05000388/LER-2002-001, Operation Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Mispositioned 125 Vdc Transfer Switches
| ML021550456 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 05/10/2002 |
| From: | Shriver B Susquehanna |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| PLA-5477 LER 02-001-00 | |
| Download: ML021550456 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 3882002001R00 - NRC Website | |
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Bryce L. Shriver Vice President - Nuclear Site Operations PPL Susquehanna, LLC P.O. Box 467, Berwick, PA 18603 Tel. 570.542.3120 Fax 570.542.1477 bIshriver~pplweb.com k A I
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MAY 1 0 2002 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Mail Station P1-137 Washington, DC 20555 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 50-388/2002-001-00 PLA e 5477 FILE R41-2 Docket No. 50-388 License No. NPF-22 Attached is Licensee Event Report 50-388/2002-001-00. This event was determined to be reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), in that Unit 2 was in a condition prohibited by the Technical Specifications when required actions for inoperable Unit 1 125 VDC components were not completed within the specified completion times. The condition was subsequently recognized and corrected. There was no loss of safety function and no adverse consequences to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.
ryce L. Shriver Vice President - Nuclear Site Operations Attachment cc:
Mr. H. J. Miller Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 cc:
Mr. S. L. Hansell Sr. Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 35 Berwick, PA 18603-0035 nl'
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Abstract
At 01:15 on March 12, 2002, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at 100% power, an operator performing rounds discovered that some transfer switches for 125 VDC power sources supplying common loads (i.e., loads that support operation of both units) were in the incorrect position. The Unit 1 Division 2 125 VDC power sources had been declared inoperable on March 11 for refueling outage work on Unit 1. in this condition, the Unit 2 Technical Specifications require transfer of associated Unit 1 and common loads to the corresponding Unit 2 125 VDC power source within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. Upon discovery that the switches were mispositioned, Operations personnel declared the applicable common loads inoperable at 02:00. At 03:00 all the transfer switches for associated common loads were properly aligned and the common loads were restored to operable status. The mispositioned transfer switches were due to inadequate control of an attachment in the transfer switch alignment procedure OP-102-002. Page 1 of 2 for Attachment J had been inadvertently omitted while copying the procedure for implementation. The causes of the event were 1) Operations personnel had less than adequate knowledge of procedure attachment page control and 2) self-checking and peer checking techniques are not normally used for performance of administrative tasks such as copying procedures. A bulletin was issued to Operations personnel to describe attachment page control, and those requirements will be included in routine training. An Operations stand-down was conducted for standards of error and event prevention to include the use of self-checking and peer checking for administrative tasks, and those standards will be included in a procedure. A method to more clearly delineate the beginning and end of Operations procedure attachments will be established. This event is reportable as a condition prohibited by the Technical Specifications per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). There was not a loss of safety function associated with the event.
There was no unmet demand for 125 VDC loads while the transfer switches were mispositioned, and therefore, there were no actual adverse consequences to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.
NRC FORM 366 (7-2001)
(If more space is required, use additional copies of (if more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)
Establish a method to more clearly delineate the beginning and end of Operations procedure attachments in addition to the use of page control in the bottom left hand comer of the page.
Revise the Operations procedure for standards of error and event prevention to include the use of self-checking and peer checking for administrative tasks.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Past Similar Events:
None Failed Component:
None