ML19331D979
| ML19331D979 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Framatome ANP Richland |
| Issue date: | 06/05/1980 |
| From: | SIEMENS POWER CORP. (FORMERLY SIEMENS NUCLEAR POWER |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19331D978 | List: |
| References | |
| 16540, NUDOCS 8009040475 | |
| Download: ML19331D979 (10) | |
Text
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ERON NUCLEAR COMPANY,Inc.
xn-2 SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL LICENSE NO. SNM-1227, NRC DOCKET N0. 70-1257 Section/ Appendix / Attachment ID:
Application - License Conditions Rev.
TABLE 1.3-1 (Continued)
Specific Locations of Authorized Activities Location SNM Authorized Activity WUR Bldg.
Uranium Compounds Mechanical operations involved in re-3 (Up to 5 w/o U-235) covering uranium from solid wastes.
Packaged Radio-Uranium Compounds Storage of closed, & externally free of active Materials (up to 5 w/o U-235) significant contamination, containers, Storage Bldg.
of product, scrap and waste materials.
Materials UO2 (up to 5 w/o Storage of closed and sealed containers Warehouse U-235) of UO Powder, pellets and fuel rods.
2 Special Enriched UO2 (5 to 19.99 Storage of closed containers of UO2 Uranium Storage w/o U-235) powder which are externally free of U
Trailer significant contamination.
Laundry Uranium Compounds Drybcleaning of contaminated protec-Facility (up to 5 w/o U-235 tive clothing and equipment.
UF Cylinder UF6 (up to 5 w/o Outside storage of UF I "
6 6
Stor.ge Areas 6-235)
(full and empty).
Packaged Fuel UO2 (up to 19.99 Outside storage of fuel packed for Storage Areas w/o U-235) shipment; the transport containers are closed, sealed and properly labeled for shipment.
l Packaged Waste Uranium Compounds Outside storage of packaged contamin-l Storage Areas (up to 19.99 w/o ated materials; the outer containers i
l U-235) are DOT Specification containers, and they are closed, and adequately sealed (3
y) and labeled.
Amendment Application Date:
June 1980 Page No.: 1.10 820RodoA78i~
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EQON NUCLEAR COMPANY,Inc.
xN-2 SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL LICENSE NO. SNM-1227, NRC DOCKET NO. 70-1257 O, 3 Section/ Appendix / Attachment ID:
Application - License Conditions Rev.
3.2.2 Technical Practices Wherever practicable, nuclear criticality safety will depend as little as possible upon decisions or actions of personnel, especially for routine activities. This normally means processing in geometrically favorable equipment insofar as practicable. The following general criteria form the bases for the Exxon Nuclear criticality safety controls and procedures.
3.2.2.1 Double Contingency Policy Process and equipment designs and operating procedures incorporate sufficient factors of safety to requite at least two unlikely, Ci
(,/
independent, and concurrent errors, accidents, equipment mal-functions, or changes in process conditions before a criticality accident is possible.
3.2.2.2 Limits on Maximum Multiplication Factors The k,gg to be used as the permissible upper limit for single units or multi-unit arrays at the worst foreseeable accident con-ditions, including appropriate allowances for uncertainties in 3
the data and methods used to demonstrate safety, is defined as follows:
a) Where reliable experimental data exists for closely similar systems and adequate calculational techniques exist for re-latively small extrapolation of data, k,gg shall not exceed 0.95 at the 95 percent confidence level.
O) b) If limited experimental data exists for a similar system and t.
Amendment Application Date:
June 1980 Page No.:
3.28
E(ON NUCLEAR COMPANY,Inc.
xN-2 O
is_,)
SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL LICENSE NO. SNM-1227, NRC DOCKET NO. 70-1257 Section/ Appendix / Attachment ID:
Application - License Conditions Rev.
relatively large but reasonable extrapolations are necessary, or where calculational methods compare less favorably with experimental data the k f the system shall not exceed 0.90 at eff the 95 percent confidence level.
3.2.2.3 Geometry Wherever practicable, reliance is placed on equipment designs which physically limit the dimensions of units containing special nuclear material.
