05000298/FIN-2016004-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Maintain Service Water Pump Maintenance Procedure |
| Description | The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed, non-cited violation of Technical Specification 3.6.4.2, Secondary Containment Isolation Valves, for the licensees failure to maintain secondary containment isolation valve HV-AOV-265 operable as a result of erecting scaffolding that interfered with valve operation. Specifically, between June 29, 2016, and September 14, 2016, the licensee erected scaffolding in close proximity of valve HV-AOV-265, such that, during valve stroking, the scaffolding would pinch the actuator air line and prevent the valve from closing, rendering the valve inoperable for approximately 10 weeks. This resulted in the licensees need to reduce power to approximately 50 percent in order to comply with technical specifications upon discovery. Immediate corrective actions included removal of the scaffolding, replacement of the pinched air line, and restoration of the valve to operable status. The licensee entered this deficiency into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-CNS-2016-05608 and initiated a root cause evaluation to investigate this condition. The licensees failure to implement Procedure 7.0.7, Scaffolding Construction and Control, Revision 34, to ensure scaffolding did not adversely affect plant equipment, in violation of Technical Specification 3.6.4.2, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with the structure, system, and component and barrier performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (secondary containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the improperly erected scaffolding prevented the operation of a secondary containment isolation valve, rendering it inoperable for approximately 10 weeks. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings AtPower, dated June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that the finding had very low safety significance (Green) because it only represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the control room, reactor building, spent fuel pool building, or standby gas treatment system. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with resources. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources were available and adequate to support nuclear safety [H.1]. |
| Site: | Cooper  |
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| Report | IR 05000298/2016004 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2016 (2016Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Henderson G Warnick J O 'Donnellm Phalen P Elkman P Voss |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.1, Resources |
| INPO aspect | LA.1 |
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Finding - Cooper - IR 05000298/2016004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Cooper) @ 2016Q4
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