotexceedthe"EmergencyHeatLoad"conditionsidentifiedinFSARTable9,1-2cand-2dbutareonlyasmallamauntlower.FSARAppendix9Aanalyzesradiologicalconssquencesofthelossoffuelpoolcoolingduringnormaloperation.'itsapproximiteiyfourfoldincreaseinheatloadduetofullcoreoffloadwouldleadtoanincreasehevaporationratewithaconsequentialincreaseInthereleaseofI-$31fromtheboilingpool.MFSARanalysesprovidesaparametricstudybutthelargestcalculateddoseis0.096REM(ThyroidDoseattheLPZfor30days).TheNRCintheirSZRforSSKS(Reference9)identifiesthelimittheyuseasi,5REM.Usingafactoroffourincreaseinreleaseswou16leadtoatotaldoseofaberOAREMwhichisstillasma6fractionofthevalueusedhyNRCintheSERasayardstick.Gmzlusiau-Thechangesinoperationofthefuelpool,principallyroutinelyoffioadingthecore,arenotanalyzedintheFSARenddoleadtoanincreaseinradiologicalcol~lsices.Themagnitudeofthereleaseisstillsmall,however,andisstillwellbelowNRCsguidelinesasidentifiedinourSER.Underthecurrentruiesthisdoesnotappeartobe.aconditionthatWa~y+ammingplWarmy.Thevariousmodesofoperationofthe5a9poolsandthecavitiesarenotidentifiedintheFSAR.OneanalysLIhasbeensubmittedtotheNRC(Reference10)whichprovidesuswithsomeoftheresultswemightgetwhentheanalysisiscompleted,UsmgthevaluesihaitiQsifortheanalysisinSafetyEvaluationNL-86405(attachedtoReferencei0),mywavierindicatedthateitherthecanBguratianipooland1cavityor2fuelpools(attheappropriatetimapostshutdown,wouldprobablyresultinathnetoboilnotsignificantlydifferentfromthe25hoursusedintheAppendix9Aanalysis,andthereforethemodeofoperationwouldnotchmgetheanalysissubstantially.

Cgzlmgn,-ThechangesinmodeofoperationoftheSueipools(otherthanthecompletecoreoffloadstrategydiscussedearlier)probablydoesnotsubstantiallyaffecttheresultsoftheFSARanafyses.Thereisaneedtadotheappropriateanalysesofthecurrentoperatingmodes.Suchareviewmightuncoveradditioedfailuremodesnotefdt¹.sadintheFSARorNightgivedifferentresultsbasedcntheIQOdeiingofmovementofwaterbet%Ã9lthe$lools.Thisanalysiswillalsoveriiytheadequacyoi'administrativelimitsandtestscurrentlydonetoensurethesafetyofthespentfuel.Basedontheinformationavailableatthistime,Iconcludethatthereisnobasisforconcludingthatthisconditionsianificant1ycompromisessafety.Theconditionsthatmakeupthetwoitemsabovedonothaveconsepaacesthatexceedcurrentreportabilitysteuhtds,however,theexisterxeoftheseerrorsoveralongperiodoftimewithmanypeopleknowingofthechangesthathadtakenplaceconstitateaconcernlargerthannightexistifasingleoversighthadgoneundiscovered.%dietheprovisionsof10CFRK.9(b)donotappeartoapplybecauseofthelackofasignificantbnplicationforpublichealthand,sakeorcammndefenseandsecurity',itmaybeprudenttoFomaQynotifytheNRCofboththeconditionandourcorrectiveactionsothattheycanconfimaourjudgmentofsignificem.NRCintheirSER(whichreferstoRegulatoryGuide1.29and1.52)identifiestheneedfortheSCABStomeetcertaincriteriaasabasisforapprovingtheuseofnon-SeismicCfassI5mlpoolcooingsystetns.VhUenocreditappearstohavebeentakeninFSARAppendix9AforthebeneGtscfEtrationthroughSGTS,itisreasonabletoassumethatitvasNRC'sintenttohaveSGTSavailableformitigationofreleasesRomthePmlpool.TheSGTSisapparentlydesignedfortheenvtromnent(usingpreheatingtoreducehumidity).'ReKDRindicatesthattheimpactofcandensationbuQduponthestructuralintegrityoftheductworkhasnotbeenproperlyanalyzed.Itisnotcharwhethertheductvotkwouldormuhinotfail,andifitMed,itisnotclearthatitmouldpreventSGISfrtznSanctioningforthisevent.Baseiiontheseuncertainties,Icannotmakeajudgnmd;inregardtotheimpactonplantsafety.QgngJlgigg-Therequiredanalysisshouldbecompletedexpeditiously(oranapplicableexistinganalysNfound)andthereportabilityofthisitembere-assessed.Itappears,fromtheevidencethatIreviewed,thatthismatterisreportableifitisconcludedthatthecondensatebuilduppreventsSGTSRomperformingitsfunction.

TheissuehthepreviousthreequestionsinvolvedchangesinthedesignoroperationoftheplantortheadequacyofananalysisspeciQcaHydonetoassureacceptab0ity.Theremainingtwoquestionsinvolvewhetherornotthephenomenaassociatedwiththefuelpoolboilingevenneedtobeconsideredasahazardtoothersafetyequipmentduringnormaloperationandaccidents.PPRLmaywelldecidethattheseconditionsareonesthatthiybelieveneettobeaddressedtomeetitsstandards,butthereportabiHtyquestioniswhetherornotthe.matteriswithinourlicensingdesignbasis.Therecordisnotperfectlydear.VecanfindnoevidenceintheformofNRCguidance,questionstousduringliceming,ormattersonourdocketthatindicatethatNRCconsideredthesephenomenaaspartofourlicensingbasis.Thereisdiscourseabouttheseismiccapabilityofthefuelpoolcoolingsystens,aboutthemethodsandassumptionsofanalysisoftheraHologicalcansepmcesoftheevent,andaboutthedesignoftheSGTS,butnotabouttheimpactofboUingontheothersafeshutdownoraccidentmitigationequipment.Historicaily,conditionsthatmightdevalopsubstantiallyaftertheinitiationofthedesignbasiseventswerefrcqm5ynotconsideredpartoftheBcensingbasis.Thiswasbecausethefocuswasonimmediateactionsenddirectconsequences,andthepresenptionthatothermatterscouldbehandledbytheemeryncystafftdanlgecontrol).Increasinglywithtime,NRChasstartedtoaddresssuchmattersadding1ongertermnuheupofcoolingwater,30dayanalystsofsprayponds,etc.NonethelessmostoftheconsequencesofdesignbasiseventsoutsidethesafetyrelatedareasarestiHnotroutinely,formallyevaluatedduringinitiallicensingactivities.Thereareelementsintherecordthatdoraisesomequestions:~DuringthelicensingofSSES,theNNP-2pltmtwasdealingwithaconcernfortheimpactoffuelpoolboilingcondensatefloodingonECCSequipment;aftersubstentia1time,theyupgradedtheirfuelpoolcoolin8systen(Reference13).DespitethefactthatSSESwasnotyetBamsed,IfoundonevidencethattheVifNP-2issuewasraisedonSSES.~OurReactorBuildingHVACanalysisinthelate$80's(identifiedastheCOTTAPanaiyshintheKR)tookIntoaccotmtthe"sinsibleheaVfromafuelpoolat212'Fbutnotthe'latentheat'.Itismyuruierstandingthatthiswasdoneforextraconservatism.NotethatthemodelusedatthetimeapparentiycouMnotaddresstheeffectsofmoisturereleasedtotheairfromthepool,sosuchconservatismOntheformofhigherheathput)mighthave,therefore,beenappropriate.~Reportedly,earlier(1970's)heatloadcalculateshavebeenpurportedtoincludeheatinyuhfromaboilingpool.(Ihavenot,inspectedtheperUnentdocumentsmyself.j2T/L8d~:88266T-22~T

-Vietherearesomefactorsthatraisedoubt,thepreponderanceoftheevidencesaysthattheeffectoftheboilingenvironmentonbothnormalendpostaccidentenvironmentsmsnotconsideredtobeaaquirementforthelicensingofSSES,AcomplicatingfactorthatgivesmesubstantialconcernisthattheeffectofInterestfallsinthecategoryofconsequentialfailures;thatis,thedanegeisadirectresultofevaluatingthedeterministicprogressoFtheeventandnotduetoassumptionofarbitraryFailures,IthereforehavereviewedgeneraUyvhatthecccmquencesmightbeforlossoffuelpoolcoolingduringnormaloperation.Forthissituation,theReactorBuildingLssufficientlyaccessiblesothatESVcanbeaiigldtoprovidetheneededma&upandinitiallythepooltemperatureandlevelcanbcdetermInedbydirectobservation.AnalysisisrequiredtoverifythatsuFuientInsttmnentationisavailableorasafestrategyIsavailabletomaintainvaterlevelisavailablevithoutinstmnentationafterthepooltemperatureIncreaseprectudesdirectobservation.Itappearsthatasuccessfulstrategyispossiblevithoutma]orchanges.Duringthisevent,RBHVACZone3(refuelingfloor)should.remainisolatedfsccntheremahdaroftheReactorBuilding(orbecapableofbeingisolate4.Thisshouldpreventthehot,moistenvimmaatftomdirectlyaffectingmostECCSejiipment.CondensationInthezone,however,villenterthedrainsysbms,andmight,therefore,beabletoimpacttheECCSsystemsduetafloodingorsectaryevaporationandheatingduetohotvtterInthesumps.Nonitheless,giventhetimeinvolved,itappearsfeasibletotabdamagecontrolstepstoaccoauaodatetheimpaats.Qgg1~jgg,-VMesubstantialanalysisisrequired,and,proceiuresmigSneedtobedeveloped,IdonotcurrentlybeHevethatthisconstitutesamattethats~icentlycompromisesplMltsafety.TheIntroducheyparagraphslntheprevioussectiondiscusstheimpactofthismatteronthelicensingbasisof'heplant.ThelimitingeventappeestobetheLOCAJLOOPbecauseInthisevent,bathhatpoolcoolingsystemsaremnovedhornservicethr~loadshehHng.InitiaLreviewindicahsthat,practically,offsitepover.iskepdred(fortheservicevatersystem)torestorefidelpoolcooling.RHRisfullyoccupiedwithcoo}Ingthecoresandlorsuppressionpoolsonbethunits.ZTiBS'd Anadditionalconcernexistsinregardtotheeffectafbathdirectradiationandradiationinthebuildingatmosphereonoperationofessentialequipment.Specifically,ifsubstantialamountsofradiatianarereleasedtocertainplantsystemsartothebuildingatmosphere,damagecontrolactionswiiibeHmltedandaccesstotheESTtainitiatemakeuptothepoolmaybyprecludedarextremelydifficult.Thesafetysignificanceafthisconditionisthereforedependentonthereleaseaffissionproductsduringtheevent.Useafmorerealisticanalysesmaybeappropriateinhandlingmatterslikethisthatareoutsidetheboundsconsideredinoriginallicensing.TheFSARChapter15providessucha"reaiistic"analysis.RecentGKwork(beingusedinaurPaverUprateapplicatian)indicatesthatthepotentialfordamageframaLOCA(andLOCAtLOOP)ismuchlovesthanoriginallyestimated(duetoloverpeakcladtemperatures)sotheFSAR'realistic"analysismaybeoverlyconservative.Nonetheless,theinformationavailabledoesnatprovideabasisforconcludingvlietherESVissufficientlyaccessiblearwhataccessisavailablefordamagecontrolefforts.ConclusionsmdReeammemhtieas:i.WiththeemptionofEDR20020item9I,theconcernsabouttheanalysisendphenomenaappeartobevalid.2.ThemattersidentifiedinEDR20O20items9E,9P,96and9HmvolvechligesinthedesignendoperationoftheplantthathavenatbeenproperlyreflectedintheFSAR.Theymustbeproperlyanalyzed(includingiOCFR50.59safetyevaluationsvherenotcurrentlyavailableorcomplete)andthePSARulxhited.Myrevievindicatedthatthecalculatedradiologicalconseqeaices(FSARAppendix9A)vouhibeincreasedbutstiEvlthinthelimitsidentifiedbyNRCinourSER.Assuchthecoiiditlondoesnotappeartomeetexistingcriteriafarrepartab0lty.3.Notvitlistamilngtheinformationin2above,lbelievethatitisprudenttoofficiallyendformallyinformNRCafthismatterbecauseitappearstobeassociatedwithaprogrammeahussthatallovedchangestooccurthatarenotproperlydocumentedintheFSAR.GivenmycurrentthatNuclearFnaineerlnghasdetermlneithattheconsideratianafha6poalboilingiinpactsansafetysystems(otherthanSGTSandtheRefueHngBeeenclosure)isnotpartofthedesignbasisoftheplantandmyrevievindicatingthatitvasnotpartoftheHcensin8basisoftheplant,IdonotGndabasisforthe.mattertobereportable.NatethatthismatterappearstypicalofshatothershavefacedduringdesignbasisrecoiistitutlaneffortsandthatvevtlifaceintheftltureantheDBDproject.

