ENS 51959
ENS Event | |
---|---|
19:15 May 25, 2016 | |
Title | Discovery of Non-Conforming Conditions During Tornado Hazards Analysis |
Event Description | {{#Wiki_filter:On May 25, 2016, during evaluation of protection for Technical Specification (TS) equipment from the damaging effects of tornados, Braidwood Station identified non-conforming conditions in the plant design such that specific TS equipment on both units is considered to not be adequately protected from tornado missiles. Each of the following reportable conditions is postulated by tornado missiles entering openings through the wall that separates the Auxiliary Building and the Turbine Building:
The following items could be impacted by tornado missiles entering the 0A and 0B [common] MCR [main control room] turbine building intake openings: Main control room pressurization, main control room ductwork and dampers, chilled water to the VC [control room ventilation] coils, main control room radiation monitors. The following items could be impacted by tornado missiles entering the Division 11 and 21 MEER [miscellaneous electrical equipment rooms] rooms: Exhaust from the MEER (affects room cooling and MCR pressure), exhaust from a battery room, conduits and cabinets associated with the battery chargers and DC bus. The following items could be impacted by tornado missiles entering the Division 12 and 22 MEER rooms: Exhaust from the MEER (affects room cooling and MCR pressure), MEER supply fan and ductwork, battery room exhaust, and the instrument inverter cabinets. The Auxiliary Feed Diesel exterior exhaust stacks (which extend from the roofline) could be impacted by tornado missiles. While we have analyses on these impacts, they do not use a NRC accepted methodology to evaluate the impact and effects. The RWST [refueling water storage tank] roof access opening Bilco hatch is fabricated from sheet metal that is not designed to prevent all postulated tornado missiles from entering the tank. The tank pressure boundary is 24" thick concrete and is designed to withstand an external tornado missile impact. Thus a missile that enters the tank will not adversely impact the tank pressure boundary. The following items could be impacted by tornado missiles entering the RWST roof access: The 6" RWST recirculation pipe, 3" overflow pipe, and 24" suction pipe. This piping is located inside the tank and they are approximately 130 degrees around the tank away from the hatch opening. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. These conditions are being addressed in accordance with EGM 15-002 and DSS-ISG-2016-01 [enforcement discretion and interim guidance documents]. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. . :�. }}[[Event description::Description::{{#Regex_clear:On May 25, 2016, during evaluation of protection for Technical Specification (TS) equipment from the damaging effects of tornados, Braidwood Station identified non-conforming conditions in the plant design such that specific TS equipment on both units is considered to not be adequately protected from tornado missiles. Each of the following reportable conditions is postulated by tornado missiles entering openings through the wall that separates the Auxiliary Building and the Turbine Building: The following items could be impacted by tornado missiles entering the 0A and 0B [common] MCR [main control room] turbine building intake openings: Main control room pressurization, main control room ductwork and dampers, chilled water to the VC [control room ventilation] coils, main control room radiation monitors. The following items could be impacted by tornado missiles entering the Division 11 and 21 MEER [miscellaneous electrical equipment rooms] rooms: Exhaust from the MEER (affects room cooling and MCR pressure), exhaust from a battery room, conduits and cabinets associated with the battery chargers and DC bus. The following items could be impacted by tornado missiles entering the Division 12 and 22 MEER rooms: Exhaust from the MEER (affects room cooling and MCR pressure), MEER supply fan and ductwork, battery room exhaust, and the instrument inverter cabinets. The Auxiliary Feed Diesel exterior exhaust stacks (which extend from the roofline) could be impacted by tornado missiles. While we have analyses on these impacts, they do not use a NRC accepted methodology to evaluate the impact and effects. The RWST [refueling water storage tank] roof access opening Bilco hatch is fabricated from sheet metal that is not designed to prevent all postulated tornado missiles from entering the tank. The tank pressure boundary is 24" thick concrete and is designed to withstand an external tornado missile impact. Thus a missile that enters the tank will not adversely impact the tank pressure boundary. The following items could be impacted by tornado missiles entering the RWST roof access: The 6" RWST recirculation pipe, 3" overflow pipe, and 24" suction pipe. This piping is located inside the tank and they are approximately 130 degrees around the tank away from the hatch opening. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. These conditions are being addressed in accordance with EGM 15-002 and DSS-ISG-2016-01 [enforcement discretion and interim guidance documents]. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. . :�. }}| ]] |
