ML18041A048

Forwards Response to Request for Info Per 10CFR50.54(f) Re Adequacy & Availability of Design Bases Info

ML18041A048
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	02/18/1997
From:	SYLVIA B R NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NMP1L-1184, NUDOCS 9702250240
Download: ML18041A048 (319)

Text

CATEGORYj.1,',II4REGULAT~INFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSTEM(RIDE)ACCESSIONNBR:9762250240DOC.DATE:97/02/18NOTARIZED:YESDOCKETFACIL:50-220NineMilePointNuclearStation,Unit1,NiagaraPowe0500022050-410NineMilePointNuclearStation,Unit2,NiagaraMoha05000410AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONSYLVIA,B.R.NiagaraMohawkPowerCorp.5~RECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONp~ppt4DocumentControlBranch(DocumentControlDesk)

SUBJECT:

Forwardsresponsetorequestforinfoper10CFR50.54(f)readequeacyaavailabilityofdesignbasesinfo.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:A074DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRiENCLIBISE:ITITLE:Responsesto50.54(f)Req.forDesignBasisInfoNOTES:RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAME~-PDINTERNAL:bPDR-2/THOMAS,KEXTERNAL:NRCPDR-COPIESLTTRENCL11113311RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEHOOD,DNRR/DRPM/PGEBCOPIESLTTRENCL1111DUENOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE!CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMOWFN5D-5(EXT.415-2083)TOELIMINATEYOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSFORDOCUMENTSYOUDON'TNEED!'OTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR8ENCL,',8 I."a(sI(

NIAGARAMOHAWKGENERATI0NBUSINESSGROUPB.RALPHSYLVIAExecutiveVicePresidentGenerationBusinessGroupChietNuclearOfficerU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttn:DocumentControlDeskWashington,DC20555300ERIEBOULEVARDWEST,SYRACUSE,NEWYORK13202/TELEPHONE(315)4284983February18,1997NMP1L1184RE:NineMilePointUnit1DocketNo.50-220NineMilePointUnit2DocketNo.50-410

Subject:

RequestforInformationPursuanttoIOCFR50.$4@RegardingAdequacyandAvailabilityofDesignBasesInformationGentlemen;OnOctober18,1996,NiagaraMohawkPowerCorporation(NMPC)receivedaletterrequesting;(a)adescriptionofourengineeringdesignandconfigurationcontrolprocesses,includingthosethatimplement10CFR50.59,10CFR50.71(e)andAppendixBto10CFR50;(b)arationaleforconcludingthatdesignbasesrequirementsaretranslatedintooperating,maintenance,andtestingprocedures;(c)arationaleforconcludingthatsystem,structure,andcomponentconfigurationandperformanceareconsistentwiththedesignbases;(d)adescriptionoftheprocessesforidentificationofproblemsandimplementationofcorrectiveactions,includingactionstodeterminetheextentofproblems,actiontopreventrecurrence,andreportingtoNRC;and(e)anassessmentoftheoveralleffectivenessofourcurrentprocessesandprogramsinconcludingthattheconfigurationofourplantsisconsistentwiththedesignbases.AttachmentAandAttachmentBtothisletterprovidetherequestedinformationforNineMilePointUnit1(NMP1)andUnit2(NMP2),respectively.InresponsetoRequestedAction(a),weareprovidingadescriptionofourcurrentdesignandconfigurationcontrolprocesses,QualityAssurance(QA)program,aswellasour10CFR50.71(e)and10CFR50.59processes.Inprovidingourrationaleforconcludingthatdesignbasesrequirementsaretranslatedintoprocedures,ourresponsetoRequestedAction(b)focusesontheinitialdevelopment,review,andapprovalofplantoperating,maintenance,andtestingprocedures,theprocedurerevisionprocess,andtheassessmentsandinitiativesconductedtoassureconsistencybetweenourdesignbasesandplantprocedures.TheassessmentsandinitiativesdiscussedincludeNMP1'sSurveillanceVerificationProgram,UpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR)VerificationProgram,RestartActionPlan,andQAAuditsandNMP2'sSurveillanceVerificationProgram,UpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR)VerificationProgram,andQAAudits.InourresponsetoRequestedAction(c),wediscussNMP1'sDesignBasisReconstitutionwalkdowns,RestartActionPlan9702250240970218PDRADaCV.05000220PPDR 03 Page2activities,RestartReadinessReport,andNMP2'sdesign,construction,andstartupQAProgramcontrols,initialtestprogram,andPowerUprateeffortasameansforprovidingreasonableassurancethatstructure,systemandcomponentconfigurationandperformanceareconsistentwiththedesignbases.AlsodelineatedinourresponsetoRequestedAction(c)andcommontobothunitsaresafetysystemfunctionalinspections,routinesurveillancetestingandexaminations,andresponsestoindustryoperationsexperienceitems.Concerningourprocessesforidentificationofproblems,implementationofcorrectiveactions,andreportingrequirements,ourresponsetoRequestedAction(d)includesadescriptionofourDeviation/EventReporting(DER)process.TheDERprocessprovidesfortheidentification,documentation,notification,evaluation,correction,andreportingofconditions,events,activities,andconcernsthathavethepotentialforaffectingthesafeandreliableoperationoftheplants.InRequestedAction(e),theCommissionaskedlicenseestodescribetheoveralleffectivenessoftheircurrentprocessesandprograms.Inresponse,NMPCsummarizesitsprogramsandprocessesandtheresultsoftheassessmentsandinitiativespreviouslydescribedinourresponsestoRequestedActions(a)through(d).AlthoughtheresponsestoRequestedActions(a)and(d)arenearlythesameforNMP1andNMP2,theAttachmentshavebeenunitizedbecauseofthedifferencesinresponsetoRequestedActions(b)and(c).Specifically,differencesexistbetweeneachunits'roceduredevelopment,planttestingactivities,assessmentsandinitiatives,andresponsestoindustryoperationsexperienceitems.NotethatseveraloftheattachedresponsesarebasedoncurrentversionsofNMPCprogramsandprocesseswhicharesubjecttorevisionsand/orenhancements.Also,inordertoeliminateanyambiguitywithregardtocommitmentscontainedinthisresponse,AttachmentCdelineatesthespecificcommitmentsmadebyNMPCinourresponsetoRequestedActions(a),(b),(c),(d),and(e).BasedontheinformationprovidedintheenclosedAttachments,NMPChasreasonableassurancethat:(1)designbasesrequirementsarebeingtranslatedintooperating,maintenance,andtestingprocedures;and(2)system,structure,andcomponentconfigurationandperformanceareconsistentwiththedesignbases.Also,NMPChasaneffectiveadministrativetoolfortheidentification,documentation,notification,evaluation,correction,andreportingofconditions,events,activities,andconcernsthathavethepotentialforadverselyaffectingthesafeandreliableoperationoftheNineMilePointNuclearStation(i.e.,theDERsystem)~Althoughdeficienciesintheareasofdesignandconfigurationcontrolhavebeenidentified,thesignificanceofthesedeficiencieshasbeensmall.Asproblemsareidentified,DERsareinitiatedanddispositioned,andappropriatecorrectiveandpreventiveactionsaretaken.Theseprocessesareafeedbacklooptothedesignandconfigurationcontrolprocessinthattheyeitherconfirmthattheprocessesareworkingeffectivelyoridentifyproblemareaswithsubsequentcorrectiveactionstoenhancetheprocess.Verytrulyyours,B.RalphSylviaChiefNuclearOfficer

Page3BRS/JMT/1mcAttachmentsxc:Mr.H.J.Miller,NRCRegionalAdministratorMr.S.J.Collins,Director,OfficeofNRRMr.S.S.Bajwa,ActingDirector,ProjectDirectorateI-l,NRRMr.B.S.Norris,SeniorResidentInspectorMr.D.S.Hood,SeniorProjectManagerRecordsManagement

UNITEDSTATESNUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONIntheMatterofNiagaraMohawkPowerCorporationNineMilePointUnit1andUnit2)))))DocketNo.50-220DocketNo.50-410B.RalphSylvia,beingdulysworn,statesthatheisChiefNuclearOfficerofNiagaraMohawkPowerCorporation;thatheisauthorizedonthepartofsaidCorporationtosignandfilewiththeNuclearRegulatoryCommissionthedocumentattachedhereto;andthatthedocumentistrueandcorrecttothebestofhisknowledge,informationandbelief.B.RalphlviaChiefNuclearOfficerSubscribedandswornbeforeme,inandfortheStateofNewYorkandtheCountyofthis18thdayofFebruary17.MyCommissionexpires:9'"~~>~"INOTARYUBLIC&En

ACAEALARAANSIASMEASSSBTPBWRCADCDSCFRCSL.DBRDCDCDDCRDDCDERDSDSEDSFIEOPEPIEQEWCFSARGAPGDCGEGIGIPGLHPCIHPCSHPESHVACIASININPOIPEISEGISIISTITSJTGAlternatingCurrentArchitect-EngineerAsLowAsReasonablyAchievableAmericanNationalStandardsInstituteAmericanSocietyofMechanicalEngineersAssistantStationShiftSupervisorBranchTechnicalPositionBoilingWaterReactorComputerAidedDrawingControlledDocumentSystemCodeofFederalRegulationsLowPressureCoreSpraySystemDesignBasisReconstitutionDirectCurrentDesignCriteriaDocumentDesignChangeRequestDesignDocumentChangesDeviation/EventReportSystemDesignSpecificationDataSheetsElectricalDistributionSystemFunctionalInspectionEmergencyOperatingProcedureEngineeringProgramIntegrationProjectEquipmentQualificationElectronicWorkControlFinalSafetyAnalysisReportGenerationAdministrativeProcedureGeneralDesignCriteriaGeneralElectricGenericIssueGenericImplementationProcedureGenericLetterHighPressureCoolantInjectionHighPressureCoreSprayHumanPerformanceEvaluationSystemHeatingVentilatingAirConditioningInstrumentAirSystemInformationNoticeInstituteofNuclearPowerOperationsIndividualPlantExaminationIndependentSafetyEngineeringGroupInserviceInspectionInserviceTestingImprovedTechnicalSpeci6cationsJointTestGroup

LCOLDCRLERLOCAMCMELMOVMSIVNCTSNDDNEPNFPANIPNMP1NMP2NMPCNMPNSNPRDSNRCNRRNSSSNTSDNUMARCP&IDPMPMSTPTSDPCRQ1PQAQARSEQATRQVSARAPRBCLCRFO6RGRHSSALPSAPSARSBOSDBDSERSERTSEWSSOERLimitingConditionforOperationLicensingDocumentChangeRequestLicenseeEventReportLoss-of-CoolantAccidentModificationCoordinatorMasterEquipmentListMotor-OperatedValveMainSteamIsolationValveNuclearCommitmentTrackingSystemNuclearDivisionDirectiveNuclearEngineeringProcedureNationalFireProtectionAssociationNuclearInterfaceProcedureNineMilePointUnit1NineMilePointUnit2NiagaraMohawkPowerCorporationNineMilePointNuclearStationNuclearPlantReliabilityDataSystemNuclearRegulatoryCommissionNuclearReactorRegulationNuclearSteamSupplySystemNon-TechnicallySignificantDiscrepancyNuclearManagementandResourceCouncilPipingandInstrumentDiagramPreventiveMaintenancePreventiveMaintenance/SurveillanceTestingPotentialTechnicallySignificantDiscrepancyPlantChangeRequestQualityFirstProgramQualityAssuranceQualifiedApplicabilityReviewerSafetyEvaluatorQualityAssuranceTopicalReportQualityVerificationandSafetyAssessmentRestartActionPlanReactorBuildingClosedLoopCoolingRefuelingOutageNo.6RegulatoryGuideResidualHeatRemovalSystemSystematicAssessmentofLicenseePerformanceStartupAdministrativeProcedureSafetyAnalysisReportStationBlackoutSystemDesignBasisDocumentSignificantEventReportsSeniorEngineeringReviewTeamScreeningEvaluationWorksheetSignificantOperatingExperienceReport I

SORCSQSQUGSRABSRVSSCSSELSSERSSFISSSSVPTRRTSDUFSARUSIUSQV&VVMCStationOperationsReviewCommitteeSeismicQualificationSeismicQualificationUtilityGroupSafetyReviewandAuditBoardSafetyReliefValveStructures,Systems,andComponentsSafeShutdownEquipmentListSupplementalSafetyEvaluationReportSafetySystemFunctionalInspectionStationShiftSupervisorSurveillanceVerificationProgramTrainingReviewRequestTechnicallySignificantDeficiencyUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(Unit1)UpdatedSafety'nalysisReport(Unit2)UnresolvedSafetyIssueUnreviewedSafetyQuestionVerificationandValidationVendorManualCoordinator 0~.~h' ineieointnit...g702250240

,ATTACHMENTANINEMILEPOINTUNIT1ToicPaeREQUESTEDACTION(a)RESPONSEExecutiveSummaryIntroductionEngineeringDesignandConfigurationControlProcesses1.ActivitiesAffectingChangestothePhysicalPlant1A.DesignChange1B.ConfigurationChange1C.TemporaryModification1D.SetpointChange1E.MaintenanceandSurveillance2.ActivitiesAffectingChangestoConfigurationDocuments/Data2A.ProcedureChanges2B.DesignDocumentChanges(DDCs)2C.ProgramChanges2D.ChangestoTraining2E.Evaluations/Analyses2F.DatabaseChanges2G.VendorManualChanges2H.SupplierDocumentAcceptance2I.ChangestoLicensingDocuments/NewRegulatoryCommitments2J.ExternalSourcesofChange3.ActivitiesAssociatedwithSpecific10CFR50Requirements3A.10CFR50.59SafetyEvaluationProcess3B.10CFR50.71(e)3C.QAProgram/10CFR50AppendixB4.CommonPrograms4A.ProblemIdentificationProcesses4B.Training111124410111212131314151515161617171818181919202021REQUESTEDACTION(b)RESPONSEExecutiveSummaryIntroduction23232324

ATTACHMIi2IITANINEMILEPOINTUNIT1ToICPaeProcedureDevelopment,Review,Approval,andRevisionAssessmentsandInitiativesSurveillanceVerificationProgram(SVP)RestartActionPlan(RAP)AdministrativeProcedureUpdateProgramVendorManualandVendorInterfaceProgramsQualityAssurance(QA)AuditsStationBlackout(SBO)AuditFireProtectionAuditServiceWaterSystemAuditOperationsExperienceGL88-14,InstrumentAirSupplySystemProblemsAffectingSafety-RelatedEquipmentUnresolvedSafetyIssues(USIs)A-44,StationBlackout(SBO)UFSARVerificationProgramTrainingSummary2426,2627283232323334353535363738REQUESTEDACTION(c)RESPONSEExecutiveSummaryIntroductionSurveillanceTestingandExaminationsDesignBasisReconstitution(DBR)ProgramDesignBasisReconstitution(DBR)WalkdownsRestartActionPlan(RAP)RestartReadinessReportNMP11990PowerAscensionProgramSafetySystemFunctionalInspections(SSFIs)ElectricalDistributionSystemFunctionalInspectionCoreSpraySystemandHighPressureCoolantInjection(HPCI)/FeedwaterFunctionalInspection39393940404145464748494950

ATTACHMENTANINEMILEPOINTUNITj.TO1CPaeOperationsExperienceGL89-10,Safety-RelatedMotor-OperatedValve(MOV)TestingandSurveillanceGL89-13,ServiceWaterProblemsAffectingSafety-RelatedEquipmentGL88-14,InstrumentAirSupplySystemProblemsAffectingSafety-RelatedEquipmentGL91-06,ResolutionofGenericIssue(Gl)A-30,AdequacyofSafety-RelatedDCPowerSuppliesGL87-02,VerificationofSeismicAdequacyofMechanicalandElectricalEquipmentinOperatingReactors,UnresolvedSafetyIssue(USI)A-46NRCBulletin88-04,PotentialSafety-RelatedPumpLossUnresolvedSafetyIssue(USI)A-44,StationBlackoutDERTrendingResultsREQUESTEDACTION(d)RESPONSEExecutiveSummaryDeviation/EventReport(DER)TrendingLessonsLearnedProblemIdentification/EvaluationStationOperationsReviewCommittee(SORC)SafetyReviewandAuditBoard(SRAB)QAAuditsandSurveillancesandThirdPartyReviewsSelf-AssessmentSurveillanceTestingQualityFirstProgram(Q1P)(EmployeeConcerns)NRCInterfaceProcessTrainingREQUESTEDACTION(e)RESPONSE5051515252535354555757575761616161616263636464656666111

ATTACHMENTANINEMILEPOINTUNIT1ToicPaeENCLOSURE1DesignConfigurationDocumentsListENCLOSURE2DesignInputConsiderationsENCLOSURE3DesignChangeOperabilityAcceptanceENCLOSURE4DesignChangeCloseoutENCLOSURE5FieldVarianceRiskDDCCriteria6970717273

ATTACEIMENTBNINEMILEPOINTUNIT2ToicPaeREQUESTEDACTION(a)RESPONSEExecutiveSummaryIntroductionEngineeringDesignandConfigurationControlProcesses1~ActivitiesAffectingChangestothePhysicalPlant1A.DesignChange1B.ConfigurationChange1C.TemporaryModification1D.SetpointChange1E.MaintenanceandSurveillance2.ActivitiesAffectingChangestoConfigurationDocuments/Data2A.ProcedureChanges2B.DesignDocumentChanges(DDCs)2C.ProgramChanges2D.ChangestoTraining2E.Evaluations/Analyses2F.DatabaseChanges2G.VendorManualChanges2H.SupplierDocumentAcceptance2I.ChangestoLicensingDocuments/NewRegulatoryCommitments2J.ExternalSourcesofChange3.ActivitiesAssociatedwithSpecific10CFR50Requirements3A.10CFR50.59SafetyEvaluationProcess3B.10CFR50.71(e)3C.QAProgram/10CFR50AppendixB4.CommonPrograms4A.ProblemIdentificationProcesses4B.Training111124410111212131314151515161617171818181919202021REQUESTEDACTION(b)RESPONSEExecutiveSummaryIntroduction23232324 0

ATTACHlVEÃTBNINEMLEPOINTUNIT2ToicPaeProcedureDevelopment,Review,ApprovalandRevisionAssessmentsandInitiativesAdministrativeProcedureUpdateProgramSurveillanceVerificationProgram(SVP)ISTISIAppendixJRemainderofTSSurveillancesUFSARVerificationProgramNMP2PowerUprateQualityAssurance(QA)AuditsFireProtectionAuditServiceWaterSystemAuditVendorManualandVendorInterfaceProgramImprovedTechnicalSpecification(ITS)ConversionIndependentSafetyEngineeringGroup(ISEG)OperationsExperienceGL88-14,InstrumentAirSupplySystemProblemsAffectingSafety-RelatedEquipmentUnresolvedSafetyIssues(USIs)A-44,StationBlackout(SBO)TrainingSummaryREQUESTEDACTION(c)RESPONSEExecutiveSummaryIntroductionFSARVerificationEffortNMP2InitialTestProgramSurveillanceTestingandExaminationsPowerUprateSafetySystemFunctionalInspections(SSFIs)ElectricalDistributionSystemFunctionalInspection(EDSFI)ServiceWaterSystem2427273131313131333434343536383839393940414242424343434445464646

ATTACHMENTBNINEMILEPOINTUNIT2ToicPaeOperationsExperienceGL89-10,Safety-RelatedMotor-Operated(MOV)TestingandSurveillanceGL89-13,ServiceWaterProblemsAffectingSafety-RelatedEquipmentGL88-14,InstrumentAirSupplySystemProblemsAffectingSafety-RelatedEquipmentNRCBulletin88-04,Safety-RelatedPumpLossUnresolvedSafetyIssue(USI)A-44,StationBlackout(SBO)DERTrendingResultsREQUESTEDACTION(d)RESPONSEExecutiveSummaryDeviation/EventReport(DER)TrendingLessonsLearnedProblemIdentification/EvaluationIndependentSafetyEngineeringGroup(ISEG)StationOperationsReviewCommittee(SORC)SafetyReviewandAuditBoard(SRAB)QAAuditsandSurveillancesandThirdPartyReviewsSelf-AssessmentSurveillanceTestingQualityFirstProgram(Q1P)(EmployeeConcerns)NRCInterfaceProcessTrainingREQUESTEDACTION(e)RESPONSE46474848484949515151515555555555565657585858596060ENCLOSURE1DesignConfigurationDocumentsListENCLOSURE2DesignInputConsiderationsENCLOSURE3DesignChangeOperabilityAcceptanceENCLOSURE4DesignChangeCloseoutENCLOSURE5FieldVarianceRiskDDCCriteria6364656667

• ATTACHM1<PITCNINEMILEPOINTUNIT1ANDU5KT2ToicPaeNRCCommitmentsMade:

e Provideadescriptionofengineeringdesignandconfigurationcontrolprocesses,includingthosethatimplement10CFR50.59,10CFR50.71(e),andAppendixBto10CFRPart50.ThetextthatfollowsinresponsetoRequestedAction(a)ofthe50.54(fjletterprovidesadescriptionofhowthedesignandconfigurationcontrolprocessismanaged,controlled,andimplementedatNineMilePointNuclearStation(NMPNS).Inaddition,detailsareprovidedtoshowthatproceduresexistforensuringthatengineeringdesignandconfigurationchangesaQectingtheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR)areevaluatedinaccordancewiththecriteriaof10CFR50.59andincorporatedintotheUFSARinaccordancewiththerequirementsof10CFR50.71(e).Alsodetailedarethequalityprogramelementsthatassurethatanyworkinvolvingsafety-relatedstructures,systems,orcomponentsmeetsthedesignandconfigurationcontrolrequirementsofAppendixBoftheMVPNSUFSARinaccordancewithourcommitmenttoAppendixBto10CFR50.NMPNSpersonnelperformworkinaccordancewithproceduresthathavebeendevelopedand,inrecentyears,significantlyimproved,tomeettheregulatoryrequirementsestablishedtooperateandmaintaintheplantinaccordancewithourlicense.Theseproceduresareperiodicallyreviewedandundergorevision,asappropriate.ThemanagementandthestafFofNMPNShavesignificantlyimprovedtheirawarenessofthelicensinganddesignbasisdocumentsinrecentyears.Back-to-Basicstrainingprogramshavebeenestablishedwhichhaveemphasizedtheimportanceoflicense-basedthinking.Ourcorrectiveactionprogramfocusesattentiononthecorrectionandpreventionofmistakesresultingfromafailuretofullyunderstandoradheretotherequirementsofourprocedures.TheapproachforassuringthatproceduresexisttocontrolengineeringworksuchthattheplantdesignandconfigurationcontrolconformswiththeNineMilePointUnit1(NMP1)licensingbasisfollows.TheNiagaraMohawkPowerCorporation(NMPC)NuclearDivisionPolicyandDirectivesManualsetsforththeoverallprogramforcontrollingtheoperation,maintenance,andmodificationoftheNMPNStoassurecompliancewithapplicableregulatoryrequirements,licenseconditions,andNMPCcommitments.ThetotalprogramconsistsoftheNuclearDivisionPolicy,theNuclearDivisionDirectives(NDDs),andlowertierdocuments(administrativeandimplementingprocedures)developedtoimplementtheapplicablerequirements.ThehierarchyofPolicy,Directives,andadministrativeandimplementingproceduresisshownonFigure1inourresponsetoRequestedAction(b).

TheNDDsarethevehiclebywhichmanagementcommunicatesrequirementsforperformingandcontrollingactivitiestothoseresponsibleforpreparingNuclearDivision,departmental,andbranchprocedures.TheNDDsidentifyapplicableregulatoryrequirementsandassociatedQualityAssurance(QA)programcommitmentsthatmustbeincorporatedintoimplementingprocedures.EachactivityaddressedinanNDDidentifiesthespecificrequirementsandorganizationalresponsibilitiesconcerningthatactivity.NuclearInterfaceProcedures(NIPs)arepreparedtoimplementNDDs.NIPsgovernactivitiesinvolvinginterfacesbetweenorganizationaldepartmentsandforthoseactivitiesperformedbymorethanoneNuclearDivisiondepartmentwhereacommonmethodologyisdesired.Departmentandbranchleveladministrativeproceduresarepreparedtodefinetheorganization,assignresponsibilitieswithintheorganization,andprescribemethodsforaccomplishingthoseactivitiesorportionsofactivitiesaddressedinNDDsorNIPs.EngineeringdesignandconfigurationcontrolactivitiesareprimarilyimplementedinconformancewithNuclearEngineeringProcedures(NEPs)andapplicableGenerationAdministrativeProcedures(GAPs).Technicalimplementingproceduresarestep-by-stepprocedurespreparedtoprescribemethodsforaccomplishingthoseactivitiesorportionsofactivitiesasoutlinedintherespectiveNDD,NIP,ordepartmentadministrativeproceduretobeconductedwithintheindividualbranch.Thehierarchydescribedaboveismaintainedfortheengineeringdesignandconfigurationcontrolprogram.TheNDDonDesignControlestablishestherequirementsfortheNMPNSdesigncontrolprogramandassignstheresponsibilityforimplementingthoserequirements.TheDesignControlDirectiveappliestodesignactivitiesassociatedwithsafety-relatedorquality-relatedstructures,systems,andcomponents(SSCs).ThedesigncontrolrequirementsincludedinthisdirectivearespecifiedintheNMPCQATopicalReport(NMPC-QATR-1),theTechnicalSpecificationsadministrativecontrolsectionandtheNDDsgoverningnuclearcomputersystems.Activitiessubjecttodesigncontrolarecategorizedasoneormoreofthefollowing:engineeringevaluationoranalysis,designchange,configurationchange,temporarymodification,orplantconditionmonitoringprogram.AseparateNDDestablishestherequirementsandresponsibilitiesforconfigurationmanagement,includingrequirementstoidentifyandupdateselectedcontrolleddocumentsanddatabasestoassurethattheNMPNSisoperated,modified,andmaintainedinconformancewiththeapproveddesignandcurrentlicensingbasis.ThisfunctionisaccomplishedbycontrollingchangestoessentialplantSSCsandassociatedprocedures,programs,anddatabasessothattheyaremaintainedconsistentwithapproveddesignoutputdocuments.Informationordataaboutplantconfigurationthatisnecessaryforefficientandcorrectdesign,operation,andmaintenanceofessentialplantsystemsissubjectedtoconfigurationcontrols.Thefollowingdiscussiondescribescurrentmethodsforcontrollingengineeringdesignandplantconfiguration,includingdesignchanges,configurationchanges,designdocument

changes(DDC),procedurechanges,temporarymodifications,programchanges,plantmaintenance,andtheevaluationofvarioussourcesofinformationforpossibleimpacttothedesignbasis.Typicalofnuclearplantsthroughouttheindustry,theNMPNSiscommittedtoasystemofdesignandconfigurationcontrolsbasedontherequirementsofAppendixBto10CFRPart50,aswellasotherregulationsandindustrystandards,Thissystemincludesnotonlycontrols,butalsofeedbackloops(testing,evaluation)thatresultinanongoingcomparisonofactualconfigurationwiththedesignbasis.SuccessfulimplementationofthedesignandconfigurationcontrolsystemassuresthattheNMPNSisoperated,tested,andmaintainedwithinitsdesignbasisthroughoutitslife.Thediscussionthatfollowsisorganizedintofourbroadareasofactivities.Thefirstareaincludesthoseactivitiesaffectingthephysicalplant.Thesecondareaincludesthoseactivitiesaffectingconfigurationdocuments/data.Thethirdareaincludesactivitiesassociatedwithspecific10CFR50requirements.Thefourthareaincludescommonprogramsapplicabletotheotheractivities.Eachoftheseareasisfurtherorganizedintodetailedactivitiesasfollows.1.ActivitiesAffectingChangestothePhysicalPlant:1A.DesignChange1B.ConfigurationChange1C.TemporaryModification1D.SetpointChange1E.MaintenanceandSurveillance2.ActivitiesAffectingChangestoConfigurationDocuments/Data:2A.ProcedureChanges2B.DesignDocumentChanges(DDCs)2C.ProgramChanges2D.ChangestoTraining2E.Evaluations/Analyses2F.DatabaseChanges2G.VendorManualChanges K

2H.SupplierDocumentAcceptance2I.ChangestoLicensingDocuments/NewRegulatoryCommitments2J.ExternalSourcesofChange3.ActivitiesAssociatedwithSpecific10CFR50Requirements:3A.10CFR50.59SafetyEvaluationProcess3B.10CFR50.71(e)3C.QAProgram/10CFR50AppendixB4.CommonPrograms:4A.ProblemIdentificationProcesses4B.TrainingWhenphysicalplantchangesarerequested,theyareevaluatedinaccordancewithaNIPtodeterminewhetherdesigncontrolsshouldbeappliedtothechange.IncreasinglevelsofcontrolareappliedtoplantchangescommensuratewiththesafetysignificanceofthechangeasperAppendixBto10CFR50.Changestothephysicalplantareaccomplishedusingoneofthefollowingprocesses:designchange,configurationchange,ortemporarymodification.Eachoftheseprocessesisdescribedbelow.Setpointchanges,maintenance,andsurveillanceactivitiesarealsodiscussedbecausetheyrepresentprocessesthatassure,orconfirmcontinuing,reliablesystemoperationand,assuch,mustbecontrolledtoremainconsistentwithdesignbasisparameters.1A.DesignChangeThedesignchangeprocessisacontrolledprocessthatisappliedwhendesignconfigurationdocumentsand/ordatabases(aslistedinEnclosure1tothisAttachment)areaffected,andtheproposedchangeaffectsthefunctionofsafety-relatedorquality-relatedSSCsortheirreliability,expectedlife,localenvironment,orfailuremodes.Additionally,thedesignchangeprocessisappliedtochangesinvolvinginterfaceswithsafety-relatedorquality-relatedSSCs.TheprocessmayalsobeusedforothersituationsatthediscretionofEngineeringorplantmanagementwhenstringentcontrolsaredesirable.Whenaplantchangehasbeenevaluatedandapprovedforimplementation,itisenteredintothePlantChangeRequest(PCR)database.Ifitistobetreatedasadesignchange,itisgiven V

adesignchangenumber.Intheinitialstagesofadesignchange,theresponsibleengineerordesignerusesadesignimpactchecklisttodeterminethepotentialimpactofthechange,possibleissuestobeconsidered,andthekindsofdesigninputrequired.Basedonthechecklistreview,inputisrequestedfromdisciplineexperts,programadministrators,andaffectedgroups.Thedesigninputprocedurerequiresthatthoseprovidinginputconsideracomprehensivelistoftopics.Theseprimarilyemphasizethedesignbasisrequirements,functionalityandperformancerequirements,andotherrequirementsrelatedtomaintainingtheintegrityofthedesign(Enclosure2tothisAttachment).Specifically,thedesigninputprocedurerequiresthatdesigninputsuchasdesignbases,performancerequirements,regulatoryrequirements,andcodesandstandards,areidentified,documented,andtheselectionreviewedandapprovedbythedesignorganization.Also,referencesmustbesufficientlyspecifictoallowtraceability.Thisprovidestheinitiallinkbetweentheproposedchange,thedesignbases,andthelicensingbasis.Thedesignchangeissubsequentlydevelopedonthebasisoftheseinputs.Aslaterdescribed,theseinputsareverifiedinaccordancewithproceduresandthedesignissubjectedtofurthercomparisonwiththelicensingbasisatotherstagesofthedesignprocess.Concurrently,theconfigurationmanagementprocessesarealsoinitiated.TheMasterEquipmentList(MEL)andtheControlledDocumentSystem(CDS)aresearchedforpotentiallyaffecteddocuments,forotherpendingworkorwork-in-progressthatcouldaffectthedesign,andforconfirmationofequipmentldocumentcurrentstatus.TheMELmayalsobeusedasaconfirmatorysourceofinformationformanyoftheitemsinthedesignimpactchecklistbecauseitlistsvariousequipmentrequirementsandcharacteristics,includingsafetyclass.Avarietyofotherinformationmayalsobeavailable,includingwhetherEquipmentQualification(EQ),SeismicQualification(SQ),InserviceInspection(ISI)andNuclearPlantReliabilityDataSystem(NPRDS)considerationsapplytothecomponents.Thenextphaseofthedesignchangeprocessisthedevelopmentalphase.Intermediateproducts,suchasevaluationsandanalyses,stressreports,andcalculations,areprepared.Theseactivitiesareperformedusingcontrolledproceduresandresultincontrolledproductsthatcannotbechangedwithoutre-invokingtheoriginallevelofreviewandapproval.Newdesignoutputdocumentsorchangestodesignoutputs,suchasrevisionstodrawings,vendortechnicalmanuals,acceptancecriteria,setpointdatasheets,designbasisdocuments/designcriteria,andspecifications,aredeveloped.ChangesmayeitherbeintheformofDDCsthatarepostedagainsttheaffecteddocumentorbyfullrevisionofthedocument.Pendingchangestoconfigurationdatabasesarealsoidentifiedandprocessed.Changestolicensingdocuments,includingtheUFSARandTechnicalSpecifications,aredevelopedinaccordancewithcontrolledprocedures.SystemEngineersintheTechnicalSupportDepartmentarerequestedbytheresponsibleengineertonotifyprocedureownersofrequiredchangestoprocedures,andtocoordinaterequiredtraining.Finally,anyguidancenecessarytosupportinstallationandtestingisdevelopedincoordinationwiththeinstallingorganization.Uponcompletionofthesesteps,thedesignpackageissufficientlycompletefromatechnicalpointofviewtoallowfinalreviewpriortoissuance.Designoutputsareapproved,butnotreleasedforimplementationuntilthereviewsrequiredinthefinaldesignphasearecomplete.

IIIllIlI Duringthefinaldesignphase,theresponsibleengineer/designerreviewsthepackagetoassurethatthedesignobjectiveismet,thatnoopentechnicalissuesexist,andthatappropriatedesignimpactshavebeensatisfactorilyaddressed.Anyindividualwhoprovideddesigninputmayrequestfinaldesignreviewtoconfirmthat'thedesigninputwascorrectlyimplementedinthefinaldesignchangepackage.Thenextstepisindependentdesignverificationbyaqualifiedindividualpertheengineeringdesignverificationprocedure.Thisactivityprovidesanindependentreviewtoassurethatappropriatedesigncriteria,qualitycriteria,anddesignbaseshavebeencorrectlyidentified,andtoassurethatthedesignoutputmeetsthespecifieddesigninputsandtheoveralldesignobjective.Ifnotdonepreviously,anapplicabilityreviewandsafetyevaluationarecompletedasdescribedlaterunderthe10CFR50.59safetyevaluationprocess.Afterverification(andresolutionofanyconcerns),thedesignchangeisreadyforfinalreviewandapproval.Thesereviewsinclude:~Reviewandapprovalbyaqualifiedengineeringapprover;IReviewby,aQualifiedTechnicalReviewerper,TechnicalSpecification6.5.2.3;~Cross-disciplinaryreviews,ifrequiredbytheQualifiedTechnicalReviewerperTechnicalSpecification6.5.2.4;and~ReviewandapprovalbythePlantManageror'ManagerTechnicalSupportperTechnicalSpecification6.5.2.3.Completionofthedesign,review,andapprovalactivitiesisdocumentedonaDesignChangeControlform.Thisformservesasaflagtoeitherpreventorallowissuanceofdesignoutputdocumentstothefieldforinstallation,asdescribedbelow.Designoutputdocumentsareissuedandreleasedperthedocumentcontrolinterfaceprocedure.TheyareenteredintotheCDSasdocumentsthatareapprovedbutnotyetOperationsAccepted(i.e.,theydonotyetrepresentinstalledconfiguration).TheyarethendistributedtoastandarddistributionthatincludestheModificationCoordinatorintheTechnicalSupportdepartment,TheModificationCoordinatorservesasthecoordinationpointforplantdesignchangesanditisthroughtheModificationCoordinatorthatdesignoutputdocumentsaretransmittedtothefieldforinstallation.WhentheModificationCoordinatorreceivesdesignoutputdocuments(e.g.,reviseddrawings,DDCs,etc.),thedocument(s)isretaineduntilacopyoftheassociatedDesignChangeControlformisreceived.Thispreventsprematureorinadvertentissuanceofdesignoutputdocumentsthathavenotbeenfullyreviewedandapprovedforinstallation;i.e.,approvedatboththedocumentlevelandatthedesignchangelevel.

~~I'4 WorkOrdersarewrittenbytheresponsibleengineer,ModificationCoordinator,ormaintenanceplannerusingtheelectronicworkcontrol(EWC)system.TheseWorkOrdersandtheirassociateddesignoutputdocumentsarecross-referencedinthePCRdatabaseundertheassociateddesignchangenumber,sothatwhentheWorkOrdersassociatedwiththedesignchangearecompleted,theModificationCoordinatorcannotifyinvolvedpartiesthatOperationsAcceptance(turnovertoOperations)ispossible.UponcompletionoftheWorkOrdersassociatedwithadesignchange,theModificationCoordinatorconfirmsthattheapplicabilityreviewnumberandsafetyevaluationnumber(ifapplicable)arelistedinthedesignpackage(asachecktoverifycompletionoftheapplicabilityreviewandsafetyevaluationifapplicable),andnotifiestheSystemEngineertoverifycompletionofanyprocedurechanges,testing,andtrainingrequiredtoplacethesysteminservice.PlantSupportEngineeringisnotifiedto"redline"criticaldrawingssothatplantoperatorswillhavecurrentandaccuratedrawingsintheControlRoomwhenthenewdesignchangeisOperationsAccepted.TheModificationCoordinatoralsoverifiesthatallrequiredrisk-releaseddocumentshavebeenresolvedpriortoOperationsAcceptance(seebelowforanexplanationoftherisk-releaseprocess).NonconformancesidentifiedduringtheprocessaredocumentedonDeviation/EventReports(DER),evaluated,andresolved.Whentheseactionsarecomplete,theyaredocumentedonaDesignChangeOperabilityAcceptanceform.ThesignatureoftheManager/GeneralSupervisorOperations(ordesignee)conveysOperationsacceptanceofthedesignchange(Enclosure3tothisAttachment).OperationsacceptanceisrequiredpriortorelyingontheSSCtoperformitsfunction.ADesignChangeCloseoutForm(Enclosure4tothisAttachment)isinitiatedtoassurethatactivitiesassociatedwiththedesignchangeareverifiedanddocumentedascomplete.TheModificationCoordinatorthenenterstheOperationsAcceptancedateintothePCRdatabasetoindicatethatthedesignchangehasbeenacceptedandisnowcurrentplantconfiguration.ThisinformationissharedwiththeCDSdatabasetostatustheassociateddesigndocumentsasOperationsAccepted.TheMELdatabaseisautomaticallyupdatedtomovethependingMELchangesfromthe"pending"filetothe"active"filewithastatusof"C"whichdesignatesthatitreflectscurrentconfiguration.Atcloseout,theresponsibleengineerforwardstheDesignChangeControlform,andanyotherrequiredrecordsthatwerenotpreviouslyreleasedthroughtheCDS,tothepermanentplantfile.ThedocumentsusedtotrackthedesignchangethroughinstallationtoOperationsAcceptance;e.g.,logs,OperationsAcceptanceform,DesignChangeCloseoutform,andPCRsareforwardedtothepermanentplantfilebytheModificationCoordinator.Theseactionsensurethatpermanentrecordsofthedesignchange,frominitiationtocloseout,areavailableforthebalanceofplantlifeforfurtherrevieworaudit,ifneeded.Therearetwovariantsofthedesignchangeprocess;1)risk-releaseofdesignchanges;and2)partialoperationsacceptanceofdesignchanges.Risk-releaseisdefinedinourengineeringproceduresasaprocessbywhichanorganizationformallyrecognizesandapprovesthefinancialriskofbeginninganimplementationorinstallationpriortofullapprovalofthefinaldesign.Risk-releasedoesnotinvolvearisktopersonnelsafetyornuclearsafety.Usually, 011 designoutputdocumentsareissuedonlyafterappropriateaspectsofthedesigndevelopment,review,andapprovalarecomplete.Undercertaincircumstances,itisnecessarytoreleasecertaindesignoutputsona"riskbasis"toallowpre-staging,pre-fabrication,pre-installation,partialinstallation,andtoallowforfieldvariancestoworkin'progress.However,becausethesecircumstancesinvolvefinancialrisk,therisk-releaseprocessisusedsparingly.Activitiessuchaspre-staging,pre-fabrication,andpre-installation/partialinstallationmaybeinitiatedandprocessedusingtherisk-releaseprocess.First,theresponsibleengineermustprepareadocumentedjustificationofwhythedesignorpartialdesignmustbereleasedpriortobeingfullyapproved.Theactivitymustbereversiblewithinatimeframeconsistentwiththeactivitytosupportoperatingrequirements.IftheresponsibleEngineeringsupervisorapprovestherisk-release,itissubmittedtothePlantManagerforapproval.Inaccordancewiththesafetyevaluationprocedure,whichprohibitsanychangetotheplant(temporaryorpermanent)withoutanappropriatereview,anyrisk-releasedworkmusthavebeenproperlyevaluatedforplantsafetyimpactandcomparedwiththedesignandlicensingbasespriortoimplementation.AfterPlantManagerapproval,theresponsibleengineermakeslimiteddistributionoftherequireddesigndocuments,whicharestatusedas"risk"intheconfigurationdatabases.Untilthis"risk"statusisresolved,thedesignchangecannotbe'OperationsAccepted,(i.e.,turnedovertoOperations)orreliedupontoprovideitsfunction.Whentheriskisresolved,thedesignchangeprocesscontinuesnormallythroughOperationsAcceptanceandcloseout.Risk-releaseoffieldvariancesmaybeauthorizedbyaresponsibleengineertoallowminorchangestoworkinprogress(e.g.,correctinginterferences).Inthesecases,theinstallerrequestsEngineeringtoreviewthesituationandtherequestedfieldvarianceforinitialfeasibility.Ifthefieldvariancesatisfiestheproceduralcriteria(listedinEnclosure5tothisAttachment),theengineermayinitiatearisk-releaseDDCtoallowtheworktocontinuewithoutinterruption.TheriskDDCisgivenlimiteddistributionbytheresponsibleengineer.Onecopygoestotheinstallertocontinuework;onecopytotheModificationCoordinatortoentertheriskDDCintothedesignchangedocumentlogforsubsequenttrackingandresolutionpriortoOperationsAcceptance;onecopytoDocumentControlforentryintoCDSwitha"Risk"status;andtheoriginaltoEngineeringforcompletionofallreviewsandapprovalsinaccordancewiththerequirementsofthenormaldesignchangeprocess.IftheEngineeringreviewandapprovalprocessuncoversproblemswiththeriskDDC,theworkisstoppedandreversed,orotherwisecorrected.WhentheriskDDCisfullyapprovedperEngineeringprocedures,itisissuedthroughDocumentControltoitsstandarddistribution.Thedocumentstatusischangedfrom"risk"to"approved".OncetheModificationCoordinatorreceivesanddistributesthefullyapprovedDDC,theworkiscompletedorconfirmedcompleteinaccordancewiththefullyapprovedDDC.ThedesignchangecanthenbeOperationsAcceptedandclosedoutfollowingthenormaldesignchangeprocess.TheothervarianttothenormaldesignchangeprocessistheoptionofpartialOperationsAcceptance.Thisoptionmaybeusedwhenthedesignchangeaffectsmultiplecomponentsortrainsthatmaybesafelyputbackintoservicebeforeeverycomponentor"train"hasbeenmodified.AnexampleofhowpartialOperationsAcceptancecouldbeusedistheprocessofimplementingachangethataffectsmanyidenticalcomponentsacrossavarietyofapplications

,'l<.',>><)f$)l<'riV5 orsystems.Inthiscase,thedesigndocumentsandassociatedsafetyevaluationwouldbewrittentocovermanyspecificapplicationsofasingletypeofcomponent(e.g.,pipesnubbers).TheModificationCoordinatorwouldthenbeabletotrackandobtainOperationsAcceptanceofthedesignchangeatthecomponentlevelratherthanhavingtowaituntilallaffectedcomponentsinthedesignchangewereOperationsAccepted.Asinthenormaldesignchangeprocess,thedatabasesareupdatedatthetimeofpartialOperationsAcceptancetoshowthatthedesignchangehasbeencompletedforcomponentXforexample(butnotYandZ),andthecomponentisreadytogobackintoservice.TherequirementsforpartialOperationsAcceptancearesimilartofullOperationsAcceptance,thatis,thesafetyreviewprocessmustbecomplete;associatedWorkOrders,includingthosefortesting,mustbecomplete;applicableproceduresmustberevised;requiredtrainingcompletedorinprogress;risk-releaseddocumentsmustbefullyapprovedandtheriskresolved;andtheControlRoomcriticaldrawingsaccuratelyupdatedtoshowtheportionofthechangethatisbeingpartiallyOperationsAccepted.Fuelreplacement,becauseofitsuniquerequirements,iscontrolledbyasetofproceduresthatincludesNEPsandFuelsGroupEngineeringDesignStandards(OT-EDS)thatmeet10CFR50AppendixBrequirements.Keydesigninputsaresolicited,reviewed,andapprovedaspartofthedesignprocess.ThepreliminaryfuelbundledesignisprovidedbyanNMPC-qualifiedvendor.DesigniterationsoccurbetweenthefuelvendorandNMPC.AnalysesandcalculationssupportingthecoredesignareperformedandverifiedbyNMPCusingcontrolledprocedures.ThefinalcoredesignisverifiedindependentlybythevendorundertheirNMPC-qualifiedQAprogram.Calculationsandanalysessupportinglicensingrequirementsfortransientsandloss-of-coolantaccidents(LOCAs)areperformedtodeterminefueloperatinglimitsforthenewcoredesign.ThevendorsubmitsafinalreporttoNMPCdocumentingtheverificationofthedesign,compliancetodesignrequirements,analysisresults,andnewoperationallimits.NMPCacceptsthedesignbytechnicalreviewandperformsa10CFR50.59safetyevaluationasdescribedlaterinthissection.Licensingdocumentchangesareperformedinaccordancewithcontrolledprocedures.Thefinalreviewandapproval,issuance,installation,andacceptancefollowaprocesssimilartothedesignchangeprocess.Insummary,thedesignchangeprocess(includingrisk-releaseandpartialOperationsAcceptance,andfuelreplacement)isacontrolledprocesswhichrequiresreviewandcomparisonoftheproposedchangetothedesignbasisoftheplant.Theprimarybarrierofdefenseagainstdeviationsfromthelicensingbasisisthe10CFR50.59processthatisrequiredforeachplantchange,Thedesignimpactassessmentanddesigninputprocessrequiretheresponsibleengineerand,asnecessary,otherdisciplineexperts,programadministrators,andotheraffectedgroupstodescribeorreferenceappropriatedesignrequirementsandconstraintstoassurecompliancewiththeplantdesignbasis.Additionally,configurationdatabasesprovideconfirmatorysourcesofdesignbasisinformation.Anindependentverifierreviewsthedesignforconsistencywithdesigninputs,includingdesignbasisrequirements.Finally,avarietyofconfigurationcontrols,includingadministrativeproceduresanddatabases,areinplacetoassurethatinformationnecessarytosupportthechangeisaccurateandisputinplaceconcurrentwiththechange(e.g.,revisionstoprocedures,drawings,training,anddatabases).ThisassuresthatdesignbasisandlicensingbasisrequirementscascadedownthroughtheNMP1