'Theabove(paragraphg)doesnotmeanthatthemattermaynotbesignificanttosafety.BItttttttttt~tttttttMttttttLOCA/LOOPeventandconsideringthedif6cultiesthattheoperatorsmight,infact,experiencetryingtocopevlththoseconsequences,lheHevethemattermeritspromptattention.Those'anetlysesmayAHuncoverconseguencesthatviQbedeterminedtobereportablesocceitinuaireviewofreportabiHtyisrequiretL6..TheimpactoFheateeimoisture(fromthespentheipoolduringlossoffuelpoolcooHna)ontheSGTSshouldbeevaluatedimmediately;iftheSGTSisnotdetceninedtobecapaMeofperformingitshtlans,1beHevethatthisconditionvouMbereportableesanumealyzedconditionthatsigniQamtlycompromisesplantsafety,7.1suggestuseofthevoluntaryLERapproachtoaddressthecomnnmicatianre@unmendedinparagralih3above.Ifyouchosetofollowthhapproach,IrecommendthatadiscussionoftheconcernsinregardtolossoffuelpoolcoolingduringtheLOCA/LOOPbediscussedandthegeneralapproachtoaddressingthematterbeidentified,ThereissuEcientconnectionbetvsenthetwomattersthataddressingonlyoneveuMconstituteanincompletecoauaunicatice.NRAisreadytoassistyouinreportpreparationityouvish.8.Duringmyreview,theactualseismicdesignbasisforthespentfuelcooHngsystemmsnotclem".VhileitisclearlynotSeimicQassI,thecooHngportionshouldbecapableofmaintainingitspressureboundaryErcunatleastihirmganearthquakeandpreferablyduringtheloadingduetothesuppressionpooldynamIcsduringaLOCA.Plan-SeismicCategoryI,QualityGroupC).9.TherecorddoesnotprovideanyevidencethatNRChasdeterminedotsuggestedthatthismatteriseitherreportableornotreportable.VhHsNRChasreceivedinformationfromPPM.aboutthismatter,theyhavenottothebestafmyknovledgeprovidedanyFeedbackinregardtoreportabiHty,nordoIexyectthantowheevearestillprocessingtheissue.i0.IauldnotethatIhavesubshntiaisympathyfortheEDRoriginators.IbeBevethattheyhavepefannedusaservicebyideaUfyingthaissuesandmaintainingthepressuretoensurethattheissuesareahhmed.!recognimethefeeHng*thatamatterofsafetyimportaaeuast,asamitterofcourse,be"reportable'.TherequirementsforreportaMty,ho%aver,arenotwritteninthat@ay.TheyareinteniiedtoensurethatoenoperatesvithhtheboundsauttlrhedbylMlsHcense.IwasunabletoidentifyaconditionthatputusoutsideourHcensethatmetthereportablUitycriteria,Notwithstmdhigthis,IbeHevevehavecertainmoralresponsibilitiestonotonlyaddressthesesafetyissuesbuttoformallynotifyNRCofourconcernandouractions.f1.Irecogni2ethatyouhaverecentlyre-directedyourstat!toattack.thetechnicalissueshvolved.IbeHevethat@asappropriateandthattheurgencyshouldremain.ZTr8T'dC,tr:88ZGGT-ZZ~T 10References(Allofthefollowingreferenceswereusedinmyrevieweventhoughnotailarecitedintheabovememorandum.AdditionalinformationwasloohdatduringthisreviewbutdidnotprovidespecificinformationontheissuesathanddifferentRomthatincfudedinthereferencesbelow.)1..10CFR50.72(b}(1)(ii)(A),(B),and(C)2.10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i)3.'lOCFR50.72(b)(2)(ill)(A),(B),(C),and(0)4.10CFR60.73(a)(2)(ii)(A),(B),and(Cj5.iOCFRK;73(a)(2)(v)(A),(B),(C),and(D)6.10CFR50.73(a)(2)(vi)7.10CFR60.9{b)8.PU-72230,A.DyszeltoT.C.Daipbu,dated2iAugust:1992,"U2RI05FuelPoolDecayiiSEWiiYM~ldelllliitddUilhliii4petMIiiH~afullcoreoEoadintheUnit2Pool.ItahoidentiBesadministrativeLhnitsthat,ifobservedrifiprovideatleast25hourstobo0fng(FSARvalue)lfthefuelpoolcoo11ngsystcmisfestwhileitisprovidingtheonlycooHagtothespentfuel.Thelimitalsoassuresthatrequirettmahuy(barntheESVisnetgreaterthan60gym(FSARvalue).9.NRCSERforSSES.10.PLA-2720,H.V.KeisettoNRC,dated12September1986,'ProposedAm'/ment41TodeceaseNo.NPF-22,SupplementalInformation.".hcfehsSafetyEvaluationNL-86-005.ThissubmittaleMressesanEmergencyTechnicalSpadQcationQmngeRequesttotabthesecondtrainofRHRoutofserviceduringanoutagewiththecoreoEloadedandthecavityandbeth@elpoachconnected.TheanalysisshowedthatwiththelargerwatervolmeavaUablethethaetoboilwasincreasedeventhoughtheheatLoadwassubshntlallyhigherthanFSARAppeuHr9Aanalysisused,11.FSARSection9.1.3,SpmtFuelPoolCoolingandCleansSystem,includingassociatedtables.12.FSARApllendix9A,AnalysisForNonSeimnicSpentFuelPoolCoolingSystems13.SERCHlicensinginformation,datedApril$987,entitled"Non-CategoryISpmtPuefPoolCoolingSysten(SFPCS)"14ET-OH9,dated19March1992,SteamElectricStationSpmtFuelPoolBoilingImues.DocumentstheoriginalconcernsthatwereLater~iocume&dhEDR20020.

15.EDR20020,Rev0,dated16Apri)1992,"LossofSpentFuelPoolCoolingEventDesignDiscrepancies"16.ET-S}71,dated22June1992,DaveLochhmmandDonPrevattetoJoeZola,entitled"SupplementalInformationforEDRGZXZOonBoilingSpentFuelPool"17.Notnumbered,dated26June1992,presutnedtobefrolDaveLochbaumandDonPrevatte,entitled"EDR620020References".18.Report,dated27July1992,byDavidA.LochbaumandOcceldC.Prevatte,entitled"SafetyConsequencesofaBoilingSpentFuelPoolattheSteamElectricStation"19.PU-72288,dated1September1992,KevinV.BrinchnantoGeorgeT.Jones,"RevievofFuelPoolCooling".ContainsastudybyKevinandcommissionedbyQeorae,toevaluateth8ty~dth10IIIWMtl.YhI'thdg'fKR620020,KevinBrhxhnan,andmyselfarenotsubstantiallydiNerentinregardtotheconsequencesshouldboilingoccur.20,PU-7E%7,dated9September1992,J.R.MilbahergertoGeorgeT.Jones,"SpentFuelPoolCooling".IdentifiesNShGconcernsandactionsassociatedwithspentfuelpoolcooling.ThecommsideNQedcloselyparallelthoseMentifiedintheEDRendinmyownreviee.Thisrefereealsogoesintothemostdateahoyspentfuelpooloperatingmodes.21.Unnumbered,dated9October1992,memofromDavidA.LodhaumandDonaldC.PrevattetoGeorgeT.Jones,"ReportabNtyofBoilingFuelPoolConcerns'.Thisreferee'aisedconcernsaboutthehandlingofthesubjectmatter,principallytheamountoftimeinvolved,butalsoinctutiessamatechnicaldiscussionspertinenttothemAer.22.ET-07M,dated7October1992,memofromJ.E.AgnewtoJ.M.Kenny.TransmitsEDR620020,endthamostrecentraportaMityandoperabilityassessa~ntfromNuclearTecbnology.23.Umnnnbered,dated14October1992,memofromDavidA.Lodlbauman4DonaldC.PrevattstoGeorgeT.Jones,"DisagreemntvithScremhtg,ReportabilityandOperaMlityEvaluationsforEDRG20020'.MentifiesspecificproblemswithReference22.24.Draftanalysis,dated9October1992,byDavidG.Kosteln8r.,entitled"LossofFuelPoolCooHngEveat,EvaluationforKDR~620020'.Tbis.draftpaperideatiGestheoperatin8~ylhyISEtituaatytWMt~prdttheseoperettingmodes.

Attachsent26PP&LMemofromGlennD.MillertoGeorgeT.Jones,"EvaluationofEDRG20020-SpentFuelCoolingIssue",October21,1992(PLI-72711)Note:Inthismemo,PP8LforthefirsttimeaddressestheconcernsinEDRG20020individually.Indoingso,PP8Lagreesthatsevenofthenineconcernsarevalid,yetdeterminesthattheoperabilityoftheplantisnotaffectedanditisnotreportable.

