ML21236A302

1) Industry-Suggested Edits to IMC 0616 - April 2021 Version

ML21236A302
Person / Time
Site:	Nuclear Energy Institute
Issue date:	04/20/2021
From:	Schlueter J Nuclear Energy Institute
To:	Andrea Kock Division of Fuel Management
OSiurano-Perez 301-415-7827 NMSS/DFM/FFL
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ML21236A302	List: ML21236A302
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Download: ML21236A302 (49)

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JANET SCHLUETER Sr. Advisor, Fuel and Radiation Safety

1201 F Street, NW, Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20004 P: 202.739.8098 jrs@nei.org nei.org

April 20, 2021

Ms. Andrea Kock Director, Division of Fuel Management U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Industry-Suggested Edits to Inspection Manual Chapter 0616 (April 2021 version) to Resolve Concerns Discussed in a July 24, 2020 Industry Letter and During NRC Public Meetings; R egarding the Regulatory Basis for Cited Violations Involving Degraded or Failed Management Measures

Reference No: 689

Dear Ms. Kock,

This letter is sent on behalf of fuel cycle facility members of the Nuclear Energy Institute 1 (NEI). This input supplements the July 24, 2020 NEI letter and discussions during the May and October 2020 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) public meetings, as well as the NRC March 24-25, 2021 Fuel Facility Stakeholders public meeting. We trust NRC will find our input clear, well-informed and useful as we continue to work together to resolve this low safety significant issue in the near term.

Context for Industry Input During the March 2021 public meeting, NRC and industry mutually acknowledged that any two persons could interpretand have interpreted the plain English language of existing Part 70 requirements and related enforcement guidance (including Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0616) differently, despite NRCs effort to issue clear guidance. Industry appreciates NRCs suggestion during the meeting that industry consider submitting proposed edits to IMC 0616 to improve its clarity and reflect a more risk-informed approach. Since then, NRC released an April 2021 version of IMC 0616; thus, our markup is based on that version and not the 2017 version discussed during the prior NRC meetings. Industrys suggested edits are earnestly submitted to provide a durable and transparent clarification of existing NRC requirements while applying a risk-informed approach to implementation. Finally, as we also discussed, a Spring 2021 public meeting where industry would discuss these edits to help ensure a mutual understanding of intent and purpose is desired.

1The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) is responsible for establishing unified policy on behalf of its members relating to matters affecting the nuclear energy industry, including the regulatory aspects of generic operational and technical issues. NEIs members include entities licensed to operate commercial nuclear power plants in the United States, nuclear plant designers, major architect and engineering firms, fuel cycle facilit ies, nuclear materials licensees, and other organizations involved in the nuclear energy industry.

Andrea Kock April 20, 2021 Page 2

An important point in the July 2020 letter to NRC bears repeating. Specifically, the regulatory basis for some Severity Level IV violations that occurred during 2014-2017 was, and is still, not transparent to industry. As a preliminary matter, it is not clear based on the rule languagethat a failed or degraded management measure which does not result in a failure to meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 is a violation at all. As discussed, 10 CFR 70.61(e) is qualified by the phrase when needed and in the context of the performance requirements of this section. Additionally, 10 CFR 70.62 (a) includes the phrase demonstrates compl iance with the performance requirements of 70.61 and 10 CFR 70.62(d) states to ensure compliance with the performance requirements of 70.61. Additionally, page 45, (d).1 of the Enforcement Policy states fails to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 70.61, Performance Requirement, and (d).2 stipulates that an acceptable safety margin has not been maintained. Each and every regulatory basis cited herein indicates that performance requirements must have been failed to reach the threshold of a violation. If it is a violation, industrys opinion is that it should be considered not more than minor based on its low safety significance. As part of resolving this issue, NRC should carefully review relevant Enforcement-related language to ensure that its implementation is consistent with the rule and relevant guidance. Such an approach will help provide a durable resolution of this issue where future misinterpretations by industry or NRC are not possible.

Overview of Industry Suggested Edits contains a markup of IMC 0616 (April 2021 version). Attachment 2 contains a change table to provide the specific reference, suggested edit and bases. These edits are intended to: 1) improve the guidance for assessing whether a violation is minor or more than minor; 2) clarify management measure related language to ensure it aligns with exiting requirements in 70.62(d); and 3) remove the revised risk screening information that was added to the August 2017 version of IMC 0616 which has been the primary source of confusion.

As stated previously, we appreciate this opportunity and look forward to a Spring 2021 public meeting on our suggested edits to, in part, ensure a mutual understanding of their intent and purpose. Please reach out to me with any questions on the content of this letter and to schedule the next public meeting.

Sincerely,

Janet Schlueter

Industry Markup for NRC Consideration - IMC 0616, April 2021 version : Change Table and Basis Document

c: Leira Cuadrado, NRC/NMSS/DFM/IOB Eric Michel, NRC/RII/DFFI LaDonna Suggs, NRC/RII/DFFI

INDUSTRY MARKUP - IMC 0616, APRIL 2021 VERSION APPENDI X B, EXAMPL ES OF MINOR VIOLATIONS

The pur pose of this appendi x is to provide the NRC staff with screeni ng criteria to support the minor /more-than -minor threshol d det erminat ion for violations.

Minor Violations

Minor violations do not reach the level of signi ficance associ ated with Severity Level (SL) IV violations and are not typically the subject of formal enf orcement action or docum ent ation. (See NRC Enforcement Manual, Part 1, S ection 2.1, M inor Violations, for more information).

While not normally document ed, licensees must still corre ct minor violations in order to restore compliance.

Screeni ng Proces s

When determining whet her ident ified violations can be considered minor, inspectors shoul d first review the appli cabl e examples in Section 6.0, V iolation Examples, of the NRC Enforcement Policy to see if the violation aligns with any of the examples for SL-I through SL-IV violations. If so, the violation is more-than -minor. Otherwise, the inspector shoul d review all relevant gener al and program area ques tions contained in IMC 0616 Appendi x B. Each of the fuel cycle functional area ques tions may need to be considered to determine if the violation is more than minor. Inspectors should then consider the specific examples at the end of this appendi x to inform thei r responses to the scr eening questions. In gene ral, if the answer to all the appli cabl e scr eeni ng questions is no, then the violation is minor. Conversely, if the answer to any at least one of the screeni ng questions is yes, the violation is may be g ener ally more-than -m inor.

However, for risk-based non -compliances the inspector shoul d consider the overall risk associated with the non -compliance. Non-compliances that resul t in a failure to meet the likelihood requirement s of §70.61( b), (c), or ( d) shoul d gener ally be consider ed more-than -

minor. However, non -compliances that do not result in a failure to meet the likelihood requi rements of §70. 61(b), (c), or ( d) are not necessarily minor as negat ive impac ts to the abili ty of an IROFS to perfo rm its intended safety function are gener ally signi ficant. In consider ing the overall risk associ ated with the non -compliance, the inspector shoul d assess 1) the overall change in risk resulting from the non -compliance and 2) any remaining risk margin above and beyond the likelihood requirement s of §70.61( b) and (c). In assessi ng the overall change in risk resul ting fro m the non -compliance, non -compliances involving a subs tantial change in the overall risk of the appli cabl e accident seque nce(s) are gener ally more signi ficant than those that resul t in a neglig ible change in risk. An example of this is the failu re of a passive engi neer ed contro l, resulting in a risk index shift of -4, versus a simple administra tive control resul ting in a risk index shift of - 2. In this case, the failure of the passive engi neer ed control shou ld gener ally be considered more significant than that of a simple adm inistra tive contro l. In assessi ng any remaining risk margin above and bey ond the likelihood requirement s of §70.61( b) and (c), non -

compliances involving little to no remaining risk margin are gener ally more signi ficant than those that involve subs tant ial margin abo ve and beyon d the likelihood requi rement s of §70.61( b) and (c). An example of this is the failure of an administra tive contro l, resulting in the overall likelihood of the applicable accident sequen ce(s) to shift from -6 to -4 at a facilit y whose ISA methodol ogy def ines highl y unli kely as -4, ver sus the failure of an administra tive cont rol resul ting in the overall likelihood to shift fro m -8 to -6. Although both failures resul ted in an overall change in risk of -2, the failures had diffe re nt impacts to the remaining risk margin and likelihood of the acci dent sequence( s). For risk-based non -compliances involving a failure to

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -1 0616 meet the Doubl e Cont ingency Principle or §70. 61(d), the inspector shoul d consider the par ametri c sensitivity to the failure. In gener al, failures that affect a highl y sensitive parameter shoul d be consider ed more signi ficant than those that affe ct a relatively insensitive parameter.

Screeni ng Questions:

Gener al

1. Coul d the violation reasonabl y be consider ed a precur sor to a signi ficant event?

2. If left uncorrected, woul d the violation have the potent ial to lead to a more signi ficant safety or safeguar ds concern? (e.g., had the licensee or NRC got lucky by catching not discovered it, but it woul d could have event ually lead to a more signi ficant issue)

3. Is the violation indi cative of a programmatic def iciency? (e.g., involves multiple examples of a failu re to establi sh or implement an adequat e program, process, procedur e, manage ment measure, or quali ty oversight function as described in the license applica tion or license).

Integrated Safety Anal ysis (ISA)

4. Does the violation resul t in a change in risk such that the licensee fails to meet 10 CFR

70. 61(b) or (c) performance requi rements?

5. Does the violation involve a failure by the licensee to designate an engi neered or adm inistra tive control as an IROFS as requi red by 10 CFR 70.61( e) and is it requi red to meet 70. 61(b) or ( c)?

6. Does the violation involve the failure of a manage ment measure such that an IROFS woul d not be availabl e or reliabl e to per form its intended safety func tion when needed as requi red by 10 CFR 70.61( e) and 70. 62(d) and is it risk signi ficant fails to meet performance requirements? Consider the risk of the non -complianc e in accordance with the Appendi x B preface.

7. For facilities without an ISA, does the violation represent a reduc tion in safety margin significant increased likelihood in safety consequences co mpared to the latest licensing documents and safety anal ysis?

8. Does the violation adver sely affect the abili ty of an IROFS or safety related componen t to perfo rm its intended safety function when needed andthat result in a failure to meet performance requirements? Consider the risk of the noncompliance in accordance with the Appendi x B preface.

Criticalit y Safety

9. Does the violation resul t in a failure to meet the doubl e cont ingency principle?

10. Does the violation resul t in the criticality acci dent al arm system being una ble to detect or activate an alarm signal (audi ble or visual ) during a time period when fissile material was handl ed, used, or stored?

11. Does the violation resul t in the failure to ensure that all nuclear processes are subcritical with an app roved margin of sub-criticality for all normal and credible abnorm al condi tions as requi red by 10 CFR 70.61(d)? Consider the risk of the non -

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -2 0616 compliance in accordanc e with the Appendi x B preface.

Fire Protection

12. Does the violation degr ade the abili ty of a fire safety system or control to perfo rm its intended safety func tion and is it determined to be risk or regulatory signi ficant as def ined in the Integrated Safety Anal ysis (ISA) or Fire Hazar ds Anal ysis (FHA) ?

Consider the risk of the non-compliance in accord ance with the Appendi x B preface.

Plant Modi fications

13. Does the violation involve a failure to proper ly perform a 10 CFR 70.72 evaluat ion wher e the licensee failed to obt ain a license amendment for the change?

14. Does the violation represent a non -conservative error in a specification, comput er progr am, design repor t, drawing, calculation, safety anal ysis, or other des ign docum ent that adver sely impac ts nuclear safety (e.g., IROFS, criticality contro ls, radi ologi cal exposur e of personnel, etc.) ? Consider the risk of the non -c ompliance in accordan ce with the Appendi x B preface.

Radi ologi cal Protection

15. Does the violation involve the failure to establi sh radi ologi cal contro ls and lead to a signi ficant unplanned or unintended intake or dos e to an indi vidual ?

16. Does the violation involve the abili ty of a radi ation moni toring instrument to per form its intended safety func tion within a reasonabl e level of saf ety margin and to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection c onsider ing the over all level of radi ological hazar d bei ng moni tored?

17. Does the violation involve the spread of con tamination beyond designat ed cont rolled areas and does it resul t in either significant unpl anned exposur e (either ex ternal or internal ) or multiple pers onnel cont aminat ion events?

Environm ental

18. Does the violation involve the spread of con tamination beyond designat ed cont rolled areas and does it resul t in either significant unpl anned exposur e (either ex ternal or internal ) or multiple pers onnel cont aminat ion events?

19. Does the violation resul t in the inabili ty of the licensee to adequat ely measure or char acterize an effluent release?

20. Is the violation the resul t of improper calib ration of an effl uent moni tor and does it result in a non -conservative inaccuracy in characterizing an effl uent release?

21. Is the violation associated with the licensee s radiologi cal environm ent al moni toring progr am and is it cont rary to NRC regul ations, license, license appli cation, or environm ental repo rt?