~I4P systemandresultinproperoperation,maintenance,andtestingoftheplantaslicensedbythe.NuclearRegulatoryCommission(NRC).1B.ConfigurationChangeTheconfigurationchangeprocessisusedforactivitiesincludingplantchangesthataffectdesigndocumentsordatabases(Enclosure1tothisAttachment),and:1)donotaffectthefunctionsofsafety-relatedorquality-relatedSSCs;2)donotadverselyaffectthereliability,expectedlife,localenvironment,orfailuremodesofsafety-relatedorquality-relatedSSCs;3)donotinvolveinterfaceswithsafety-relatedorquality-relatedSSCsand;4)donotchangetheintentoreffectivenessofprogramsrequiredbyregulation.Thisprocessisprimarilyintendedfornonsafety-relatedchangeshavingnosafetyimpactandnointerfaceswithsafety-relatedsystems.However,itmayalsobeusedforsafety-relatedequivalent,replacementssuchaslike-for-likecomponentreplacements.Thefirststepintheconfigurationchangeprocessistoconfirmthattheproposedchangeeithersatisfiesordoesnotaffectthecurrentdesignandlicensingbasis.Thisstepisinadditiontothe10CFR50.59reviewthatwilleventuallyalsobeperformed;however,itassuresthattheresponsibleengineerwillcomparetheproposedchangewiththeUFSAR,TechnicalSpecifications,andotherlicensingdocumentsandregulationsasearlyintheprocessaspossible.Theprocedurealsorequiresthatiftheengineerdeterminesthatsafety-relatedorquality-relatedfunctionsdescribedinthecurrentdesignandlicensingbasisareaffected,thedesignchangeprocessmustbeusedinsteadoftheconfigurationchangeprocess.Likethedesignchangeprocess,aconfigurationchangerequiresassessmentofpotentialimpactsusingthedesignimpactchecklistandtheidentificationofpotentiallyaffecteddocumentsanddatabases.Atthispoint,outputdocumentssuchasdrawings,drawingrevisions,DDCs,specifications,andvendormanualrevisionsareprocessedandpendingchangestodatabasesaredeveloped.Changestolicensedocumentsareprocessedpertheinterfaceproceduregoverningcontroloflicenses,UFSARs,andNRCapprovedplansandprograms.Ifthechangeinvolvessafety-relatedorqualityrelatedSSCs,anequivalencyevaluationisdocumentedforthepermanentplantfileshowingwhythechangehasnoeffectonthedesignbases.Ifequivalencycannotbejustified,thechangeisprocessedasadesignchange.Likeanyotherplantchange,configurationchangesareevaluatedper10CFR50.59.Atthispoint,theconfigurationchangeisreadyforfinalreviewbytheEngineeringapprover.Unlikeadesignchange,independentverificationandPlantManagerapprovalarenotnecessary.However,similartoadesignchange,thecompletionandapprovalofaconfigurationchangeisdocumentedonaConfigurationChangeControlform.Processingfromthispointforwardissimilartotheprocessingofadesignchange.OutputsaredistributedthroughDocumentControltotheModificationCoordinatorwho,uponreceiptofanapprovedConfigurationChangeControlform,issuesthechangetothefieldand,uponcompletion,presentsittoOperationsforreviewandacceptance,ThesameconfigurationcontrolsthatNMP110

$hI appliedtothedesignchangeprocessareinvokedbytheconfigurationchangeprocessatOperationsAcceptance,includingautomaticdatabaseupdates,verificationofproceduresandtraining,,and"redlining"ofcriticaldrawings.Insummary,althoughtheconfigurationchangeprocessisaimedprimarilyatchangesthatdonotaffectthedesignbasisoftheplant,therearenumerouscontrolsinplacetopreventthesechangesfromcompromisingtheplantoperating,maintenance,andtestrequirements,andthedesigndocumentsuponwhichtheyarebased.1C.TemporaryModificationTemporarymodificationsarecontrolledperaGAP.ThisGAPappliestotemporarymodificationstositeinstallations,facilities,structures,andinservicesystemsandcomponentstherein,asdescribedintheUFSAR.Likeconfigurationanddesignchanges,temporarymodificationsmustbescreenedtodeterminewhetherdesigncontrolsapplyandif10CFR50,59applies.Becauseofthehierarchicalstructureoftheprocedures,theinterfacingproceduresgoverningdesigncontroland10CFR50.59reviewsarealwaysinvokedforplantchangesthatcouldimpactthelicensingbasis,includingtemporarymodifications.Asaresult;temporarymodificationsreceivethesamereviewaspermanentchangesregardingconformancewithdesignandlicensing:basisrequirements.TemporarymodificationsarecoordinatedbytheSystemEngineersintheTechnicalSupportBranch.Designchangesareprocessedperengineeringproceduresdescribedpreviously.Atemporarymodificationcontrolformisusedtocontroltheinstallationandremovalofthetemporarymodification.Associated10CFR50.59safetyevaluationsaredevelopedandreviewedasdescribedlaterintheresponse.TemporarymodificationsthataffectnuclearsafetyarereviewedbyaQualifiedTechnicalReviewerandapprovedbythePlantManagerorManagerTechnicalSupport.Priortoauthorizingimplementationofatemporarymodification,theStationShiftSupervisor(SSS)reviewstheassociatedapplicabilityreview/safetyevaluationandWorkOrdertoassurecompliancewiththeTechnicalSpecifications.At,thispointintheprocess,thetemporarymodificationmaybeinstalledperapplicablework/designdocumentswiththepermissionoftheoperatingshiftleadership(SSSandChiefShiftOperator).Temporarymodificationsaretaggedandtestedasrequiredbyprocedure.Theyare,verifiedashavingbeeninstalledinaccordancewithapplicablework/designdocumentsandControlRoomcriticaldrawingsareredlinedaspartofimplementation.TheSSSreviewsthecompletedtemporarymodificationpackagetodeterminetheoperabilitystatusoftheaffectedsystem(s).JClearanceoftemporarymodificationsisthereverseoftheaboveexceptthat10CFR50.59reviewsarenotnecessaryunlesstheequipmentisbeingreturnedtoastateotherthantheoriginaldesign.Inthatcase,theactivitywouldgothroughthescreeningprocessesagainandbere-evaluatedperprocedure.Clearanceinvolvesindependentverification,confirmationofcompletionofprocedurerevisions,testing,andasnecessarytraininganddeterminationofsimulatorimpact.Ifdesigndocumentsordatabaseswereaffected,Engineeringisnotifiedso11 V

thattheoriginalconfiguration'anberestored.ControlRoomcriticaldrawingsareupdatedtotheoriginalconfiguration,ifpreviouslyaffected.TheSSSreviewsclearedtemporarymodificationpackagestodeterminetheoperabilityoftheaffectedsystem(s).llInsummary,thetemporarymodificationprocessisacontrolledprocessthatassurestheintegrityofthelicenseanddesignbasesbyinvokingthereviewsofthelicensebasisrequiredby10CFR50.59,andbyapplyingconfigurationcontrolsthatassurethattheplant,associatedprocedures,training,andtestingconformtothedesignbasisoftheplant.Thesechecksareappliedbothduringinstallationandclearanceoftemporarymodifications,assuringthatthechangesfrom,andtherestorationto,theoriginalconditionareverifiedascompleteandcorrect.1D.SetpointChangeNMPNSmaintainssetpointcontrolthroughthehierarchyofdesigncontrolandconfigurationmanagementprocedures.ChangestosetpointsareperformedandcontrolledinaccordancewithNEPsincludingthoseassociatedwith"DesignChange,""ConfigurationChange,""DesignDocumentChange,""DesignInput,"and"Calculations."Adesigninputstatementisrequiredforsetpointchangesthataredefinedasadesignchangeandprovidestheinputandbasisforthechange.Inaddition,eachsetpointchangerequiresanapplicabilityreviewtobeperformedinaccordancewiththeNIPforApplicabilityReviewsandSafetyEvaluations.NMP1InstrumentandControlsafety-relatedandnonsafety-relateddesignsetpointsarecontrolledinaccordancewithanEngineeringSetpointSpecification.Whensetpointsarechanged,designoutputdocumentsintheformofDDCsareissuedandpostedagainstthisdocumentandlaterincorporatedintosubsequentrevisionstothespecification.TherevisionprocessiscontrolledinaccordancewiththeEngineeringprocedureforengineeringspecifications.Setpointrequirementsforplantinstruments,bothsafety-relatedandnonsafety-related,aredefinedincontrolleddocumentsandaremaintainedviathedocumentcontrolprocess.ChangestosetpointsareconsideredplantchangesandaremanagedbytheengineeringchangeprocessviatheappropriateNIPsandNEPs.Asetpointchangemaybeaconfigurationchange,adesignchange,oratemporarymodification.'E.MaintenanceandSurveillanceMaintenanceandsurveillanceactivities,whethercorrectivemaintenance,preventivemaintenanceortesting,arebasedon,orareconsistentwith;approveddesigndocumentation,TechnicalSpecifications,orregulatorysourcedocuments.Recurringactivitiessuchaspreventivemaintenanceorsurveillancetestingareaddressedbycontrolledprocedures.Correctivemaintenance,maybeperformedutilizingproceduralguidance,ormaybeperformedusingdesigndocumentsdirectlyaspartofaWorkOrder.Drawings,vendormanuals,specifications,setpointdatasheets,DDCs,andotherapprovedEngineering12 4

documentsareoftenreferencedintheMaintenanceWorkOrderssothattheycanbeusedtoaccuratelyreturntheSSCtoitsas-designedstate.2.Theprecedingtextcoveredhowchangestothephysicalplantaremade,includingtheprocessesusedtocomparethechangetothedesignbasestoassurecontinuedcompliance,andtherevisionofaffecteddocuments/databasestoreflectthechange.Inthissection,thediscussionwillcoversituationswhereachangetodocumentsordatabases,ratherthanachangetothephysicalplant,istheinitiator,andhowthatchangeiscomparedtothelicensingbasisanddesignbasesforcomplianceand,ifnecessary,isincorporatedintotheplantconfiguration.Thesechangeprocessesinclude:1)ProcedureChanges;2)DDCs;3)ProgramChanges;4)ChangestoTraining;5)Evaluations/Analyses;6)DatabaseChanges;7)VendorManualChanges;8)SupplierDocumentAcceptance;9)ChangestoLicensingDocuments/NewCommitments;and10)OtherExternalSourcesofChange.TheseprocessesmayimpactthewaytheNMPNSisoperated,tested,maintainedandmodified;therefore,theyarediscussedindetailasfollows.2A.ProcedureChangesTheprocedurechangeprocessusedatNMPNSincludescontrolledrequirementsfordevelopment,requiredreviews,approvals,andconfigurationcontrol.Theprocessgenerallyconformswiththerequirements'andrecommendationsofAmericanNationalStandardsInstitute(ANSI)/ANS-3.2-1976asendorsedbyRegulatoryGuide(RG)1.33,Revision2,andSection5.3ofANSI/ANS-3,2-1982,andhasbeenexpandedandrefinedbeyondthebasicrequirementstoincorporateoperatingexperienceandlessonslearned.Keysupportprogramsandguidancedocumentshavebeenestablishedtoenhanceprogramefficiencyandfacilitatetimelyincorporationofchanges.Theprocessconsistsoffourdistinctelements:1)development;2)developmentalreviews;3)finalreview;and4)approval.Thedetailsoftheprocessdifferslightlyforadministrativeproceduresandtechnicalprocedures(e.g.,changestoadministrativeproceduresdonotrequireatechnicalverificationunlesstheproceduresarerequiredbyTechnicalSpecification'6.8orotherwiseaffectnuclearsafety),however,thebasicelementsareemployedforbothtypesofprocedures.Thedevelopmentphaserequiresassignmentofanindividualknowledgeableintheareacoveredbytheprocedure.Toassistinthedevelopmentprocess,NMPChasdevelopedaProcedureWritersManualwhichprovidesextensiveg'uidanceonthestructure,content,andhumanfactorsprinciplestobeusedinpreparingprocedures,TheProceduresWritersManualisusedtoensureconsistencythroughouttheroughly3,500proceduresmaintainedatNMPNS.Fortechnicalprocedures,therevisionprocessrequiresthatprocedurepreparersresearchandusecontrolledreferencedocumentsincluding,butnotlimitedto,engineeringspecifications,drawings,vendormanuals,andTechnicalSpecifications.Theuseofcontrolleddocumentsensuresthatinformationusedtoprepareproceduresreflectscurrentdesignconfiguration.13

'i Developmentalreviewsareconductedtotheextentrequiredbytheprocedure.Cross-disciplinaryreviewsmaybeconductedwhenaprocedureinvolvesareasofspecificexpertisethatareoutsidethegroupthatpreparedtheprocedure,orwhenanothergroupisrequiredtoperformactivitieswithintheprocedure.Fortechnicalprocedures,avalidationreviewisnormallyperformed'contingentuponcomplexity,potentialconsequences,andexpectedenvironmentincludingreducingradiationtoaslowasreasonablyachievable(ALARA))bytheenduserstoensuretheprocedureisworkableandcontainsasufficientlevelofdetailfortheintendedusers.Thefinalreviewphaseisknownastechnicalverification.Aspreviouslydiscussed,changestoadministrativeproceduresdonotrequireatechnicalverificationunlesstheprocedureisrequiredbyTechnicalSpecification6.8orotherwiseaffectsnuclearsafety.Technicalreview,asrequiredbyTechnicalSpecification6.5.2.1,isperformedbyanindividualotherthantheindividualwhopreparedtheprocedure.Thefinalreviewispermittedonlyafterdevelopmentalreviewshavebeencompleted.Theverificationinvolvesareviewoftheprocedureandreferencedocumentsusedtodeveloptheproceduretoindependentlyverifytheaccuracy.ThisreviewmayonlybeperformedbyqualifiedindividualspreviouslydesignatedbythePlantManager.Thesequalifiedreviewers,asdefinedbyTechnicalSpecification6.5.2.4,aremembersofthestationsupervisorystaffandtheyarequalifiedinareasspecifictotheirexpertise(suchasOperations,Maintenance,orRadiationProtection).FollowingfinalrevieweachtechnicalprocedureandTechnicalSpecificationrelatedadministrativeprocedureisreviewedforapplicabilityunder10CFR50.59asdescribedlaterunderthe10CFR50.59safetyevaluationprocess.Intheapprovalphase,theresponsibleprocedureownerandtheresponsibleapprover(e.g.,BranchManager,etc.)provideapprovalandensurethatrequiredreviewsbyqualifiedpersonnelhavebeenaccomplished.Theapprovalprocessalsoincludesrequirementstoassurethatpendingchangeshavebeenappropriatelyaddressed,thattheTechnicalSpecificationclassification(adeterminationastowhetherornotaprocedureisrequiredbyTechnicalSpecification6.8orotherwiseaffectsnuclearsafety)isappropriate,thatanychangesmadeduringreviewhavenotinvalidatedpreviousreviews,andthatanyrequiredimplementationtraininghasbeenarranged.Insummary,theprocedurerevisionprocessprovidescontrolstoensurethatproceduresarepreparedtoreflectcurrentconfiguration,thatadequatereviewisperformedbyappropriatelyqualifiedpersonneltoindependentlyverifyaccuracy,andthatappropriateapprovalsareobtained.2B.DesignDocumentChanges(DDCs)DDCs,evenwhennotassociatedwithaphysicalchangetotheplant,areprocessedundereitherthedesignchangeortheconfigurationchangeprocessaspreviouslydiscussed.Therearetwoothermeansofdocumentchangesthatinvolveengineeringenhancementsandeditorialchanges.NMP114 Ip Thefirstmeans,engineeringenhancement,isatermused'forthecorrectionofaverifiederror.Theengineeringenhancementprocesshastraditionallybeenusedtocorrectdrawingerrors.Ineffect,itisarevisiontoadrawingperform'edinaccordancewiththeapplicableprocedure,butseparatefromtheconfigurationchangeprocess..PertheEngineeringproceduregoverning'drawingcontrol,anApplicabilityReviewisperformedtoassurethattheapplicabilityof10CFR50.59isconsidered;i.e.,whetherthechangecouldaffectthelicensingbasis.Thedrawingrevisionischeckedandapprovedjustlikeanyotherrevision,andthenissuedtoitsstandarddistributionsothatallholderswillbeprovidedwiththe"enhanced"drawing.Thesecondmeans,editorialchanges,areminorchangesthatdonotaffectthetechnicalcontentorintendedpurpose',ofthedocument.Examplesarespelling,typographical,andgrammaticalerrors.Becausetheyareinconsequential,theyareusuallynotinitiatedindependently.Mostcommonly,theseerrorsareidentifiedwhenthedocumentisbeingrevisedforsomeotherpurposesuchasadesignchange.Theyareusuallyprocessedandcontrolledaspartoftheassociateddesignorconfigurationchange.Ifaneditorialchangewasmadeindependentlyofanyotherprocess,itwouldbedoneasarevisioninaccordancewiththecontrolledprocedureforthattypeofdesigndocument.IfthechangepotentiallyaffectedtheUFSAR,TechnicalSpecifications,orNRCapprovedprograms,suchasnomenclaturechanges,itwouldbeprocessedpertheprocedureforinitiatinghcensingdocumentchanges.2C.ProgramChangesProgramchangestoNRC-approvedprogramsmustbeprocessedpertheproceduresthatgovernApplicabilityReviews,safetyevaluations,licenses,UFSARs,andNRC-approvedplansandprograms.Additionaladministrativecontrolsmayalsobeapplied.Forexample,thereisanengineeringprocedureforplantconditionmonitoringprogramswhichinvokesprogramresponsibilities,andrequiresreviewsforcontinuingcomplianceandeffectiveness.AdescriptionofhowregulatoryrequirementsarereflectedintheNMPCprocedurehierarchyisdescribedinourresponsetoRequestedAction(b)under"AdministrativeProcedureUpdateProgram."ChangestoprogramsthatarenotNRCapprovedbutarerequiredbyregulation,suchastheMaintenanceRuleProgramrequiredby10CFR50;65,arealsocontrolledbyadministrativeprocedures.2D.ChangestoTrainingChangestotrainingassociatedwithdesignorconfigurationchangesareaddressedbyrequiringtheModificationCoordinatortonotifytheTrainingDepartment.RequestsforchangestotrainingortrainingprogramsthatarepartofthelicensebasisareprocessedasdescribedlaterinresponsetoRequestedAction(a)under"Training."2E.Evaluations/AnalysesSpecificrecurringevaluationslikesafetyevaluations,breachpermitevaluations,evaluationsoftemporaryshielding,andseismicevaluationsareaddressedbycontrolledadministrativeprocedures.Otherevaluationsthatpotentiallyaffectdesignfunctionsaredirectedtothe115 AE WEngineeringDepartmentandprocessedperacontrolledEngineeringprocedure.Thisprocedurerequiresthatanyevaluationoranalysisperformedtodefinethedesignbasisforadesignchangeortoestablishadesignbasisbeprocessedinamannerthatassuresthatpropertechnicalinput,impactassessments,designreviews,andverificationsareobtained.Independentverificationisrequiredwhentheevaluationoranalysiswillresultinachangetothedesignorlicensingbasis.Examplesofwhenverificationmayberequiredinclude:Evaluationsdoneinresponsetoregulatoryrequirements;Analysisdoneinsupportofadesignchangeorthatislikelytoresultinadesignchange;EvaluationsoranalysissupportingchangestoNRCapprovedprograms;and~Analysis/Evaluationofsafety-relatedorquality-relatedactivities.Aspreviouslydiscussed,thecontrolledEngineeringprocedureforindependentverificationrequiresthatappropriatedesigncriteria,qualitycriteria,anddesignbasesbereviewedtoassurethattheyhavebeencorrectlyidentifiedandincorporated.2F.DatabaseChangestConfigurationdatabasechangesareaccomplishedpercontrolledprocedures.Primarily,thesechangesresultfromdesignorconfigurationchanges,however,someareinitiatedindependentlyasEngineeringenhancementsoreditorialchanges.Regardlessofthereasonforinitiation,eachproposedchangetoconfigurationdataisreviewedforcompletenessandaccuracybeforeentry,aswellasbeingcheckedfortheaccuracyofthedataentryitself.Changestocomputerhardwareandsoftwarearealsocontrolledbyadministrativeprocedures.Verificationandvalidation(V&V)processesareappliedtoassurethatsoftwareprogramsoperateasintendedanddonotresultinerroneousdisplaysofinformation.2G.VendorManualChangesNMPCmaintainsavendorinterfaceprogramthatprovidesforannualcontactwithourNuclearSteamSupplySystem(NSSS)supplierandbi-annualcontactswithvendorsforotherselectedkeysafety-relatedequipment.Thesevendorsarecontactedtorequestthelatesttechnicalmanuals,servicebulletins,notices,advisories,letters,andoperation,maintenance,andrepairproceduresfortheselectedequipment.Additionally,thevendorinterfaceprogramprovidesforthemaintenanceofanindexofapplicabletechnicaldocumentsandalogofvendorcontactsandcorrespondence.Periodically,thelistofvendorstobecontactedisupdatedbasedonresponsesreceivedandEngineeringreviewsofthelistsofkeysafety-relatedequipment.Follow-upcontactsaremadewithnon-NMP116 gIIII responsivevendorstoensurethatagoodfaitheffortwasmadetoobtainthenecessary~~~equipmentinformation.Vendormanualchangesmaythenbeinitiatedbyreceiptofnewinformationfromthevendor,orbyNMPCtoaccommodatepreferredpractices,materials,orotherconsiderations.Revisionsofbothkindsareaddressedinanengineeringproceduregoverningvendortechnicalmanuals.VendorinitiatedchangesareforwardedtotheVendorDocumentCoordinatorforloggingandtracking.ThechangeisthenforwardedtoanassignedresponsibleengineerwhoreviewsitforapplicabilitytotheNMPNS.Ifappropriate,theresponsibleengineerobtainsmulti-disciplinaryreviews.Ifthemanualisassociatedwithequipmentoractivitiesthataresafety-related,quality-related,EQ-related,orTechnicalSpecificationrelated,atleastoneotherknowledgeablereviewermustreviewthechange.NonconformancesbetweentheNMPC-acceptedvendorproductandtheproposedchangearedocumentedinaDER.Whenreviewcommentsandnonconformanceshavebeenresolvedwiththereviewersandthevendor,therevisedmanualisapprovedanddistributed.NMPC-initiatedchangestovendormanualsareprocessedinthesameway,exceptasfollows:~ADDCmaybepostedagainstthemanualinsteadofrevisingandredistributingtheentiremanual.InvokingtheDDCprocessinvolvesdesignimpactassessment,checking,andapproval.~TosupportthePMOptimizationProgram,vendorrecommendedPMmethodsandfrequenciesmaybechangedwithoutrevisingthevendormanualbasedonMaintenance,Operations,TechnicalSupport,andEngineeiingreviewandconcurrence.Additionally,thereviewmustbedocumentedandfiledintheMaintenanceDepartmentandrevisedPMmethodorfrequencyidentifiedonacomponentlevelinthePreventiveMaintenanceSurveillanceTesting(PMST)database.2H.SupplierDocumentAcceptanceSupplierdocuments,otherthanVendorTechnicalManuals,areprocessedinaccordancewiththecontrolledprocedureforthespecificdocumenttype.Theprocessofsupplierdocumentacceptanceissimilartoothertypesofdesigndocumentsandincludes:1)preparation,checking,verification,review,andapproval,controlledeitherbythevendor's(NMPCapproved)QAprogramorbyNMPCproceduresand2)formalacceptancebyNMPCbasedonadetailedreviewoftechnicalcontent,certificateofcompliance,orsurveillanceofworkinprogress.I2I.ChangestoLicensingDocuments/NewRegulatoryCommitmentsChangestolicensingdocuments/newregulatorycommitmentsareprocessedpertheinterfaceproceduregoverningcontroloflicenses,UFSARs,andNRC-approvedplansandprograms.17

NewcommitmentsareprocessedpertheinterfaceprocedurethatgovernsNRCinterfacesandtrackedviatheNuclearCommitmentTrackingSystem(NCTS).Inbothcases,proposedchangesmustbereviewedforimpactonthedesignconfigurationandprocessedappropriatelyasadesignchange,configurationchange,aprogramchangeoracontrolledevaluation/analysis.Aspreviouslydiscussed,anychangetothedesignbasesinvokestherequirementforreviewsinaccordancewith10CFR50.59,includingareviewofpotentialimpactonTechnicalSpecificationrequiredprocedures.Theabovecontrolsassurethatwhennewregulatoryorlicensechangesareimplemented,theyareproperlyreflectedintheplant,thedesignbasis,theaffectedprograms,andprocedures.2J.ExternalSourcesofChangeExternalsourcesofchangederivedfromdeficiencies,concerns,orissuesidentifiedbyregulatoryagencies,industryoperatingexperience,vendorinformationnotices(INs),orexternalpublicationsareprocessedpertheDERprocess.AsdiscussedinourresponsetoRequestedAction(d),DERsoftenresultinreferraltootherprocessessuchasdesignchange,procedurechange,andevaluation/analysisforcorrectiveandpreventiveaction.UseoftheDERprocessensuresthatevaluation,disposition,resolutionandtrendingoftheissuewilloccur.3.3A.10CFR50.59SafetyEvaluationProcessAnNDDregardingsafetyevaluationsestablishestherequirementsforassessingproposedchanges,tests,orexperimentstodetermineifadditionalanalysis,evaluation,orNRCapprovalisrequiredbeforeimplementation.ThisdirectiveappliestoproposedchangestoNMPNSfacilities(permanentortemporary),proposedrevisionsorchangestoprocedures,andproposedtestsorexperiments.Aqualifiedevaluatordetermineswhether10CFR50.59appliestotheproposedchange,testorexperimentbydeterminingifitinvolvesachangetothefacilityorproceduresasdescribedintheUFSAR,atestorexperimentnotdescribedintheUFSAR,andwhethertheactivityaffectsnuclearsafetyinawaynotpreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARorrequiresachangetoaTechnicalSpecification..ThisdeterminationisdocumentedaspartoftheApplicabilityReview.WhentheApplicabilityReviewdeterminationidentifiesthattherequirementsof10CFR50.59areapplicable,'a10CFR50.59safetyevaluationisthenperformedtodetermineifanunreviewedsafetyquestion(USQ)exists.Thepreparermustalsoobtainthereviewofhis/herBranchManager,signifyingasufficientcross-disciplinaryreviewhasbeenperformed.TheManagerTechnicalSupportmayspecifyadditionaltechnicalreviewandmaywaiveStationOperationsReviewCommittee(SORC)reviewifitisdeterminedthataproposedchangedoesnotaffectnuclearsafety.Priortoimplementation,safetyevaluationsforchangesthataffectnuclearsafetyarereviewedbytheSORC.SORCrendersadetermination,inwriting,astowhetherornotthesafetyevaluationconstitutesaUSQ.Iftheproposedchange,testorexperimentinvolvesaUSQ,itwillnotbeimplementedwithoutpriorNRCapproval.TheSafetyReviewandAuditBoard(SRAB)reviewssafetyevaluationstoverifythatactionscompletedundertheprovisionsof10CFR50.59didnotconstituteaUSQ.18

!t.

ANIPgoverningApplicabilityReviewsandsafetyevaluationsprovidesadministrativecontrolsforthereviewofchanges,testsandexperiments.ThesereviewsassessimpacttoOperatingLicenses,UFSARs,NRC-approvedplansandprograms,andNRCcommitments;determinewhetherthechangeinvolvesaUSQ;anddeterminewhetherNRCreviewandapprovalisrequired.ConsistentwiththegoverningNDD,theprocedureappliestoallproposedchangestoNMPNSstructures,systems,orcomponents(permanentandtemporary),proposedrevisionsorchangestoprocedures,andproposedtestsorexperiments.WhenanApplicabilityReviewindicatesachangetoalicensingdocumentisrequired,theproposedchangeisprocessedperasecondnuclearinterfaceprocedure.1Thissecondinterfaceprocedure,whichcontrolslicenses,UFSARs,andNRC-approvedplansandprograms,providesadministrativecontrolsforamendmentsandrevisionstoOperatingLicenses,UFSARs,andNRC-approvedplansandprograms.:Theeffectsofproposedfacilitychanges,procedurechanges,testsandexperimentsareidentifiedonaLicensingDocumentChangeRequest(LDCR).EachLDCRisreviewed,approved,andincorporatedintolicensedocumentsinaccordancewithspecificrequirementsidentifiedwithintheprocedure.InSeptember1996,NMPCbeganusingAdobeAcrobatsoftwaretosearchandviewelectronicversionsoftheNMPNSUFSARandplantTechnicalSp'ecifiications.TheAdobesoftwareprovidesfull-textsearchcommandsthatcanfindallthewordsonapage,nomatterwhereorhowtheyareused.AdobeAcrobatsoftwareisanewtoolforApplicabilityReviewersandSafetyEvaluatorstoidentifyandassesstheimpactofproposedchangesoninformationpresentedintheUFSARandTechnicalSpecifications.3B.10CFR50.71(e)AnNDDregardingchangestoOperatingLicenses,UFSARs,andNRCapprovedplansandprogramsreflectstherequirementsof10CFR50.71(e).ANIPgoverningchangestoLicenses,UFSARs,andNRC-approvedplansandprogramsprovidesadministrativecontrolsfortheinitiation,review,andapprovalofproposedchangestotheUFSAR.ANIPgoverninginterfacewiththeNRCprovidesadministrativecontrolsforfilingtheUFSARrevision.TheseproceduresprovideadministrativecontrolsforrevisingtheUFSARtoincludetheeffectsof:allchangesmadeinthefacilityorproceduresasdescribedintheUFSAR;allsafetyevaluationsperformedbythelicenseeeitherinsupportofrequestedlicenseamendmentsorinsupportofconclusionsthatchangesdidnotinvolveanUSQ;andallanalysesofnewsafetyissuesperformedbyoronbehalfofthelicenseeattheNRC'srequest.TheupdatedinformationisappropriatelylocatedwithintheUFSAR.3C.QAProgram/10CFR50AppendixBTheNMPNSQATR(UFSARAppendixB)addressestherequirementsforadescriptionoftheQAProgramfortheoperationsphaseoftheNMPNS.TheQATRappliestoorganizationsperformingworkthataffectstheoperation,maintenance,ormodificationofsafety-relatedstructures,systemsorcomponentsandindicatesthattheaccountabilityforthequalityofNMP119

safety-relatedworkrestswiththeperformer,whereasaccountabilityforverifyingthequalityofworkrestswiththeverifyingorganizations.TheQATRprovidesfortheoperation,maintenance,andmodificationofNMPNSconsistentwithANSUAmericanSocietyofMechanicalEngineers(ASME)NQA-l,ANSI/ANS-3.2andBranchTechnicalPosition(BTP)APCSB9.5-1,AppendixA.TheQATRisorganizedtopresenttheNMPCQAprogramintheorderofthe18criteriasetforthin10CFR50AppendixB.TheQATRstatesNMPC'spolicyforeach.ofthesecriteriaanddescribeshowthecontrolspertinenttoeacharecamedout.Amatrixshowingthe18criteriaof10CFR50AppendixBandthepolicyanddirectivesandorganizationproceduresimplementingthesecriteriaispresentedintheQATR.ChangesmadetotheQATRthatdonotreducecommitmentspreviouslyacceptedbytheNRCaresubmittedtotheNRCinaccordancewiththerequirementsof10CFR50.71(e).ChangesmadetotheQATRthatdonotsatisfythecriteriaofAppendixBto10CFR50,orreducecommitmentspreviouslyacceptedbytheNRC,aresubmittedtotheNRCandmustreceiveNRCapprovalpriortoimplementation.Thechangesdescribedabovearesubmittedinaccordancewiththerequirementsof10CFR50.54.Aspreviouslystated,NMPNSiscommittedtoasystemofdesignandconfigurationcontrolsthatsatisfytherequirementsofAppendixBof10CFR50.ConcerningAppendixB,CriteriaIII,theNMPNSQATRstatesthatstationmodificationsareaccomplishedinaccordancewithapproveddesignsandprocedures.Thecontrolsapplytopreparation,review,andrevisionofdesigndocuments,includingthecorrecttranslationofapplicableregulatoryrequirementsanddesignbasesintodesign,procurement,andproceduraldocuments.ThecontrolsapplytodesignworkperformedbycontractorsaswellasbyNMPCengineeringandtechnicalorganizations.AdministrativeproceduresatNMPNSweredevelopedtoassurethatlicenserequirements,includingAppendixBrequirements,areaccuratelyimplementedandthatresponsibilitiesforimplementationareproperlyassigned.4.4A.ProblemIdentificationProcessesANIPprescribesthemethodforprocessingDERs.Guidanceisprovidedregardingidentification,documentation,notification,evaluation,correction,andreportingofconditions,events,activities,andconcernsthathavethepotentialforaffectingthesafeandreliableoperationoftheNMPNS.TheDERprocessisdescribedindetailinourresponsetoRequestedAction(d)under"Deviation/EventReport."DERsareinitiatedupondiscoveryofadeficiency,includingdeficienciesinourengineeringdesignandconfigurationcontrolprocess,orinconsistenciesbetweenourlicensedocuments,physicalplant,andprocedures.AnumberofotherprocessesexistatNMPNSthathavethepotentialtoidentifyproblems.Theseprocessesincludeself-identification,reviewsperformedbytheSORCandtheSRAB,requiredtechnicalreviews,QAauditsandsurveillances,selfassessments,surveillanceandexaminationactivities,InstituteofNuclearPowerOperations(INPO)evaluations,NRCinspections,andtheevaluationof.industryoperationalexperiences.20 Nl~lt Asproblemsareidentified,DERsareinitiated,dispositioned,andappropriatecorrectiveandpreventiveactionstaken.Theseprocessesareafeedbacklooptothedesignandconfigurationcontrolprocessinthattheyeitherconfirmthattheprocessesareworkingeffectivelyoridentifyproblemareaswithsubsequentcorrectiveactionstoenhancetheprocess..ResultsfromsomeoftheseprocessesarepresentedinourresponsestoRequestedActions(b)and(c),providingpartofourbasesforconcludingthatdesignbasesrequirementsarebeingtranslatedintooperating,maintenance,andtestingprocedures,andthatSSCconfigurationandperformanceisconsistentwiththedesignbases.4B.TrainingITrainingconcerningengineeringdesignandconfigur'ationcontrolproceduresisprovidedtostationoperatingandtechnical/engineeringpersonnelaspartoftheircontinuingtraining/positionspecifictrainingprogramsasrequired.Operatorsareroutinelytrainedontheprocessesusedfortemporary/permanentchangestoplantdesignorprocedures.Additionally,reviewsofactualchangestoproceduresandsignificantplantdesignchangesaftermajormaintenanceoutagesarecovered,asappropriate,beforestartup.Simulatorsmaybeusedtotrainoperatorsandothersonnewsystems/componentsbeforeactualsystemstartupandtodevelopnewproceduresforsystemoperationbeforethesystem/componentisturnedoverfortesting.Plantsystemconfigurationchanges,specialtestsandsignificantevolutionsmaybetestedonthesimulatorbeforetheyareactuallyaccom'plishedintheplant.ThePCRdatabaseissearchedbythesimulatorsupportstaffquarterlyasareviewofplantchangesforsimulatorimpact.Administrativecontrolsareinplacethatensurethatanyplantchangeshavingpotentialimpactonthesimulatorareevaluatedandchangesimplementedasrequired.Maintenance,chemistry,radiationprotection,andengineeringpersonnelreceivetraininginplantdesign/procedurechangesaspartofthecontinuedtrainingprogram,eitheronanasneededbasisorcyclically.ProcedurechangesandplantdesignchangescanalsoreachthetrainingprogramviatheTrainingReviewRequest(TRR)/TrainingChangeOrderprocess.Thisprocessrequiresthateachchangethatpotentiallyhastrainingprogramimpactbeevaluatedandrevisionsmadeasappropriate.'lantpersonnelcaninitiateaTRRonanyissuewhichcouldhavetrainingprogramimpact.TRRs/TrainingChangeOrdersareroutinelyusedforissuesthatrequiretrainingprogrammodification.Concerningtrainingonthe10CFR50.59process,operationsshiftmanagement,designatedengineeringandmaintenancesupportpersonnel,andothersin'managementandtechnicalpositionsaretrainedandqualifiedasApplicabilityReviewers/SafetyEvaluatorsandhavetocompletearequalificationeverytwoyears.TrainingincludesanoverviewoflicensedocumentsincludingTechnicalSpecifications,UFSAR,andNRC-approvedplansandprogramstogetherwithanoverviewofthehierarchyofprocedures.Currently,thereareapproximately400fullytrainedandqualifiedpersonnelonsitewhohave.theknowledgeandabilitytodoApplicabilityReviewsandsafetyevaluations.Thistraining/knowledgebasecontributestotheawarenessandsensitivitythatexiststhroughouttheworkforcewithregardtooperatingtheplantwithinthelicensingbasis.21 I~8~Arg1~

IBranchManagersandSeniorManagersalsoperformobservationsofsimulatorandotherclassroomtrainingaspartoftheirnormalduties.Theirfeedbacktothetrainingorganizationisfactoredintotheoverallprogramtoensurethecurriculumandconductoftrainingmeetsmanagement'sexpectations.NMP122 I"'Ky,S Providetherationaleforconcludingthatdesignbasesrequirementsaretranslatedintooperating,maintenanceandtestingprocedures.Asdiscussedbelow,NiagaraMohawkhasreasonableassurancethatdesignbasesrequirementsaretranslatedintooperating,maintenanceandtestingproceduresatNMP1.Therationalesupportingthisconclusionisbasedonnumerousactions,programsandoversightactivities.AsdescribedinNDDs,administrativeproceduresestablishrequirementsforthepreparation,review,andapprovaloftechnicalprocedures,Technicalproceduresdefinerequirementsfortheoperation,maintenance,andtestingdescribedintheOperatingLicense,TechnicalSpecifications,andUFSAR.AsdiscussedintheresponsetoRequestedAction(a),extensiveprogramsandcontrolsareutilizedatNMPNStoensurethatdesignbasisinformationisaccuratelymaintainedandupdatedasconditionswarrant.Proceduresareupdatedtoreflectchangesindesign,correctiveactions(identifiiedbythecorrectiveactionprogram),industryoperatingexperience,andchangestosource'requirements.Duringthedevelopment,review,andapprovalofoperating,maintenance,andtestingprocedures,areviewofdesigndocumentswasconducted.Thisreviewincludedreviewsofdesigndrawings,DesignSpecifications,TechnicalSpecifications,andtheFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR).IFollowingthedevelopmentofoperating,maintenance,andtestingprocedures,thetechnicalaccuracyoftheprocedureshasbeenmaintainedthroughprogrammaticcontrolsforprocedurerevisionandperiodicreview.Theseprogramshavebeenstrengthenedovertheyearstotheircurrentstatus.NMPChasutilizedknowledgeableandappropriatelyqualifiedindividualstodevelop,review,approve,andreviseprocedures.Programrequirementshavebeenin'placeformanyyearsandhavebeenenhancedovertimetoimprovetheeffectivenessofthedevelopment,review,andapprovalprocess.Thetrainingprogramandotheradministrativerequirementsassurethatpersonnelassignedtoperformthesefunctionsarecompetenttoperformtheirassignedtasks.ThisassuresthatNMPCcaneffectivelyimplementprogramrequirementsassociatedwiththedevelopment,review,approval,andrevisionofadministrativeandtechnicalprocedures.Finally,NMPChasbeeninvolvedinnumerousassessmentsthatdemonstratehoweffectivelydesignrequirementsaretranslatedintooperating,maintenance,andtestingprocedures.Theseassessmentsinclude,inpart,functionalinspections,complianceverificationprojects,audits,andprocedure(bothadministrativeandtechnical)andrelatedprogramupgradeprojects.23 IPa NMPC'sresponsetoRequestedAction(a)providesadescriptionoftheengineeringdesignandconfigurationcontrolprocessescurrentlyinplaceatNMP1,includingthosethatimplement10CFR50.59,10CFR50,71(e),andAppendixBto10CFRPart50.OurresponsetoRequestedAction(d)providesadetaileddescriptionoftheprocesses'fortheidentificationofproblemsandimplementationofcorrectiveactionstopreventrecurrence(i.e.,theDER).OurresponsetoRequestedAction(b)discussestheprocesswhichwasusedtodevelop,review,andapprovetheoperations,maintenance,andtestingproceduresconsistentwiththedesignbases.Anoverviewofthehistoricprocedurerevisionprocessispresented,aswellasthecurrentrevisionprocess.Thetrainingprogramisdiscussedtoshowthatindividualsarecapableofeffectivelyimplementingtheproceduredevelopment,review,approval,andrevisionprocess.Finally,areviewofassessmentsandinitiativesconductedisprovidedtofurtherdemonstratethattheimplementationofprogramrequirementshasbeeneffectiveinassuringthatdesignbasisrequirementsarebeingtranslatedintooperating,maintenanceandtestingprocedures.NMPCisconfidentthatadherencetoourdesignandconfigurationcontrolprocessesandDERprocessprovidereasonableassurancethatdesignbasesrequirementsareproperlytranslatedintooperating,maintenance,andtestingproceduresandthat,wheninconsistenciesarefound,theyareevaluatedandpropercorrectiveactionsaretaken.NMP1soperating,maintenance,andtestingprocedureswereinitiallydevelopedinthelate1960s.Subsequenttotheinitialdevelopmentofprocedures,theadministrativeprocessforproceduredevelopment,review,approval,andrevisionhaschangedandimproved.Thetechnicalcontentofoperating,maintenance,andtestingprocedureshasalsocontinuedtoimprove.WehavechosentodescribetheprocesssincethecompletionofconstructionofNineMilePointUnit2(NMP2)inthemid-1980s.Althoughpreviousdirectionandcontrolofproceduresexisted,theyhavebeensignificantlyenhancedsincetheconstructionofNMP2.Theseprogramcontrolsdefinedtherequirementsnecessaryinordertoassuredesignbasisrequirementswereadequatelytranslatedintooperating,maintenance,andtestingprocedures.Someoftheprogramdocumentsinplaceatthetimeincludedthefollowing:~ANSIN18.7providedtherequirementsforthepreparation,reviewandapprovalprocessforprocedures,aswellasanappendixofactivitieswhichrequireprocedures.~Administrativeproceduresprescribedtheprocessforthegeneration,approval,publication,distribution,andcontrolofprocedures.~AdministrativeproceduresprescribedtheSORCrequirementsassociatedwiththecommittee'sresponsibilities.Amongthosewererequirementsforformalprocedurereviewandthedocumentationofthosereviews.24

/N' NMPChasutilizedknowledgeableandappropriatelyqualifiedindividualstodevelop,review,approve,andreviseprocedures.Programrequirementsfordevelopmentofprocedureshavebeeninplaceformanyyears.PersonnelinvolvedinthewritingoftechnicalprocedureswereeitherNMPCemployeesorcontractorscognizantintheareaforwhichtheprocedurewasbeingwritten.Ineithercase,individualsassignedtothosetaskswerecompetenttoperformtheirrespectivetasks.Individualsassignedtosupportthereview,approval,andrevisionfunctionsofproceduredevelopmentandmaintenancewerealsoappropr'iatelyqualified.Throughthetrainingprogram,andotheradministrativerequirements,reasonableassuranceisprovidedthatpersonnelassignedtoperformthesefunctionsarecompetenttoperformtheirassignedtasks.This,inturn,reasonablyassuresthatNMPCcaneffectivelyimplementtheprogramrequirementsassociatedwiththedevelopment,review,approval,andrevisionofadministrativeandtechnicalprocedures.Followingproceduredevelopment,reviewandapproval,proceduresweremaintainedup-to-dateutilizingadministrativecontrolsfortherevisionprocess.Procedurerevisioncontrolswereinplacetoestablishrequirementsnecessarytoensurethatproceduresweremaintainedappropriately.Theserequirements,coupledwithconfigurationanddesigncontrolprocesses,ensuredthatdesignbasisrequirementsweretranslatedintooperating,maintenance,andtestingproceduresinatimelymanner.Overtime,theproceduredevelopment,review,approval,andcontrolprocesshasbeenstrengthened.Abriefsummaryof.majorprogramenhancementsfollows:~1984-Anadministrative.procedurechangeincorporatedtheNMP1andNMP2organizationsunderacommonsiteadministrationprogram..j1985-Administrativeproceduresprovidedsignificantlymoredetailregardingthedevelopment,review,andrevisionprocessforprocedures.1989-ASiteProcedureWriter'sGuidewasdevelopedandapprovedinordertoprovideconsistentguidanceonformatandhumanfactors.Thiswascompletedinanticipationofamajorprocedurerewriteeffort.I1990-1992-'-Anewprocedurehierarchydevelopmentwasinitiated.Thiswasdonetoprovideamoreorganized,tieredprocedurestructureandhierarchy.AdministrativeProceduresforproceduregeneration,approval,distribution,revision,andusewouldbetransformedintotheNDDandNIP-PROseries.Amajortechnicalprocedurerewriteprogramwasalsounderway,utilizingtheSiteProcedureWriter'sGuide.Thebulkofthiseffortwascompletedin1992.Concurrentwiththetechnicalprocedureupgrade,APsgoverningproceduralcontrolswerethemselvesenhancedtobetterdescribecertainrequirementsforprocedurereviewandcontrolactivities.Akeyattributetothischangewasbetterdefiningtheexpectationsforprocedureauthorsandreviewers,aswellasimprovingthe10CFR50.59screeningprocess.25

'