~~~IOctober21,1992GeorgeT.JonesA6-2SUSQUEHANNASTEAMELECTRICSTATION'VALUATIONOFEDRG20020-SPENTFUELPOOLCOOLINGISSUEPLI-72711FILEA45-1ATheattachedevaluationofEDRG20020isprovidedinresponsetoyourmemoPLI-72640.ThisevaluationwaspreparedbymyselfandateamofengineersworkingontheactionplantoresolvethesubjectEDR.Inthecourseofreviewingthisissueindetail,wehaveconcludedthatsevenofthenineidentifieddiscrepanciesarenotvaliddeficiencies.Thisisexplainedindetailintheevaluation.Thetworemainingdiscrepanciesarevaliddeficienciesbutarenotconsideredsafetysignificantnorreportable.Ibelievethatthetechnicalbasisonseveraloftheseissueshasbeenclarifiedconsiderablyinthecourseofthepastweek.Therefore,IsuggestprovidingthisevaluationtoNuclearRegulatoryAffairsforreconsiderationofthereportabilityaspects.Wearecontinuingwiththeremainingactionitemsasrequested.Adetailedengineeringdesignreportandjustificationforinterimoperationwillprovidemoredetailthancontainedintheattachedevaluation.WearescheduledtomeetwithPORConHondayOctober26,1992at2:30pmtoreviewthisissue.WeareworkingwithSystemsEngineering,OperationsandNRA-Compliancewithrespecttopotentialcompensatorymeasures..ueGlennD.HillerCC:G.J.KuczynskiC.A.MyersH.W.SimpsonH.G.StanleyJ.S.StefankoJ.R.MiltenbergerNuclearRecords-SSES-A2-4-Al-2-SSES-A9-3-A6-1-A6-2J.E.M.R.D.F.J.H.F.G.D.C.D.A.AgnewMjaatvedtRothKennyButlerPrevatteLochbaum-A6-3-A6-3-SSES-A2-4-A6-3-A6-3-Enercon October21,1992Page1EvaluationofEDRG20020ThisdocumentcontainsanevaluationofthediscrepanciesdocumentedinEDRG20020,"LossofSpentFuelPoolCoolingEventDesignDiscrepancies."ConclusionsoftheauthorwithrespecttoreportabilityoftheseconcernsandoperabilityimpactonSSESarealsoprovided.DesinBasisThedesignbasesfortheFuelPoolCoolingSystemarefoundinFSARsection9.1.TheportionsofthedesignbasisrelevanttoEDRG20020areasfollows:1.Maintainthefuelpoolwatertemperaturebelow125Funder"normalmaximumheatloads"definedas12.6HBtu/hr(equivalenttoatypicalfuelcycledischargeschedulewhichfillsthefuelpool,lastquartercoreoffloadat6.7daysaftershutdown).2.3.4,Maintainfuelpoolwatertemperatureatorbelow125Fduringthe"emergencyheatload"conditionof32.6HBtu/hr(equivalenttoafullcoreoffload10.5daysafterashutdownfollowingatypicalfuelcycledischargeschedulewhichfillsthefuelpool)utilizingtheRHRsystem(withorwithoutnormalfuelpoolcooling)forfuelpoolcooling.Thismodeofoperationapplies"duringperiodsofhigherthanHNHLgenerationinthefuelpool,eg.,storingofafullcoreofirradiatedfuelshortlyaftershutdown".TheRHRsystemisusedundertheseconditionstoassisttheFPCCSindissipatingthedecayheat.Thus,anyheatloadinexcessof12.6HBtu/hrisconsideredtobewithinthedesignbasisfortheRHRFPCassistmodeofoperation.RedundantSeismicCategoryIESWconnectionstoeachpoolareprovidedtoallowformakeupofevaporativelossesintheeventoffailureoftheFPCsystem.Theconditionsareboundedbyafuelpooltime-to-boilanalysisbasedonthesametypicalfuelcycledischargescheduleasinbasis¹1exceptthetimeaftershutdownis10.5daysinsteadof6.7daysresultinginaheatloadof9.8MBtu/hr.(Thisexplainsthedifferencebetweenthetwodifferentheatloads,ie.,12.6HBtu/hrforbasis¹1and9.8HBtu/hrforbasis¹3.Thisisnotadiscrepancy.)TheESWmakeuplineissizedonthebasisofthiscalculation(ReferenceFSARsection3.13).ThecauseoftheLossofSpentFuelPoolCoolingeventisstatedtobeaseismicevent.5.AllpipingandequipmentsharedwithorconnectingtotheRHRintertieloopareSeismicCategoryIandcanbeisolatedfromanypipingassociatedwiththenon-SeismicCategoryIfuelpoolcoolingsystem.EvaluationofDiscreanciesNotedinEDRG20020EDRG20020describesninediscrepanciesrelatingtothelossofspentfuelpoolcoolingevent.Thisdiscussionwillsummarizeeachissue.Thereaderis October21,1992Page2referredtothecompletetextoftheEDR.GeneralStatementTheintroductoryparagraphoftheEDRstates:"...thedesignprovisionforthelossofspentfuelpoolcoolingeventistopermitthefuelpooltoboilandmaintainitswaterlevelabovethefuelthroughmakeupfromtheESWsystem.ThisdesignprovisionisnecessarybecausethefuelpoolcoolingsystemusedfornormaloperationandtheRHRfuelpoolcoolingassistmodeusedforabnormalheatloadsarenotdesignedtosatisfyseismiccategoryIandsinglefailurecriteria."Asstatedindesignbasis¹5abovetheRHRfuelpoolcoolingassistportionofthepipingisdesignedtoseismiccategoryIrequirements.NocredithoweveristakenforthismodeofoperationinthefuelpoolboilinganalysisintheFSAR.Creditistakenforthismodeforemergencyheatloadsituationsasdefi'nedbybasis¹2.DiscussionofEDRItemsAthrouhIInordertodiscussandevaluateeachoftheninediscrepancieslistedintheEDRitwillbemorelogicaltoreviewtheminadifferentorder.ItemsE&Fbothrelatetothetime-to-boilcalculationsandwillbereviewedfirstfollowedbyitemsGthroughI,whicharerelatedtothetime-to-boilconcern.ItemsC8Dinvolveoperatoractionconsiderationsandwillbediscussednext.FinallyitemsA88relatingtotheevaporationeffectswillbediscussed.

October21,1992Page3ItemE;AnalticalTime-to-Boil"Theanalytical25hourtime-to-boilforthespentfuelpoolisnonconservativeforthemaximumnormalheatloadinthespentfuelpool."Asstatedinbasis¹Ithemaximumnormalheatloadis12.6HBtu/hr.Asstatedinbasis¹2thetime-to-boilanalysisisbasedonaheatloadof9.8HBtu/hr.Thesetwodesignbasesareinfactconsistentandarebasedonthesame"typicalfueldischargeschedule"andrefuelingoutagescenario.Thedifferenceintheheatloadisduesolelytothetimeaftershutdownassumedforpurposesofestablishingthedesignbasis.Focusingonthetime-to-boilanalysis,atimeaftershutdownvalueof10.5daysisused.Thisisthe'timeatwhichitisassumedthatrefuelingiscompletedandthereactorcavitytofuelpoolgatesarereinstalled.PriortothatpointtheadditionalwaterstoredinthereactorcavityisalsoavailableasaheatsinkandtheRHRsystemisavailableforfuelpoolcooling.Fortimesgreaterthan10.5daystheappropriateheatloadwillbeevenlowerthantheanalyzedvalueof9.8HBtu/hr,.FortheSSESUnit25RIOthemmefromreactorshutdowntofuelpoolgatesinstalledwas38days.ThedecayheatintheUnit2poolatthattimeiscalculatedtobe5.65HBtu/hr(ReferenceSEA-HE-405).Thecorrespondingtime-to-boilis45hours.TheEDRgoesontodiscussothercalculationswhichresultindifferentheatloadsusingvariousassumptions.CalculationNFE-B-NA-053wasperformedbyNuclearFuelstoaccountforactualfueldischargehistoryandfutureoffloadsaccountingforpoweruprateconditions.Thefuelpoolheatloadversustimecurvesobviouslywillincreasesubsequenttopoweruprate,however,thesecurvesdonotapplytotheexistingdesign.Aslongasthecalculateddecayheatislessthan9.8HBtu/hratthepointwherethefuelpoolgatesarereinstalledtheoriginaldesignbasistime-to-boilcalculationisstillvalid.CalculationH-FPC-009determinedtime-to-boilconditionspostpoweruprate.Thiscalculationshowsthatthetime-to-boilforthedesignbasisheatloadof9.8HBtu/hrisslightlygreaterthan25hours.Inconclusion,thedesignbasisforthetime-to-boilconditionisestablishedbythe9.8HBtu/hrvalueusedintheoriginalcalculations.ThisdesignbasisismetbyplanningtheoutagesothatthefuelpoolisnotisolatedfromthereactorcavityortheRHRsystempriortoapointintimewheretheactualheatloadis9.8HBtu/hrorless.Thisdiscrepancyisnotavaliddeficiency,isthereforenotreportableandhasnoimpactontheoperabilityoftheplant.

October21,1992Page4ItemF:Time-to-BoilforEmerencHeatLoad"Theanalytical25hourtime-to-boilforthespentfuelpooldoesnotaccountfortheemergencyheatloadinthespentfuelpool."Asdiscussedabove,thetime-to-boilconditionsapplytoconfigurationswherethespentfuelpoolsareisolatedfromthereactorcavity(ie.,non-refuelingconfigurations).AsiscorrectlystatedintheEDR,currentpracticeistofullyoffloadthecoreduringeachrefuelingoutage.SpecificcalculationsareperformedbyNuclearFuelstodeterminetheabilityoftheFPCsystemtoremovethecombineddecayheatofthecross-tiedrefuelingpools.Testsarealsoconductedtodeterminethattheactualheatremovalcapabilityexceedstheactualfuelpoolheatloadsduringtheoutage(ReferenceTP-235-011).Normallythereactorcavityismaintainedfloodedandcross-tiedtothefuelpools.OneloopofCoreSprayisalwaysoperableinthisconfiguration.OnedivisionofRHRismaintainedinshutdowncoolingmodeexceptforabriefperiodrequiredforthecommonRHRsystemoutagewindow.Designbasis¹2statesthatheatloadsinexcessoftheHNHLareconsideredtobeemergencyheatloads.ThedesignoftheRHRsystemtoassisttheFPCsystemduringemergencyheatloadconditionsassuresthatfueldecayheatisremoved.Notime-to-boilcalculationforthisconfigurationisrequiredsincetheRHRsystemwillbeinoperationoravailable.Atanyrate,suchacalculationshouldconsidertheeffectoftheadditionalwaterinventoryavailablefromthefloodedreactorcavity,caskstoragepitanddryerandseparatorstoragepoolwhichareallcross-connectedduringthistime.makeupinventoryisalsoavailablefromCoreSprayandtheRHRsystemisnormallyin-serviceexceptforthecommonRHRsystemoutagewindow.Inconclusion,notime-to-boilanalysisisrequiredfortheemergencyheatloaddesignbasis.SinglefailuresoftheRHRsystemarenotrequiredforthisdesignbasisfortheemergencyheatload(ReferenceSRP9.1.3).Thisdiscrepancyisnotavaliddeficiency,notreportableandhasnoimpactonplantoperability.

October21,1992Page5Item6:RadioloicalReleaseCalculationforBoilinSentFuelPool"Theradiologicalreleaseanalysisforaboilingspentfuelpoolusesnonconservativeevaporationrates."Thisdiscrepancyisdirectlyrelatedtotheheatloadassumedforthetime-to-boilanalysis.Theevaporationrateusedinthedosecalculationisbasedonaheatloadof9.8MBtu/hrwhichisthedesignbasisheatloadforthetime-to-boilcal'culation.Heatloadsinexcessof9.8MBtu/hrobviouslyresultinhigherevaporationrates.SincethediscussionunderItemEaboveestablishesthat9.8MBtu/hristhecorrectoriginaldesignbasisandstillboundscurrentoperationthereisnodiscrepancyintheoffsitedosecalculation.Itusesanevaporationrateconsistentwiththedesignbasisheatload:Thisdiscrepancyisnotavaliddeficiency,notreportableandhasnoimpactonplantoperability.

October21,1992Page6ItemH:NonconservativeActivitTerms"Theradiologicalreleaseanalysis-foraboilingspentfuelpoolusesnonconservativeactivityterms.Theoriginaldesigncalculation(200-0048)assumed12monthoperatingcyclesand184bundleequilibriumreloadsizestodeterminetheactivitytermsforfailedfuelinthefuelpool.SSEScurrentlyhas18monthoperatingcycleswithapproximately230bundlereloadswhichwillincreasetoapproximately254bundlesafterpoweruprate.Sincethecalculationimpliedthatmostoftheactivityresultsfromthemostrecentdischargebatch,theeffectofincreasingthedischargesizefrom184bundlesassumedinthecalcto230and254bundleswouldappeartobenonconservativewithrespecttotheradiologicalreleaseanalysis."Theoriginalradiologicalreleaseanalysisasreferencedaboveisconservativeforthefollowingreasons:(1)theactivitylevelsusedasasourcetermarebasedon1Xfailedfuel.Allofthefailedfuelrodsareassumedtobeintheoffloadedbatchof184fuelassemblies.Therefore,increasedbatchsizeswillnotincreasetheamountofthesourcetermusedinthisanalysis.(2)theactivitylevelsusedfortheiodinesourcetermarebasedonsaturationlevelinventoriesforacoreoperatingat3440NHtforonethousanddays.Therefore,thefuelcyclelengthwillnotaffectthesourceterm.Inconclusion,theoffsitedosecalculationremainsvalid.Thisdiscrepancyisnotavaliddeficiency,notreportableandhasnoimpactonplantoperability.

