ML20211K189

From kanterella
Revision as of 15:11, 6 August 2021 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (StriderTol Bot insert)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Review of Safeguards Regulations & Guidance (Category I Nonpower Reactors)
ML20211K189
Person / Time
Issue date: 04/30/1985
From:
NRC - SAFETY/SAFEGUARDS REVIEW GROUP
To:
Shared Package
ML20211K170 List:
References
FOIA-86-432 NUDOCS 8606270347
Download: ML20211K189 (28)


Text

. . ~ ,

REVIEW 0F SAFEGUARDS REGULATIONS AND GUIDANCE (CATEGORY I NON-POWER REACTORS)

SAFEGUARDS' INTEROFFICE REVIEW GROUP April, 1985 g62 7 060624 AFTERCOB6-432 PDR _.

P- -- . - - _ - . -. -. --- -- --- -- - -- -- --- ' - - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

FOREWORD The Safeguards Interoffice Review Group was formed in'0ctober, 1984, at the direction of the NRC Executive Director for Operations, to review Safeguards regulations and guidance. This was done to identify possible inconsistencies that could lead to misunderstanding and lack of coordination within the staff in administering safeguards requirements.

The Group has the following membership:

Robert A. Erickson, NMSS, Chairman Tom R. Allen, NMSS Paul Baker, NMSS Loren L. Bush, IE Francis X. Cameron, ELD Jane L. Gibson, NRR Gordon E. Gundersen, NMSS Carl B. Sawyer, NMSS Philip Ting, RES In preparing this report, the Group was assisted and advised by others, including: Patricia Anderson, NRR; Willard Brown, NMSS; Donald Carlson, NMSS; Robert Dube, NMSS; Sandra Frattali, RES; Ellen Kraus, NMSS; Charles Nulsen, NMSS; Richard Rosano, IE; Bruce Taylor, RES; and Carl Withee, NMSS. The

<- following served as Group contacts: Walter Schwink, (ED0); Richard P. Keimig (RI); Kenneth P. Barr (RII); James R. Creed (RIII); Ramon E. Hall (RIV); and James L. Montgomery (RV).

l I

1 iii l

ppew was

TABLE OF CONTENTS Pag Foreword ....................................:........................

Summary of Findings ..................................................

iii 1

Ba~ckground ........................................................... 1 Scope.and Approach ................................................... 2 Regulatory Overview .................................................. 3

, Findings Related to Category I Non-Power Reactors .................... 5 Clarity of Safeguards Requirements Involving the 100 Rems per Hour Exemption ................................... 5 Potential Problems Associated with Loss of the 100 Rems per Hour Exemption ................................... 6 Security Plan Submitta'ls ........................................ 7 Security Plan Contents .......................................... 7 Contingency Plans ............................................... 7 Storage of SNM .................................................. 8 Inclusion of Apparently Inappropriate Provisions in 10 CFR S 73.60 ............................................ 8 Confusing Reference in 10 CFR S 70.22(h) ........................ 9 Regul ato ry Guide Re ferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-Inconsistencies Related to Category II Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Protection against Radiological Sabotage ........................ 11 Clarity of Language in Regulations .............................. 11 Industrial Sabotage ............................................. 12 References ................................. .....................

Bibliography .........................................................

R-1

.... B-1 l

i V

I t

t

u y ._

REVIEW 0F SAFEGUARDS REGULATIONS AND, GUIDANCE (CATEGORY I NON-POWER REACTORS)

Summary of Findings In reviewing NRC safeguards regulations and supporting guidance for Category I non power reactors, the Group identified several inconsistent req 6irements for physical security plans and safeguards contingency plans. In addition, the Group noted a potential for difficulties arising out of the "100 rems per hour" exemptions contained in 10 CFR S573.6, 73.60, and 73.67(b)(1). Also noted were several inaccurate references in the regulations and guidance, as well as inconsistencies in Category II guidance that could be applicable to Category I non power reactors. The Commission is currently engaged in a rulemaking which addresses most of these issues and has already published a proposed rule for comment (48 FR 34056, see Ref. 1).

