NUREG-0358, Forwards NRC Review of Fast Flux Test Facility Power Addition Safety Documents,Per Vaughn .Concludes That Proper Issues Being Addressed & That DOE Plan for Addressing Issues Appears Adequate

Forwards NRC Review of Fast Flux Test Facility Power Addition Safety Documents,Per Vaughn .Concludes That Proper Issues Being Addressed & That DOE Plan for Addressing Issues Appears Adequate

ML20151X979
Person / Time
Issue date:	03/08/1988
From:	Beckjord E NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES)
To:	Garrish T ENERGY, DEPT. OF
References
PROJECT-448A, RTR-NUREG-0358, RTR-NUREG-358 NUDOCS 8805040301
Download: ML20151X979 (10)

Text

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MAR 8 tggg Mr. Theodore J. Garrish Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy De))rtment of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545

Dear Mr. Garrish:

We have completed our review of the Fast Flux Test Facility Power Addition as requested by Mr. Vaughan's letter to Mr.~ Stello dated August 17,1987. -We have concluded that the proper issues are being addressed and that the 00E process / plan for addressing these issues appears adequate.-

The enclosed report more fully discusses the basis for the review, the guidelines under which it was conducted, and the material reviewed. If we can provide any additional , ass.istance or infonnation1 1n this. regard, please call upon me or Mr. Owen P. Gonnley~ of my staff on (301) 49E4743.

Sincerely,

($% f. T^^ *: ,

hEric 5. Beckjord, Director Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

Enclosure:

As stated 015TRIBUT10N: [MEM0 TO THE0DORE GARRISH]

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! NRC Staff Review of Fast Flux Test Facility l Power Addition Safety Documents .

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Sumary j i

f We have completed our review of the documents describing the safety assessment l

. of the design for the Power Addition to the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF).

] The purpose of the review was to assess the adequacy of the scope and process  :

! of the safety reviews conducted by DOE, its contractors, and consultants. The I review was based on the documents provided by the Department of Energy, DOE, l (the FFTF Power Addition Safety Assessment Approach and the FFTF Power Addition l Safety Assessment). The information contained therein~was supplemented by  ;

information presented during an NRC staff tour of the FFTF site, responses to -

l staff questions, and information contained in the report of the External Safety 8

Review Committee (ESRC), Our conclusion is that the proper issues are being ,

J j addressed and that the DOE process / plan for addressing those issues appears adequate.  !

] Background j The FFTF is a sodium cooled fast spectrum experimental reactor owned by the i j Federal Government and operated by the Department of Energy at its Richland, )

j Washington (Hanford) site. Its primary mission is the irradiation of fuels f

I and materials and does not produce electric power. During the design and  ;

! construction phase of the FFTF Project there was an extensive dialogue between I

the designers and operators and the licensing staff on issues pertaining to  !

s i 4 safcty. This dialogue began in 1970 before the separation of the Atomic Energy Cennission functions into the NRC and the Energy Research and Cevelopment Administration (ERDA, now DOE). Advice on safety issues pertaining to the FFTF  :

] was formally reauested by ERDA in November 1975 with clarification of scope in a

August 1976. Tbc nature of the review was advisory only and did not involve j

j the issuance of an cperatinr1 license. The review resulted in the publication d  !

NUREG-0358 "Safety Evalusticn Report Related to Operation of f ast F1 tx T%t  !

t j facility" in August IW8 and Supplement 1 of that cccument published in Ma3  !

} 1979.  !

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2 In August 1987, DOE requested NRC participation in the review of the scope and adequacy of the safety assessment process for a proposed Power Addition to the FFTF (Ref. 1). The Power Addition would involve the addition of the components necessary to generate electric power. This would include evaporators and superheaters, steam and feedwater piping and components and a turbine generator. The Fower Addition would modify two of the three existing-FFTF secondary loops by adding the evaporators /superheaters in series with the existing Dump Heat Exchangers (DHXs). The third (east) loop would be preserved unchanged. The design selected for the FFTF-PA would use Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant (CRBRP) steam generating system components, wherever practical.