Trainingeffortswerecompletedtoensureprocedurewriters,reviewers,approversandthoseinvolvedintherevisionprocesscouldeffectivelyimplementtheprogramrequirements.~1992-1997-Thequalityofproceduresandrelatedprocessescontinuetoimproveduetoenhancementsintheareasoftechnicalreview,validation,verificationandthe10CFR50.59screeningprocessandsafetyevaluationquality.Initialqualificationandrequalificationprogramsintheseareashavebeenstrengthenedconsiderably.TheseprogramchangeshaveledtoourcurrentprogramrequirementsdescribedinourresponsetoRequestedAction(a).NMPChasconductedseveralinitiativesinordertoimprovetheprocessbywhichdesignrequirementsaretransferredintooperating,maintenance,andtestingprocedures.Additionally,severalassessmentshavebeenconductedwhichreviewedplantprocedures,demonstratedthatNMPC'sprogramscontainsufficientrequirements,andthatNMPCpersonnelarequalifiedtoimplementtheprogramrequirements.ThisreasonablyassuresthatNMPCcanconcludethatdesignbasisrequirementsaretranslatedintooperating,maintenanceandtestingprocedures.Asummaryofthesignificantinitiativesandassessmentsinthisareaisprovidedonthefollowingpages.NMPCinitiated(1989)andcompleted(1990)theNMP1SVPwiththepurposeofensuringthatTechnicalSpecificationlogicsystemswerebeingadequatelytested.AspartoftheSVP,surveillancetestswerereviewedtoensurethatwholelogicchannelsandsubchannelsweretestedinaccordancewithTechnicalSpecifications.Inaddition,thereviewverifiedthatcontactsinlogiccircuitswerebeingprocedurallytestedinawaythatuniquelydeterminesthateachcontactperformeditssafetyfunction.Forparallelpaths,thismeantassuringthateachpathwasfunctionallytestedseparately.TheSVPwasdocumentedasaone-timereviewusingatemporaryprocedure.Thereviewdocumentationconsistedofcomparingsystemdesignbasesdrawings,surveillanceproceduresandtheapplicableTechnicalSpecifications,Reviewformswerecompletedforeachsystemverified.ThereviewformscomparedeachTechnicalSpecificationlinewithrequiredfunctionstobetested.Manysurveillanceprocedureswereupdated,asappropriate,basedontheresultsfromthereview.AsaresultofIN95-15,aguidelinewasissuedtoprovideguidancetosystemengineersregardingtestrequirements.Asaresultofthenotice,NMPCrecentlyverifiedthatmodificationstosafety-relatedcircuitssince1990werebeingtestedproperlytomeetTechnicalSpecifications,Thesemodificationsmetthescopeofreviewandthetestingprogramwasfoundtobesatisfactory.Further,NMPCstrengthenedspecificadministrativecontrolsforNMP126 gII establishingrequirementsforpreparationandreviewoftechnicalprocedures,fordeterminingandperformingpost-maintenancetesting,andfortestingdesigncha'ngestoplantsystemsandequipment.BasedonrecentindustryeventsinvolvingimpropertestingoflogiccircuitsandinformationprovidedinGenericLetter(GL)96-01,NMPCdetermineditwouldbeprudenttoreaffirmourSVPforcompletenessandscope.Thesystemstobereviewedwillbethereactorprotectionsystem,emergencydieselgeneratorloadsheddingandsequencing,andactuationlogicforengineeredsafetyfeatures.Basedonthisreassessment,anotherreviewofsurveillancetestproceduresandassociatedprintswillbeimplementedtoverifyTechnicalSpecificationlogicsystemtestingrequirementsarebeingmet.ThisreassessmentisbeingcompletedperoursubmittalforGL96-01andisscheduledforcompletionpriortostartupfromRFO15.Insummary,theSVPwasanextensiveefforttoensureoperating,maintenance,andtestingprocedurescomplywithdesignbasestestingrequirementsasreflectedintheplantTechnicalSpecifications,InDecember1987,NMP1wasshutdownduetoequipmentproblems.Duringtheoutage,technicalandprogrammaticdeficiencieswereidentifiedbyNMPCandtheNRC.ThesedeficienciesledtotheissuanceofaConfirmatoryActionLetterbytheNRCconcerningNMPClinemanagement'sineffectivenessinrecognizingandremedyingproblems.NMPCwasrequiredtoprepareandsubmitaRAPforNRCapproval.IncludedamongthecorrectiveactionsintheRAPwereanumberofactionswhichdeterminedtheadequacyofproceduresanddesign.Actionsrelatedtoproceduresincluded:1.ThesurveillancetestingrequirementscontainedintheplantTechnicalSpecificationswerereviewed'toensurethattheyhadbeenadequatelytranslatedintoimplementingprocedures.Thiseffortisdescribedinmoredetailunder"SurveillanceVerificationProgram(SVP)."2.ArequirementforthedevelopmentofastreamlineddeficiencyreportingsystemledtotheestablishmentoftheDERprocess,thedetailsofwhicharedescribedinourresponsetoRequestedAction(d)ofthisletter.Thisformalprocessisused,inpart,toidentifyandresolvediscrepanciesbetweentheas-builtconfigurationoftheplant,(includingoperating,maintenance,andtestingprocedures,andtheUFSAR),andtheplantdesignbases.3.AreviewwascompletedtoinsurethatEmergencyOperatingProcedures(EOP)inputvalueswereconsistentwithdesignbasisinformation.Inaddition,controlswereaddedtoensuretheEOPsweremodified,asnecessary,toreflectchangestothe"as-built"conditionoftheplant.27 ll]i4 a.AdministrativecontrolswereestablishedtorequireadequatereviewandcontroloftheInserviceTesting/ST)Program.ThesecondintervalISTprogramwasfinalizedtoincludeallrequiredpumpsandvalvesinaccordancewiththedesignbasesrequirements.Theprocedureswereupdatedtoreflecttheprogramandhencedesignbasesrequirements.Operating,maintenance,andtestingproceduresaredevelopedandmaintainedinaccordancewiththerequirementsofvariousadministrativeproceduresa'ndprograms.Theadministrativecontrolsapplicabletooperating,maintenance,andtestingproceduresaredescribedindetailinourresponsetoRequestedAction(a).ThissectiondescribestheAdministrativeProcedureUpdateProgramwhichwascompletedin1992torestructureandvalidateadministrativeproceduresandprogramsatNMPNS.Theprimaryobjectivesoftheprogramwereto:I~ReviewlicensingdocumentationtoidentifylicensingrequirementsandcommitmentsapplicabletoNMPNS.Verifythatlicenserequirementsandcommitmentswerecompletelyandaccuratelyimplementedthroughadministrativeproceduresandprograms.IVerifythatresponsibilitiesforimplementinglicenserequirementsandcommitmentswereappropriatelyassignedwithintheorganization.TheAdministrativeProcedureUpdateProgramwasinitiatedbydevelopingaNuclearDivision"Policy"document.ThePolicyprovidedasummaryofthemajororganizationalresponsibilities,generalprogramrequirements,andotherelementsforensuringthesafe,reliable,andefficientoperationofNMPNS.ThePolicyalsodefinedahierarchyofprocedurestofacilitateorganizedimplementationoflicenserequirements.28 rill4 ThecurrenthierarchyisdepictedinFigure1:EKKIRFDNuclear'ivisionPolicyNuclearDivisionDirectivesNuclearInterfaceProceduresDepartmentSpeciTicAdministrativeProceduresBranchLevelAdministrativeProceduresTechnicalImplementingProceduresInitialeffortsalsoinvolveddevelopmentofacomprehensivelistoffunctionalareastoencompassallaspectsofoperation,maintenance,modification,andtestingoftheNMPNS.NMP129 0)limni<"I Thelistoffunctionalareasisasfollows:~~~ALARAProgramAuditsandSurveillancesBudget/ExpenditureControlChemistryConfigurationManagementDesignControlDocumentControlEvaluationandCorrectiveActionEnvironmentalProtectionEmergencyPreparednessFitnessforDutyFireProtectionProgramHumanResourceManagementHousekeepingandSystemCleanness~ISIandTestingInspectionsInterfacingwithRegulatoryand~IndustryGroupsInventory,IdentificationandPhysical~ControlofMaterials,Equipment,~PartsandSupplies~Licenses,PlansandProgramsMaintenanceMeasuringandTestEquipmentNuclearComputerSystemsNuclearFuelManagementOccupationalSafetyandHealthOperationsOutageManagementNuclearDivisionPolicyandDirectivesManualControlProcurementofMaterials,Equipment,Parts,SuppliesandServicesProceduresandOrdersPlanningandSchedulingProjectandTaskManagementRadiologicalEffluentsStationReliabilityRecordsManagementRadioactiveMaterialProcessing,TransportandDisposalRadiationProtectionProgramRegulatoryPostingRequirementsSafeguardsInformationControlSurveillanceandTestingSecuritySafetyEvaluationsSpecialNuclearMaterialAccountabilitySpecialProcessesControlSafetyReviewsTraining,QualificationandSimulatorsFollowingdevelopmentofthePolicy,NDDsweredevelopedforeachfunctionalareaidentifiedabove.NDDsareusedtoestablishrequirementsthatmustbeaccomplishedtocomplywithregulatoryrequirementsandguidelines,industrystandardsandpractices,andcommitmentstoregulatoryagenciesoutlinedintheOperatingLicense,UFSAR,andTechnicalSpecifications.Theyserveasavehiclebywhichmanagementcommunicatesrequirementsforperformingandcontrollingactivitiestothoseresponsibleforpreparingtheassociatedadministrativeandimplementingprocedures.ISubjectmatterexpertswereassignedtocompileeachNDDbyperformingacomprehensiveassessmentoflicensingrequirementsandcommitmentstoidentifyapplicablerequirementsforeachfunctionalarea.EachNDDwasreviewedbyresponsibleindividualsinthefunctionalareaandthenbytheSeniorgfanagementTeam.TheNDDswereissuedasasetinthe-NuclearDivisionPolicyandDirectivesManual.AdministrativecontrolsareappliedtoensuretheNDDsremainaccurate.NMP130 4~f~I FollowingissuanceoftheNuclearDivisionPolicyandDirectivesManual,theAdministrativeProcedureUpdateProgramwascompletedbyincorporatingrequirementscontainedintheNDDsthroughoutvariouslowertieradministrativeprocedures.Itisimportanttonotethat,inparallelwithimplementationoftheNDDs,NMPNSconductedacomprehensive"BacktoBasics"programtoeducatestationpersonnelonthestructureandcontentofthelicensingbasis,includingitsrelationtotheNuclearDivisionPolicyandDirectivesManual.ThisprogramisdescribedlaterinourresponsetoRequestedAction(b)under"Training."IncontrasttotheNDDswhichestablish"what"therequirementsareforaparticularfunctionalarea,theimplementingproceduresprovidethedetailsofmethodstobeusedtoimplementtherequirementscontainedintheNDDs.Thiswasaccomplishedusingtheprocedurehierarchydevelopedearlierintheprogram.Twotiersofadministrativeproceduresareemployedintheprocedurehierarchytoensureappropriatelevelsofreviewandapprovalareobtained:Departmentleveladministrativeprocedureswhichinclude:1)NIPswhichimplementcommonoruniversalprogramsforNMPNSdepartments(suchasprocedurereviewandcontrol,correctiveaction,andsecurity).NIPsarereviewedbyresponsibleindividualsfromappropriateareasandapprovedbytheVicePresidentandGeneralManager-Nuclear;and2)Department-specificadministrativeprocedureswhichimplementcommonprogramsassignedtoaspecificdepartment(suchasGenerationorEngineering).Department-specificadministrativeproceduresarereviewedwithintheappropriatedepartmentandapprovedbythedepartmenthead.Lowertier(branchlevel)administrativeprocedureswhicharespecifictofunctionalareaswithindepartments(suchasOperationsorRadiationProtection)andinvolveimplementationofrequirementsbyanindividualgroup.BranchleveladministrativeproceduresarereviewedandapprovedwithinthefunctionalareaandallowflexibilityinimplementingdetailedrequirementsprovidedcompliancewiththeNDDsandhighertierproceduresismaintained.Adherencetotheprocedurehierarchywasmaintainedtoensur'eimplementingproceduresweredevelopedtotheextentnecessarytoexecutetherequirementscontainedintheNDDs.Theeffortwascoordinatedbyacentralgrouptoensurecompleten'essandtominimizeoverlapandduplication.AprocedurenumberingschemewasemployedthatassociatedimplementingprocedurestotheirparentNDD.Thisphaseoftheprogramresultedinrevisionofnearlyallofthemorethan800administrativeproceduresthatwereinplaceatthattime.Insummary,thiseffortverifiedthatlicensebasisrequirementswerebeingimplementedthroughadministrativeproc'eduresincludingthoseapplicabletodevelopingandmaintainingoperations,maintenance,andtestingprocedures.Theprogramalsoservedtoconsolidaterequirementsformoreeffectiveimplementationandtoeliminateoutdatedorundesirablepractices.Uponcompletion,thetotalnumberofadministrativeprocedureswasreducedfrommorethan800toapproximately350.ThedescribedprocedureprogramandhierarchyremainsinplacetodayasanintegralpartoftheNMPNSprocedureprogram.31

,)lgVIr TheNMP1DesignBasisReconstitution(DBR)ProgramincludedaVendorTechnicalManualReviewandUpgradeProject.Theintegratedprogramincludedprocessingover10,000vendordocumentswhichresultedinreviewandapprovalofover7,000vendortechnicalmanuals.PartofthiseffortwastodeveloptheequipmenttoVendorTechnicalManualcross-referenceaspartofDBR.InNovemberof1995,theprocessforvendormanualuseandcontrolwasenhancedusingINPO'sGoodPracticeDE102,INPO87-009,ControlofVendorManuals,asaguide.Therevisedprocessensuresplantpersonnelareprovidedwithcurrentandtechnicallyaccuratevendormanualstosupportoperationandmaintenanceandincludesthefollowing:1.IdentificationoftheprimaryresponsibilitiesofvariousindividualsresponsibleforcontrolofvendormanualsincludingtheVendorDocumentCoordinator.2.Expectationsforturnaroundtimeforthereviewandapprovalofvendormanuals.3.Requirementsforthereceipt,review,approval,issue,andrevisionofvendormanuals,andnotificationtodepartmentsandresponsiblepersonnelfornewand/orrevisedvendormanuals.Thisnotificationservesasthetriggertostationpersonneltoreview'ndreviseappropriateprogramsandproceduresiftheyareaffectedbyaparticularvendormanual.4.Aprocessforplantpersonneltotakeexceptiontorequirementsspecifiedbyavendor.Basedontheabove,NMPCisconfidentthatplantpersonnelareprovidedwithcurrentandtechnicallyaccuratevendormanualstosupportplantoperationandmaintenance.TheVendorInterfaceProgramandtheinternalreviewandapprovalprocessassuresthatvendormanualinformationisreviewedagainstthedesignbasis.Thisprocessconfirmstheacceptabilityoftechnicalinformationthathasnotchanged,andidentifiesotherinformationthatrequiresrevision.SignificantQAaudits(verticalslices)havebeenperformedintheareasofStationBlackout(SBO),ServiceWaterandFireProtectioninwhichareviewofproceduresagainstdesignbasisdocumentswasincluded.AQAauditwasperformedin1993todetermineNMP1'sabilitytocopewithaSBOevent.TheauditteamfoundthatNMP1hadanestablishedSBOProgramwithafourhourcopingdurationandthatOperationshadreceivedadequatetraininganddevelopedproceduresthatwouldenablethemtocopewithaSBO.Theauditconcludedthatadieselgeneratorreliability32 tj~h programhadbeenestablishedandmettherequirementsofRG1.155.ProceduresandguidelinesusedtocopewithaSBOwerereviewed.ThisincludedacomparisonofNuclearManagementandResourceCouncil(NUMARC)87-00toourspecialoperatingproceduresforSBO,observinguseoftheproceduresinthesimulator,andperformingawalkdownofportionsoftheproceduresintheplant.TheauditconcludedthattheSBOproceduresincludedtheoperatoractionsnecessarytocopewithaSBOandthattheprocedureshadbeenwrittentoincorporateNVMARC87-00andRG1.155requirements.Thisauditdididentifysomeinconsistencies.TheseitemsweredocumentedthroughtheDERprocess.AQAauditwasperformedin1995underthecognizance"ofSRABtomeettherequirementsoftheannual,biennialandtriennialfireprotectionauditsdescribedintheTechnicalSpecifications.Theauditobjectivesweretoevaluatethefireprotectionprogramandimplementingprocedurestoassuretherequirementsfordesign,procurement,fabrication,installation,testing,maintenanceandadministrativecontrolsfortherespectiveprogramsareincludedintheQATRandme'etprogramrequirementsestablishedbythelicensedocumentsandBTPAPCSB9.5-1,AppendixA-1976,SectionC.'dditionalobjectivesweretoassesstheplantfireprotectionequipmentandprogramimplementationtoverifycompliancewiththeNRCrequirementsaddressedinlicensedocumentsandimplementingprocedures.TheauditteamconcludedthattheNMPNSFireProtectionProgramwasincompliancewithapplicableCoderequirementsandtheNationalFireProtectionAssociation(NFPA)fireprotectionguidelines.Thefireprotectiondesignanddesignchangeprocesseswereconsideredaprogramstrength.OpportunitiesforprogramimprovementswereidentifiedwhichincludedattentiontodetailconcerningtheidentificationofrelateddocumentchangesneededwhenFireProtectionprogramchangeswereimplemented.DERswere,writtenagainsttheprogramwhichincludedinconsistencieswiththeFSAR,butnoneindicatedanymajorprogramflawsorviolations.TheauditevaluatedthedesigncontrolandprocurementdocumentcontrolprocessesforfireprotectionbyreviewingDDCsforplantchangemodifications,reviewingprocurementdocumentsforfireprotectionsystemreplacementitems,andconductinginterviewswithdesignengineeringandprocurementpersonnel.Theauditteamfoundthedesignchangecontrolprocessforfireprotectiontobeastrength,particularlythethoroughnessofengineeringevaluationsforAppendixRrequirements.Qualitystandards,suchasfireprotectioncodes,werespecifiedindesigndocumentsanddeviationsfromthesecodesorstandardswereappropriatelycontrolled.Also,newdesignsandplantmodificationswerereviewedbyqualifiedpersonneltoensureinclusionofapplicablefireprotectionrequirements.Theauditteamalsoreviewedprocedures,instructionsanddrawingstoensurethatfireprotectionprogramelementshadbeenappropriatelyincorporatedintotheimplementingdocuments.Theteamalsoobservedpersonnelperformanceoffireprotectionproceduresandinterviewedpersonneltoassesstheimplementationoftheseproceduresandprogramelements.Theteamfoundthatthetrainingprogramsforfirefightingandfirepreventionwerebeingimplementedinaccordance'withdocumentedproceduresandthatthetrainingprogramsforfirebrigademembersmetthe'minimumrequirementsof10CFR50AppendixR.TheteamalsoNMP133 I4 foundthat,theinstructions,procedures,anddrawingsfordesign,installation,inspection,test,maintenance,modification,andadministrationoffireprotectionactivitiesandsystemswerebeingproperlyreviewed,andcontainedappropriaterequirementsforcontrolofignitionsources,combustibles,precautionsandcompensatoryactionswhenfiresystemswereplacedoutofservice.TheauditteamreviewedtheNMPNSUFSARAppendixB(NMPC-QATR-l),fireprotectionsurveillancetestprocedures,NFPAstandards,andfireprotectionrelatedworkdocumentstoensurethataprogramofindependentinspectionhadbeenestablished.Theauditteamalsoreviewedtestandsurveillanceproceduresandrelatedworkdocuments,witnessedtestingactivitiesandinterviewedpersonneltoverifythatatestprogramhadbeenestablished.Theteamfoundthatthetestproceduresincorporatedtherequirementsandlimitscontainedinapplicabledesigndocumentsandthattheschedulesandmethodsforperiodictestinghadbeenappropriatelydevelopedandimplemented.Theteamalsofoundthatfireprotectionequipmentandcommunicationsequipmentweretestedperiodicallytoassurethattheequipmentwouldproperlyfunctionandcontinuetomeetdesigncriteria.AnauditoftheNMP1ServiceWaterSystemwasconductedin1993toreviewsystemdesignandoperation,includingmaintenance,testingandvariousregulatorycommitmentssuchasheatexchangerperformance(GL89-13)andcheckvalvemonitoring(INPOSignificantOperatingExperienceReport(SOER)86-03).ThepurposeoftheauditwastodetermineiftheNMP1servicewatersystemwasdesigned,operated,tested,andmaintainedtoassureperformanceofdesignsafetyfunctionsinresponsetopostulatedaccidentconditions,postulatednaturalphenomena,andhazardoussysteminteractions.Theauditteamemployeddeep,vertical-slicetechniquesoriginallydevelopedbytheNRCSafetySystemFunctionalInspection(SSFI)program.Specifically,theServiceWaterSystemwasreviewedintechnicaldepthinordertoevaluatesystemdesignandmodificationprocesses,andtoevaluatetheimplementationofthedesigninoperations,maintenance,testing,trainingandadministrativecontrolsprograms.Writtenquestionswereissuedwhereconcernsorneedsforadditionalinformationwereidentified.Uponevaluationofquestionresponsesfromresponsibleorganizations,itemswereclosed,continuedforfurtherevaluationorcorrectiveaction,orwhereappropriate,aDERwasissued.TheteamfoundthattheNMP1ServiceWaterSystemDesignBasisDocument(SDBD)waswellorganized,informativeandcomprehensive,andthatstatingthefunctionalrequirementanditsbasiswasasoundpracticeandconsistentwiththedesignbasisdefinitionin10CFR50.2.TheauditalsostatedtheSDBDscontainedagoodbalancebetweenfunctionalrequirementsanddesigndetailsmakingthemusefulforareassuchasplantmodifications,safetyevaluations,maintenance,operationsandtraining.TheteamalsocommentedontheinherentdesignreliabilityoftheServiceWaterSystem,thecommitmentstodofrequentheatexchangercleaningandtheapproachbeingtakentocontrolmicrobiologicallyinducedcorrosion(i.e.,ourresponsetoGL89-13).TheoverallconclusionwasthattheNMP1ServiceWaterSystemwassufficientlydesigned,operatedtested,andmaintainedtoassureperformanceofdesignsafetyfunctionsunderpostulateddesignbasisaccidentconditions.NMP134 0"[IIs Inconclusion,theseauditsweredesigned,inpart,toverifythatthedesignbasiswasproperlyreflectedintheapplicableoperating,maintenan'ce,andtestingproceduresforthosefunctionalareas.Theresultsindicatethatwhilenotperfect,thereisareasonablebasisforconcludingthatgoalhasbeenaccomplished.Continualverificationthroughauditandsurveillanceactivitiesisamanagementexpectation.Industryoperations,experienceitemsprovideNMPNSopportunitiestoconfirmthatdesignbasesrequirementsaretranslatedintooperating,maintenance,andtestingprocedures.Asaminimum,NRCBulletins,Notices,GLs,andINPOissuancessuchasSOERSandSignificantEventReports(SERs),aswellasvendorissuancesarereviewedtodetermineapplicabilitytotheNMPNS.NuclearDivisionpersonnelaredirectedtoinitiateaDERupondiscoveryofadeviation/eventorconditionadversetoqualityorwhenitisdeterminedthatanindustryexperienceisapplicabletotheNMPNS.TheDERprocess,'sdescribedinourresponsetoRequestedAction(d),requiresadispositionandcorrectiveactions,asnecessary.SomeexamplesofoperationsexperienceitemsthathaverequiredNMPNSto'confirmand/ortakeactiontoassurethatdesignbasisre'quirementsarebeingtranslatedintooperating,maintenance,andtestingproceduresareasfollows:ThepurposeofGL88-14wastorequestthateachlicensee/applicantreviewNUREG-1275,Volume'2,andperformadesignandoperationsverificationoftheinstrumentairsystem(IAS).AsstatedintheGL,theverificationshouldinclude"verificationthatmaintenancepractices,emergencyprocedures,andtrainingareadequatetoensurethatsafety-relatedequipmentwillfunctionasintendedonlossofinstrumentair."Inresponsetotherequest,NMPCreviewedthespecifiedproceduresandfoundthemtobeadequatetoensurethatthesubjectsafety-relatedequipmentwouldfunctionasintendedonlossofinstrumentairorduringdesignbasisaccidents.Operationalprocedureswerealsorevisedtoimproveproceduralcontrolduringtheloadsheddingprocess.ThereviewsandenhancementsconductedaspartofthisGLeffortprovideassurancethatfortheinstrumentairsystem,designbasishasbeenproperlytranslatedintoprocedures.NRCUSIA-44,SBOwasconcernedwiththeabilityofanuclearpowerplanttocopewithatotallossofbothoffsiteandonsitealternatingcurrent(AC)electricalpower.TheNRCresolvedtheissuebyincorporatingrequirementsforcopingwithaSBOin10CFR50.63.AspartofNMPC'seffortstoaddressensuringcompliancewiththeserequirements,existingprocedureswerereviewedand,inconjunctionwiththecreationofanewoperatingproceduredetailingthespecificactionsforrespondingtoanSBO,werefoundflNMP135 a~>

tomeettherequirementsof10CFR50.63andguidelinesinNUMARC87-00.Aspartofthisreview,NMPCconfirmedthatexistingproceduresprovidedguidancewhichwouldpermittherestorationofACpowereitherfromoffsiteorfromtheemergencydieselgenerators.Additionally,corporateoperatinginstructionswereidentifiedthataddresstherestorationofoffsitepowertoNMP1andtheScribaSubstationfromvarioussources.ConfirmationoftheseexistingproceduralandoperatingcontrolsalongwiththoseaddedtomeetNUMARC87-00providesarationalethatoperatingproceduresadequatelyaddressthedesignbasisforlossofACpowerevents.Promptedbyrelevantindustryevents,NMPCinitiatedandhassincecompletedareviewofselectedUFSARchapterstodeterminetheiraccuracy.Thereviewcoveredtenhighrisksystems(basedonPRA)includingsafety-relatedandnonsafety-relatedsystems.Thisreviewidentifiedattributesthatshouldbeimplementedbyplantprocedures,approvedprocessesorcontainedinanEngineeringdocument.Inthisway,designbasisandlicensinginformationcouldbeverified.Eachattributewasthenprovidedtotheappropriatelinedepartmenttoprovidetechnicaljustificationastowhetherornottheattributewasfullyimplemented.Thisreviewidentifiedapproximately634individualstatementstobeverifiedbyplantandengineeringpersonnel.AsoftheendofJanuary1997,approximately600statements(or95%)havebeendispositioned.Ofthe600statements,lessthan9%resultedindiscrepanciescontainedintheUFSARthatmetthecriteriaforDERinitiation.Thesediscrepanciesrangedfromtypographicalmistakestominorinconsistenciesininformationcontainedinplantproceduresandprocesses.Oftheidentifiedinconsistencies,themajorityofthesewereduetofailuretoaccuratelyupdatetheapplicableUFSARsectionasdescribedinexistingsafetyevaluations.Baseduponourreviewtodate,nodiscrepancyhasresultedinanoperabilityconcern,aplantperformanceproblem,orareportableconditionoutsidethedesignbasesoftheplant.Aself-assessmentoftheUFSARreviewwastheninitiatedtodeterminetheneedforandscopeofanUFSARverificationprogram.Additionally,thisself-assessmentalsoevaluatedselectedNRCinspectionreportsandNMPCLicenseeEventReports(LERs)forthepurposeofdeterminingtheaccuracyoftheUFSARinformation.Theself-assessmentconcludedthattheNMP1UFSARisgenerallyaccurateindescribingtheoperationoftheplant.Althoughdeficienciesandminorinconsistencieshavebeenidentified,theyhavebeendeterminednottoimpactplantoperationorperformance.However,theassessmentindicatesthatNMPCshouldpursueimprovingtheaccuracyoftheUFSAR.Thisprocesswouldalsoconfirmthevalidityofthedesignbasisfortheremainingsystems,andimprovetheabilitytoefficientlymaintaintheNMP1UFSAR.Accordingly,wearecurrentlyfinalizingourplansforaUFSARverificationeffort.Weintendtoperformacomprehensivereviewwhichwillbecompletedbytheendof1998.Thisreviewwillincludeprovisionforpromptevaluationofidentifieddeviationsforoperabilityandreportability.ItwillalsoassessonanongoingbasiswhethertherearebroadunderlyingNMP136 It concernsofdesignbasisrelatedinadequacies.TheUFSARVerificationProgramconfirmsNMPC'scommitmenttoensurethedesignbasisisreflectedintheday-to-dayoperationoftheunit,andthatplantpersonnelareknowledgeableandawareofthesignificanceofoperatingwithinthelicensingbasis.In1992,NMPCdevelopedanewtrainingcourseentitled"Back-to-Basics."Thiscourseprovidedtrainingonlicensingbasisdocumentsandoperationwithinourlicensingenvelope,andwasdesignedtoresultinenhancementstoourmanagementandleadershipskills.Alsodiscussedwastheexpectationthatifworkcouldnotbeperformedwithinthecontrolsofaprocedure,theworkshouldstopandaresolutionobtainedbeforeworkcontinues.ThistrainingwasprovidedtoBranchManagersandselectedSupervisorswhowerethenresponsibletoteachthe"Back-to-Basics"coursetotheindividualworkgroups."Back-to-BasicsH"trainingwasconductedin1995-1996toassistorganizationsinunderstandinghowBack-to-Basicsrelatestotheirspecificjobs.Thistrainingincludedadiagramofourlicensebasisanddiscussionsof10CFR50.59and50.92,commitmentsmadetoOperationalExperienceitems,RGs,andindustrystandardsandhowwechangethesecommitments,adefinitionofoperabilitywithanemphasisonpostaccidentfunction,discretionaryenforcement,reportabilityrequirementsof10CFR50Parts72,73and21,andhowspecificworkactivitiesinteractwiththedesignbasis.Concerning50.59training,thebiennialrequaliflicationtrainingforpersonnelauthorizedtopreparesafetyevaluationsnowincludesaspecificdiscussionoftheconsequencesoffailingtoprepareasafetyevaluation.MembersoftheSeniorManagementTeamrecentlyattendedtherequalificationtrainingtoensuretheirexpectationsareincorporated,andtoheightenawarenessof10CFR50.59requirementsandissues.MembersoftheSORCandtheSRABarealsorequiredtoattendrequalificationtraining.TrainingfornucleardivisionpersonneldevelopedduringtheRestartActionPlanperiodemphasizedincreasedStandardsofPerformanceexpectations.Topicsincludedaheightenedfocusondesigncontrol,DBR,andabetterunderstandingoftheNMPldesignandhowplantpersonnelshouldusedesigndocumentswhenwritingproceduresandperformingmodifications.Lessonslearnedwerepresentedintrainingwhichdiscussedconfigurationcontrolandprogrammanagement.Changesintrainingprogramprocessesincludedconfigurationcontrolofindividualtrainingandqualificationrecordsforlicensedoperators.AnewTrainingRecordsSystem,TRAIN,wasputinplacetohelpwiththemanagementoftrainingrecords.Additionally,programprocedureswererevisedtospecifycontinuingcoverageoftopicsannually.OperationalExperience,includingindustryevents,aretypicallyanalyzedfortrainingvalueinconjunctionwithDERdispositionsand,ifappropriate,areincludedinthecontinuingtrainingprogramforoperations,maintenance,engineering,chemistry,radiationprotection,andsupportorganizations.37

Routineandspecialtrainingperiodicallyresultsinenhancementstoprocedures.Operatorscanprocessprocedurechangeswhentrainingactivitiesshowthatthereisabetterwaytoaccomplishthespecifictask.Proceduresarereviewedperiodicallywithintenttopreventpersonnelerrors,ensurebetterunderstanding,andtrainpersonnelonthedesignorlicensingbasisof.theplant.Anexampleofwhereanengineeringsupportcontinuedtrainingclassidentifiedaconcernwasthediscussionofcontrolroddriveflowandhowitisusedtocalculatecorethermalpower.Asaresultofthisdiscovery,configurationchangestotheplantprocesscomputerweremadetocorrectthedeficiency.Thishassincebeenidentifiedasanindustryproblemthatinitiatedactionatotherplants.AdministrativeproceduresandcontrolshavebeeninplacesinceconstructionofNMPl,althoughsubstantiallyenhancedovertime,tomandaterequirementsassociatedwiththepreparation,review,approvalandrevisionofoperating,maintenance,andtestingprocedures.Theseproceduresandprocessescontainappropriaterequirementswhichreasonablyensuredesignbasisrequirementsareincorporatedintoadministrativeandtechnicalprocedures.PersonnelqualificationrequirementsassurethatNMPCiscapableofimplementingtheprogramrequirements.ContinuousimprovementofprogramrequirementsandimplementationhasbeenaregularpracticeatNMPNS.Additionally,multipleassessmentshavebeenconductedwhich'demonstratetheoveralleffectivenessofvariousprogramsinthedesign/configurationcontrolandprocedurearea.Coupledtogether,theseactivitiesandprocessesprovidereasonableassurancethatdesignbasisrequirementsaretranslatedintooperating,maintenance,andtestingproceduresatNMPl.38 0

tProvidetherationaleforconcludingthatsystem,structureandcomponentconfigurationandperformanceareconsistentwiththedesignbases.NMP1wasbuiltpriortoestablishmentofQACriteriaof10CFR50AppendixBandothermoreformaldesignandconfigurationcontrolsappliedtonewerplants.However,actionshavebeentakensinceinitialoperationtoensurethatsystem,structure,andcomponentsconfigurationandperformanceareconsistentwithdesignbases.SurveillancetestingprogramshavebeeninplacethroughoutNMP1'soperatinglifeandareformalizedbyprocedures.Suchtestsprovideaprimarybasistoensurethatperformanceofsystemsmeetdesignbasesrequirements.Additionally,post-maintenanceandmodificationtestingisroutinelyperformedtoensurethatdesignbasesrequirementscontinuetobemetfollowingmaintenanceandmodificationactivities.PressureretainingcomponentsarealsoroutinelytestedthroughISIandtestingprograms.,InadditiontoconfirmingthatSSCsmeetacceptancerequirements,thesetestingprogramsprovideamecha'nismtoidentifydeficienciesusingtheDERprocessandtotrendequipmentperformance.Severalinitiativeshavebeentakenorareinplacetoconfirmthatthephysicalconfigurationoftheplantisalsoconsistentwithdesignbases.AspartoftheDBRprogram,anumberofsystemwalkdownswereperformedforselectedsafetysignificantsystems.Theseincludedverificationactivitiesrelatingtomajorelectricalandmechanicalcomponentsandsystemsaswellaspiping/pipesupportandpenetrationwalkdowns.NMP1wasinanextendedoutagefrom1987-1990.Aspartofthisextendedregulatoryoutage,NMP1preparedaRAPandRestartReadinessReport,whichincludedanumberofactionstoconfirmdesignadequacypriortorestart.In1990,aPowerAscensionProgramwascompletedforNMP1.Testswereconductedatvariouspowerlevelstoverifytheperformanceofindividualsystemsaswellasinter-relatedsystemperformanceandoverallstationoperationandcontrol.'hetestingalsoprovidedabasisforadditionalevaluationofstationoperatingandsurveillancetestprocedures.OperationsexperienceandSSFIs/ElectricalDistributionSystemFunctionalInspection(EDSFIs)havebeenappliedtofurtherandmorespecificallyevaluateNMP1'sconformanceandperformanceagainstdesignbases.NMPC'sOperationsExperienceProgramroutinelyevaluatesNRCBulletins,Notices,GLs,aswellasotherindustryinputsincludingINPO'sSOERs,SERs,andvendorissuances.EvaluationssuchasEDSFIandOperationsExperienceincludeourassessmentofmotor-operatedvalves(MOVs)capabilityunderGL89-10,ServiceWaterSystemcapabilityunderGL89-13,InstrumentAirSystemcapabilityaspartofGL88-14,GL91-06whichdiscussedtheadequacyofsafety-relateddirectcurrent(DC)powersupplies,GL87-0239

~w~y regardingseismicadequacy,andSBO-USIA-44.Theseassessments,coupledwithongoingevaluationsofplantperformance,assurethatconfigurationtoperformanceparametersareupdatedasappropriate.Theaboveactivities,coupledwithourcorrectiveactionprogram,willensureroutineproblemidentificationandevaluationofas-builtconditionsandtestresultsandprovidereasonableassurancethatcurrentperformanceandconfigurationareconsistentwiththedesignbases.NMPC'sresponsetoRequestedAction(a)providesadescriptionoftheengineeringdesignandconfigurationcontrolprocessescurrentlyinplaceatNMP1,includingthosethatimplement10CFR50.59,10CFR50.71(e),andAppendixBto10CFRPart50.OurresponsetoRequestedAction(d)providesadetaileddescriptionoftheprocessesfortheidentificationofproblemsandimplementationofcorrectiveactionstopreventrecurrence(i.e.,theDER).NMPCisconfidentthatadherencetotheseprocessesprovidereasonableassurancethatNMPNSSSCconfigurationandperformanceareconsistentwiththedesignbases.NMPCbasesthisconfidencenotonlythequalityoftheseprocesses,butonthemultipleefforts,reviews,inspections,testsandauditsthathavetakenplaceandthatarecurrentlybeingtakentoassureSSCconfigurationandperformanceareconsistentwithourdesignbases.Adiscussionofsomeoftheseefforts,reviews,inspections,testsandauditsisprovidedbelow.RoutinesurveillancetestingandexaminationsprovideaprimarymethodbywhichtheperformanceandmaterialconditionofplantSSCsareconfirmedtobeconsistentwithdesignbases.AnNDDestablishestherequirementsfordevelopmentandexecutionofaprogramforsurveillancesandtestsrequiredbytheTechnicalSpecifications,regulatorycommitmentsincludingtheISTProgram,industryexperience,andspecialtestsandexperiments.AsurveillanceandtestprogramhasbeenestablishedtodemonstratethatSSCsperformsatisfactorilyinservice.Theregulatoryrequirementsareidentifiedintheoperatinglicense,TechnicalSpecificationsandUFSAR.Thesurveillanceandtestprogramisupdatedasaresultofdesignchanges,correctiveactionsidentifiedaspartoftheDERprocess,evaluationsofindustryoperatingandmaintenanceexperienceandchangestosourcerequirements.Also,testrequirementsforsurveillanceandtestsmeettherequirementsoftheASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCodeandRGsasappropriate.Specificproceduresaredevelopedforeachsurveillanceandtest,andwillsimulate,asnearaspractical,theactualconditionsunderwhichthesystemmustoperateondemand,Post-maintenanceandmodification'estsverifythecapabilityofSSCstoperformsatisfactorilyinservice.TheextentofthetestingiscommensuratewiththeworkperformedandtheimportanceoftheSSCtostationsafetyandreliability.Thetestrequirementsandacceptancecriteriafordesignchangesarederivedfromdesigndocumentsorsourcesforregulatoryrequirements.SSCdeficienciesandtestdatatrendsareevaluatedandaDERinitiatedasappropriate.NMP140 A'I>>~

AnNDDalsoestablishestherequirementsforthedevelopmentofISIandTestingprograms.ThisdirectiveappliestotheexaminationandtestingofthepressureretainingcomponentsoftheNMPNSreactorcoolantpressureboundaryandtocomponentsrequiredtobetestedinaccordancewiththeASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.UnacceptableexaminationortestresultswillresultintheinitiationofaDERandappropriateactions.SuchtestingandexaminationactivitiesassurethatSSCscontinuetoperformasdescribedinthedesignbasisdocuments.DuringtheNMP1extendedoutagefromDecember1987toJuly1990,'anumberofdesignbasisrelateddeficiencieswereidentifiedwhichsupportedtheneedforadesignbasisproject.TheDBRProject,initiallycalledtheEngineeringProgramIntegrationProject(EPg,wasimplementedtoreviewandprovidethebasisforintegratingthevariousactivitiesinvolvedwithengineeringsupportandprogrammanagementforNMP1intotheappropriatefunctionalgroupsoftheNuclearDivision.TheprogramsincludedintheDBRProjectwerethosewhich:1~Definedandverifiedthecurrentplantconfiguration,thecorrespondingdesignbasisdocuments,'anddevelopedtoolsnecessaryforcontrollingtheplantconfigurationafteritwasdefinedandverified.~Assessedthematerialconditionoftheplantsystemsandstructures,assessedmaintenanceeffectiveness,developedthelong-termstrategyforplantmonitoringonacontinuousbasis,andcoordinatedthiswithplantlifeextensionactivities,~Establishedtheapproachforaddressingplantupgrades,technicalissuesandsystemassessments.Coordinatedengineeringresourcedevelopmentincludingorganization,training,engineeringcomputer/softwaresupportandadvancedmethodologydevelopment.Astheprogramevolved,theprogramfocusedonDBRandconfigurationmanagementactivities.ThespecificobjectivesofDBRandconfigurationmanagementupgradeprogramwereto:ARecoveranddocumentdesignbasisinformationforplantsystem,componentsandstructuresofNMP1.DevelopSDBDandDesignCriteriaDocuments(DCDs)whichincludethedesignbasisinformation.~Determineanddocumentthecurrentas-builtconfigurationoftheplant.~Validatevendordocumentationbasedontheas-builtinformation.41

~Establishsystemstoprovideaccessandcontrolforplantdesignconfigurationinformation.'lWhentheDBRProjectwasendedinJune1994,thefollowingitemshadbeencompleted:~21SDBDs.~23DCDs.~71programreviews.1VaxEquipmentList(E-List)thatincludescomponentsidentifiedfromthedatabaseswhichweremergedintotheE-ListandadditionalcomponentsidentifiedthroughthedevelopmentofSDBDs.TheE-ListwasconvertedafterDBRintotheMEL-1whichisconsistentwiththeformatatNMP2andiscurrentlyused.26walkdowns(system,piping,pipesupports,electricalpanels,cables,etc.).~IntegrationoftheVendorTechnicalManualsProgram..ImprovementstotheConfigurationManagementSystem,IDevelopmentofaprocesstoimproveplantconditionassessmentanddemonstrationofinitialevaluationsofonesystemandtwocomponents.~3areasoftechnicalassessmentimprovement.~8engineeringtoolsdeveloped.'moredetaileddiscussionofsomeoftheaboveitemsisprovidedbelow:TheSDBDsweredevelopedasaresultofrecovering/reconstitutingthesystemdesignbasisofcertainsystemsatNMP1.TheSDBDsareintendedtosummarizethetechnicalandregulatorybasesforthesystemdesignandoperationandtoprovidearoadmaptotheunderlyingdesignbasisdocuments.The21SDBDsrepresentthemajorityofthesafety-relatedsystemsatNMP1.ThosesystemschosenwerebasedoninputfromEngineeringandOperationsandwerejudgedtobehighlyrisksignificant(althoughtheIndividualPlantExamination(IPE)wasnotcompleteatthetime).TheDCDsaretopicaldesignbasissummarydocumentsforuseinengineeringsupportofNMP1.Thesubjectofthesetopicaldesignbasisdocumentsinclude,butarenotlimitedto,pipesupports,seismicclassification,fireprotectioncriteria,hydraulicdesignrequirements,Instrument&Controlsetpointcriteria,andDCloadandpowerdistribution.TheDCDscontainboththeoriginaldesignbasesandoptionalupgrades(i.e.,requirementsfromnewercodes,etc.,thatarenotcurrentlypartofthedesignbases).42 5L+,~

ManyconfigurationmanagementimprovementswereimplementedasaresultoftheDBRprogramincludingtheupgradingoftheolderequipmentlistsintoanintegratedMEL-1anddevelopmentofsoftwareinterfaceswiththeotherconfigurationdatabases(PCR,CDS,andEWC).Specificexamplesincludethefollowing:~ThecontrolleddocumentdatabasewaslinkedwithMEL-1throughtheEquipment/ComponentIdentificationand,AlternateIdentification.~ThePCRdatabasewaslinkedwithMEL-1throughtheEquipment/ComponentIdentificationandinterfaceswithMEL-1fortheComponentIdentification,Subsystem/SystemandSafetyClass.~TheinterfacewiththeEWC(WCMosse)databasewasimproved.Thesesoftwareupgradesprimarilyimprovedthetimelinessandcoordinationofequipmentstatusanddocumentstatus,sothatplantstaffcanmoreeasilyrecognizewhenpendingchangeshavebeencompleted,whentheyhavebeenmadeoperational,andthestatusofassociateddesigndocuments.TechnicalassessmentimprovementsresultingfromDBRactivitiesincludedtheIPEIntegrationwhichcoordinatedthedevelopmentscheduleandcontentfortheSDBDsandDCDs.TheDBRprogramalsoresultedinthedevelopmentoftheengineeringtoolsdescribedbelow:~Acableroutingdatabasewasestablishedthroughtheuseofsoftwarefortrackingandevaluatingcablerouting.Thedatabaseusedwasbasedondrawingreviewsandwalkdowns.Selectedampacitycalculationswerealsoperformed.~Afusingindexwasestablishedusingacomputerprogramfortrackingfuseinformation.NecessaryinformationoncertainfuseswasobtainedandafinaldatabasewasintegratedintheE-List.~FortycalculationsforkeyEOPsandsafety-relatedinstrumentationweredeveloped.ThesecalculationswereusedtodefineNMPC'sapproachtoInstrument&Controlinstrumentloopaccuracycalculations.Personneltrainingmaterialsweredevelopedtoinstructengineersintheuseandcareofdesignbasisinformation.ClassesweregiventoNuclearEngineeringandselectedothergroups,~AprototypeAdvancedSearchandImageRetrievalMethodsforDesignBasisInformationsystem,usedfordocumentretrieval,wasdevelopedforCoreSpraySystemdocuments.Thissystemwasbasedonadetailedreviewofavailabletechnology.NMP143 0I

~ComputerAidedDrawing(CAD)versionsofthePipingandInstrumentDiagrams(P&IDs)weredevelopedincludingcoloroverlays.PrototypeCADversionsofotherdrawingtypesforeachdisciplineweredevelopedtodemonstratelinkingofdrawinginformation.~NMPCprocuredacomputerprogram,trainingandtechnicalsupportforpipingandhangeranalysiscode.AnalysiscodewastailoredtospecificNMPCdocumentformatsandcompatibilityrequirements.~NMPCalsoprocuredathermal-hydraulicanalysistoolfor'MechanicalEngineeringanddevelopedspecificinterfacesforthesoftwaretofacilitateitsuse.Trainingandmanualsforusingthesoftwarewerealsodeveloped.Thesetoolsaiddesignersandengineersinorganizingandtrackingdesigninformationwhichshould,inturn,helpthemtorecognizeandsatisfydesignbasisrequirements.ITheDBRProgramincludedaVendorTechnicalManualReviewandUpgradeProject.Thisintegratedprogramincludedprocessingover10,000vendordocumentswhichresultedinthereviewandapprovalofover7,000vendortechnicalmanualsforbothsafetyandnonsafety-relatedequipment.PartofthiseffortwastodevelopanEquipmenttoVendorTechnicalManualcross-reference.OpenItemsweregeneratedduringtheDBRProgramasaresultofwalkdownsandthedevelopmentofSDBDsandDCDs.DuringtheconductofDBRwalkdowns,openitemsweregeneratedwhentheinstalledequipmentand/orconfigurationofthesystemwasinconsistentwiththecontrolleddesigndocumentation.AnOpenItemwasdefinedas:~Aninconsistencybetweendocuments,databases,anddrawingsreviewed,or~Missingorincompletedesignbasisinformation,or~DBRcommitmentstoberesolvedduringthepreparationoftheDesignBasisSummaryDocument,or~InterfacesbetweenDesignBasisSummaryDocumentsthatcannotbeconfirmedduetothecompletionstatusoftheinterfacingdocuments.Discrepanciesbetweentheas-installedconfigurationandthedesigndocumentationwereclassifiedasobservations.Observations,,whichareasubsetofOpenItems,wereassessedfortechnicalsignificanceandassignedaclassificationof:~RoutineMaintenanceItem~Non-TechnicallySignificantDiscrepancy(NTSD)44.

~PotentialTechnicallySignificantDiscrepancy(PTSD)ObservationsclassifiedasPTSDwerepresentedtotheSeniorEngineeringReviewTeam(SERT)whichconsistedofEngineersfromthevariousdisciplinesassignedresponsibilityforevaluationanddispositionofobservations(i.e.,mechanical,electrical,structural).TheSERTdisciplineengineerwouldprovideguidancetotheEvaluationEngineertoevaluatetheimpactofthediscrepancyonequipment,systemsafetyfunction,etc.Asappropriate,theobservationswouldbebroughttotheattentionofthefullSERTmembershiptoobtainabroaderperspectiveoftheissue.Inaddition,discrepancieswhichwereevaluatedtobeTechnicallySignificantDeficiencies(TSDs)werereviewedbytheentireSERTTeamandrepresentativesfromDBR,licensing,andoperations.TheOpenItemsclassifiedasObservationsweredispositionedinaccordancewithDBRguidelines,TheObservationswereassessedfortechnicalsignificance.ADERwaspreparedforTSDsandtheywerereviewedforoperabilityandreportability.OpenItemswereclosed/resolvedbycorrectingequipment/componentsthroughroutinemaintenance,performingevaluationstoacceptasis,issuingDesignChangeRequests(DCRs)toreworkinstalledcomponents,orreconstitutionofdesignbases,etc.AsaresultoftheDBRprogram,atotalof6009OpenItemswereoriginatedasofJune1,1994,andattheconclusionofDBR,5083OpenItemswereclosed.RemainingOpenItemswereevaluatedanddeterminednottorequireadditionalaction,withtheunderstandingthatasasystemrequiresamodification,enhancement,orforotherreasons,themissinginformation,analysis,etc.,willbeinvestigated,collectedorpursued.ThoseitemsthatinvolveadiscrepancywiththeUFSARarebeingresolvedbythecorrectiveactionprogram.Aspreviouslydiscussed,systemwalkdownswereperformedaspartofourDBReffort.Thesewalkdowns,performedfor19ofthe21systemsforwhichSDBDsweredeveloped,wereconductedtoverifythattheas-builtconfigurationofthesystemswasconsistentwithdesigndrawingsanddocuments,includingtheSafetyAnalysisReport(SAR)description.Thisincludedobtainingnameplateinformationformajorelectricalandmechanicalcomponentsinthesystem.Inaddition,piping,pipesupportsandcontainmentpenetrationconfigurationswerewalkeddown.Inaddition,piping/pipesupportslimitedscopewalkdowns(i.e.,forlargeborepiping,penetrations,etc.)wereperformedforfivesystemsforwhichSDBDswerenotdeveloped.Thesefivesystemsarecondensatetransfer,mainsteam,reactorrecirculation,reactorwatercleanupandspentfuelpoolfilteringandcoolingsystems.ElectricalpanelwalkdownswerealsoperformedseparatefromthesystemwalkdownsaswellasawalkdownofRG1.97instrumentcables.NMP145 00 4tDuringtheconductofDBRwalkdowns,OpenItemsweregenIIcratedwhentheinstalledequipmentand/orconfigurationofthesystemwasinconsistentwith'thecontrolleddesigndocumentation.ThereviewprocessesassuredthatOpenItemswereevaluatedpromptlyandadeterminationwasmaderegardingoperability,significanceandadditionalactionsAdditionalinformationconcerningtheprocessingofOpenItemsisprovidedinourpreviousdescriptionoftheDBRprogram.Insummary,theDBRProjectwasthemajorengineeringsponsoredactivitytowardtheimprovementoftheunitperformancebetween1989andmid-1994.Theprojectresultedinseveralsignificantaccomplishments,includingthedocumentationofdesignbasisinformationofimportantsafetysystems(SDBDs)andtopicaldesigncriteria(DCDs).Insomecases,designbasisdocumentationwasreconstitutedbecauseitwasimportantand/orfoundationalinformationsuchasservicewaterheatloadsandthermal-hydraulicanalysis,oremergencydieselgeneratorelectricloadsandtransientanalysis.DuringtheDBRProgram,improvementsweremadetotheconfigurationmanagementprocessaswellastothemethodsforresearchingandreconstitutingdesignbasisinformation.AnypotentialsafetyconcernswerereviewedbyaSERTandappropriateactionstaken.Therewerenodesignbasisissueswhichconcludedthatanysystemorcomponentwasinoperable.Exceptforafewinstancessuchasselectedpipesupportsbeingoverstressedandsizingoffuses,plantconfigurationwasfoundtobeinaccordancewiththedesignbasisoftheplant.Inthoseinstancesoffusesandpipingsupports,actionshavebeentakentobringthediscrepanciesintodesignbasiscomplianceforsafety-relatedsystems.AsdiscussedinourresponsetoRequestedAction(b),theNMPCRAPcontainedanumberofactionstodeterminetheadequacyofproceduresanddesign.Additionally,theRAPconductedactionsrelativetoequipmentconfigurationandperformanceincludingthefollowing:1.Theplantfirebarrierswerewalkeddowntoreconcilethe'"as-installed"configurationwithdesignbasedocuments.SpecificaccountabilityforensuringthatthedesignbasebekeptcurrentwasalsoassignedviatheissuanceofaNEPdefiningfireprotectionengineeringresponsibilities.2.Thedesignbasesforthestationbatterychargerswere'pecifiedinadesignreportasaresultofconcernsidentifiedwiththeirsafetyclassification.Thesewerelaterreplacedwithstaticsafety-relatedbatterychargers.3.ASSFIoftheCoreSpraySystembytheNRCresultedinseveralfindingsthatwereincorporatedintotheRAP.SeveralcorrectiveactionsforthesefindingsresultedinanupdatingandaugmentationoftheCoreSpraydesignbasesinformation.Asaresultofthissituation,problemreportsdocumentingspecificdeficienciesindesignbasisdocumentationwerereviewedandevaluated.Anydeficienciesthatwereconsideredtobeofsafetyconsequencewereresolvedpriortostartup.46 0kt.