~

Background

Proceedings on the application for renewal of the non power reactor license for the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) highlighted a lack of coordination and consistency in the NRC staff concerning implementation of the, relevant regulations (17 NRC 927 and 18 NRC 802, see Ref. 2). During those proceedings, the safeguards licensing staff of the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) testified that NRC regulations do not require non power reactors to protect against radiological sabotage. However, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board interpreted 10 CFR S 73.40 as requirin'g such protection, and cited references to sabotage protection in the UCLA security plan, as well as in an NRC sample security plan and certain NRC inspection docu-ments. The staff's position was supported by a significant body of regulatory guidance and a major policy paper on physical protection standards (SECY 77-79, see Ref. 3). The Board's position reflected a literal reading of S 73.40 and other regulatory documents which illuminated possible inconsistencies that may have developed during the evolution of safeguards regulations and supporting 1

3_
guidance. Accordingly, the Board recommended that if the Commission agreed with the staff's technical justification for its position, it should amend S 73.40(a) so that no ambiguity will exist with respect to what is required of non power reactor licensees. To preclude such problems in the future, NRC's Executive Director for Operations (EDO) directed NMSS to "...promptly review all NRC Safeguards regulations and pertinent associated guidance with .

other NRC offices (NRR, IE, and Regions, as necessary) to assure that no '

~

further misunderstanding or lack of coordination and consistency, as were manifested in the UCLA proceeding, exist or recur either in hearing-related or non-hearing-related activities" (see Ref. 4).

NMSS organized the Safeguards Interoffice Review Group, including professionals from each safeguards licensing branch and representatives from other offices, ,

to address the concerns raised by the EDO. NRC's Regional offices and the ED0's office each designated persons to serve as points of contact for the .. m Group, which held its first weekly meeting on October 18,1984.

t

! Scoce and Acoroach

~

1 i The ED0 directive to review safeguards regulations and guidance was broad in scope. In order to make the review manageable, while being fully responsive j to the directive, the Group agreed to approach its work as follows:

1. The Group would concentrate on identifying inconsistencies in safeguards, l regulations and cJidance, with the understanding that resolution of those 1

inconsistencies is a task for the staff at large.

i

! 2. The group would review regulations and guidance affecting various classas of licensees as follows:

i n

i Non power Reactors - Catecories II and III (report issued January 31,

! 1985, see Ref. 5) .

l Non power Reactors - Category I Nuclear Materials Transportation - Category I Nuclear Materials Transportation - Category II Nuclear Materials Transportatier. - Category III Fuel Fabrication Facilities - Category I Fuel Fabrication Facilities - Category II Fuel Fabrication Facilities - Category III

, 2

Power Reactors Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations Fuel Fabrication / Conversion Facilities and Power Reactors under IAEA Safeguards Spent Fuel Transportation ,

New Fuel Stored at Reactors These classes of licensees could be further refined or consolidated, as appropriate, to facilitate the Group's review.

3. The Group would attempt to identify and screen all relevant documents used by the NRC staff in the performance of safeguards licensing and inspection / enforcement functions.
4. In the course of its reviews covering various classes of licensed activi-ties, the Group would also be alert for generic probicins. These may be discussed in the Group's final report, which, accordingly, could include -"

comments on such matters as improving NRC staff coordination; clarifying the scope of NRC regulations (in terms of the types of facilities or activities covered); clearly identifying superseded regulations and guidance; and ensuring- that regulations, guidance, licensing criteria, and inspection procedures are coherent and accessible.

Regulatory Overview Safeguards at licensed non power reactors are regulated by the NRC under author-ity of the Atomic Energy Act of 19541 as amended, and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. Applicable NRC safeguards regulations are codified principally in 10 CFR Parts 50, 70, and 73. Non power reactor licensees establish safeguards 1 Nuclear research faci ~lities, including non power reactors, constitute a special class, from the NRC's perspective. Subsection 104c of the Atomic Energy Act authorized the Commission "to issue 1icenses to persons applying therefor for utilization and production facilities useful in the conduct of research and development activities of the types specified in section 31 and which are not facilities of the type specified in subsection 104b. The Commission is directed to impose only such minimum amount of regulation of the licensee as the Commission finds will permit the Commission to fulfill its obligations under this Act to promote the common defense and security and to protect the health and safety of the public and will permit the conduct of widespread and diverse research and development."

3 i

programs in accordance with these regulations and supporting guidance docu-ments. The terms " Category I," " Category II," and " Category III," respectively, denote special nuclear material (SNM) of "high" (formula quantities), moder-ate, and low strategic significance.2 Requirements for the physical protection of Category I non power reactors are contained in 10 CFR S 73.60. Category I non power reactor licensees are also subject to the provisions of S 73.67(a) through (d), which are incorporated by reference in S 73.60. The current requirements of S 73.60 were intended to be an interim solution, pending devel-opment of new physical protection requirements for non power reactors that would take into account their design features and fuel type and form. Under the interim regulations, non power reactor licensees are exempt from the requirements of S 73.60 to the extent that the material they hold is irradiated beyond the level of 100 rems per hour. Amendments proposed by the Commission in July 1983 (48 FR 34056, see Ref.1) would remove 10 CFR S 73.60, and require Category I 2As defined in 10 CFR 73.2:

Formula cuantity means: strategic special nuclear material in any combination in a quantity of 5,000 grams or more computed by the formula, grams = (grams contained U-235)+2.5 (grams U-233 + grams plutonium). Strategic special nuclear material means uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope),' uranium-233, or plutonium.