Safe dimensions may be established by utilizing the following safety IT factors:
wJ a) The k of the unit may be established by using the guidelines gg given in Section 3.2.2.2.
b) Critical dimensions multiplied by the applicable safety f stors given in Tables 3.2-1 and 3.2-2.
Where applicable, dimensional limitations include an allowance for fabrication tolerance and/or potential dimensional changes from corrosion or mechanical distortion.
3 3.2.2.4 Neutron Absorbers Criticality safety may be assured through the use of fixed neutron absorbers, such as cadmium, boron, etc., provided that:
i (V~'T a) Neutron absorbers are designed and fabricated as an integral part l
of the equipment.
Amendment Application Date:
June 1980 Page No.: 3.29 l
Ef(ON NUCLEAR COMPANY,Inc.
xn-2 SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL LICENSE NO. SNM-1227, NRC DOCKET NO. 70-1257 V
Section/ngpendix/ Attachment ID:
Application - License Conditions Rev.
b) Inspections to verify the continued integrity of the equipment and neutron absorber structure are performed on established time frequencies sufficient to insure their affectiveness. Results of these inspections, and the basis for the inspection frequencies are recorded and audited.
c) Viable alternatives to the use of fixed neutron absorbers to assure criticality safety do not exist.
3.2.2.5 Concentration control Reliance for primary criticality control may be placed on concen-tration controls in areas where geometry control is not practicable, and where the nature of the process and operations make violation of the concentration limit unlikely even after failure of any single control. Concentration control may be applied to both overmoderated and undermoderated accumulations of material as described below.
3.2.2.5.1 Concentration Control - Solutions The concentration of fissile material dispersed or dissolved in another medium may be limited to prevent criticality, provided that:
a) The permitted concentration of fissile material in solution shall be equal to or less than fifty percent of the minimum critical concentration in the vessel.
b) The k f the system at the maximum allowable concentration shall eff be limited by using the guidelines given in Section 3.2.2.2.
ll p) c)
For individual tanks (non-geometrically safe) using concentration q
v control, the mass shall be limited such that k,gg is limited by the Amendment Application Date:
June 1980 Page No.:
3.30
EQON NUCLEAR COMPANY,Inc.
XN-2 SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL LICENSE NO. SNM-1227, NRC DOCKET NO. 70-1257 g) k.
Section/ Appendix / Attachment ID:
Application - License Conditions Rev.
guidlines given in Section 3.2.2.2 for the maximum uranium mass accumulated in the tank under the worst conditions attainable by inadvertent concentration of the fissile material.
For large storage systems where concentration of the fissile material is not a credible condition, or where administrative practices are im-plemented to prevent concentration of the fissile material, the above requirement may be disregarded.
3.2.2.5.2 concentration control - Powders and Pellets The concentration of hydrogenous material within the fissile matar-ial may be limited to a small percentage by weight of the fissile material (moderation control) to prevent criticality, provided that:
a) The permitted concentration of hydrogenous material shall be equal to or less than fifty percent of the critical concentration for the system in question; and b) The maximum reactivity of the system full of the material in ques-tion, under the worst credible accident conditions, shall be limited by the guidelines given in Section 3.2.2.2; and c) Where practicable, the material shall be contained within a fireproof barrier or in a process area containing limited sources of hydrogenous material.
In the absence of a fireproof barrier, special controls shall be used to prevent fires and to control the use of moderators in fire fighting in such process areas.
3.2.2.6 Multi-Unit Arrays
(]
The spacing between units within an array is limited by mechanical
' ~ ' '
means such that the following requirements are met.
Amendment Application Date:
June 1980 Page No.:
3.31
EQON NUCLEAR COMPANY,Inc.
xn-2
'SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL LICENSE NO. SNM-1227, NRC DOCKET NO. 70-1257
,O Section/ Appendix / Attachment ID:
Application - License Conditions Rev.
a) The k,gg of the.irray under the maximum credible accident condi-tions shall be lisited by the guidelines given section 3.2.2.2.
b)
For multi-unit arrays where k is n t used as a basis, the number eff of units in the array shall not exceed 50 percent of the calculated critical number.
The mechanical design of equipment or storage arrays in which deformation or rearrangement could result in the loss of a con-tingency, shall be reviewed by a person competent in mechanical engineering.