Inaddition,alongertermcommitmentwasmadetodevelopandimplementaDBRandConfigurationManagementUpgradeProgram.Adetaileddescriptionandstatusofthisprogramwasprovidedearlierinthisresponse.4.Thedesignbasisofthe125VDCsystemwasevaluatedfollowingconcernsidentifiedwiththeabilitytodemonstrateoperabilityandfunctionalcapability.Subsequently,threenewbatterieswereinstalled,twosafety-relatedandonenonsafety-related.Inaddition,thissystemwasincludedintheDBRprogram.InSeptember1989,NMPCissuedthe"RestartReadinessReport".ThisreportprovidedstatusandassessmentsforthecorrectiveactionscontainedintheRAP.Aportionoftherestartreportprovidedanassessmentofthereadinessofthephysicalplantforrestart.Oneoftheconditionstobemetforrestartwasthat"theas-builtdesignoftheplantisknowntoagreewiththesafetydesignbasis'asdescribedintheFSAR".Anengineeringevaluationentitled,"DesignBasisJustificationforNineMilePointRestart"wasperformedinMay1990todocumentthatthisconditionwassatisfied.TheevaluationwasstructuredtojustifytheadequacyoftheNMP1safetysystemsinsupportofrestarttoensurethesafetyofsubsequentoperationwiththeunderstandingthatdesignbasisandconfigurationinadequacieswouldberesolvedbythelongertermDBRandConfigurationManagementUpgradeProgramdiscussedearlier.AnevaluationoftheNMP1safetysystemswasinitiatedbasedonreviewingthesignificanttopicsandissuesaffectingboththedesignandoperationoftheNMP1safetysystems.Thistopic-basedevaluationapproachmadeuseofthesafetysystemrelatedconclusions,recommendations,andactionsimplementedbytheNMPCengineeringandstationprogramsandactivitiescompletedpriortounitrestart.Thisapproachwassimilartoasystem-basedevaluation,suchasisdonewithaSSFIsincebothapproachesaddressvirtuallythesametopics.Theprimarydifferenceintheapproacheswasthattopicswereidentifiedonanissuebasisoronasystembasis.Anadvantageoftheprogramreviewapproachwasthattheinformationreviewedcoveredagreaterperiodoftime.Theevaluationdevelopedthespecifictechnicalbasisforapplyingengineeringjudgementtotheassessmentoftheadequacyoftheas-builtdesignandconfigurationofthe13safetysystemsevaluatedforNMP1.Thesesystemswereselectedforevaluationbasedontheiraccidentcontrolandmitigationroles.TheevaluationsupportedconclusionsontheadequacyofNMP1as-builtdesignforunitrestart.Thekeyfactorsconsideredinevaluatingthesafetysystemadequacyprovidedbyeachactivitywere:~Functionaladequacy~Structuraladequacy47 III1IIP

~Configurationagreement~Procedure/DocumentControladequacyTheexecution,findingsandimplementationstatusofeachactivityprovidedthetechnicalbasisforanengineeringjudgmentineachoftheseareas.AnoverallconclusionontheadequacyofNMP1safetysystemswasprovided'byevaluatingthecompletenessoftheindividualprogramevidence.TheevaluationofprogramandissueresolutionactivityasdescribedinthisreportconcludedthatthedesignbasisandconfigurationconcernraisedfortheNMP1safetysystemshadbeenaddressed.Theevaluationconcludedthattherewasahighdegreeof,confidencethatthethirteenkeysafetysystemsevaluatedwouldbeconsistentwithandperformtheirsafetydesignbasisfunctionsasdescribedintheNMP1UFSARandthattheNMP1safetysystemswereadequatelyas-builtforunitrestart.NMPCcompletedaPowerAscensionProgramforNMP1in1990todemonstratetheplantwilloperateconsistentwiththedesignbases.Systemswhichcouldnotbefullytestedduringtheextendedrefuelingoutage(1988-1990)weretestedduringthePowerAscensionProgram.ThePowerAscensionProgramwasdividedintothreephases:0to25%,25to75%,and60to100%power.Thetestswereconductedtoverifytheperformanceofindividualsystems,verifyinter-relatedsystemperformance,andoverallstationoperationandcontrol.Additionally,thetestingprovidedadditionalevaluationofsystem,stationoperatingandsurveillanceprocedures.Theseprocedureswereusedintheirnormalfashionwhereverpossibletosupportpowerascensiontesting.Theprogramconsistedof3administrativeproceduresand13powerascensiontests.The13testsweredeterminedbasedon'reviewofthefollowingdocumentation:1)NMP1initialstartuptestprogram;2)NMP2startuptestprogram;(3)modificationsandoutagemaintenanceactivities;4)industryissuesforwhichtestingcouldsupportpreviousevaluations;5)otherrecentBoilingWaterReactor(BWR)restartpowerascensiontestprograms;and6)transientanalysisassumptions.TheprogramtestcontrolsincludedSORCreviewofeachtestprocedure,testresult,andtestexception.SORCreviewedtheresultsofeachtestphaseandrecommendedapprovaltomovetothenexttestphase.Theprocedurefortestcontrolsprovidedgeneralguidance,instructionsfortestinterpretations,datacollection,reviewofacceptancecriteria,shiftlogs,turnover,andshiftbriefings.ThePowerAscensionSelf-Assessmentprocedureassessedmanagementeffectivenessincludingpersonnelperformance,duringthePowerAscensionProgram.Evaluationsandassessmentswerecompletedbythelinemanagement,NuclearQAOperation,theIndependentAssessmentGroupandSORC.AssessmentswerebasedonNMPNSstandardsofperformance,departmentalperformancecriterion,andINPOPerformanceStandards.SORCdeterminediftheselfassessmentsweresatisfactorypriortoproceedingtothenexttestphaseforcompletionofthePowerAscensionProgram.NMPCdocumentedtheresultsofouroverallassessmentofthePowerAscensionPrograminareporttotheNRCasrequiredbyConfirmatoryActionLetter88-17.ThereportconcludedthattheoperatingandsupportpersonnelhavepreparedthemselvesandarecapableofcontinuedsafeoperationofNMP1.NMP148

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Thereportalsoconcludedthatselfassessmentandotherproblemidentificationandresolutionsareinplacetoprevent,ordetect,andcorrectfutureproblems.DuringtheperiodbetweenSeptember23andOctober25,1991,anNRCinspectionteamconductedanEDSFIatNMP1.Theinspectionwasperformedtodetermineiftheelectricaldistributionsystemwascapableofperformingitsintendedsafetyfunctionsasdesigned,installed,andconfigured.Theteamalsoassessedthelicensee'sengineeringandtechnicalsupportofelectricaldistributionsystemactivities.Forthesepurposes,theteamperformedplantwalkdownsandtechnicalreviewsofstudies,calculations,anddesigndrawingspertainingtotheelectricaldistributionsystem,andconductedinterviews,ofcorporateandplantpersonnel.Baseduponthesampleofdesigndrawings,studiesandcalculationsreviewedandequipmentinspected,theteamconcludedthattheelectricaldistributionsystematNMP1iscapableofperformingitsintendedfunctions.Inaddition,theteamconcludedthattheengineeringandtechnicalsupportstaffprovideadequatesupportforthesafeoperationoftheelectricaldistributionsystemattheplant.Theinspectionalsoidentifiedtwoviolations(onewaslaterwithdrawn),onenon-citedviolation,twelveunresolveditems,variousstrengthsandobservationsasdiscussedintheparagraphsbelow.Theteamfoundthatrootcauseanalyseswerethorough,correctiveactionsweretakeninatimelymanner,andNMPC'splantmodificationanddesignchangeprogramwasadequate.Theteamalsofoundthatthelicenseehadaneffectiveprogramforcontrollingtemporarymodificationsintheplant,andtheprocedurestooperatetheelectricaldistributionsystemweresufficientandwouldassureelectricaldistributionsystemoperabilityundernormal,abnormal,andaccidentconditions.Operatorswerefoundtobeknowledgeableoftheelectricaldistributionsystemandassociatedprocedures.TheNRCfoundthatNMPNShadacommendableself-assessmentprogramthatallowsplantpersonneltoidentifytheproblemareas,evaluatetheproblems,andinitiatecorrectiveactionstoimproveplantperformance.Seniormanagementwasdirectlyinvolvedinthisprogram.Threestrengthsthatwereidentifiedintheengineeringandtechnicalsupportareaconsistedof:1)aninternalsystematicassessmentoflicenseeperformance(SALP)programtoevaluateandimproveperformance;2)aself-initiatedEDSFItoidentifyelectricaldistributionsystemdeficienciesandtakecorrectiveactions;and3)aDERprogramtoidentifyproblemareasandinitiatecorrectiveactionsbeforetheybecomeasafetyconcern.Theteam'sreviewofthedesignattributeswithinthescopeofthisinspectionconcludedthat,withtheexceptionofthespecificfindingsinthereport,theelectricaldistributionsystemcomponentswereadequatelysizedandconfigured,designwasgenerallyadequate,andnooperabilityproblemsexist.Intheareaofmechanicalsupport'systemsfortheelectrical49 e

distributionsystem,theteamconcludedthatthetechnicalstaffwasknowledgeableofthemechanicalsystemsaffectingtheelectricaldistributionsystem.,Sufficientinformationwasavailabletoreviewandassesstheoperabilityofthesemechanicalsystemswiththeexceptionofthelackofgooddocumentationforpumpperformancecurvesandadequateheatingventilatingairconditioning(HVAC)calculationsfortheelectricaldistributionsystem.However,boundingcalculationswereperformedandadminist'rativecontrolsimplementedtoassuretheoperabilityofthesystem.Ingeneral,theNRCconcludedthatadequatecontrolshadbeenimplementedtomaintaintheelectricalsystemconfigurationforallsafety-relatedelectricaldistributionsystemcomponents.OurletterdatedFebruary18,1992,providedourresponsetotheEDSFI,includingthecorrectiveactionstakentoaddresstheidentifieddeficienciestopreventrecurrence.LASSFIwasconductedduringtheperiodofSeptember12,1988,throughOctober7,1988.TheeffortinvolvedanassessmentoftheoperationalreadinessandfunctionalityoftheHPCImodeoftheFeedwater(HPCI/Feedwater)systemandtheCoreSpraySystem.Particularattentionwasdirectedtothedetailsofmodificationsanddesigncontrol,maintenance,operation,andtestingoftheapplicablesystems.Additionally,theprogramsforassuringoperabilityintheseareaswerereviewedtodeterminetheireffectiveness.TheinspectionteamconcludedthatdesigninformationforboththeCoreSprayandHPCI/FeedwaterSystemswasnotadequatelycontrollednorsupportedbysufficientlydetailedanalyses.Aspreviouslydiscussed,manyofthesefindingswereincorporatedintotheRAP.CorrectiveactionsincludedupdatingandaugmentingtheCoreSpraydesignbasisinformation.Anydeficienciesthatwereconsideredtobeofsafetyconsequencewereresolvedpriortostartup.Further,theDBRprogrampreviouslydescribedresultedinimprovementstodesignbasisinformationandreconciliationwithoperating,maintenance,andtestingproceduresforthissystem.Insummary,function'alinspectionsareconductedtodetermineifplantsystemsarecapableofperformingtheirintendedsafetyfunctionsasdesigned,installed,andconfigured,andtherefore,providearationalethatSSCsconfigurationandperformanceareconsistentwiththedesignbases.IndustryoperationsexperienceitemsprovidetheNMPNSopportunitiestoconfirmthatSSCconfigurationandperformanceisconsistentwiththedesignbases.,Asaminimum,NRCBulletins,Notices,GLs,andINPOissuancessuchasSOERsandSERs,aswellasvendorissuancesarereviewedtodetermineapplicabilitytotheNMPNS.NuclearDivisionpersonnelarerequiredbyprocedureandtrainedtoinitiateaDERupondiscoveryofadeviation/eventorNMPl50

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conditionadversetoqualityorwhenitisdeterminedthatanindustryexperienceisapplicabletotheNMPNS.TheDERprocess,asdescribedinourresponsetoRequestedAction(d),requiresadispositionandcorrectiveactions,asnecessary.SomeexamplesofoperationsexperienceitemsthathaverequiredNMPNStoconfirmand/o'rtakeactiontoassurethatSSCconfigurationandperformanceisconsistentwiththedesignbasesareprovidedbelow:GL89-10requestedthatlicenseesdevelopandimplementaprogramtoensurethatMOVswitchsettingsareselected,setandmaintainedsothatMOVswouldoperateunderdesignbasisconditionsforthelifeoftheplant.TheNMP1MOVProgramPlanwasdevelopedinresponsetoGL89-10toidentifythescopeoftheprogramandassureproperdesignbasisreviewandconfirmationthatsafety-relatedMOVscouldperformtheirdesignfunctionunderalldesignconditions.TheprogramexaminesdesignbasisrequirementsofallMOVsundertheprogramanddocumentedtheresultsofthisreviewunderNMPC'scalculationprocedure'toassurefutureaccesstothisinformation.ThisreviewencompassessuchdesignbasisdocumentationasapplicableUFSARsectioris,TechnicalSpecifications,systemdesigncriteria,systemdescriptions,operating,andmaintenanceprocedures.Withthesedesignrequirementsfirmlyestablishedandverified,eachMOVisevaluatedinasizingcalculationtoassuresufficientactuatorcapabilitytoperformdesignateddesignfunctions.AppropriateMOVmaintenanceproceduresaredevelopedtostaticallyanddynamicallytestMOVs.AselectednumberofMOVsaretestedunderdynamicconditionsasclosetodesignbasisdifferentialpressureasachievableinaccordancewithNMP1'sMOVtestinggroupingstudy.Wherein-situplanttestinginformationisdeterminedinsufficienttovalidatedesignassumptionsusedinMOVsizingcalculations,applicableindustrydataisappliedtosupplementNMP1information.Asaresultofthesereviewsandtestingresults,additional'safetymarginwasidentifiedasdesirableforselectedMOVsandresultedinseveralmodificationstotheplantdesign.Modificationsperformedincludeactuatorreplacement,gearingchanges,andspringpackchanges.Insummary,theeffortsofGL89-10haveprovidedaddedassurancethatMOVswilloperateasneededfordesignbasesconditions.GL89-10testingactivitiesarescheduledtobecompletedbytheendofREFOUT97scheduledfortheSpringof1997.Programclosure,includingincorporationoftest.results,isscheduledfor30daysaftertheendoftheoutage.GL89-13statesthatnuclearpowerplantsmustensurethattheServiceWaterSystemisincompliancewiththeminimumrequirementsof10CFR50,,'AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriteria(GDC)44,45,and46,andAppendixB,SectionXI.ActionshavebeentakeninresponsetoGL89-13tohelpensuretheperformanceandconfigurationoftheServiceWaterSystemareconsistentwiththedesignbases.Theseactionsinclude,butarenotlimitedto,thefollowing:I~51 Ir Erosion/CorrosionProgramdevelopedfortheServiceWaterSystemtoidentifyareasmostsusceptibletoerosion/corrosion,provideresolutiontospecificerosion/corrosionproblems,andestablishamonitoringprogramtodetectonsetoferosion/corrosion.Aspartofplantpowerascensionin1990,thermalperformancetestingand/orsupportingcalculationswereperformedforReactorBuildingClosedLoopCooling(RBCLC)andContainmentSprayheatexchangers.Testingandcalculationsdemonstratedacceptableheatexchangerperformanceinaccordancewithdesignbasis.~Rawwatersafety-relatedheatexchangermaintenance(inspectionsandcleanings)frequencieswerereviewedandrevisedasrequired.Frequenciesestablishedtominimizedegradation,maintainingbaselinetestedheatexchangercondition.~RBCLCheatexchangerthermalperformancetestingisperformedsemi-annually.Testingperformedtoevaluateheatexchangerconditionandensuretheymeetminimumthermalperformancerequirement.Aspreviouslydiscussed,anauditoftheNMP1ServiceWaterSystemw'asconductedtoreviewsystemdesignandoperationincludingcommitmentstoGL89-13.ThisauditconcludedthattheNMP1ServiceWaterSystemwassufficientlydesigned,operated,tested,and'maintainedtoassureperformanceofdesignsafetyfunctionsunderpostulateddesignbasisaccidents.ThepurposeofGL88-14wastorequestthateachlicensee/applicantreviewNUREG-1275,Volume2,OperatingExperienceFeedbackReport-AirSystemsProblems,andperformadesignandoperationsverificationoftheIAS.InresponsetoGL88-14,NMPCverifiedandevaluatedtheIASdesignandoperation.Specificequipmentanddesigndocumentenhan'cementswereidentifiedandmodificationsperformedtoenhanceIASreliabilityandperformance.Enhancementsincludednewinstrumentairdryers,developmentofaSDBD,verificationofdesignbasisrequirementsforsystemendusercomponents,systemwalkdowns,upgradingofexistingdocuments.TheseactivitiesprovideassurancethatIASconfigurationandperformanceisconsistentwiththedesignbasis.GIA-30,"AdequacyofSafety-RelatedDCPowerSupplies,"isconcernedwithmultipleandcommoncausefailuresofDCpowersupplies;primarilyastheresultofinadequatemaintenance,surveillance,andfailuredetection.GL91-06requestedlicenseestosubmitplant-specificinformationconcerningtheirsafety-relatedDCpowersuppliestoenabletheNRCtodetermineiflicenseeshadadequatelyresolvedGIA-30.GL91-06alsogave52

'tj licenseestheoptionofprovidingcertainsupportinginformationaspartoftheirIPEsubmittalinsteadofsupplyingitinresponsetotheGL.FollowingthedirectiongiveninGL91-06,NMP1respondedthatitcompliedwithmostofthedesign,maintenance,andtesting'attributesdescribedintheletter.Inparticular,thelevelofredundancy,controlroomindication,weeklytesting,performancetesting,andbatterysystemcapacitywereinaccordancewiththeprovisionssetforthintheletter.ExceptionswerelateraddressedintheNMP1IPEsubmittaldatedJuly1993.Justificationwasprovidedfor1)alternativealarmindications,and2)performingcertaintestingona24-monthcycleversusthe,recommended18-monthfrequency.Inconclusion,NMP1'sresponsetoGL91-06demonstratedthatmaintenance,surveillance,andmonitoringprovisionsareappropriatetoprecludemultipleandcommoncausefailuresofthesafety-relatedDCsystem.NInGL87-02,datedFebruary19,1987,theCommissionsetforththeprocessforresolutionofUSIA-46,SQofEquipmentinOperatingPlants.InGL87-02,theNRCconcludedthattheseismicadequacyofcertainequipmentmustbereviewedagainstseismiccriterianotinusewhentheplantswerelicensed.InSupplement1toGL87-02,datedMay22,1992,theCommissionrequiredthatlicenseessubmitacommitmenttotheGenericImplementationProcedure'(GIP)forSeismicVerificationofNuclearPlantEquipment,Revision2,(GIP-2),preparedbytheSeismicQualificationUtilityGroup(SQUG).ByletterdatedSeptember18,1992,NMP1,respondedtoSupplement1ofGL87-02.OurresponseincludedacommitmenttoimplementGIP-2,includingtheclarifications,interpretations,andexceptionsinSupplementalSafetyEvaluationReport(SSER-2),andtocommunicatetotheCommissionanysignificantorprogrammaticdeviationsfromtheGIPguldallce.IBasedontheScreeningEvaluationWorksheet(SEWS)evaluationsperformed,theNMP1A-46SafeShutdownEquipmentList(SSEL)equipmentmeetstheintentoftheGIP-2withtheexceptionofidentifiedoutliers.OutliersnotmeetingthecriteriaidentifiedintheSEWSwereidentifiedonDERsandoperabilitydeterminationsperformedinaccordancewithNineMilePoint(NMP)Engineeringguidelinesandprocedures.Althoughdeficiencieshavebeennoted,theequipmentwasdeterminedtobeoperableandmodificationsfortheseoutliers(tocomplywithGIP-2)scheduledtobecompletedattheconclusionofRFO15.TheactivitiesofGL87-02haveprovidedaddedassurancethatplantequipmentwillperformtheirintendedfunctions.ForNMP1,ninesystemswithsafety-relatedpumpswereevaluatedforpotentialminimumflowconcerns.Oftheninesystems,eightwerefoundacceptablebasedonevaluationNMP153 If'1 alone.Fortheoneremainingsystem,corespray,atestwasconductedtoverifyoperability.ThetestsimulatedsmallbreakLOCAconditionsincludingpumpinitiationsequenceandmaximumoperatingtimeintheminimumflowmode.ThetestresultsverifiedthatthecorespraypumpsandtoppingpumpswouldbeabletooperateintheminimumflowmodeduringasmallbreakLOCA.Additionally,toaddressthepossibilitythatdegradationofthepumpscouldaffecttheinitialtestresults,andtherefore,requirerepeatedtesting,NMPCinstalledindividualrecirculationlinesforthepumps.TheeffortsinresponsetoBulletin88-04providedadditionalassurancethroughanalysisandspecifictestingthatsusceptiblesafety-relatedpumpswereinfactdesignedwithadequateminimumflowprotectiontomeetdesignbasisrequirements.NRCUSIA-44,"StationBlackout"(SBO),wasconcernedwiththeabilityofanuclearpowerplanttocopewithatotallossofbothoffsiteandonsiteACelectricalpower.TheNRCresolvedtheissuebyincorporatingrequirementsforcopingwithaSBOintheCodeofFederalRegulations(CFR),specifically10CFR50.63.AssessmentandimplementationoftheSBOrequirementsresultedinthefollowing:,I~Analyseswereperformedtodemonstratethatthereactorcore,primarycontainment,controlroom,andothercritical'areasintheplantwouldnotbeadverselyaffectedbyanSBOdurationof4hours.~Anemergencydieselgeneratorreliabilityrequirementofatleast.975orgreaterwasshowntobesatisfied.~AnalyseswereperformedtoinsurethatcriticalDCpowersuppliesandassociatedinstrumentationrequiredforthe4-hourcopingdurationwereavailable.~Systemwalkdownswereperformedasnecessary,tovalidatetheexistenceofadequatelighting,thatequipmentwasphysicallylocatedasdeterminedfromconfigurationdocumentsandthatplantequipmentcouldbephysicallycontrolledinthemannerassumedbytheprocedures.TheseeffortshaveprovidedassuranceofNMP1'sabilitytocopewithaSBO.Self-auditshaveconfirmedthatthisdesignbasischangehasbeenadequatelyimplementedtherebydemonstratingtheproperimplementationofthedesigncontrolsdescribedinresponsetoRequestedAction(a),Additionally,aswithanychangemadetothefacility,activitiessuchaswalkdownsandreanalysisprovidetheopportunitytopotentiallyidentifyexistingdiscrepancies.Forthesereasons,theactivitiesassociatedwithSBOhelpprovideassurancethatsystem,structureandcomponentconfigurationandperformanceareconsistentwiththedesignbases.54

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AhistoricalanalysiswascompletedoftheDERdatasystem.Specifically,asearchwasdonetodeterminethenumberofdesignandconfigurationcontrolissueswhichhavebeenidentified.Since1991,over1400DERshavebeeninitiatedwhichhadacausalfactorcode"DesignandConfigurationAnalysis."Theseincluded519DERsforNMP1,922DERsforNMP2,and21DERswhichwerecommontobothplants.ThenumberofDERsrelatingtodesignandconfigurationcontrolissueshasincreasedinmorerecentyears.Thespecificresultsareasfollows:DERs199119921993199419951996Unit1Unit291512507984205204341155276CommonTOTAL202813129454810441Asameasureofsignificanceoftheover1400issuesidentified,wedeterminedthenumberofLERsidentifiedasaresultoftheseissues.Inthesametimeperiod,8oftheDERsforNMP1werereportedonLERsand10forNMP2.Thedetailsbyyearareasfollows:LERs199119921993199419951996Unit1Unit2TOTAL0'ftheover1400DERsinitiatedsince1991,19wereinitiatedasaresultofNRCidentifiedissues.Thedetailsbyyearandunitareasfollows:DERsUnit1Unit2TOTAL19911992001993199419951996Insummary,theabovedataindicatesthatNMPCisroutinelyidentifyingissuesassociatedwiththeNineMilePointDesignandConfigurationControlprocessesandprograms.Thefactthatthenumberofissueshasincreasedsince1991doesnotmeanthatdesignandconfigurationcontrolismoredeficient,butthatourabilitytoidentifyissuesisimproving.Also,becauseveryfewoftheseissuesresultedinreportableevents,thesafetysignificanceofmostissuesissmall.Theseresults55 P1r(

supportourbeliefthattheoveralldesignbasesforbothunitsaresoundandareunderconstantscrutinyandincreasedquestioningtoensurethatdiscrepancies,regardlessofsigni6cance,arepromptlyidentified~andresolved.NMP156 cp4 Describetheprocessesforidentificationofproblemsandimplementationofcorrectiveactions,includingactionstodeterminetheextentofproblems,actionstopreventrecurrence,andreportingtotheNRC.NMPCutilizestheDERastheadministrativetoolfordocumenting,evaluating(includingreportabilitytotheNRC),determiningcause,anddeterminingcorrectiveandpreventiveactionsforproblemsthatareidentifiedattheNMPNS.Problemidentificationresultsfromawiderangeofsources,whichincludein-houseevents,testingandinspectionactivities,observations,auditandsurveillanceactivities,self-assessments,andoutsideagencies'nspectionsandevaluationactivities.TheDERisalsousedasthetrackingtoolforOperationsExperienceissues.ThetextthatfollowsdescribesindetailtheNMPNS'sprocessforproblemidentificationandultimateresolution,thecornerstoneofwhichistheDER,andassociatedadministrativeproceduresthatensureeffectiveimplementationoftheprocess.AnNDDestablishestherequirementsfortheidentification,documentation,notification,evaluation,correction,andreportingofdeviations/eventsorconditionsadversetoqualitythatmayimpactthesafeandreliableoperationoftheNMPNSorpersonnelsafety,withtheexceptionofcertainSafeguardsinformation.ThisNDDdirectseachNuclearDivisionemployee,aspartofhis/hernormalduties,tobealertforandtopromptlyidentifyeventsandnonconformingitems,includinghardwarefailures.Acontinuousassessmentofoperatingandindustryexperienceforimpactonsafeoperationisperformedandaformalprogramforreviewingindustryexperienceestablished.Asaminimum,NRCBulletins,Notices,GLs,andINFOissuancessuchasSOERsandSERs,aswellasvendorissuancesarereviewedtodetermineapplicabilitytotheNMPNS.NuclearDivisionpersonnelaredirectedtoinitiateaDERupondiscoveryofadeviation/eventorconditionadversetoqualityorwhenitisdeterminedthatanindustryissuanceisapplicabletotheNMPNS.Thedeterminationofreportabilityandoperabilityisthenperformedasnecessary,theDERdispositioned,andappropriatecorrectiveandpreventiveactionstaken.ANIPprescribesthemethodforprocessingDERsfortheidentification,documentation,notification,evaluation,correction,andreportingofconditions,events,activities,andconcernsthathavethepotentialforaffectingthesafeandreliableoperationoftheNMPNS.Thisinterfacingprocedureappliestoconditionshavinganadverseorpotentiallyadverseeffectonactivitiesimportanttonuclearsafety,industrialsafety,plantreliability,orhumanperformance,includingbutnotlimitedtothefollowing:57 01~I0'4f'$<

~hardwarefailuresotherthannormalwearandtear;~hardwareorcomponentmalfunctionsresultingfromdesignormanufacturingdeviationsordefects;~out-of-calibrationmeasuringandtestequipmentknowntohaveadverselyorpotentiallyadverselyaffectedotherplantequipment;I~non-complianceshavingnuclearsafetysignificance;~adversepersonnelperformancesuchasfailuretofollowproceduresorviolationsofpersonnelsafetyrulesorpractices;~radiationprotectiondeviations;~preventivemaintenanceactivitiesnotcompletedbeforelatedateordeferraldate;~recurringcorrectivemaintenance/hardwarefailures;~humanperformanceproblems/issues;~inadequatecorrectiveactionsortestfailures;~deviationsfromdesigndocumentrequirements(otherthannormalwearandtear)includingstationconfigurationdiscrepancies;~conditionsadversetofireprotectionsuchasfailures,malfunctions,deficiencies,deviations,defectivecomponents,uncontrolledcombustiblematerial,andnonconformances.1Alsoapplicablearedeficiencies,concerns,orissuesresultingfromregulatoryagencies,industryandinternaloperatingexperience,inspections,observationsorpublications,reportableeventstotheNRCandotherregulatoryagencies,issuesresultingfromself-assessment,andissuesthatdonotmeettheabovecriteriabut,intheopinionofmanagement,warrantevaluation.ADERrequiresaconcisesummaryoftheeventordeviation,thecomponentnumber,ifapplicable,theidentifyingorganizationandadescriptionofanyimmediateactionstakentoplacetheplantinastableconditionortominimizepersonnelandequipmentsafetyhazards.TheDERinitiatorthenmusthand-delivertheDERtohisorherSupervisor.Ifthedeviation/eventcouldhaveanimpactonplantequipment,ispotentiallyreportable,orissecurityrelated,theDERishanddeliveredtotheSSS/AssistantStationShiftSupervisor(ASSS)forreportabilityandoperabilitydeterminations.NMP158 0I,$S AnoperationsadministrativeprocedureestablishesamethodfordeterminingtheoperabilityofSSCs.ThisoperationsadministrativeprocedurewasspecificallydevelopedtoprovideguidancetoOperationspersonnelasnecessarywhenmakingoperabilityassessmentsofSSCsthathavebeenidentifiedonDERsorWorkOrdersasbeinginadegradedornonconformingcondition.IncludedinthisprocedureisanEquipmentOperabilityDeterminationChecklistwhichdocumentsthedecisionaffirmingthecapabilityofasystem/componenttoperformitsspecifiedfunctionasrequiredbytheTechnicalSpecificationsortheFSAR.GuidanceprovidedintheprocedureindicatesthataSSCiseitheroperableorinoperableatalltimes.Operabilitydeterminationsarerequiredtobeperformedpromptly(inmostcaseswithin24hours),withatimelinessthatiscommensuratewiththepotentialsafetysignificanceoftheissue.ForSSCsinTechnicalSpecifications,theSSS/ASSSusesthetimelimitcontainedinthespecificLimitingConditionforOperation(LCO)actionstatementasguidancetodeterminesafetysignificance.Engineeringmayberequestedtosupportanoperabilitydetermination.AnEngineeringSupportingAnalysismustbecompletedwithin5daysofnotificationorasdirectedbytheplantmanagerbasedonthesignificanceofthedeviation.InordertodeclareanSSCoperablewhiletheengineeringreviewisbeingperformed,operationspersonnelmusthavereasonableassurance,basedonthebestinformationavailable,thattheSSCiscapableofperformingitsdesignfunctionifcalledupon.Intheabsenceofreasonableassurance,orifmountingevidencesuggeststhefinalanalysiswillconcludetheSSCcannotperformitsspecifiedfunction,theSSCisdeclaredinoperableandtheappropriateactionsimplemented.WhenEngineeringispreparinganEngineeringSupportAnalysis,theindividualmustconsiderthefollowing:calculations,testresultsandotherdocumentationwhichdefinetheSSCdesignbasis;thepotentialadverseaffectsonsafetyandTechnicalSpecificationimpact;thelengthoftimetheconditionhasbeenandwillremainineffect;foreachequipmentfunctionadverselyimpacted,theimpactonrelatedsystemfunctions;foreachsystemfunctionadverselyimpacted,theimpactonanyequipmentorsystemssupportedbytheimpactedsystemfunctions.TheEngineeringSupportAnalysismustbeofsufficientdepthtoprovidealogicalanddefensiblebasisforoperabilityconclusionsandtodeterminewhethera10CFR50.59safetyevaluationisrequiredtosupportanyoperabilitydecisions.Guidancetodetermineifadeviation/eventisreportabletotheNRCisprovidedbyaNIP.TheNIPprovidesasummaryoftherequiredNRCnotificationsandreportsandtheresponsibleorganizations.Followingreportability/operabilitydeterminationactivities,theDERisdeliveredtothePlantManager'sofficebytheendoftheoperatingshift.Theplantmanager,basedonthesignificanceofthedeviation,assignsacategorytotheDERfordispositioning.ThedispositiontotheDERrequiresthataRootCauseEvaluationbeperformedanddocumentedintheDERifthethresholdguidelinesforperformingaformalrootcausearemet.AformalrootcauseisperformedforallCategory1(highestsignificancecategory)DERsandintheeventofanyofthefollowing:NMPI59 jII,~~l'~V%