Special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance means:

, (1) Less than a formula quantity of strategic special nuclear material but more than 1000 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope) or more than 500 grams of uranium-233 or plutonium or in a combined quantity of more than 1000 grams when computed by the equation, grams = (grams contained in U-235) + 2 (grams U-233 + grams plutonium), or (2) 10,000 grams or more of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 10 percent or more but less than 20 percent in the U-235 isotope).

Soecial nuclear material of low strategic significance means:

(1) Less than an amount of strategic special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance...but more than 15 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope) or 15 grams of uranium-233 or 15 grams of plutonium or the combination of 15 grams when computed by the equation, grams = grams contained U-235 + grams plutonium +

grams U-233, or (2) Less than 10,000 grams but more than 1000 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 10 percent or more but less than 20 percent in the U-235 isotope), or (3) 10,000 grams or more of uranium-235 contained in uranium enriched above natural but less than 10 percent in the U-235 isotope.

4

non power reactors to protect their material at least at the level prescribed in 10 CFR S 73.67(d) for Category II mateSial, regardless of what portion of their material is irradiated to meet the 100 rems per hour exemption. The pro-posed amendments would also provide that: "During an interim period of 90 days after a formula quantity of non exempt fuel is possessed by a non power reactor licensee, approved compensatory measures may be substituted for those approved on a permanent basis."

FINDINGS RELATED TO CATEGORY I NON-POWER REACTORS Clarity of Safeguards Reouirements Involving the 100 Rems per Hour Exemotion 10 CFR S 73.60 states, in part: "a licensee is exempt from the requirements of this section to the extent that he possesses or uses special nuclear material which is not readily separable from other radioactive material and which has a _,

total external radiation dose rate in excess of 100 rems per hour at a distance of three feet from any accessible surface without intervening shielding."

This exemption appears to relieve Category I non power reactor licensees from

~

physical protection requirements to the extent that their fuel is irradiated to a 100 rems per hour level.3 However, no such exemption applies to 10 CFR 73.40(a), which states: "Each licensee shall provide physical protection against radiological sabotage and against theft of special nuclear material at the fixed sites where licensed activities are conducted. Physical security systems shall be established and maintained by the licensee in accordance with security plans approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission."

Based on both these rules (SS 73.60 and 73.40(a)), it is not clear what level of physical protection is required of Category I non power reactor licensees who qualify for the 100 rems per hour exemption.

310 CFR S 73.67 contains an exemption similar to that in S 73.60. Therefore, Categories II and III non power reactor licensees are subject to the same type of exemption.

5

As noted in the Regulatory Overview section of this report, the NRC has pub-lished a proposed rule, (48 FR 34056, see Ref.1) that would clarify this by specifically limiting reduction in the protection level from Category I to Category II, when the 100 rems per hour criterion is met.

Potential Problems Associated with Loss of the 100 Rems per Hour Exemotion Under current regulations, if a non power reactor possesses a formula quantity of strategic special nuclear material which does not qualify for the 100 rems.

per hour exemption, it would appear to be subject to the following requirements:

1. The need for a safeguards contingency plan (10 CFR S 50.34(d) and S 73.40(b))
2. The ability to carry out the contingency plan (10 CFR S 73.40(c) and (d)) _ . ,
3. The need to describe 10 CFR S 73.60 features in a security plan (10 CFR S 50.34(c)) -
4. The need to implement the physical security measures of 10 CFR S 73.60
5. The need to keep certain safeguards records (10 CFR S 73.70 requirements arising from 10 CFR S 73.6(e))
6. The need to provide advance notice of shipments (10 CFR S 73.72 require-ments arising from 10 CFR S 73.6(e)).

It would probably be difficult for an exempt Category I non power reactor to immediately satisfy these requirements in the event its fuel irradiation levels no longer met the 100 rems per hour criterion. In this regard, the Group noted that NRC's proposed rule (see Ref. 1) would, among other things,  ;

provide that: "During an interim period of 90 days after a formula quantity of non-exempt fuel is possessed by a non power reactor licensee, approvad i compensatory measures may be substituted for those approved on a permanent l basis."

6 J

Security Plan Submittals The Group noted inconsistencies between staff licensing guidance and the regula-tions regarding submittal of security plans by Category I non power reactor licensees. The Standard Review Plan for Category I Non power Reactors (see Ref. 6) states that security plans are not required for such facilities.