For example, utilization oV the CRBRP' evaporator /superheater' design is planned since it has been extensively analyzed, tested by the CRBRP program and reviewed in detail by the NRC. The steam will be piped approximately 250 f t to a turbine generator building located'outside 6f the vital area. In an arrangement similar to that used for N-Reactor, the turbine generator and electric distribution facility will be owned and operated by a private entity.

The configuration and operating conditions of the reactor core are to remain unchanged although primary system flow will be increased in the two loops'with evaporators /superheaters (and reduced in the Icap without an evaporator /superheater) to maximize steam production. As stated in Reference 9, the primary mission of the FFTF would continue to be that of a fuels and materials irradiation facility. Reference 3 contains a detailed description of the proposed Power Addition and DOE's preliminary safety assessment.

The DOE Safety Review Process /Plun DOE has documented the safety assessment approach for the Power Addition (Ref. 2) dnd the conceptual design and safety assessment for the Power Addition (Ref. 3).

The DOE approach to safety with respect to the Power :idition is to ensure that the original safety envelope of the FFTF is not adversely impacted. In addition, state-of-the-art components and design features are tu be used in the Power Aodition.

In the review of areas where the Power Addition interfaces with the existing safety envelope it was DOE's intent to determine whether (1) the original safety envelope and analyses were maintained and (2) if new detailed safety

3 analyses need to be performed. Preliminary analyses were performed by 00E to assess' the potential of'the proposed Power Addition to accomplish the~ above.

Specifically, they evaluated how the Power Addition impacts the ability to meet each of the FFTF General Design Criteria, how it impacts the design conditions of FFTF and how it changes existing safety analyses. They also performed a preliminary assessment of the impact of new safety concerns. Key acceptan'ce criteria (temperature limits, fuel cladding strain limits, etc.) from the original FFTF safety analyses were maintained. DOE also conveaed an External Safety Review Committee (ESRC) which reviewed the conceptual design and preparad a report entitled, "An Evaluation of the Fast Flux Test Facility Power Addition Safety Assessment" (Ref. 5). This diverse group of five safety, fast reactor and liquid metal technology experts in association with a committee chairman and two observers performed a broad scope review which identified 37 issues.

These issues were resolved by Westinghouse Hanford Company as documented in the ESCR report. Tbn depth and scope of the ESRC review contributed to the depth and certainty of the NRC review by bringing many issues to resolution prior te our review.

If the project is authorized to proceed, DOE will prepare a detailed design, during which it will perform a detailed safety analysis addressing all of the issues currently under consideration plus any new ones identified.

URC Review Our review was undertaken in November 1987 under the following guidelines noted by Ref. 6:

1. DOE retains full responsibility for all safety issues, including analyses, R&D and inspection.

2 The NRC review only addresses design related aspects of the Power Addition.

2. The NRC review is limited to the scope and process of the DOE safety dssessF20t.

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4 The review was based on the safety assessment approach and the completed safety assessment noted abov , supplemedted by'the report of ESRC. ~Also, during Movember 1987, the NRC staff toured the location for the Power Addition and received a briefing on the technical details. Reference 7 transmitted staff questions wnich resulted from the review and the briefing, and Ref. 8 provided the responses. '

Results of the Review Our review was of necessity an overview whic.h concentrated our efforts in the areas with'the greatest potential for impacting plant safety.~ We L2nefitted both from the completencss of the Safety Assessment (Ref. 3) and the report of the External Safety Review Committee (Ref. 5). The enclosure to Ref. 8 lists

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our questions on certain issues along with the DOE responses. The main objective of our review was to review the scope of the DOE safety assessment done to date, their plans for safety assessments as the design proceeds and

. their criteria for acceptability. We conclude tha*. the DOE process and plan for assessing the safety of the Power Addition, as documented in References 2 and 3 and the report of the External Safety Review Committee (Ref. 5), appears satisfactory. This conclusion is based upon our review of the app *oach to maintaining the original safety envelope of the plant, the scope of the issues to be cor.11dered in the safcty assessment and the independent review process established by 00E. Of primary importance in this regard is that DOE's plan maintains the existing reactor core configuration and operating conditions, retair<s the capability to remove decay heat via natural convection with the existing DHXs in all three loops, retains all existing reactor shutdown system inputs and trip limits and utilizes state-of-the-art components and design features in the Power Addition. In addition, containment design is not to be changed or is its integrity to be compromised by the Powar Addition. The following is a summary list of the items we considered in assessing the completeness of the scope of issues considered by DOE in its safety assessment:

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~1. Removal of Decay Heat (a) Extent of preservation of configuration and conditions in-the tornado hardened east loop.