~asevereorunusualplanttransient;~safetysystemmalfunctionorimproperoperation;~majorequipmentdamage;~othereventsinvolvingnuclearsafetyorplantreliability;~fuelhandlingorstorageevent;~excessiveradiationexposureorseverepersonnelinjury;~excessivedischargeofradioactivity;~oradeficiencyindesign,analysis,operations,maintenance,testing,proceduresortrainingthatcouldcauseasignificanteventasdescribedabove.TheDERprocedurerequiresthatpersonnelperformingroot'causeanalysisbequalifiedinthetechniquesofrootcauseanalysis.Apparentcausedeterminationsareusedwhenaformalrootcauseevaluationisnotrequired.ApparentorrootcausesarevalidatedforpotentiallysignificantDERsbyensuringadeviation/eventwouldnothaveoccurredhadthecausenotbeenpresent,thatthedeviation/eventwillnotrecurduetothesamecausalfactor(s)ifthecauseiscorrectedoreliminated,andthatcorrectionoreliminationofthecausewillpreventrecurrenc'eofsimilarconditions.Theconditionisassigned,aDeviationEventTrendCodefortrackingpurposes.AdispositiontotheDERisthengeneratedwhichincludescorrectiveactionsandforpotentiallysignificantDERs,preventiveactionstopreventrecurrence.Referencestocurrentandapproveddesigndocuments,procedures,instructionsforrepairs,retest/inspectionrequirements,acceptancecriteria,supportingsketchesanddocumentationareincludedasappropriate,IftheDERisforanindustryissuance,thepotentialimpactonequipmentdocumentssuchasvendormanualsandvendordesigndocumentsisidentified.TheproceduregoverningtheDERprocessrequiresthatifaDERisanonconformanceandnotcorrected,thenonconformancewillbeassessedforimpactontheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR).IfanonconformanceresultsinadeviationfromtheUFSAR,theplantmanagerisnotifiedandthenonconformancemustbereconciledwithinsixmonthsofthedeviation(orearlierasdeterminedbytheplantmanager).Thedispositionwillimplementthefollowingasappropriate:1)restorethenonconformancetocompliancewiththeUFSAR,or2)changetheUFSARpertheNIPgoverningapplicabilityreviewsandsafetyevaluations,or3)ifitisnotpossibletocorrectthenonconformancewithinsixmonths(suchasifaplantoutageisrequired),provideanEngineeringSupportAnalysisthatsupportsoperationwiththenonconformancefortheperiodoftimerequired.Anonconformanceisdefinedasadeficiencyincharacteristic,documentation,orprocedurethatrendersthequalityofanitemunacceptableorindeterminate.DERdispositionsmustbeapprovedbytheappropriateBranchManager,andifrequired,bytheSORCandtheplantmanager.DERsarenotcloseduntilrequired60 1~

~~~~~Pdispositionactions,havebeencompletedandidentifieddeficiencieshavebeencorrected.FinalclosurerequiresaBranchManagersignature;XxcQRlgTrendinformationisgeneratedbytheQAdepartmentusingtheTrendCodesportionoftheDERdatabase.ReportsaresubmittedtotheBranchManagersonaquarterlybasis.BranchManagersareexpectedtoinvestigateandevaluatetrendsidentified,toassesstheirstrengthsandweaknesses,andtodetermine,whattypesofcorrectiveactionshavebeeneffectiveandwheretheyneedtoimproveperformanceintheirbranch.ANIPprovidestheadministrativecontrolsforcommunicationof"lessonslearned"informationthroughouttheNuclearDivision.ALessonsLearnedTransmittalisusedwhenitisnecessarytocommunicateappropriateactionsthatshouldbeencouragedorinappropriateactionsthatmustbepreventedfromrecurring.LessonsLearnedTransmittalscontainadescriptionoftheevent,causeofevent,andlessonslearnedandtypicallyresultfromdispositioningDERs.AnNDDgoverningsafetyreviewsestablishestherequirementsforthedevelopmentandexecutionofaprogramfortheplanned,systematicreviewoftheoperationofNMPNSandtoassignresponsibilityforimplementingthoserequirements.SafetyReviewOrganizationsincludetheSORCandtheSRAB.TheresponsibilitiesforeachofthesegroupsisdelineatedintheplantTechnicalSpecifications.TheSORCfunctionstoadvisetheplantmanageronallmattersrelatedtonuclearsafety.TheSORCisresponsiblefortheinvestigationofviolationsoftheTechnicalSpecifications,includingthepreparationandforwardingofreportscoveringevaluationandrecommendationstopreventrecurrence,totheVice-PresidentandGeneralManager-Nuclear,andtotheSRAB.TheSORCisalsoresponsibleforthereviewofallreportableevents,reviewofunitoperationstodetectpotentialhazardstonuclearsafety,performanceofspecialreviews,investigations,oranalysesandreportsasrequestedbythePlantManagerortheSRAB.ANIPprovidestheadministrativecontrolsandconductoftheSRABtoensurethattheExecutiveVicePresident-GenerationBusinessGroupandChiefNuclearOfficerisadvisedonmattersofnuclearsafety.Currently,theSRABiscomposedofaChairmanand12membersincludingfournon-NMPCmembers.TheSRABprovidesan'independentreviewandauditofdesignatedactivitiesintheareasofplantoperations,nuclearengineering,chemistryandNMP161 nat'(>>~'

radiochemistry,metallurgy,instrumentationandcontrol,radiologicalsafety,mechanicalandelectricalengineeringandQA.TheSRABreviewssignificantoperatingabnormalitiesordeviationsfromnormalandexpectedperformanceofplantequipmentthataffectnuclearsafety,allreportableevents,recognizedindicationsofanunanticipateddeficiencyinsomeaspectofdesignoroperationofstructures,systemsorcomponentsthatcouldaffectnuclearsafety,andreportsandmeetingminutesoftheSORC.AuditsofunitactivitiesthatoccurunderthecognizanceoftheSRABencompass,butarenotlimitedto,theconformanceofunitoperationstoprovisionscontainedwithintheTechnicalSpecificationsandapplicablelicenseconditions,theresultsofactionstakentocorrectdeficienciesoccurringinunitequipment,structures,systemsormethodsofoperationthataffectnuclearsafetyandtheperformanceofactivitiesrequiredbytheOperationalQAProgramtomeetthecriteriaof10CFR50AppendixB.TheQADepartmentreviewsNMPNS'sadherencetoengineeringdesignandconfigurationcontrolproceduresandprograms.Thethreegroupswhichspecificallydothisareaudits,inspection,andQualityVerificationandSafetyAssessment(QVSA).TheAuditGroupperformsauditswhichmeettherequirementsofTechnicalSpecifications,UFSAR/USARAppendixBandAppendixBto10CFRPart50.Auditsarescheduledandplannedbasedonamatrixpreparedtoreflectthelicensebasisandinternalrequirements.InsomecasesauditsareperformedfortheSRAB.Auditplanningconsidersresultsfrompreviousaudits,surveillancesandinspectionsandtakesintoaccountDERs,trends,internalandexternalperformanceinformation,NRCandINPOperformancecriteriaandreports,andapplicabledirectivesandprocedures.Auditsareperformedinaccordancewiththeapprovedplans.TheDERprocessisusedtodocumentanydeviationsandnonconformancesidentifiedduringauditorsurveillanceactivities.QAreviewsthedispositionofauditinitiatedDERsandfollowsupontheirclosureinsubsequentsurveillancesandaudits.Auditresultsarecommunicatedtoappropriatemanagementthroughexitmeetingsandauditreports.TheInspectionGroupperformsexaminations,inprocess,andfinalinspectionsinaccordancewithcodes,standards,regulationsorasspecifiedbyNuclearEngineeringacceptancecriteria.ThisgroupindependentlyconfirmsthatcriticalcharacteristicsidentifiedbyEngineeringmeetacceptancecriteria.Otherinspectionsandexaminationsmaybeperformedonselectedoperationswhereitisdeemednecessarytoverifyconformancetospecifiedrequirements.TheDERprocessisusedtodocumentnonconformances.TheQASurveillanceProgramisperformedbytheQVSAGroup.,Surveillancetopicsarescheduledbasedoninputfromotherorganizations,previoussurveillanceresults,currentactivities,projectsandprogramchanges,DERsandregulatorycommitments,upcomingaudittopicsandauditresults.Surveillancesreviewperformanceinseveralways.Theseincludeprocessmonitoringwhichevaluatesaselectionof'ongoingworkactivitiestodetermineeffectivenessandconformancetorequirements,productreviewwhichreviewsselectedoperations,maintenance,engineeringandsupportgroupworkoutputstoevaluatequalityandtechnicalcontent,andcomponentconfigurationreviewwhichevaluatesthecontinuingdesigncontrolofselectedplanthardwarebyreviewingcurrentconfigurationagainstthedesignbasisNMP162 vr andsubsequentdesignchangesandreplacements.TheDERprocessisusedtodocumentanydeviationsandnonconformances.Also,theeffectivenessoftheOperationsExperienceprogram(screeningandimplementation)isperiodicallyreviewedduringQVSAsurveillancesandQAaudits.Severalorganizations,includingINPO,ANI,andANII,providethirdpartyreviewsfortheNMPNS.NMPCpersonnelareresponsibleforinterfacingwiththeseorganizationsanddocumentingtheir.findingsonDERsasdiscussedabove.INPOevaluationscurrentlyreviewtheNMPNSusingINPOCriteria90-015,"PerformanceObjectivesandCriteriaforOperationandNear-termOperatingLicensePlants."ANIIevaluationsreviewtheplants'esignconformanceandmaintenanceofASMESectionXI.AnANIIInspectorisassignedfulltimetoNMPNS.Thisinspectorverifiesthat,asneeded,therequiredASMEexaminations,systemhydrostatictesting,andrepairsareperformedanddocumentedcorrectly.FindingsaredocumentedandresolvedusingtheDERprocess.ANIevaluationsaredonetodetermineinsurancepremiums.TheNMPNSadherencetocodesanddesigncriteriaarespecificallyreviewed.Theevaluationsarebrokenintotwoparts,FireProtectionandPressureSystem(BoilerandMachinery).FindingsfromtheANIevaluationsaredocumentedandresolvedusingtheDERprocess.TheANIreviewstheresolutionofallofitsfindingsandevaluatesthemtodetermineiftheywereacceptableforclosure.ANIPestablishestheself-assessmentprogramto,achievehigherstandardsofqualityandperformance.Eachnucleardivisionbranchmanagerensuresthatatleasttwobranchself-assessmentsareperformedanhually.Atleastoneself-assessmentnormallyinvolvesanassessmentofthecorrectiveactionprogramtodetermineifadverseconditionsandcommoncausesreceiveappropriatemanagementattention,andthatcausesfrompreviousself-assessmentfindingswereaddressedandactionstakenwereeffective.Areastobeconsideredwhendevelopingself-assessmentschedulesincludeactivitiesthatexhibitnegativetrendsbasedoninformationfromtheDERdatabase.TheassessorensuresaDERisgeneratedforself-assessmentfindingsthatmeettheDERinitiationcriteria.Further,branchmanagersmeetwiththeSeniorManagementTeamtoreviewtheresultsoftheirfindings.Theresults,methods,andplannedcorrectiveactionsarediscussedwiththeSeniorManagementTeamtoassuretheadequacyoftheassessmentsandresultantcorrectiveactions.SurveillancetestingandplantexaminationsasrequiredbytheTechnicalSpecificationsandtheASMECodeareanadditionalmeansofverifyingequipmentiscapableofperformingitsintendedfunctionandidentifyingproblems.SurveillancetestingandexaminationsarediscussedinourresponsetoRequestedAction(c).NMP163 If1jltlI Seniormanagementhasstatedthattheysupporttheworkers'ighttoraisesafetyissuesandthatthoseworkerswhoraisesafetyconcernswillnotbesubjectedtoharassment,intimidation,ordiscrimination.Seniormanagementrecognizesthatthepreferredvehicleformostemployeesforidentificationandresolutionofconcernsisthroughthenormallineorganization.Seniormanagementprovidessupporttolinesupervisioninaddressingconcernsraisedthroughthenormallineorganization.Notwithstandingresolutionofproblemsinthenormallineorganization,seniormanagementalsoprovidesforandsupportsaconfidentialemployeeconcernsprogramtoaddressconcernsraisedbyworkers.ANIPgoverningtheQ1Pprovidestheadministrativecontrolsfortheconfidentialreportingofconcernsandsubsequentevaluationandcorrectiveaction.ThisprocedureappliestoNMPCemployeesandcontractorshavingsafety,quality,andnonsafety-relatedconcerns.InadditiontothereportingactivitiescontrolledthroughtheDERprocess,NMPCmaintainsapositiveandprofessionalworkingrelationshipwithNRCpersonnelthroughforthrightcommunicationofidentifiedproblemsandtheactionstakentothoroughlyevaluateandcorrectsuchdeficiencies.NDDsandNIPsestablishaprimaryinterfacewiththeNRCthroughtheLicensingBranchwithcertainadditions.Training,EmergencyPreparednessandSecurityhavedirectNRCinterfaces.Further,thePlantManagersaredesignatedtohavetheprimaryinterfacewiththeNRCResidentInspector(s).Eachorganizationorpositionhasdefinedresponsibilitiestomanagetheirrespectiveinterfacesforvariousformsofcommunication.First,formalinterfacesincludeon-siteinspectionsorinvestigations,technicalormanagementmeetings,andtelephoneconferencesinresponsetorequestsforinformation'onanyissue.Secondly,informalcommunicationsareinitiatedtoprovidepertinentinformationtotheResidentInspectorortheNuclearReactorRegulation(NRR)ProjectManagerconcerningsituationsthatwouldnototherwiserequirereporting.Inaddition,aspartoftheiroverallmanagementresponsibilities,thePlantManagersroutinelymeetwiththeResidentInspectionStafftokeepthemapprisedonthestatusofplantoperationsanddevelopmentsonspecificissues,includingtheresolutionofidentifieddeficiencies.Otherseniormanagersdothesameperiodicallyforissuesintheirrespectivefunctionalareas.TheLicensingstaffroutinelyassistsandadvisesthePlantManagerswithrespecttotheirsiteNRCinterface,andmaintainsanormalinterfacewiththeNRRProjectManageronlicensingmattersrequiringStaffinvolvement.Typically,'hisincludeslicenseamendmentapplications,GLandBulletinresponsereviews,andresolutionofavarietyoftechnicalissues.Inaddition,LicensingregularlyadviseseachNMPCdepartment,onlicensebasesissuestoassurethatproblemidentificationandcorrective/preventiveactionspecificationareconsistentwiththatbases,theregulationsandNMPCcommitments.

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Theproceduresalsoassurewrittencommunications,includingincomingandoutgoingcorrespondence,meetingminutes,andreports,areappropriatelydistributed,reviewed,andaddressed.Inaddition,proceduresprovideforoutgoingcorrespondencetoreceiveathoroughmanagementreviewpriortosubmittaltoensureitsaccuracy.NMPCmaintainsaprocessfortrackingdocketedcommitmentscontainedinsuchcorrespondence(bothincomingandoutgoing)toassuretheyarecompletedinatimelymanner(i.e.,NCTS).WhiletheNCTSsystemfocusesondocketedcommitments,theDERsystemtracksthecompletionofotherassociatedactions.StationpersonnelhavereceivedtrainingontheDERprocedur'eandasprocedurerevisionsaremade,follow-uptrainingisconductedwithintheindividualdepartments.Stationpersonnelalsoreceiveappropriatereportabilitytrainingrelatedtotheirspecificjobfunction(e.g.,Operationreceives10CFR50.72,50.73training).VariousstationpersonnelhaveattendedformalHumanPerformanceEvaluationSystem(HPES)rootcausetrainingandsimilartraining(e.g.,barrieranalysis,etc.)andare'capableofperformingarootcausedetermination.TheDERprocedurecurrentlyrequiresthattheappropriateBranchManagerensureaRootCauseEvaluationisperformed,whenrequired,andthattheindividualassignedisknowledgeableinthetechniquesofRootCauseAnalysis.SORCandSRABmembersreceivesafetyevaluatortrainingandattendQualifiedApplicabilityReviewerSafetyEvaluator(QARSE)requalificationtraining.QARSEtrainingisextensivewiththeinitialtrainingsessionlastingthreedaysandcontinuedtraininglastingfourhourseverytwoyears.Approximately,400NMPNSemployeesaretrained(asQARSE)includingmembersofeachoperatingshift.NMP165, Nl4lw Describetheoveralleffectivenessofyourcurrentprocessesandprogramsinconcludingthattheconfigurationofyourplantisconsistentwiththedesignbases.BasedupontheinformationpresentedinourresponsestoRequestedActions(a),(b),(c),and(d),NMPChasevidencethatreasonableassuranceexiststhatdesignbasesrequirementsarebeingtranslatedintotheappropriateprocedures;thatSSCsconfigurationandperformanceareconsistentwiththeirdesignbases;andthataneffectiveadministrativetoolfordocumenting,evaluating,determiningcauseandappropriatecorrectiveandpreventiveactionsexistsatNMPNS(i.e.,theDERsystem).AsdiscussedinourresponsetoRequestedAction(c),NMP1wasbuiltpriortoestablishmentofQACriteriaof10CFR50AppendixBandothermoreformalcontrols.However,appropriateandextensiveactionshavebeentakensinceinitialoperationthatassurethatSSCsconfigurationandperformanceareconsistentwithdesignbases.SurveillancetestingprogramshavebeeninplacethroughoutNMP1'soperatinglifeandareformalizedbyprocedures.Suchtestsprovideaprimarybasistoassurethatperformanceofsystemsmeetdesignbasesrequirements.Additionally,post-maintenanceandmodificationtestingisroutinelyperformedtoassurethatdesignbasesrequirementscontinuetobemetfollowingmaintenanceandmodificationactivities.PressureretainingcomponentsarealsoroutinelytestedthroughISIandtestingprogramsasapplicable.InadditiontoconfirmingthatSSCsmeetacceptancerequirements,thesetestingprogramsprovideamechanismtoidentifydeficiencies(usingtheDERprocess)andtotrendequipmentperformance.Severalinitiativeshavebeentakenorareinplacetoconfirmthatthephysicalconfigurationoftheplantisconsistentwithdesignbases.AspartoftheDBRprogram,anumberofsystemwalkdownswereperformedforselectedsafetysignificantsystems.Theseincludedverificationactivitiesrelatingtomajorelectricalandmechanicalcomponentsandsy'stemsaswellaspiping/pipesupportandpenetrationwalkdowns.NMP1wasinanextendedoutagefrom1987through1990.Aspartofthisextendedregulatoryoutage,NMP1preparedaRAPandRestartReadinessReportwhichincludedanumberofactionstoconfirmdesignadequacypriortorestart.In1990,aPowerAscensionProgramwascompletedforNMP1.Testswereconductedatvariouspowerlevelstoverifytheperformanceofindividualsystemsaswellasinter-relatedsystemperformanceandoverallstationoperationandcontrol.Thetestingalsoprovidedabasisforadditionalevaluationofstationoperatingandsurveillancetestprocedures.SSFIshavebeenconductedtodetermineifselectedplantsystemsarecapableofperformingtheirintendedfunction.IndustryoperationsexperienceisalsoroutinelyappliedtofurtherandmorespecificallyevaluateNMP1'sconformanceandperformanceagainstdesignbases.NMP166 4I Theseactivities,coupledwithourcorrectiveactionprogram,assureroutineproblemidentificationandevaluationofas-builtconditionsandtestresults.Thisprovidesadditionalassurancethatcurrentperformanceandconfigurationareconsistentwiththedesignbases.AsdiscussedinourresponsetoRequestedAction(b),administrativeproceduresestablishrequirementsforthepreparation,review,andapprovaloftechnicalprocedures.Technicalproceduresimplementrequirementsfortheoperation,maintenanceandtestingdescribedintheOperatingLicense,TechnicalSpecificationsandUFSAR.Duringthedevelopment,reviewandapprovalofoperating,maintenance,andtestingprocedures,areviewofdesigndocumentswasconducted.Thisreviewencompasseddesigndrawings,DesignSpecifications,TechnicalSpecifications,andtheFSAR.Followingthedevelopmentofoperating,maintenanceandtestprocedures,technicalaccuracyoftheprocedureswasmaintainedthroughprogramcontrolsforprocedurerevisionandperiodicreview.Theseprogramshavebeencontinuallystrengthenedovertime,NMPChasutilizedknowledgeableandappropriatelyqualifiedindividualstodevelop,review,approve,andreviseprocedures.Programrequirementshavebeeninplaceforyearsandhavebeenenhanced,overtime,toimprovetheeffectivenessofthedevelopment,reviewandapprovalprocess.Thetrainingprogramandotheradministrativerequirementsassurethatpersonnelassignedtoperformthesefunctionsarecompetenttoperformthosetasks.ThisassuresthatNMPCcaneffectivelyimplementprogramrequirementsassociatedwiththedevelopment,review,approvalandrevisionofadministrativeandtechnicalprocedures.AlsodiscussedinourresponsetoRequestedAction(b)weresomeoftheassessmentsandinitiativesusedtoprovideassurancethatdesignbasisrequirementsaretranslatedintoprocedures.ThisincludestheSVP,UFSARVerificationProgram,RAP,QAaudits,andOperationsExperienceitems.AsdiscussedintheresponsetoRequestedAction(a),extensiveprogramsandcontrolsareutilizedatNMPNStoassurethatdesignbasisinformationisaccuratelymaintainedandupdatedasconditionswarrant.Proceduresareupdatedtoreflectchangesindesign,correctiveactions(identifiedbythecorrectiveactionprogram),industry.operatingexperience,andchangestosourcerequirements.Inaddition,NMPChasconducted"Back-to-Basics"trainingforNMPNSpersonnel."Back-to-BasicsI"providedtrainingonlicensingbasisdocumentsandoperationwithinthelicensingbasis.Alsodiscussedwastheexpectationthatifworkcannotbeperformedwithinthecontrolofaprocedure,theworkshouldbestoppedandaresolutionobtainedbeforeworkcontinues."Back-to-BasicsII"wasconductedtoassistorganizationsinunderstandinghowBack-to-Basicsrelatestotheirspecificjobs.Thistrainingincludedadescriptionofourlicensingbasisanddiscussionsof10CFR50.59and50.92,commitmentsmadeto;operationalexperienceitems,RGs,industrystandards,andtheprocessforchangingcommitments.Also,adefinitionofoperabilitywithanemphasisonpostaccidentfunction,reportability,andhowvariousactivitiesinteractwiththedesignbasiswasincluded.Theeffectivenessofthistrainingandtheresultingincreasedawarenessbyplantpersonneltodesignbasisissuescanbeseeninthelower67 Il5fs>

thresholdatwhichconfigurationanddesigncontrolissuesarebeingreportedviatheDERsystem.AdiscussionofdesignbasisdeficiencytrendsisincludedinourresponsetoRequestedAction(c).Also,themajorityofplantengineering,maintenancesupport,andothersinmanagementandtechnicalpositionsaretrainedon10CFR50.59andqualifiedasApplicabilityReviewers/SafetyEvaluatorsandhavetocompletearequalificationeverytwoyears.Theeffectivenessofourcurrentprocessesandprogramswhichassurethattheplantconfigurationisconsistentwiththedesignbasisareassessedonanongoingbasis.Theseassessments,whichincludetestingactivities,functionalinspections,complianceverificationprojects,auditsandsurveillances,andlinemanagementself-assessments,provideanoverallindicationthatNMP1isoperatedwithinitsdesignbasesandthatourprocessesandprogramsareeffective.NMP1sUFSARVerificationeffort,whichisscheduledforcompletionbytheendof1998,willprovideanongoingassessmentofdesignbasisrelatedinadequacies.Also,NMPChasreinforcedtheimportanceofmaintainingconsistencywithourdesignbasisthrough"Back-to-Basics"trainingaswellas10CFR50.59training.Onthebasisofourprogramsandprocessesandassessmentactivity,NMPChasreasonableassurancethattheconfigurationofNMP1isconsistentwithitsdesignbasis.NMP168

ENCLOSUREIDESIGNCONFIGURATIONDOCUMENTSLIST1.0DESIGNINPUTDOCUMENTS"DesignInputStatements-Generatedand/orapprovedbyNuclearEngineering2.0DESIGNOUTPUTDOCUMENTSDATABASES~~2.1Drawings-Generatedand/orapprovedbyNuclearEngineering2.2"Specifications-Generatedand/orapprovedbyNuclearEngineering..Thescopeand.contentofthesespecificationsvarybytopicasfollows:2.2.1Installation2.2.2Design2.2.3Fabrication2.2.4Procurement2.2.5.Inspection.andTesting2.2.6ConfigurationControltI-~~2.3ChangePaper-Engineeringgeneratedand/orapprovedchangestoEngsn'eeringdocumentsord'atabas'es.2.4Databasesneededtomaintainplantconfiguration,suchas:'MasterEquipmentList(MEL)-Datafieldsmaintainedand/orapprovedbyNuclearEngineering~CableConfigurationandTrackingSystems~ValidatedMasterPartsLists2.5SystemDesignBasisDocuments(SDBDs)-Generatedand/orapprovedbyNuclearEng>neering2.6SetpointDataSheets-ApprovedbyNuclearEngineering2.7ProgramsandPlans-ApprovedbyNuclearEngineeringandthatspecifylantconfigurationdetails,suchasErosion/Corrosion,AppendixJesting,etc.3.0DESGOCDOCUMNTSDATABASESCalculations-ApprovedoracceptedbyNuclearEngineeringControlledDocumentSystem(CDS)4.0OTHERDESIGN-REATDDOCUMENTSVendorDocuments-Engineeringaccepted69

ENCLOSURE2DESIGNINPUTCONSIDERATIONSEachdisciplineorprogramareashallconsiderthefollowingasaminimuminthedevelopmentofdesigninput.DisciplineDesignInputcriteriamaybeusedinconjunctionwiththeconsiderationsandaretheresponsibilityofthediscipline/programtomaintainanduse.Designbases,includingavailableSystemDesignBasisDocuments(SDBDs).andDesignCriteriaDocuments(DCDs)RegulatoryrequirementsCodesandStandards,includingissue,rev.Basicsystem,structureorcomponent(SSC)FunctionsPerformancerequirementsDesignConditionsLoadsOperatingExperiencereviewsandassessments,suchasDERtrending,NRCSOERs,INPONPRDSandothersAnticipatedEnvironmentalconditions(internalandexternaltotheplant)during:~NormalPlantOperation~AnticipatedTran'sients~'ccidents~SpecialEvolutionsFunctionalandphysicalinterfacesofSSCsMaterialRequirements,compatibility,coatings,etc.MechanicalrequirementsStructuralrequirements,includingseismic/dynamicqualificationHydraulicrequirementsChemistryrequirementsIElectricalrequirements,includingprocesscomputerrequirementsLayoutandarrangementrequirementsInstrumentationandControlrequirementsAccessandAdministrationcontrolrequirementsRedundancy,diversity,separationrequirementsFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)Testrequirements;pre-operationalandperiodicAccessibility,maintenance,repair,inservicerequirementsPersonnelqualificationrequirementsforoperation,maintenance,testing.TransportationrequirementsFireprotectionrequirements,Handling,storage,cleaningrequirementsOtherrequirementstopreventunduerisktopublicMaterials,processes,parts,equipmentsuitabilityPersonnelsafetyrequirements,electrical,radiation,heat,confinedspace;etc.Oualityandqualityassurancerequirements70

ENCLOSURE3'-':-DESIGN'CHANGE'OPERABILITYACCEPTANCEDesignChangeControlNumber1.0-Initiation1.1Title0PartiallyAccepted1.2ThefollowingfinalSefetyEveluetions/ApplicebilityReviewforthisdesignchengeereSORC/TechnicelReviewepproved.SE/ARNumbers:Revision:1.3ThefollowingWOshavebeencompleted1.WO3.WO6.WO7.WO11.WO2.WO4.WO6.WO6.WO10.WO12.WO2.0-SystemEngineer2.10ThetestslistedontheDesignChangeTestRecordhavebeencompleted,reviewed,andapproved.0NotApplicable2.2Thefollowingprocedureswererevisedbythisdesignchange.NumberTitle0NotApplicable.30Requiredtrainingiscompletedorinprogress.2.4CompletedBy3.0-ModificationCoordinator3.1ThefollowingTechnicalSpecificationwasrevisedbythisdesignchange.Date0NotApplicable0NotApplicableSectionTitle3.20RiskBasisdesignchangedocumentshavereceivedfinalEngineeringapproval.3.30ControlRoomCriticalDrawingshavebeenupdatedtoreflectinstalledcondition.3.4Comments0NotApplicable0NotApplicable3.5CompletedByDate4.0-AcceptanceforOperationManager/GeneralSupervisorOperationsordesigneeDate71

ENCLOSURE41.0-In'ation1.1Title1.2MajorOrderNo.1.3Remarks'"-"DESIGN'CHANGECLOSEOUTAccountCodeDesignChangeControlNumber1.4OperabilityAcceptanceDate1.5ModificationCoordinatorRequiredCompletionDateDate2.0CloseoutActivit)esISignwhenactivityiscompleteandreturntoModificationCoordinator)No.2.12.22.32.42.52.62.82.92.102.112.122.132.142.152.162.172.182.192.202.212.22DepartmentModificationCoordinatorPlantAccountingStoresTechnicalSupportISI-InstallerISI/ISTNuc.EngineeringIST-TechSupport/OpsOperationsTrainingTrainingQAProjectEngineerALARAMechanicalMaintenanceElectricalMaintenanceInstrument&ControlFireProtectionModificationCoordinatorSystemEngineeringTechnicalSupportMechanicalDesignRadwasteOperatorsCloseoutActivitySiteDocumentLogClosedProperty-In-ServiceRept.Completed&M.O.ClosedMajorOrderOverstockDispositionedNPRDSCoordinatorInformedISIReqSatisfied/INIS-2)ISI/ISTProgramRevisedISTReqSatisfied/ProceduresRevisedAllOperationsProc/STsRevised/MarkupDatabaseRevised/PMSTReviewedforincorporationintoTrainingProgramSimulatorEvaluatedQAFilesClosedFinalDesign/SafetyEvaluationReviewedALARAReviewS-AIP-2,JobReviewsCompleteAllProceduresRevised/PMsRequired/PMSTRevisedAllProceduresRevised/PMsRequired/PMSTRevisedAllProceduresRevised/PMsRequired/PMSTRevisedAllProceduresRevised/PMsRequired/PMSTRevisedOtherRequiredProcedureChangesCompletedPost<perabilityAcceptanceTestingCompletedChangesevaluatedagainstmaintenancerulerequirementsP&ID'supdatedforsignificantchanges(Unit1only)AllRadwasteOperationsproceduresrevisedandmarkupdatabaserevised/PMSTActionN/A(I)CompletedByDate3.0CloseotCom'letion3.1CloseoutActivitiesComplete:ModificationCoordinatorDate.2DatabaseUpdatedandRecordssenttoPermanentFileDate72

ENCLOSURE5YNAGARA0MOHAWKNUCLEARENGINEERINGDVARIANCRISKDDCCIAfieldvariance,MHILEMORKISINPROGRESS,toapproveddesigndocumentsorchangedocumentsmaybeissuedona"riskbasis"ifthefollowingcriteriaissatisfied.TherequestedfieldvarianceshallNOT:A.Extendthescopeofadesignorconfigurationchange.IB.Altertheintent(purposeasdescribedintheapplicabilityrevieworsafetyevaluation)ofadesignchangeorplantprocedure.C.AffecttheDesignInput/ImpactAssessment.D.Altertheacceptancecriteriabeyondtherangedefinedinthecontrollingdesignorplantdocumentation.E.Alterthefunctionofequipmentfromthatdefinedinthecontrollingdesignorplantdocumentation.F.Beirreversible.73

ineieointnit

Provideadescriptionofengineeringdesignandconfigurationcontrolprocesses,includingthosethatimplement10CFR50.59,10CFR50.71(e),andAppendixBto10CFRPart50.ThetextthatfollowsinresponsetoRequestedAction(a)ofthe50.54(fjletterprovidesadescriptionofhowthedesignandconfigurationcontrolprocessismanaged,controlled,andimplementedatNineMilePointNuclearStation(NhPNS).Inaddition,detailsareprovidedtoshowthatproceduresexistforensuringthatengineeringdesignandconfigurationchangesaffectingtheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR)areevaluatedinaccordancewiththecriteriaof10CFR50.59andincorporatedintotheUFSARinaccordancewiththerequirementsof10CFR50.71(e).Alsodetailedarethequalityprogramelementsthatassurethatanyworkinvolvingsafety-relatedstructures,systems,orcomponentsmeetsthedesignandconfigurationcontrolrequirementsofAppendixBoftheNMPNSUFSARinaccordancewithourcommitmenttoAppendixBto10CFR50.NMPNSpersonnelperformworkinaccordancewithproceduresthathavebeendevelopedand,inrecentyears,significantlyimproved,tomeettheregulatoryrequirementsestablishedtooperateandmaintaintheplantinaccordancewithourlicense.Theseproceduresareperiodicallyreviewedandundergorevision,asappropriate.ThemanagementandthestafFofNMPNShavesignificantlyimprovedtheirawarenessofthelicensinganddesignbasisdocumentsinrecentyears.Back-to-Basicstrainingprogramshavebeenestablishedwhichhaveemphasizedtheimportanceoflicense-basedthinking.Ourcorrectiveactionprogramfocusesattentiononthecorrectionandpreventionofmistakesresultingfromafailuretofullyunderstandoradheretotherequirementsofourprocedures.TheapproachforassuringthatproceduresexisttocontrolengineeringworksuchthattheplantdesignandconfigurationcontrolconformswiththeNineMilePointUnit2(NMP2)licensingbasisfollows.TheNiagaraMohawkPowerCorporation(NMPC)NuclearDivisionPolicyandDirectivesManualsetsforththeoverallprogramforcontrollingtheoperation,maintenance,andmodificationoftheNMPNStoassurecompliancewithapplicableregulatoryrequirements,licenseconditions,andNMPCcommitments.ThetotalprogramconsistsoftheNuclearDivisionPolicy,theNuclearDivisionDirectives(NDDs),andlowertierdocuments(administrativeandimplementingprocedures)developedtoimplementtheapplicablerequirements.ThehierarchyofPolicy,Directives,andadministrativeandimplementingproceduresisshownonFigure1inourresponsetoRequestedAction(b).

TheNDDsarethevehiclebywhichmanagementcommunicatesrequirementsforperformingandcontrollingactivitiestothoseresponsibleforpreparingNuclearDivision,departmental,andbranchprocedures.TheNDDsidentifyapplicableregulatoryrequirementsandassociatedQualityAssurance(QA)programcommitmentsthatmustbeincorporatedintoimplementingprocedures.EachactivityaddressedinanNDDidentifiesthespecificrequirementsandorganizationalresponsibilitiesconcerningthatactivity.NuclearInterfaceProcedures(NIPs)arepreparedtoimplementNDDs.NIPsgovernactivitiesinvolvinginterfacesbetweenorganizationaldepartmentsandforthoseactivitiesperformedbymorethanoneNuclearDivisiondepartmentwhereacommonmethodologyisdesired.Departmentandbranchleveladministrativeproceduresarepreparedtodefinetheorganization,assignresponsibilitieswithintheorganization,andprescribemethodsforaccomplishingthoseactivitiesorportionsofactivitiesaddressedinNDDsorNIPs.Engineeringdesignandconfigurationcontrolactivities'reprimarilyimplementedinconformancewithNuclearEngineeringProcedures(NEPs)andapplicableGenerationAdministrativeProcedures(GAPs).Technicalimplementingproceduresarestep-by-stepprocedurespreparedtoprescribemethodsforaccomplishingthoseactivitiesorportionsofactivitiesasoutlinedintherespectiveNDD,NIP,ordepartmentadministrativeproceduretobeconductedwithintheindividualbranch.Thehierarchydescribedaboveismaintainedfortheengineeringdesignandconfigurationcontrolprogram.TheNDDonDesignControlestablishestherequirementsfortheNMPNSdesigncontrolprogramandassignstheresponsibilityforimplementingthoserequirements.TheDesignControlDirectiveappliestodesignactivitiesassociatedwithsafety-relatedorquality-relatedstructures,systems,andcomponents(SSCs).ThedesigncontrolrequirementsincludedinthisdirectivearespecifiedintheNMPCQualityAssuranceTopicalReport(NMPC-QATR-1),theTechnicalSpecificationsadministrativecontrolsectionandtheNDDsgoverningnuclearcomputersystems.Activitiessubjecttodesigncontrolarecategorizedasoneormoreofthefollowing:engineeringevaluationoranalysis,designchange,configurationchange,temporarymodification,orplantconditionmonitoringprogram.AseparateNDDestablishestherequirementsandresponsibilitiesforconfigurationmanagement,includingrequirementstoidentifyandupdateselectedcontrolleddocumentsanddatabasestoassurethattheNMPNSisoperated,modified,andmaintainedinconformancewiththeapproveddesignandcurrentlicensingbasis.ThisfunctionisaccomplishedbycontrollingchangestoessentialplantSSCsandassociatedprocedures,programs,anddatabasessothattheyaremaintainedconsistentwithapproveddesignoutputdocuments,Informationordataaboutplantconfigurationthatisnecessaryforefficientandcorrectdesign,operation,andmaintenanceofessentialplantsystemsissubjectedtoconfigurationcontrols.Thefollowingdiscussiondescribescurrentmethodsforcontrollingengineeringdesignandplantconfiguration,includingdesignchanges,configurationchanges,designdocumentchanges(DDCs),procedurechanges,temporarymodifications,programchanges,plant

'r maintenance,andtheevaluationofvarioussourcesofinformationforpossibleimpacttothedesignbasis.Typicalofnuclearplantsthroughouttheindustry,theNMPNSiscommittedtoasystemofdesignandconfigurationcontrolsbasedontherequirementsofAppendixBto10CFRPart50,aswellasotherregulationsandindustrystandards.Thissystemincludesnotonlycontrols,butalsofeedbackloops(testing,evaluation)thatresultinanongoingcomparisonofactualconfigurationwiththedesignbasis.SuccessfulimplementationofthedesignandconfigurationcontrolsystemassuresthattheNMPNSisoperated,tested,andmaintain'edwithinitsdesignbasisthroughoutitslife.Thediscussionthatfollowsisorganizedintofourbroadareasofactivities.Thefirstareaincludesthoseactivitiesaffectingthephysicalplant.Thesecondareaincludesthoseactivitiesaffectingconfigurationdocuments/data.Thethirdareaincludesactivitiesassociatedwithspecific10CFR50requirements.Thefourthareaincludescommonprogramsapplicabletotheotheractivities.Eachoftheseareasisfurtherorganizedintodetailedactivitiesasfollows.1.ActivitiesAffectingChangestothePhysicalPlant:1A.DesignChange1B.ConfigurationChange1C.TemporaryModification1D.SetpointChange1E.MaintenanceandSurveillance2.ActivitiesAffectingChangestoConfigurationDocuments/Data:2A.ProcedureChanges2B.DesignDocumentChanges(DDCs)2C.ProgramChanges2D.ChangestoTraining2E.Evaluations/Analyses2F.DatabaseChanges2G.VendorManualChanges III~

2H.SupplierDocumentAcceptance2I.ChangestoLicensingDocuments/NewRegulatoryCommitments2J.ExternalSourcesofChange3.ActivitiesAssociatedwithSpecific10CFR50Requirements:3A.10CFR50.59SafetyEvaluationProcess3B.10CFR50.71(e)3C.QAProgram/10CFR50AppendixB4.CommonPrograms:4A.ProblemIdentificationProcesses4B.TrainingWhenphysicalplantchangesarerequested,theyareevaluatedinaccordancewithaNIPtodeterminewhetherdesigncontrolsshouldbeappliedtothechange.IncreasinglevelsofcontrolareappliedtoplantchangescommensuratewiththesafetysignificanceofthechangeasperAppendixBto10CFR50.Changestothephysicalplantareaccomplishedusingoneofthefollowingprocesses:designchange,configurationchange,ortemporarymodification.Eachoftheseprocessesisdescribedbelow.Setpointchanges,maintenance,andsurveillanceactivitiesarealsodiscussedbecausetheyrepresentprocessesthatassure,orconfirmcontinuing,reliablesystemoperationand,assuch,mustbecontrolledtoremainconsistentwithdesignbasisparameters.1A.DesignChangeThedesignchangeprocessisacontrolledprocessthatisappliedwhendesignconfigurationdocumentsand/ordatabases(aslistedinEnclosure1tothisAttachment)areaffected,andtheproposedchangeaffectsthefunctionofsafety-relatedorquality-relatedSSCsortheirreliability,expectedlife,localenvironment,orfailuremodes.Additionally,thedesignchangeprocessisappliedtochangesinvolvinginterfaceswithsafety-relatedorquality-relatedSSCs.TheprocessmayalsobeusedforothersituationsatthediscretionofEngineeringorplantmanagementwhenstringentcontrolsaredesirable.Whenaplantchangehasbeenevaluatedandapprovedforimplementation,itisenteredintothePlantChangeRequest(PCR)database.Ifitistobetreatedasadesignchange,itisgivenNMP2 J'

adesignchangenumber.Intheinitialstagesofadesignchange,theresponsibleengineerordesignerusesadesignimpactchecklisttodeterminethepotentialimpactofthechange,possibleissuestobeconsidered,andthekindsofdesigninputrequired.Basedonthechecklistreview,inputisrequestedfromdisciplineexperts,programadministrators,andaffectedgroups.Thedesigninputprocedurerequiresthatthoseprovidinginputconsideracomprehensivelistoftopics.Theseprimarilyemphasizethedesignbasisrequirements,functionalityandperformancerequirements,andotherrequirementsrelatedtomaintainingtheintegrityofthedesign(Enclosure2tothisAttachment).Specifically,thedesigninputprocedurerequiresthatdesigninputsuchasdesignbases,performancerequirements,regulatoryrequirements,andcodesandstandards,areidentified,documented,andtheselectionreviewedandapprovedbythedesignorganization.Also,referencesmustbesufficientlyspecifictoallowtraceability.Thisprovidestheinitiallinkbetweentheproposedchange,thedesignbases,andthelicensingbasis.Thedesignchangeissubsequentlydevelopedonthebasisoftheseinputs.Aslaterdescribed,theseinputsareverifiedinaccordancewithproceduresandthedesignissubjectedtofurthercomparisonwiththelicensingbasisatotherstagesofthedesignprocess.Concurrently,theconfigurationmanagementprocessesarealsoinitiated.TheMasterEquipmentList(MEL)andtheControlledDocumentSystem(CDS)aresearchedforpotentiallyaffecteddocuments,forotherpendingworkorwork-in-progressthatcouldaffectthedesign,andforconfirmationofequipment/documentcurrentstatus.TheMELmayalsobeusedasaconfirmatorysourceofinformationformanyoftheitemsinthedesignimpactchecklistbecauseitlistsvariousequipmentrequirementsandcharacteristics,includingsafetyclass.Avarietyofotherinformationmayalsobeavailable,includingwhetherEquipmentQualification(EQ),SeismicQualification(SQ),InserviceInspection(ISI)andNuclearPlantReliabilityDataSystem(NPRDS)considerationsapplytothecomponents.Thenextphaseofthedesignchangeprocessisthedevelopmentalphase.Intermediateproducts,suchasevaluationsandanalyses,stressreports,andcalculations,areprepared.Theseactivitiesareperformedusingcontrolledproceduresandresultincontrolledproductsthatcannotbechangedwithoutre-invokingtheoriginallevelofreviewandapproval.Newdesignoutputdocumentsorchangestodesignoutputs,suchasrevisionstodrawings,vendortechnicalmanuals,acceptancecriteria,setpointdatasheets,designbasisdocuments/designcriteria,andspecifications,aredeveloped.ChangesmayeitherbeintheformofDDCsthatarepostedagainsttheaffecteddocumentorbyfullrevisionofthedocument.Pendingchangestoconfigurationdatabasesarealsoidentifiedandprocessed.Changestolicensingdocuments,includingtheUFSARandTechnicalSpecifications,aredevelopedinaccordancewithcontrolledprocedures.SystemEngineersintheTechnicalSupportDepartmentarerequestedbytheresponsibleengineertonotifyprocedureownersofrequiredchangestoprocedures,andtocoordinaterequiredtraining.Finally,anyguidancenecessarytosupportinstallationandtestingisdevelopedincoordinationwiththeinstallingorganization.Uponcompletionofthesesteps,thedesignpackageissufficientlycompletefromatechnicalpointofviewtoallowfinalreviewpriortoissuance.Designoutputsareapproved,butnotreleasedforimplementationuntilthereviewsrequiredinthefinaldesignphasearecomplete.

p Duringthefinaldesignphase,theresponsibleengineer/designerreviewsthepackagetoassurethatthedesignobjectiveismet,thatnoopentechnicalissuesexist,andthatappropriatedesignimpactshavebeensatisfactorilyaddressed.Anyindividualwhoprovideddesigninputmayrequestfinaldesignreviewtoconfirmthatthedesigninputwascorrectlyimplementedinthefinaldesignchangepackage.Thenextstepisindependentdesignverificationbyaqualifiedindividualpertheengineeringdesignverificationprocedure.Thisactivityprovidesanindependentreviewtoassurethatappropriatedesigncriteria,qualitycriteria,anddesignbaseshavebeencorrectlyidentified,andtoassurethatthedesignoutputmeetsthespecifieddesigninputsandtheoveralldesignobjective.Ifnotdonepreviously,anapplicabilityreviewandsafetyevaluationarecompletedasdescribedlaterunderthe10CFR50.59safetyevaluationprocess.Afterverification(andresolutionofanyconcerns),thedesignchangeisreadyforfinalreviewandapproval.Thesereviewsinclude:~Reviewandapprovalbyaqualifiedengineeringapprover;ReviewbyaQualifiedTechnicalReviewerperTechnicalSpecification6.5.2.3;~Cross-disciplinaryreviews,ifrequiredbytheQualifiedTechnicalReviewerperTechnicalSpecification6.5.2.4;and~ReviewandapprovalbythePlantManagerorManagerTechnicalSupportperTechnicalSpecification6.5.2.3.Completionofthedesign,review,andapprovalactivitiesisdocumentedonaDesignChangeControlform.Thisformservesasaflagtoeitherpreventorallowissuanceofdesignoutputdocumentstothefieldforinstallation,asdescribedbelow.Designoutputdocumentsareissuedandreleasedperthedocumentcontrolinterfaceprocedure.TheyareenteredintotheCDSasdocumentsthatareapprovedbutnotyetOperationsAccepted(i.e.,theydonotyetrepresentinstalledconfiguration).TheyarethendistributedtoastandarddistributionthatincludestheModificationCoordinatorintheTechnicalSupportdepartment.TheModificationCoordinatorservesasthecoordinationpointforplantdesignchangesanditisthroughtheModificationCoordinatorthatdesignoutputdocumentsaretransmittedtothefieldforinstallation.WhentheModificationCoordinatorreceivesdesignoutputdocuments(e.g.,reviseddrawings,DDCs,etc.),thedocument(s)isretaineduntilacopyoftheassociatedDesignChangeControlformisreceived.Thispreventsprematureorinadvertentissuanceofdesignoutputdocumentsthathavenotbeenfullyreviewedandapprovedforinstallation;i.e.,approvedatboththedocumentlevelandatthedesignchangelevel.NMP2

WorkOrdersarewrittenbytheresponsibleengineer,ModificationCoordinator,ormaintenanceplannerusingtheelectronicworkcontrol(EWC)system.TheseWorkOrdersandtheirassociateddesignoutputdocumentsarecross-referencedinthePCRdatabaseundertheassociateddesignchangenumber,sothatwhentheWorkOrdersassociatedwiththedesignchangearecompleted,theModificationCoordinatorcannotifyinvolvedpartiesthatOperationsAcceptance(turnovertoOperations)ispossible.UponcompletionoftheWorkOrdersassociatedwithadesignchange,theModificationCoordinatorconfirmsthattheapplicabilityreviewnumberandsafetyevaluationnumber(ifapplicable)arelistedinthedesignpackage(asachecktoverifycompletionoftheapplicabilityreviewandsafetyevaluationifapplicable),andnotifiestheSystemEngineertoverifycompletionofanyprocedurechanges,testing,andtrainingrequiredtoplacethesysteminservice.PlantSupportEngineeringisnotifiedto"redline"criticaldrawingssothatplantoperatorswillhavecurrentandaccuratedrawingsintheControlRoomwhenthenewdesignchangeisOperationsAccepted.TheModificationCoordinatoralsoverifiesthatallrequiredrisk-releaseddocumentshavebeenresolvedpriortoOperationsAcceptance(seebelowforanexplanationoftherisk-releaseprocess).NonconformancesidentifiedduringtheprocessaredocumentedonDeviation/EventReports(DER),evaluated,andresolved.Whentheseactionsarecomplete,theyaredocumentedonaDesignChangeOperabilityAcceptanceform.ThesignatureoftheManager/GeneralSupervisorOperations(ordesignee)conveysOperationsacceptanceofthedesignchange(Enclosure3tothisAttachment).OperationsacceptanceisrequiredpriortorelyingontheSSCtoperformitsfunction.ADesignChangeCloseoutForm(Enclosure4tothisAttachment)isinitiatedtoensurethatactivitiesassociatedwiththedesignchangeareverifiedanddocumentedascomplete.TheModificationCoordinatorthenenterstheOperationsAcceptancedateintothePCRdatabasetoindicatethatthedesignchangehasbeenacceptedandisnowcurrentplantconfiguration.ThisinformationissharedwiththeCDSdatabasetostatustheassociateddesigndocumentsasOperationsAccepted.TheMELdatabaseisautomaticallyupdatedtomovethependingMELchangesfromthe"pending"filetothe"active"filewithastatusof"C"whichdesignatesthatitreflectscurrentconfiguration.Atcloseout,theresponsibleengineerforwardstheDesignChangeControlform,andanyotherrequiredrecordsthatwerenotpreviouslyreleasedthroughtheCDS,tothepermanentplantfile.ThedocumentsusedtotrackthedesignchangethroughinstallationtoOperationsAcceptance;e.g.,logs,OperationsAcceptanceform,DesignChangeCloseoutform,andPCRsareforwardedtothepermanentplantfilebytheModificationCoordinator.Theseactionsensurethatpermanentrecordsofthedesignchange,frominitiationtocloseout,areavailableforthebalanceofplantlifeforfurtherrevieworaudit,ifneeded.Therearetwovariantsofthedesignchangeprocess;1)risk-releaseofdesignchanges;and2)partialoperationsacceptanceofdesignchanges.Risk-releaseisdefinedinourengineeringproceduresasaprocessbywhichanorganizationformallyrecognizesandapprovesthefinancialriskofbeginninganimplementationorinstallationpriortofullapprovalofthefinaldesign.Risk-releasedoesnotinvolvearisktopersonnelsafetyornuclearsafety.Usually,

designoutputdocumentsareissuedonlyafterappropriateaspectsofthedesigndevelopment,review,andapprovalarecomplete.Undercertaincircumstances,itisnecessarytoreleasecertaindesignoutputsona"riskbasis"toallowpre-staging,pre-fabrication,pre-installation,partialinstallation,andtoallowforfieldvariancestoworkinprogress.However,becausethesecircumstancesinvolvefinancialrisk,therisk-releaseprocessisusedsparingly.Activitiessuchaspre-staging,pre-fabrication,andpre-installation/partialinstallationmaybeinitiatedandprocessedusingtherisk-releaseprocess.First,theresponsibleengineermustprepareadocumentedjustificationofwhythedesignorpartialdesignmustbereleasedpriortobeingfullyapproved.Theactivitymustbereversiblewithinatimeframeconsistentwiththeactivitytosupportoperatingrequirements.IftheresponsibleEngineeringsupervisorapprovestherisk-release,itissubmittedtothePlantManagerforapproval.Inaccordancewiththesafetyevaluationprocedure,whichprohibitsanychangetotheplant(temporaryorpermanent)withoutanappropriatereview,anyrisk-releasedworkmusthavebeenproperlyevaluatedforplantsafetyimpactandcomparedwiththedesignandlicensingbasespriortoimplementation.AfterPlantManagerapproval,theresponsibleengineermakeslimiteddistributionoftherequireddesigndocuments,whicharestatusedas"risk"intheconfigurationdatabases.Untilthis"risk"statusisresolved,thedesignchangecannotbeOperationsAccepted,(i.e.,turnedovertoOperations)orreliedupontoprovideitsfunction.Whentheriskisresolved,thedesignchangeprocesscontinuesnormallythroughOperationsAcceptanceandcloseout.Risk-releaseoffieldvariancesmaybeauthorizedbyaresponsibleengineertoallowminorchangestoworkinprogress(e,g.,correctinginterferences).Inthesecases,theinstallerrequestsEngineeringtoreviewthesituationandtherequestedfieldvarianceforinitialfeasibility.Ifthefieldvariancesatisfiestheproceduralcriteria(listedinEnclosure5tothisAttachment),theengineermayinitiatearisk-releaseDDCtoallowtheworktocontinuewithoutinterruption.TheriskDDCisgivenlimiteddistributionbytheresponsibleengineer.Onecopygoestotheinstallertocontinuework;onecopytotheModificationCoordinatortoentertheriskDDCintothedesignchangedocumentlogforsubsequenttrackingandresolutionpriortoOperationsAcceptance;onecopytoDocumentControlforentryintoCDSwitha"Risk"status;andtheoriginaltoEngineeringforcompletionofallreviewsandapprovalsinaccordancewiththerequirementsofthenormaldesignchangeprocess.IftheEngineeringreviewandapprovalprocessuncoversproblemswiththeriskDDC,theworkisstoppedandreversed,orotherwisecorrected.WhentheriskDDCisfullyapprovedperEngineeringprocedures,itisissuedthroughDocumentControltoitsstandarddistribution.Thedocumentstatusischangedfrom"risk"to"approved".OncetheModificationCoordinatorreceivesanddistributesthefullyapprovedDDC,theworkiscompletedorconfirmedcompleteinaccordancewiththefullyapprovedDDC.ThedesignchangecanthenbeOperationsAcceptedandclosedoutfollowingthenormaldesignchangeprocess.TheothervarianttothenormaldesignchangeprocessistheoptionofpartialOperationsAcceptance.Thisoptionmaybeusedwhenthedesignchangeaffectsmultiplecomponentsortrainsthatmaybesafelyputbackintoservicebeforeeverycomponentor"train"hasbeenmodified.Anexampleofhowp'artialOperationsAcceptancecouldbeusedistheprocessofimplementingachangethataffectsmanyidenticalcomponentsacrossavarietyofapplicationsNMP2 p"Ip orsystems.Inthiscase,thedesigndocumentsandassociatedsafetyevaluationwouldbewrittentocovermanyspecificapplicationsofasingletypeofcomponent(e.g.,pipesnubbers).TheModificationCoordinatorwouldthenbeabletotrackandobtainOperationsAcceptanceofthedesignchangeatthecomponentlevelratherthanhavingtowaituntilallaffectedcomponentsinthedesignchangewereOperationsAccepted.Asinthenormaldesignchangeprocess,thedatabasesareupdatedatthetimeofpartialOperationsAcceptancetoshowthatthedesignchangehasbeencompletedforcomponentXforexample(butnotYandZ),andthecomponentisreadytogobackintoservice.TherequirementsforpartialOperationsAcceptancearesimilartofullOperationsAcceptance,thatis,thesafetyreviewprocessmustbecomplete;associatedWorkOrders,includingthosefortesting,mustbecomplete;applicableproceduresmustberevised;requiredtrainingcompletedorinprogress;risk-releaseddocumentsmustbefullyapprovedandtheriskresolved;andtheControlRoomcriticaldrawingsaccuratelyupdatedtoshowtheportionofthechangethatisbeingpartiallyOperationsAccepted.Fuelreplacement,becauseofitsuniquerequirements,iscontrolledbyasetofproceduresthatincludesNEPsandFuelsGroupEngineeringDesignStandards(OT-EDS)thatmeet10CFR50AppendixBrequirements.Keydesigninputsaresolicited,reviewed,andapprovedaspartofthedesignprocess.ThepreliminaryfuelbundledesignisprovidedbyanNMPC-qualifiedvendor.DesigniterationsoccurbetweenthefuelvendorandNMPC.AnalysesandcalculationssupportingthecoredesignareperformedandverifiedbyNMPCusingcontrolledprocedures.ThefinalcoredesignisverifiedindependentlybythevendorundertheirNMPC-qualifiedQAprogram.Calculationsandanalysessupportinglicensingrequirementsfortransientsandloss-of-coolantaccidents(LOCA)areperformedtodeterminefueloperatinglimitsforthenewcoredesign.ThevendorsubmitsafinalreporttoNMPCdocumentingtheverificationofthedesign,compliancetodesignrequirements,analysisresults,andnewoperationallimits.NMPCacceptsthedesignbytechnicalreviewandperformsa10CFR50.59safetyevaluationasdescribedlaterinthissection.Licensingdocumentchangesareperformedinaccordancewithcontrolledprocedures.Thefinalreviewandapproval,issuance,installation,andacceptancefollowaprocesssimilartothedesignchangeprocess.Insummary,thedesignchangeprocess(includingrisk-releaseandpartialOperationsAcceptance,andfuelreplacement)isacontrolledprocesswhichrequiresreviewandcomparisonoftheproposedchangetothedesignbasisoftheplant.Theprimarybarrierofdefenseagainstdeviationsfromthelicensingbasisisthe10CFR50.59processthatisrequiredforeachplantchange.Thedesignimpactassessmentanddesigninputprocessrequiretheresponsibleengineerand,asnecessary,otherdisciplineexperts,programadministrators,andotheraffectedgroupstodescribeorreferenceappropriatedesignrequirementsandconstraintstoassurecompliancewiththeplantdesignbasis.Additionally,configurationdatabasesprovideconfirmatorysourcesofdesignbasisinformation.Anindependentverifierreviewsthedesignforconsistencywithdesigninputs,includingdesignbasisrequirements.Finally,avarietyofconfigurationcontrols,includingadministrativeproceduresanddatabases,areinplacetoassurethatinformationnecessarytosupportthechangeisaccurateandisputinplaceconcurrentwiththechange(e.g.,revisionstoprocedures,drawings,training,anddatabases).Thisassuresthatdesignbasisandlicensingbasisrequirementscascadedownthroughthe 4

systemandresultinproperoperation,maintenance,andtestingoftheplantaslicensedbytheNuclearRegulatoryCommission(NRC).1B.ConfigurationChangeTheconfigurationchangeprocessisusedforactivitiesincludingplantchangesthataffectdesigndocumentsordatabases(Enclosure1tothisAttachment),and:1)donotaffectthefunctionsofsafety-relatedorquality-relatedSSCs;2)donotadverselyaffectthereliability,expectedlife,localenvironment,orfailuremodesofsafety-relatedorquality-relatedSSCs;3)donotinvolveinterfaceswithsafety-relatedorquality-relatedSSCsand;4)donotchangetheintentoreffectivenessofprogramsrequiredbyregulation.Thisprocessisprimarilyintendedfornonsafety-relatedchangeshavingnosafetyimpactandnointerfaceswithsafety-relatedsystems.However,itmayalsobeusedforsafety-relatedequivaleritreplacementssuchaslike-for-likecomponentreplacements.1Thefirststepintheconfigurationchangeprocessistoconfirmthattheproposedchangeeithersatisfiesordoesnotaffectthecurrentdesignandlicensingbasis.Thisstepisinadditiontothe10CFR50.59reviewthatwilleventuallyalsobeperformed;however,itassuresthattheresponsibleengineerwillcomparetheproposedchangewiththeUFSAR,TechnicalSpecifications,andotherlicensingdocumentsandregulationsasearlyintheprocessaspossible.Theprocedurealsorequiresthatiftheengineerdeterminesthatsafety-relatedorquality-relatedfunctionsdescribedinthecurrentdesignandlicensingbasisareaffected,thedesignchangeprocessmustbeusedinsteadoftheconfigurationchangeprocess.Likethedesignchangeprocess,aconfigurationchangerequiresassessmentofpotentialimpactsusingthedesignimpactchecklistandtheidentificationofpotentiallyaffecteddocumentsanddatabases.Atthispoint,outputdocumentssuchasdrawings,drawingrevisions,DDCs,specifications,andvendormanualrevisionsareprocessedandpendingchangestodatabasesaredeveloped.Changestolicensedocumentsareprocessedpertheinterfaceproceduregoverningcontroloflicenses,UFSARs,andNRCapprovedplansandprograms.Ifthechangeinvolvessafety-relatedorqualityrelatedSSCs,anequivalencyevaluationisdocumentedforth'epermanentplantfileshowingwhy'thechangehasnoeffectonthedesignbases.Ifequivalencycannotbejustified,thechangeisprocessedasadesignchange.Likeanyotherplantchange,configurationchangesareevaluatedper10CFR50.59.Atthispoint,theconfigurationchangeisreadyforfinalreviewbytheEngineeringapprover.Unlikeadesignchange,independentverificationandPlantManagerapprovalarenotnecessary.However,similartoadesignchange,thecompletionandapprovalofaconfigurationchangeisdocumentedonaConfiguration'ChangeControlform.Processingfromthispointforwardissimilartotheprocessingofadesignchange.OutputsaredistributedthroughDocumentControltotheModificationCoordinatorwho,uponreceiptofanapprovedConfigurationChangeControlform,issuesthechangetothefieldand,uponcompletion,presentsittoOperationsforreviewandacceptance.Thesameconfigurationcontrolsthat10

appliedtothedesignchangeprocessareinvokedbytheconfigurationchangeprocessatOperationsAcceptance,includingautomaticdatabaseupdates,verificationofproceduresandtraining,and"redlining"ofcriticaldrawings.Insummary,althoughtheconfigurationchangeprocessisaimedprimarilyatchangesthatdonotaffectthedesignbasisoftheplant,therearenumerouscontrolsinplacetopreventthesechangesfromcompromisingtheplantoperating,maintenance,andtestrequirements,andthedesigndocumentsuponwhichtheyarebased.1C.TemporaryModificationTemporarymodificationsarecontrolledperaGAP.ThisGAPappliestotemporarymodificationstositeinstallations,facilities,structures,andinservicesystemsandcomponentstherein,asdescribedintheUFSAR.Likeconfigurationanddesignchanges,temporarymodificationsmustbescreenedtodeterminewhetherdesigncontrolsapplyandif10CFR50.59applies.Becauseofthehierarchicalstructureoftheprocedures,theinterfacingproceduresgoverningdesigncontroland10CFR50.59reviewsarealwaysinvokedforplantchangesthatcouldimpactthelicensingbasis,includingtemporarymodifications,Asaresult,temporarymodificationsreceivethesamereviewaspermanentchangesregardingconformancewithdesignandlicensingbasisrequirements.TemporarymodificationsarecoordinatedbytheSystemEngineersintheTechnicalSupportBranch.Designchangesareprocessedperengineeringproceduresdescribedpreviously.Atemporarymodificationcontrolformisusedtocontroltheinstallationandremovalofthetemporarymodification.Associated10CFR50.59safetyevaluationsaredevelopedandreviewedasdescribedlaterintheresponse.TemporarymodificationsthataffectnuclearsafetyarereviewedbyaQualifiedTechnicalReviewerandapprovedbythePlantManagerorManagerTechnicalSupport.Priortoauthorizingimplementationofatemporarymodification,theStationShiftSupervisor(SSS)reviewstheassociatedapplicabilityreview/safetyevaluationandWorkOrdertoensurecompliancewiththeTechnicalSpecifications.Atthispointintheprocess,thetemporarymodificationmaybeinstalledperapplicablework/designdocumentswiththepermissionoftheoperatingshiftleadership(SSSandChiefShiftOperator).Temporarymodificationsaretaggedandtestedasrequiredbyprocedure.Theyareverifiedashavingbeeninstalledinaccordancewithapplicablework/designdocumentsandControlRoomcriticaldrawingsareredlinedaspartofimplementation.TheSSSreviewsthecompletedtemporarymodificationpackagetodeterminetheoperabilitystatusoftheaffectedsystem(s).Clearanceoftemporarymodificationsisthereverseoftheaboveexceptthat10CFR50.59reviewsarenotnecessaryunlesstheequipmentisbeingreturnedtoastateotherthantheoriginaldesign.Inthatcase,theactivitywouldgothroughthescreeningprocessesagainandbere-evaluatedperprocedure.Clearanceinvolvesindependentverification,confirmationofcompletionofprocedurerevisions,testing,andasnecessarytraininganddeterminationofsimulatorimpact.Ifdesigndocumentsordatabaseswereaffected,Engineeringisnotifiedso11 J~~y~

thattheoriginalconfigurationcanberestored.ControlRoomcriticaldrawingsareupdatedtotheoriginalconfiguration,ifpreviouslyaffected.TheSSSreviewsclearedtemporarymodificationpackagestodeterminetheoperabilityoftheaffectedsystem(s).1Insummary,thetemporarymodificationprocessisacontrolledprocessthatassurestheintegrityofthelicenseanddesignbasesbyinvokingthereviewsofthelicensebasisrequiredby10CFR50.59,andbyapplyingconfigurationcontrolsthatassurethattheplant,associatedprocedures,training,andtestingconformtothedesignbasisoftheplant.Thesechecksareappliedbothduringinstallationandclearanceoftemporarymodifications,assuringthatthechangesfrom,andtherestorationto,theoriginalconditionareverifiedascompleteandcorrect.I1D.SetpointChangeNMPNSmaintainssetpointcontrolthroughthehierarchyofdesigncontrolandconfigurationmanagementprocedures.ChangestosetpointsareperformedandcontrolledinaccordancewithNEPsincludingthoseassociatedwith"DesignChange,""ConfigurationChange,""DesignDocumentChange,""DesignInput,"and"Calculations."Adesigninputstatementisrequiredforsetpointchangesthataredefinedasadesignchangeandprovidestheinputandbasisforthechange.Inaddition,eachsetpointchangerequiresanapplicabilityreviewtobeperformedinaccordancewiththeNIPforApplicabilityReviewsandSafetyEvaluations.NMP2iscommittedtocompliancewiththeRegulatoryPosition(ParagraphC)ofRegulatoryGuide(RG)1.105,InstrumentSetpoints.TheprocessisoutlinedinanEngineeringDesignStandard.Thisdocumentalsoprovidesthecriteriaforestablishinganinstrumentsetpoint.Setpointrequirementsforplantinstruments,bothsafety-relatedandnonsafety-related,aredefinedincontrolleddocumentsandaremaintainedviathedocumentcontrolprocess,ChangestosetpointsareconsideredplantchangesandaremanagedbytheengineeringchangeprocessviatheappropriateNIPsandNEPs,Asetpointchangemaybeaconfigurationchange,adesignchange,oratemporarymodification.I1E.MaintenanceandSurveillanceMaintenanceandsurveillanceactivities,whethercorrectivemaintenance,preventivemaintenance(PM)ortesting,arebasedon,orareconsistentwith,approveddesigndocumentation,TechnicalSpecifications,orregulatorysourcedocuments.RecurringactivitiessuchasPMorsurveillancetestingareaddressedbycontrolledprocedures.Correctivemaintenancemaybeperformedutilizingproceduralguidance,ormaybeperformedusingdesigndocumentsdirectlyaspartofaWorkOrder.Drawings,vendormanuals,specifications,setpointdatasheets,DDCs,andotherapprovedEngineeringdocumentsareoftenreferencedintheMaintenanceWorkOrderssothattheycanbeusedtoaccuratelyreturntheSSCtoitsas-designedstate.NMP212

)h~4I 2.Theprecedingtextcoveredhowchangestothephysicalplantaremade,includingtheprocessesusedtocomparethechangetothedesignbasestoassurecontinuedcompliance,andtherevisionofaffecteddocuments/databasestoreflectthechange.Inthissection,thediscussionwillcoversituationswhereachangetodocumentsordatabases,ratherthanachangetothephysicalplant,istheinitiator,andhowthatchangeiscomparedtothelicensingbasisanddesignbasesforcomplianceand,ifnecessary,isincorporatedintotheplantconfiguration.Thesechangeprocessesinclude:1)ProcedureCh'anges;2)DDCs;3)ProgramChanges;4)ChangestoTraining;5)Evaluations/Analyses;6)DatabaseChanges;7)VendorManualChanges;8)SupplierDocumentAcceptance;9)ChangestoLicensingDocuments/NewCommitments;and10)OtherExternalSourcesofChange.TheseprocessesmayimpactthewaytheNMPNSisoperated,tested,maintainedandmodified;therefore,theyarediscussedindetailasfollows.2A.ProcedureChangesTheprocedurechangeprocessusedatNMPNSincludescontrolledrequirementsfordevelopment,requiredreviews,'approvals,andconfigurationcontrol.TheprocessgenerallyconformswiththerequirementsandrecommendationsofAmericanNationalStandardsInstitute(ANSI)/ANS-3.2-1976asendorsedbyRG1.33,Revision2,andSection5.3ofANSI/ANS-3.2-1982,andhasbeenexpandedandrefinedbeyondthebasicrequirementstoincorporateoperatingexperienceandlessonslearned.Keysupportprogramsandguidancedocumentshavebeenestablishedtoenhanceprogramefficiencyandfacilitatetimelyincorporationofchanges.Theprocessconsistsoffourdistinctelements:1)development;2)developmentalreviews;3)finalreview;and4)approval.Thedetailsoftheprocessdifferslightlyforadministrativeproceduresandtechnicalprocedures(e.g.,changestoadministrativeproceduresdonotrequireatechnicalverificationunlesstheproceduresarerequiredbyTechnicalSpecification6.8orotherwiseaffectnuclearsafety),however,thebasicelementsareemployedforbothtypesofprocedures.Thedevelopmentphaserequiresassignmentofanindividualknowledgeableintheareacoveredbytheprocedure.Toassistinthedevelopmentproces's,NMPChasdevelopedaProcedureWritersManualwhichprovidesextensiveguidanceonthestructure,content,andhumanfactorsprinciplestobeusedinpreparingprocedures.TheProceduresWritersManualisusedtoensureconsistencythroughouttheroughly3,500proceduresmaintainedatNMPNS.Fortechnicalprocedures,therevisionprocessrequiresthatprocedurepreparersresearchandusecontrolledreferencedocumentsincluding,butnotlimitedto,engineeringspecifications,drawings,vendormanuals,andTechnicalSpecifications.Theuseofcontrolleddocumentsensuresthatinformationusedtoprepareproceduresreflectscurrentdesignconfiguration.Developmentalreviewsareconductedtotheextentrequiredbytheprocedure.Cross-disciplinaryreviewsmaybeconductedwhenaprocedureinvolvesareasofspecificexpertisethatareoutsidethegroupthatprep'ared,theprocedure,orwhenanothergroupisrequiredto13 sfP IIperformactivitieswithintheprocedure.Fortechnicalprocedures,avalidationreviewisnormallyperformed(contingentuponcomplexity,potentialconsequences,andexpectedenvironmentincludingreducingradiationtoaslowasreasonablyachievable(ALARA))bytheenduserstoensuretheprocedureisworkableandcontainsasufficientlevelofdetailfortheintendedusers.Thefinalreviewphaseisknownastechnicalverification.Aspreviouslydiscussed,changestoadministrativeproceduresdonotrequireatechnicalverificationunlesstheprocedureisrequiredbyTechnicalSpecification6.8orotherwiseaffectsnuclearsafety.Technicalreview,asrequiredbyTechnicalSpecification6.5.2.1,isperformedbyanindividualotherthantheindividualwhopreparedtheprocedure.Thefinalreviewispermittedonlyafterdevelopmentalreviewshavebeencompleted.Theverificationinvolvesareviewoftheprocedureandreferencedocumentsusedtodeveloptheproceduretoindependentlyverifytheaccuracy.ThisreviewmayonlybeperformedbyqualifiedindividualspreviouslydesignatedbythePlantManager.Thesequalifiedreviewers,asdefinedbyTechnicalSpecification6.5.2.4,aremembersofthestationsupervisorystaffandtheyarequalifiedinareasspecifictotheirexpertise(suchasOperations,Maintenance,orRadiationProtection).FollowingfinalrevieweachtechnicalprocedureandTechnicalSpecificationrelatedadministrativeprocedureisreviewedforapplicabilityunder10CFR50.59asdescribedlaterunderthe10CFR50.59safetyevaluationprocess.Intheapprovalphase,theresponsibleprocedureownerandtheresponsibleapprover(e.g.,BranchManager,etc,)provideapprovalandensurethatrequiredreviewsbyqualifiedpersonnelhavebeenaccomplished.Theapprovalp'rocessalsoincludesrequirementstoassurethatpendingchangeshavebeenappropriatelyaddressed,thattheTechnicalSpecificationclassification(adeterminationastowhetherornotaprocedureisrequiredbyTechnicalSpecification6.8orotherwiseaffectsnuclearsafety)isappropriate,thatanychangesmadeduringreviewhavenotinvalidatedpreviousreviews,andthatanyrequiredimplementationtraininghasbeenarranged.Insummary,theprocedurerevisionprocessprovidescontrolstoensurethatproceduresarepreparedtoreflectcurrentconfiguration,thatadequatereviewisperformedbyappropriatelyqualifiedpersonneltoindependentlyverifyaccuracy,andthatappropriateapprovalsareobtained.2B.DesignDocumentChanges(DDCs)DDCs,evenwherinotassociatedwithaphysicalchangetotheplant,areprocessedundereitherthedesignchangeortheconfigurationchangeprocessaspreviouslydiscussed.Therearetwoothermeansofdocumentchangesthatinvolveengineeringenhancementsandeditorialchanges.Thefirstmeans,engineeringenhancement,isatermusedforthecorrectionofaverifiederror.Theengineeringenhancementprocesshastraditionallybeenusedtocorrectdrawingerrors.InNMP214

$IIfgal)jII' effect,itisarevisiontoadrawingperformedinaccordancewiththeapplicableprocedure,butseparatefromtheconfigurationchangeprocess.PertheEngineeringproceduregoverningdrawingcontrol,anapplicabilityreviewisperformedtoassurethattheapplicabilityof10CFR50.59isconsidered;i.e.,whetherthechangecouldaffectthelicensingbasis.Thedrawingrevisionischeckedand'approvedjustlikeanyotherrevision,andthenissuedtoitsstandarddistributionsothatallholderswillbeprovidedwiththe"enhanced"drawing.Thesecondmeans,editorialchanges,areminorchangesthatdonotaffectthetechnicalcontentorintendedpurposeofthedocument.Examplesarespelling,typographical,andgrammaticalerrors.'ecausetheyareinconsequential,theyareusuallynotinitiatedindependently.Mostcommonly,theseerrorsareidentifiedwhenthedocumentisbeingrevisedforsomeotherpurposesuchasadesignchange.Theyareusuallyprocessedandcontrolledaspartoftheassociateddesignorconfigurationchange.Ifaneditorialchangewas'adeindependentlyofanyotherprocess,itwouldbedoneasarevisioninaccordancewiththecontrolledprocedureforthattypeofdesigndocument.IfthechangepotentiallyaffectedtheUFSAR,TechnicalSpecifications,orNRCapprovedprograms,suchasnomenclaturechanges,itwouldbeprocessedpertheprocedureforinitiatinglicensingdocumentchanges.2C.ProgramChangesProgramchangestoNRC-approvedprogramsmustbeprocessedpertheproceduresthatgovernapplicabilityreviews,safetyevaluations,licenses,UFSARs,andNRC-approvedplansandprograms.Additionaladministrativecontroismayalsobeapplied.Forexample,thereisanengineeringprocedureforplantconditionmonitoringp'rogramswhichinvokesprogramresponsibilities,andrequiresreviewsforcontinuingcomplianceandeffectiveness.AdescriptionofhowregulatoryrequirementsarereflectedintheNMPCprocedurehierarchyisdescribedinourresponsetoRequestedAction(b)under"AdministrativeProcedureUpdateProgram."ChangestoprogramsthatarenotNRCapprovedbutarerequiredbyregulation,suchastheMaintenanceRuleProgramrequiredby10CFR50.65,arealsocontrolledbyadministrativeprocedures.2D.ChangestoTrainingChangestotrainingassociatedwithdesignorconfigurationchangesareaddressedbyrequiringtheModificationCoordinatortonotifytheTrainingDepartment.RequestsforchangestotrainingortrainingprogramsthatarepartofthelicensebasisareprocessedasdescribedlaterinresponsetoRequestedAction(a)under"Training."2E.Evaluations/AnalysesSpecificrecurringevaluationslikesafetyevaluations,'reachpermitevaluations,evaluationsoftemporaryshielding,andseismicevaluationsareaddressedbycontrolledadministrativeprocedures.OtherevaluationsthatpotentiallyaffectdesignfunctionsaredirectedtotheEngineeringDepartmentandprocessedperacontrolledEngineeringprocedure.ThisprocedurerequiresthatanyevaluationoranalysisperformedtodefinethedesignbasisforaNMP215 IE designchangeortoestablishadesignbasisbeprocessedinamannerthatassuresthatpropertechnicalinput,impactassessments,designreviews,andverificationsareobtained.Independentverificationisrequiredwhentheevaluationoranalysiswillresultinachangetothedesignorlicensingbasis.Examplesofwhenverificationmayberequiredinclude:IEvaluationsdoneinresponsetoregulatoryrequirements;Analysisdoneinsupportofadesignchangeorthatislikelytoresultinadesignchange;~EvaluationsoranalysissupportingchangestoNRCapprovedprograms;and~Analysis/Evaluationofsafety-relatedorquality-relatedactivities.Aspreviouslydiscussed,thecontrolledEngineeringprocedureforindependentverificationrequiresthatappropriatedesigncriteria,qualitycriteria,anddesignbasesbereviewedtoassurethattheyhavebeencorrectlyidentifiedandincorporated.2F.DatabaseChangesIConfigurationdatabasechangesareaccomplishedpercontrolledprocedures.Primarily,thesechangesresultfromdesignorconfigurationchanges;however,someareinitiatedindependentlyasEngineeringenhancementsoreditorialchanges.Regardlessofthereasonforinitiation,eachproposedchangetoconfigurationdataisreviewedforcompletenessandaccuracybeforeentry,aswellasbeingcheckedfortheaccuracyofthedataentryitself.Changestocomputerhardwareandsoftwarearealsocontrolledbyadministrativeprocedures.Verificationandvalidation(V&V)processesareappliedtoassurethatsoftwareprogramsoperateasintendedanddonotresultinerroneousdisplaysofinformation.2G.VendorManualChangesNMPCmaintainsavendorinterfaceprogramthatprovidesforannualcontactwithourNuclearSteamSupplySystem(NSSS)supplierandbi-annualcontactswithvendorsforotherselectedkeysafety-relatedequipment.Thesevendorsarecontactedtorequestthelatesttechnicalmanuals,servicebulletins,notices,advisories,letters,andoperation,maintenance,andrepairproceduresfortheselectedequipment.Additionally,thevendorinterfaceprogramprovidesforthemaintenanceofanindexofapplicabletechnicaldocumentsandalogofvendorcontactsandcorrespondence.Periodically,thelistofvendorstobecontactedisupdatedbasedonresponsesreceivedandEngineeringreviewsofthelistsofkeysafety-relatedequipment.Follow-upcontactsaremadewithnon-responsivevendorstoensurethatagoodfaitheffortwasmadetoobtainthenecessaryequipmentinformation.NMP216 I

Vendormanualchangesmaythenbeinitiatedbyreceiptofnewinformationfromthevendor,orbyNMPCtoaccommodatepreferredpractices,materials,orotherconsiderations.Revisionsofbothkindsareaddressedinanengineeringproceduregoverningvendortechnicalmanuals.VendorinitiatedchangesareforwardedtotheVendorDocumentCoordinatorforloggingandtracking.ThechangeisthenforwardedtoanassignedresponsibleengineerwhoreviewsitforapplicabilitytotheNMPNS.Ifappropriate,theresponsibleengineerobtainsmulti-disciplinaryreviews.Ifthemanualisassociatedwithequipmentoractivitiesthataresafety-related,quality-related,EQrelated,orTechnicalSpecificationrelated,atleastoneotherknowledgeablereviewermustreviewthechange.NonconformancesbetweentheNMPC-acceptedvendorproductandtheproposedchangearedocumentedinaDER.Whenreviewcommentsandnonconformanceshavebeenresolvedwiththereviewersandthevendor,therevisedmanualisapprovedanddistributed.NMPC-initiatedchangestovendormanualsareprocessedinthesameway,exceptasfollows:ADDCmaybeposted-againstthemanualinsteadofrevisingandredistributingtheentiremanual.InvokingtheDDCprocessinvolvesdesignimpactassessment,checking,andapproval.~TosupportthePMOptimizationProgram,vendorrecommendedPMmethodsandfrequenciesmaybechangedwithoutrevisingthevendormanualbasedonMaintenance,Operations,TechnicalSupport,andEngineeringreviewandconcurrence.Additionally,thereviewmustbedocumentedandfiledintheMaintenanceDepartmentandrevisedPMmethodorfrequencyidentifiedonacomponentlevelinthePreventiveMaintenanceSurveillanceTesting(PMST)database.'H.SupplierDocumentAcceptanceSupplierdocuments,otherthanVendorTechnicalManualsareprocessedinaccordancewiththecontrolledprocedureforthespecificdocumenttype.Theprocessofsupplierdocumentacceptanceissimilartoothertypesofdesigndocumentsandincludes:,1)preparation,checking,verification,review,andapproval,controlledeitherbythevendor's(NMPCapproved)QAprogramorbyNMPCproceduresand2)formalacceptancebyNMPCbasedonadetailedreviewoftechnicalcontent,certificateofcompliance,orsurveillanceofworkinprogress.I2I.ChangestoLicensingDocuments/NewRegulatoryCommitmentsChangestolicensingdocuments/newregulatorycommitmentsareprocessedpertheinterfaceproceduregoverningcontroloflicenses,UFSARs,andNRC-approvedplansandprograms.NewcommitmentsareprocessedpertheinterfaceprocedurethatgovernsNRCinterfacesandtrackedviatheNuclearCommitmentTrackingSystem(NCTS).Inbothcases,proposedchangesmustbereviewedforimpactonthedesignconfigurationandprocessedappropriately17

~Ip asadesignchange,configurationchange,aprogramchangeoracontrolledevaluation/analysis.Aspreviouslydiscussed,anychangetothedesignbasesinvokestherequirementforreviewsinaccordancewith10CFR50.59,includingareviewofpotentialimpactonTechnicalSpecificationrequiredprocedures.'heabovecontrolsassurethatwhennewregulatoryorlicensechangesareimplemented,theyarepropeilyreflectedintheplant,thedesignbasis,theaffectedprograms,andprocedures.,2J.ExternalSourcesofChangeExternalsourcesofchangederivedfromdeficiencies,concerns,orissuesidentifiedbyregulatoryagencies,industryoperatingexperience,vendorinformationnotices(INs),orexternalpublicationsareprocessedpertheDERprocess.AsdiscussedinourresponsetoRequestedAction(d),DERsoftenresultinreferraltootherprocessessuchasdesignchange,procedurechange,andevaluation/analysisforcorrectiveandpreventiveaction.UseoftheDERprocessensuresthatevaluation,disp'osition,resolutionandtrendingoftheissuewilloccur.3.3A.10CFR50.59SafetyEvaluationProcessAnNDDregardingsafetyevaluationsestablishestherequirementsforassessingproposedchanges,tests,orexperimentstodetermineifadditionalanalysis,evaluation,orNRCapprovalisrequiredbeforeimplementation.Thisdirectiveappliestoproposedch'angestoNMPNSfacilities(permanentortemporary),proposedrevisionsorchangestoprocedures,andproposedtestsorexperiments.Aqualifiedevaluatordetermineswhether10CFR50.59appliestotheproposedchange,testorexperimentbydeterminingifitinvolvesachangetothefacilityorproceduresasdescribedintheUFSAR,atestorexperimentnotdescribedintheUFSAR,andwhethertheactivityaffectsnuclearsafetyinawaynot'previouslyevaluatedintheUFSARorrequiresachangetoaTechnicalSpecification.Thisdeterminationisdocumentedaspartoftheapplicabilityreview..Whentheapplicabilityreviewdeterminationidentifiesthattherequirementsof10CFR50.59areapplicable,a10CFR50.59safetyevaluationisthenperformedtodetermineifanunreviewedsafetyquestion(USQ)exists.Thepreparermustalsoobtainthereviewofhis/herBranchManager,signifyingasufficientcross-disciplinaryreviewhasbeenperformed.TheManagerTechnicalSupportmayspecifyadditionaltechnicalreviewandmaywaiveStationOperationsReviewCommittee(SORC)reviewifitisdeterminedthataproposedchangedoesnotaffectnuclearsafety.Priortoimplementation,safetyevaluationsforchangesthataffectnuclearsafetyarereviewedbytheSORC.SORCrendersadetermination,inwriting,astowhetherornotthesafetyevaluationconstitutesaUSQ.Iftheproposedchange,testorexperimentinvolvesaUSQ,itwillnotbeimplementedwithoutpriorNRCapproval.TheSafetyReviewandAuditBoard(SRAB)reviewssafetyevaluationstoverifythatactionscompletedundertheprovisionsof10CFR50.59didnotconstituteaUSQ.ANIPgoverningapplicabilityreviewsandsafetyevaluationsprovidesadministrativecontrolsforthereviewofchanges,tests,andexperiments.ThesereviewsassessimpacttoOperating18 0tI~pl1 ILicenses,UFSARs,NRCapprovedplansandprograms,andNRCcommitments;determinewhetherthechangeinvolvesaUSQ;anddeterminewhetherNRCreviewandapprovalisrequired.ConsistentwiththegoverningNDD,theprocedureappliestoallproposedchangestoNMPNSstructures,systems,orcomponents(permanentandtemporary),proposedrevisionsorchangestoprocedures,and'proposedtestsorexperiments.Whenanapplicabilityreviewindicatesachangetoalicensingdocumentisrequired,"theproposedchangeisprocessedperasecondNIP.Thissecondinterfaceprocedure,whichcontrolslicenses,UFSARs,andNRC-approvedplansandprograms,providesadministrativecontrolsforamendmentsandrevisionstoOperatingLicenses,UFSARs,andNRC-approvedplansandprograms.Theeffectsofproposedfacilitychanges,procedurechanges,testsandexperimentsareidentifiedonaLicensingDocumentChangeRequest(LDCR).EachLDCRisreviewed,approved,andincorporatedintolicensedocumentsinaccordancewithspecificrequirementsidentifiedwithintheprocedure.InSeptember1996,NMPCbeganusingAdobeAcrobatsoftwaretosearchandviewelectronicversionsoftheNMPNSUFSARandplantTechnicalSpecifications.TheAdobesoftwareprovidesfull-textsearchcommandsthatcanfindallthewordsonapage,nomatterwhereorhowtheyareused.AdobeAcrobatsoftwareisanewtoolforApplicabilityReviewersandSafetyEvaluatorstoidentifyandassesstheimpactofproposedchangesoninformationpresentedintheUFSARandTechnicalSpecifications.3B.10CFR50.71(e)AnNDDregardingchangestoOperatingLicenses,UFSARs,andNRCapprovedplansandprogramsreflectstherequirementsof10CFR50.71(e).ANIPgoverningchangestoLicenses,UFSARs,andNRC-approvedplansandprogramsprovidesadministrativecontrolsfortheinitiation,review,andapprovalofproposedchangestotheUFSAR.ANIPgoverninginterfacewiththeNRCprovidesadministrativecontrolsforfilingtheUFSARrevision.TheseproceduresprovideadministrativecontrolsforrevisingtheUFSARtoincludetheeffectsof:a11changesmadeinthefacilityorproceduresasdescribedintheUFSAR;allsafetyevaluationsperformedbythelicenseeeitherinsupportofrequestedlicenseamendmentsorinsupportofconclusionsthatchangesdidnotinvolveanUSQ;andallanalysesofnewsafetyissues'performedbyoronbehalfofthelicenseeattheNRC'srequest.TheupdatedinformationisappropriatelylocatedwithintheUFSAR.II3C.QAProgram/10CFR50AppendixBTheNMPNSQATR(UFSARAppendixB)addressestherequirementsforadescriptionoftheQAProgramfortheoperationsphaseoftheNMPNS.TheQATRappliestoorganizationsperformingworkthataffectstheoperation,maintenance,ormodificationofsafety-relatedstructures,systemsorcomponentsandindicatesthattheaccountabilityforthequalityofsafety-relatedworkrestswiththeperformer,whereasaccountabilityforverifyingthequalityofworkrestswiththeverifyingorganizations.19 VE TheQATRprovidesfortheoperation,maintenance,andmodificationofNMPNSconsistentwithANSUAmericanSocietyofMechanicalEngineers(ASME)NQA-1,ANSI/ANS-3.2andBranchTechnicalPosition(BTP)APCSB9.5-1,AppendixA.TheQATRisorganizedtopresenttheNMPCQAprogramintheorderofthe18criteriasetforthin10CFR50AppendixB.TheQATRstatesNMPC'spolicyforeachofthesecriteriaanddescribeshowthecontrolspertinenttoeacharecarriedout.Amatrixshowingthe18criteriaof10CFR50AppendixBandthepolicyanddirectivesandorganizationproceduresimplementingthesecriteriaispresentedintheQATR.ChangesmadetotheQATRthatdonotreducecommitmentspreviouslyacceptedbytheNRCaresubmittedtotheNRCinaccordancewiththerequirementsof10CFR50.71(e).ChangesmadetotheQATRthatdonotsatisfythecriteriaofAppendixBto10CFR50,orreducecommitmentspreviouslyacceptedbytheNRC,aresubmittedtotheNRCandmustreceiveNRCapprovalpriorto'implementation.Thechangesdescribedabovearesubmittedinaccordancewiththerequirementsof10CFR50.54.Aspreviouslystated,NMPNSiscommittedtoasystemofdesignandconfigurationcontrolsthatsatisfytherequirementsofAppendixBof10CFR50.ConcerningAppendixB,CriteriaIII,theNMPNSQATRstatesthatstationmodificationsareaccomplishedinaccordancewithapproveddesignsandprocedures.Thecontrolsapplytopreparation,review,andrevisionofdesigndocuments,includingthecorrecttranslationofapplicableregulatoryrequirementsanddesignbasesintodesign,procurement,andproceduraldocuments.ThecontrolsapplytodesignworkperformedbycontractorsaswellasbyNMPCengineeringandtechnicalorganizations.AdministrativeproceduresatNMPNSweredevelopedto'ssurethatlicenserequirements,includingAppendixBrequirements,areaccuratelyimplementedandthatresponsibilitiesforimplementationareproperlyassigned.4.4A.ProblemIdentificationProcessesANIPprescribesthemethodforprocessingDERs.Guidanceisprovidedregardingidentification,documentation,notification,evaluation,correction,andreportingofconditions,events,activities,andconcernsthathavethepotentialforaffectingthesafeandreliableoperationoftheNMPNS.TheDERprocessisdescribedindetailinourresponsetoRequestedAction(d)under"Deviation/EventReport-(DER)."DERsareinitiatedupondiscoveryofadeficiency,includingdeficienciesinourengineeringdesignandconfigurationcontrolprocess,orinconsistenciesbetweenourlicensedocuments,physicalplant,andprocedures.AnumberofotherprocessesexistatNMPNSthathavethepotentialtoidentifyproblems.Theseprocessesincludeself-identification,reviewsperformedbytheSORCandtheSRAB,requiredtechnicalreviews,QAauditsandsurveillances,selfassessments,surveillanceandexaminationactivities,IndependentSafetyEngineeringGroup(ISEG)assessments,InstituteofNuclearPowerOperations(INPO)evaluations,NRCinspections,andtheevaluationofindustryoperationalexperiences.20

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IAsproblemsareidentified,DERsareinitiated,dispositioned,andappropriatecorrectiveandpreventiveactionstaken.Theseprocessesareafeedbacklooptothedesignandconfigurationcontrolprocessinthattheyeitherconfirmthattheprocesses"areworkingeffectivelyoridentifyproblemareaswithsubsequentcorrectiveactionstoenhancetheprocess.ResultsfromsomeoftheseprocessesarepresentedinourresponsestoRequestedActions(b)and(c),providingpartofourbasesforconcludingthatdesignbasesrequirementsarebeingtranslatedintooperating,maintenance,andtestingprocedures,andthatSSCconfigurationandperformanceisconsistentwiththedesignbases.4B.TrainingTrainingconcerningengineeringdesignandconfigurationcontrolproceduresisprovidedtostationoperatingandtechnical/engineeringpersonnelaspartoftheircontinuingtraining/positionspecifictrainingprogramsasrequired.Operatorsareroutinelytrainedontheprocessesusedfortemporary/permanentchangestoplantdesignorprocedures.Additionally,reviewsofactualchangestoproceduresandsignificantplantdesignchangesaftermajormaintenanceoutagesarecovered,asappropriate,beforestartup.Simulatorsmaybeusedtotrainoperatorsandothersonnewsystems/componentsbeforeactualsystemstartupandtodevelopnewproceduresforsystemoperationbefore.thesystem/componentisturnedoverfortesting.Plantsystemconfigurationchanges,specialtestsandsignificantevolutionsmaybetestedonthesimulatorbeforetheyareactuallyaccomplishedintheplant.ThePCRdatabaseissearchedbythesimulatorsupportstaffquarterlyasareviewofplantchangesforsimulatorimpact.Administrativecontrolsareinplacethatensurethatanyplantchangeshavingpotentialimpactonthesimulatorareevaluatedandchangesimplementedasrequired.Maintenance,chemistry,radiationprotection,andengineeringpersonnelreceivetraininginplantdesign/procedurechangesaspartofthecontinuedtrainingprogram,eitheronanasneededbasisorcyclically.ProcedurechangesandplantdesignchangescanalsoreachthetrainingprogramviatheTrainingReviewRequest/TrainingChangeOrderprocess.Thisprocessrequiresthateachchangethatpotentiallyhastrainingprogramimpactbeevaluatedandrevisionsmadeasappropriate.PlantpersonnelcaninitiateaTrainingReviewRequestonanyissuewhichcouldhavetrainingprogramimpact.TrainingReviewRequests/TrainingChangeOrdersareroutinelyusedforissuesthatrequiretrainingprogrammodification.Concerningtrainingonthe10CFR50.59process,operationsshiftmanagement,designatedengineeringandmaintenancesupportpersonnel,andothersinmanagementandtechnicalpositionsaretrainedandqualifiedasApplicabilityReviewers/SafetyEvaluatorsandhavetocompletearequalificationeverytwoyears.TrainingincludesanoverviewoflicensedocumentsincludingTechnicalSpecifications,UFSAR,andNRC-approvedplansandprogramstogetherwithanoverviewofthehierarchyofprocedures.Currently,thereareapproximately400fullytrainedandqualifiedpersonnelonsitewhohavetheknowledgeandabilitytodoapplicabilityreviewsandsafetyevaluations.Thistraining/knowledgebasecontributestotheawarenessandsensitivitythatexiststhroughouttheworkforcewithregardtooperatingtheplantwithinthelicensingbasis.21 4l,p<'g CBranchManagersandSeniorManagersalsoperformobservationsofsimulatorandotherclassroomtrainingaspartoftheirnormalduties.Theirfeedbacktothetrainingorganizationisfactoredintotheoverallprogramtoensurethecurriculumandconductoftrainingmeetsmanagement'sexpectations.II22

Providetherationaleforconcludingthatdesignbasesrequirementsaretranslatedintooperating,maintenanceandtestingprocedures.Asdiscussedbelow,NiagaraMohawkhasreasonableassurancethatdesignbasesrequirementsaretranslatedintooperating,maintenanceandtestingproceduresatNMP2;Therationalesupportingthisconclusionisbasedonnumerousactions,programs,andoversightactivities.AsdescribedinNDDs,administrativeproceduresestablishrequirementsforthepreparation,review,andapprovaloftechnicalprocedures.Technicalproceduresdefinerequirementsfortheoperation,maintenance,andtestingdescribedintheOperatingLicense,TechnicalSpecifications,andUFSAR.AsdiscussedintheresponsetoRequestedAction(a),extensiveprogramsandcontrolsareutilizedatNMPNStoensurethatdesignbasisinformationisaccuratelymaintainedandupdatedasconditionswarrant.Proceduresareupdatedtoreflectchangesindesign,correctiveactions(identifiedbythecorrectiveactionprogram),industryoperatingexperience,andchangestosourcerequirements.Duringtheinitialdevelopment,review,andapprovalofoperating,maintenanceandtestingprocedures,areviewofdesigndocumentswasconducted.Thisreviewincludedreviewsofrelevantsystemdescriptions,designdrawings,DesignSpecificationDataSheets,vendormanuals,TechnicalSpecifications,andtheFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR).Additionalproceduredevelopmentactivitiesiricludedselecteddesignwalkdownverifications,andinthecaseofpreoperationaltestprocedures,reviewofapplicableengineeringdesigncalculationstoensurethattheas-builtsystemmetdesignrequirements.PreoperationaltestdevelopmentalsoutilizedsystempreoperationalteststandardsfortheNSSS.Followingtheapprovalofinitialope'rating,maintenance,andtestingprocedures,thetechnicalaccuracyoftheprocedureshasbeenmaintainedthroughprogrammaticcontrolsforprocedurerevisionandperiodicreview.Theseprogramshavebeenstrengthenedovertheyearstotheircurrentstatus.NMPChasutilizedknowledgeableandappropriatelyqualifiedindividualstodevelop,review,approve,andreviseprocedures.Programrequirementshavebeeninplacestartingwiththeinitialdevelopmentofproceduresandhavebeenenhancedovertimetoimprovetheeffectivenessofthedevelopment,review,andapprovalprocess.Thetrainingprogramandotheradministrativerequirementsassurethatpersonnelassignedtoperformthesefunctionsarecompetenttoperformtheirassignedtasks.ThisassuresthatNMPCcaneffectivelyimplementprogramrequirementsassociatedwiththedevelopment,review,approval,andrevisionofadministrativeandtechnicalprocedures.23 11/P Finally,NMPChasbeeninvolvedinnumerousassessmentsthatdemonstratehoweffectivelydesignrequirementsaretranslatedintooperating,maintenance,andtestingprocedures.Theseassessmentsinclude,inpart,functionalinspections,complianceverificationprojects,audits,andprocedure(bothadministrativeandtechnical)andrelatedprogramupgradeprojects.NMPC'sresponsetoRequested'Action(a)providesadescriptionoftheengineeringdesignandconfigurationcontrolprocessescurrentlyinplaceatNMP2,includingthosethatimplement10CFR50.59,10CFR50.71(e),andAppendixBto10CFRPart50.OurresponsetoRequestedAction(d)providesadetaileddescriptionoftheprocessesfortheidentificationofproblemsandimplementationofcorrectiveactionstopreventrecurrence(i.e.,theDER).OurresponsetoRequestedAction(b)discussestheprocesswhichwasusedtodevelop,review,andapprovetheinitialoperations,maintenance,andtestingprocedures.Anoverviewofthehistoricprocedurerevisionprocessispresented,aswellasthecurrentrevisionprocess.Thetrainingprogramisdiscussedtoshowthatindividualsarecapableofeffectivelyimplementingtheproceduredevelopment,review,approval,andrevisionprocess.Finally,areviewofassessmentsconductedisprovidedtofurtherdemonstratethattheimplementationofprogramrequirementshasbeeneffectiveinassuringthatdesignbasisrequirementsarebeingtranslatedintooperating,maintenanceandtestingprocedures.NMPCisconfidentthatadherencetoourdesignandconfigurationcontrolprocessesandtheDERprocessprovidesreasonableassurancethatdesignbasesrequirementsareproperlytranslatedintooperating,maintenance,andtestingproceduresandthat,wheninconsistenciesarefound,propercorrectiveactionsaretaken.NMP2'soperating,maintenance,andtestingprocedureswereinitiallydevelopedinthemid-1980s.Theyweredevelopedutilizingadministrativeproceduresandcontrolscontainedinmultipledocuments.Theseprogramcontrolsdefinedtherequirementsnecessaryinordertoassuredesignbasisrequirementswereadequatelytranslatedintooperating,maintenance,andtestingprocedures.Someoftheprogramdocumentsinplaceatthetimeincludedthefollowing:~ANSVANS-3.2providedtherequirementsforthepreparation,reviewandapprovalprocessforprocedures,aswellasanappendixofactivitieswhichrequireprocedures.~AStartupAdministrativeProcedure(SAP)definedtherequirementsforthepreparationofstationproceduresreferringtoRG1.33Revision2,asthegoverningregulatorydocumentanddefinedwhatprocedureswererequiredtobeinplacepriortolicensingNMP2.~ASAPdefinedthequalificationandcertificationofsiteandunitpersonnel.24 C

Administrativeproceduresprescribedtheprocessforthegeneration,approval,publication,distribution,andcontrolofprocedures.~AdministrativeproceduresprescribedtheSORCrequirementsassociatedwiththecommittee'sresponsibilities.Amongthosewererequirementsforformalprocedurereviewandthedocumentationofthosereviews.Aspartoftheproceduredevelopment,review,approval,andrevisionprocessforinitialtechnicalproceduredevelopment,thefollowingactionstookplaceinordertoassurethetechnicaladequacyofthoseprocedures:1"~Thefollowingengineeringcontrolleddocumentswerereviewedduringtheinitialpreparationandreviewofproceduresasapplicable:l.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.FSKs,MechanicalonelinedrawingsESKs,ElectricalschematicsLSKs,LogicdiagramsVendormanualsEEs,wiringdiagramsSystemDesignSpecificationDataSheets(DSDS)SystemdescriptionsOthersasrequiredCross-disciplinaryreviewsandconsultationwithvendors,theNSSSsupplier(GeneralElectric(GE)),andtheArchitect-Engineer(AE)wereconductedasappropriate.AspartoftheEOPdevelopmentprogram,aspecializedreviewprocesswasutilizedtoensuredesignbasisrequirementswereappropriatelycapturedintheprocedures.AnextensiveverificationofdesigninputswasutilizedtosupportEOPcalculations.EachprocedurewasreviewedbytheSORC.~Procedureswereroutinelyvalidatedutilizingtheplantsimulator,wherepossible,aspartoftheinitialtrainingprograms.Sincethesimulatordesignandproceduredevelopmentwerebaseduponplantdesignrequirements,utilizingproceduresinthesimulatorprovidedagoodmeasureofthetechnicalaccuracyoftheproceduresandsimulator.~TheOperationsDepartmentSuperintendentwasassignedasamemberoftheJointTestGroup(JTG).Thisgroupwasrequiredtoreviewandapprovepreoperationaltestprocedurestoberuninthestationaswellascompletedtestresults.ThisalloweddirectfeedbackcapabilitytotheAEregardingdiscrepanciesbetweendesignrequirementsandprocedures.Thisgroupprovidedtechnicalreviewandoversightfunctions.25 VVft

~Operatingexperiencefromotherplantsdevelopinginitialoperating,maintenance,andtestingprocedureswassoughtoutandincorporatedintoNMPC'sprogram.NMPChasutilizedknowledgeableandappropriatelyqualifiedindividualstodevelop,review,approve,andreviseprocedures.Program'requirementswereestablishedbeforeinitialdevelopmentofprocedures.PersonnelinvolvedintheinitialwritingoftechnicalprocedureswereeitherNMPCemployeesorcontractorscognizantintheareaforwhichtheprocedurewasbeingwritten.Ineithercase,individualsassignedtothosetaskswerecompetenttoperformtheirrespectivetasks.Individualsassignedtosupportthereview,approvalandrevisionfunctionsofproceduredevelopmentandmaintenancewerealsoappropriatelyqualified.Throughthetrainingprogramandotheradministrativerequirements,reasonableassuranceisprovidedthatpersonnelassignedtoperformthesefunctionsarecompetenttoperformtheirassignedtasks.Thisinturn,reasonablyassuresthatNMPCcaneffectivelyimplementtheprogramrequirementsassociatedwiththedevelopment,review,approval,andrevisionofadministrativeandtechnicalprocedures.Followinginitialproceduredevelopment,review,andapproval,proceduresweremaintaineduptodateutilizingadministrativecontrolsfortherevisionprocess.AtthetimeofreceiptoftheNMP2lowpowerlicense(10/31/86),requiredprocedureshadbeendeveloped,reviewed,andapprovedinaccordancewithexistingprogrammaticrequirements.Procedurerevisioncontrolswereinplacetoestablishrequirementsnecessarytoensurethatproceduresweremaintainedappropriately.Theserequirements,coupledwithconfigurationanddesigncontrolprocesses,ensuredthatdesignbasisrequirementsweretranslatedintooperating,maintenance,andtestingproceduresinatimelymanner.Overtime,theproceduredevelopment,review,approval,andcontrolprocesshasbeenstrengthened.Abriefsummaryofmajorprogramenhancementsfollows:~1984-AnAdministrativeProcedurechangeincorporatedtheNineMilePointUnit1(NMP1)andNMP2organizationsunderacommonsiteadministrationprogram.~1985-AnAdministrativeProcedureprovidedsignificantlymoredetailregardingthedevelopment,review,andrevisionprocessforprocedures.'989-ASiteProcedureWriter'sGuidewasdevelopedandapprovedinordertoprovideconsistentguidanceonformatandhumanfactors.Thiswascompletedinanticipationofamajorprocedurerewriteeffort,i1990-1992-Anewprocedurehierarchydevelopmentwasinitiated.Thiswasdonetoprovideamoreorganized,tieredprocedurestructureandhierarchy.'dministrativeProceduresforproceduregeneration,approval,distribution,revision,andusewouldbetransformedintotheNDDandNIP-PROseries.Amajortechnicalprocedurerewriteprogramwasalsounderway,utilizingtheSiteProcedureWriter'sGuide.Thebulkofthiseffortwascompletedin1992.Concurrentwiththetechnicalprocedureupgrade,26

,r~"

APsgoverningproceduralcontrolswerethemselvesenhancedtobetterdescribecertainrequirementsforprocedurereviewandcontrol,activities.Akeyattributetothischangewasbetterdefiningtheexpectationsforprocedureauthorsandreviewers,aswellasimprovingthe10CFR5059screeningprocess.ITrainingeffortswerecompletedtoensureprocedurewriters,reviewers,approversandthoseinvolvedintherevisionprocesscouldeffectivelyimplementtheprogramrequirements.~1992-1997-Thequalityofproceduresandrelatedprocessescontinuetoimproveduetoenhancementsintheareasoftechnicalreview,validation,verification,andthe10CFR50.59screeningprocessandsafetyevaluationquality.Initialqualificationandrequalificationprogramsintheseareashav'ebeenstrengthenedconsiderably.TheseprogramchangeshaveledtoourcurrentprogramrequirementsdescribedinourresponsetoRequestedAction(a).NMPChasconductedseveralinitiativesinordertoimprovetheprocessbywhichdesignrequirementsaretransferredintooperating,maintenanceandtestingprocedures.Additionally,severalassessmentshavebeenconductedwhichreviewedplant,procedures,demonstratedthatNMPC'sprogramscontainsufficientrequirements,andthatNMPCpersonnelarequalifiedtoimplementtheprogramrequirements.ThisreasonablyassuresthatNMPCcanconcludethatdesignbasisrequirementsaretranslatedintooperating,'maintenanceandtestingprocedures.Asummaryofthesignificantinitiativesandassessmentsinthisareaisprovidedonthefollowingpages.Operating,maintenance,andtestingproceduresaredevelopedandmaintainedinaccordancewiththerequirementsofvariousadministrativeproceduresandprograms.Theadministrativecontrolsapplicabletooperating,maintenance,andtestingproceduresaredescribedindetailinourresponsetoRequestedAction(a).ThissectiondescribestheAdministrativeProcedureUpdateProgramwhichwascompletedin1992torestructureandvalidateadministrativeproceduresandprogramsatNMPNS.Theprimaryobjectivesoftheprogramwereto:~ReviewlicensingdocumentationtoidentifylicensingrequirementsandcommitmentsapplicabletoNMPNS.~Verifythatlicenserequirementsandcommitmentswerecompletelyandaccuratelyimplementedthroughadministrativeproceduresandprograms.~Verifythatresponsibilitiesforimplementinglicenserequirementswereappropriatelyassignedwithintheorganization.27

TheAdministrativeProcedureUpdateProgramwasinitiatedbydevelopingaNuclearDivision"Policy"document.ThePolicyprovidedasummaryofthemajororganizationalresponsibilities,generalprogramrequirements,andotherelementsforensuringthesafe,reliable,andefficientoperationofNMPNS.ThePolicyalsodefinedahierarchyofprocedurestofacilitateorganizedimplementationoflicenserequirements.ThecurrenthierarchyisdepictedinFigure1:ZIGIlKMNuclearDivisionPolicyNuclearDivisionDirectivesNuclearInterfaceProcedures,DepartmentSpecificAdministrativeProceduresBranchLevelAdministrativeProceduresTechnicalImplementingProceduresInitialeffortsalsoinvolveddevelopmentofacomprehensivelistoffunctionalareastoencompassallaspectsofoperation,maintenance,modification,andtestingoftheNMPNS.28

Thelistoffunctionalareasisasfollows:ALARAProgramAuditsandSurveillancesBudget/ExpenditureControlChemistryConfigurationManagementDesignControl'DocumentControlEvaluationandCorrectiveActionEnvironmentalProtectionEmergencyPreparednessFitnessforDutyFireProtectionProgramHumanResourceManagementHousekeepingandSystemCleannessISIandTestingInspectionsInterfacingwithRegulatoryandIndustryGroupsInventory,IdentificationandPhysicalControlofMaterials,Equipment,PartsandSuppliesLicenses,PlansandProgramsMaintenanceMeasuringandTestEquipmentNuclearComputerSystems,NuclearFuelManagementOccupationalSafetyandHealthOperationsOutageManagementNuclearDivisionPolicyandDirectivesManualControlProcurementofMaterials,Equipment,Parts,SuppliesandServicesProceduresandOrdersPlanningandSchedulingProjectandTaskManagementRadiologicalEffluentsStationReliabilityRecordsManagementRadioactiveMaterialProcessing,TransportandDisposalRadiationProtectionProgramRegulatoryPostingRequirementsSafeguardsInformationControlSurveillanceandTestingSecuritySafetyEvaluationsSpecialNuclearMaterialAccountabilitySpecialProcessesControlSafetyReviewsTraining,QualificationandSimulatorsFollowingdevelopmentofthePolicy,NDDsweredevelopedforeachfunctionalareaidentifiedabove.NDDsareusedtoestablishrequirementsthatmustbeaccomplishedtocomplywithregulatoryrequirementsandguidelines,industrystandardsandpractices,andcommitmentstoregulatoryagenciesoutlinedintheOperatingLicense,UFSAR,andTechnicalSpecifications.Theyserveasavehiclebywhichmanagementcommunicatesrequirementsforperformingandcontrollingactivitiestothoseresponsibleforpreparingtheassociatedadministrativeandimplementingprocedures.SubjectmatterexpertswereassignedtocompileeachNDDbyperformingacomprehensiveassessmentoflicensingrequirementsandcommitmentstoidentifyapplicablerequirementsforeachfunctionalarea.EachNDDwasreviewedbyresponsibleindividualsinthefunctionalareaandthenbytheSeniorManagementTeam.TheNDDswereissuedasasetintheNuclearDivisionPolicyandDirectivesManual.AdministrativecontrolsareappliedtoensuretheNDDsremainaccurate.29

FollowingissuanceoftheNuclearDivisionPolicyandDirectivesManual,theAdministrativeProcedureUpdateProgramwascompletedbyincorporatingrequirementscontainedintheNDDsthroughoutvariouslowertieradministrativeprocedures.Itisimportanttonotethat,inparallelwithimplementationoftheNDDs,NMPNSconductedacomprehensive"Back-to-Basics"programtoeducatestationpersonnelonthestructureandcontentofthelicensingbasis,includingitsrelationtotheNuclearDivisionPolicyandDirectivesManual.ThisprogramisdescribedlaterinourresponsetoRequestedAction(b)under"Training."IncontrasttotheNDDswhichestablish"what"therequirementsareforaparticularfunctionalarea,implementingproceduresprovidethedetailsofmethodstobeusedtoimplementtherequirementscontainedintheNDDs.Thiswasaccomplishedusingtheprocedurehierarchydevelopedearlierintheprogram.Twotiersofadministrativeproceduresareemployedintheprocedurehierarchytoensureappropriatelevelsofreviewandapprovalareobtained:Departmentleveladministrativeprocedureswhichinclude:1)NIPswhichimplementcommonoruniversalprogramsforNMPNSdepartments(suchasprocedurereviewandcontrol,correctiveaction,andsecurity).NIPsarereviewedbyresponsibleindividualsfromappropriateareasandapprovedbytheVicePresidentandGeneralManager-Nuclear;and2)Department-specificadministrativeprocedureswhichimplementcommonprogramsassignedtoaspecificdepartment(suchasGenerationorEngineering).Department-specificadministrativeproceduresarereviewedwithintheappropriatedepartmentandapprovedbythedepartm'enthead.Lowertier(branchlevel)administrativeprocedureswhicharespecifictofunctionalareaswithindepartments(suchasOperationsorRadiationProtection)andinvolveimplementationofrequirementsbyanindividualgroup.BranchleveladministrativeproceduresarereviewedandapprovedwithinthefunctionalareaandallowflexibilityinimplementingdetailedrequirementsprovidedcompliancewiththeNDDsandhighertierproceduresismaintained.AdherencetotheprocedurehierarchywasmaintainedtoensureimplementingproceduresweredevelopedtotheextentnecessarytoexecutetherequirementscontainedintheNDDs.Theeffortwascoordinatedbyacentralgrouptoensurecompletenessandtominimizeoverlapandduplication.AprocedurenumberingschemewasemployedthatassociatedimplementingprocedurestotheirparentNDD.Thisphaseoftheprogramresultedinrevisionofnearlyallofthemorethan800administrativeproceduresthatwereinplaceatthattime.Insummary,thiseffortverifiedthatlicensebasisrequirementswerebeingimplementedthroughadministrativeproceduresincludingthoseapplicabletodevelopingandmaintainingoperations,maintenance,andtestingprocedures.Theprogramalsoservedtoconsolidaterequirementsformoreeffectiveimplementationandtoeliminateoutdatedorundesirablepractices.Uponcompletion,thetotalnumberofadministrativeprocedureswasreducedfrommorethan800toapproximately350.ThedescribedprocedureprogramandhierarchyremainsinplacetodayasanintegralpartoftheNMPNSprocedureprogram.30

NMPChasinitiatedseveralsurveillanceprogramreviewsoverthepastsixyears.Severalofthesewereconductedbyindependentconsultantstoensureanunbiasedreview.Specifically,theInserviceTesting(IST)ProgramforpumpsandvalveswasreviewedbyStoneandWebsterEngineeringCorporationpersonnel,the10CFR50AppendixJProgramwasreviewedbyGeneralPhysicsCorporation,andtheremainderoftheSurveillanceProgramwasreviewedbyVectraTechnologies,Inc.In.addition,NMPChasperformedinternalreviewsoftheISIProgram.In1990,NMPCutilizedtheservicesofStoneandWebsterEngineeringCorporationtoreviewtheNMP2ISTProgramforpumpsandvalves.ThisreviewconsistedofevaluatingallAmericanSocietyofMechanicalEngineers(ASME)classandsafety-relatedpumpsandvalvestoassurethattheNMP2programplanscopecontainedapplicablepumpsandvalvesandassociatedcodetestingrequirements.Theresultsofthatreviewverifiedthattheprogramplancontainedapplicablecomponents;ifnot,theprogramplanwasrevised.Inaddition,thereviewassuredthattestingprocedureswereadequateandthattestswereperformedattheproperperiodicity.During1989-1990,NMPCperformedaverificationoftheASMESectionXIISIProgram.AgroupofNMPCengineersandconsultantsperformedthisreview.TheyverifiedthatweldsandsupportsrequiredbytheASMEcodewereintheprogramandthattheplanincludedprovisionstomeetthe10yearinspectionrequire'ments.Subsequently,someminorrevisionstotheprogramhavebeenimplemented.In1993,NMPCutilizedtheservicesofGeneralPhysicsCorporation,toperformareviewoftheNMP210CFR50AppendixJTestingProgram.Thereviewverifiedcommitmentstoandcompliancewiththetestingrequirementsof10CFR50AppendixJ.Thisreviewincludedapenetrationbypenetrationreviewofplantdrawings,andareviewofplantsurveillanceproceduresusedtoconductTypeA,B,andCtests.Inaddition,theNMP2AppendixJTestingProgramwasreviewedagainsttherequirementsof10CFR50AppendixJ,ANSN45.4-1972,Leakage-RateTestingofContainmentStructuresforNuclearReactors,ANSI/ANS56.8-1981,ContainmentSystemLeakageTestingRequirementsandNRCAppendixJInspectionProcedures.AreviewoftheremainderoftheNMP2SurveillanceProgramwasperformedutilizingtheservicesofVectraTechnologies,Inc.ThiseffortwascompletedinJanuary1995.Thiseffort31 II entailedathoroughreviewofNMP2TechnicalSpecificationsandapplicableprocedures.Wherewarranted,interviewswereconductedwithcognizantpersonnelresponsibleforthetesting.Requiredsurveillanceswereidentified,includingChannelChecks,ChannelFunctionalTests,ChannelCalibration,LogicSystemFunctionalTests,andothersurveillancetests.SpecificallyexcludedfromthisreviewwereASMESectionXIweldandsupport(ISI)surveillancerequirementsandtheAppendixIProgramsince,theyhadbeenpreviouslyreviewedasdiscussedabove.Thereviewalsoincludedthedocumentationofthebasisandthemethodformeetingeachtypeofsurveillancerequirement.Duringthistask,thefollowingtypesofinformation/sourceswerereviewed:DesignBasisDocuments(e.g.,FSAR,drawings)SystemDescriptionsandDesignCriteriaDocuments(DCDs)SystemLevelDrawings-pipingandinstrumentdiagrams(P&IDs),electricalsinglelineandschematics,logicdrawings,etc.InformationrelativetothedevelopmentoftheoriginalTechnicalSpecificationsandsubsequentamendmentsILicensingcorrespondenceVendorinformationrelatedtocomponentoperationandsurveillancerequirementsTestproceduresandresultsASMEXIPumpandValveProgram,includingdeviationrequestsApplicablesafetyanalysisInstrumentsetpointinformationandmethodologySystem/ComponentFailureModesandEffectsAnalysisApplicableEngineeringAnalysesIndustryCodesandStandardsNRCRegulationsandRGs'naddition,thebasisforacceptancecriteriaandhowthosecriteriarelatetothesurveillancerequirementwasdefined.Thiseffortincludedtheidentificationofthelimitsthatareprotectedbythespecification,thebasisfortheacceptancecriteriaalongwiththereferencestothesourcedocumentsfromwhichthesubjectinformationwasobtained,theacceptancecriteriaandsurveillancetestintervals,andadiscussionofthereasons.and/orbasesforanyexceptions.Theresultsoftheverificationeffortwerecompiledinasurveillancebasisdocument.TheresultantdocumentprovidedthebasisfortheTechnicalSpecificationSurveillanceProgramandmethodsofcompliancewiththesurveillancerequirements,andtheiracceptability.Inaddition,adatabasewasdevelopedwhichcreatedamatrixofsurveillancerequirements,implementingprocedures,andcomponents.Thisdatabasefileprovidestheendusertheabilitytosearchanyfieldtocompileuniquereportsofrequirements,procedures,and/orcomponents.Intheprocessofcompilingthisdocument,thebasisforeliminationofpossibleduplicationand/orunnecessarysurveillancerequirementswasexplored.Consequently,redundantorunnecessarysurveillancerequirementswereidentified.Furthermore,duringtheperformanceofthistask,areaswheresurveillancerequirementscouldbecombinedwereexplored.TheNMP232

~Iv~V evaluationalsofocusedonthesurveillanceprogram"process"andidentifiedweaknessesand/oromissionsthatmayhaveexisted.Alongwiththeidentificationofweaknessesand/orpotentialomissions,recommendedactionstoaddresstheareasofconcernwereproposed.AspartoftheTechnicalSpecificationreview,thePMSTdatabasewasreviewedtoverifycompliancewithTechnicalSpecificationrequirements,frequencyrequirements,andanyspecialmoderestraints.Ineachverificationeffortdescribedabove,theoverridingrequirement(e.g.,ASMEcodeorTechnicalSpecification)hasbeenverifiedandthedesignprogramplansandproceduresreviewed.Theprocessesconsidereddefinitionoftherequirement,comparisonofdesigntotherequirement,comparisonoftheprogramplanstotherequirementandreviewoftheimplementingprocedurestoensurecompliance.BasedupontheresultsofISI,IST,AppendixJandremainingTechnicalSpecificationsurveillancerequirementreviews,NMPChasahighdegreeofconfidencethatrequiredsurveillancesarebeingperformed,andthattheseprogramsareappropriatelyimplementingthedesignrequirements.Inadditiontotheabove,onJanuary10,1996,theCommissionissuedGenericLetter(GL)96-01,"TestingofSafety-RelatedLogicCircuits,"tonotifyaddresseesaboutproblemswithtestingofsafety-relatedlogiccircuits.ByletterdatedApril18,'1996,NMPCprovideditsinitialresponsetoGL96-01.OurletterstatedourintenttoperformanassessmentofNMP2surveillancetestprocedurestoverifythatlogiccircuitsofthereactorprotectionsystem,EmergencyDieselGenerator(EDG)loadsheddingandsequencing,andactuationlogicforengineeredsafetyfeaturesaretestedinaccordancewithTechnicalSpecifications.Moreover,ourresponserecognizedthatGL96-01requestedthatthisassessmentand,ifrequired,anyprocedurechangesbecompletedpriortostartupfromNMP2RefuelingOutageNo.6(RFO6)scheduledforSpringof1998.Afterdeterminingthescopeofworkandresourcerequirements,NMPCconfirmeditscommitmenttocomplete'theGL96-01assessmentand,ifrequired,procedurechangespriortostartupfromRFO6,byletterdatedAugust14,1996.OnMarch28,1996,NMPCpersonnelidentifiedthatfullcoreoffloadstothespentfuelpoolperformedduringrefuelingoutageswereoutsidethedesignbasesoftheplant.ThiseventwasdescribedinLicenseeEventReport(LER)96-03,Supplement1,"FullCoreOffloadandSpentFuelPoolCoolingSystemOperatingOutsideofDesignBasis."Correctiveactionincludedalessonslearnedtransmittaldescribingthisevent'ndtheneedtoperformanin-depthreviewandevaluationofdesignbaseswhenwritingand/orrevisingprocedures.TheBranchManagersreviewedthisissuewithpersonnelqualifiedtodoapplicabilityreviewsandsafetyevaluations.Also,inresponsetoLER96-03,Supplement1,aswellasindustryissuesconcerningUFSARdiscrepancies,areviewteamwasformedtoevaluateasampleofsystemscontainedintheNMP2UFSAR.Theteamwastaskedwithevaluatingthissampleofsystemstodeterminewhetheranyomissionsorerrorsexistbetweenplantproceduresandthelicensebasisdocuments.Todate,theseevaluationshaveindicatedthattheNMP2UFSARisgenerally33 4III accurateindescribingtheoperationoftheplant.Althoughdeficienciesandminorinconsistencieshavebeenidentified,theyhavebeendeterminednottoimpactplantoperation,performance,orbeareportableconditionoutsidethedesignbasisoftheplant.Theassessmentdoes,however,indicatethatNMPCshouldcontinuetofocusonimprovingtheaccuracyoftheUFSAR.Thisprocesswouldalsoconfirmthevalidityofthedesignbasisfortheremainingsystems,andimprovetheabilitytoefficientlymaintaintheUFSAR.~IAccordingly,wearecurrentlyfinalizingourplansfora'UFSARverificationeffort.Weintendtoperformacomprehensivereviewwhichwillbecompletedbytheendof1998.Thisreviewwillincludeprovisionforpromptevaluationofidentifieddeviationsforoperabilityandreportability.Itwillalsoassess,onanongoingbasis,whethertherearebroadunderlyingconcernsofdesignbasisrelatedinadequacies.TheUFSARVerificationProgramconfirmsNMPC'scommitmenttoensurethedesignbasisisreflectedintheday-to-dayoperationoftheunit,andthatplantpersonnelareknowledgeableandawareofthesignificanceofoperatingwithinthelicensingbasis.AsdescribedintheresponsetoRequestedAction(c),NMP2developedaprogramtoimplementa4.3%poweruprate.EngineeringreviewedGENSSSandturbinegeneratorchanges,NMP2designcalculations,'andaffecteddrawings,making,appropriatechanges.SelectedGenerationsystemengineersandOperationspersonnelthenreviewedtheEDCs.AffectedMaintenanceandOperationsprocedureswerereviewedandrevisedtoreflecttheupratedpowerconditionbasedonthenewdesignbasesrequirements.Thesereviewsprovidedtheopportunitytoexamineexistingproceduresandprovidesreasonableassurancethattheyaccuratelyreflectedtheexistingdesignbasis.IIIISignificantQAaudits(verticalslices)havebeenperformedintheareasofFireProtectionandServiceWaterinwhichareviewofproceduresagainstdesignbasisdocumentswasincluded.tAQAauditwasperformedin1995,underthecognizanceoftheSRAB,tomeettherequirementsoftheannual,bierinial,andtriennialfireprotectionauditsdescribedintheTechnicalSpecifications.Theauditobjectivesweretoevaluatethefireprotectionprogramandimplementingprocedurestoassuretherequirementsfordesign,procurement,fabrication,installation,testing,maintenanceandadministrativecontrolsfortherespectiveprogramsareincludedintheQATRandmeetprogramrequirementsestablishedbythelicensedocumentsandBTPAPCSB9.5-1,AppendixA-1976,SectionC.~AdditionalobjectivesweretoassesstheplantfireprotectionequipmentandprogramimplementationtoverifycompliancewiththeNRCrequirementsaddressedinlicensedocumentsandimplementingprocedures.TheauditteamconcludedthattheNMPNSFireProtectionProgramwasincompliancewithapplicableCoderequirementsandtheNationalFireProtectionAssociation(NFPA)fireprotection34

guidelines.Thefireprotectiondesignanddesignchangeprocesseswereconsideredaprogramstrength.Opportunitiesforprogramimprovementswereidentifiedwhichincludedattentiontodetailconcerningtheidentificationofrelateddocu'mentchangesneededwhenFireProtectionprogramchangeswereimplemented.DERswerewrittenagainsttheprogramwhichincludedinconsistencieswiththeFSAR,butnoneindicatedanymajorprogramflawsorviolations.The'auditevaluatedthedesigncontrolandprocurementdocumentcontrolprocessesforfireprotectionbyreviewingDDCsforrecentplantchanges/modifications,reviewingprocurementdocumentsforfireprotectionsystemreplacementitemsandconductinginterviewswithdesignengineeringandprocurementpersonnel.Theauditteamfoundthedesignchangecontrolprocessforfireprotectiontobeastrength,particularlyinregardstothethoroughnessofengineeringevaluationsforAppendixRrequirements.Qualitystandards,suchasfireprotectioncodes,werespecifiedindesigndocumentsanddeviationsfromthesecodesorstandardswereappropriatelycontrolled.Also,newdesignsandplantmodificationswerereviewedbyqualifiedpersonneltoensureinclusionofapplicablefireprotectionrequirements.Theauditteamalsoreviewedprocedures,instructionsanddrawingstoensurethatfireprotectionprogramelementshadbeenappropriatelyincorporatedintotheimplementingdocuments.Theteamalsoobservedpersonnelperformanceregardingfireprotectionproceduresandinterviewedpersonneltoassesstheimplementationoftheseproceduresandprogramelements.Theteamfoundthatthetrainingprogramsforfirefightingandfirepreventionwerebeingimplementedinaccordancewithdocumentedproceduresandthatthetrainingprogramsforfirebrigademembersmettheminimumrequirementsof10CFR50AppendixR.Theteamalsofoundthattheinstructions,procedures,anddrawingsfordesign,installation,inspection,test,maintenance,modification,andadministrationoffireprotectionactivitiesandsystemswerebeingproperlyreviewed,andcontainedappropriaterequirementsforcontrolofignitionsources,combustibles,precautionsandcompensatoryactionswhenfiresystemswereremovedfromservice.TheauditteamreviewedtheNMPNSUFSARAppendixB(NMPC-QATR-l),fireprotectionsurveillancetestprocedures,NFPAstandardsandfireprotectionrelatedworkdocumentstoensurethataprogramofindependentinspectionhadbeenestablished.Theauditteamalsoreviewedtestandsurveillanceproceduresandrelatedworkdocuments,witnessedtestingactivitiesandinterviewedpersonneltoverifythatatestprogramhadbeenestablished.Theteamfoundthatthetestproceduresincorporatedtherequirementsandlimitscontainedinapplicabledesigndocumentsandthattheschedulesandmethodsforperiodictestinghadbeenappropriatelydevelopedandimplemented.Theteamalsofoundthatfireprotectionequipmentandcommunicationsequipmentweretestedperiodicallytoassurethattheequipmentwouldproperlyfunctionandcontinuetomeetdesigncriteria.AnauditoftheNMP2ServiceWaterSystemwasconductedin1993toreviewsystemdesignandoperation,maintenance,testingandvariousregulatorycommitmentssuchasheatexchangerperformance(GL89-13),motor-operatedvalve(MOV)controlprogram(GL89-10)andcheckvalvemonitoringgNPOSignificantOperatingExperienceReport(SOER)86-03).35 e1III ThepurposeoftheauditwastodetermineiftheNMP2ServiceWaterSystemwasdesigned,operated,tested,andmaintainedtoassureperformanceofdesignsafetyfunctionsinresponsetopostulatedaccidentconditions,p'ostulatednaturalphenomena,andhazardoussysteminteractions.Theauditteamemployeddeep,vertical-slicetechniquesoriginallydevelopedbytheNRCSafetySystemFunctionalInspection(SSFQprogram.Specifically,theServiceWaterSystemwasreviewedtoevaluatesystemdesignandmodificationprocesses,andtoevaluatetheimplementationofthedesigninoperations,maintenance,testing,trainingandadministrativecontrolsprogram.Theresultsofthisaudit,93003-RG/IN"Unit2ServiceWaterSystem(GL-13),"werepresentedtotheCommissiononJune9,1993inKingofPrussia,PA.Theexecutivesummaryof93003-RG/INstatesthefollowing:"TheauditteamconcludedthattheNMP2ServiceWaterSystemissufficientlydesigned,operated,tested,andmaintainedtoassureperformanceofitsdesignsafetyfunctionunderpostulateddesignbasisaccidentconditions,includingthemostlimitingsinglefailures',postulatednaturalphenomena,orhazardoussysteminteractions.Continuingflowdegradationandrelatedtrends,similartothoseobservedatotherpowerplants,indicatethatcontinuingactionsandvigilanceareessentialtoassurelong-termavailability."ConcurrentwiththetimetheauditplanwasbeingpreparedtheCommissionissuedTemporaryInstruction2515/118,Revision1,ServiceWaterSystemOperationalPerformanceInspection(SWOP/."NMPCwasrequestedtoreviewtheirauditplanversustheNRCrequirementsandprepareamatrixtoensurethatallitemsoftheNRCInspectionManualwereaddressed.ThiswascompletedandpresentedtotheCommission.TheNMPCeffortatself-assessmentprecededtheissuancebytheNRCofInspectionProcedure40501,"LicenseeSelf-AssessmentsRelatedtoArea-of-EmphasisInspections.",Theoverall'conclusionwasthattheNMP2ServiceWaterSystemwassufficientlydesigned,operated,tested,andmaintainedtoassureperformanceofdesignsafetyfunctionsunderpostulateddesignbasisaccidentconditions.Thus,itcanbefurtherconcludedthattheSWPsystemdesignbasesrequirementshavebeentranslatedintooperating,maintenance,andtestingprocedures,Inconclusion,theseauditsweredesigned,inpart,toverifythatthedesignbasiswasproperlyreflectedintheapplicableoperating,maintenance,andtestingproceduresforthosefunctionalareas.Theresultsindicatethatwhilenotperfect,thereisareasonablebasisforconcludingthatgoalhasbeenaccomplished.Continualverificationthroughauditandsurveillanceactivitiesisamanagementexpectation.NMP2safety-relatedandnonsafety-relatedvendormanualswereoriginallyreviewedfortechnicalcontent,andgeneralapplicationtoNMP2andissuedforusebyourA/E.AftertheissuanceofGL83-28,vendormanualswereidentifiedtoacomponentlevelandaplant-specificapplicabilityreviewwasperformedforeachmanual,identifyingthoseportionsofthemanualapplicabletotheidentifiedcomponents.ThisapplicabilityreviewwasperformedbyaNMP236 N

Icontractorandwasgenerallyaccomplishedbyreviewingplant-specificdrawings.Thisactivitywascompletedinthelate1980's.InSeptember1990,NMP2initiatedaVendorManualUpgradeProgram.Thisprogram.involvedtheupdating(baselining)ofNSSSSystemLevelManualsandupdating225componentlevelvendormanualsforselectedsafety-relatedpiecesofequipment.TheupdatingofNSSSsystemmanualswascompletedbyourNSSSsupplierwiththeobjectivetoprovideabaselineupdateofNMP2'sNSSSsystemmanualstoreflectnewconfigurationinformation(i.e.,changesmadetotheplantsincethemanualsweresuppliedorlastupdated),newtechnology,BoilingWaterReactor(BWR)fieldexperienceinformationandareviewofServiceInformationLetterstoretrieveanyoperatingormaintenanceinformation.Thisprojectwascompletedin1996.NMPCupdatedselectedcomponentlevelmanuals.Theupdateprocessfocusedontwokeyelements:equipmentsuppliercomponentconfigurationchangesandareviewofnewtechnologies.Thereviewofnewtechnologiesincludedaninvestigationofoperatingexperiencesfromthesupplierswhichcouldprovideimprovedorsimplifiedoperatingandmaintenanceproceduresfortheequipment(i.e.,newlubricants,simplifiedassembly,orcalibratingprocedures,etc.).WhenapplicableneworrevisedvendormanualswereprovidedtoNMPC,theywerereviewedandapprovedbyNMPCEngineeringandthenissued,supersedingourcurrentrevision.ThisprojectwascompletedinSeptember1993.InNovember1991,actionswerecompletedtoimplementamethodtotrackandtrendthereviewandapprovalofvendormanuals.ThisinvolvedtheappointmentofaVendorManualCoordinator(VMC),andthecleanupandenhancementofthePlanningandSchedulingDatabaseintheCDS.MonthlyreportsarenowissuedbytheVMCtodepartmentsupervisorsandmanagementtoidentifymanualsthatare"inthereviewcycleandtheoverallstatusofmanualsissued,added,andbacklogged.InNovemberof1995,theprocessforvendormanualuseand.controlwasenhancedusingINPO'sGoodPracticeDE-102,INPO87-009,ControlofVendorManuals,asaguide.Thereviewprocessensuresplantpersonnelareprovidedwithcurrentandtechnicallyaccuratevendormanualstosupporttheoperationandmaintenanceandincludesthefollowing:I1.IdentificationoftheprimaryresponsibilitiesofvariousindividualsresponsibleforcontrolofvendormanualsincludingtheVendorDocumentCoordinator.2.Expectationsforturnaroundtimeforthereviewandapprovalofvendormanuals.3.Requirementsforthereceipt,review,approval,issue,,andrevisionofvendormanuals,andnotificationstodepartm'entsandresponsiblepersonnelfornewand/orrevisedvendormanuals.Thisnotificationservesasthetriggertostationpersonneltoreviewandreviseappropriateprogramsandproceduresiftheyareaffectedbyaparticularvendormanual.NMP237 Vi,il 4.Aprocessforplantpersonneltotakeexceptiontorequirementsspecifiedbyavendor.IIBasedontheabove,NMPCisconfidentthatplantpersonnelareprovidedwithcurrentandtechnicallyaccuratevendormanualstosupportplantoperationandmaintenance.TheVendorInterfaceProgramandtheinternalreviewandapprovalprocessassuresthatvendormanualinformationisreviewedagainstthedesignbasis.Thisprocessconfirmstheacceptabilityoftechnicalinformationthathasnotchanged,andidentifiesotherinformationthatrequiresrevision,NMP2isintheprocessofconvertingitscurrentTechnicalSpecificationstotheITS.NMP2isalsoconvertingfroman18-monthtoa24-monthoperatingcycle.Thisconversionprocessisdescribedbelow.IITheITScontainsagenericBaseswhichissubstantiallygreaterindetailthantheBasesofthecurrentTechnicalSpecifications.Duringtheconversionprocess(i.e.,draftingoftheproposedlicenseamendment)thegenericBasesoftheITSisreviewedandcomparedwiththeUFSARofNMP2.Incertaininstances,calculationsandanalysesarealsoreviewedduringtheconversionprocess.Inaddition,duringtheconversionprocessandonanas-neededbasis,theNRC's"SafetyEvaluationReportRelatedtotheOperationofNineMilePointNuclearStationUnit2"(NUREG-1047),includingitssixsupplements,isalsoreviewedbyNMPC.Basedonthesereviews,thegenericBasesoftheITSisappropriatelymodifiedtoreflecttheLicensingandDesignBasisofNMP2.tTheconversionofNMP2totheITSalsoincludesincreasingthelengthoftheoperatingcyclefrom18to24months.Each18-monthSurveillanceRequirementisevaluatedtodeterminethefeasibilityofincreasingitssurveillanceinterval.Thisevaluationincludesareviewofhistoricalmaintenanceandsurveillancedata,theUFSARandappropriatecalculations,analyses,andvendormanuals.Basedonthesereviewsandevaluations,theoperatingcycleofNMP2isexpectedtobeincreasedfrom18to24months.AsaresultoftheabovereviewsandevaluationsforITSand24-monthconversion,requiredchangeswillbemadetothefacility,anditscalculations,analyses,procedures,UFSAR,andvendordocuments.Inthoseinstanceswheretheconversionwillresultinnewormorestringentrequirements,plantprocedureswillbeappropriatelyrevisedandtherebymadeconsistentwiththedesignbasisoftheunit.Theaboveprocessprovidesassurancethatthedesignandlicensingbasisoftheplant,itsprocedures,andtheperformanceofplantequipment(i.e.,SSCs)willsupportconversiontotheITSandtoa24-monthcycle.ThefunctionofISEGistoexamineplantoperatingcharacteristics,variousNRCissuances,industryadvisories,'ERsandothersourcesofunitdesignandoperatingexperienceinformation,includingunitsofsimilardesign'whichmayindicateareasofimprovingunit38

'

safety.Thishasincludedindependentreviewsofplantactivities/programs,includingmaintenance,modifications,operationalconcernsandanalysis.TheISEGmakesdetailedrecommendationsforprocedurechanges,equipmentmodifications,maintenanceactivities,operationsactivitiesorothermeansofimprovingunitsafetytotheVicePresident-NuclearSafetyAssessmentandSupport.Manyofthereviews/assessmentsperformedtodatehavebeenrelatedtodesignbasesandconfigurationcontrolissues.IndustryoperationsexperienceitemsprovideNMPNSopportunitiestoconfirmthatdesignbasesrequirementsaretranslatedintooperating,maintenance,andtestingprocedures.Asaminimum,NRCBulletins,Notices,GLs,andINPOissuancessuchasSOERsandSignificantEventReports(SERs),aswellasvendorissuancesarereviewedtodetermineapplicabilitytotheNMPNS.NuclearDivisionpersonnelaredirectedtoinitiateaDERupondiscoveryofadeviation/eventorconditionadversetoqualityorwhenitisdeterminedthatanindustryexperienceisapplicabletotheNMPNS.TheDERprocess,asdescribedinourresponsetoRequestedAction(d),requiresadispositionandcorrectiveactions,asnecessary.SomeexamplesofoperationsexperienceitemsthathaverequiredNMPNStoconfirmand/ortakeactiontoconcludethatdesignbasesrequirementsarebeingtranslatedintooperating,maintenance,andtestingproceduresarediscussedbelow.ThepurposeofGL88-14,wastorequestthateachlicensee/applicantreviewNUREG-1275,Volume2,andperformadesignandoperationsverificationoftheinstrumentairsystem(IAS).AsstatedintheGL,theverificationshouldinclude"verificationthatmaintenancepractices,emergencyprocedures,andtrainingareadequatetoensurethatsafety-relatedequipmentwillfunctionasintendedonlossofinstrumentair."Inresponsetotherequest,NMPCreviewedthespecifiedproceduresandfoundthemtobeadequatetoensurethatthesubjectsafety-relatedequipmentwouldfunctionasintendedonlossofinstrumentairorduringdesignbasisaccidents.Inadditiontofurtherenhancemaintenanceofthesystem,anewsamplingprocedurewasdevelopedtotestforqualitycriteria,andexistingprocedureswererevisedtoaddressfilterchangeoutpracticesandcheckvalvetesting.ThereviewsandenhancementsconductedaspartofthisGLeffortprovideassurancethatfortheIAS,designbasishasbeenproperlytranslatedintoprocedures.NRCURIA-44,SBOwasconcernedwiththeabilityofanuclearpowerplanttocopewithatotallossofbothoffsiteandonsitealternatingcurrent(AC)electricalpower.TheNRCresolvedtheissuebyincorporatingrequirementsforcopingwithaSBOin10CFR50.63.39 4I0 AspartofNMPC'seffortstoaddressensuringcompliancewiththeserequirements,existingprocedureswerereviewedandmodifiedtomeet10CFR50.63requirementsandtheguidelinesinNuclearManagementandResourceCouncil(NUMARC)87-00.Aspartofthisreview,NMPCconfirmedthatexistingproceduresprovidedguidancewhichwouldpermittherestorationofACpowereitherfromoffsiteorfromtheemergencydieselgenerators.Additionally,corporateoperatinginstructionswereidentifiedthataddresstherestorationofoffsitepowertoNMP2andtheScriba,Substationfromvarioussources.ConfirmationoftheseexistingproceduralandoperatingcontrolsalongwiththoseaddedtomeetNUMARC87-00providesarationalethatoperatingproceduresadequatelyaddressthedesignbasisforlossofACpowerevents.IIIn1992,NMPCdevelopedanew,,trainingcourseentitled"Back-to-Basics."Thiscourseprovidedtrainingonlicensingbasisdocumentsandoperationwithinourlicensingenvelope,andwasdesignedtoresultinenhancementstoourmanagementandleadershipskills.Alsodiscussedwastheexpectationthatifworkcouldnotbeperformedwithinthecontrolsofaprocedure,theworkshouldstopandaresolutionobtainedbeforeworkcontinues.ThistrainingwasprovidedtoBranchManagersandselectedSupervisorswhowerethenresponsibletoteachthe"Back-to-Basics"coursetotheindividualworkgroups.'"Back-to-Basics'II"trainingwasconductedin1995-1996toassistorganizationsinunderstandinghowBack-to-Basicsrelatestotheirspecificjobs.Thistrainingincludedadiagramofourlicensebasisanddiscussionsof10CFR50,59and50.92,commitmentsmadetoOperationalExperienceitems,RGs,andindustrystandardsandhowwechangethese"commitments,adefinitionofoperabilitywithanemphasisonpostaccidentfunction,discretionaryenforcement,reportabilityrequirementsof10CFR50Parts72,73and21,andhowspecific.workactivitiesinteractwiththedesignbasis.Concerning50.59training,thebiennialrequalifiicationtrainingforpersonnelauthorizedtopreparesafetyevaluationsnowincludesaspecificdiscussionoftheconsequencesoffailingtoprepareaspecificevaluation.MembersoftheSeniorManagementTeamrecentlyattendedtherequalificationtrainingtoensuretheirexpectationsareincorporated,andtoheightenawarenessof10CFR50.59requirementsandissues.MembersoftheSORCandtheSRABarealsorequiredtoattendrequalificationtraining.OperationExperience,includingindustryevents,aretypicallyanalyzedfortrainingvalueinconjunctionwithDERdispositionsand,ifappropriate,areincludedinthecontinuingtrainingprogramforoperations,maintenance,engineering,chemistry,radiationprotection,andsupportorganizations.Routineandspecialtrainingperiodicallyresultsinenhancementstoprocedures.Operatorscanprocessprocedurechangeswhentrainingactivitiesshowthatthereisabetterwaytoaccomplishthespecifictask.Proceduresarereviewedperiodicallywithintenttopreventpersonnelerrors,ensurebetterunderstandin'g,andtrainpersonnelonthedesignorlicensing40, 4

IIbasisoftheplant.Anexampleofwhereanengineeringsupportcontinuedtrainingclassidentifiedaconcernwasthediscussionofcontrolroddriveflowandhowitisusedtocalculatecorethermalpower.Asaresultofthisdiscovery,configurationchangestotheplantprocesscomputerweremadetocorrectthedeficiency.Thishassincebeenidentifiedasanindustryproblemthatinitiatedactionatotherplants.AdministrativeproceduresandcontrolshavebeeninplacepriortoNMP2receivingalowpowerlicensetomandaterequirementsassociatedwiththepreparation,review,approval,andrevisionofoperating,maintenance,andtestingprocedures.Theseproceduresandprocessescontainappropriaterequirementswhichreasonablyensuredesignbasisrequirementsareincorporatedintoadministrativeandtechnicalprocedures.PersonnelqualificationrequirementsassurethatNMPCiscapableofimplementingtheprogramrequirements.ContinuousimprovementofprogramrequirementsandimplementationhasbeenaregularpracticeatNMPNS.Additionally,multipleassessmentshavebeenconductedwhichdemonstratetheoveralleffectivenessofvariousprogramsinthedesign/configurationcontrolandprocedurearea.Coupledtogether,theseactivitiesandprocessesprovidereasonableassurancethatdesignbasisrequirementsaretranslatedintooperating,maintenanceandtestingproceduresatNMP2.P41

Providetherationaleforconcludingthatsystem,structureandcomponentconfigurationandperformanceareconsistentwiththedesignbases.Duringthedesign,constructionandstartupofNMP2,arigorousQAProgramwasapplied.Thisprogramincludedproceduresandprocessesconsistentwith10CFR50,AppendixBrequiringproceduralizeddesigncontrolstoensuredesignadequacyandcheckingprocessesthroughoutconstructionandtestingtoconfirmthatEngineeringrequirementswereimplemented.TheNMP2initialtestprogrambeganassystems,components,andstructureswerenearingconstructioncompletion.TheobjectivesoftheprogramweretodemonstratethatplantSSCsoperateinaccordancewiththedesignperformancerequirementswhileutilizingtotheextentpossibleplantproceduresanddemonstrating,wherepractical,thattheplantiscapableofwithstandinganticipatedtransientsandpostulat'edaccidents.TheproceduresfortheNMP2StartupTestProgramrequiredtestengineerstoperformwalkdownsofthesystems/equipment.Markupsofmasterdrawingsweremaintainedandas-builtchangesweredocumentedaspartoftheprocess.Thisprogramincludedpreliminary,preoperational'andstartuptesting.Surveillancetestingandexaminationprogramshavebeenusedsincestartup.ThesetestsandexaminationsareformalizedbyproceduresandensurethatsurveillancesandtestsrequiredbyTechnicalSpecificationsandotherregulatorycommitmentsareestablished.'Thesetestsandexaminationsprovideaprimarybasistoensurethattheperformanceofsystemsmeetdesignbasesrequirements.Additionally,post-maintenanceandmodificationtestingisroutinelyperformedtoensurethatdesignbasesrequirementscontinuetobemetfollowingmaintenanceandmodificationactivities.Pressureretainingcomponentsarealsoroutinelytestedinaccordancewithin-serviceinspectionandtestingprograms.InadditiontoconfirmingthatSSCsmeetacceptancerequirements,thesetestingprogramsprovideamechanismtoidentifydeficienciesusingtheDERprocess.Additionaldesignverificationandpowerascensiontestingwasperformedaspartofthe4.3%poweruprateeffortimplementedin1995.OperationsExperienceandSSFIs/ElectricalDistributionSystemFunctionalInspections(EDSFIs)havebeenappliedtofurtherandmorespecificallyevaluateNMP2'sconformanceandperformanceagainstdesignbases.NMPC'sOperationsExperienceProgramevaluatesNRCBulletins,Notices,GLsaswellasotherindustryinputsincludingINPO'sSOERs,SERs,andvendorissuances.EvaluationssuchasEDSFIandOperationsExperienceincludeourassessmentofMOVcapabilityunderGL89-10,ServiceWaterSystemcapabilityunderGL89-13,InstrumentAirSystemcapabilityaspartofGL88-14,pumpdead-headingissuesasdescribedinBulletin88-04,andURIA-44,SBO.Theseassessments,coupledwithongoingevaluationsofplantperformance,assurethatconfigurationandperformanceparametersareupdatedasappropriate.42 I