In contrast, 10 CFR S 50.34(c) states that each applicant for a license to operate a utilization facility shall include a physical security plan. 10 CFR S 73.60 st&tes that Category I non power reactors which do not qualify for the 100 rems per hour exemption shall comply with 73.67(a), (b), (c), and (d), plus the other requirements of S 73.60. 10 CFR 73.67(c) then calls for the submittal of security plans. Technical specifications in typical non power reactor licenses refer to the periodic audits of security plans. Also, S 73.40(a) states,

... Physical security systems shall be established and maintained by the licensee _,,

in accordance with security plans approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission."

The Group noted that security plans have been submitted by all non power reactor licensees authorized to possess forinula quantities of SNM.

Security Plan Contents An inconsistency was noted in requirements dealing with the format and content of Category I non power reactor security plans. 10 CFR S 50.34(c) requires that a two part security plan be submitted by each applicant to operate a utilization facility. Part I of that plan shall address vital equipment, vital

. areas, isolation zones and applicable requirements of 10 CFR Parts 73 and 11.

Part II of the plan shall address tests and inspections and other means to be used to demonstrate compliance with such requirements, if applicable. However, 10 CFR SS 73.60 and 73.67, the major applicable safeguards requirements for Category I non power reactors, do not deal with vital equipment or vital areas.

Continoency Plans Inconsistencies concerning the need for contingency plans for Category I non-power reactors were identified. 10 CFR S 50.34(d) requires each application for a license to operate a utilization facility subject to S 73.60 to include 7

e a safeguards contingency plan. Likewise, 10 CFR S 73.40(b) requires each licensee subject to S 73.60 to prepare a safeguards contingency plan. 10 CFR SS 50.54(p) and 70.32(g) require, as license conditions, that the licensee prepare and maintain procedures for effecting the safeguards contingency plan.

Further, Draft Inspection Procedure 814014 (see Ref. 7) calls for verifica-tion of the existence of a contingency plan for Category I non power reactors.

However, the Standard Review Plan (see Ref. 6) states that Category I non power reactors are not required to submit safeguards contingency plans. Moreover, current licenses for non power reactors authorized to possess formula quantities of SNM do not refer to safeguards contingency plans.

Storace of SNM The requirements for the storage of SNM at Category I non power reactors contain potentially confusing statements. 10 CFR S 73.60(a)(3) states "special nuclear _.

material not in process shall be stored in a vault equipped with an intrusion alarm or in a vault-type room, and each such vault or vault-type room shall be controlled as a separate material access area." However, Section 73.67(d)(2),

which is incorporated by reference into S 73.60, states that the licensee shall

" store the material only within a centrolled access area such as a vault-type room or approved security cabinet or their equivalent."

Inclusion of Apparently Inacorocriate Provisions in 10 CFR S 73.60 The title of 10 CFR S 73.60 is " Additional requirements for the physical protection of special nuclear material at non-power reactors." Accordingly, the introductory paragraph to that section refers only to non power reactors.

10 CFR S 73.60(a)(4), however, refers to protection of " enriched uranium scrap in the form of small pieces, cuttings, chips, solutions or in other forms which result from a manufacturing process." This requirement appears to apply to fuel facilities rather than to non power reactors.

4The Group noted that the current IE procedures have been in effect for several years and are recognized to be significantly out of date. Accordingly, with respect to 81400 series procedures, the review was confined to draft versions of the updated procedures, which have been circulated for Regional comment.

8

7 Confusing Reference in 10 CFR S 70.22(h) 10 CFR S 70.22(h) calls for each applicant possessing a formula quantity of SNM except nuclear reactors licensed under Part 50 to submit a security plan. The plan, according to S 70.22(h), would demonstrate how the licensee would meet the requirements of SS 73.20, 73.40, 73.45, 73.46, 73.50, 73.60, 73.70, and 73.71 in the conduct of the activity to be licensed. The Group notes that prior to 1981, S 73.60 applied to certain fuel facilities. The reference in S 70.22(h) to S 73.60 (which now applies exclusively to non power reactors) appears to have been left over from that time period.

Reoulatory Guide References Two Regulatory Guides that exclusively cite 10 CFR S 73.60 requirements appear to contain information that would not be relevant to Category I non power _ . . ,

reacto'rs. The Introduction to Regulatory Guide 5.27, "Special Nuclear Material Doorway Monitors" (see Raf. 8) for example, cites only 10 CFR S 73.60(b), " Exit Requirements" as a regulatory reference. The " Introduction" states, "This guide

~

e describes means acceptable to the regulatory staff for employing SNM doorway monitors to comply with that requirement." The Guide goes on to discuss equip-ment for detecting various types of nuclear material, including plutonium, which generally would not exist in appreciable quantities at non power reactors.

Likewise, Regulatory Guide 5.47, " Control and Accountability of Plutonium in Waste Material" (see Ref. 9) cites 10 CFR S 73.60 requirements exclusively aad then discusses various aspects of plutonium handling. These inconsistencies apparently resulted from references to S 73.60 that are now obsolete (prior to 1981, 10 CFR S 73.60 applied to certain fuel facilities).