October21,1992Page7ItemI:Analsisf'rHaxTimePriortoHakeu"Theanalysisformaximumtimepriortomakeuptoaboilingspentfuelpoolisbaseduponnonconservativeassumptions.Theoriginaldesigncalculation(175-14)determinedthetimeusingevaporationoftheentirefuelpoolwaterinventory.Themaximumtimeshouldbebaseduponaminimumfuelpoolwaterlevelwhichissufficientlyabovethetopofthefueltoprovidetheshieldingrequiredtoallowcorrectiveoperatoractions."Thepurposeofthereferencedcalculationwastodeterminerefuelingflooratmosphereconditionsundervariousoperatingmodes.Theevaporationratesandassumptionsusedinthecitedportionofthecalculationwereusedsolelytodetermineifcondensationcouldbeexpectedunderfuelpoolboilingconditions.Theconclusionofthecalculationregardingtimetoboilthepooldryisnotrelevanttoanyoperatoraction.Operatoractionsarebasedonmaintainingnormalpoollevelandtemperatureconditions.Inanycase,thecitednonconservatismwouldhaveaminoreffectonthecalculated19daystoboilthepooldry,aresultwhichisnotusedelsewhereinthedesign.Thisdiscrepancyisnotavaliddeficiency,isnotreportableandhasnoimpactonplantoperability.

October21,1992Page8ItemC:ManualESWValveActions"ThemanualvalvemanipulationsrequiredtoprovideESWmakeupflowtoaboilingspentfuelpoolmaynotbepossible."In-plantpost-accidentradiationlevelsareanalyzedforSSEStotherequirementsspecifiedinNUREG-0737.Thisdocumentrequiresthatpost-accidentradiationlevelsbedeterminedforpurposesofvitalareaaccessbyplantoperatorstoperformshort-termfirstpriorityactions.Itspecifiesthatradiationlevelsbedeterminedonthebasisofcontainedsources,andcoredamagesourcetermsequivalenttothoseusedfor10CFR100calculations.TheseassumptionsareclearlybasedondegradedcoreconditionswhicharebeyondthedesignbasisLOCA.Airborneradioactivitysourcesfromcontainmentleakagearerequiredtobeanalyzedforenvironmentalqualificationofequipmentbutnotforpersonnelaccess.AreviewofFSARchapter18showsthataccesstotheequipmentnecessarytoprovidemakeuptothefuelpoolfromESWisrestrictedfortheapproximatelythefirst30hoursfollowingthedesignbasisevent(Figure18.1-9).ThisanalysisisbasedonaconservativesourcetermequatingtoIOOXfueldamageresultingfromcoremeltconditionsasoriginallyutilizedforoffsitedosecalculationsusedtodetermineplantsitingadequacy.Thesesourcetermswerebasedonexperimentsinvolvingheatedirradiateduraniumdioxidepellets.Anevaluationofactualfuelthermalresponseduringdesignbasisaccidentsresultsinnopredictedfuelfailures(ReferencePLI-72696).Thus,thesourcetermresultingfromtheDBALOCAwouldonlybeequivalenttotheradioactivitypresentinthereactorcoolantasaresultofnormaloperations(allowingforfueldefectsaspermittedbyTechnicalSpecifications).Toboundthepotentialeffectsofadesignbasisaccident,arealisticyetconservativeanalysisusinganassumed1XfueldamageresultingfromcoredegradationunderLOCAconditionswasperformed(ReferenceEP-548)andconcludesthataccesstoequipmentnecessarytomitigatetheeffectsofalossoffuelpoolcoolingfollowingaDBALOCAisassured.Inconclusion,post-accidentoperatoractionsareviableforallpotentialscenariosunderconsideration,forboththecurrentdesignbasisandthoseoutsideofthecurrentdesignbasis.Thisdiscrepancyisnotavaliddeficiency,isnotreportableandhasnoimpactonplantoperability.

October21,1992Page9ItemD:Instrumentation"Theinstrumentationavailabletotheoperatorpost-LOCAdoesnotprovideadequateindicationofspentfuelpooltemperatureandleveltoallowproperresponsetoalossoffuelpoolcoolingevent."TheinstrumentationavailabletotheoperatorisnotrequiredtobequalifiedsincethedesignbasislossofspentfuelpoolcoolingisnotcoincidentwiththeDHALOCAconditions.Thisinstrumentationispoweredfromanuninterruptiblepowersupplyandits'ssociated1EACsource.TheminimumwaterlevelrequiredperTechSpecsisbelowtheweirelevation.SinceESWmakeupisprovidedtothepooltheoperatorswillknowthatwhentheyseeariseinskimmersurgetanklevelthefuelpoollevelisatleastashighastheweir.Thisprovidesaconfirmationofadequatepoollevelwithoutrequiringaccesstotherefuelingfloor.Furthermore,onthebasisofthediscussioninitemCabove,accesstotherefuelingfloorispossibleunderallconsideredconditions.Therefore,'itispossibletoverifyadequatefuelpoollevelvisuallyfromtherefuelingfloorwhichisaccessiblefromseverallocations.WhiletheavailableinstrumentationisadequateforoperatoractionsandmeetstheregulatoryrequirementsofRegGuide1.13,improvementstotheinstrumentationhavebeenrecommendedinthepastandshouldbeimplemented.Thiswouldenhanceplantsafety.Inconclusion,theexistinginstrumentationisadequateforperformanceofrequiredoperatoractionsforthecurrentdesignbasisandforscenariosnotincludedinthecurrentdesignbasis.Thisdiscrepancyisnotavaliddeficiency,itisnotreportableandhasnoimpactonplantoperability.

October21,1992Page10ItemA:ReactorBuildinDesinHeatLoads"Reactorbuildingdesignheatloadsdonotaccountfortheboilingspentfuelpoolevent."ThereactorbuildingtemperatureanalysisisperformedforOBALOCAconditions.ThepresumptionofitemAisthatthespentfuelpoolwillreachboilingconditionspriortorestorationoffuelpoolcoolingsubsequenttoaLOCA.Theexistingtemperatureanalysisdoesaccountforthesensibleheatloadfromthefuelpoolat212F.Alossofspentfuelpoolcoolingeventcanresultfromseveralconditions.ThedesignbasisconditionisaseismiceventasanalyzedintheFSAR.TheFuelPoolCoolingsystemisnotdesignedforseismicloads.Inthiscase,theFuelPoolCoolingsystemisassumedtobelost.Anevaluationoftheplantresponseshowsthatseveralmethodsareavailabletoassurethatthespentfuelremainscooled.Theseinclude:(1)theRHRsystemcanbeusedtocoolthefuelpoolswithalternateshutdowncoolingofthereactorusingCoreSprayandRHRforsuppressionpoolcooling;or(2)allowthefuelpooltoboilwithmakeupsuppliedbyESWwithconsiderationofeitherSGTSoperatingonZ'oneIIIorprovidingaventpathfromZoneIII.TheoffsitedoseanalysistakesnocreditforSGTS.Ifavailable,normalreactorbuildingventilationwouldbeusedtoprovidecoolingandventingoftheZoneIIIatmosphere.Underanyofthesescenariostransportofmoistairtootherportionsofthereactorbuildingwouldnotoccur.Thisscenarioisthedesignbasisforlossoffuelpoolcooling.OtherscenariosnotincludedinthedesignbasisincludeLOCAandLOOPevents,andcombinationsthereof.Thetimeframeforconsiderationofoperatoractionsisbasedonreasonableexpectationsforthetime-to-boilcondition.Asstatedpreviously,forthecurrentoperatingpractice,thefuelpool,heatloadpriortoreactorrestartisapproximately4.65HBtu/hr.Timetoboilunderthisconditionisontheorderof55hours.Notethatthisistheshortestpossibletime-to-boilforthecurrentfuelcycle.Withthepoolscross-tiedthetime-to-boilisgreaterthan100hours.ForaLOCAscenario,theFPCsystemwillbelostinitiallyduetotheAuxLoadShedprovisions.AlthoughtheFuelPoolCoolingsystemandothernon-safetyrelatedsystemsarenotspecificallyanalyzedfortheeffectsofhydrodynamicloadsitisexpectedthattheywillbeabletoperformtheirnormalfunctionsfollowingabroadspectrumofdesignbasisevents.Creditforthesesystemsisnotneededtomeetthedesignbasis,however,plantoperatorswillutilizeanyequipmentavailabletothemduringemergencysituations.Therefore,inthecourseofevaluatingtheeffectsofaOBALOCAonthefuelpoolcoolingsystem,weacknowledgetheavailabilityofnormalplantsystemsinrespondingtotheemergency.IndependentoftheLOCAcondition,offsitepowerisneededtorestorenormalcoolingsystems.TheSSESIndividual.PlantEvaluationconsideredlossofoffsitepower(ReferenceIPEAppendixF).TheIPEconservativelyestimatedtheincidenceofLOOPtobe.04/year(plantrelated),.008/year(gridrelated),.00807/year

October21,1992Page11{severeweatherrelated),and.00066)year{extremelysevereweatherrelated).TheprobabilityofrecoveryfromtheLOOPwithinspecifiedtimeswasalsocalculatedasfollows:~TimehrPRecoverwithinThrs12.097.96X24.099.53X60.099.923X75.099.953XThus,itcanbereasonablyconcludedthatoffsitepowerwillbeavailablewithin24hoursfollowingtheinitiatingevent.Theremainingfactorinaddressingrestorationoffuelpoolcoolingisaccesstothereactorbuilding.ThisissueisdiscussedunderItemCabove.Exceptfordegradedcoreconditionsaccesstothereactorbuildingisfeasibleafterthefirsttwelvehoursoftheinitiatingevent(ReferenceEP-548).Notwithstandingtheabovebasis,wehavealsoconsideredthescenariowhereoffsitepowerisnotavailableandaccesstothelowerreactorbuildingelevationsisrestricted(basedonFSARchapter18containedsourceterms).Undertheseconditions(representativeofadegradedcoreevent)accesstotherefuelingfloorremainsavailable.Provisionforfuelpoolcoolingismadethroughuseoftheplantfireprotectionsystem.VentingofZoneIIIviathefilteredexhaustsystemisalsopossibleforthisscenario.Whileaccesstolevelandtemperatureinstrumentswouldbequestionableitispossibletoverifyadequatepoollevelvisually.fromtherefuelingfloorwhichisaccessibleatseverallocations.ALossofFuelPoolCoolingEventTreeisattachedtothisevaluationtohelpguidethereaderthroughthesevariouspostulatedscenarios.Inconclusion,forthedesignbasislossoffuelpoolcoolingtheplantascurrentlydesignedandanalyzedisacceptable.Forotherscenariosnotspecificallyincludedinthedesignbasiswehavereasonableassurancethattheeffectsofalossoffuelpoolcoolingcanbemitigatedwithoutadverseconsequencesontheplant.Thisdiscrepancyisavaliddeficiency.Itisnotasafetysignificantissuebecausewehaveestablishedreasonableassurancethattheeffectsofalossoffuelpoolcoolingcanbemitigatedwithoutadverseconsequencesontheplantandpublichealthandsafetyandisthereforenotreportable.Theevaluationabovealsoshowsthatthisconcerndoesnotimpactplantoperability.Inconsiderationofthisconcern,additionalanalysesarewarrantedtofurtherquantifytheeffectsofevaporationandboilingconditionsontheZoneIIIatmosphereandthepotentialtransportofmoistairtootherlocationsinthereactorbuildingforconditionsoutsideofthecurrentdesignbasis.