Radi oactive Waste/Transporta tion

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -3 0616

22. Does the violation resul t in exceedi ng radi ation levels or 5 times the removable surface cont amination limits for a transpor tation package as def ined in 49 CFR 173 or 10 CFR Part 71?

23. Does the violation resul t in the breach of a trans port package?

24. Does the violation involve a failure to ident ify the type, quant ity, or f orm of the material and does it have the pot ent ial to result in unpl anned per sonnel exposur e or cont amination?

25. Does the violation involve an NRC-appr oved tra nspor t package Certi ficate of Conf ormance (CoC) design docum entation def iciency, maintenance/use noncom pliance, or contents deficiency of minor safety signi ficance (i.e., not a geom etry,

weight, enrichment, or m oder ator specification noncon formance)?

26. Does the violation involve a failure to meet a QA requi rement and does it resul t in improper char acterization, classification, or disposal of t he waste?

27. Does the violation involve a failure to proper ly characterize, classify, label, trac k, or dispose of radi oactive waste and does it resul t in (1) the failure to meet a disposal facilit y's waste accept ance criteria, or ( 2) unpl ann ed per sonnel exposur e or cont amination?

Emergency Prepa rednes s

28. Is the violation associated with a failure to implement a regul atory requi rement dur ing an actual emergency or a failure to implement a regul atory requi rement affec ting the publi c dur ing a graded exercise?

29. Is the violation associated with the failure to comply with a regul atory requi rement and does it at a minimum degrade (i.e., not fully effective or inappr opriately delayed) the abili ty of the licensee to respond to an emergency as des cribed in the licensee s Emergency Plan?

30. Does the violation rende r an Emergency Action Level (EAL) initiating condition (IC )

ineffec tive? (EALs may be rende red inef fective by unavail abilit y or non -calibrated instru ments relied upon by the EAL, er rors in calculation of the EAL threshol d, and by def iciencies in classification procedu res, Emergency Response Organi zation staffi ng or tra ining, or any other cap abili ty necessar y to complete the classification or declaration.)

31. Does the violation involve the failure of the licensee to ident ify and corre ct def iciencies ident ified during an emergency exercise, or audit, or based on internal and or external feedback?

Material Control & Accounting (MC&A)

32. Does the violation adver sely impact or deg rade the effectiveness of the MC&A progr am?

33. Does the violation represent more than an isolated failure to establi sh or implement an adequat e progr am, pr ocess, procedure, or qualit y oversight function as described in the Fundam ent al Nuclear Material Cont rol Plan (FNMC)?

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -4 0616 Physical Secur ity

34. Does the violation for Categor y I fuel cycle facilit ies adver sely affect licensees secur ity systems and /or material control and accoun tabili ty programs def ense-in-dept h appr oach and abili ty to protect agai nst: (1) the design basis threat of radi ologi cal sabot age fro m external and internal threats or (2) the design basis threat of thef t or diversion of special nuclear material from external and internal threat s?

35. Does the violation for Categor y II and III fuel cycle facilit ies adversely affe ct licensees security systems and/ or material cont rol and account abili ty programs abili ty to: (1) minimize the possibilit ies for unau thorized removal of special nuclear material or (2) facilit ate the location and recovery of missi ng special nuclear material?

36. Does the violation for Conversion and Deconver sion facilities adversely affect licensees security systems and/ or material cont rol and account abili ty programs abili ty to: (1) protect hazardous chemical storage areas, (2) protect agai nst radi ologi cal sabot age, or (3) protect agai nst the loss, theft, or diversion of radi ologi cal materials, source material or byproduct material?

Minor /More-than -Minor Examples

1. Oper ations/Chemical Safety

Example 1a: Oper ators were starti ng up a furnace from a maintenance shutdow n.

They were at a temperature hol d poi nt wher e combustible gas was to be adm itted in an iner t concentra tion. The ope rators attempted to admit the gas, but two sequen tial isolation valves, once opened, failed shut. The oper ators found the manual isolation valve shut (norm ally open unl ess recover ing from a long -term shutdow n) as the result of a required tag out of several componen ts for the previous maintena nce. The lock-out /tag out procedure requi res steps or comme nts regar ding system restoration following tag out release, specifically if the oper ating procedu re does not cover com ponen t restoration. In this case, the re conf igur ation instru ctions were missi ng.

The violation: The licensee failed to perfo rm activities in accordance with site procedur es as requi red by the license. The lock-o ut/tag-out (LO/TO) procedur e requi res steps or comments regar ding system restoration follo wing tag out release if the oper ating procedur e does not cover component restoration.

Minor bec ause: The system was isolated in a safe configur ation with no adverse nuclear or radi ologi cal safety impact on equi pment/p ersonnel and no abili ty to proceed further.

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -5 0616 Not minor if: The system was in an unsafe configuration that adversely impacted nuclear or radi ologi cal safety of equi pment/p ersonnel ; or there were indi cations of a programmatic breakdow n in the LO/TO process.

NOTE: A LO/TO violation that adversely impacts life safety (e.g., injury or fatalit y), but does not impact nuclear or radi ologi cal safety, is consider ed an Occupat ional Safety and Heal th Administra tion (OSHA) issue and is not enforceable under NRC requi rements. Refer to the Memorandu m of Under standi ng (MOU) between NRC and OSHA for addi tional information.

Example 1b: The inspector determined that the licensee was using an out dated version of an oper ating procedur e to per form a system valve/componen t lin e-up prior to start-up of an ammoni um diuranat e (ADU) conver sion area processing system. Correct valve conf iguration was credi ted as an adm inistra tive IROFS in the ISA. Licensee procedur es requi re personnel to verify the correct version of the procedu re prior to use. The licensee credi ted procedure use and adher ence and configuration manage ment as managem ent measures in the license appli cation.

The violation: The licensee failed to implement establish or maintain manage ment measur es (procedur e use and adherence and configur ation manage ment) as requi red by 10 CFR

70. 61( e) and 70. 62(d) to ensur e that IROFS were availabl e and reliabl e to perfo rm thei r function when needed to comply with the per formance requi rements of Part 70.61.

Minor bec ause: The procedure changes were minor or administra tive; or the changes did not adversely impact the positioni ng or safety func tion of an IROFS.

Not minor if: The changes adver sely impacted the positioni ng and safety func tion of an IROFS.

Example 1c: Post-maintenance testing was perfo rmed on five IROFS furnace temperature contro lle rs during an outage at a fuel facilit y manufacturer.

All the required tests were per formed, based on statements fro m licensee workers, but ther e was no record that an actual post-maintenance test was conducted on one of the cont rollers. Based on indi cation in the control room, al l temper ature cont rollers had compar able temper ature readi ngs includi ng the contro ller that di d not have docum ent ed pos t-maintenance test resul ts. Furnace temperature readi ngs were within the requi red operating range. Recor dkeepi ng and reporti ng was credi ted as a manage ment measur e in the license appli cation.

The violation: The licensee failed to implement establish or maintain manage ment measur es (re cordkeepi ng and repo rting) per 10 CFR 70.61( e) and 70.62( d) for an IROFS due to a

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -6 0616 lack of documented test resul ts (re cords) verifying that test requirements were satisfied.

Minor bec ause: Thi s was an isolated example of a record keepi ng issue of low safety signi ficance. Ther e was reasonabl e assurance that pos t-maintenance test requi rements were met as evidenced by actual furnace temperature readi ngs bei ng within limits.

Not minor if: The temper ature contro ller was det ermined to be degr aded during subsequent testing and not capabl e of per forming its intended safety function.

Example 1d: A licensee procedu re required specific IROFS valves on a locked valve list to be locked as indi cated on plant Piping and Instru ment ation Diagr ams (P&IDs). Inspectors ident ified IROFS designat ed valves on the locked valve list that were not indi cated as locked on the P&I Ds. The licensee is requi red to implement a configur ation managem ent progr am to ensur e that the information used to operate and maintain safety contro ls is kept cur rent. Conf igur ation manage ment was credi ted as a managem ent measure in the license appli cation.

The violation: The licensee failed to implement establish or maintain manage ment measur es (configur ation managem ent) as requi red by 10 CFR 70.61( e) and 70. 62(d) to ensur e that IROFS were available and reliab le to perfo rm thei r function when needed to comply with the per formance requi rement s of 10 CFR 70.61.

Minor bec ause: Thi s is an insigni ficant drawing discr epancy; or t he valves were found positioned/ locked in positions did not adversely impact an IROFS safety function.

Not minor if: The valves were found positioned/ locked in positions that adversely impacted an IROFS safety function.

Example 1e: The inspectors ident ified that an operator perfo rming IROFS-related dut ies failed to meet ope rator requalif ication training requi rement s.

Training and quali fication was credi ted as manage ment measure in the license applica tion.

The violation: The licensee failed to implement establish or maintain manage ment measur es (training and quali fication) as requi red by 10 CFR 70.61(e) and

70. 62(d) to ensur e that IROFS were availabl e and reliabl e to per form thei r func tion when needed to comply with the performance requi rement s of 10 CFR 70.61.

Minor bec ause: All oper ations continued to be per formed in a safe and contro lled manner and the operator, when interviewed, exhi bited a clear under standi ng of

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -7 0616 his/her assi gned IROFS-related duties; or t he discrepancy was the resul t of a minor ad ministra tive or training docum entation error.

Not minor if: The oper ator incorre ctly perfo rmed tasks that impacted the abilit y of an IROFS to perform its intended safety func tion; or when interviewed, the oper ator did not have a clear under standi ng of his/her assigned IROFS-related duties.

Example 1f: The inspectors ident ified dur ing a walkdow n that the diffe rential pressure readi ngs for ventilation high-efficiency par ticulate air (HEPA) filters were out side their normal ope rational band. The opera ting procedur e requi res the ope rators to log the readi ngs once per shift. The primary safety concer ns are failure to detect a filter break throug h (low differe ntial pressure) or filter over loading (high differential pressure). The inspec tor reviewed the latest ope rator logs and det ermined that the ope rators had failed to log the readi ngs dur ing the previous two shifts. Procedu re use and adher ence was credited as a managem ent measur e in the license appli cation.

The violation: The licensee failed to implement establish or maintain manage ment measur es (procedur e use and adherenc e) as required by 10 CFR 70.61( e) and 70. 62(d) to ensur e that IROFS were availabl e and reliabl e to perfo rm thei r function when needed to comply with the performance requi rement s of 10 CFR 70.61.

Minor bec ause: Moni toring of HEPA filter diffe rent ial pressure was not credi ted as an adm inistra tive IROFS in the ISA.

Not minor if: Moni toring of HEPA diffe rent ial pr essure was credited as an adm inistra tive IROFS in the ISA.

Example 1g: During a walkdow n, the inspectors identified that oper ators routinel y left a chem ical suppl y valve open following each filling of the chemical column.

The procedure requi res that the valve be closed between chemical fills.

Valve position verification was credi ted as an administra tive IROFS in the ISA. Procedu re use and adher ence was credi ted as a manage ment measur e in the license appli cation.

The violation: The licensee failed to implement establish or maintain manage ment measur es (procedur e use and adherenc e) as required by 10 CFR 70.61( e) and 70. 62(d) to ensur e that IROFS were availabl e and reliabl e to perfo rm thei r function when needed to comply with the performance requi rement s of 10 CFR 70.61.

Minor bec ause: Fail ure to proper ly position the valve did not adversely impact the safety function of the compone nt/s ystem.

Not minor if: Fail ure to proper ly position the valve did adversely impac t the safety function of the compone nt/s ystem.

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -8 0616 Example 1h: During a walkdow n of product stagi ng columns, the inspectors ident ified num erous missi ng component ident ification tags, several tags on the floor, and loosely attache d tags that had slipped away from component s.

Site conduct of ope rations procedu res requi re that com ponen ts be label ed. Procedu re use and adher ence was credited as a managem ent measur e in the license appli cation.

The violation: The licensee failed to implement establish or maintain manage ment measur es (procedur e use and adherenc e) as required by 10 CFR 70.61( e) and 70. 62(d) to ensur e that IROFS were availabl e and reliabl e to perfo rm thei r function when needed to comply with the performance requi rement s of 10 CFR 70.61.

Minor bec ause: Component labeli ng issues did not con tri but e to oper ational evol utions that adver sely impac ted nuclear safety (e.g., saf ety function of an I ROFS) or radi ologi cal safety of personnel.

Not minor if: Component labeli ng issues did contri but e to oper ational evol utions that adver sely impacted nuclear safety or radi ologi cal safety of per sonnel.

NOTE: Component labeli ng issues that adversely impac t per sonnel /life safety, but do not impac t nuclear or radi ologi cal safety of per sonnel, shoul d be handl ed by OSHA according to the MOU between OSHA and NRC.

Example 1i: During a walk dow n, the inspectors ident ified numerous scales that were one to several days past thei r calibration due dates. The scales were designat ed as IROFS for the prevention of criticality. Maintenance, which includes calibration of IROFS equi pment, was credited as a managem ent measur e in the license appli cation.

