ML17264A847
| ML17264A847 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 03/31/1997 |
| From: | MECREDY R C ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17264A848 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9704070038 | |
| Download: ML17264A847 (19) | |
Text
UNITEDSTATESOFAMERICANUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONIntheMatterof))RochesterGasandElectricCorporation)DocketNo.50-244(R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantAPPLICATIONFORAMENDMENTTPERATINLIENSEPursuanttoSection50.90oftheregulationsoftheU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission(NRC),RochesterGasandElectricCorporation(RG&E),holderofFacilityOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,herebyrequeststhattheTechnicalSpecificationssetforthinAppendixAtothatlicense,beamended.Thisrequestforchangeistoreviserequirementsassociatedwiththespentfuelpooltoreflectaplannedmodificationtothestorageracks.Adescriptionoftheamendmentrequest,necessarybackgroundinformation,justificationoftherequestedchanges,andnosignificanthazardsandenvironmentalconsiderationsareprovidedinAttachmentI.Thisevaluationdemonstratesthattheproposedchangesdonotinvolveasignificantchangeinthetypesorasignificantincreaseintheamountsofeffluentsoranychangeintheauthorizedpowerlevelofthefacility.Theproposedchangesdonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.97040700389'7033kPDRADQCK05000244PPDR AmarkedupcopyoftheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationswhichshowtherequestedchangesissetforthinAttachmentII.TheproposedrevisedtechnicalspecificationsareprovidedinAttachmentIII.TheLicensingReportsupportingtheproposedchangestothespentfuelpoolstorageracksisprovidedinAttachmentIV.WHEREFORE,ApplicantrespectfullyrequeststhatFacilityOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,andAttachmentAtothatlicense,beamendedintheformattachedheretoasAttachmentRochesterGasandElectricCorporationByRobertC.MecryVicePresidentNuclearOperationsSubscribedandsworntobeforemeonthis3t'Jayof~1997.NotaryPublicDEBORAHA.PIPERN[NotaryPublicrntheStateofNewYork~ONTARIOCOUNTYCommisrrooExpireeNov.23,I9...2' Attachment1R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantLicenseAmendmentRequestRevisedSpentFuelStorageRequirementsThisamendmentprovidesthedescriptionofthelicenseamendmentrequest(LAR)andthenecessaryjustificationstosupportanincreaseintheallowedspentfuelpoolstoragecapacity.Thisattachmentisdividedintosixsectionsasfollows.SectionAsummarizesallchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecifications.SectionBprovidesbackgroundandhistoryassociatedwiththechangesbeingrequested.SectionCprovidesthejustificationsassociatedwiththeproposedchanges.AnosignificanthazardsconsiderationevaluationandenvironmentalconsiderationoftherequestedchangestoGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsareprovidedinSectionsDandE,respectively.SectionFlistsallreferencesusedinthisattachment.A.DESCRIPTIONOFPROPOSEDTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONCHANGESThisLARproposestorevisetheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationstoreflectnewspentfuelpoolstoragerequirements.ThischangeissummarizedbelowandshowninAttachmentII.L7.121.The'requirementfortheminimumboronconcentrationinthespentfuelpoolisincreasedfrom300to450ppm.