'ctober21,1992Page12ItemB:ImactofESWHakeuWater"TheimpactoftheESWmakeupwatertothespentfuelpoolonequipmentinthereactorbuildinghasnotbeenevaluated."TheanalysisunderitemAaboveappliestothisissueaswell.Thisevaluationshowsthatwiththecurrentplantdesignandforexistingdesignbasisconditionstheeffectsofalossoffuelpoolcoolingareacceptable.Thisdiscrepancyisavaliddeficiency.AswithitemAitisnotasafetysignificantissueandisnotreportable.Theevaluationabovealsoshowsthatthisconcerndoesnotimpactplantoperability.Inconsiderationofthisconcern,additionalanalysesarewarrantedtofurtherquantifytheeffectsofevaporationandboilingconditionsontheZoneIIIatmosphereandthepotentialtransportofmoistairtootherlocationsinthereactorbuildingforconditionsoutsideofthecurrentdesignbasis.

October21,1992Page13EnineerinReortonLossofSentFuelPoolCoolinAdetailedreport,SEA-ME-405,isbeingpreparedtodocumentthisevaluationinfurtherdetail.Thisreportcontainstechnicalinputfromseveralengineeringgroupsandwillprovideacomprehensivesetofreferencesonthissubject.ThereportwillbecompletedwithinbyOctober28,1992.

October21,1992Page13EnineerinReortonLossofSentFuelPoolCoolinAdetailedreport,SEA-HE-405,isbeingpreparedtodocumentthisevaluationinfurtherdetail.Thisreportcontainstechnicalinputfromseveralengineeringgroupsandwillprovideacomprehensivesetofreferencesonthissubject.ThereportwillbecompletedbyOctober28,1992.

LossofFuelPoolCoolingEventTreeLossctfPC.YcsSKsrnkfvsrltYssllIsobts4wlhKoSOTSlrNnkrptLOCAfrerstUssfkSFPCassblwlhAk<<n>>eSOC~avaks64,oth>>wls<<.UseISSfPCassMwlhAk<<n>>sSOCIaraksMe,oth<<wbrssSakesT<<aRsseritNoOtskePow<<AvaksMetAloetobolwkhESWrnskerksAloetobolwkhESWaskerkrStmr>>ls4ONekePoe>>AvakaMetYssftesletINACONsksPoe>>AvshMetltest<<sFPCwlhna>>4sfvtersLUseFSSfPCsssMwkhAk<<n>>sSOClsvakable.oth<<<<brRrSuadeAccsssbbtNosIIISrfSWAccsssbbtfleet<<tINAC4Ma<<sFPCwlhna<<Mayst<<nsIavalsbb.cth<<wb<<.Useft}SfPCsssMaskewtobolwkhfSWaakcupdTtkrsrled.AtowtobolwkhESWmakeupSbkvsrks4Nest<<aFPCwkhn<<restctslsallavaksMe.OO>>wb<<.AkowtobolvrkhReRotsc5onrnak>>ySttkr>>te4,UseIIISfPCassbt<<aloelobolwkhESWceakeup4tktr<<led.AkowtobolwlhfkeRaecuonrsak<<kratntrerks4UssfpSFPCassMaakowlobolwlhfSWaakersr4tktracked.UssFSSFPCassbtccaloetobolwlhESW~rakerlr4ttlv>>ds4

\0 Attachaent27PPBLMemofromDavidA.LoclibaumandDonaldC.PrevattetoGeorgeT.Jones,"EvaluationofEDR620020Reportability/Operability",October26,l992(PLI-72739)

~~October26,1992GeorgeT.JonesA6-2SUSQUEHANNASTEAMELECTRICSTATIONEVALUATIONOFEDRG20020REPORTABILITY/OPERABILITYPLI-72739FILEA45-1AWehavereadMr.Myers'emoofOctober20,1992evaluatingthereportability/operabilityofEDRG20020.WewouldliketothankbothyouandMr.Myersforyourconsiderationsinperformingtheseevaluations.Ouroverallimpressionisthat,inthisdocument,wehavereceivedanotherconfirmationofthetechnicalvalidityoftheconcernsthatweraised.However,therearestillareasofdisagreementastoreportingrequirementstotheNRC,andmisunderstandingastosomeofthefactsassociatedwiththisEDR.Thefollowingparagraphsaddressthesedisagreementsandmisunderstandings.First,onreportability.Foranoperatingplant,10CFR50.72requireslicenseestoreportinonehouranyinstanceoftheplantbeing(a)inanunanalyzedconditionthatsignificantlycompromisesplantsafety;(b)inaconditionthatisoutsidethedesignbasisoftheplant;or(c)inaconditionnotcoveredbytheplant'soperatingandemergencyprocedures.Ifanyoneofthesecriteriaapplies,theconditionisreportable.'ebelievethatallofthesecriteriaaresatisfiedbytheconcernsdescribedinEDRG20020andotherdocumentsthathavebeencommunicatedtoyou,totheEDRGroup,andtoothershandlingtheevaluationoftheseconcerns.Forthefirstcondition,wehavepointedoutnumerousareaswheresafety-relatedequipmentinthereactorbuildingisnotanalyzedfortheconditionsthatwouldresultfromaboilingspentfuelpool,andwherethereishighpotentialthatsuchanalyseswouldshowtheconditionstobeunacceptable,e.g.,potentialfloodingofsafety-relatedequipment,potentialexceedingofEQtemperaturesbylargemargins,potentialpressurizationofthereactorbuilding,potentialwettingofthecharcoalintheSGTS,potentialstructuralfailuresofductworkduetocondensation,etc..

Theseexamplesalsoillustrateareaswherewesatisfythesecondconditionofreportability.Foreveryexample,theprobableconsequencesofaboilingspentfuelpoolare'utsidetheirdesignbases.Thethirdconditionofreportabilityissatisfiedsincewehavenoplantprocedureswhichaddresshowtocopewiththeconditionsthatwouldbegeneratedbyaboilingspentfuelpool,orevenrecognizethataboilingspentfuelpoolwouldcreatetheseadverseconditions.LegalisticliteralinterpretationsoftheCFRhavebeenmadethatyoumustactuallybeintheseconditions,thatis,youmustactuallyhaveanaccident>nprogresswheretheseconditionsexist,for,themtobereportable.Thisis,aswehavediscussed,aludicrousargument.TheobviousintentoftheNRCisthatweshouldnevergetintotheseconditionsinthefirstplace.Therefore,thecommonsenseinterpretationis,anystatusthatwouldcreatesuchaconditionwereanaccidenttooccur.Usingthis,interpretation,ourstatus'ouldbereportable.Eveniftheabovedescribed.provisionsof10CFR50.72werenotapplicable,anotherprovisioni~.-Paragraph(b)(2)(iii,requiresthatreportsshallbemadewithinfourhoursofanythesafetyfunctionofstructuresorsystemsneededto(a)shutdownthereactorandmaintainsafeshutdown,(b)removeresidualheat,(c)controlradioactiverelease,or(d)mitigatetheaccident.TheconcernsdescribedintheEDRpotentiallycouldhavepreventedthefulfillmentofallfourofthese.Again,legalisticargumentshavebeenraisedwiththefactthat,atthetime,itwasnotknownforcertainthatanyoftheseconditionswouldresult.Wemaintainthattheintentofthisprovisionisclear;ifitisreasonabletobelieve,basedonourknowledgeandexperiencewithourplantanditsanalyses,thataconditioncouldhavepreventedthefulfillmentofasafetyfunction,thenitisreportable.Therehasbeensufficientknowledgetohavethisreasonable'eliefforseveralmonths.Ztisn'tnecessarytocrossevery"T"anddotevery"I"tohavethatreasonablebelief.lnaddition,otherindependentformalreportshaveconfirmedourconcernsandreinforcedthisreasonablebelief(ReferenceMr.K.W.Brinkman'sreport,PLI-72288of1/9/92andMr.J.R.Miltenberger'sreport,PLI-72367of9/9/92).

TheMr.followingparagraphsaddressspecificcommentsmadeinMyers'emo:Firstparagraph,weagreewithMr.Myers'onclusionthattheseconcerns<<...shouldbe~formallbroughttotheNRC'sattention...",andwewouldliketociteseveralveryimportantreasons.First,itisthelaw.Second,informalreportsarenotwelldocumentedandmaybeincomplete.Third,informalreportsdon'ttendtogettherequisitelevelofattention,eitherinternallyorexternally.Fourth,formalreportssetintomotioncertainactions,commensuratewiththesafetysignificanceoftheconcerns,bothinternallyandexternally,thatarenotnecessarilysetintomotionbyinformalreports.2~Page3,Item1,thissectionpurportstodiscussItems9Gand9HfromtheEDR.Itactuallyaddressesneither.Item9Gdiscussestheradiologicalreleasefromaboilingfuelpoolwithrespecttotheincreasedheatloadandtheresultantshortertimetoboilandincreasedboilingrate,bothofwhichincreasetheradiologicalrelease.Mr.Myers'iscussiondoesnot,touchonthispoint.Item9Hdiscussestheincreasesinradiologicalreleaseduetotheincreaseinthenumberofbundlesoffloaded(themostsignificantcontributortotheincreaseinreleases)from184to230(a25%increase).Mr.Myersdefersdiscussionofthisitemtoanothersectionofhisreport.Heconcludesthattheexistinganalysisresultsarestillbounding.Withoutconsideringthesetwofactors,itis'ifficulttounderstandhowthisconclusioncanbereached.3~Page3,Item2,thissectiondiscussesItems9E,9F,9G,and9HfromtheEDR.Inthisdiscussion,Mr.Myersconcludesthatinthepoolconfigurationcurrentlyusedforrefueling,"attheappropriatetimepostshutdown",thetimetoboilwouldnotbesignificantlydifferentfromthe25hoursfromtheFSAR(Thisisthesametime

4~currentlyrelieduponbytheoperatorsfromprocedureON-135-001.).Reference8citedbyMr.Myersshowsthat"theappropriatetimepostshutdown"doesnotoccurfor14days.However,until14dayshavepast,thetimetoboilislessthan25hours(aslowasapproximately8.8hoursatthebeginningofthistime).Thisisnotreflectedintheplantprocedures.Page5,inMr.Myers'ddressingthe"EffectofSpentFuelPoolBoilingontheSGTS",hestatesthat,"TheSGTSisapparentlydesignedfortheenvironment(usingpreheatingtoreducehumidity)."Infact,SGTSrequiresthispreheatingtowithstandtheenvironmentofaLOCAwithoutfuelpoolboiling(inletconditionsof125F,100%relativehumidity).Itisspecificallynotdesignedtoaccommodatefuelpoolboilingconditions(inletof,180F,1004relativehumidity)asdescribedinBechtelCalculation175-17,Rev4.Additionally,Mr.Myers'eviewonlyaddressesoneoftheconcernswiththeSGTSdesign,thestructuralintegrityoftheductwork.SeveralotherconcernshavebeencommunicatedindocumentsandconversationssubsequenttotheoriginalEDR.Theseincludemoisturecarryoverand/orcondensationinthecharcoalbeds,fusingofthefiredampersintheductwork(ratedat165F),exceedingtheEQconditionsintheSGTSroom,andpressurizingthereactorbuilding,amongothers,anyoneofwhichcouldincapacitateordegradethesystem.EvenwiththesingleconcernaddressedbyMr.Myers,heconcludesthattheconditionisunanalyzed,and"itisnotclear"iftheSGTSwouldfunction.Thisalone,per10CFR50.72(b)(ii)(A),makestheconditionreportable.5.Page6,Mr.Myersstatesthat"...thereportabilityquestioniswhetherornotthematteriswithinourlicensingdesignbasis."Althoughthisiscertainlyoneofthecriteriafrom10CFR50.72thatmustbeconsidered,thereareothersthatdonotappeartobeconsideredinhisreport.Thereisalsothequestionofthecorrectnessoftheoriginaldesigncriteria.Ifitisnotcorrect,andasaresult,unanalyzedconditionsexistwhichhavethepo'tentialtocompromisetheintegrityorfunctionalityofasafetyfeatureorsystemintheplant,thenthatisalsocertainlyreportable.