The violation: The licensee failed to implement establish or maintain manage ment measur es (maintenance) as requi red by 10 CFR 70.61( e) and 70. 62(d) to ensur e that IROFS were avail abl e and reliabl e to perfo rm thei r function when needed to comply with the per formance requirement s of 10 CFR

70. 61.

Minor bec ause: Subsequent calibrations of the scales were satisfactory, requi ring no adj ustments; or t he scales were not used since the last cali bration; or t he scales were out of cali bration in the conservative direction.

Not minor if: Subsequent calibrations of the scales were unsatisfactory in the non -

conser vative direction.

Example 1j: The licensee failed to implement establish or maintain adequa te mana gem ent measures, resul ting in a condi tion wher e an IROFS was una vailabl e, unr eliabl e, or less reliable than assumed in the ISA.

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -9 0616 The violation: The licensee failed to implement establish or maintain manage ment measur es per 10 CFR 70.61( e) and 70. 62(d), to ensur e that an IROFS remained avail abl e and re liabl e. which led to the IROFS degradation or failure not being within the analyzed failure rate.

Minor bec ause: The licensee maintained signi ficant risk margin above and bey ond the perfo rmance requi rements of §70.61( b) and (c); or the overall change in risk resulting fro m the failure was low, and the licensee maintained some level of r isk margin abo ve and beyond the requirement s of §70.61( b) and (c).The licensee maintained a r isk index that meets the pe rformance requirements of §70.61.

Also minor if: The inspectors determined that the degradation or f ailure of the IROFS was within its analyzed failure rate assumed in the ISA; or the licensee could credit IROFS fro m other accident sequences to ensure the ac cident remains hi ghly unlikely.

Not minor if: The failure resul ted in no remaining risk margin above and beyond the perfo rmance requi rements of §70.61( b) and (c); or the overall change in risk resulting fro m the failu re was high, and the licensee did not maintain a signi ficant level of risk margin abo ve and beyon d the requi re ment s of

§70. 61( b) and (c). The degradation or failure resulted in the licensee not meeting the pe rformance requirements of §70.61.

2. Criticality Safety

Example 2a: During a criticality safety inspection, the inspec tor det ermined that the licensee failed to meet the doubl e contingency principle which requi res that at l east two unli kely, independent, and concurre nt changes in process conditions must occur before a criticalit y accident is possi ble.

The violation: The licensee failed to meet doubl e contingency as requi red by 10 CFR

70. 64( a)(9 ), which requi res that the design provide for criticalit y control includi ng adher ence to the doubl e contingency principle for new facilities or processes. For existing facilit ies, adher ence to the doubl e contingency principle is specified as a license condition.

Minor bec ause: The licensee onl y document ed a subset of the changes in pro cess condi tions that woul d have to occur to cause a criticality. Upon further review and discussions with the licensee, the inspector det ermined that an addi tional, although undocum ent ed for doubl e cont ingency, unli kely, independent, and concurrent change in proces s condi tions would have had to occur to resul t in a criticality.

Not minor if: Upon further review, the inspector determined that criticality could occur without at least two unli kely, independent, and concurre nt change s in process conditions.

Example 2b: Foll owing an audi t of the licensees Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS)

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -10 0616 progr am by external audi tors the licensee failed to ent er the findi ngs the audi tors identified into their corrective action program.

The Violation: Fail ure to enter audi t findings into their corre ctive action progra m as requi red by procedur e. The use of procedu res is credi ted as a managem ent measure in the license appli cation.

Minor bec ause: The findi ng ident ified by the external audi tors was merely a progr ammatic improvement to the licensee s NCS p rogr am or a n edi torial change.

Not Minor if: The findi ng ident ified by the external audi tors was a violation that the licensee failed to take corre ctive actions to corre ct.

Example 2c: The licensee ident ified that a requi red NCS signat ure for work on an out of service componen t had not been obtained. Licensee manage ment ident ified the issue almost immedi ately and corre cted the situat ion by perfo rming the requi red NCS review.

The Violation: Failu re to obtain the requ ired NCS review and approval per pr ocedur e.

Minor bec ause: It was ident ified and corrected by the licensee before the system was returned to service, or up on return to service the component was still able to perfo rm its intended safety function.

Not Minor if: It was ident ified after the system was returned to service; and the component was unabl e to per form its intended safety func tion.

Example 2d: Inspectors observed that an NCS ana lysis had been per formed using a diffe rent set of assumptions than those committe d to in the license appli cation. The inspectors determined that the model ed condi tions adequat ely bounded the as-buil t configur ation and were within the validat ed area of appli cabilit y.

The Violation: Use of technical practices cont rary to those committed to in the license.

Minor bec ause: Assumptions bounded the as-buil t condi tions and were within the bounds of the validat ion repor t.

Not Minor if: The model ed condi tions were not conservative or were signi ficant ly out side the validat ion s area of appli cabili ty (AOA), or resul ted in a signi ficant redu ction in the appr oved margin of subcriticalit y for safety.

NOTE: To det ermine if the redu ction in the margin of sub criticality is signi ficant, or if the deviation fro m the AOA is signi ficant, see Example j.

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -11 0616 Example 2e: An inspector noted that some NCS analyses had been per formed by contra ctor NCS engi neer s (who were quali fied by thei r organiza tion). The inspector questioned whet her the contract engi neers had been quali fied as licensee NCS engi neers. The licensee stated that the contra ctor engi neer s had not com pleted the licensee s NCS engi neer quali fication progr am and initiated corrective actions to complete thei r qualification.

The Violation: Fail ure to qualify NCS engineer s per the requirement s of the license appli cation.

Minor bec ause: The inspector did not identify any safety concerns rega rding the content of the anal yses per formed by the cont ractor engi neer s.

Not Minor if: The NCS eng ineer s had establi shed and implement ed contro ls in the field that were subs tant ially incorrec t, and did not pr ovide a reasonabl e level of NCS ass urance.

Example 2f: Thi s event involves a failure to perfo rm a requi red test for the presence of moder ator. The test has never det ected an accumulation of moder ator, which is subject to upstream contro ls. The licensee credi ted these upstre am controls to prevent an accumulation of mode rator from occurri ng.

The Violation: Fail ure to perfo rm a requ ired test for the presence of mode rator.

Minor bec ause: The requi red testing when completed did not detect an accumulation of moder ator; and the licensee cont inued to meet doubl e cont ingency.

Not Minor if: The requi red testing when completed did detect an accumulation of moder ator; or the upstream and other cont rols or IROFS had been insuffi cient to maintain doubl e cont ingency.

Example 2g: The licensee returned the criticality alarm system to service following maintenance without per forming the requi red post-maintenan ce test.

The violation: 10 CFR 70. 24 requi res the licensee to maintain a moni toring system capabl e of detecting a cri ticality accident. Maintenance was not conducted in accordance with procedur es.

Minor bec ause: The licensee later per formed the requi red post-m aintenance testing with no ident ified deficiencies.

Not minor if: When the licensee perfo rmed the requi red post-m aintenance test, the alarm system failed.

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -12 0616 Example 2h: The licensee failed to post an area as a moder ator-contro lled area.

Prevent ing the introduc tion of mode rators into the area is credited as an adm inistra tive IROFS in the license appli cation.

The violation: The licensee commit ted to post appro priate criticality safety precau tions and prohi bitions at the entrance to affected process areas in the license appli cation.

Minor bec ause: Failu re to prov ide the posting was an isolated incident (e.g., sign was inadvertent ly removed or sign fell down) and no moder ator material actuall y ent ered the room during the time the posting was missi ng.

Not minor if: Significant mModer ator material was found in or ent ered the room as a resul t of t he def icient posting; or f ailure to meet doubl e cont ingency.

Example 2i: The inspectors determined through a review of docum ent ation that the licensee failed to verify criticality safety dimensions following a facilit y modi fication. The dimensions were credi ted as a passive geometry control in the nuclear criticality safety anal ysis (NCSA).

The violation: The licensee failed to verify passive engi neer ed NCS contro ls at the time of installation as requi red by the license appli cation. The licensee is requi red to meet 10 CFR 70.61 per formance requ irement s.

Minor bec ause: The licensee per formed the requi red measurements and det ermined that they were within the established dimensions (or acceptance criteria) as establi shed in the NCSA.

Not minor if: The licensee per formed the requi red measurements and det ermined that they were not within the establi shed dimensions (or acceptance criteria) as establi shed in the NCSA.

Example 2j: The licensee s anal ysis demonstrating subcriticalit y under nor mal and /or credi ble abnor mal condi tions was perfo rmed with less than the minimum appr oved margin of subcriticality for safety, or ou tside the validat ed area of appli cabilit y.

The violation: Fail ure to demons tra te subcriticality unde r normal and credi ble abnor mal condi tions, includi ng use of an app roved margin of subc riticality for safety.

Minor bec ause: The licensee subsequently perfo rms an anal ysis (in accordance with the techni cal pra ctices specified in the license appli cation) demons tra ting the process as it exists is subcritical with the app ropr iate margin or is abl e to extend the validat ed area of appli cabilit y to cover the calculations.

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -13 0616 Not minor if: New par ameters, cont rols, or limits, or physical or oper ational changes to the pr ocess, are requi red to dem onstrate subc riticality with an adequat e margin.

Example 2k: The licensee s Criticality Acci dent Alarm Sy stem (CAAS) experienced a failu re (e.g., loss of detector coverage, loss of annunciation, etc.) withou t compensatory measures bei ng in effect in an area for which evacuat ion is requi red under 10 CFR 70.24( a) and (a)(3 ).

The violation: The licensee failed to establi sh or maintain the CAAS as requi red by 10 CFR 70. 24.

Minor bec ause: The failure occurred for an insigni ficant duration (e.g., less than or equal to 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> s), compensat ory measures were imposed within that time, the failu re effected a very small area of the plant (e.g., a bathroom), or the failu re onl y effe cted remote areas away from where SNM is handl ed, used, or store d, that would not be exposed to doses requi ring immedi ate evacuat ion.

Not minor if: The CAAS failed to provide either detection or annunciation coverage for a signi ficant time per iod (e.g., great er than 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> s), without compensatory measures bei ng in effect.

NOTE: For failures where the duration is not know n, but t he failure rate can reasonabl y be assumed to be constant, the average failure dur ation may be calculated as one hal f the dur ation since the CAAS was last know n to be functional.

3. Fire Protection

Example 3a: NRC inspectors ident ified appr oximately 30 cubi c feet accumulation of leftover packagi ng materials and other combus tibles in a radiologi cal shippi ng/ storage facility. The buil ding procedu res limited combus tible trash to about five cubi c feet due to the building having not having a fire sprinkler system.

The violation: The license appli cation requi res the licensee to follow procedur es. The licensee failed to follow building procedur es that limit combus tible trash to five cubi c feet.

Minor bec ause: The volume limit for combustibles was not credi ted as an adm inistrative IROFS in the ISA Su mmary; or m itigat ive alternati ves were establi shed ;

or had it igni ted, nuclear material would not have been impac ted.

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -14 0616 Not minor if: The volume limit for combustibles was credi ted as an administra tive IROFS in the ISA Summa ry; or no mitigat ive alternat ives were establi shed ; or had it ignited, nuclear material would have been impac ted.

Example 3b: The inspectors ident ified that a Class A fire extingui sher was located in an area used for the storage of Class B combus tible liqui ds. The licensee credi ts proper fire-fight ing techni ques includi ng proper use of a fire extingui sher as an adm inistra tive IROFS in the ISA Summary. The licensee committed to following appli cabl e National Fi re Protection Associ ation (NFPA) codes in the license appli cation.

The violation: The license appli cation requi res that portabl e fire extingui sher s be of suffi cient capacity and the prope r type of suppr ession agent. The licensee failed to install a Class B fire extingui sher in a storage area for Class B combustible liqui ds.

Minor bec ause: Only minimal quant ities of combus tible liqui ds are stored in the area; or ther e are no credi ble fire accident sequences for the specific area ident ified in the ISA Summary.

Not minor if: Ther e were signi ficant quant ities of combus tible liqui ds stored in the area; and credi ble fire accident sequences were iden tified in the ISA Summary.

Example 3c: The inspectors discovered that the licensee failed to perfo rm the requi red mont hly inspection of a portabl e fire extingui sher. The fire pro tection progr am which includes appli cabl e NFPA compliance is cred ited as an adm inistra tive IROFS in the ISA.

The violation: The licensee failed to perfo rm the requi red mont hly portabl e fire extingui sher inspec tion as requi red by NFPA 10 to which they committed in the license appli cation. Appli cabl e NFPA compliance is listed as an administra tive IROFS in the ISA.

Minor bec ause: The fire extingui sher was found to be ope rabl e when the requi red inspection was perfo rmed; or the extingui sher failed the requi red inspection, but ther e were addi tional oper abl e fire extingui sher s in the immedi ate area; or NFPA code compliance is not specified as an IROFS in the ISA.