A number of other regulatory guides (e.g., 5.7, 5.12, 5.14', 5.20, 5.29, 5.43, 5.44, and 5.62, see Refs. 10-17) contain information that could be applicable to Category I non power reactors, but none of the'se guides specifically mentions non power reactors or their safeguards requirements. (It is, therefore, unclear whether these guides were intended to apply to Category I non power reactors.) j 9

Inconsistencies Related to Category II Guidance Because regulations for the safeguards protection of Category I non power reac-tors (10 CFR S 73.60) are supplementary to Category II requirements (10 CFR S 73.67(a), (b), (c), and (d)), many of the guidance documents generally used for Category II facilities could be applicable to Category I non power reactors.

Inconsistencies in these documents as discussed'in the Group's first report, dated January 31, 1985 (see Ref. 5), may consequently affect Category I non-power reactors. Two such inconsistencies are discussed below.

An apparent inconsistency exists between the Category II licensing criteria document (see Ref. 18) and the safeguards reporting requirements of 10 CFR S 73.71. Section 73.71(b) appears to require that actual or attempted thefts or diversion of material be reported to the NRC within one hour of occurrence.

On the other hand, the Category II licensing criteria document (see Ref. 18) _ . ,

specifies allowable theft detection times of two hours and longer for various -

types and quantities of nuclear material. Furthermore, a table whicn suggests a greater range of reporting times is appended to the regulation, but appears

~

to refer only to S 73.71(c), dealing with events concerning security effective-ness. With regard to this inconsistency, the Group noted that S 73.71 is under-going revision which would, among other things, also change the one-hour report-ing reference point in S 73.71(b) from the time of occurrence to the time of discovery, as is currently specified in S 73.71(c). If these revisions are made, the Category II licensing criteria document (see Ref. 18) and S 73.71 will be consistent. Another apparent inconsistency was identified between two guid-ance documents which discuss illumination levels for controlled access areas.

The Category II licensing criteria document (see Ref. 18) states that an illumi-nation level of 0.2 footcandles, measured horizontally at ground level, is acceptable. Draft Inspection Procedure 81421,s (see Ref. 19) however, calls for illumination sufficient to allow surveillance by the unaided human eye, and recommends the level be in the range of 2 to 5 footcandles, as suggested in NUREG/CR-1327, (see Ref. 20).

5See footnote 4, page 8.

10

[

Protection against Radiological Sabotage (addressed in the Group's report on Categories II and III non power reactors, January 31, 1985, see Ref. 5) i Depending upon interpretation of 10 CFR S 73.40(a), an inconsistency may exist between implementing guidance documents for all non power reactors and 10 CFR 73.40(a). That section of the regulation states "...each licensee shall provide physical protection against radiological sabotage and against theft of special nuclear material at the fixed sites where licensed activities are conducted."

i However, licensee guidance and inspection documents relevant to non power reac-tors deal exclusively with protection against theft of SNM. These documents are consistent, in this respect, with the more detailed protection requirements in 10 CFR S 73.67 (which do not explicitly address protection against radio-logical sabotage).6 However, the omission of sabotage may make them inconsis-tent with the general requirements of 10 CFR S 73.40(a).

) Clarity of Language in Regulations (addressed in the Group's report on Cate-J gories II and III non power reactors, January 31, 1985, see Ref. 5)

~

-o The Group noted an awkward wording in the regulations that was difficult to interpret. It appeared that a 93-word sentence in 10 CFR, Part 73, Appendix B, could be interpreted to require every licensed utilization facility to estab-lish a security organization, including guards. In this case, proper inter-pretation depends upon the word "respectively," which appears in the middle of that sentence quoted below. -

, " Pursuant to the provisions of S 73.50 and 73.55 of 10 CFR Part 73, Requirements for Physical Protection of Plants and Materials, each licensee who is authorized to conduct certain activities with speci-fied quantities of special nuclear material pursuant to 10 CFR Part 70 and each licensee who is authorized to operate a production or utilization facility pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50, respectively, is 6 Regulatory Guide 5.59 (see Ref. 21) the standard format and content guide for Categories II and III security plans, does mention " industrial sabotage" in its introduction. However, none of the substantive parts of the Guide addresses sabotage.

11

required to establish a security organization, including trained and equipped guards to physically protect special nuclear material in their possession and their facilities against theft and radiological sabotage." (Underscoring added for emphasis.)

Thus, the requirement applies only to Part 70 licensees subject to S 73.50 and to Part 50 licensees (power reactors) subject.to S 73.55.