(b) Extent of preservation of Dump Heat Exchanger (OHX) capability in west and south"loops.

(c) Potential overcooling /undercooling risk caused by the Power Addition.

(d) Decay heat removal implications of loop to loop flow redistribution, including pump coastdown and establishment of natural circulation (e.g could greater energy in west and south loop rotating pump j components cause flow' reversal or closing of check valves in the east loop thereby slowing establishment of natural circulation, etc.).

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2. Freservation of Containment Integrity (a) Impact on containment integrity, including intermediate heat exchanger (IHX) and associated pipir n caused by sodium water reaction (SWR) or temperature or pressure transients of increased severity, or other related problems.

(b) Potential impact on containment integrity caused by events in the

' Power Addition considering equivalent risk levels e.g. steam drum rupture, turbine missiles, etc.

1 (c) Increased risk to the plant attributable to sodium fires or sodium water reactions external to piping components.

3. Preservation of the Reliability of the Plant Protection System I i

(a) Maintaining diversity and independence between primary and secondary system inputs.

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(b) Effects of additional complexity.

(c) Increased challenges to the system and consequent increased risk of failure.

4. Control of the Plant (a) Protection from steam plant transients.

(b) Ability to quickly cut off the steam plant and return to use.of DHXs.  ;

5. Impact of Normal Operations and Minor Events on the, Primary Plant Design Margin l (a) Increased flow effects - vibration, thermal striping, margin between l increased ficw tests in the west and south loops and planned flow in  !

those loops.

(b) Increased temperature transients (both number and severity) on design life safety margin.

(c) Increased temperature of cold leg components caused by decreased heat removal in the east loop DHX.

6. Acceptability of Clinch River Breeder Reactor Project (CRBRP) components for use at FFTF.

(a) Degree to which CRBRP design criteria meet FFTF site and safety criteria.

(b) Effect of extended storage on components e.g. aging, environmental ef fects; including QA on storage. , 'i (c) Need for special inspections.

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.. 7 1 4- l 7.. ChangeinseismicresponseofFFTFplantandcomponentscausedbyPober ,

Addition Structures and Piping' -

8. Applicability of LWR Unresolved S'a'fety Issues aiid Generic Issues l l

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- Issues which may have been reviewed and dismissed earlier, may become  !

l relevant with the addition of power generating capability. l l

9. Change in Response for Accidents Initiated at Off-Normal i.e. Less Than l Full Power May result in more severe than design basis conscluences with the l

Power Addition. j

10. Impact on Severe Accident Capability and Emergency Planning needs.

DOE has or plans to assess each of these items as part of its safety review. ,

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Conclusion  !

We have concluded that the proper issues are being addressed in the FFTF-Power Addition program and the process for addressing these issues appears adequate.

1 The strategy of maintaining heat removal capability in all loops and preserving the tornado hardened east loop in the unchanged condition has preserved the l validity of essentially all of the earlier safety analyses. A thorough examination of the effects of adding the Power Addition by DOE and the ESRC I has confirmed that only secondary issues need to be examined. These issues i have been identified and the schedule for their resolution is established.

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References .

1. Letter Vaughn (00E) to Stello (NRC), August 17, 1987 +

2'. FFTF Power Addition Safety Assessment Approach (undated)

3. WHC.-EP-0077 "Fast Flux Test Facility Power Addition Safety Assessment,"

December 1987

4. LetterHunter(00E)toBeckjord(NRC), December $1,1987

5. An Evaluation of the Fast Flux Test Facility Power Addition Safety Asseivment, Novem'ber 2'3, 1987.

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6. Letter Stello to Vaughn, November 3, 1987 i

7. Letter Morris (NRC) to Hunter, December 3,1987 -

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8. Letter Hunter to Beckjord, January 6,1988

9. Letter Hunter to King (NRC), October 15, 1987 i

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