Not minor if: The fire extingui sher failed the requi red inspection and ther e were no other oper able fire extinguisher s availabl e in the immedi ate area.

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -15 0616 Example 3d: The licensee failed to obtain a hot work per mit for welding/ cutti ng during rout ine maintenance in a proces s room wher e significant quantities of urani um are stored. The hot work per mit progr am is credi ted as an adm inistra tive IROFS in the ISA.

The violation: The licensee failed to use of hot w ork per mits for welding/ cutti ng activities as requi red by the license appli cation.

Minor bec ause: Precaut ions requi red by a hot work per mit were in-place even though a perm it was not obtained.

Not minor if: Precaut ions requi red by a hot work per mit were not in-place.

Example 3e: Inspectors discovered that the licensee failed to perfo rm routine inspection, maintenance, and functional testing activities of fire det ection/ suppression systems. The fire systems are locat ed in manuf acturing buil ding that processes various chemical forms and stores various container s of nuclear materials. The fire detection/ suppr ession systems are credi ted as an IROFS in the ISA for the det ection and suppr ession of a fire (high consequence event ). In addi tion, the licensee appli cation requi res NFPA detection/ supp ression surveillance activities.

The violation: A specific section of the license appli cation requi res that IROFS be installed, tested, and maintained in accordance with app roved procedu res (also a manage ment measur e). Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that critical fire det ection and suppr ession systems were inspected/te sted on a regul ar basis in accordance with appr oved procedur es.

Minor bec ause: The licensee subsequently perfo rmed the inspec tions, maintenance, and testing (surveillance) activities and found that al l safety systems were oper ating in accordance with establi shed accept ance criteria; or fire det ection/ suppression systems are not IROFS; or the system is tagged -

out of service for a legi timate reason ; or the tests were not requi red to assure func tionali ty or operabili ty of the system; or mitigative alternat ives were establi shed.

Not minor if: The licensee subsequently perfo rmed the inspec tions, maintenance, and testing (surveillance) activities and found that al l safety systems were not oper ating in accordance with establi shed accept ance criteria; or the issue is par t of a larger br eakdown in the fire protection or surveillance testing progr ams.

Also minor if: The fire safety systems were in ano ther build ing that ha s no association with licensed materials or by-products of licensed materials.

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -16 0616 Example 3f: Inspectors were following up a licensee-ident ified event where the licensee had updat ed software on a fire det ection/alarm computer system. The licensee perfo rmed a computer software modi fication that was not in accordance with the licensee s quali ty assurance program.

The modi fication unknowingl y caused an automatic phone dialer to stop functioni ng. The malfunction was later inadverte ntly discovered during an activation of the fire alarm.

The violation: A specific section of the license appli cation requi res the licensee to perfo rm comput er softw are modi fications in accordance with the licensee s QA progr am. The license appli cation states that the licensee must conduc t its business in accordance with a system of Standar d Oper ating Procedu res, Company Standar ds, and Policy Guideli nes. The licensee implement ed revised computer programming contra ry to the licensee s comput er software procedur es, and the software disabl ed the aut o dialer.

Minor bec ause: The fire det ection system and aut o-dialer were not credi ted as an IROFS in the ISA Summary.

Not minor if: The fire det ection system and aut o-dialer were credi ted as an IROFS in the ISA Summary; and the licensee was unaw are of the failure and inadvertent ly discovered the issue dur ing actual alarm activation.

Example 3g: Inspectors ident ified that a new ven tilation duct ha d been installed in a fuel pell et produc tion area and the new duct was shielding a num ber of the existing fire sprinkler heads. The affe cted fire sprinklers were not repositioned resul ting in a noncom pliance with NFPA standar ds.

The violation: A license condition states that the licensee shal l conduct authorized activities in accordance with the statements, repr esent ations, and condi tions made in the license applica tion. A specific section of the license applica tion related to fire protection requi res that fire sprinkler system be maintained in accordance with NFPA standar ds. The licensee failed to ensure that the fire sprinkler systems in specified manu facturing areas were installed in accordance with NFPA standar ds after a new ventilation duct was installed.

Minor bec ause: The Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ ), which may be the NRC or other State or local agency, ap proved the deviation from NFPA 13 standar ds; or the fire sprinkler systems were not ident ified as an IROFS.

Not minor if: The licensee condi tions or licensee documentation requi red compliance with NFPA standa rds; or the sprinkler system was not in compliance with NFPA 13 standa rds and the licensee did not establish a deviation fro m the AHJ.

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -17 0616 Example 3h: Foll owing a loss of power to a furnace, the inspectors ident ified a failure of both the procedur e and the oper ator to adequa tely verify vessel status which resul ted in a boo t seal separ ation and a combustible gas flare. The procedur e was inadequa te in providing oper ator guidance to assess all areas of the furnace. The inspectors noted that the oper ator had all the physical information present to assess vessel status.

The violation: The licensee commit ted to following procedu res in the license appli cation.

The activity (ope rator assessm ent of vessel status) was not per formed in accordance with procedu res.

Minor bec ause: The combustible gas flare was a low consequenc e fire as evaluat ed by the licensee s ISA fire hazard anal ysis, and therefore, was not an IROFS.

Not minor if: Failu re to adequa tely assess vessel status was credi ted as an IROFS in the ISA fire hazard anal ysis.

Example 3i: The licensee failed to review and revalidat e the fire hazar ds anal yses for multiple uranium production buil dings at least every five years in accordance with ope rations procedu res. The inspectors identified several diffe rences between the existing hazar ds anal ysis versus the actual and passive fire protection features within the production areas.

The violation: The license appli cation states that the licensee must condu ct its business in accordance with a system of S tanda rd Oper ating Procedu res Company Standar ds, and Policy Guideli nes. The licensee s procedures requi red a five-year review and revisions as necessary to ensure the accuracy of the fire hazard analysis. The licensee had not reviewed or revised the docum ent within the required per iod. Multiple inaccuracies were ident ified.

Minor bec ause: The num ber and magnit ude of the diffe rences were of minor signi ficance in that they woul d not negat ively affect the ISA assumptions and accident sequences.

Not minor if: Based on a review of the appli cabl e accident sequences in the ISA Summary, the inspector determined that the num ber and magni tude of diffe rences did not supp ort the licensee s ISA assumptions.

Example 3j: The inspectors reviewed the ISA to verify that credible fire related scenar ios were ident ified. The inspectors reviewed accident sequences in the ISA that involved a hot -oil heat-exchange system used in a urani um drying appli cation, and the proces sing/ locat ion of ur ani um hexafluor ide (UF6) cylinder s. The ISA accident sequences were limited and did not

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -18 0616 consider that an oil fire coul d adver sely affe ct UF6 cylinder s bei ng stored or unde rgoi ng processi ng in the bay area. The inspectors noted that a fire coul d overhea t a UF6 cylinder and cause a structural failure of the cylinder. The inspec tors reviewed the ISA for accident sequen ces involving UF6 cylinder s and det ermined that the licensee had def ined the release of UF6 as a potential hi gh consequence event as defined in 10 CFR 70. 61.

The violation: 10 CFR 70. 61(a) requi res the licensee to evaluat e compliance with the perfo rmance requi rements of 70.61( b), (c), and (d) in the ISA, and appl y engi neer ed cont rols and /or administra tive contro ls to the extent needed to reduce the likelihood of occurrence and /or the consequences of each credi ble high and intermedi ate consequence event. The licensee failed to evaluat e whet her IROFS were necessary to redu ce the risk of a urani um hexaf luor ide cylinder failure as a result of a fire from the hot oil system.

Minor bec ause: The licensee per formed an evaluat ion and det ermined that existing hot oil system contro ls woul d have prevented a fire of an intensity requi red to resul t in a UF6 cylinder failure.

Not minor if: The ISA Summary failed to include credi ble fire related scenarios that requi red the appli cation of IROFS in order to meet 10 CFR 70.61 perfo rmance requi rements.

4. Plant Modi fications

Example 4a: During a plant modification inspection, the inspector det ermined that pos t maintenance testing (PMT) was missed on an IROFS actuat or valve for a bul k chem ical suppl y system following a modi fication that relocated the valve and added a local pow er on-off switch. The licensee s procedu res for modi fications requi re PMT following modi fications to IROFS component s. The licensee credi ted procedur e use and adhe rence as a managem ent measure in the license appli cation.

The violation: The licensee failed to implement establish or maintain manage ment measur es (procedur e use and adherenc e) as required by 10 CFR 70.61( e) and 70. 62(d) to ensur e that IROFS were availabl e and reliabl e to perfo rm thei r function when needed to comply with the performance requi rement s of 10 CFR 70.61.

Minor bec ause: The valve passed the subsequent PMT; therefore, the IROFS was availabl e and reliabl e to perfo rm its intended safety function.

Not minor if: The valve failed the subsequent PMT; therefore, the IROFS was not availabl e and reliabl e to perfo rm its intended safety function.

Example 4b: During a plant modi fication inspection, the inspector discovered that a regul atory engi neer assigned to complete a 70. 72 evaluat ion had not completed the requi red training and was unquali fied.

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -19 0616 The violation: The licensee failed to ensure tra ined personnel completed the 70. 72 evaluat ions. The license appli cation states that indoctri nat ion, tra ining, and quali fication of regulatory func tion engi neer s is perfo rmed in accordance with an appr oved procedu re. The procedur e provides specific actions includi ng training that must be completed to become quali fied.

Minor bec ause: The 70. 72 evaluat ion dealt with a non-safety related modi fication; or the

70. 72 evaluation deal t with a safety-related modi fication, but no deficiencies were found with the 70. 72 evaluat ion (e.g., the boxes on the form were proper ly chec ked, the evaluat ion was perfo rmed correctly, and evaluat ion came to the corre ct conclusion).

Not minor if: The 70. 72 evaluat ion involved a safety-related modi fication and one or more def iciencies were found with the 70.72 evaluat ion when reviewed by the inspec tor. Specifically, one or more of the questions on the form were incorrec tly answered as no instead of yes with regar ds to whet her the change impac ted the ISA. The inspec tor concluded that the licensee shoul d have obtained prior NRC app roval for the change by subm itting a license amendment.

Example 4c: During a system walkdown of IROFS, the inspec tor determined that a P&I D does not match the as-buil t configur ation of the componen t/s ystem.

The violation: The licensee failed to implement establish or maintain manage ment measur es (configur ation managem ent) as requi red by 10 CFR 70.61( e) and 70. 62(d) to ensur e that IROFS were available and reliab le to perfo rm thei r function when needed to comply with the per formance requi rement s of 10 CFR 70.61. Specifically, the licensee failed to keep drawings and design information up -to-date as a result of facility modi fications.

Minor bec ause: The discr epancy is administra tive in nat ure (e.g., typo, incor rect symbol,

missi ng dat e, ) ; or t he discrepancy is techni cal, but does not adver sely impact the abili ty of an IROFS to per form its safety function.result in a failure to meet performance requirements.

Not minor if: The discr epancy adversely impacts the abili ty of an IROFS to perfo rm its safety function (e.g., missi ng, installed in wrong locat ion, configur ation does not match description in ISA, etc ). and results in a failure to meet performance requirements.

Example 4d: The inspectors ident ified that the licensee failed to obt ain the necessary interdisci plinary safety reviews for a recen t design change that impac ted nuclear criticality safety. The design change was not considered a like kind change.

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -20 0616 The violation: The licensee failed to obtain the necessary interdisci plinar y safety reviews for a recent design change that impac ted nuclear criticality safety.

The license appli cation requi res the licensee to follow procedur es. The licensee s change cont ro l procedur e requi res that changes which do not quali fy as like-kind chan ges be evaluated and approved before the change is made and the ISA is modi fied.

Minor bec ause: The licensee completed the requi red review and no safety issues or def iciencies were iden tified;

Not minor if: Deficiencies were ident ified dur ing the subsequent review that adv ersely impacted the safety func tion or reliabilit y/availa bilit y of an IROFS; or an IROFS was det ermined to be failed or degr aded as a resul t of t he violation.

Example 4e: During a plant mods inspection, the inspectors identified that the licensee failed to perform a 70. 72 evaluat ion for a change to a UF6 storage area oper ations procedu re.

The violation: The licensee failed to perfo rm a 70.72 evaluat ion for an affe cted procedur e. 10 CFR 70.72(b)(3 ) requi res that any change to the site, stru ctures, proces ses, systems, equi pment, com ponent s, comput er programs, and activities of personnel must be evaluat ed by the licensee bef ore the change is implement ed.

Minor bec ause: The licensee subsequently completed the 70.72 evaluat ion and concluded that NRC pre-appr oval of t he change was not requi red.

Not minor if: The licensee subsequently completed the 70.72 evaluat ion and concluded that NRC pre-appr oval of t he change was requi red.