Mr.MyersalsomakesthepointthathistoricallytheNRCdidnotconsiderallofthesubsequentconsequencesofdesignbasisevents.Thisisaninterestinghistoricalfootnote,butitisnotpertinent.Theconsequencesshouldhavebeenconsidered,andthefactthattheywerenotdoesnotdiminishtheirsafetysignificanceortheobligationtoreportthemandcorrectthem.Mr.Myerscitesthreepointswhichheconcedes"...doraisesomequestions:"ThefirstisthatMNP-2(similarindesigntoSSES)didconsidertheeffectstheboilingspentfuelpool,cametotheconclusionthattheconditionwasunacceptable,andupgradedtheirfuelpoolcoolingsystemtoprecludethiscondition.ThiswouldseemtolendcredibilitytothecontentionthatthecurrentdesignforSSESisinadequatelyanalyzedandprobablyunacceptable.ThesecondpointmadeisthatourlatestCOTTAPanalysisofthereactorbuildingtemperaturesisconservativebecauseittakesintoaccountthesensibleheatfromthefuelpoolatboilingconditions.Mr.Myersdoesnotappeartounderstandtheproblemwiththecurrentanalysis.Theproblemisthatthisanalysisconsidersthesensibleheat~onl;itdoesnotconsiderthelatentheatreleaseddur'ingboilingwhichismanytimegreaterthanthesensibleheat.Consideringthesensibleheatonly,yieldsatotalbuildingheatloadofapproximately5.2millionBTU/hr.Consideringthelatentheataddsapproximately20millionBTU/hr.Clearly,theresultsofthelatestanalysisareverynon-conservative.Thethirdpointmadeisthat,heunderstandsthat:earliercalculationsdidincludeconsiderationsofaboilingspentfuelpool.Indeed,thisistrue;thepreviouslycitedBechtelCalculation175-17,Rev4isanexample,andbasedontheresultsofthesecalculations,itwasconcludedthattheboilingspentfuelpoolwasnotacceptable.However,thisconclusionwassomehowlostandwasnot.integratedintotheoriginaldesignandlicensingoftheplant.Page7,firstparagraph,Mr.MyerspreponderanceoftheevidencesaysboilingenvironmentonbothnormalenvironmentswasnotconsideredtothelicensingofSSES."statesthat"...thethattheeffectoftheandpostaccidentbearequirement.for Onthispointwestronglydisagree.Firstofall,itwasarequirement;10CFR50.49specificallyrequiresthatelectricalequipmentbeenvironmentallyqualified"forthemostseveredesignbasisaccidents."Inthiscase,thedesignbasisaccidentofLOCA/LOOP,orevenLOCAwithoutLOOPunderthecurrentoperatingprocedures,mechanisticallyresultsinaboilingspentfuelpoolwhichproducesenvironmentalconditionswhicharenotanalyzedandarelikelytoexceedthecurrentEQlimitsforthesafety-relatedsystemsinthebuilding.Secondly,thepreponderanceofevidenceisnotthatitwasnotconsideredtobearequirement(WehaveanEQprogramthat'sevidenceofourunderstandingoftherequirement.),butsimplythatitwasoverlookedexceptfortheSGTS,andinthatcase,theeffectswerefoundtobeunacceptable.Page7,inthesecondparagraph,Mr.Myersbeginsadiscussionofthelossoffuelpoolcoolingduringnormaloperation.Inthisandtheensuingtwoparagraphshedescribesanalysesthatneedtobeperformed'andconditionsthatwouldberequiredto'emaintainedforthiseventwhicharenotaddressedbythecurrentdesignoroperatingprocedures.Heconcludesthat"...giventhetimeinvolved[untilboilingbeginsafterlossofcooling),itappearsfeasibletotakedamagecontrolstepstoaccommodatetheimpacts."Westronglymaintainthatthisisnotavalidapproachtoplantdesignoroperations.Designshortcomingsarerequiredtobecorrectedwhentheyarefound,notwhentheyaremanifestedinactualfailures,andprocedurestoaddressanticipatedaccidentconditionsarealsorequiiedtobedevelopedaheadoftime,notwhiletheaccidentisinprogress.Itisnotvalidtosaythatwewilldeveloptheseatthetimeoftheeventasapartofdamagecontrol.Additionally,itshouldbepointedoutthatsinceourletterofOctober9,1992,betweentenandtwentyengineershavebeenworkingintheAllentownofficeandothersatthesite,continuously,latenights,andweekendsfortwoweekstorevisethedesignsandtheprocedurestojustifyinterimoperation.Thesignificanceofthisistwofold:First,ifaJIOisrequired,thiswouldappeartoconcedethattheexistingdesignsandproceduresareinadequate.Second,ifsuchmassiveandconcentratedeffortisrequiredtoexplore alloftheramificationsofmakingthesechanges,thenitisdifficulttoimaginehowinanaccidentwecouldtaketherightactionsorevenknowwhattherightactionsare,withlesspeople,inashortertimeframe,andunderextremepressure,asapartof"damagecontrol".Thefactthatwedonotcurrentlyhavethesedesignfeaturesandproceduresinplacesatisfiestheconditionsforreportabilityper10CFR50.72,paragraphs(b)(ii)(A)and(b)(ii)(c)respectively.Page8,Conclusion1,thereappearstobenoreasongivenwhyItem9IfromtheEDRisnotvalid.Page8,Conclusion4,Mr.Myersstatesthatbecausetheeffectsoffuelpoolboilingwerenotconsideredaspartoftheoriginaldesignbasisorlicensingbasis,0heconcernsarenotreportable.Thisappearstobeconvolutedlogic.Theirnotbeingconsideredintheoriginaldesignandlicensingis,inandofitself,areportablecondition.TheeffectsnotbeingconsideredistheprimefocusoftheEDR-thereasonforconcerninthefirstplace.Iftheoriginaldesignandlicensingbaseswerenotadequate,thefactthatit.wasnotrecognizeduntiltodaydoesnotmakethemadequatetoday.Conclusion5appearstoagreewiththisinprinciple,butnottothepointofsayingtheseconcernsarereportable.ItisatleastgratifyingtoseethatMr.Myerssharesourconcernforthepotentialdifficultiesoftheoperatorsandtheneedforpromptattention.Mr.MyersmakesthepointinthelastsentenceofConclusion4thattheseconcernsaretypicalofthoseuncoveredinDBDeffortsandimpliesthatDBDconcernsareexemptfrombeingreportable.Onthispointtheregulatoryguidanceisveryclear;NUREG-1397,2/91,AnAssessmentofDesignControlPracticesandDesignReconstitutionProgramsintheNuclearPowerIndustry,statesinSection3.8,OperabilityandReportability,"Oncethedeterminationhasbeenmadethatthefacilityhasbeenorisoperatingoutsideitsdesignbasesorthatsystems,structures,andcomponentsmaybeincapableofperformingtheirspecifiedfunction(s),therequirementsforreportabilityasspecifiedin10CFR50.72and10CFR50.73becomeoperativeandthetimeclockstartsforanyaffectedaction statementsasdefinedinthefacility'stechnicalspecifications."Additionally,inSection4.3.2Reportability,theNUREGstates,"Thereportingrequirementsspecifiedin10CFR50.9,50.72,and50.73applyequallytodiscrepanciesdiscoveredduringDDR[DBD]programs.Therefore,thereisnoregulatox'ybasistotreatdiscrepanciesdiscoveredduringtheconductofaDDRprogramdifferentlythananyotherreportableitem."10.Conclusion6statesthattheimpactofheatandmoistureonSGTSshouldbeevaluatedimmediately,andthat,iftheconditionsareunanalyzed,thatisreportable.Thefactisthat,asdescribedinItem4above,oneoftheconcernswasanalyzedbyBechtelandfoundtobeunacceptableforSGTS.ThisshouldbereportableasMr.Myerssays.Theotherconditionsofconcern,asdescribedinItem4above,areunanalyzed,andthereforetheyalsoshouldbereportableasMr.Myerssays.11.Conclusion7,weagreethatanLERshouldbeproduced.12.Mr.Myers'ommentsinConclusion10areappreciated,andwebelievetheyaresincexe.Unfortunately,theywillnotbereadbytheengineersinthetren..hesoftheNuclearDepartment,ofiftheyare,theywillnotbebelieved.Tothem,thisisatestcase.TheirapproachtotheEDRSysteminthefuturewillbegovernedinlargemeasurebyhowthisissuehasbeenhandled,andupuntilourmeetingOctober9,1992,theyhaveseenthisissuebeingbrushedoff.Theywillbelievewhattheysee,notwhattheyaretold.Again,weappreciatetheattentionofyourself,Mr.Myers,andalloftheotherswhohavebeenengagedinaddressingtheseconcerns.WearegratifiedthattheapproachofMr.Myersappearstohavetakenhasbeenmorecommonsensicalandlesslegalisticthanothershavetaken.However,ourbasicconcernsandpositionsreflectedinourletterofOctober9,1992andsubsequentconversationsstillremain.Asalways,weremainatyourservice.DavidA.LochaumDonaldC.Prevatte J.S.KemperR.L.A.F.A.R.W.R.J.S.F.'.J.A.M.R.C.A.T~J0G.D.M.J.J.D.DotyZorfidaSabolLichtStefankoButlerZolaMjaatvedtBoschettiSweeneyGogatesManskiRichardsoncc:C.A.MyersG.D.MillerR.R.SgarraJ.M.KennyJ.E.AgnewD.F.McGannG.J.KuczynskiH.G.StanleyJ.R.MiltenbergerH.W.KeiserR.G.ByramW.R.CorcoranA2-4A6-3A2-4A2-4A6-3SSESSGA-4SSESSSESA6-1TW-16A6-121BroadleakCircleWindson,CT06095115PolecatRoadGlenMills,PA19342A9-3SSESA2-5A6-1A9-3A6-3A6-3A6-3SSESSSESSSESEnerconEnercon Attachaent28PP8LMemofromDavidA.Lochbaum.andDonaldC.PrevattetoGeorgeT.Jones,"ResponsetoEvaluationofEDRG20020",October28,1992(PLI-72751)Note:Inthismemo,theauthorsrespondedtoPPEL'sevaluationoftheindividualconcernsinEDRG20020(Attachment26).TheauthorsagreedwiththetechnicaljustificationpreparedbyPP&Lshowingthattwo(2)ofthenineconcernswerenotvaliddiscrepancies.TheauthorsalsoagreedwithPP8Lthattheremainingsevenconcernswerevaliddiscrepancies,butstronglydisagreedthatthesevaliddiscrepanciesdidnotaffectthe,operabilityoftheplantandwerenotreportable.