~~~~~~~~~~~Theaboveactivities,coupledwithourcorrectiveactionprogr'amensureroutineproblemidentificationandevaluationofas-builtconditionsandtestresultsandprovidereasonableassurancethatcurrentperformanceandconfigurationareconsistentwiththedesignbases.NMPC'sresponsetoRequestedAction(a)providesadescriptionoftheengineeringdesignandconfigurationcontrolprocessescurrentlyinplaceatNMPNS,includingthosethatimplement10CFR50.59,10CFR50.71(e),andAppendixBto10CFRPart50.OurresponsetoRequestedAction(d)providesadetaileddescriptionoftheprocessesfortheidentificationofproblemsandimplementationofcorrectiveactionstopreventrecurrence(i.e.,theDER).NMPCisconfidentthatadherencetotheseprocessesprovidereasonableassurancethatNMPNSconfigurationandperformanceareconsistentwiththedesignbases.NMPCbasesthisconfidencenotonlyonthequalityoftheseprocesses,butonthemultipleefforts,reviews,inspections,tests,andauditsthathavetakenplaceandthatarecurrentlybeingtakentoassureconsistencybetweenourplantsandthedesignbases.Adiscussionofthesevariouseffortsisprovidedbelow.DuringtheNMP2licensingprocess,NMPCestablishedaprogramfortheverificationofthefinaldraftTechnicalSpecificationsandtheFSAR.Theverificationeffortconsistedofannotatingbothlicensingdocumentstocontrollingplantdocumentssuchasdrawings,'rocedures,specifications,andcalculations.Thiseffortincludedprovisionsforupdatingthelicensingdocuments,asnecessary,toreflecttheas-builtconfigurationoftheplant.TheverificationprogramprovidedassurancethattheplantwasconstructedinaccordancewiththeFSARandtheTechnicalSpecificationstobeissuedwiththelowpowerlicense.TheNMP2startupandtestprogramconsistedofthreephaseswhichbeganassystemsandcomponentsandstructureswerenearingconstructioncompletion.Theobjectivesofthestartupandtestprogramincludedthefollowing:Demonstrate,totheextentpractical,thattheplantSSCsoperateinaccordancewiththeirdesignandperformancerequirements.~Utilizeandevaluate,totheextentpossible,theplantprocedures.Demonstrate,wherepractical,thattheplantiscapableofwithstandinganticipatedtransientsandpostulatedaccidents.Thethreemajorphasesofthetestprogramprovidedasystematicandcontrolledapproachtoplantstartup.Thethreephases,preliminary-testing,preoperationaltesting,andstartuptesting,aredescribedinthefollowingparagraphs.43 l'"~I Preliminarytesting-testsperformedsubsequenttoreleaseoftheequipment,system,orstructurefromconstruction.Thistestphaseverifiedproperinstallationandoperationofequipment,systemsand,whereapplicable,structures.Preoperationaltesting-performedaftersystemturnoverandusuallypriortofuelloadtoverifythattheperformanceofplantsystemsandcomponentsmetapplicableperformancedesignandregulatoryrequirements.Twotypesoftestswereincludedduringpreoperationaltesting:ao\lPreoperationaltests-performedtoprovideverificationthatSSCsmetperformancerequirementsandsatisfiedthedesigncriteria.totheextentpossible.Thesetestswereperformedonsafety-relatedsystemsasspecifiedinRG1.68,systemsdesignatedundertheaugmentedQAprogram,andothersystemsimportanttoreactorsafetyorthesafeshutdownofthereactor.b.Acceptancetests-similartopreoperationaltestsexcepttheywereperformedonnon-safetysystemsandwerenotspecifiedinRG1.68.1Startuptesting-consistedoffuelloading,precritical,lowpower,andpowerascensionteststhatensurefuelloadinginasafemanner,confirmthedesignbases,demonstratedwherepracticalthattheplantiscapableofwithstandingtheanticipatedtransientsandpostulatedaccidents,andensuredthattheplantissafelybroughttoratedcapacityandsustainedpoweroperation.TheNMP2StartupProgramwasgovernedbySAPswhichrequiredtestengineerstoperformwalkdownsofthesystems/equipment.ComponentverificationandsystempreparationwerethetwophasesofthepreliminarytestactivitiesfortheStartupProgram.Componentverificationincludedinitialenergizing,calibration,logictesting,andequipmentoperation,whilesystempreparationincludedinitialsystemoperation.Yellowlinemarkupsofapplicablemasterdrawingsweremaintainedandas-builtchangesweredocumentedaspartoftheprocess.Insummary,theNMP2initialtestprogram'wasimplemented,todemonstrate,totheextentpractical,thattheplantSSCsoperatedinaccordancewiththeirdesignandperformancerequirementspriortocommercialplantoperation.ItalsodemonstratedthattheexistingplantconfigurationwasinconformancewiththeFSARdescription,withas-builtchangesdocumented.Followingcompletionoftheinitialtestprogram,routinesurveillancetestingandexaminationshaveprovidedtheprimarymethodbywhichperformanceandmaterialconditionofplantSSCsareconfirmedtobeconsistentwiththedesignbasis.Routinesurveillancetestingandexaminationsprovidesaprimarymethodbywhichtheperformanceandmaterialconditionofplantsystems,structuresandcomponentsareconfirmedtobeconsistentwithdesignbases.AnNDDestablishestherequirementsfordevelopmentandexecutionofaprogramforsurveillancesandtestsrequiredbytheTechnicalSpecifications,NMP244 0C regulatorycommitmentsincludingtheISTprogram,industryexperience,andspecialtestsandexperiments.AsurveillanceandtestprogramhasbeenestablishedtodemonstratethatSSCsperformsatisfactorilyinservice.Theregulatoryrequirementsareidentifiedintheoperatinglicense,TechnicalSpecificationsandUFSAR.Thesurveillanceandtestprogramisupdated,inpart,asaresultofdesignchanges,correctiveactionsidentifiedaspartoftheDERprocess,evaluationsofindustry,operatingandmaintenanceexperience,andchangestosourcerequirements.Also,requirementsforsurveillancesandtestsmeettherequirementsoftheASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCodeandRGsasappropriate.Specificproceduresaredevelopedforeachsurveillancetestandsimulate,totheextentpractical,theactualconditionsunderwhichthesystemmustoperateondemand.Post-maintenanceandmodificationtestsverifythecapabilityofSSCstoperformsatisfactorilyinservice.TheextentofthetestingiscommensuratewiththeworkperformedandtheimportanceoftheSSCtostationsafetyandreliability.Thetestrequirementsandacceptancecriteriafordesignchangesarederivedfromdesigndocumentsandsourcesforregulatoryrequirements.SSCdeficienciesandtestdataadversetrendsareevaluatedandaDERinitiatedasappropriate.AnNDDalsoestablishestherequirementsforthedevelopmentofISIandTestingprograms.ThisdirectiveappliestotheexaminationandtestingofthepressureretainingcomponentsoftheNMPNSreactorcoolantpressureboundaryandtocomponentsrequiredtobetestedinaccordancewiththeASMEBoiler&PressureVesselCode,SectionXI.UnacceptableexaminationortestresultswillresultintheinitiationofaDERandappropriatecorrectiveactions.SuchtestingandexaminationactivitiesassurethatSSCscontinuetoperformasdescribedinthedesignbasisdocuments.APowerUprate-PowerAscensionStartupProgramwasdevelopedandperformedtoimplementa4.3%powerupratein1995.TherequirementsfortestingwerederivedfromtheNMP2powerupratelicensingsubmittals,theNRCStaff'sSafetyEvaluationReportforpoweruprate,Chapter14oftheUFSAR,theGEpowerupratepowerascensiontestspecificationandtheTechnicalSpecificationsforpow'eruprate.TheresultsofthistestprogramwerereportedtotheNRCintheNMP2"PowerUpratePowerAscensionTestProgramInterimStartupReport,"Rev.1datedNovember1995,andrevisedperiodically.ThePowerAscensionProgramfollowedthenormalNMP2administrativeprocedures,andoneadministrativeprocedurespecificallywrittenfortheprogram,whichdelineatedthepowerupratepowerascensiontestrequirements.TheprogramtestcontrolsincludedSORCreviewofeachspecialtestprocedure,specialtestresults,andtestexceptions.TheManagerTechnicalSupportreviewedtheresultsofeachtestphaseandapprovedmovingtothenextphase.Aspartofthepoweruprateeffort,EngineeringreviewedtheGEpoweruprateevaluationsandanalysestransmittedtoNMPCandtheappropriateNMP2designcalculationsanddrawings.Theappropriatechangesweremade.TheassignedGenerationpersonnelreviewedsubsequentEngineeringchanges.Applicableprocedureswererevisedandupdatedtoreflecttheupratedpowerconditionandanynewdesignbasesrequirements.ThepowerascensionprogramNMP245 r'4r~."pl providedatestingevaluationtoconfirmtheperformanceandconfigurationofindividualsystemsandoverallstationoperationandcontrol'atvariouspowerlevels.IAnEDSFI(InspectionReportNo.50-410/93-81)wasconductedatNMP2fromNovember29,1993throughJanuary28,1994.Thisinspectionwasdirectedtowardareasimportanttopublichealthandsafety.Thepurposeofthisinspectionwastodeterminewhethertheelectricaldistributionsystemasdesigned,installed,andconfiguredatNMP2wascapableofperformingitsintendedsafetyfunctions.Inaddition,thisinspectionalsoincludedareviewofourself-assessmentoftheelectricaldistributionsystemandareviewofourresponsetothedeficientconditionthattheHighPressureCoreSpray(HPCS)SysteminjectionvalvefailedtoopenduringtestingasreportedinLER93-10.Basedontheteam'sindependentreviewofselectedelectricalandmechanicaldesignareas,andmaintenanceandtestareas,theteamdeterminedthatourelectricaldistributionsystemwascapableofperformingitsintendedfunction.Theteamalsodeterminedthatourself-assessmentwascomprehensiveandofhighquality,andthatouractionsinresponsetothedeficientconditioninvolvingtheHPCSsysteminjectionvalve'ereappropriate.Inaddition,asdiscussedinourresponsetoRequestedAction(b)underQAAudits,aSSFItypeauditwasperformedontheNMP2ServiceWaterSystem.ThepurposeofthisauditwastodetermineiftheSWPsystemwasdesigned,operated,testedandmaintainedtoassureperformanceofdesignsafetyfunctions.DetailsofthisauditcanbefoundinourresponsetoRequestedAction(b).Insummary,functionalinspectionsareconductedtodetermineifplantsystemsarecapableofperformingtheirintendedsafetyfunctionsasdesigned,installedandconfiguredand,therefore,providearationalethatSSCsconfigurationandperformanceareconsistentwiththedesignbases.IndustryoperationsexperienceitemsprovidetheNMPNSopportunitiestoconfirmthatSSCconfigurationandperformanceisconsistentwiththedesignbases.Asaminimum,NRCBulletins,Notices,GLs,andINPOissuancessuchasSOERsandSERs,aswellasvendorissuancesarereviewedtodetermineapplicabilitytotheNMPNS.NuclearDivisionpersonnelarerequiredbyprocedureandtrainedtoinitiateaDERupondiscoveryofadeviation/eventorconditionadversetoqualityorwhenitisdeterminedthatanindustryexperienceisapplicabletotheNMPNS.TheDERprocess,asdescribedinourresponsetoRequestedAction(d),requiresadispositionandcorrectiveactions,asnecessary.SomeexamplesofoperationsEI46