Example 4f: The licensee recen tly completed a modi fication to add a new adm inistra tive control (IR OFS) for acci den t sequences associated with the prevent ion of leaks involving UF6 cylinder pigtails in vaporizers. The new adm inistra tive cont rol requi res operations to inspect the cylinder for cleanli ness and verify that loose material is removed prior to loadi ng the cylinder into the vapor izer. The new requi rements were documented in a revision to an ope rations procedu re. During a modifications inspection, the inspec tors reviewed oper ator tra ining records and determined that the licensee failed to per form tra ining on the new procedur e prior to implement ation.

The violation: The licensee failed to perfo rm training on the new UF6 cylinder pigtail leak test pr ocedu re prior to implement ation. The license appli cation requi res the licensee to follow p rocedur es. The licensee s change control

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -21 0616 procedur e requi res that training be performed on any modi fications to existing operating procedur es prior to ope ration in order to meet 10 CFR

70. 72( a)(3 ).

Minor bec ause: The issue was a documentation erro r and the ope rators had recei ved the requi red tra ining; or t he oper ators failed to recei ve the requi red training, but corre ctly perfo rmed the adm inistrative cont rol in the field.

Not minor if: The licensee failed to perfo rm or i ncorre ctly performed the new adm inistra tive control as a resul t of inadequat e training.

Example 4g: The licensee failed to provide a written evaluat ion for a 70. 72 evaluat ion involving a recen t modi fication to remove an IROFS fro m a specific accident sequence. The IROFS was nee ded to meet 10 CFR 70.61( b) and (c) performance requirement s. The licensee provided the inspe ctors with a completed positive 70. 72 scr eening checklist (e.g., yes/no check boxes), which requi red the licensee to complete a 70. 72 evaluat ion.

Upon review of the evaluation, the inspectors concluded that the evaluat ion onl y consisted of yes/no answers to the specific 70.72 questions. The licensee concluded that prior NRC appr oval was not requi red.

The violation: The licensee failed to provide a written evaluat ion for a 70. 72 evaluat ion involving a recen t modi fication to remove an IROFS fro m a specific accident sequence. 10 CFR 70. 72( f) requi res the licensee to maintain recor ds of changes to its facilit y and the recor ds must include a written evaluat ion that provides the bases for the determinat ion that the changes do not requi re prior NRC appr oval.

Minor bec ause: The licensee subsequently completed the written evaluat ion and the answers to the 70.72 evaluat ion questions were corre ct and NRC prior appr oval was not requi red.

Not minor if: The licensee subsequently completed the written evaluat ion and the inspectors concluded that the answers to the 70. 72 evaluat ion ques tions were incor rect (e.g., bases for determinat ion were incorre ct or invalid);

ther efore, the licensee failed to obt ain prior NRC appr oval for the change as requi red by 70. 72.

5. Radi ation Radi oactive Waste/Environment al/Transpo rta tion

Example 5a: The NRC requi res the licensee to submit effl uen t moni toring repor ts within 60 days after Janu ary 1 and July 1 of each year (i.e., sem i-annual effl uent repo rts ). The licensee failed to collect and anal yze air samples fro m two ambient air monitoring stations over a 2-week per iod. The

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -22 0616 licensee s environm ental moni toring progr am requires weekly air samples. Even though the samples were not obt ained dat a was still availabl e from the two air moni toring stations and subsequent ly anal yzed.

Air samples were collec ted weekly as requi red by the licensee s program fro m the other environment al moni toring stations. Upon review of the dat a the inspec tor not ed no adver se trend or elevat ed radi onuclide concentra tions detected at the other am bient air moni toring stations over the period in ques tion.

The violation: Activities involving Special Nuclear Material (SNM) were not per formed in accordance with procedu res as required by the license appli cation.

Minor bec ause: The licensee was abl e to subm it the semi-annual effl uent report and dem onstrate compliance with effl uent release limits and dose to the publi c for the moni toring period and there is no evidence to indi cate that ef fluent releases were greater than those reported in previous repor ting periods.

Not minor if: The air moni toring dat a was not recoverabl e or the licensee coul d not other wise produce sufficient suppo rti ng docum entation to calculate (or estimate) dose to the public resul ting fro m effl uen t releases (10 CFR

20. 1301) over t he per iod in question.

Example 5b: The licensee failed to install tamper -indi cating seals in thei r prope r locat ions on a transpo rtation package overpack.

The violation: The Certi ficate of Conf ormance Compliance (CoC) requi res that the pac kage be pr epar ed for shipment and oper ated in accordan ce with the Oper ating Procedur es of Chapt er 7 of the application, which requi res that the package (overpack) tamper -indi cating seals be installed in thei r prope r locat ion.

Minor bec ause: The package had not left the site and ther e was no evidence that the package had been tampered with.

Not minor if: The package had not left the site and ther e was evidence that the package had been tampered with.

Also not minor if: The package had left the site regar dless of whet her ther e was evidence that it had been tamper ed with.

Example 5c: The licensee failed to proper ly calib ra te the final liqui d effl uent monit ors prior to release of the liquid to the environm ent. Specifically, the secondar y calibration sources used for the moni toring system were not of suffi cient strengt h to meet channel calibration requi rement s.

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -23 0616 The violation: 10 CFR 70. 56, Tes ts, Paragr aph (c) requi res tests of radi ation detection and moni toring instrumentation used for effluent moni toring (10 CFR

70. 59). The licensee failed to follow proced ures as commit ted to in the license applica tion.

Minor bec ause: The effluent moni toring resul ts are not used for emergency response decision making; or t he quant ities of radi onuclides released to the environm ent do not chall enge 10 CFR Part 20 public dose limits.

Not minor if: The effluent moni toring resul ts are used to make critical decisions during a licensee response to an emergency; or the 10 CFR Part 20 publi c dose lim its were challenged or exceeded.

Example 5d: The licensee incor rectly filled out a waste mani fest for a radi oactive waste shipment to a low-level waste disposal facility. Specifically, the waste gener ator incorrectly listed the radi onuclide activities for various isotopes of urani um.

The violation: 10 CFR 20. 2006 and 10 CFR Part 20, A ppendi x G requi res the waste gener ator to list the radi onuclide activities of all ra dioactive waste shipment s on a waste mani fest (NRC Fo rms 540 and 541). The licensee failed to accurately list radionuclide activities for various isotopes of urani um.

Minor bec ause: The error on the waste mani fest was minor or a dministra tive; or actual radi onuclide quant ities were less than what was reported on the waste mani fest (conservative); and the shipment was in compliance with the waste disposal facilitys waste acceptance criteria.

Not minor if: The actual radi onuclide quant ities were greater than the waste disposal facilit ys waste acceptance criteria or the erro r was associated with progr ammatic issues relating to the licensee s prepar ation and appr oval of radi oactive waste shipment s.

Example 5e: The licensee s waste certification official failed to sign and date the shipment mani fest pr ior to shippi ng a radi oactive waste shipment to a land disposal facility.

The violation: 10 CFR Part 20, Append ix G requi res the waste gener ator to certif y the shipment by signi ng and dat ing the waste mani fest.

Minor bec ause: All information on the manifest was corre ct (e.g., waste was prope rly classified, described, pa ckaged, marked, and labeled) and the failure to certif y the shipment was adm inistra tive in nature.

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -24 0616 Not minor if: The information on the mani fest was incor rect (e.g., waste was not proper ly classified, descr ibed, packaged, marked, or l abel ed) or the error was associated with programmatic issues relating to the quali fications and/ or availabili ty of properly trained, qualif ied and certified radi oactive material shi pper s.

Example 5f: The licensee failed to document a tra nspor tation package inspection in accordance with the conditions specified in the CoC

The violation: The package Safety Analysis Repor t and the licensee s package oper ating procedur e require that the licensee document package inspections.

Minor bec ause: The licensee per formed the package inspec tions in accorda nce with the licensee s package oper ating procedure, bu t failed to prope rly document the inspec tions (i.e., document ation contained minor or administra tive erro rs).

Not minor if: The licensee failed to perfo rm the requi red inspection which resulted in a non -conf orming package bei ng used to transpor t radi oactive material.

Example 5g: The licensee failed to make a determinat ion that a transpor tation package( s) was prope r for the contents to be shipped (i.e., failure to verify that package is in an unimpai red physical condi tion, proper installation of gasket and closur e device, package was loaded and closed in accordance with written procedur es, mode rator or neu tron absor ber is present and in prope r condi tion, contaminat ion and radi ation levels do not exceed Depar tment of Transporta tion regul ations, and temperatures do not exceed regul atory limits.)

The violation: 10 CFR 71. 87, Routine Determinations, requi res the licensee to per form various actions to ensure the package is prope r for the contents to be shipped.

Minor bec ause: The package had not left the site and the rout ine det erminat ions were subsequent ly completed with no identified def iciencies or non-conf ormances.

Not minor if: The package had the left the site withou t per forming the routine det erminat ions.

Example 5h: During a review of shi ppi ng records, the inspec tors ident ified that the licensee made an error which resul ted in mislabeling a shipment.

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -25 0616 The violation: 10 CFR 71. 91, Recor ds, requi res each licensee to maintain shippi ng recor ds for a per iod of 3 years afte r shipment for material not exem pt under 71.10.

Minor bec ause: The error was in the conservative direction; or the error was adm inistra tive in nature with no safety signi ficance.

Not minor if: The error was in the non-conser vative direction and resul ted in the potent ial for per sonnel over-exposure.

6. Radi ologi cal Protection

Example 6a: A licensee prope rly per formed a radiation or airborne contamination survey (e.g., air sampling), but t he survey was not document ed.

The violation: Fail ure to meet 10 CFR Part 20.2102 /2103, which requi res each licensee to maintain recor ds of the radi ation protection program includi ng surveys or failu re to per form activities in accordance with site procedures or the license applica tion.

Minor bec ause: The survey was actuall y perfo rmed and proper radiologi cal contro ls were establi shed; or the lack of a survey recor d led to a situat ion (e.g.,

super vision or heal th physics techni cians bei ng unaware of radi ologi cal condi tions) that resul ted in the failure to establi sh radi ologi cal contro ls, but did not resul t in signifi cant unpl anned or uni ntended upt ake/dose to an indi vidual.

Not minor if: The lack of a survey record led to a situation that resul ted in the failure to establi sh radiologi cal contro ls and resulted in unplanned or unintended dose to an indi vidual that exceeded the limits of either 10 CFR 20.1201( e) or the equivalent of 10 CFR 20. 1207, Occupat ional Dose Limits for Minor s.

Example 6b: Radi ation det ection instrument s (e.g., por tabl e instru ment s or installed area radi ation moni tors) were not cali brated properly or not r esponse checked prior to use in accordance with site procedur es.

The violation: Fail ure to meet 10 CFR 20. 1501( c), which requi res that instrument s and equi pment used for quan titative radi ation measurement s be calibrated per iodi cally or failure to perfo rm activities in accordance with site procedur es or the licens e appli cation.

Minor bec ause: When recali brated or response checked, the as-found condi tion of the instru ment was within accept ance criteria for the calibration or respon se

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -26 0616 check, or prov ided conservative measurement (i.e., over -respon se).

Not minor if: When recali brated or response checked, the as-found condi tion of the instru ment was not within accept ance criteria for the calibration or response check and did not provide conservative measur ement.

Example 6c: A Heal th Physics techni cian provided job coverage or per formed a task that the technician was not fully quali fied to per form (e.g., a task perfo rmance quali fication was not completed as requi red, or the Heal th Physics techni cian did not have adequat e experience).

The violation: Fail ure to perfo rm activities in accordance with site procedu res or specific requi rements cont ained in the license appli cation.

Minor bec ause: Either no errors or onl y minor erro rs were made by the Heal th Physics techni cian, who had completed bas ic Heal th Physics training and the erro r(s) did not resul t in unpl anned or uni ntended upt ake or dose to a worker that exceede d the limits of either 10 CFR 20. 1201( e) or the equi valent of 10 CFR 20.1207, O ccupat ional Dose Limits for Minor s.

Not minor if: One or more subs tant ial erro rs were made by the techni cian while perfo rming radi ologi cal surveys and moni toring for a radi ologi cally risk signi ficant task and the erro r(s) did resul t in unpl anned or uni ntended upt ake or dose to a worker that exceeded the limits of either 10 CFR

20. 1201( e) or the equi valent of 10 CFR 20. 1207, Occupational Dose Limits for Minor s.

Example 6d: An item (e.g., tool ) containing det ectable licensed radi oactive material (RAM ) was inadequa tely surveyed and subsequently released from the radi ologi cal control area (RCA) of the facilit y. The tool was found in an area outside the RCA b oundar y not subject to radiologi cal monitoring.

The pot ential existed for the cont aminat ed item to be released offs ite beyond the owner cont rolled area.

The violation: Fail ure to perfo rm activities in accordance with site procedu res or the license applica tion.