Industrial Sabotace (addressed in the Group's report on Categories II and III non power reactors, January 31, 1985, see Ref. 5)

The term " industrial sabotage" was found in several places in the regulations and guidance. Specifically,10 CFR SS 50.34(d), 70.22(g), 70.22(j), and the introduction to Regulatory Guide 5.59 (see Ref. 21) all mention industrial sabotage, even though the term has been suptrseded by " radiological sabotage,"

as defined in 10 CFR 73.2(p). _ .,

~

30 12

REFERENCES (Category I Non power Reactors)

Cited in Text Description or Designator:

1. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1. FR 34056

" Physical Protection Requirements for Nonpower Reactor Licensees Possessing Formula Quantities of Strategic Nuclear Material," Federal Register, Vol. 48, No. 145, July 27, 1983, 34056-34060.

2. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2. LBP-83-25A, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 17 NRC 927 (1983) decisions in the matter of Docket and LBP-8367

, No. 50-142-OL (proposed renewal of 18 NRC 802 (1983) facility license)

The Regents of the University of California (UCLA Research Reactor) 1983.

3. Memo for the Commissioners, from 3. Secy 77-79 Kenneth R. Chapman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, "NRC and Inter-national Physical Protection Standards," Secy 77-79, Feb. 11, 1977. -
4. Memo for J. Davis, U.S. Nuclear 4. ,

E00 Memorandum, Regulatory Commission, Director, dated July 3, 1984 Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, et al. , from William J.

Dircks, Executive Director for R-1

REFERENCES, Cont'd (Category I Non power Reactors)

Cited in Text Description or Designator Operations, 0IA Investigation, ,

"ASLB--Allegations concerning Three NRC Employees" (dated June 12,1984),

July 3, 1984.

5. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 5. Safeguards Interoffice Safeguards Interoffice Review Group, Review Group Report -

" Review of Safeguards Regulations Categories II and III) and Guidance (Categories II and III Non-Power Reactors)," January 31 1985. . _ ,

6. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 6. A catalogue of standard

" Standard Review Plans Providing Guidance review plans, used by for Fuel Facilities Safeguardi Licensing the safeguards licensing Branch," September.1983. staff; broken into chapters corresponding to facility types (Category I)

7. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 7. Draft Inspection Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Procedure 81401

" Inspection Procedure 81401,1 Physical Security Plans," draft, undated.

1The Group noted that the current IE procedures have been in effect for several years and are recognized to be significantly out of date. Accordingly, with respect to 31400 series procedures, the review was confined to draft versions of the updated procedures, which have been circulated out for Regional comment.

R-2

4 REFERENCES, Cont'd 4 (Category I Non power Reactors)

Cited in Text Description or Designator:

8. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 8. Regulatory Guide 5.27 Regulatory Guide 5.27, "Special Nuclear Material Doorway Monitors," 1974.
9. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 9. Regulatory Guide 5.47 Regulatory Guide 5.47, " Control and Accountability of Plutonium in Waste Material," 1975.
10. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 10. Regulatory Guide 5.7 _.=

Regulatory Guide 5.7, " Control for Protected Areas, Vital Areas, and Ma'terial Access Areas," 1980.

11. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 11. Regulatory Guide 5.12 Regulatory Guide 5.12, " General Use of Locks in the Protection and Control of Facilities and Special Nuclear Materials,"

1973. (being revised). -

12. 'U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 12. Regulatory Guide 5.14 Regulatory Guide 5.14, "Use of Observation (Visual Surveillance)

Techniques in Material Access Areas,"

1980.

13. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory'Commis5 ion, 13. Regulatory Guide 5.20 Regulatory Guide 5.20, " Training, Equipping, and Qualifying of Guards and Watchmen," 1974.

R-3

REFERENCES, Cont'd (Category I Non power Reactors)

Cited in Text Descriotion or Desionator:

14. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 14. Regulatory Guide 5.29 Regulatory Guide 5.29, " Nuclear Material Control Systems for Nuclear Plants," 1974.
15. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 15. Regulatory Guide 5.43 Regulatory Guide 5.43, " Plant Security Force Duties," 1975.
16. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 16. Regulatory Guide 5.44 _ . ,

Reoulatory Guide 5.44, " Perimeter Intrusion Alarm Systems," (being revised). -

17. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 17. Regulatory Guice 5.62 Regulatory Guide 5.62, "Reporti~ng of Physical Security Events," 1981.
18. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 18. Catego.ry II Licensing-

" Physical Protection Requirements Criter'ia for Special Nuclear Material of Moderate Strategic Significance,"

November 1983.

19. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 19. Draft Inspection Inspection Procedure 81421,2 " Fixed Procedure 81421 Site Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material of Moderate Strategic Significance," draft, undated.

25ee footnote 1, p. R-2.