Where | |
---|---|
Braidwood Illinois (NRC Region 3) | |
Reporting | |
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
LER: | 05000456/LER-2016-002 |
Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-2.08 h-0.0867 days <br />-0.0124 weeks <br />-0.00285 months <br />) | |
Opened: | Ryan Witcofski 17:10 May 25, 2016 |
NRC Officer: | Howie Crouch |
Last Updated: | May 25, 2016 |
51959 - NRC Website
Loading map... {"minzoom":false,"maxzoom":false,"mappingservice":"leaflet","width":"350px","height":"250px","centre":false,"title":"","label":"","icon":"","lines":[],"polygons":[],"circles":[],"rectangles":[],"copycoords":false,"static":false,"zoom":6,"defzoom":14,"layers":["OpenStreetMap"],"image layers":[],"overlays":[],"resizable":false,"fullscreen":false,"scrollwheelzoom":true,"cluster":false,"clustermaxzoom":20,"clusterzoomonclick":true,"clustermaxradius":80,"clusterspiderfy":true,"geojson":"","clicktarget":"","imageLayers":[],"locations":[{"text":"\u003Cb\u003E\u003Cdiv class=\"mw-parser-output\"\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u003Ca class=\"mw-selflink selflink\"\u003EENS 51959\u003C/a\u003E - \u003Ca href=\"/Braidwood\" title=\"Braidwood\"\u003EBraidwood\u003C/a\u003E\n\u003C/p\u003E\u003C/div\u003E\u003C/b\u003E\u003Cdiv class=\"mw-parser-output\"\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDiscovery of Non-Conforming Conditions During Tornado Hazards Analysis\n\u003C/p\u003E\u003C/div\u003E","title":"ENS 51959 - Braidwood\n","link":"","lat":41.24283055555556,"lon":-88.2290111111111,"icon":"/w/images/b/be/Constellation_icon.png"}],"imageoverlays":null} | |
Unit 1 | |
---|---|
Reactor critical | Critical |
Scram | No |
Before | Power Operation (100 %) |
After | Power Operation (100 %) |
Unit 2 | |
---|---|
Reactor critical | Critical |
Scram | No |
Before | Power Operation (100 %) |
After | Power Operation (100 %) |
Braidwood with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | |
WEEKMONTHYEARENS 519592016-05-25T19:15:00025 May 2016 19:15:00
[Table view]10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Discovery of Non-Conforming Conditions During Tornado Hazards Analysis ENS 517712016-03-07T02:00:0007 March 2016 02:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Unanalyzed Condition Involving Diesel Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Air Intakes ENS 513342015-08-20T22:10:00020 August 2015 22:10:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Condition That Could Prevent Pressurizer Porv Block Valves from Operating ENS 502822014-07-15T14:42:00015 July 2014 14:42:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Unanalyzed Condition - Low Containment Spray Flow Rate ENS 502272014-06-25T20:55:00025 June 2014 20:55:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Potential Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink Capacity Due to Low Level ENS 501892014-06-11T19:34:00011 June 2014 19:34:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition One Containment Spray Train Chemical Additive Flow Out of Specifications ENS 493712013-09-09T22:00:0009 September 2013 22:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Unanalyzed Leakage of Containment System Isolation Valve Controlled Leakage Devices ENS 468682011-05-20T23:00:00020 May 2011 23:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Unanalyzed Condition Marine Life Inside Afw Piping ENS 467072011-03-30T01:00:00030 March 2011 01:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Potential Voiding in Auxiliary Feedwater Alternate Suction Line ENS 464152010-11-12T19:00:00012 November 2010 19:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Inaccurate Information Provided in License Amendment Request ENS 464142010-11-12T14:18:00012 November 2010 14:18:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Control Room Outside Air Intake Noble Gas Channel Setpoints Non-Conservative ENS 462032010-08-24T16:40:00024 August 2010 16:40:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Essential Service Water Placed in a Line-Up That May Have Prevented Its Safety Function ENS 460212010-06-17T10:19:00017 June 2010 10:19:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition Unanalyzed Condition Due to Containment Spray Recirc Sump Isolation Valve Failure to Stroke Closed ENS 443542008-07-17T16:41:00017 July 2008 16:41:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Degraded Control Room Ventilation Envelope 2016-05-25T19:15:00 | |