Note: A violation does not occur in the situation where an item with RAM has been prope rly surveyed using appr opriate survey techni ques, evaluated as not having detectabl e RAM, is released, and is later discovered as cont aining RAM when surveyed using a more sensitive survey method.

In this case a detectabl e quant ity is def ined as contaminat ion levels exceedi ng the moni toring setpoi nts establi shed by the licensee for RCA exit moni tors and/ or levels exceedi ng those in Table 1 of Regul atory Guide 1.86, as appli cabl e.

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -27 0616 Minor bec ause: An inadequat e survey was per formed for an item that was released and later discove red. The follo w-up survey concluded that the item contained radi oactive material with a measured dose rate that was indi stingui shabl e fro m bac kground (measured in a low background area, at a distance of 30 cm from the item with a micro-rem per hou r type instru ment that typically uses a 1 by 1 sci ntillation det ector) and the calculated dose using a reali stic exposure scenar io was less than the limits of 10 CFR

20. 1207, Occupational Dose Limits for Minor s.

Not minor if: An inadequat e contaminat ion survey was per formed for an item that was released from the RCA and later discovered in a plant area not sub ject to radi ologi cal moni toring contro ls. The follow-up survey concluded that the measur ed dose rate is distingui shable fro m background. The calculated dose using a reali stic exposur e scenario is in excess of the limits of 10 CFR 20. 1207, Occupational Dose Limits for Minors and the cont amination levels did not exceed the quan tities listed in 10 CFR 20 Appendi x C.

Example 6e: An inadequat e radi ation survey did not ident ify a radi ation area (i.e., dose rates were greater than 5 mrem/hr at 30 cm and 100 mrem/hr at 30 cm).

The violation: Fail ure to meet 10 CFR 20. 1101, which requi res the licensee to ensure that occupa tional doses are As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) or failu re to per form activities in accordance with site procedures or the license applica tion.

Minor bec ause: Radi ologi cal condi tions existed such that the dose to an uni nformed worker (e.g., a worker who had not been briefed on or reviewed radi ologi cal condi tions) was not likely to exceed 2 mrem in any 1 hou r (2 mrem/hr) or 50 mrem in a year.

Not minor if: Radi ologi cal condi tions existed such that the dose to an uni nformed worker was likely to exceed 2 mrem in any 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (2 mrem/hr) or 50 mrem in a year.

Example 6f: The inspectors discovered an unl ocked High Radi ation Area (HRA) du ring a routine tour/i nspec tion. Locked entryway cont rol was the onl y feat ure used to control ac cess to the HRA.

The violation: Failu re to meet 10 CFR 20. 1601( a)(3 ), which requires that entryways to HRAs be locked.

Minor bec ause: The HRA was conservatively posted. The highest radi ation level was 100 mrem/hr at 30 cm (i.e., the radi ologi cal conditi ons did not actuall y constitute an HRA a rea in accordan ce with the re gul atory definition of an

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -28 0616 HRA).

Not minor if: The radi ation levels exceeded 100 mrem/hr at 30 cm (i.e., an HRA actuall y existed and was not barri caded).

Example 6g: An imprope r entry was made into a High Radi ation Area (HRA).

The violation: Fail ure to meet 10 CFR 20. 1101, which requi res the licensee to ensure that occupa tional doses are ALARA. Radi ation Work Permit (RWP) requi rements are establ ished for the radi ologi cal pr otection of workers and are to be followed as prescribed by specific RWPs.

Minor bec ause: The indi vidual was aut horized for entry into an HRA (e.g., au thor ized by radi ation protection per sonnel or by RWP), was made aware of the radi ologi cal condi tions in the area (e.g., during a pre-j ob briefing or a review of r adi ation survey resul ts), but the indi vidual signed in on the wrong RWP, and complied with the instructions of the corre ct RWP.

Not minor if: The indi vidual was not author ized to enter an HRA or; the indi vidual was aut hor ized for entry, but was not made aware of the radi ologi cal condi tions (e.g., did not get briefed or did not review radi ologi cal surveys )

or; the indi vidual was author ized to enter an HRA, was made aware of the radi ologi cal condi tions and given specific radi ological instru ctions, but took unau thorized actions that signi ficantly changed the radi ologi cal condi tions or; the indi vidual cont inues work in an HRA afte r recei ving an electroni c dosimeter (ED) alarm withou t taking the prescribed procedur al actions as defined in the licensee s radi ation protection progr am/procedur es (e.g., stoppi ng work, leaving the area and cont acting Heal th Physics) or; the individual takes actions that involved the bypassing of physical contro ls (e.g., bypas sed the bar rier around a locked high radi ation area, or an indi vidual by passed an interlock on a calib ration sour ce); and the dose received to the indi vidual (s) chall enge or exceed the RWP limits.

Example 6h: Work activities were ong oing within the material access area (or contro lled zone) that was covered by a RWP. The inspector noticed that an indi vidual was not wearing a respi rator as required by the job-specific RWP. As part of t he investigat ion, the licensee requi red the affected indi vidual to subm it a bioassay sample in accordance with the licensee s bioassay procedu re. As a result, the licensee determined that the indi vidual recei ved a significant uptake of sol ubl e urani um.

The violation: The licensee is requi red to follow thei r procedu res per license condi tions.

RWP requi rement s are establi shed for the radi ologi cal pr otection of workers and are to be followed as pre scribed by specific RWPs. 10 CFR

20. 1201 specified occupational dose lim its for adults includi ng solubl e

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -29 0616 urani um uptake.

Minor bec ause: Fail ure to follow RWP requi rement s did not resul t in exposures and /or upt akes in excess of regulatory lim its (> 10 mg solubl e urani um or > 10%

of annual oc cupat ional dose limits).

Not minor if: Failure to follow RWP requi rement di d resul t in exposur es and/ or uptakes in excess of regul atory limits (>10 mg solubl e ura nium or > 10% of annual occupat ional dose limits).

Example 6i: The NRC requi res licensees to limit the solubl e urani um intake by an indi vidual to less than 10 milligrams in a week. The licensee establi shed an adm inistrative limit of 1 milligram in a week. Contra ry to the licensee s progr am, an ope rator was exposed to 1.3 milligrams of sol ubl e urani um over a 7-day per iod based on bioassay resul ts. Rout ine radi ologi cal surveys and breat hing zone air sampling failed to ident ify that the oper ator was exposed to urani um concen tra tions exceedi ng the adm inistra tive limit.

The violation: The licensee failed to identify that the ope rator was exposed to urani um concentra tions exceedi ng the adm inistrative limit.

Minor bec ause: Thi s was a licensee adm inistra tive limit. The worker was within Feder al lim its.

Not minor if: The licensees multiple processes by which to det ermine potent ial intakes by workers did not ident ify an actual intake were ident ified of failures to satisfy radi ation protection procedu res indi cating a failure to maintain and implement programs to keep exposur es as low as reasonabl y achi evabl e; or the ope rator exceede d the 10 mg/week regul atory requi rement.

Example 6j: During a walkdow n, the inspectors identified the collapse of a cont amination cont rol enclosur e installed to control pot ent ial airborne cont amination in suppo rt of schedul ed maintenan ce on a pot entially cont aminated furnace. Seali ng tape peel ed away resul ting in openi ngs in the enclosure, impac ting the intended pur pose of the enclosure, namely to contain any pot ential airbor ne material gener ated dur ing the maintenance activity from escapi ng the enclosur e.

The violation: Activities were not per formed in accordance with radi ologi cal cont amination cont rol procedur es and requi rements of the associated RWP/ALARA planni ng package or associated work instru ctions.

Minor bec ause: The licensee had not begun work and radi ologi cal surveys and airbor ne samples reveal ed no radiologi cal issues.

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -30 0616 Not minor if: Work was in progr ess and surveys/samples indi cated an uncont rolled spread of airb orne cont aminat ion requi ring addi tional radi ological contro ls in other ar eas.

7. Integrated Safety Anal ysis

Example 7a: The licensee failed to perfo rm a dail y functional test of a dry rad waste collec tion scale so that a signi ficant quantity of ur ani um will not accumulate in a waste drum. The functional test is credited as an IROFS in the ISA for the prevention nuclear criticalit y which is considered a high consequence event.

The violation: A specific section of the license appli cation related to conf iguration managem ent (also a managem ent measure) requires that IROFS be installed, tested, and maintained in accordance with app roved procedur es. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that the scale was functionall y tested in accordance with an app roved procedu re.

Minor bec ause: Subsequent functional testing was completed satisfactory with no ident ified deficiencies.

Not minor if: Subsequent functional testing resulted in the failure to meet specified test obj ectives or acceptance criteria.

Example 7b: The inspector discovered a mathematical erro r during the review of an ISA dose consequence calculation.

The violation: 10 CFR 70. 61 requi res IROFS for event s that exceed per formance requi rements for the worker and publi c. Specifically, 10 CFR 70.61( b) requi res that hi gh consequence events be made highl y unli kely.

Minor bec ause: The error did not resul t in an increase in the consequences that exceeded 10 CFR 70. 61 per formance requi rements (e.g., the unm itigated consequences remained intermedi ate for an unli kely event ).

Not minor if: The error did resul t in an increase in the dose to the worker or publi c that exceeded 10 CFR 70.61 (b) per formance requi rement. The licensee was requi red to establi sh IROFS to reduce the likelihood from unlike ly to highl y unli kely.

Example 7c: During a review of I ROFS calibration recor ds, the inspector identified that the licensee failed to per form instru ment calibration at the frequency established in the ISA.

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -31 061 The violation: The licensee failed to perfo rm instru ment calibration at the frequency establi shed in the ISA. 10 CFR 70. 62 requi res the licensee to implement managem ent measures (work control system) to ensur e that IROFS are designed, implement ed, and maintained to ensure they are availabl e and reliabl e to perfo rm thei r safety function when need ed.each l icensee to establish management measures to ensure engineered and administrative controls and control systems identified as IROFS are designed, implemented and maintained as necessary to ensure they are available and reliable to perform their function when needed, to comply with performance requirements.

Minor bec ause: The instru ment was subs equent ly sent out for calib ration and the as-found condition was within establi shed acceptance criteria or provided a conser vative measurement (e.g., over-response); or the instru ment was not used since the last calibration.

Not minor if: Foll owing recalib ration, the instru ment was found out side of the establi shed acceptance criteria or did not pr ovide a conservative measur ement (e.g., und er-response).

Example 7d: A water leak or fire occurred in the records storage vault and resulted in dam age to recor ds involving 10 CFR 70.72 evaluations.

The violation: The licensee failed to maintain records of changes to its facility until terminat ion of the license as requi red by 10 CFR 70. 72( f).

Minor bec ause: The licensee coul d reasonabl y recons tru ct the re cords if per mitted to do so by the license appli cation.

Not minor if: The records were heavily dam aged (e.g., illegi ble) and the licensee was either not permitted to or unabl e to reconstruct the records.

Example 7e: The licensee declared an IROFS vacuum breaker inoper abl e as a resul t of a failed surveillance test (e.g., test was perfo rmed but failed to oper ate). Only one IROFS remained availabl e and reliabl e to prevent a nuclear criticality accident. Inspec tor follow-up concluded that the licensee failed to implement establish or maintain a manage ment meas ure. or license requirement.

The violation: Fail ure to implement establish or maintain m anagem ent measures to ensur e that IROFS were avail abl e and reliabl e to perfo rm thei r intended safety func tion as requi red by 10 CFR 70.61( e) and 70. 62(d).

Minor bec ause: The violation (such as a failu re to implement establish or maintain a managem ent measure or license requirement) identified by the inspectors did not contribute to the failure of the IROFS.

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -32 0616 Also minor if: The inspectors determined that the failure of the IROFS was within its analyzed failure rate assumed in the ISA; or the licensee coul d credit IROFS fro m other accident sequences to ensure the ac cident remains highly unlikely.

Not minor if: The failure was the direct resul t of an inadequat e managem ent measure or a failure to establish or maintain a management measure; and the failure resulted in not meeting performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61. implement a manage ment measur e; or the failure of the IROFS was not within its anal yzed failu re rate assumed in the ISA.

8. Emergency Prepa rednes s

Example 8a: The inspector requested for review the agreem ent lette r with the offsite Volunt eer Fire Depar tment (VFD) to verify that an agr eement was in effe ct detailing the type of suppo rt pr ovided by the offsite VFD, the type of tra ining provided to the offs ite VFD by the licensee, and the frequency for reviewing and updat ing the agr eement.

The violation: The licensee failed to updat e the agreem ent lette r for the offsite VFD as requi red by Section 4.0 of the Emergency Plan, Local Offs ite Assi stance, requi res in par t that Agreement Lett ers are renew ed every four year s. The agreem ent letter for the offsite VFD was last updat ed and reviewed 5 years ago.