R-4

REFERENCES, Cont'd (Category I Non power Reactors)

Cited in Text Descriotion or Designator:

20. H. J. Waite, et al. , Mason & Hanger- 20. NUREG/CR-1327 Silas Mason Co., Inc., " Security Lighting Planning Document for Nuclear Fixed Site Facilities,"

NUREG/CR1327, MHSH-SD 7911, prepared for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission April 1980.

21. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 21. Regulatory Guide 5.59, _,

Regulatory Guide 5.59, " Standard Standard Format and Format and Content for a Licensee Content Guide for and Physical Security Plan for the Categories II and III

~

- Protection of Special Nuclear Material Security Plans of Moderate or Low. Strategic Signifi-cance," February 1983.

l .

R-5

BIBLIOGRAPHY -

P,ublic Notices:

1. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Safeguards Requirements for Nonpower Reactor Facilities Authorized to Possess Formula Quantities of Strategic-Special Nuclear Material," Federal Register, Vol. 45, No.181, September 18, 1981, 6333-6338.

Code of Federal Reaulations:

2. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Chapter I Part 11 -

Criteria for access to special nuclear material Part 50 -

domestic licensing - utilization facilities (10 CFR) S 50.34(c) -

requirements for security plan submittal S 50.34(d) -

contingency plan submittal S 50.54(p) -

contingency plans; no fee plan changes Part 70 -

domestic licensing - special nuclear material S 7J.?2(g) -

physical protection plans S 70.22(h) -

Category I security plans S 70.22(j) -

contingency plan submittal -

S 70.22(k) -

security plans, > 10 kg Category III S 70.32(e) -

changes to security plans S 70.32(g) -

changes to contingency plans S 70.41 -

use of SNM S 70.51(b) -

MC&A records S 70.51(c) -

MC&A procedures, > 1 kg SNM S 70.51(d) -

annual inventories-S 70.51(i) -

quality of records S 70.52(a) -

reporting accidental criticality or loss S 70.52(b) -

reporting of thefts S 70.53(a) -

reporting material balance S 70.54 -

reporting transfers of SNM B-1

Part 73 -

physical protection of plants and materials S 73.2 -

definitions S 73.2(p) -

definition of radiological sabotage S 73.6(e) -

exemptions >

5 73.20 -

Category I, General Performance requirement S 73.40(a) -

general theft / sabotage protection-fixed sites S 73.40(b) -

requirements for contingency plans S 73.40(c) -

conditions of contingency plans

. S 73.40(d) -

maintenance / review contingency plans S 73.45 -

Category I fixed site requirements S 73.46 -

Category I system requirements S 73.50 -

physical protection of licensed activities S 73.55 -

power reactor safeguards S 73.60 -

introduction / Category'I non power reactor requirement _ . ,

S 73.60(a) -

access requirements S 73.67(a) -

general safeguards requirements Categories II and III S 73.67(b) -

exemptions / distribution of material S 73.67(c) -

security plant suba:ittal S 73.67(d) -

Category II fixed site requirements S 73.67(e) -

Category II in-transit requirements S 73.67(f) -

Category III fixed site requirements S 73.67(g) -

Category III in transit requirements ,.

S 73.70 -

records S 73.71(b) -

reporting requirements S 73.71(c) -

reporting requirements S 73.72 -

advance notification requirements Pt 73, App. B -

guard training and qualification Pt 73, App. C -

contingency planning l r

l i

e> B-2

Regulatory Guides: Designator:

3. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 3. Regulatory Guide 5.10 Regulatory Guide 5.10, " Selection and Use of Pressure-Sensitive Seals on Containers for Onsite Storage of Special Nuclear Material," July 1973.
4. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 4. Regulatory Guide 5.13 Regulatory Guide 5.13, " Conduct of Nuclear Material Physical Inventories,"

November 1973.

5. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 5. Regulatory Guide 5.15 Regulatory Guide 5.15, " Security Seals -

for the Protection and Control of '

Special Nuclear Material," January 1974.

~

6.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 6. Regulatory Guide 5.26 Regulatory Guide 5.26, " Selection of Material Balance Areas and Item Control Areas," June 1974.

7. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 7. Regulatory Guide 5.30 -

Regulatory Guide 5.30, " Materials Protection Contingency Measures for Uranium and Plutonium Fuel Manufacturing Plants," June 1974.

8. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 8. Regulatory Guide 5.32 Regulatory Guide 5.32, " Communication with Transport Vehicles," June 1974.

B-3

Regulatory Guides: Designator:

9. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 9. Regulatory Guide 5.45 Regulatory Guide 5.45. " Standard Format -

and Content for the Special Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Section of a Special Nuclear Material License Application (Including That for a Uranium Enrichment Facility)," December 1974.

10. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 10. Regulatory Guide 5.46 Regulatory Guide 5.46 (not issued).
11. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 11. Regulatory Guide 5.60 _.,

Regulatory Guide 5.60, " Standard Format and Content of a Licensee Physical Protection Plan for Strategic

~

Special Nuclear Material in Transit,"

April 1980.