October28,1992GeorgeT.ZonesA6-2SUSQUEHANNASTEAMELECTRICSTATIONRESPONSETOEVALUATIONOFEDRG20020PLI-72751FILEA45-1AWehavereviewedMr.GlennMiller'smostrecentevaluationofEDRG20020datedOctober21,1992(PLI-72711).WhileweconcurwiththetechnicaljustificationprovidedfortwooftheconcernsexpressedinEDRG20020,wecontinuetodisagreewiththeoperabilityandreportabilityassessmentsforthemajorityoftheconcerns.AdetaileddiscussioninresponsetoMr.Miller'sevaluationisattached.Inhismemo,Mr.MillersuggestedthatNuclearRegulatoryAffairsreconsiderthereportabilityaspectsofEDRG20020inlightoftheclarifiedinformation.SincetheinitialevaluationdatedOctober6,1992forEDRG20020concludedthatnoneoftheconcernswasvalidandMr.Miller'sevaluationindicatesthattwooftheconcernsarevalid,wesuggestthatEDRG20020beformallyrevisedtoreflectthelatestPP&Lpositiononthesenineconcerns.Mr.Milleralsoindicatedthatajustificationforinterimoperationwouldsoonbecompleted.InMr.Miller'sevaluation,noneofthenineconcernsaffecttheoperabilityoftheplantandajustificationforinterimoperationwouldnotberequired.Weagreethatthejustificationforinterimoperationshouldbecompleted,butbecausecurrentoperationofSSESisadverselyaffectedbytheconcernsidentifiedinEDRG20020.WhilewearepleasedtohavetheconcernsweraisedinEDRG20020addressedindividually,ourbasicconcernsandpositionsreflectedinourletterofOctober9,1992andsubsequentdiscussionsstillremain.Asalways,weremainatyourservice.DavidLochbaumDonalC.PrevatteCeuI'ReysrrgAttachment-ResponsetoEvaluationofEDRG20020(PLI-72711)cc:C.A.MyersH.G.StanleyG.D.MillerJ.E.AgnewM.R.MjaatvedtNuclearRecordsA2-4SSESA6-3A6-3A6-3A6-2M.W.SimpsonJ.S.StefankoJ.R.MiltenbergerD.F.RothZ.M.KennyF.G.ButlerA1-2A9-3A6-1SSESA2-4A6-3 ResponsetoEvaluationofEDRG20020(PLZ-72711)1~ThenineconcernsidentifiedinEDRG20020werelistedinorderofdecreasingnuclearsafetysignificance.Mr.Miller'sevaluationrearrangesthenineconcernsandaddressestheminessentiallyorderofincreasingsafetysignificance.WehaveorderedourcommentstomatchtheorderinEDRG20020.2.3~WeconcedethatEDRG20020incorrectlystatedthattheRHRfuelpoolcoolingassistmodewasnotseismicallydesigned.ThefactthatthefuelpoolcoolingmodeofRHRisseismicallydesigneddoesnotmateriallychangeanyoftheconcernsexpressedinEDRG20020.Mr.Miller'sresponsetoEDRG20020ItemAonreactorbuildingheatloadsisinadequateforzanyreasons.Mr.MillerstatesthattheonlyscenariointheSSESdesignbasisforlossoffuelpoolcoolingisaseismicevent.However,theSSESdesignbasisalsoincludeslossofoffsitepower,LOCA,andfailuresofnon-safetyrelatedcomponentswhich"aneachresultinlossoffuelpoolcooling.Additionally,Mr.KevinBrinckmaninhisreportdatedSeptember1,1992(PLI-72288)indicatedthatthehydrodynamicloadsresultingfromaLOCAmayresultinlossoffuelpoolcooling.Andfinally,RegGuide1.13statesthatthespentfuelpoolshallbedesignedtomaintainadequatecoolingofthefuelunderallnormaloperatingandpostulatedaccidentconditions.Therefore,theSSESdesignbasisimplicitlycoversfailuremodesforfuelpoolcoolingotherthantheseismicevent.Mr.MillercontendsthatthelossoffuelpoolcoolingeventcoupledwithaLOCAorLOOPisoutsidetheSSESdesignbasis.However,SSESFSARChapter6.2reportsthattheLOCAscenariousedforcontainmentfunctionaldesignispostulatedtooccursimultaneouslywithaLOOPandasafeshutdownearthquake.ThecalculatedreactorbuildingheatloadsareinputstotheEQprogramforsafetyrelatedcomponentslocatedinthereactorbuilding.Sinceoperationofthesesafetyrelatedcomponentsisassumedforcoreandcontainmentcoolinginthecontainmentfunctionaldesignanalyses,itisnecessarythatthereactorbuildingheatloadcalculationsconsideralossoffuelpoolcooling.Thelatentheatloadfromasinglespentfuelpoolisapproximatelyfour(4)timesgreaterthanthecurrenttotalcalculatedreactorbuildingheatloadandcouldresultincalculatedreactorbuildingroomtemperaturesexceedingE{}valuesforsafetyrelatedcomponents.PP&L'simplementationin1988ofprocedurestomanuallyinitiatesheddingofallnon-ClasslEloadsinthereactorbuilding24hoursafteraLOCAtocontrolreactorbuildingroomtemperaturesshouldhavebeenanopportunitytoproperly ResponsetoEvaluati.onofEDRG20020(PLI-72711)addresstheconsequencesofaboilingspentfuelpool.The10CFR50.59safetyevaluationforthisactivityshouldhavecoveredtheeffectsoflossoffuelpoolcooling,particularlyconsideringthechangewasmadetopreventexcessivereactorbuildingroomtemperaturesandlossoffuelpoolcoolingwilladverselyaffectthesesameroomtemperatures.Mr.MillerstatesthatoneSSESresponsetoalossoffuelpoolcoolingistheRHRsystem.TheRHRfuelpoolcoolingassistmodehasadequatedecayheatremovalcapacitytohandletheload,butitisanon-safetyrelatedsystemwhichhasneverbeenusedatSSESandmayneverhaveevenbeensuccessfullypre-operationallytested.Furthermore,useoftheRHRfuelpoolcoolingassistmodeisdescribedintheSSESFSARandSERonlytosupplementfuelpoolcoolingfortheemergencyheatloadcase(fullcoreoffload).Andfinally,asMr.BrinckmanstatesinhisreportdatedSeptember1,1992(PLI-72288),useofRHRinthefuelpoolcoolingassistmodefollowingaLOCAisanunanalyzedconditionwhichmaycompromisecoreandcontainmentcooling.Mr.MillerstatesthatthesecondSSESresponsetoalossoffuelpoolcoolingisto"allowthefuelpooltoboilwithmakeupsuppliedbyESWwithc'onsiderationofeitherSGTSoperatingonZoneIIIorprovidingaventpathfromZoneIII."PerMr.DavePai,theSGTSwillnotoperatei.fthefuelpoolboilsbecausethefiredampersisolateatinlettemperaturesabove165Fandthecalculatedinlettemperatureresultingfromaboilingspentfuelpoolis=180'F.ThenormalreactorbuildingventilationrelieduponbyMr.MillertocoolandventZoneIIIisanon-safetyrelatedfunctionwhichcannotberelieduponinthismanner.Additionally,thecurrentdesignofthereactorbuildingHVACsystemandthestandbygastreatmentsystemfortheLOCAscenariodonotpermitthealignmentproposedbyMr.Miller.Toutilizesuchanalignmentwouldrequireextensiveanalysestodetermineitsfeasibilityandthedesignmodificationsnecessarytoaccomplishthi.soperation.Mr.MillerreportsthattheSSESIPEdeterminedaverylowprobabilityofLOOPslastingover24hours.Suchinformationwouldsupportajustificationforinterimoperation,butcannotbeusedtoeliminateadesignrequirement.Inaddition,Mr.Miller'scontentionthatfuelpoolcoolingwouldberestoredpriortothepoolboilingafteraLOCAisinconsistentwiththeassumedLOOPdurationspecifiedthroughouttheSSESFSAR.Forexample,thedesignbasisfortheultimateheatsinkwaterinventoryprovidesmakeuptobothboilingspentfuelpoolsforthe30daysperiodfollowingthe ResponsetoEvaluationofEDR020020(PLI-72711)SSESdesignbasisLOCA/LOOP,notjust24hours.Mr.Millerstatesthat"althoughthefuelpoolcoolingsystemandothernon-safetyrelatedsystemsarenotspecificallyanalyzedfortheeffectsofhydrodynamicloadsitisexpectedthattheywillbeabletoperformtheirnormalfunctionsfollowingabroadspectrumofdesignbasisevents"andthat"creditforthesesystemsisnotneededtomeetthedesignbasis".Thedesignresponsetoanypostulateddesignbasisaccidentmustnotrelyonnon-safetyrelatedequipment.Additionally,"itisexpected"asMr.Millerstatesisinsufficientrigorfordesignanalysesofnuclearsafetyfunctions.Mr.Millerstatesthatalossoffuelpoolcoolingcouldbehandledbyallowingthepooltoboil,providingmakeupfromtheESWsystem,andoperatingZoneIIIventilationtoavoidadverseconsequences.WeassumethatMr.MillerisconcedingthatSSEScouldnothaveenduredaboilingspentfuelpoolwiththedesignfeaturesandprocedurescurrentlyinplacewithoutsignificantadverseconsequences.WeagreewithMr.MillerthatEDRG20020ItemAisavaliddeficiency.WestronglydisagreewithMr.Miller'scontentionthatthisvaliddeficiencyhasnosafetysignificanceandisnotreportable.Ifthefuelpoolboils,theexistingreactorbuildingheatloadcalculationsdonotaccountforthelatentheatload.4~Mr.Miller'sresponsetoEDR620020ItemBontheimpactofESWmakeupwaterisinadequateforthereasonsasgiveninComment3andbecausehisresponsedoesnotaddressallofthepotentialimpacts.TheESWflowsuppliedtothefuelpooliscontrolledbymanuallypositioningathrottlevalve.IftheESWflowratetothefuelpoolexactlymatchestheboil-offrate,thenthelevelinthefuelpoolwillbemaintainedconstant.IftheESWflowrateislowerorhigher,thenthefuelpoollevelwilldroporriseaccordingly.ThemostprobableoutcomewillbeformoreESWflowthanisrequiredtobe'suppliedtothefuelpool.Underthisscenario,boththemoistairfromfuelpoolboil-offandthewaterfromfuelpoolrun-offmustbeconsidered.Theadversenuclearsafetyconsequencesincludepressurizationoftherefuelingbayand/orsecondarycontainment,flooding,componentfailureduetohumidityandcondensation,andHVACductworkfailuresduetoeitherflowblockagefromcondensedvapororcollapsefromtheaddedwaterweight.AsstatedinComment3,theSSESultimateheatsink ResponsetoEvaluationofEDRG20020(PLI-72711)designanalysiscoversESWmakeuptobothspentfuelpoolsthroughoutthe30dayperiodfollowingtheSSESdesignbasisLOCA/LOOP.However,thisanalysisisincompleteandinvalidbecausetheconsequencesofthe5milliongallonsofwaterdeliveredtothespentfuelpoolsonsystemsandcomponentsinthereactorbuildingisnottakenintoaccount.WeagreewithMr.MillerthatEDRG20020ItemBisavaliddeficiency.WestronglydisagreewithMr.Miller'scontentionthatthisvaliddeficiencyhasnosafetysignificanceandisnotreportable.IfESWissuppliedtoaboilingfuelpool,theconsequencesarevirtuallyunanalyzed.Forexample,theboil-offmightresultinpressurizingtherefuelingbayandchallengingsecondarycontainmentintegrity.AsMr.Millerstates,"additionalanalysesarewarrantedtofurtherquantifytheeffectsofevaporationandboilingconditionsontheZoneIIIatmosphereandthepotentialtransportofmoistairtootherlocationsinthereactorbuilding."However,theseanalysesareneededtosupportSSESoperationwithinitsexistingdesignbasis.Mr.Miller'sresponsetoEDRG20020ItemConmanualESWvalveactionsisinadequatebecauseitisbasedonpredictionsofnomorethan14fuelfailures.Mr.Miller'slogicthatrecentevaluationsofactualfuelthermalresponseduringdesignbasisaccidentsindicatenofuelfailuresoccurwouldsupporttearingdownsecondarycontainmentandremovingthestandbygastreatmentsystemifitwerejustified.Mr.MillerstatesthattheradiationlevelsdeterminedatSSESinresponsetoNUREG-0737requirementsare"clearlybasedondegradedcoreconditionswhicharebeyondthedesignbasisLOCA."Nevertheless,therequirementsinNUREG-0737wereimposedbytheNRCfollowingtheTMIaccidentandareclearlywithintheSSESlicensingbasis.Mr.Millerclaimsthat"airborneradioactivitysourcesfromcontainmentleakagearerequiredtobeanalyzed"forenvironmentalqualificationofequipmentbutnotforpersonnelaccess."Thisclaimispreposterous,andwebelievethattheSSESOperationsstaffdoesnotsupportthisposition.Ifairborneradiationsourcesareconsidered,andtheywouldbeyg~~g'eactorbuildingcouldbeentered,severecoredamageisnotrequiredforthereactorbuildingtoberenderedinaccessible.ThereforeEDRG20020ItemCisavaliddeficiencybecausethemakeupsupplytoaboilingspentfuelpoolmaynotbeavailablepost-LOCAduetoinaccessibilityoftheESWmanual