ML20008F330
| ML20008F330 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 02/11/1981 |
| From: | Parker W DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20008F325 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8103120836 | |
| Download: ML20008F330 (4) | |
Text
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1 DUKE POWER COMPANY g
Powen Duttorwo 422 Socin Caracu Srazer, CruawrTz. N. C. 28242 WI L LI AM O. PA R M E R, J R.
Vice Patssagwe 7g,g,,,g g g, 4, g, 7 3 4 sera-Pacouctio=
February 11, 1981 373 083 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Re:
RIl:CFDI 50-269/80-31 50-270/80-27 50-287/80-24
Dear Sir:
With regard to James P. O'Reilly's letter of January 20, 1981 which transmitted the subject inspection report, Duke Power Company does not consider the infor-mation contained therein to be proprietary.
Please find the attached response to the cited items of noncompliance and significant findings.
Very truly yours, a
William O. Parker, Jr.
JIJ:pw Attachment 16103120S3(o
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DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION Response to IE Inspection Reports 50-269/80-31, -270/80-27, -287/80-24 Significant Finding A The instrumentation used for contamination monitoring of personnel does not have the necessary sensitivity to assure that personnel exiting the radiation controlled area are not contaminated above the station limit. The minimum detectable contamination level for the RM-14 with pencil probe used for con-tamination monitoring was approximately twice the station limit.
Response
This finding resulted from the use of " pencil probes" on the RM-14 friskers which were not sufficiently sensitive.
Station personnel had already re-placed some pencil probes with the limited available number of more sensitive HP-210 " pancake" probes prior to the inspection. At the inspector's suggestion these more sensitive instruments were placed at high-volume personnel traffic RCA exits. An order for HP-210 probes and holders for the remaining RM-14 monitors was expedited. The new probes were received and installed va monitors at all normally utilized RCA exits.
Significant Finding B The safety evaluation performed to determine if the operation of the con-taminated auxiliary boiler was acceptable (i.e., does not involve an un-reviewed safety question or a change to Technical Specifications) did not include the following elements specified by IE Bulletin 80-10:
(1) con-j sideration of levels of contamination, (2) an assessment of potential re-leases of radioactivity to the environment, or (3) comparison of such re-leases with the rcdioactive effluent Itnits of 10CFR20 and the facility's Technical Specifications.
Response
A revised safety evaluation on operation of the contaminated auxiliary boiler l
has been performed and includes the following:
1.
Activity of the water in the boiler was Cs
= 1.lE-and Cs
= 5.5E~
which is less than 10CFR20 Appendix B, Table II 1Laits.
Based on 4000 gallons of water in the boiler, a dose of 1.08E-5 mrem would result when This released at a flow rate of 100 gpm with normal hydro dilution flow.
would present no hazard to individuals in the environment.
Activity of contamination in the boiler mud drum was determined from 2.
samples of both loose contamination and fixed contamination scraped from the inner surfaces. Dose calculations indicate that if an individual was the site boundary downwind of the smokestack simultaneously standing at with a boiler tube rupture, that person would receive a maximum whole body dose of 0.2 mrem. This dose would not be hazardous.
l
9 e,
Violation A i
As required by 10CFR50.59, the holder of a license authorizing operation of a production or utilization facility may make changes in the facility as described in the safety analysis report, without prior Co= mission approval, unless the proposed change involves a change in the technical specifications incorporated in the license or an unreviewed safety question. The licensee shall maintain records of changes in the facility which shall include a written safety evaluation which provides the basis for the determination that the change does not involve an unreviewed safety question.
Contrary to the above, on September 11, 1980, lead shielding was observed on Unit 1, pressurizer spray line near RC-1.
The shielding had been installed i
without performing a safety evaluation to determine that the installation did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
This is an infraction.
l
Response
The lead shielding cited was removed immediately af ter discovery by the in-spector. The shielding should have been removed at the end of a previous outage but had been overlooked during a building tour intended to remove temporary shielding. After the cited shielding was discovered, HP personnel inspected the reactor building to assure no other temporary shielding had inadvertantly been left in place.
i There has been no procedure or-directive available at the station which addresses the static and dynamic loading of shielding on safety related equipment, criteria for use of temporary shielding, and surveillance and removal of temporary shielding. A station directive on shielding has been i
written to include these items.
This directive was approved for use on Janua ry 27, 1981.
Violation B As required by Technical Specification 6.4, the station shall be operated I
f and maintained in accordance with approved procedures.
Station Procedure l
HP/0/B/1000/09, Procedure for Removal of Items From Radiation Control Zones (RCZ) or From Radiation Control Areas (RCA) requires that all potentially radioactive tools, equipment, and waste is to be wrapped and/or bagged and tagged when removed from the work area.
l Contrary to the above, on September 14, 1980, an inspector observed six used liquid filters laying on the floor near the door to Room 118 (Units 1 and 2 LPI/HPI Hatch Area) which were not wrapped, bagged or tagged. The filter was highly contaminated (approximately 10 mR/Hr each).
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This is an infraction.
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Response
This item resulted from inadequate communications between HP and Maintenance l
personnel. The filters had originally been bagged when first removed from the HPI room. Since the filters were still wet, the HP technician involved instructed the Maintenance mechanics to return the filters to the HPI room, remove the bags, and let the filters dry out prior to re-bagging and disposal.
The mechanics misunderstood these instructions and lef t the un-bagged filters outside the HPI room to dry. The filters were properly disposed of subsequent to discovery by the inspector.
The mechanics and technician involved have been cautioned about the importance of maintaining proper control of radioactive material.
In addition, a letter dated February 4, 1981 on proper controls of radioactive materials removed from Radiation Control Zcaes or Areas was written to the management of all groups involved with this type work at the station. This information will be reviewed by all appropriate personnel, t
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