1.2.2.7 Criticality Safety Parameters Q
V A) Criticality Data Critical parameters used to establish primary criticality safe a limits shall be based on one or more of the following (see Section 3.2.2.8 for sources of data currently acceptable to Exxon Nuclear):
- 1) Criticality parameters obtained directly from experimental measure-ments.
- 2) Criticality parameters derived from experimental measurements.
- 3) Theoretical calculations using methods shown to be accurate by validation according to Regulatory Guide 3.14, " Validation of Calculational Methods for Nuclear Critic 111ty Safety."
B)
Enrichment Levels
)
Design isotopic compositions shall be established and appropriate criticality safety controls implemented to assure conformance with Amendment Application Date:
June 1980 Page No.:
3.32 l
l
E'f(ON NUCLEAR COMPANY,Inc.
xN-2 g-~)
SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL LICENSE NO. SNM-1227, NRC DOCKET NO. 70-1257
%-)
Section/ Appendix / Attachment ID:
Application - License Conditions Rev.
the respective fissile element composition prior to initiating re-spective activities.
Norm &lly, equipment is designed to assure criticality safety by geometry control. Where batch control is utilized, enrichment level or other isotopic composition limits are clearly posted at the respective equipment or location.
C) Moderation Critical parameters shall be based on optimum water moderation unless other than optimum moderation can be assured under both
(/~')s normal and credible abnormal conditions. If used in conjunction with other primary criticality safety parameters, the hydrogen-to-fissile atom ration shall be maintained such that the resulting k,gg of the unit shall be limited by the guidelines given in Section 3.2.2.2.
D) Reflection Critical values shall be based on full water reflection unless less-than-full reflection can be assured under both normal and credible abnormal conditions. Consideration shall be given to other reflectors in the immediate vicinity which could result in a reactivity greater than that for a water-reflected system.
E)
Neutron Interaction i
Neutron interaction (exchange between individually subcritical r~s
(
)
units shall be considered.
Consideration of the interaction Amendment Application Date:
June 1980 Page No.: 3.33
Ef(ON NUCLEAR COMPANY,Inc.
XN-2 SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL LICEllSE NO. SNM-1227, flRC DOCKET NO. 70-1257 p.
O Section/ Appendix / Attachment ID:
Application - License Conditions Rev.
i between units or arrays of special nuclear material may be accom-p11shed through the use of the Solid Angle method.
The Solid Angle method is applied according to'the constraints in the " Nuclear Safety Guide." TID-7016, Rev. 2, except for the use of the nominally reflected solid angle acceptance criteria. The nominally reflected solid angle acceptance criteria is used to limit the allowable solid angle for arrangements of individually suberitical units provided that:
- 1) Boundary conditions for the spacing between concrete walls and the array are as stated in Table 1 of Reference (b'), except that a p/
minimum separation of s'ix (6) inches shall be required; G
- 2) Concrete walls arc < seven (7) inches in thickness;
- 3) Separation distances given in Table 1 of Reference (b') are mea-sured from the outermost vessel in the array to the closest wall;
- 4) The array shall be limited in both number and size of vessels to arrays that are reasonable extrapolations of the conditions assumed in Reference (b'); and
- 5) All vessels within the array shall be suberitical when fully reflected by water and shall have a minimum edge-to-edge separation of twelve (12) inches.
For arrays that violate any of the five (5) conditions stated above, 3
additional analyses will be necessary to (1) demonstrate the p
lN Amendment Application Date:
June 1980 Page No.: 3.34 i
E(ON NUCLEAR COMPANY,Inc.
xn-2 sPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL LICENSE N0. SNM-1227, NP.C DOCKET NO. 70-1257 Section/ Appendix / Attachment ID:
Application - License Conditions
- Rey, safety of the particular array in question, or (2) demonstrate the continued acceptability of using the nominally reflected solid angle acceptance criteria.
The above methods will have been validated according to Regulatory Guide 3.14, " Validation of Calculational Methods for Nucicar Cri-ticality Safety".
O O
Amendment Application Date:
June 1980 Page No.: 3.35 LUDSU
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