ResponsetoEvaluationofEDRG20020(PLI-72711)valves.Mr.Miller'sresponsetoEDRG20020ItemDonfuelpoolinstrumentationisinadequatebecauseitisincomplete.RegGuide1.97requiresthatinstrumentationrequiredforinitiatingandmonitoringsafetyfunctionsbequalified.ThefuelpoolinstrumentationmaybepoweredfromClass1Esources,butithasnotbeenestablishedthatthisinstrumentationwillfunctionintheenvironmentinwhichitwillbeexposedpost-LOCA.Inaddition,Mr.BrinckmaninhisletterdatedSeptember1,1992(PLI-72288)reportedthat"thefuelpooltroublealarminthecontrolroomcannotbecountedonforreliableindication."Thereadoutsoffuelpoollevelandtemperatureareatlocalpanelsinthereactorbuildingandwouldalsobeinaccessiblepost-LOCA.Mr.JamesMiltenbergerinhisletterdatedSeptember9,1992(PLI-72367)indicatedthatthefuelpoollevelinstrumentationneedstobeupgradedtoprovidereliablecontrolroomindication.Mr.Milleralsostatesthatthe"instrumentationavailabletotheoperatorisnotrequiredtobequalifiedsincethedesignbasislossofspentfuelpoolcoolingisnotcoincidentwiththeDBALOCAconditions."However,RegGuide1.13requiresadequatecoolingofthespentfuelpooltobeavailableforallnormaloperatingandpostulatedaccidentconditions.SinceafuelpoolcoolingfailurecanoccurduetothehydrodynamicloadsorenvironmentalconditionsassociatedwiththedesignbasisLOCA,itshouldhavebeenconsideredaspartofthedesignbasis.Inaddition,iftheexistingunqualifiedinstrumentationprovidesafalseindicationofincreasingfuelpooltemperatureordroppingfuelpoolwaterlevelpost-LOCA,personnelmaybeunnecessarilyexposedtoradiationastheyenterthereactor.buildingandrefuelingfloorareatorespondtotheperceivedthreat.EDRG20020ItemDisavaliddeficiencybecausethefuelpoolinstrumentationmaynotbeadequatetoprovidetheoperatorwithsufficientinformationtoimplementandmonitorrequiredsafetymeasures.Mr.Miller'sresponsetoEDRG20020ItemEontheanalyticaltimetoboilforthemaximumnormalheatloadcaseisinadequatebecauseitdoesnotaddresstheprob)emreported.EDRG20020ItemEdidnotdipputethe9.79x10BTU/hrheatloadvalueversusthe12.6x10BTU/hrvalue,butratherthatthemaximumnormalheatloaduponwhichthetimetoboilcalculationwasbasedwasrenderednon-conservativebychangesinfueltypesandoperatingcyclelengths.EDRG00005waswrittenin1990onthesubjectofoutdatedFSARChapter9 ResponsetoEvaluationofEDRG20020(PLI-72711)data.ItemEwasincludedinEDRG20020toidentifyanotherconsequenceoftheproblemoriginallyreportedinEDRG00005.ItisourunderstandingthatEDRG00005hasnotyetbeenresolvedovertwoyearsafteritwasinitiated.EDRG20020ItemEisavaliddeficiencybecausethebasisforthetimetoboilcalculationreportedintheFSARisinvalid,butasweclearlystatedinourmemodatedJune22,1992toJoeZola(ET-0471)itdoesnotaffectthepresentoperationofSSESbecausetheexistingdecayheatloadsinthefuelpoolarelessthan9.79x10BTU/hr.ThisdeficiencyrepresentsapotentialsafetyconcernbecausethemaximumnormalheatloadatSSESmayexceed12.6x10BTU/hrwhenthespentfuelpoolisfilledtocapacity.Mr.Miller'sresponsetoEDRG20020ItemFonthetimetoboilfortheemergencyheatloadcaseisinadequateformanyreasons.Mr.Millerstatesthat"notime-to-boilcalculationforthisconfiguration[emerechetlodcase]isrequiredsincetheRHRsystemwillbeinoperationoravailable."ThetimetoboilcalculationforthemaximumnormalheatloadcaseisprovidedinFSARAppendix9Aeventhoughthefuelpoolcoolingsystemisinitiallyoperatingbecauseitsfailuremustbeconsidered.AnequivalentcalculationmustbeprovidedfortheemergencyheatloadcasebecausetheRHRfuelpoolcoolingassist.modecouldfail.AsMr.Millerpointsout,thiscalculationshouldconsidertheadditionalwaterinventoryavailable.Butthiscalculationmustalsoaccountforoperationaleventssuchasputtingthefuelpoolgatesintoisolatethereactorcavityfromthespentfuelpoolvolume.Mr.Millerstatesthat"singlefailuresoftheRHRsystemarenotrequiredforthisdesignbasisfortheemergencyheatload"andreferencesSRP9.1.3.SRP9.1.3indeedsupportsthepositionthatasingleactivefailureneednotbeconsideredfortheemergencyheatloadcase.However,sincetheemergencyheatloadcaseisdefinedasafullcoreoffloadinSRP9.1.3andSSESFSARChapter9andrefuelingoperationsdescribedintheSSESFSARdonotentailfullcoreoffloads,thenPP&L'sroutineuseoffullcoreoffloadsconflictswiththeFSARandincreasestheprobabilityof"new"and"unanalyzed"eventswithconsequencespotentiallymoreseverethantheanalyzedevent.ItisourunderstandingthattheRHRfuelpoolcoolingassistmodehasnotbeenusedat.SSESandwasnotevensuccessfullypre-operationallytested.

ResponsetoEvaluationofEDRG20020(PLI-72711)9.EDRG20020ItemFisavaliddeficiencybecausecurrentSSESrefuelingoperationsroutinelyplacethe"emergencyheatload"inthespentfuelpoolwithoutacorrespondingtimetoboilanalysis.Mr.Miller'sresponsetoEDRG20020ItemGontheradiologicalreleasecalculationisinadequateforthereasonsstatedinComment7.10.EDRG20020ItemGisavaliddeficiencybecausethebasisforthetimetoboilcalculationreportedintheFSARisinvalid,butasweclearlystatedinourmemodatedJune22,1992toJoeZola(ET-0471)itdoesnotaffectthepresentoperationofSSESbecausetheexistingdecayheatloadsinthefuelpoolarelessthan9.79xl0BTU/hr.Mr.Miller'sresponsetoEDRG20020ItemHonnonconservativeactivitytermsintheradiologicalreleasecalculationisadequate.BasedonthetechnicaljustificationprovidedbyMr.Miller,weagreethatEDR620020ItemHisnotavaliddeficiency.Mr.Miller'sresponsetoEDRG20020ItemIonmaximumtimepriortomakeupisadequate.WeagreethatEDRG20020ItemIisnotavaliddeficiency,butwerecommendthatcalculation175-14beeitherrevisedtoclarifyitspurposeandusageordeleted.2.Mr.MillerfocusedmuchofhisevaluationontheabilityofSSEStowithstandalossoffuelpoolcoolingduringarefuelingoutage.EDR620020didnotemphasizethisaspecttothesamedegree,althoughmanyoftheproblemsarejustaspertinentunderthiscondition.Infact,thecurrentSSESpracticeofperformingfullcoreoffloadseachrefuelingoutageplacesthestationinaveryvulnerable(andunanalyzed)condition.AtthepointwhenthecommonRHRsystemoutageisenteredontheunitinrefueling,theoperatingunit'sfuelpoolcoolingsystemishandlingtheentireheatloadfromthecross-tiedfuelpools.AdesignbasisLOCA/LOOPatthistimesubjectsthestationtoalossoffuelpoolcoolingatatimewhenoneunit'sRHRsystemistotallyunavailableandtheremainingunit'sRHRsystemisdedicatedtocoreandcontainmentcoolingfunctions.IfrealisticeventssuchasthesinglefailureofoneRHRontheoperating(LOCA)unitand/orinstallationofthefuelpoolgatestothereactorcavityontheunitinrefuelingareconsidered,thepotentialconsequencescanbequitesevere.Inanycase,thisconditionisroutinelyenteredbySSES'ithoutthenecessaryanalysestosupportit.

Attachwent29PP8LMemofromGlennD.MillertoGeorgeT.Jones,"EvaluationofEDRG20020-SpentFuelPoolCoolingIssue",October29,1992(PLI-72763)

~~~October29,1992GeorgeT.JonesA6-2SUS(UEHANNASTEANELECTRICSTATIONEVALUATIONOFEDRG20020-SPENTFUELPOOLCOOLINGISSUEPLI-72763FILEA45-lAAttached,pleasefindacopyofNE-092-002,Rev.0"LossofFuelPoolCoolingEventEvaluation".ThisevaluationisprovidedinresponsetoyourmemoPLI-72640.ThisreportisintendedtosupplementmypreviousevaluationofEDRG20020transmittedinPLI-72711.ThisdocumentevaluatesthevariousaccidentscenariosidentifiedbyEDRG20020forwhichalossoffuelpoolcoolingcanbeexpected.Inaddition,thisdocumentprovidespertinentdesignbasisinformationwithregardtotheFuelPoolCoolingsystemandrecoveryfromalossofFuelPool-Coolingevent.Thisreportconcludesthatrecoveryfromalldesignbasisaccidentsispossiblewithoutcompromisingsafetyrelatedequipment,whileassuringthatthespentfuelpoolwillremainsufficientlycooled.Therefore,itcanbeconcludedthattheplantisoperableandcontinuedsafeoperationoftheplantisassuredwithregardtotheconcernsraisedinEDRGZ0020.Thisreportalsorecommendsanumberofimmediateandshorttermactions(seeSection5.0)whichwillenhanceplantsafetyandreducetherisktotheplantenvironmentresultingfromtheeventsstudied.Implementationoftheseactionsisrequiredtosupporttheconclusionsreachedinthisevaluation.Ifyouhaveanyquestionsregardingthisevaluation,pleasecontactmeatyourconvenience.GlennD.MillerCC:G.J.KuczynskiC.A.HyersH.M.SimpsonH.G.StanleyJ.S.StefankoJ.R.MiltenbergerNuclearRecords-SSES-A2-4-A1-2-SSES-A9-3-A6-1-A6-2J.E.AgnewH.R.MjaatvedtD.F.RothJ.M.KennyF.G.ButlerD.C.PrevatteD.A.Lochbaum-A6-3-AS-3-SSES-A2-4-A6-3-A6-3-Enercon

-Attachaent30PP8LEngineeringReport,"LossofFuelPoolCoolingEventEvaluationforEDR8620020",October29,1992(NE-92-002Rev.0)Note:ThisreportdocumentstheextensiveengineeringeffortundertakenbyPP8Ltoexplorethelossoffuelpoolcoolingevent.Itrecommendssubstantialmodificationsandprocedurechangesinorderfortheunitstohandlealossoffuelpoolcoolingunderalldesignconditions.Thisreportconcludesthattheoperabilityoftheplantisnotaffected,butseemstobasethisconclusionontheconditions~1~alltherecommendedmodificationsandprocedurechangesareimplemented,notastheplantexistscurrently.