~IN'a experienceitemsthathaverequiredNMPNStoconfirmand/ortakeactiontoassurethatSSCconfigurationandperformanceisconsistentwiththedesignbasesareprovidedbelow:GL89-10requestedthatlicenseesdevelopandimplementaprogramtoensurethatMOVswitchsettings(i.e.,torque,torquebypass,positionlimit,overload)areselected,setandmaintainedsothatMOVswouldoperateunderdesignbasisconditionsforthelifeoftheplant.TheNMP2MOVProgram'PlanwasdevelopedinresponsetoGL89-10toidentifythescopeoftheprogramandassureproperdesignbasisreviewandconfirmation,thatsafety-relatedMOVscouldperformtheirdesignfunction.TheprogramexamineddesignbasisrequirementsofMOVsundertheprogramanddocumentedtheresultsofthisreviewunderNMPC'scalculationproceduretoassurefutureaccesstothisinformation.ThisreviewencompassedsuchdesignbasisdocumentationasapplicableUFSARsections,technicalspecifications,systemdesigncriteria,systemdescriptions,operating,andmaintenanceprocedures.Withthesedesignrequirementsfirmlyestablishedandverified,eachMOVwasevaluatedinasizingcalculationtoassuresufficientactuatorcapabilitytoperformdesignateddesignfunctions.AppropriateMOVmaintenanceproceduresweredevelopedtoperiodicallystaticallytest,performpreventativemaintenance,anddynamicallytestMOVs.'AselectednumberofMOVsweretestedunderdynamicconditionsasclosetodesignbasisdifferentialpressureasachievableinaccordancewithNMP2'sMOVtestinggroupingstudy.Wherein-situplanttestinginformationwasdeterminedinsufficienttovalidatedesignassumptionsusedinMOVsizingcalculations,applicableindustrydatawasappliedtosupplementNMP2information.Asaresultofthesereviewsandtestingresults,additionalsafetymarginwasidentifiedasdesirableforselectedMOVsandresultedinseveralmodificationstotheplantdesign.Modificationsperformedincludeactuatorreplacement,gearingchanges,andspringpackchanges.NMP2ispresentlyintheclosureprocessoftheGL89-10program.AsaresultofinspectorconcernsidentifiedduringtheGL89-10closureauditinOctober-November1996,additionalmarginisbeingaddedtothedesignbasisforseveralMOVs.Thiswillresultinseveraladditionalmodificationssuchasmotorreplacement,additionalgearingchanges,andpotentialactuatorreplacement,toassurereasonablefuturesetupcapabilityofMOVsduringperiodicverification.TheinspectoridentifiedthattheactualfieldsetupofNMP2'sMOVsprovidesufficientoperatingsafetymarginforcontinuedplantoperationbutthatadditionaldesignspecifiedandcontrolledmarginmaybewarrantedtoaddresspresentlyunknownvalvedegradationbetweenperiodicverifications.Insummary,theeffortsofGL89-'10haveprovidedaddedassurancethatMOVswilloperateasneededunderdesignbasisconditions.NMP247 IIyp IGL89-13statesthatnuclearpower'lantsmustensurethattheservicewatersystemisincompliancewiththeminimumrequirementsof10CFR50,AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriteria(GDC)44,45,and46,andAppendixB,SectionXI;ActionsweretakeninresponsetoGL89-,13toensurecompliancewiththeserequirements.Aspreviouslydiscussed,anauditoftheNMP2'ServiceWaterSystemwasconductedtoreviewsystemdesignandoperation,includingcommitmentstoGL89-13.ThisauditconcludedthattheNMP2ServiceWaterSystemwassufficientlydesigned,operated,tested,andmaintainedtoassureperformanceofdesignsafetyfunctionsunderpostulateddesignbasesaccidents.ltThepurposeofGL88-14wastorequestthateachlicensee/applicantreviewNUEEG-1275,Volume2,OperatingExperienceFeedbackReport-AirSystemsProblems,andperformadesignandoperationsverificationof.theIAS.InresponsetoGL88-14,NMPCverifiedandevaluatedtheIASdesignandoperation.SpecificequipmentanddesigndocumentenhancementswereidentifiedandmodificationsperformedtoenhanceIASreliabilityandperformance.Modifications/enhancementsincludedreplacementoftheIAScompressorsandaP&IDupgradetoprovideasummaryoftheendusersdownstream'ofeachrootvalve.AsystemwalkdownwasperformedtoverifytheP&IDvalvedata.Also,AutomaticDepressurizationSystem(ADS),MainSteamIsolationValve(MSIV),andSafetyReliefValve(SRV)accumulatorsizing,testmethodsandcalculationswerereviewedtoverifydesignandlicensingrequirementswerebeingmetandIASmodesofoperationwerewithintheoperationaldesignbasis.NRCBulletin88-04,requestedlicenseestoinvestigate'andcorrect,asappropriate,thepotentialforpumpdead-headingduetopump-to-pumpinteractionsandtheadequacyofinstalledminimumflowcapacityforsafety-relatedsystems.ForNMP2thereareonlytwosafety-relatedsystemsthatcouldhavetwopumpsrunninginparallelwithacommonminimumflowline,ThesesystemsaretheLowPressureCoreSpraySystem(CSL)andtheResidualHeatRemovalSystem(RHS).Theoriginaldesignwasfoundadequatetoprecludedead-headingofoneormorepumpsduringminimumflowoperation,andtherefore,andnocorrectiveactionswererequired.Thereviewidentifiedthreesystems;HPCS,CSL,andRHS,pumpswithpotentialforoperationforextendedperiodsonminimumflowafterasystemstartonaLOCAsignal.Therecommendationwastominimizetheamountoftimethepumpisinthe48 II tminimumflow'ode.Accordingly,theoperatingproceduresincludecautionsagainstextendedoperationintheminimumflowmode.I,Insummary,theconcernsofBulletin88-04havebeenaddressedprovidingreasonableassurancethatNMP2ECCSSystemswillperformconsistentwithdesignbases.NRCURIA-44,SBO,wasconcernedwiththeabilityofanuclearpowerplanttocopewithatotallossofbothoffsiteandonsiteACelectricalpower.TheNRCresolvedtheissuebyincorporatingrequirementsforcopingwithaSBOin10CFR50.63.Assessmentandimplementationof-theSBOrequirementsresultedinthefollowing:~Analyseswereperformedtoinsurethatcriticaldirectcurrent(DC)powersuppliesandassociatedinstrumentationrequiredforthe4-hourcopingdurationwereavailable.~Anemergencydieselgeneratortargetreliabilityof0.975wasshowntobesatisfied.~Analyseswereperformedtodemonstratethatcondensateinventoryfordecayheatremovalwassufficient,thatreasonableassuranceoftheoperabilityofSBOresponseequipmentwasdeterminedfortheeffectsofloss'ofventilation,andthatreactorcoolantinventorywasadequateunderSBOconditions.~Systemwalkdownswereperformedasnecessarytovalidatetheexistenceofadequatelighting,thatequipmentwasphysicallylocatedasdeterminedfromconfigurationdocuments,includingbreakerpositions,andthatplantequipmentcouldbephysicallycontrolledinthemannerassumedbytheprocedures.TheseeffortshaveprovidedassuranceofNMP2'sabilitytocopewithaSBO.Inspectionreportsandself-auditshaveconfirmedtheproperimplementationofthedesigncontrolsdescribedinresponsetoRequestedAction(a).Forthesereasons,theactivitiesassociatedwithSBOhelpprovideassurancethatsystem,structureandcomponentconfigurationandperformanceareconsistentwiththedesignbases.AhistoricalanalysiswascompletedoftheDERDataSystem.Specifically,asearchwasdonetodeterminethenumberofdesignandconfigurationcontrolissueswhichhavebeenidentified.Since1991,over1400DERshavebeeninitiatedwhichhadacausalfactorcode"DesignandConfigurationAnalysis."Theseincluded519DERsforNMP1,922DERsforNMP2,and21DERswhichwerecommontobothplants.ThenumberofDERsrelatingtodesignandconfigurationcontrolissueshasincreasedinmorerecentyears.Thespecificresultsareasfollows:49

