NRC Generic Letter 1980-06
| ML031350334 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Kewaunee  |
| Issue date: | 03/13/1980 |
| From: | Keppler J G NRC/RGN-III |
| To: | |
| References | |
| BL-80-006 GL-80-025, NUDOCS 8003260421 | |
| Download: ML031350334 (5) | |
CENTRAL FILIMAR 3 180Docket No. 50-305Wisconsin Public ServiceCorporationATTN: Mr. E. R. MathewsVice PresidentPower Supply andEngineeringP. 0. Box 1200Green Bay, WI 54305Gentlemen:The enclosed Bulletin 80-06 is forwarded to you for action. Awritten response is required. If you desire additional informationregarding this matter, please contact this office.Sincerely,James G. KepplerDirectorEnclosure: IE BulletinNo. 80-06cc w/encl:D. C. Hintz, PlantSuperintendentMr. W. Sayles, ChiefEngineerCentral FilesDirector, NRR/DPMDirector, NRR/DORPDRLocal PDRNSICTICRIII RIIjqBA(Heisgian/jp 9p pler3/13/808003266 014.
SSINS: 6820Accession No.:8002280639UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENTWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555March 13, 1980IE Bulletin No. 80-06ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE (ESF) RESET CONTROLS
Description of Circumstances
- On November 7, 1979, Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO) reported thatfollowing initiation of Safety Injection (SI) at North Anna Power StationUnit 1, the use of the SI Reset pushbuttons alone resulted in certain ventila-tion dampers changing position from their safety or emergency mode to theirnormal mode. Further investigation by VEPCO and the architect-engineer resultedin discovery of circuitry which similarly affected components actuated by aContainment Depressurization Actuation (CDA, activated on Hi-Hi ContainmentPressure). The circuits in question are listed below:Component/SystemProblemOutside/Inside Recirculation SprayPump MotorsPressurized Control RoomVentilation Isolation DampersSafeguards Area Filter DampersContainment Recirculation CoolerFansService Water Supply and DischargeValves to ContainmentService Water Radiation MonitoringSample PumpsMain Condenser Air Ejector ExhaustIsolation Valves to the ContainmentPump motors will not start afteractuation if CDA Reset is depressedprior to starting timer runningout (approx. 3 minutes)Dampers will open on SI ResetDampers reposition to bypassfilters when CDA Reset is depressedFans will restart when CDA Resetis depressedIf service water is being used asthe cooling medium prior to CDAactuation, valves will reopenupon depressing CDA resetPumps will not start afteractuation if CDA reset is depressedprior to motor starting timersrunning outAfter receiving a high radiationmonitor alarm on the air ejectorexhaust, SI actuation would shutthese valves and depressing SI Resetwould reopen them IE Bulletin No. 80-06 March 13, 1980 Review of circuitry for ventilation dampers, motors, and valves reported byVEPCO resulted in discovery of similar designs in ESF-actuated components atSurry Unit 1 and Beaver Valley; where it has been found that certain equipmentwould return to its normal mode following the reset of an ESF signal; thus,protective actions of the affected systems could be compromised once theassociated actuation signal is reset. These two plants had Stone and WebsterEngineering Corporation for the architect-engineer as did the North AnnaUnits.The Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation and VEPCO are preparing designchanges to preclude safety-related equipment from moving out of its emergencymode upon reset of an Engineered Safety Features Actuation Signal (ESFAS).This corrective action has been found acceptable by the NRC, in that, uponreset of ESFAS, all affected equipment remains in its emergency mode.The NRC has performed reviews of selected areas of ESFAS reset action on PWRfacilities and, in some cases, this review was limited to examination of logicdiagrams and procedures. It has been determined that logic diagrams may notadequately reflect as-built conditions; therefore, the requested review ofdrawings must be done at the schematic/elementary diagram level.There have been several communications to licensees from the NRC on ESF resetactions. For example, some of these communications have been in the form ofGeneric Letters issued in November, 1978 and October, 1979 on containmentventing and purging during normal operation. Inspection and EnforcementBulletins Nos. 79-05, 05A, 05B, 06A, 06B and 08 that addressed the events atTMI-2 and NUREG-0578, TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report andShort-Term Recommendations. However, each of these communications hasaddressed only a limited area of the ESF's. We are requesting that thereviews undertaken for this Bulletin address all of the ESF's.Actions To Be Taken By Licensees:For all PWR and BWR facilities with operating licenses:1. Review the drawings for all systems serving safety-related functions atthe schematic level to determine whether or not upon the reset of an ESFactuation signal, all associated safety-related equipment remains in itsemergency mode.2. Verify the actual installed instrumentation and controls at the facilityare consistent with the schematics reviewed in Item 1 above by conductinga test to demonstrate that all equipment remains in its emergency modeupon removal of the actuating signal and/or manual resetting of thevarious isolating or actuation signals. Provide a schedule for theperformance of the testing in your response to this Bulletin.3. If any safety-related equipment does not remain in its emergency mode uponreset of an ESF signal at your facility, describe proposed systemmodification, design change, or other corrective action planned toresolve the problem.
IE Bulletin No. 80-06 March 13, 1980 . Report in writing within 90 days, the results of your review and includea list of all devices which respond as discussed in item 3 above, actionstaken or planned to assure adequate equipment control, and a schedule forimplementation of corrective action. This information is requested underthe provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(f). Accordingly, you are requested toprovide within the time period specified above, written statements ofthe above information, signed under oath or affirmation. Reports shallbe submitted to the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office anda copy shall be forwarded to the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement,Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, Washington, D.C. 20555.For all power reactor facilities with a construction permit, this Bulletin isfor information only and no written response is required.Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072); clearance expires 7-31-80. Approval wasgiven under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.
1E Bulletin No. 80-06March 13, 1980EnclosureRECENTLY ISSUEDIE BULLETINSBulletinNo.80-05SubjectVacuum Condition ResultingIn Damage To Chemical VolumeControl System (CVCS) HoldupTanksDate Issued3/10/80IssuejiToAll PWR power reactorfacilities holdingOLs and to those witha CP79-01B80-0480-0380-0280-0179-OB79-2879-2779-26Environmental Qualificationof Class IE EquipmentAnalysis of a PWR MainSteam Line Break WithContinued FeedwaterAdditionLoss of Charcoal FromStandard Type II, 2 Inch,Tray Adsorber CellsInadequate QualityAssurance for NuclearOperability of ADS ValvePneumatic SupplyEnvironmental Qualificationof Class IE EquipmentPossible Malfunction ofNamco Model EA 180 LimitSwitches at ElevatedTemperaturesLoss Of Non-Class-1-EInstrumentation andControl Power System BusDuring OperationBoron Loss From BWRControl BladesFailures of WestinghouseBFD Relays In Safety-RelatedSystems2/29/802/8/802/6/801/21/801/11/801/14/8012/7/7911/30/7911/20/7911/2/79All power reactorfacilities with an OLAll PWR reactor facilitiesholding OLs and to thosenearing licensingAll holders of PowerReactor OLs and CPsAll BWR licenses witha CP or OLAll BWR power reactorfacilities with andOLAll power reactorfacilities with anOLAll power reactorfacilities with anOL or a CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingOLs and to thosenearing licensingAll BWR power reactorfacilities with anOLAll power reactorfacilities with anOL or CP79-25