~L~~711.TherequirementsforstorageofspentfuelinRegion1ofthestorageracksisrevisedtoincluderestrictionsoninitialenrichmentandaccumulatedburnupasidentifiedinnewFigure3.7.13-1.2.TheREQUIREDACTIONfornotsatisfyingthestoragerequirementsisrevisedtoallowmovementofthenoncomplyingfuelassemblytoanyacceptablestoragelocationregardlessofstorageregion.3.Figure3.7.13-1isaddedtoprovidetheinitialenrichmentandburnuprestrictionsforstorageinspecifiedlocationsinRegion1.4.PreviousFigure3.7.13-1isrenumberedto3.7.13-2andrevisedtoprovideadditionalrestrictionsonacceptablestoragelocationsforRegion2. 5.SR3.7.13.1isrevisedtoremovetheNOTEprovidinganexemptiontotheSRwhenmovingafuelassemblyfromRegion2toRegion1.6.SR3.7.13.1isrevisedtoverifytheadditionalrestrictiononburnupandaccumulatedburnupissatisfiedpriortostoringafuelassemblyinRegion1.7.Figure3.7.13-1isrenumberedto3.7.13-2inSR3.7.13.2reflectingtheadditionofthefigureforRegion1.DINFEAR41.Specification4.3.1.1(c)ischangedtoremovethestatementconcerningRGAF2fuelstoragecanisternotsatisfyingtherequirementsforinitialenrichmentandburnupofLCO3.7.13.2.Thespecificationofthespentfuelpoolstoragecapacityischangedtoreflectthemaximumnumberoffuelassembliesandstoragelocations.B.BACKGROUNDTheoriginalspentfuelstorageracksforGinnaStationhadastoragecapacityof210fuelassemblies.In1977theserackswereremovedandreplacedwithracksmanufacturedbyUSToolandDieconsistingofninerackmodulesutilizingacheckerboardpatternalternatingstoragelocationswithwatercells.Thisincreasedstoragecapacityto595storagelocations.In1985sixoftheninerackswereremovedfromthestoragepoolandmodified.Thismodificationremovedthelead-infunnelsoverthewaterboxlocationsandaddedboraflexinsertstoalllocationstoeffectivelydoublethestoragecapacityforthemodifiedmodules,Thisincreasedoverallpoolstoragecapacityto1016fuelassembliesanddividedthestorageracksintotworegions.Region1consistedofthreecheckerboardpatternrackmodulescapableofstoringall(freshorrecentlydischarged)fuelassemblies.Region2consistedofthesixmodifiedrackmoduleswithhigherdensityfuelstorageandrestrictionsbasedoninitialenrichment,minimumaccumulatedburnup,andminimumdecaytimeaftershutdown.TheproposedmodificationwillreplacethethreeRegion1rackmoduleswithsevennewrackmodulesscheduledforimplementationin1998.Sixnewperipheralmodulescanbeaddedatsometimeinthefuture.Twoofthesevennewmodulesplannedtobeinstalledin1998willbedesignatedaspartofRegion2withsimilarrestrictionsonburnupversusinitialenrichment(i.e.,theRegion2areawillbeeffectivelyincreased).TheotherfivenewmoduleswillcomposeRegion1.Higherdensityfuelstorageinthenewrackswillbepossiblewiththeuseofboratedstainlesssteeland,forRegion1,theuseofacheckerboardpatternalternatingfreshfuelwithburnedfuelsatisfyingminimumburnuplevelsbasedoninitialenrichment.Table1summarizestheproposedSFP changes.C.JUSTIFICATIONOFCHANGESThissectionprovidesthejustificationforallchangesdescribedinSectionAaboveandshowninAttachmentII.Thejustificationsareorganizedbasedonwhetherthechangeis:morerestrictive(M),lessrestrictive(L),administrative(A),ortherequirementisrelocated(R).Thejustificationslistedbelowarealsoreferencedinthetechnicalspecificationswhichareaffected(seeAttachmentII).Reference1(enclosedasAttachmentIV)providesadetailedanalysisofthedesignandlicensingbasisoftheproposedmodification.ThisanalysisisbasedupontheguidanceestablishedinReference2andaddressesthemajorareasofstructural,criticality,thermalhydraulic,andradiological.ThisanalysisissummarizedbelowtotheextentnecessarytoprovidejustificationforthespecificproposedchangestotheTechnicalSpecifications.C.1MoreRestrictive1.LCO3.7.12specifiestheminimumboronconcentrationrequiredforthespentfuelpool.Theproposedrevisionincreasesthisminimumconcentrationto450ppmfrom300ppm.ThecriteriaforthecriticalitydesignofbothRegion1and2ofthespentfuelpoolisbaseduponmaintainingtheK,6.95.NRCguidelinesspecifythatduetothepostulatedaccidentconditionwhereallsolubleboronislost,nocreditforboroncanbetakenundernormalconditions.HoweverthedoublecontingencyprinciplediscussedinANSIN16.1-1975(Reference3)andReference2allowscreditforboronunderaccidentorabnormalconditionssinceonlyasingleaccidentneedbeconsideredatonetime.Thelimitingaccidentcondition,asdiscussedinSection4ofReference1,isanincorrectlyplacedassemblyinRegion2.Theanalysisshowsthatthecriticalitycriterionforthis,andanyotherabnormalevent,issatisfiedbyaminimumboronconcentrationof450ppmduringfuelmovement.T2.LCO3.7.13specifiestherequirementsforstorageoffuelassembliesinRegions1and2ofthespentfuelpooltomaintainK,~~.95.WiththeproposedmodificationthestorageconfigurationforfuelinRegion1changestoacheckerboardpatternalternatingbetweenstoragelocationsforfreshorlowburnupfuel,andlocationsforhigherburnupfuel.Thefresh/lowburnupfuellocationsareidentifiedontheracksbyusinglead-infunnelsforthoselocationsonly.TheproposedchangetotheTechnicalSpecificationaddsthereferencetothenewFigure3.7.13-1whichprovidesthecriteriafordeterminingthe
't)Al acceptabilityoffuelassemblystorageineitheroftwolocationsbasedupontheinitialenrichmentandaccumulatedburnup.TheanalysisprovidingthebasisforthisconfigurationisinSection4ofReference1.WiththeadditionofnewFigure3.7.13-1forRegion1,thefigureforRegion2isrenumberedto3.7.13-2.ThisnewfigurecontainsfourpossiblelocationsforfuelstoragewithinRegion2(versustheprevioustwo).WiththeproposedmodificationRegion2isexpandedfromtheoriginalsixBoraflexlinedrackmodulestoincludetwonewboratedstainlesssteelrackmodules.TheacceptabilityforstorageoffuelassembliesinRegion2isexpandedtoincludeanyfuelassemblyprovidedspecifiedinitialenrichment,burnup,andstorageconfigurationrequirementsaresatisfied.TheserequirementsarebaseduponmaintainingthecriticalitycriteriaofK,S.95,andincludeanassumedamountofBoraflexdegradation/shrinkage.Based'ntheinitialenrichmentandaccumulatedburnupthefuelassemblyisdeterminedtofallwithinoneoffourburnupdomains.Eachdomainhasspecificrestrictionsforthestorageoffuelassembliesinadjacentstoragelocationstosatisfythebasisforthecriticalityanalysis.TheanalysisthatdemonstratesthatfuelassembliesstoredinconformancewiththisfiguresatisfythecriteriaofK,s.95isinSection4ofReference1.3.SR3.7.13.1specifiesthesurveillancerequiredpriortoplacingafuelassemblyintoastoragelocationinRegion1.ConsistentwiththeproposedchangetoLCO3,7.13,theproposedchangetothisSRaddsthereferencetotheinitialenrichmentandaccumulatedburnupcriteriaidentifiedonFigure3.7.13-1.Priortotheproposedmodification,anyfuelassemblyacceptableforstorageinRegion2couldbestoredinanylocationofRegion1.AftertheproposedmodificationandrevisionstonewFigure3.7.13-2,thecriteriashouldbeverifiedpriortomovementofanyassemblyregardlessofitsinitialstoragelocation.Withtheproposedchange,thenoteexemptingthissurveillancewhenmovingafuelassemblyfromRegion2isnolongerappropriate.C.2sRestrictive1.REQUIREDACTIONA.1forLCO3.7.13specifiestheactiontobetakengivenafuelassemblyisidentifiedinalocationthatisnotincompliancewiththerequirementsoftheLCO.WiththeadditionofrequirementsforstorageoffuelassemblieswithineachregionasidentifiedonFigures3.7.13-1and3.7.13-2,theactionfornon-compliancemustallowmovementoffuelwithinaregiontoanacceptablelocation.Thatis,itisnowacceptabletoallowmovementofthenoncomplyingfuelassemblytoadifferentlocationwithinthesamespentfuelpoolregionandstillmeettheLCOrequirements.