Draft IE Proceduresl Designator:

12. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 12. Draft Inspection Procedure Office of Inspection and Enforcement, 81402 Inspection Procedure 81402, " Reports of Safeguards Events," draft, undated.

1The Group noted that the current IE procedures have been in effect for several years and are recognized to be significantly out of date. Accordingly, with respect to 81400 series procedures, the review was confined to draft versions .

of the updated procedures, which have been circulated for Regional comment. l l

B-4

w . . _ ~ . .- .

Oraft IE Procedures,2 Cont'd: Designator:

13. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 13. Draft' Inspection Procedure Office of Inspection and Enforcement 81403 J

Inspection Procedure 81403, " Receipt

of Fuel at Non power Reactors," draft .

j undated.

14. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 14. Draft Inspection Procedure Office of Inspection and Enforcement 81411 Inspection Procedure 81411, " Physical Protection for Nonpower Reactors with Formula Quantities of Special Nuclear Material," draft undated.
15. U.S. Nuclear' Regulatory Commission, 15. IE Manual Chapter 2545 for

" Manual Chapter 2545, Research and non power reactors Test Reactor Inspection Program--

Operations Phase," draft (undated).

MC&A Guidance Designator:

16. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 16. NUREG/BR-0006 -

" Instructions for Completing Nuclear j Material Transaction Reports," NUREG/

i BR-0006, Rev. 2, Dec 1, 1984.

17. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission, 17. NUREG/BR-0007

" Instructions for Completing Material Balance Report, Physical Inventory Listing, and Concise Note Forms, NUREG/BR-0007, effective Jan. 1, 1980. .

b 2See footnote 1, p. B-4.

I

B-5

v Staff Guidance: Cesignator:

18. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 18. Category III licensing

" Acceptance Criteria for the Review criteria of Category III Physical Protection Plans," March 4, 1983.

Effective IE Procedures: Designator:

19. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 19. Active Inspection Inspection Procedure 85102, " Material Procedure 85102 Control and Accounting, Power Reactors,"

February 21, 1984

20. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 20. Active Inspection _.,

Inspection Procedure 81810, " Physical Procedure 81810 Protection Safeguards Information,"

October 1, 1982.

~

21. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 21. Active Inspection Inspection Procedure 92706, "Inde- Procedure 92706 pendent Inspection Effort," Procedure 92706, October 1, 1980.

Enforcement Guidance Memoranda: Designator:

22. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 22. (Unnumbered)

Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Memorandum, James Lieberman, to R. Carlson et al., NRC, " Citing I Safeguards Violations against I Approved Plans," May 13, 1981 (unnumbered).

1 B-6 4

w , ,, -- n -.---.- , -~-, -n -

3-Enforcement Guidance Memoranda Cont'd: Designator:

23. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 23. (Unnumbered)

Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Mere,randum, James Lieberman to Distri-bution, NRC, " Enforcement Guidance for Handling Safeguards Violations,"

July 22, 1981 (unnumbered).

24. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 24. Enforcement Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Memorandum EGM-81-03 Memorandum, Dudley Thompson to J. P. O'Reilly, NRC, " Selection of Security Level," EGM-81-03, January 12, 1981. . _ . ,
25. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 25. Enforcement Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Memorandum EGM-81-17 Memorandum, Dudley Thompson to R. Carlson et al. , NRC, " Policy Guidance for Safeguards Enforcement,"

EGM 81-17, May 14, 1981.

26. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 26. Enforcement -

Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Memorandum EGM-81-28 Memorandum, Richard H. Wessman to Robert Carlson et al. , NRC, " Citations Regarding Noncompliance with Physical Protection Rules," EGM-81-28, September 8, 1981.  :

i I

l l

B-7 I

Designator:

! Industry Standards

27. American Nuclear Society Standards 27. ANSI Standard 15.14 Secretariat, " Physical Security of Research Reactors," ANSI Standard 15.14,3 draft, undated.
28. Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. 28. UL Standard 437

" Standard for Key Locks," UL 437, January 30, 1975.

29. Underwriter Laboratories, Inc., 29. UL Standard 768

" Standard for Combination Locks,"

UL 768, July 20, 1972.

3With minor exceptions, ANSI 15.14 was found to contain essentially identical substance to the Categories II and III licensing criteria documents (" Physical Protection Requirements for SNM of Moderate Strategic Significance" (see Ref.18) and " Acceptance Criteria for the Review of Category III Physical Protection Plans" (See Bibliography No. 18). ,Therefore, all comments contained in the body of this report which refer to either of these two documents can also be applied to ANSI 15.14.

i i

B-8

_ , ,