Minor bec ause: The offsite and onsite contacts assigned the responsibilit y for maintaining the agreem ent curre nt and who were signat ories to the agreement lette r were unchanged and when interviewed regar ding the agr eement, the offs ite contact for suppor t services acknowledged that the support and services agreed to in the previous lette r remained in effect. Training was bei ng provided on an annual basis as requi red by the Em ergency Plan.

Annual site familia rization tours were provided by the site to the offsite VFD, and the offsite VFD par ticipat ed with the site fire brigade on an annual basis dur ing drills in addi tion to parti cipat ed in the pas t two NRC graded exercises.

Not minor if: The onsite fire brigade was trained strictly to hand le incipient fire-f ight ing responsibility and ther e were no drills or training conducted with offs ite VFD; or the offsite VFD managem ent had chang ed along with a large turnover in staffi ng but no training or site familia rization tours were provided.

Example 8b: The inspector examined an emergency response kit to det ermine the adequacy of con tent s and oper ational readi ness status of the emergenc y equi pment stored inside the kit. Thr ee air samplers and electroni c dosimeters were found out of calibra tion. The calibration sticker showed that the air sampler was last calib rated more than a year ago and no det erminat ion coul d be made regar ding the last calibration per formed on the dosimeters as ther e was no calibration document ation availabl e.

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -33 0616 The violation: The licensee failed to maintain equi pment in thei r emergenc y response kit.

The license requi res the licensee to maintain and execut e the response measures in the Emergency Plan. The Emergency Plan requi res that Inventory and maintenan ce be carried out in accordance with appr oved procedu res. Emergenc y prepar edness implementing pr ocedur es requi re that instru ment s be calibrated on a semi-annual basis.

Minor bec ause: Emergency response kits with ident ical bu t cali brated equi pment and cont ent s were availabl e elsewher e onsite and accessi ble to emergency response personnel. In addi tion, several backup survey instru ments, ai r samplers and dosimeters were availabl e in the Radi ation Safety offi ce.

The equi pment with the expired calibration sticke r was checked pre-calibration and determined to be within the calibration range and deem ed ope rational.

Not minor if: No other cali brated emergency equi pment or emergency kits with calib rated equipment were availabl e and or readil y accessi ble to responder ; or non -calibrated equi pment was used to addr ess an actual emergenc y.

Example 8c: The inspectors observed that no offsite respon se organi zations were present to observe or parti cipat e in the bienni al gr aded exercise and that the licensee simulated cont act with these organi zations. The inspectors reviewed the licensee s prepar ations for the bienni al exer cise through discussi ons with the Health Physics specialist, who had responsibilit y for coor dinat ion of emergen cy prepa redness. These discussions reveal ed that the requirement to invite the responsible offsite response organi zations to parti cipate in the exercise had been overlooked.

The violation: The licensee failed to invite offsite respon se organizations to par ticipat e in bienni al onsite emergenc y exercises as requi red, in par t, by 10 CFR

40. 31( j)(2)(xii) or 10 CFR 70. 22(ai)(3 )(x ii).

Minor bec ause: The offsite response organi zation is not required to parti cipat e in the exercise. The licensee is requi red to offer the opportuni ty, but the offsite organi zation is not requi red or obli gat ed to parti cipat e.

Not minor if: The offsite response organi zations have reques ted and expressed an interest in parti cipat ing in training, drill s, and or exercises but the licensee has not been respo nsive to any and all reques ts from offsite suppor t groups; or dur ing an actual event, the response by an offs ite suppo rt group and /or the coor dination bet ween the licensee and the offs ite suppor t gr oup resul ted in an inadequat e response to protect the plant, workers, public, and the environm ent.

Example 8d: The inspector determined an indi vidual assigned as an alternat e to the

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -34 0616 emergenc y organi zation with responsibility to maintain a chronologi cal listing and sequence of the event s was not trained in accordance with the Emergency Plan requi rement s. Thr ee other indi vidual s including the primary assigned to the position were tra ined. The licensee s Emergency Plan requi red that al l member s of the emergenc y organi zation be trained annuall y.

The violation: The licensee failed to ensure that al l members of the emergenc y organi zation be trained annually as requi red by their Emergency Plan.

The license requi res the licensee to maintain and execut e the response measur es in the Emergency Plan. The Emergency Plan states, in par t, that tra ining rega rding the actions they are requi red to perform during an emergenc y will be provided on an annual basis. One indi vidual was last tra ined 2 years prior to the dat e of the inspection.

Minor bec ause: Ther e were three other indi vidual s assigned this role in the emergency organiza tion with current training qualifications. The responsibilit y associated with this position did not involve risk signi ficant activity or decision-making.

Not minor if: The indi vidual that per formed the specific role in the emergency organi zation did not have current training quali fications and the position involved risk signi ficant activities or decision-making.

Example 8e: During an annual emergency prepa redness inspection, the inspectors discovered that the licensee failed to corre ct a deficiency identified during the last bi ennial exer cise. The inspectors reviewed the condi tion repor t (CR) and determined that the licensees emergen cy response staff was unf amiliar with the Radi ologi cal Assessm ent Systems for Consequence Anal ysis (RASCAL) dose assessment softw are. One of the iden tified corre ctive actions was to send the affe cted staff to off-site RASCAL tra ining. The inspec tors reviewed the training records of the affe cted staff and det ermined that the training was incom plete. The condi tion repo rt had been open for the past 12 months.

The violation: The licensee failed to correct a deficiency ident ified dur ing the last bienni al exer cise as required, in part, by 10 CFR 70. 22( i)(3)(xii) that def iciencies found by the critiques must be corre cted.

Minor bec ause: The licensee had corre cted the def iciency, but failed to prope rly close-out the condi tion repo rt; or the licensee sent the affe cted per sonnel to the off-site training (licensee could provide tra ining certi ficates), but failed to updat e thei r tra ining records; or t he affected staff was repl aced with other staff who were formally trained on the RASCAL softw are; or the licensee had schedul ed the tra ining, but not yet com pleted the training due to cour se availabili ty.

Not minor if: The licensee had taken no actions to correct the critique deficiencies.

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -35 0616

9. Material, Cont rol, and Account abili ty

Example 9a: The inspectors cond ucted a perfo rmance test of the licensee s item control program at a Categor y (CAT) III fuel facility. All selected items, with one exception, were verified by direct observ ation to be physically present at t he storage locat ion indi cated by licens ee s recor ds. The one except ion was a waste item, cont aining three grams of U-235. The licensee traced the item to a waste box mani fest and discovered that the item was trans ferred to the waste box a mont h prior, withou t perfo rming the app ropr iate documentation in the nuclear material account ing dat abase.

The violation: The licensee failed to perfo rm the appr opriate document ation in the nuclear material accounting dat abase to be capab le of measuring the unaut hor ized removal of substant ial quan tities of material as requi red, in par t, by 10 CFR 74. 31(c)(6).

Minor bec ause: The U-235 cont ent for the missi ng item was less than 500 grams.

Not minor if: The U-235 cont ent of the missi ng item was great er than 500 grams; or the licensee failed to ent er the issue into thei r corrective action progr am.

Example 9b: The licensee failed to perfo rm the physical invent ory every 12 mont hs as requi red by NRC regul ations at a CAT III fuel facility.

The violation: The licensee failed to perfo rm the physical invent ory every 12 mont hs as requi red by 10 CFR 74. 31(c)(5).

Minor bec ause: The invent ory was per formed and did not resul t in any missi ng invent ory that exceeded the allowabl e 9,000 grams of U-235 or 0.25 per cent of the active invent ory.

Not minor if: The invent ory was per formed and did result in missing invent ory that exceeded the allowabl e 9,000 grams of U-235 or 0.25 percent of the active invent ory.

Example 9c: The licensee fails to remove a Material Balance Area (MBA) custodi an fro m having access to the MC&A account ing system when the indi vidual s tra ining and quali fication had expired.

The violation: The licensee failed to remove a Material Balance Area (MBA) custodi an fro m having access to the MC&A account ing system when the individuals tra ining and quali fication had expired. 10 CFR 74.59( c), Personnel Quali fication and Training, requi res the licensee to assure that personnel

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -36 0616 who work in key positions wher e mistakes coul d degr ade the effe ctiveness of the material control and account ing system are trained to maintain a high level of s afeguar ds awareness and are quali fied to perfo rm thei r duties and/ or responsibilit ies.

Minor bec ause: The indi vidual di d not perfo rm custodi an dut ies (e.g., MC&A transac tions, movement of SNM, appli cation of tamper-indi cating devices, et c.) since the tra ining and quali fications expired.

Not minor if: The indi vidual perfo rmed MBA custodi al du ties.

10. Physical Secur ity

Example 10a: An unar med or armed security officer patro lling buildings, conducting safety observations, fire brigade, or emergen cy medi cal team (EMT) activities, or posted within the site owner cont rolled area, protected area, and/ or cont ro lled access area for dut ies not associated with implement ing the NRC-appr oved security plan is found inatte ntive. Activities not involved with implementing the NRC-appr oved security plan can be conducted by any trained and quali fied employee, and the site chose to assign site security this activity.

The violation: Fail ure to perfo rm activities in accordance with site procedu res.

Minor bec ause: The inatte ntive una rmed or armed security offi cer was conducting this activity and had no other dut ies associated with implement ing the NRC-appr oved security plan, regul atory requi rement s, and any other appli cabl e Commi ssi on requi rement s such as an Order or Confirmatory Action Let ter.

Not minor if: If the security offi cer is unarm ed or armed and conducting this activity in conj unc tion with certa in activities (not all activities will be more-than -

minor ) associ ated with implement ing the NRC-appr oved security plan, regul atory requi rements, and any other appli cable Commissi on requi rements such as an Order or C onf irmatory Action Let ter.

Example 10b: The licensee' s security fence is required to be a specific hei ght. The NRC discovers that, in one section, the fence is not at the requi red hei ght.

The violation: Fail ure to meet the license condi tion that requi res the licensee per form activities in accordance with its NRC-app roved secur ity plan and/ or Order Commitments.

Minor bec ause: The inner pro tected area (PA) boundar y fence continues to meet the minimum height requi red by NRC regul ations. The inner PA fence

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -37 0616 effe ctively per forms the function as the dem arcation of the PA, ensur es assessm ent of penet ration attempts, and del ays atte mpts of unau thor ized exits fro m the PA.

Not minor if: The inner PA fence does not pr ovide delay attempts at unauthor ized exits fro m the PA and/ or the intrus ion detection system was not oper abl e in any par t of the isolation zones upon discovery.

Example 10c: Licensee does not perfo rm testing of per imeter intrusion det ection system for all pot ent ial expl oitation methods within the adversary characteristics.

Violation: Fail ure to meet 10 CFR 73. 46( g) that requi res a test and maintenance progr am for intru sion alarms, emergency exit alarms, communications equi pment, physical ba rri ers, and other physical protection re lated devices and equi pment.

Minor bec ause: When perfo rmance tested in accordance with the adver sary char acteristics, the intrusion det ection system detects atte mpted penetra tion of the PA.

Not minor if: The intrus ion det ection system fails to det ect attempted penet ration of the PA for one exploitation method.

Example 10d: The inspectors discovered that the weapons cour se of fire did not include all of the elements requi red by the Commissi on appr oved tra ining and quali fication plan (T&QP).

Violation: Fail ure to meet weapons training and quali fication requi rements in accordance with 10 CFR Part 73, A ppendi x B and the licensee s T&QP and implementing procedur es.

Minor bec ause: The element s are contained in anot her course of fire, used for quali fication, and are trained at the same periodi city and proficiency standar ds as the weapo ns training course of fire.

Not minor if: The element s are not tra ined in anot her course of fire in a manner to suppor t pr oficiency in the use of the assi gned weapon or that meet s the prescribed standa rds in the weapons course of fire. For example, an element not tra ined in a manner to suppor t pr oficiency in the course of fire woul d be the licensee not requi ring tactical reloading while conducting specific maneuver s and this is not included in the handgun or rifle cour se of fire.

Example 10e: An armed or una rmed security officer entered the PA boundar y near a vehicle access gate without bei ng searched. The officer mistakenl y

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -38 0616 walked across a PA boundar y to spea k to the driver of a vehicle.

The violation: Fail ure to identify and search all individual s for firearm s, explosives, and incendi ary devices at the PA boundar y.

Minor bec ause: Central Alarm Station (CAS) Operator iden tified it and the offi cer immedi ately exited.

Not minor if: The licensee failed to immedi ately ident ify the offi cer crossing the PA boundar y withou t bei ng sear ched and therefore did not det ect unaut hor ized activities at the PA boundar y.

Example 10f: A security offi cer per forming security response related duties failed to inform thei r supervisor that they were taking prescription medication as requi red by the sites fitness-for-duty (FFD ) procedur es. Addi tionall y, the employee indicated that the type of medi cation does not have any physical or mental af fects that woul d impai r the officers FFD suitabili ty to perfo rm security duties. Thi s was confirmed by the licensee s medi cal review officer (a licensed physician).