,r~~ 2.DesignFeature4.3.1.1(c)containsastatementnotingthatafuelcanistercontainingrodsfromaregionRGAF2fuelassemblythatwouldnotsatisfytheinitialenrichmentandburnupspecificationsforthestorageregion.Withthecriticality'analysisdocumentedinSection4ofReference1,thesubjectfuelcanisterwillsatisfythemodifiedrequirementsofLCO3.7.13andthestatementisnolongerrequired.3.DesignFeature4.3.3currentlyspecifiesthespentfuelpoolstoragecapacityintermsofthenumberoffuelassemblies.Withtheuseofconsolidatedfuelcanisters,fuelrodsfrommultiplefuelassemblies(typically2assembliesorless)canbestoredinonecanisterwhichoccupiesonestoragelocation.Withtheproposedmodification,thedesignandlicensingbasiswillsupportthestorageofupto1879fuelassembliesin1369storagelocations.Therefore,thisspecificationwasrevisedtospecifythatnomorethan1879fuelassembliesbestoredinnomorethan.1369storagelocationsconsistentwiththeanalysisinReference1.D.SIGNIFICANTHAZARDSCONSIDERATIONSEVALUATIONTheproposedchangestoGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasidentifiedinSectionAandjustifiedinSectionChavebeenevaluatedwithrespectto10CFR50.92(c)andshowntonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdescribedbelow.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thedesignbasiseventsconsideredforthespentfuelpoolincludebothexternaleventsandpostulatedaccidentsinthepool.Theexternaleventsconsideredaretornadomissilesandseismicevents,TheevaluationofthepostulatedimpactofatornadomissileisdetailedinSections3,4,and6ofReference1.Thestructuralevaluationindicatesthattherearenogrossdistortionsoftheracksoranyadverseeffectsuponplantstructuresorequipment.Theradiologicalconsequencesofthiseventindicatethatoffsitedosesare"wellwithin"the10CFR100limits.ThestructuralevaluationisdetailedinSection3ofReference1.Currentstateoftheartmethodsareusedinthestructuralanalysis.TheevaluationofthestorageracksisbasedonaconservativeinterpretationoftheASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCode.TheevaluationofthespentfuelpoolisbasedonaconservativeinterpretationofrequirementssetforthintheAmericanConcreteInstitute,CodeRequirementsforNuclearSafetyRelatedConcreteStructures,andAmericanInstituteofSteelContruction,SpecificationforStructuralSteelBuildings.The spentfuelstoragesystemwasdesignedtomeetallapplicablestructuralcriteriafornormal(LevelA),upset(LevelB),andfaulted(LevelD)conditionsasdefinedinNUREG-0900,SRP3.8.4,AppendixD.Thefollowingloadingswereconsidered:deadweight,seismic,thermal,stuckfuelassembly,dropafuelassembly,andtornadomissileimpact.LoadcombinationswereperformedinaccordancewithSRP3.8.4,AppendixD.Giventheevaluatedseismicevents,thechangesinthefinalpositionoftheracksaresmallascomparedtotheinitialpositionpriortotheseismicevent.Themaximumclosureofgapsissuchthatnosignificantchangesingapsresultduringanysingleseismicevent.Furthermore,thecombinedgapclosuresresultingfromacombinationof5OBEsand1SSEshowthattherearenorack-to-rackor,.rack-to-wallimpacts.Theseevaluationsconcludethatunderthesepostulatedeventsthestoredfuelassembliesaremaintainedinastable,eoolablegeometry,andasubcriticalconfiguration.AsdescribedinthebasesforLCO3.7.12and3.7.13,thepostulatedaccidentsinthespentfuelpoolaredividedintotwocategories.Thefirstarethoseinvolvingalossofcoolinginthespentfuelpool.Thethermal-hydraulicanalysisforthemaximumexpecteddecayheatloadsisdescribedinSection5ofReference1.Theproposedmodificationdoesnotchangetheconfigurationoftheavailablespentfuelcoolingsystems,thelimitingdesignconditionsformaximumdecayheatloadwhichoccursduringafullcoreoffload,ortheexistingrequirementtomaintainpooltemperaturebelow150'F.Utilizingthethreeavailablespentfuelcoolingsystems,GinnaStationmaintainsfullredundancyduringhighheatloadconditions.Thedecayheatloadtothespentfuelpoolismaintainedwithinthecapacityoftheoperatingcoolingsystembyappropriatelydelayingfueloffloadfromthereactor.Shouldafailureoccurontheoperatingcoolingsystem,theresultingheatratesallowsufficienttimetoplaceastandbycoolingsysteminservicebeforethepooldesignlimittemperatureisexceeded.Increasesinspentfuelpooltemperature,withthecorrespondingdecreaseinwaterdensityandvoidformationfromboiling,willresultinadecreaseinreactivityduetothedecreaseinmoderationeffects.Inaddition,theanalysisdemonstratesthatthestoragerackgeometryandrequiredfuelstorageconfigurationsresultinaK,~S.95assumingnosolubleboronallowingforthepotentialofmakeuptothepoolwithunboratedwater.Thesecondcategoryisrelatedtothemovementoffuelassembliesandotherloadsabovethespentfuelpool.ThelimitingaccidentwithrespecttoreactivityisthefuelhandlingaccidentwhichisanalyzedinSection4ofReference1.Forboththeincorrectlytransferredfuelassembly(placedinanunauthorizedlocation)oradroppedfuelassembly,thepositivereactivityeffectsresultingareoffsetbythenegativereactivityfromtherequiredminimumsolubleboronconcentration.TheresultingK,isshowntobelessthan0.95.TheradiologicalconsequencesofafuelassemblydropremainasdescribedinSection15.7.3oftheUFSARandasdiscussedinSection6ofReference1.Loadsinexcessofafuelassemblyandits r.4~* handlingtoolareadministrativelyprohibitedfrombeingcarriedoverspentfuel.Therearenochangesanticipatedforeitherthefuelhandlingequipmentortheauxiliarybuildingoverheadcraneduetotheproposedmodificationtothefuelstorageracks.ThemodificationisscheduledfortheYear1998tobeperformedwhileGinnaStationisoperating.MovementofheavyloadsaroundthespentfuelpoolarecontrolledbytherequirementsofNUREG-0612andtheregulatoryguidelinessetforthinNRCBulletin96-02(seeSection3ofReference1).Spentfuelcasksandstorageracks(duringremovalandinstallation)willbemovedusingtheauxiliarybuildingcraneandliftingattachmentssatisfyingthesinglefailureproofcriteriaofNUREG-0554,obviatingtheneedtodeterminetheconsequencesforthisaccident.Basedontheabove,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesdonotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityorconsequencesofanyaccidentpreviouslyanalyzed.2.Operationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedmodificationdoesnotalterthefunctionofanysystemassociatedwithspentfuel'handling,cooling,orstorage.Theproposedchangesdonotinvolveadifferenttypeofequipment-orchangesinmethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Theadditionalrestrictionsplacedontheacceptablestoragelocationsforspentfuelareconsistentwiththetypeofrestrictionthatpreviouslyexisted.Thepotentialviolationoftheserestrictions(incorrectlytransferredfuelassembly)areanalyzedasdiscussedabove.Thedesign,analysis,fabrication,andinstallationmeetalltheappropriateNRCregulatoryrequirements,andappropriateindustrycodesandstandards.Basedontheabove,thechangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanypreviouslyanalyzed.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninthemarginofsafety.TheLicensingReportenclosedasReference1addressesthefollowingconsiderations:nuclearcriticality,thermal-hydraulic,andmechanical,material,andstructural.Resultsoftheseevaluationsdemonstratethatthechangesassociatedwiththespentfuelreracking'donotinvolveasignificantreductioninthemarginofsafetyassummarizedbelow:NclrriicalitTheestablishedregulatoryacceptancecriterionisthatK,~belessthanorequalto I.~t1l'~l'j 0.95,includingalluncertaintiesatthe95/95probability/confidencelevel,undernormalandabnormalconditions.ThemethodologyusedintheevaluationmeetsNRCrequirements,andapplicableindustrycodes,standards,andspecifications.Inaddition,themethodologyhasbeenreviewedandapprovedbytheNRCinrecentnuclearcriticalityevaluations.Specificconditionswhichwereevaluatedincludemisloadingofafuelassembly,dropofafuelassembly(shallow,deepdrops,andsidedrops),poolwatertemperatureeffects,andmovementofracksduetoseismicevents.ResultsdescribedinSection4ofReference1documentthatthecriticalityacceptancecriterionismetforallnormalandabnormalconditions.Thermal-HdulicConservativemethodsandassumptionshavebeenusedtocalculatethemaximumtemperatureofthefuelandtheincreaseofthebulkpoolwatertemperatureinthespentfuelpoolundernormalandabnormalconditions.Themethodologyforperformingthethermal-hydraulicevaluationmeetsNRCregulatoryrequirements.Resultsfromthethermal-hydraulicevaluationshowthatthemaximumtemperatureofthehottestfuelassembly,intactorconsolidatedcanister,islessthanthetemperaturefornucleateboilingcondition.Theeffectsofcellblockageonthemaximumtemperatureofintactfuelandconsolidatedcanisterswereevaluated.ResultsdescribedinSection5ofReference1showthatadequatecoolingoftheintactorconsolidatedfuelisassured.Inallcasestheexistingspentfuelpoolcoolingsystemwillmaintainthebulkpooltemperatureatorbelow150'Fbydelayingcoreoffloadfromthereactor.MechanicalMaterialndru1Theprimarysafetyfunctionofthespentfuelpoolandtheracksistomaintainthespentfuelassembliesinasafeconfigurationthroughallnormalandabnormalloads.,Abnormalloadingswhichhavebeenconsideredintheevaluationare:seismicevents,thedropofafuelassembly,theimpactofatornadomissile,astuckassembly,andthedropofaheavyload.Themechanical,material,andstructuraldesignofthenewspentfuelracksisinaccordancewithNRCregulatoryrequirements(includingtheNRCOTPositiondatedApril14,1978,andaddendumdatedJanuary18,1979),andapplicableindustrystandards.Therackmaterialsarecompatiblewiththespentfuelpoolenvironmentandfuelassemblies.Thematerialusedasaneutronabsorber(boratedstainlesssteel)hasbeenapprovedbytheAmericanSocietyforTestingandMaterials(ASTM),andlicensedpreviouslybytheNRCforuseasaneutronabsorberatIndianPoint3,IndianPoint2,andMillstone2.ThestructuralevaluationpresentedinSection3ofReference1documentsthatthetippingorslidingofthefree-standingrackswillnotresultinrack-to-rackorrack-to-wallimpactsduringseismicevents.Thespentfuelassemblieswillremainintactandthecriticalitycriterionofk,zlessthanorequalto V5g~~g~,' 0.95ismet,Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninthemarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.E.ENVIRONMENTALCONSIDERATIONRG&Ehasevaluatedtheproposedchangesanddeterminedthat:1.ThechangesdonotinvolveasignificantsafetyhazardsconsiderationasdocumentedinSectionDabove;2.Thechangesdonotinvolveasignificantchangeinthetypesorsignificantincreaseintheamountsofanyeffluentsthatmaybereleasedoffsite,since:a.theconsequencesfollowingafuelhandlingaccidentortornadomissileeventremainwithinacceptedlimits(Section6ofReference1),b.itisnotexpectedthatthewastegeneratedfromdemineralizerresinreplacementwillsignificantlyincrease(Section6ofReference1),c.anticipatedwastegeneratedfromtherackreplacementwillbesubstantiallydecreasedthroughdecontaminationpriortodisposal(Section6ofReference1),andd.itisnotexpectedthatasignificantactivitywillbereleasedtoreceivingwaters-ortotheatmosphereasaresultofthereracking(Section6ofReference1).3,Thechangesdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseinindividualorcumulativeoccupationalradiationexposure.Theoccupationalexposurelimits'arelimitedby10CFR20andcontrolledtoaslowasreasonablyachievablebyplantproceduresandpractices.ExpecteddoseratesinaccessiblespacesadjacenttothespentfuelpoolarecalculatedanddocumentedinSection6ofReference1.Increasedstoragecapacityofthespentfuelpoolisnotexpectedtoresultinanysignificantincreaseintheradiationdoselevelsatthepoolsurfaceorotherlocationsofaccessibility.Dosestotheworkerswillbeconstantlymonitoredduringthereracking.Theuse ofelectronicdosimetry,in-poolradiationareamonitors,aswellasthepresenceofradiationprotectionstaffwillprovideahighdegreeofassurancethatdosestoworkerswillbeminimizedinaccordancewithALARAprinciples.TheRadiationProtectionStaffwillbeanintegralpartofthisoperation,andthereforewillbeavailabletosupportemergingrequirements.Theestimatedtotalexposureforthisoperationwillbebetween8and12Person-Rem.ReviewsofthererackwillbeconductedformallyaspartoftheALARAprocess,anddocumentedaspartoftheprojectworkscope.AdditionalradiologicalconsiderationsaredetailedinSection6ofReference1.Accordingly,theproposedchangesmeettheeligibilitycriteriaof.categoricalexclusionsetforthin10CFR51.22(c)(9).Therefore,pursuantto10CFR51.22(b),anenvironmentalimpactstatementoftheproposedchangesisnotrequired.F..REFERENCES1.FramatomeTechnologies,Inc.,"R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,SpentFuelPoolRe-rerackingLicensingReport",February1997.2.LetterfromB.K.Grimes,NRCtoAllReactorLicensees,
Subject:
"OTPositionforReviewandAcceptanceofSpentFuelStorageandHandlingApplications,"datedApril14,1978,andmodifiedJanuary18,1979.3.ANSIN16.1-1975,"AmericanNationalStandardforNuclearCriticalitySafetyinOperationswithFissionableMaterialsOutsideReactors."