DERsUnit1Unit2CommonTOTAL199120199215122819935079"131199484205,2941995204341548199615527610441Asameasureofsignificanceoftheover1400issuesidentified,wedeterminedthenumberofLERsidentifiedasaresultoftheseissues.Inthesametimeperiod,8oftheDERsforNMP1werereportedonLERsand10forNMP2.Thedetailsbyyearareasfollows:Unit1Unit2TOTAL1991199219931994019951996Oftheover1400DERsinitiatedsince1991,19wereinitiatedasaresultofNRCidentifiedissues.Thedetailsbyyearandunitareasfollows:DERs199119921993199419951996Unit1Unit2TOTAL00Insummary,theabovedataindicatesthat,NMPCisroutinelyidentifyingissuesassociatedwith'heNineMilePointDesignandConfigurationControlprocessesandprograms.Thefactthatthenumberofissueshasincreasedsince1991doesnotmeanthatdesignandconfigurationcontrolismoredeficient,butthatourabilitytoidentifyissuesisimproving.Also,becauseveryfewoftheseissuesresultedinreportableevents,thesafetysignificanceofmostissuesissmall.Theseresultssupportourbeliefthattheoveralldesignbasesforbothunitsaresoundandareunderconstantscrutinyandincreasedquestioningtoensurethatdiscrepancies,regardlessofsignificance,arepromptlyidentifiedandresolved.50

Describetheprocessesforidentificationofproblemsandimplementationofcorrectiveactions,includingactionstodeterminetheextentofproblems,actionstopreventrecurrence,andreportingtotheNRC.NMPCutilizestheDERastheadministrativetoolfordocumenting,evaluating(includingreportabilitytotheNRC),determiningcause,anddeterminingcorrectiveandpreventiveactionsforproblemsthatareidentifiedattheNMPNS.Problemidentificationresultsfromawiderangeofsources,whichincludein-houseevents,testingandinspectionactivities,observations,auditandsurveillanceactivities,self-assessments,andoutsideagenciesinspectionsandevaluationactivities.TheDERisalsousedasthetrackingtoolforOperationsExperienceissues.ThetextthatfollowsdescribesindetailtheNMPNS'sprocessforproblemidentificationandultimateresolution,thecornerstoneofwhichistheDER,andassociatedadministrativeproceduresthatensureeffectiveimplementationoftheprocess.AnNDDestablishestherequirementsfortheidentification,documentation,notification,evaluation,correction,andreportingofdeviations/events'orconditionsadversetoqualitythatmayimpactthesafeandreliableoperationoftheNMPNSorpersonnelsafety,withtheexceptionofcertainSafeguardsinformation.ThisNDDdirectseachNuclearDivisionemployee,aspartofhis/hernormalduties,tobealertforandtopromptlyidentifyeventsandnonconformingitems,includinghardwarefailures.Acontinuousassessmentofoperatingandindustryexperienceforimpactonsafeoperationisperformedandaformalprogramforreviewingindustryexperienceestablished.Asaminimum,NRCBulletins,Notices,GLs,andINPOissuancessuchasSOERsandSERs,aswellasvendorissuancesarereviewedtodetermineapplicabilitytotheNMPNS.NuclearDivisionpersonnelaredirectedtoinitiateaDERupondiscoveryofadeviation/eventorconditionadversetoqualityorwhenitisdeterminedthatanindustryissuanceisapplicabletotheNMPNS.Thedeterminationofreportabilityandoperabilityisthenperformedasnecessary,theDERdispositioned,andappropriatecorrectiveandpreventiveactionstaken.ANIPprescribesthemethodforprocessingDERsfortheidentification,documentation,notification,evaluation,correction,andreportingofconditions,events,activities,andconcernsthathavethepotentialforaffectingthesafeandreliableoperationoftheNMPNS.Thisinterfacingprocedureappliestoconditionshavinganadverseorpotentiallyadverseeffectonactivitiesimportanttonuclearsafety,industrialsafety,plantreliability,orhumanperformance,includingbutnotlimitedtothefollowing:NMP251 liI~I il~hardwarefailuresotherthannormalwearandtear;~hardwareorcomponentmalfunctionsresultingfromdesignormanufacturingdeviationsordefects;out-of-calibrationmeasuringandtestequipmentknowntohaveadverselyorpotentiallyadverselyaffectedotherplantequipment;non-complianceshavingnuclearsafetysignificance;adversepersonnelperformancesuchasfailuretofollowproceduresorviolationsofpersonnelsafetyrulesorpractices;radiationprotectiondeviations;~PMactivitiesnotcompletedbeforelatedateordeferraldate;~recurringcorrectivemaintenance/hardwarefailures;~humanperformanceproblems/issues;inadequatecorrectiveactionsortestfailures;deviationsfromdesigndocumentrequirements(otherthannormalwearandtear)includingstationconfigurationdiscrepancies;conditionsadversetofireprotectionsuchasfailures,malfunctions,deficiencies,deviations,defectivecomponents,uncontrolledcombustiblematerial,andnonconformances.Alsoapplicablearedeficiencies,concerns,orissuesresultingfromregulatoryagencies,industryandinternaloperatingexperience,inspections,observationsorpublications,reportableeventstotheNRCandotherregulatoryagencies,issuesresultingfromself-assessment,andissuesthatdonotmeettheabovecriteriabut,intheopinionofmanagement,warrantevaluation.ADERrequiresaconcisesummaryoftheeventordeviation,thecomponentnumber,ifapplicable,theidentifyingorganizationandadescriptionofanyimmediateactionstakentoplacetheplantinastableconditionortominimizepersonnelandequipmentsafetyhazards.TheDERinitiatorthenmusthand-delivertheDERtohisorherSupervisor.Ifthedeviation/eventcouldhaveanimpactonplantequipment,ispotentiallyreportable,orissecurityrelated,theDERishanddeliveredtotheSSS/AssistantStationShiftSupervisor(ASSS)forreportabilityandoperabilitydeterminations.52 U

AnoperationsadministrativeprocedureestablishesamethodfordeterminingtheoperabilityofSSCs.ThisoperationsadministrativeprocedurewasspecificallydevelopedtoprovideguidancetoOperationspersonnelasnecessarywhenmakingoperabilityassessmentsofSSCsthathavebeenidentifiedonDERsorWorkOrdersasbeinginadegradedornonconformingcondition.IncludedinthisprocedureisanOperabilityChecklistwhichdocumentsthedecisionaffirmingthecapabilityofasystem/componenttoperformitsspecifiedfunctionasrequiredbytheTechnicalSpecificationsortheFSAR.GuidanceprovidedintheprocedureindicatesthataSSCiseitheroperableorinoperableatalltimes.Operabilitydeterminationsarerequiredtobeperformedpromptly(inmostcaseswithin24hours),withatimelinessthatiscommensuratewiththepotentialsafetysignificanceoftheissue.ForSSCsinTechnicalSpecifications,theSSS/ASSSusesthetimelimitcontainedinthespecificLimitingConditionforOperation(LCO)actionstatementasguidancetodeterminesafetysignificance.Engineeringmayberequestedtosupportanoperabilitydetermination.AnEngineeringSupportingAnalysismustbecompletedwithin5daysofnotificationorasdirectedbythePlantManagerbasedonthesignificanceofthedeviation.InordertodeclareanSSCoperablewhiletheengineeringreviewisbeingperformed,operationspersonnelmusthavereasonableassurance,basedonthebestinformationavailable,thattheSSCiscapableofperformingitsdesignfunctionifcalledupon.Intheabsenceofreasonableassurance,orifmountingevidencesuggeststhefinalanalysiswillconcludetheSSCcannotperformitsspecifiedfunction,theSSCisdeclaredinoperableandtheappropriateactionsimplemented.WhenEngineeringispreparinganEngineeringSupportAnalysis,theindividualmustconsiderthefollowing;calculations,testresultsandotherdocumentationwhichdefinetheSSCdesignbasis;thepotentialadverseaffectsonsafetyandTechnicalSpecification;thelengthoftimetheconditionhasbeenandwillremainineffect;foreachequipmentfunctionadverselyimpacted,theimpactonrelatedsystemfunctions;foreachsystemfunctionadverselyimpacted,theimpactonanyequipmentorsystemssupportedbytheimpactedsystemfunctions.TheEngineeringSupportAnalysismustbeofsufficientdepthtoprovidealogicalanddefensiblebasisforoperabilityconclusionsandtodeterminewhethera10CFR50.59safetyevaluationisrequiredtosupportanyoperabilitydecisions.Guidancetodetermineifadeviation/eventisreportabletotheNRCisprovidedbyaNIP.TheNIPprovidesasummaryoftherequiredNRCnotificationsandreportsandtheresponsibleorganizations.Followingreportability/operabilitydeterminationactivities,theDERisdeliveredtothePlantManager'sofficebytheendoftheoperatingshift.Theplantmanager,basedonthesignificanceofthedeviation,assignsacategorytotheDERfordispositioning.ThedispositiontotheDERrequiresthataRootCauseEvaluationbeperformedanddocumentedintheDERifthethresholdguidelinesforperformingaformalrootcausearemet.AformalrootcauseisperformedforallCategory1(highestsignificancecategory)DERsandintheeventofanyofthefollowing:NMP253 1)PI~

~asevereorunusualplanttransient;~safetysystemmalfunctionorimproperoperation;~majorequipmentdamage;~othereventsinvolvingnuclearsafetyorplantreliability;~fuelhandlingorstorageevent;~excessiveradiationexposureorseverepersonnelinjury;~excessivedischargeof,radioactivity;'radeficiency'indesign,analysis,operations,maintenance,'testing,proceduresortrainingthatcouldcauseasignificanteventasdescribedabove.TheDERprocedurerequiresthatpersonnelperformingrootcauseanalysisbequalifiedinthetechniquesofrootcauseanalysis.Apparentcausedeterminationsareusedwhenaformalrootcauseevaluationisnotrequired.ApparentorrootcausesarevalidatedforpotentiallysignificantDERsbyensuringadeviation/eventwouldnothaveoccurredhadthecausenotbeenpresent,thatthedeviation/eventwillnotrecurduetothesamecausalfactor(s)ifthecauseiscorrectedoreliminated,andthatcorrectionoreliminationofthecausewillpreventrecurrenceofsimilarconditions.TheconditionisassignedaDeviationEventTrendCodefortrackingpurposes.AdispositiontotheDERisthengeneratedwhichincludescorrectiveactionsandforpotentiallysignificantDERs,preventiveactionstopreventrecurrence.Referencestocurrentandapproveddesigndocuments,procedures,instructionsforrepairs,retest/inspectionrequirements,acceptancecriteria,supportingsketchesanddocumentationareincludedasappropriate.IftheDERisforanindustryissuance,thepotentialimpactonequipmentdocumentssuchasvendormanualsandvendordesigndocumentsisidentified.TheproceduregoverningtheDERprocessrequiresthatifaDERisanonconformanceandnotcorrected,thenonconformancewillbeassessedforimpactontheUFSAR.IfanonconformanceresultsinadeviationfromtheUFSAR,theplantmanagerisnotifiedandthenonconformancemustbereconciledwithinsixmonthsofthedeviation(orearlierasdeterminedbytheplantmanager).Thedispositionwillimplementthefollowingasappropriate:1)restorethenonconformancetocompliancewiththeUFSAR;or2)changetheUFSARpertheNIPgoverningapplicabilityreviewsandsafetyevaluations;or3)ifitisnotpossibletocorrectthenonconformancewithinsixmonths(suchasifaplantoutageisrequired),provideanEngineeringSupportAnalysisthatsupportsoperationwiththenonconformancefortheperiodoftimerequired.Anonconformanceisdefinedasadeficiencyincharacteristic,documentation,orprocedurethatrendersthequalityofanitemunacceptableorindeterminate.DERdispositionsmustbeapprovedbytheappropriateBranchManager,andifrequired,bytheSORCandtheplantmanager.DERsarenotcloseduntilrequireddispositionactionshavebeencompletedandidentifieddeficiencieshavebeencorrected.FinalclosurerequiresaBranchManagersignature.NMP254 0I<we TrendinformationisgeneratedbytheQAdepartmentusingtheTrendCodesportionoftheDERdatabase.ReportsaresubmittedtotheBranchManagersonaquarterlybasis.BranchManagersareexpectedtoinvestigateandevaluatetrendsidentified,toassesstheirstrengthsandweaknesses,andtodeterminewhattypesofcorrectiveactionshavebeeneffectiveandwheretheyneedtoimprovep'erformanceintheirbranch.ANIPprovidestheadministrativecontrolsforcommunicationof"lessonslearned"informationthroughouttheNuclearDivision.ALessonsLearnedTransmittalisusedwhenitisnecessarytocommunicateappropriateactionsthatshouldbeencouragedorinappropriateactionsthatmustbepreventedfromrecurring.LessonsLearnedTransmittalscontainadescriptionoftheevent,causeofevent,andlessonslearnedandtypicallyresultfromdispositioningDERs.AnNDDgoverningsafetyreviewsestablishestherequirementsforthe'developmentandexecutionofaprogramfortheplanned,systematicreviewoftheoperationofNMPNSandtoassignresponsibilityforimplementingthoserequirements.SafetyrevieworganizationsincludetheISEG,theSORC,andtheSRAB.TheresponsibilitiesforeachofthesegroupsisdelineatedintheplantTechnicalSpecifications.TheISEGgroupfunctionstoexamineunitoperatingcharacteristics,NRCissuances,industryadvisories,LERs,andothersourcesofunitdesignandoperatingexperienceinformation,includingunitsofsimilardesign,whichmayindicateareasforimprovingunitsafety.TheISEGmakesdetailedrecommendationsforprocedurechanges,equipmentmodifications,maintenanceactivities,operationsactivities,orothermeansofimprovingunitsafetytotheVicePresident-NuclearSafetyAssessmentandSupport.Thisincludesassessmentsofplantmaintenance,modification,andoperationsactivitiesaswellasassessmentsofdesignbasesandconfigurationcontrolissues.TheISEGiscomposedoffive,dedicated,full-timeengineerslocatedonsite.TheSORCfunctionstoadvisetheplantmanageronallmattersrelatedtonuclearsafety.TheSORCisresponsiblefortheinvestigationofallviolationsoftheTechnicalSpecifications,includingthepreparationandforwardingofreportscoveringevaluationandrecommendationstopreventrecurrence,totheVice-PresidentandGeneralManager-Nuclear,andtotheSRAB.TheSORCisalsoresponsibleforthereviewofallreportableevents,reviewofunitoperationstodetectpotentialhazardstonuclearsafety,performanceofspecialreviews,NMP255 4P investigations,oranalysesandreportsasrequestedby,thePlantManagerortheSRABandreviewofsafetyevaluationsandanalysesresultingfromTechnicalReviewandControlActivitiesdescribedinSections6.5.2.1,6.5.2.2,6.5.2.3,and6.5.2.5oftheTechnicalSpecifications.ANIPprovidestheadministrativecontrolsandconductoftheSRABtoensurethattheExecutiveVicePresident-GenerationBusinessGroupandChiefNuclearOfficerisadvisedonmattersofnuclearsafety.TheSRABiscomposedofaChairmanand12membersincludingfournon-NMPCmembers.TheSRABprovidesanindependentreviewandauditofdesignatedactivitiesintheareasofplantoperations,nuclearengineering,chemistryandradiochemistry,metallurgy,instrumentationandcontrol,'radiologicalsafety,mechanicalandelectricalengineeringandQA.TheSRABreviewssignificantoperatingabnormalitiesordeviationsfromnormalandexpectedperformanceofplantequipmentthataffectnuclearsafety,allreportableevents,allrecognizedindicationsofanunanticipateddeficiencyinsomeaspectofdesignoroperationofstructures,systemsorcomponentsthatcouldaffectnuclearsafety,andreportsandmeetingminutesoftheSORC.AuditsofunitactivitiesthatoccurunderthecognizanceoftheSRABencompass,butarenotlimitedto,theconformanceofunitoperationstoprovisionscontainedwithintheTechnicalSpecificationsandapplicablelicenseconditions,theresultsofactionstakentocorrectdeficienciesoccurringinunitequipment,structures,systemsormethodsofoperationthataffectnuclearsafetyandtheperformanceofactivities'requiredbytheOperationalQAProgramtomeetthecriteriaof10CFR50AppendixB.TheQADepartmentreviewsNMPNS'sadherencetoengineeringdesignandconfigurationcontrolproceduresandprograms.Thethreegroups'whichspecificallydothisareaudits,,inspection,andQualityVerificationandSafetyAssessment(QVSA).TheAuditGroupperformsauditswhichmeettherequirementsofTechnicalSpecifications,UFSAR/USARAppendixBandAppendixBto10CFRPart50.Auditsarescheduledandplannedbasedonamatrixpreparedtoreflectthelicensebasisandinternalrequirements.InsomecasesauditsareperformedfortheSRAB.Auditplanningconsidersresultsfrompreviousaudits,surveillancesandinspectionsandtakesintoaccountDERs,trends,internalandexternalperformanceinformation,NRCandINPOperformancecriteriaandreports,andapplicabledirectivesandprocedures.Auditsareperformedinaccordancewiththeapprovedplans,TheDERprocessisusedtodocumentanydeviationsandnonconformancesidentifiedduringauditorsurveillanceactivities.QAreviewsthedispositionofauditinitiatedDERsandfollowsupontheirclosureinsubsequentsurveillancesandaudits.Auditresultsarecommunicatedtoappropriatemanagementthroughexitmeetingsandauditreports.TheInspectionGroupperformsexaminations,inprocess,andfinalinspectionsinaccordancewithcodes,standards,regulationsorasspecifiedbyNuclearEngineeringacceptancecriteria.ThisgroupindependentlyconfirmsthatcriticalcharacteristicsidentifiedbyEngineeringmeetacceptancecriteria.Otherinspectionsandexaminationsmaybeperformedonselectedoperationswhereit56 I44 isdeemednecessarytoverifyconformancetospecifiedrequirements.TheDERprocessisusedtodocumentnonconformances.TheQASurveillanceProgramisperformedbytheQVSAGroup.Surveillancetopicsarescheduledbasedoninputfromotherorganizations,previoussurveillanceresults,currentactivities,projectsandprogramchanges,DERsandregulatorycommitments,upcomingaudittopicsandauditresults.Surveillancesreviewperformanceinseveralways.Theseincludeprocessmonitoringwhichevaluatesaselectionofongoingworkactivitiestodetermineeffectivenessandconformancetorequirements,productreviewwhichreviewsselectedoperations,maintenance,engineeringandsupportgroupworkoutputstoevaluatequalityandtechnicalcontent,andcomponentconfigurationreviewwhichevaluatesthecontinuingdesigncontrolofselectedplanthardwarebyreviewingcurrentconfigurationagainstthedesignbasisandsubsequentdesignchangesandreplacements.TheDERprocessisusedtodocumentanydeviationsandnonconformances.Also,theeffectivenessoftheoperationsexperienceprogram(screeningandimplementation)isperiodicallyreviewedduringQVSAsurveillancesandQAaudits.Severalorganizations,includingINFO,ANI,andANII,providethirdpartyreviewsfortheNMPNS.NMPCpersonnelareresponsibleforinterfacingwiththeseorganizationsanddocumentingtheirfindingsonDERsasdiscussedabove.INPOevaluationscurrentlyreviewtheNMPNSusingINPOCriteria90-015,"PerformanceObjectivesandCriteriaforOperationandNear-termOperatingLicensePlants."ANIIevaluationsreviewtheplants'esignconformanceandmaintenanceofASMESectionXI.AnANIIInspectorisassignedfulltimetoNMPNS.Thisinspectorverifiesthat,asneeded,therequiredASMEexaminations,systemhydrostatictesting,andrepairsareperformedanddocumentedcorrectly.FindingsaredocumentedandresolvedusingtheDERprocess.ANIevaluationsaredonetodetermineinsurancepremiums.TheNMPNSadherencetocodesanddesigncriteriaarespecificallyreviewed.Theevaluationsarebrokenintotwoparts,'ireProtectionandPressureSystem(BoilerandMachinery).FindingsfromtheANIevaluationsaredocumentedandresolvedusingtheDERprocess.TheANIreviewstheresolutionofeachofitsfindingsandevaluatesthemtodetermineiftheywereacceptableforclosure.ANIPestablishestheself-assessmentprogramtoachievehigherstandardsofqualityandperformance.Eachnucleardivisionbranchmanagerensuresthatatleasttwobranchself-assessmentsareperformedannually.Atleastoneself-,assessmentnormallyinvolvesanassessmentofthecorrectiveactionprogramtodetermineifadverseconditionsandcommoncausesreceiveappropriatemanagementattention,andthatcausesfrompreviousself-assessmentfindingswereaddressedandactionstakenwereeffective'.Areastobeconsideredwhendevelopingself-assessmentschedulesincludeactivitiesthatexhibitnegativetrendsbasedoninformation'romtheDERdatabase.TheassessorensuresaDERisgeneratedforself-assessmentfindingsthatmeettheDERinitiationcriteria.Further,branchmanagersmeetwiththeSeniorManagementTeamtoreviewtheresultsoftheirfindings.Theresults,methods,57

andplannedcorrectiveactionsarediscussedwith'theSeniorManagementTeamtoassuretheadequacyoftheassessmentsandresultantcorrectiveactions.SurveillancetestingandplantexaminationsasrequiredbytheTechnicalSpecificationsandtheASMECodeareanadditionalmeansofverifyingequipmentiscapableofperformingitsintendedfunctionandidentifyingproblems.SurveillancetestingandexaminationsarediscussedinourresponsetoRequestedAction(c).Seniormanagementhasstatedthattheysupporttheworkers'ighttoraisesafetyissuesandthatthoseworkerswhoraisesafetyconcerns"willnotbesubjectedtoharassment,intimidation,ordiscrimination.Seniormanagementrecognizesthatthepreferredvehicleformostemployeesforidentificationandresolutionofconcernsisthroughthenormallineorganization.Seniormanagementprovidessupporttolinesupervisioninaddressingconcernsraisedthroughthenormallineorganization.Notwithstandingresolutionofproblemsinthenormallineorganization,seniormanagementalsoprovidesforandsupportsaconfidentialemployeeconcernsprogramtoaddressconcernsraisedbyworkers.ANIPgoverningtheQ1Pprovidestheadministrativecontrolsfortheconfidentialreportingofconcernsandsubsequentevaluationandcorrectiveaction.ThisprocedureappliestoNMPCemployeesandcontractorshavingsafety,quality,andnonsafety-relatedconcerns.InadditiontothereportingactivitiescontrolledthroughtheDERprocess,NMPCmaintainsapositiveandprofessionalworkingrelationshipwithNRCpersonnelthroughforthrightcommunicationofidentifiedproblemsandtheactionstakentothoroughlyevaluateandcorrectsuchdeficiencies.NDDsandNIPsestablishaprimaryinterfacewiththeNRCthroughtheLicensingBranchwithcertainexceptions,Training,emergencypreparednessandsecurity,havedirectNRCinterfaces.ThePlantManagersaredesignatedtohavetheprimaryinterfacewiththeNRCResidentInspector(s).Eachorganizationorpositionhasdefinedresponsibilitiestomanagetheirrespectiveinterfacesforvariousformsofcommunication.First,formalinterfacesincludeon-siteinspectionsorinvestigations,technicalormanagementmeetings,andtelephoneconferencesinresponsetorequestsforinformationonanyissue.Secondly,informalcommunicationsareinitiatedtoprovidepertinentinformation"totheResidentInspectorortheNuclearReactorRegulation(NRR)ProjectManagerconcerningsituationsthatwouldnototherwiserequirereporting.Inaddition,aspartoftheiroverallmanagementresponsibilities,thePlantManagersroutinelymeetwiththeResidentInspectionStafftokeepthemapprisedonthestatusofplantoperationsanddevelopmentsonspecificissues,includingtheresolutionofidentifieddeficiencies.Otherseniormanagersdothesameperiodicallyforissuesintheirrespectivefunctionalareas.58

IITheLicensingstaffroutinelyassistsandadvisesthePlantManagerswithrespecttotheirsiteNRCinterface,andmaintainsanormalinterfacewiththeNRRProjectManageronlicensingmattersrequiringStaffinvolvement.Typically,thisincludeslicenseamendmentapplications,GLandBulletinresponsereviews,andresolutionofavarietyoftechnicalissues.Inaddition,LicensingregularlyadviseseachNMPCdepartmentonlicensebasesissuestoassurethatproblemidentificationandcorrective/preventiveactionspecificationareconsistentwiththatbases,theregulationsandNMPCcommitments.Theproceduresalsoassurewrittencommunications,includingincomingandoutgoingcorrespondence,meetingminutes,andreports,areappropriatelydistributed,reviewed,andaddressed.Inaddition,proceduresprovideforoutgoingcorrespondencetoreceiveathoroughmanagementreviewpriortosubmittaltoensureitsaccuracy.NMPCmaintainsaprocessfortrackingdocketedcommitmentscontainedinsuchcorrespondence(bothincomingandoutgoing)toassuretheyarecompletedinatimelymanner(i,e.,NCTS)."WhiletheNCTSsystemfocusesondocketedcommitments,theDERsystemtracksthecompletionofotherassociatedactions.StationpersonnelhavereceivedtrainingontheDERprocedureandasprocedurerevisionsaremade,follow-uptrainingisconductedwithintheindividualdepartments.Stationpersonnelalsoreceiveappropriatereportabilitytrainingrelatedtotheirspecificjobfunction(e.g.,Operationsreceive10CFR50.72,50.73training).VariousstationpersonnelhaveattendedformalHumanPerformanceEvaluationSystem(HPES)rootcausetrainingandsimilartraining(e.g.,barrieranalysis,etc.)andarecapableofperformingarootcausedetermination.TheDERprocedurecurrentlyrequiresthattheappropriateBranchManagerensureaRootCauseEvaluationisperformed,whenrequired,andthattheindividualassignedisknowledgeableinthetechniquesofRootCauseAnalysis.SORCandSRABmembersreceiveSafetyEvaluatortrainingandQualifiedApplicabilityReviewerSafetyEvaluator(QARSE)requalificationtraining.QARSEtrainingisextensivewiththeinitialtrainingsessionlastingthreedaysandcontinuedtraininglastingfourhourseverytwoyears.Approximately400NMPNSemployeesaretrained(asQARSE)includingmembersofeachoperatingshift.59

Describetheoveralleffectivenessofyourcurrentprocessesandprogramsinconcludingthattheconfigurationofyourplantisconsistentwiththedesignbases.BasedupontheinformationpresentedinourresponsestoRequestedActions(a),(b),(c),and(d),NMPChasevidencethatreasonableassuranceexiststhatdesignbasesrequirementsarebeingtranslatedintotheappropriate.procedures;thatSSCsconfigurationandperformanceareconsistentwiththeirdesignbases;andthataneffectiveadministrative,toolfordocumenting,evaluating,determiningcauseandappropriatecorrectiveandpreventiveactionsexistsatNMPNS(i.e.,theDERsystem).AsdiscussedinourresponsetoRequestedAction(c),duringthedesign,constructionandstartupofNMP2,arigorousQAProgramwasapplied.Thisprogramincludedproceduresandprocessesconsistentwith10CFR50,AppendixBrequiringproceduralizeddesigncontrols.ThesedesigncontrolsweretoassuredesignadequacyandcheckingprocessesusedthroughoutconstructionandtestingconfirmedthatEngineeringrequirementswereimplemented.TheNMP2initialtestprogramandPowerUpratedemonstratedthatplantSSCsoperateinaccordancewiththedesignperformancerequirements.Thiswasdemonstratedwhileutilizing,totheextentpossible,plantproceduresanddemonstratingwherepracticalthattheplantiscapableofwithstandinganticipatedtransientsandpostulatedaccidents.Surveillancetestingandexaminationprogramshavebeenimplementedsinceinitialstartup.ThesetestsandexaminationsareformalizedbyprocedurestoassurethatsurveillancesandtestsrequiredbytheTechnicalSpecificationsandotherregulatorycommitmentsareestablished.Thesetestsandexaminationsprovideaprimarybasistoassurethatperformanceofsystemsmeetdesignbasesrequirements.Additionally,post-maintenanceandmodificationtestingisroutinelyperformedtoassurethatdesignbasesrequirementscontinuetobemetfollowingmaintenanceandmodificationactivities.Pressureretainingcomponentsarealsoroutinelytestedusingin-serviceinspectionandtestingprograms.InadditiontoconfirmingthatSSCsmeetacceptancerequirements,thesetestingprogramsprovideamechanismtoidentifydeficienciesusingtheDERprocess.4PowerascensiontestingwasperformedatNMP2aspartofthe4.3%poweruprateeffortimplementedin1995.SSFIshavebeenconductedtodetermineifselectedplantsystemsarecapableofperformingintendedfunctions.IndustryOperationsExperienceisalsoroutinelyappliedtofurtherandmorespecificallyevaluateNMP2'sperformanceandtheplant'sconformancewithdesignbases.Thesetypesofactivities,coupledwithourcorrectiveaction,program,assureroutineproblemidentificationandevaluationofas-builtconditionsandtestresults.Thisprovidesreasonableassurancethatthecurrentplantperformanceandconfigurationareadequatelyconsistentwiththedesignbases.'0

AsdiscussedinourresponsetoRequestedAction(b),administrativeproceduresestablishrequirementsforthepreparation,review,andapprovaloftechnicalprocedures.Technicalproceduresimplementrequirementsfortheoperation,maintenanceandtestingdescribedintheOperatingLicense,TechnicalSpecificationsandUFSAR.Duringtheinitialdevelopment,reviewandapprovalofoperating,maintenance,andtestingprocedures,areviewofdesigndocumentswasconducted.Thisreviewencompasseddesigndrawings,DesignSpecificationDataSheets,vendormanuals,TestLoopDiagrams,TechnicalSpecifications,andtheFSAR.Additionaltechnicalreviewsincludeddesignwalkdownverifications,andinthecaseofpreoperationaltestprocedures,reviewofapplicableengineeringdesigncalculationstoassurethattheas-builtsystemmetdesignrequirements.Designvaluesforvariousparameterswereincludedthroughouttheinitialtechnicalprocedures.Followingtheapprovalofinitialoperating,maintenance,andtestprocedures,technicalaccuracyoftheprocedureswasmaintainedthroughprogramcontrolsforprocedurerevisionandperiodicreview.Theseprogramshavebeencontinuallystrengthenedovertime.NMPChasutilizedknowledgeableandappropriatelyqualifiedindividualstodevelop,review,approve,andreviseprocedures.Programrequirementshavebeeninplacesinceinitialdevelopmentofprocedures.Theseprogramshavebeenenhanced,overtime,toimprovetheeffectivenessofthedevelopment,reviewandapprovalprocess.Thetrainingprogramandotheradministrativerequirementsassurethatpersonnelassignedtoperformthesefunctionsarecompetenttoperformthosetasks.ThisassuresthatNMPCcaneffectivelyimplementprogramrequirementsassociatedwiththedevelopment,review,approvalandr'evisionofadministrativeandtechnicalprocedures.AlsodiscussedinourresponsetoRequestedAction(b)weresomeoftheassessmentsandinitiativesusedtoprovideassurancethatdesignbasisrequirementsaretranslatedintoprocedures.ThisincludestheSVP,UFSARVerificationProgram,QAaudits,andOperationsExperienceitems.AsdiscussedintheresponsetoRequestedAction(a),'xtensiveprogramsandcontrolsareutilizedatNMPNStoassurethatdesignbasisinformation'isaccuratelymaintainedandupdatedasconditionswarrant.Proceduresareupdatedtoreflectchangesindesign,correctiveactions(identifiedbythecorrectiveactionprogram),industryoperatingexperience,andchangestosourcerequirements.Inaddition,NMPChasconducted"Back-to-Basics"trainingforNMPNSpersonnel."Back-to-BasicsI"providedtrainingonlicensingbasisdocumentsandoperationwithinthelicensingbasis.Alsodiscussedwastheexpectationthatifworkcannotbeperformedwithinthecontrolofaprocedure,theworkshouldbestoppedandaresolutionobtainedbeforeworkcontinues."Back-to-BasicsII"wasconductedtoassistorganizationsinunderstandinghowBack-to-Basicsrelatestotheirspecificjobs.Thistrainingincludedadescriptionofourlicensingbasisanddiscussionsof10CFR50.59and50.92,commitmentsmadetooperationalexperienceitems,RGs,industrystandards,andtheprocessforchangingcommitments.Also,adefinitionofoperabilitywithanemphasisonpost-accidentfunction,reportability,andhowvariousNMP261

activitiesinteractwiththedesignbasiswasincluded.Theeffectivenessofthistrainingandtheresultingincreasedawarenessbyplantpersonneltodesignbasisissuescanbeseeninthelow'erthresholdatwhichconfigurationanddesigncontrolissuesarebeingreportedviatheDERsystem.AdiscussionofdesignbasisdeficienciestrendsisincludedinourresponsetoRequestedAction(c).Also,themajorityofplantengineering,planttechnicalstaff,andothersinmanagementandtechnicalpositionsaretrainedon10CFR50.59andqualifiedasApplicabilityReviewers/SafetyEvaluatorsandarerequiredtocompletearequalificationeverytwoyears.Theeffectivenessofourcurrentprocessesandprogramswhichassurethattheplantconfigurationisconsistentwiththedesignbasisareassessedo'nanongoingbasis.Theseassessments,whichincludetestingactivities,functionalinspections,complianceverificationprojects,auditsandsurveillances,andlinemanagementself-assessments,provideanoverallindicationthatNMP2isoperatedwithinitsdesignbasesandthatourprocessesandprogramsareeffective.NMP2UFSARverificationeffort,whichisscheduledforcompletionbytheendof1998,willprovideanongoingassessmentofdesignbasisrelatedinadequacies.Also,NMPChasreinforcedtheimportanceofmaintainingconsistencywithourdesignbasisthrough"Back-to-Basics"trainingaswellas10CFR50.59training.Onthebasisofourprograms,processesandassessmentactivities,NMPChasreasonableassurancethattheconfigurationofNMP2isconsistentwithitsdesignbasis.62

ENCLOSURE1DESIGNCONFIGURATIONDOCUMENTSLIST1.ODESIGNINPUTDOCUMENTSDesignInputStatements-Generatedand/orapprovedbyNuclearEngineering2.0.DESIGNOUTPUTDOCUMENTSDATABASES2.12.22.3Drawings-Generatedand/orapprovedbyNuclearEngineeringSpecifications-Generatedand/orapprovedbyNuclearEngineering.Thescopeandcontentofthesespecificationsvarybytopicasfollows:2.2.I.Installation2.2.2Design2.2.3Fabrication2.2.4Procurement2.2.5InspectionandTesting2.2.6.ConfigurationControlIChangePaper-Engineeringgeneratedand/orapprovedchangestoEng>neeringdocumentsordatabases2.4Databasesneededtomaintainplantconfiguration,suchas:~MasterEquipmentList(MEL)-Datafieldsmaintainedand/orapprovedbyNuclearEngineering~CableConfigurationandTrackingSystems2.5~ValidatedMasterPartsListsSystemDesignBasisDocuments(SDBDs)-Generatedand/orapprovedbyNuclearEng>neering2.6SetpointDataSheets-ApprovedbyNuclearEngineering2.7ProgramsandPlans-ApprovedbyNuclearEngineeringandthatspecifylantconfigurationdetails,suchasErosion/Corrosion,AppendixJesting,etc.3.0DESGOCDOCUMNTSDATABASESCalculations-ApprovedoracceptedbyNuclearEngineeringControlledDocumentSystem(CDS)4.0OTHERDESIGN-REATEDDOCUMENTSVendorDOcuments-Engineeringaccepted

ENCLOSURE2DESIGNINPUTCONSIDERAIONSEachdisciplineorprogramareashallconsiderthefollowingasaminimuminthedevelopmentofdesigninput.DisciplineDesignInputcriteriamaybeusedinconjunctionwiththeconsiderationsandaretheresponsibilityofthediscipline/programtomaintainanduse.Designbases,includingavailableSystemDesignBasisDocuments(SDBDs)andDesignCriteriaDocuments(DCDs)RegulatoryrequirementsCodesandStandards,includingissue,rev.Basicsystem,structureorcomponent(SSC)FunctionsPerformancerequirementsDesignConditionsLoadsOperatingExperiencereviewsandassessments,suchasDERtrending,NRCSOERs,INPONPRDSandothersAnticipatedEnvironmentalconditions(internalandexternaltotheplant)during:~NormalPlantOperation~AnticipatedTransients~Accidents~SpecialEvolutionsFunctionalandphysicalinterfacesofSSCsMaterialRequirements,compatibility,coatings,etc.MechanicalrequirementsStructuralrequirements,.includingseismic/dynamicqualificationHydraulicrequirementsChemistryrequirementsElectricalrequirements,includingprocesscomputerrequirementsLayoutandarrangementrequirementsInstrumentationandControlrequirementsAccessandAdministrationcontrolrequirementsRedundancy,diversity,separationrequirementsFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)Testrequirements;pre-operationalandperiodicAccessibility,maintenance,repair,inservicerequirementsPersonnelqualificationrequirementsforoperation,maintenance,testing.TransportationrequirementsFireprotectionrequirementsHandling,storage,cleaningrequirementsOtherrequirementstopreventunduerisktopublicMaterials,processes,parts,equipmentsuitabilityPersonnelsafetyrequirements,electrical,radiation,heat,confinedspace,etc.gualityandqualityassurancerequirements64

ENCLOSURE3='"":DESIGNCHANGE'OPERABILITYACCEPTANCEDesignChangeControlNumber1.0-Initiation1.1Title0PartiallyAccepted1.2ThefollowingfinalSafetyEvaluations/ApplicabilityReviewforthisdesignchangeereSORC/TechnicalReviewapproved.SE/ARNumbers:Revision:1.3ThefollowingWOshavebeencompleted1.WO'.WO5.WO7.WOB.WO2.WO4.WO5.WO5.WO10.WO11.WO12.WO2.0-SystemEngineer2.10ThetestslistedontheDesignChangeTestRecordhavebeencompleted,reviewed,andapproved.0NotApplicable2.2Thefollowingprocedureswererevisedbythisdesignchange.NumberTitle0NotApplicable.30Requiredtrainingiscompletedorinprogress.2.4CompletedByDate0NotApplicable3.0-ModificationCoordinator3.1ThefollowingTechnicalSpecificationwasrevisedbythisdesignchange.0NotApplicableSectionTitle3.20RiskBasisdesignchangedocumentshavereceivedfinalEngineeringapproval.3.30ControlRoomCriticalDrawingshavebeenupdatedtoreflectinstalledcondition.3.4Comments0NotApplicable0NotApplicable3.5CompletedByDate4.0-AcceptanceforOperationManager/GeneralSupervisorOperationsordesigneeDate65

ENCLOSURE41.0-In'ation~~1.1Title1.2MajorOrderNo.1.3Remarks'"'-:'""DESIGNCHANGE'CLOSEOUTAccountCodeDesignChangeControlNumber1.4OperabilityAcceptanceDate1.5ModificationCoordinatorRequiredCompletionDateDate2.0CloseoutActivities{SignwhenactivityiscompleteandreturntoModificationCoordinator)No.DepartmentCloseoutActivityActionN/AVICompletedByDate2.1ModificationCoordinatorSiteDocumentLogClosed2.2PlantAccounting2.3Stores2.4TechnicalSupport2.5ISI-InstallerProperty-In-ServiceRept.Completed&M.O.ClosedMajorOrderOverstockDispositionedNPRDSCoordinatorInformedISIReqSatisfied/(NIS-2)2.6ISI/ISTNuc.EngineeringISI/ISTProgramRevised.7IST-TechSupport/Ops.8Operations2.9Training2.10Training2.11QA2.12ProjectEngineer2.13ALARAISTReqSatisfied/ProceduresRevisedAllOperationsProc/STsRevised/MarkupDatabaseRevised/PMSTReviewedforincorporationintoTrainingProgramSimulatorEvaluatedQAFilesClosedFinalDesign/SafetyEvaluationReviewedALARAReviewS-AIP-2,JobReviewsComplete2.14MechanicalMaintenanceAllProceduresRevised/PMsRequired/PMSTRevised2.15ElectricalMaintenance2.16Instrument&Control2.17FireProtectionAllProceduresRevised/PMsRequired/PMSTRevisedAllProceduresRevised/PMsRequired/PMSTRevisedAllProceduresRevised/PMsRequired/PMSTRevised2.18ModificationCoordinatorOtherRequiredProcedureChangesCompleted2.19SystemEngineering2.20TechnicalSupport2.21MechanicalDesign2.22RadwasteOperatorsPost-OperabilityAcceptanceTestingCompletedChangesevaluatedagainstmaintenancerulerequirementsP&ID'supdatedforsignificantchanges(Unit1only)AllRadwasteOperationsproceduresrevisedandmarkupdatabaserevised/PMST3.0CloseotComletion3.1CloseoutActivitiesComplete:ModificationCoordinatorDate.2DatabaseUpdatedandRecordssenttoPermanentFileDate66

ENCLOSURE5hlYNAGARAII0MOHAWKNUCLEARENGINEERINGDAANCISKDDCCAfieldvariance,l6iILEifORKISINPROGRESS,toapproveddesigndocumentsorchangedocumentsmaybeissuedona"riskbasis"ifthefollowingcriteriaissatisfied.TherequestedfieldvarianceshallNOT:A.Extendthescopeofadesignorconfigurationchange..'B.Altertheintent(purposeasdescribedintheapplicabilityrevieworsafetyevaluation)ofadesignchangeorplantprocedure.C.AffecttheDesignInput/ImpactAssessment.D.Altertheacceptancecriteriabeyondtherangedefinedinthecontrollingdesignorplantdocumentation.E.Alterthefunctionofequipmentfromthatdefinedinthecontrolling.designorplantdocumentation.F.Beirreversible.67

ineieointnitannit

SpecificcommitmentsmadeinresponsetoNRCRequestforInformationPursuantto~~~10CFR50.54(f)RegardingAdequacyandAvailabilityofDesignBasesInformation.CompleteaUFSARVerificationProgrambytheendof1998,asdescribedinourresponsetoRequestedAction(b).CompleteaUFSARVerificationProgrambytheendof1998,asdescribedinourresponsetoRequestedAction(b).