Violation: Fail ure to meet the licensee s writte n FFD proced ure that is required by 10 CFR 26. 27.

Minor bec ause: A licensed physician confirmed that the medi cation woul d not impai r the offi cer from perfo rming thei r security duties.

Not minor if: The medi cation coul d have impai red or prevented the officer from effe ctively implement ing thei r securi ty response duties.

Example 10g: A security offi cer per forming access cont rol functions (x-ray machi ne oper ator) at t he access control facility discovered that thei r gas mask filters had exceede d the expiration date by two days. Upon discovery, the licensee relieved the officer of duties until they were provided curre nt gas mask filters. The officer was one of the committe d armed contingency responder s. The licensee conducted an extent of condi tion review and det ermined that the issu e was isolated and all other gas mask filters issued to officers were up-to-dat e.

The violation: Fail ure to meet the requi rements of 10 CFR 73.46(g)(5 ) and the NRC-appr oved security plan, for ensuring a physical pr otection related subsystem was maintained in oper able condi tion.

Minor bec ause: The success of the lice nsee protective strategy was not con tingent on the dut ies of the access control of ficer if they were attacked by gas at that locat ion. The final acces s cont rol offi cer contro lled all critical shutdow n poi nts. The officer was not previously assigned to response position that

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -39 0616 coul d be significant to the licensee s overall protective stra tegy during the time that the gas mask filter was expired.

Not minor if: The issue involved a security offi cer whose dut ies as a commit ted responder were signi ficant to the licensee s implement ation of thei r overall protective strategy.

Example 10h: A licensee employee self-repor ted that they had entered the site PA and inadvertent ly brough t with them a small mace spray cont ainer that is consider ed by the licensee s written security implement ing procedu res to be a contraband item and prohi bited fro m being inside the PA.

Violation: Fail ure to control pr ohi bited items in accordance with the licensee s security implementing procedur es, and the NRC-appr oved security plan, for cont rolling items that ar e prohi bited from the PA.

Minor bec ause: The item was a small mace spray that was not used as a threat to the licensee and it was self-r eported by the employee.

Not minor if: The employee attempted to use the mace as a threat and the event lead to a subs tantial security consequence (i.e., abl e to mace several tactical responder s in a shor t period of time). If such a situat ion coul d happen with a coordinat ed attack, it has the pot ential to lead to a substantial security consequence.

Example 10i: The licensee failed to perfo rm the weekly security light ing inspections as requi red by the licensee s written procedur e. Upon discovery, the licensee immedi ately conducted the light ing inspection and disco vered one small area inside the PA that was bel ow the requi red illuminat ion level for assessing unau thor ized activities inside the PA. The licensee,

using closed-circuit television, assessed the area from the CAS and the oper ator was capabl e of assessing activities in the affected are a. The security depar tment immedi ately submitted a work order request to get the light ing repai red.

Violation: Fail ure to meet the licensee s writte n procedur es and NRC -appr oved security plan for security systems weekly testing.

Minor bec ause: The area affected failed bel ow the requi red illuminat ion level. However, the licensee demons tra ted that illu minat ion in the area was suffi cient to det ect unaut horized activity.

Not minor if: It was determined that it was a signi ficant degr adation in the licensee s abili ty to adequa tely assess unaut horized activity in the area. For example, very low level light ing covering a large part of t he PA that was not observable fro m the CAS and/ or Secondar y Alarm Station (SAS) and no compen satory measures were in place.

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -40 0616 Example 10j: An event occur s wher e the licensee discovered that the SAS offi cer was found inat tentive (appea red to be sleeping or unresponsive). At the time of the discovery, two qualif ied alarm station opera tors were per forming dut ies inside the CAS.

The violation: Fail ure to maintain a primary and secondar y alarm station as requi red by 10 CFR 73. 46(e)(5).

Minor bec ause: The accept able compen satory measur e for a loss of one alarm station is to have two quali fied operators inside the operational al arm station.

Not minor if: At the time of the event, ther e is onl y one quali fied oper ator inside the oper ational al arm station or the inatt entive offi cers actions are det ermined to be willful.

Example 10k: During the conduct of a limited scope test at the access control por tal, an access control security offi cer per formed a search on an individual who failed the walk-through metal de tector while ent ering the PA access control facilit y. The access control s ecurity officer, as requi red by the licensee s procedur e, perfo rmed a handhel d metal sear ch on the indi vidual. However, the officers search failed to det ect the training firear m on the indi vidual resul ting in the potent ial for the indi vidual to ent er the PA with a firearm.

The violation: Fail ure to detect atte mpts to introdu ce unau thor ized material into the PA as requi red by 10 CFR 73.45( f)(2).

Minor bec ause: The licensee has establi shed a limited scope per formance testing progr am that tests aspects of the overall security progr am. The program requi res very strict safety cont rols and not ification to managem ent and the shift super visor prior to bei ng conducted. The failure was per formed under a safe contro lled environm ent for testing purposes. The offi cer was immedi ately removed fro m the duties to be retra ined. Anot her quali fied access control officer was posted at the access control poi nt to perfo rm access control func tions.

Not minor if: The test was per formed dur ing an NRC inspec tion.

Example 10l: An NRC inspector requested to review a licensees in-tra nsit secur ity response progr am for shippi ng Special Nuclear Material (SNM). Although the licensee had a securi ty progr am for in-trans it shipment s, they informed the NRC inspe ctor that they were not responsible for security of the shipment s once the shipment depa rts thei r site. Since the licensee

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -41 0616 deli vered the SNM to the carrier for transpo rt, the inspector reques ted written conf irmation that the recei ver accept ed responsibility for in-transit security. The licensee was unabl e to provide written conf irmation.

The violation: Fail ure to proper ly arrange for in-trans it physical protection of SNM of low stra tegi c significance as requir ed by 10 CFR 73. 67(g)(1 )(v), which requi res that a licensee agr ee in writing to arrang e for the in-trans it physical pr otection when they are not the shipper.

Minor bec ause: The licensee had in place an adequate in-tra nsit physical pro tection progr am to respond if needed. In addition, there had not been an in-trans it security event requi ring them to respond.

Not minor if: Ther e had been an in-transit security incident involving a shipment that the licensee was requi red to respond to but failed to do so.

Example 10m: The licensee conduc ted an audi t of the rando m secur ity inspections requi red to be per formed by the shift security offi cers. During the audi t the licensee noticed on the inspection log that 3 days prior to thei r audit,

one of the inspected locations (i.e., exterior UF6 cylinder pad within the Contro lled Access Area [CAA] ) was not inspected for ano malies by the shift security offi cer.

The violation: Fail ure to adequa tely conduct random security inspections as requi red by the licensee s written security procedu re and the NRC-appr oved security plan.

Minor bec ause: The licensee conduc ted an investigat ion and extent of condi tion review that reveal ed no ano malies and the offi cer responsible for the check indi cated that he simply failed to check the area. The area is locat ed within the CAA and is observable by security officers. In addition, the licensee s investigat ion reveal ed that ther e were no issues in the area and all material was account ed for.

Not minor if: At the time of the event, ther e was a discovered anom aly.

Example 10n: During an outside walkdown, the inspec tors identified less than the requi red foot candl es illuminat ion between large storage boxes and other adj acent di mly lit areas. The licensee implemented tempor ary light ing until per manent light ing modi fications coul d be implement ed.

The violation: Fail ure to adequa tely illuminat e the physical per imeter as requi red by the licensee s written security procedu res and the NRC-appr oved security plan and regulations.

Minor because: The licensee conduc ted an investigat ion and extent of condi tion walkdow n that reveal ed no other anomalies and det ermined that the dimly

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -42 0616 lit area was the result of recent ly moved storage items within the protected area which is obser vable by security officers.

Not minor if: A repor tabl e event result ed as a result of the light ing degr ada tion.

END

Issue Date: 04/ 01/21 AppB -43 0616 Change Table NRC IMC-0616 effective 4/1/21, Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards Inspection Reports, Appendix B - Examples of Minor Issues

Prepared by Industry - April 202 1

Section Page Description of Change Reason for Change Number Screening App B-1 First paragraph, last sentence. Changed any to Improve guidance for process at least one and changed is to may be and assessing whether a deleted generally violation is minor or more than minor Screening App B-1 Deleted second paragraph regarding overall Removed change in risk process change in risk screening information that was added to Aug 2017 version Screening App B-2 Changed got lucky to discovered and Improve guidance for question 2 changed would to could and fixed typo: assessing whether a lead to led violation is minor or more than minor Screening App B-2 Changed is it risk significant to fails to Improve guidance for question 6 meet performance requirements and assessing whether a deleted the sentence added to the 2021 violation is minor or more version beginning with Consider the risk than minor Screening App B-2 Changed reduction in safety margin to Improve guidance for question 7 significant increased likelihood in safety assessing whether a consequences violation is minor or more than minor Screening App B-2 Added when needed that result in a failure to Improve guidance for question 8 meet performance requirements and deleted assessing whether a the sentence added to the 2021 version violation is minor or more beginning with Consider the risk than minor Screening App B Deleted the sentence added to the 2021 version Improve guidance for question 11 3 beginning with Consider the risk assessing whether a violation is minor or more than minor Screening App B-3 Deleted the sentence added to the 2021 version Improve guidance for question 12 beginning with Consider the risk assessing whether a violation is minor or more than minor Screening App B-3 Deleted the sentence added to the 2021 version Improve guidance for question 14 beginning with Consider the risk assessing whether a violation is minor or more than minor Screening App B-3 Changed reasonable level of safety margin to Improve guidance for question 16 provide reasonable assurance of adequate assessing whether a protection violation is minor or more than minor Screening App B-4 Added based on and changed and to or Clarification question 31 Example 1b App B-6 Changed implement to establish or Clarify management maintain measure requirements to align with 70.62(d)

Example 1c App B-6 Changed implement to establish or Clarify management maintain measure requirements to align with 70.62(d)

Example 1d App B-7 Changed implement to establish or Clarify management maintain measure requirements to align with 70.62(d)

Example 1e App B-7 Changed implement to establish or Clarify management maintain measure requirements to align with 70.62(d)

Example 1f App B-8 Changed implement to establish or Clarify management maintain measure requirements to align with 70.62(d)

Example 1g App B-8 Changed implement to establish or Clarify management maintain measure requirements to align with 70.62(d)

Example 1h App B-9 Changed implement to establish or Clarify management maintain measure requirements to align with 70.62(d)

Example 1i App B-9 Changed implement to establish or Clarify management maintain measure requirements to align with 70.62(d)

Example 1j App B Changed implement to establish or Clarify management 10 maintain measure requirements to align with 70.62(d)

Example 1j - App B-10 Changed to ensure that an IROFS remained Improve guidance for the violation available and reliable to, which led to the assessing whether a IROFS degradation or failure not being within the violation is minor or more analyzed failure rate than minor Example 1j - App B-10 Changed risk margin above and beyond to risk Improve guidance for minor because index that meets assessing whether a violation is minor or more than minor Example 1j - App B-10 The inspectors determined that the failure Improve guidance for added also was within its analyzed failure rate in the ISA, assessing whether a minor if or the licensee could credit IROFS from other violation is minor or more accident sequences. than minor Example 1j - App B-10 Changed no remaining risk margin above and Improve guidance for not minor if beyond to licensee not meeting assessing whether a violation is minor or more than minor Example 2h App B-13 Added significant before moderator Improve guidance for assessing whether a violation is minor or more than minor Example 4a App B-19 Changed implement to establish or Clarification maintain

Example 4c App B-20 Changed implement to establish or Clarification maintain

Example 4c - App B-20 Changed adversely impact the ability to Improve guidance for minor because result in a failure to meet performance assessing whether a requirements violation is minor or more than minor Example 4c - AppB-20 Added and results in a failure to meet Improve guidance for not minor if performance requirements assessing whether a violation is minor or more than minor Section 5 AppB-22 Edited section title Correction

Example 5b AppB-23 Changed Conformance to Compliance Correction

Example 6f AppB-28 Fixed typo in Minor because section Correction

Example 6f AppB-29 Fixed typo in Not minor if section Correction

Example 7c - AppB-32 Reworded section - changed implement to Clarify management the violation establish management measures to ensure measure requirements to compliance align with 70.62(d)

Example 7e AppB-32 Changed implement to establish or Clarification maintain

Example 7e - AppB-34 The inspectors determined that the failure Improve guidance for added also was within its analyzed failure rate in the ISA, assessing whether a minor if or the licensee could credit IROFS from other violation is minor or more accident sequences. than minor Example 7e - AppB-33 Changed not within its analyzed failure rate Improve guidance for not minor if to resulted in not meeting performance assessing whether a requirements violation is minor or more than minor Example 8c AppB-34 Corrected 10 CFR reference in The violation Correction section

Example 8e AppB-35 Corrected typo Correction

Example 9a/9b AppB-36 Added line between Examples 9a and 9b Correction