TABLE1PROPOSEDCHANGESTOT.S.'"".;.jCHAhGES.TO;;.';:;-;',,FeRA~TO~-;,::;::"',":.L'IC'ENSeGP-,',':.9giixREPORT,~/y/;.;..".-',:.'-:<,'-':::.".~,"'.DESCRIPiTIOV:.!;:.'"-:;:;:.:":,::::;:::-:;:.:.:,':;::;;:::;.::;::;";:;-,':.";;;,";::,::,;".-;,.:::;:;:;::;::CURRENT,.;;.'.";;;".";.";j...Sections433andB3.7.13FigureB3.7.13-1NotdescribedSections3.7.13andB3.7.13Figure3.7.13-1Sections43andB3.7.13Sections1,2,3,4,5,6,and8Section1Section4Section40CAPACITY0NUMBEROFRACKSANDTYPEOFPOISOi(MATERIAL0LOADINGREQUIREI,KNTS0CONSOLIDATEDRODSTORAGECANISTERS1016FUELASSEhIBLIESREGIOiN1(176LOCATIONS)3S.S.IVITHNOPOISONSREGION2(840LOCATIONS)6S.S.IVITHBORAFLEXREGION1NOENRICILmm/BURNUPREQUIRIMFKI'SREGIOiN2EiNRICI&KÃf/BURhVPREQUIREMENTS(TiVODOMAINS)TRANSFEROFNOiN-COMPLYIiNGASSEMBLIESFROMREGIOiN2TOREGIOiN1iN&iIBEROFRODSINCOiNSOLIDATEDSTORAGECANISTERSHALLBE(144RODSOR)256RODS1879FUELASSEi~LIESIN1369STORAGELOCATIOiNS(ASSUMESCONSOLIDATION)REGIOiN1(294LOCATIONS)5S.S.iVITHBORATEDSTAINLESSSTEELREGIOiN2(1075LOCATIONS)2S.S.iVITHBORATEDSTAINLESSSTEEL6S.SiVITHBORAFLEX6S.S.IVITHBORATEDSTAINLESSSTEELREGIOiN1EiiiRICHMENT/BURNUP(TiVODOMAINS)ANDSTORAGECONFIGURATIONSREGION2ENRICIBKNT/BURi&JP(FOURDOMAINS)AM)STORAGECOiIFIGURATIONSTRANSFEROFNON-COMPLYINGFUELASSEMBLIESIVITHINAREGIOiNNORESTRICTIONSONTHENUMBEROFRODSINCOiNSOLIDATEDRODSTORAGECANISTERSection3.7.12andB3.7.12Section40BORONCOiNCENTRATIOiN300PPM450PPiVI AttachmentIIMarkedupcopyofR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantTechnicalSpecificationsIncludedpages:3.7273.7-293.7-303.7-314.0-24.0-3B3.7-87*B3.7-89*B3.7-90~B3.7-91*B3.7-92+B3.7-93*B3.7-94*B3.7-96*"'hesebasespagesareunderthecontrolofRG&Eandarebeingprovidedforinformationonly.