ML20212J607

Pilot Program:Nrc Severe Reactor Accident Incident Response Training Manual.U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Response

ML20212J607
Person / Time
Issue date:	02/28/1987
From:	Giitter J, Hively L, Mckenna T, Chris Miller, Perkins K, Sakenas C, Sharpe R, Watkins R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
To:
References
NUREG-1210, NUREG-1210-V05, NUREG-1210-V5, NUREG-1228, NUDOCS 8703090067
Download: ML20212J607 (105)

Text

NUREG-1210 e

Vol. 5 Pilot Program: NRC Severe Reactor Accident Incident Response Training Manual U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Response

'I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement C. A. sakenas, T. J. McKenna, K. Perkins, C. W. Miller, L. M. Hively, l R. W. Sharpe, J. G. Glitter, R. M. Watkins

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1210 R PDR

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NOTICE r-

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Availability of Reference Materials Cited in NRC Publications Most documents cited in NRC publications will be available from one of the following sources:

1. The NRC Public Document Room,1717 H Street, N.W.  ;

Wnhington, DC 20555 j

2. The Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Post Office Box 37082, .

l Washington, DC 20013-7082

3. The National Technical information Service, Springfield, VA 22161

- Although the listing that follows represents the majority of documents cited in NRC publications, it is not intended to be exhaustive.

Referenced documents available for inspection and copying for a fee from the NRC Public Docu-ment Room include NRC correspondence and internal NRC memoranda; NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement bulletins, circulars, information notices, inspection and investigation notices; Licensee Event Reports; vendor reports and correspondence; Commission papers; and applicant and

licensee documents and correspondence.

The following documents in the NUREG series are available for purchase from the GPO Sales i

Program: formal NRC staff and contractor reports, NRC-sponsored conference proceedings, and NRC booklets and brochures. Also available are Regulatory Guides, NRC regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations, and Nuclear Regulatory Comminion issuances.

Documents available from the National Technical Information Service include NUREG series reports and technical reports prepared by other federal agencies and reports prepared by the Atomic Energy Commission, forerunner agency to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Documents available from public and special technical libraries include all open literature items,

- such as books, journal and periodical articles, and transactions. Federal Register notices, federal and j state legislation, and congressional reports can usually be obtained from these libraries.

Documents such as theses, dissertations, foreign reports and translations, and non-NRC conference

proceedings are available for purchase from the organization sponsoring the publication cited.

Single copies of NRC draft reports are available free, to the extent of supply, upon written request to the Division of Technical Information and Document Control, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com- '

mission, Washington, DC 20555.

Copies of industry codes and standards used in a substantive manner in the NRC regulatory process are maintained at the NRC Library, 7920 Norfolk Avenue, Bethesda, Maryland, and are available there for reference use by the public. Codes and standards are usually copyrighted and may be purchased from the originating organizatian or, if thy are American National Standards, from the American National Standards institute,1430 Broadway, New' York, NY 10018.

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NUREG-1210 Vol. 5 Pilot Program: NRC Severe Reactor l

Accident Incident Response Training Manual U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Response Manuscript Completed: October 1986

( Date Published: February 1987 C. A. Sakenas, T. J. McKenna, K. Perkins, C. W. Miller *, L. M. Hively*,

R. W. Sharpe*, J. G. Giitter, R. M. Watkins*

• Oak Ridge National Laboratory Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 l ,p* "'%,,

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FOREWORD Over the past few years the Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE), Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response, has undertaken a program to upgrade the NRC capabilities to respond to severe reactor accidents. As part of this effort, basic training sessions have been presented by IE staff to all response personnel (Headquarters and regions). Through the process of providing this training a standard student text has evolved.

This pilot training manual has been written to fill the need for a general text on NRC response to reactor accidents. The manual is intended to be the foundation for a course for all NRC response personnel.

This set of manuals is not licensing guidance. Rather, it is designed to pre-sent to NRC personnel the best understanding of response planning for a serious reactor accident.

These draft manuals are intended to change over time as NRC staff continues to gain experience. Suggestions are requested and should be sent to the Incident Response Branch.

M h -

Edward Jordan, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement i

I PREFACE U.S. Nuclear Remulatory Ca==ission Resnonne is the fifth in a series of volumes that collectively summarize the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) emergency response during severe power reactor accidents and provide necessary background information. This volume describes NRC response modes, organizations, and official positions; roles of other federal agencies are also described briefly.

Other volumes in the series are:

4 Volume 1--Overview and S=--arv of Maior Point s 6 Volume 2--Severe Reactor Accident Overview 4 Volume 3--Resnonse of Licensee and State and Local Officials 6 Volume 4--Pub 11c Protective Actions--Predetermined Criteria and Initial Actions Each volume serves, respectively, as the text for a course of instruction in a series of courses for NRC response personnel. These suterials do A21 provide guidance or license requirements for NRC licensees. The volumes have been organized into these training modules to accommodate the scheduling and duty needs of participating NRC staf f.

Each volume is accompanied by an appendix of slides that can be used to

present this material. The slides are called out in the text.

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00NTENTS PREFACE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 LIST OF FIGURES. . . . ... . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v11 LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iz LIST OF ACRONYMS AND INITIALISMS FOR VOLUMES 1-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x1

1. U.S. NUQ. EAR REGULATORY 00MMISSION RESPONSE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.1 OBJECTIVES. . .... . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

1.2 OVERVIEW

THE NRC AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE AT LIGNSED FACILITIES. . . . 2

1.3 INTRODUCTION

. - . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.4 NRC RESPONSE MODES. . .. . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.4.1 Standby Mode . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.4.2 Initial Activation Mode. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.4.3 Expanded Activation Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.5 ACTIVITIES OF ME EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 1.6 NRC EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . 11 1.6.1 Response Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 1.6.2 Reactor Safety Assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 1.6.3 Protective Measures Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 1.6.4 Safeguards / Security Assessment Functions and Objectives. . . . . 29 1.6.5 Government Liaison Functions and Objectives. . . . . . . . . . . 29 1.6.6 Congressional Liaison. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 1.6.7 Public Affairs Functions and Objectives. . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 1.6.8 Response Coordination Functions and Objectives . . . . . . . . . 33 1.7 ROLE OF THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 1.8 ROLES OF DTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 1.8.1 Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan . . . . . . . . . . 35 1.8.2 Location of Federal Agency Decision Makers / Coordinator . . . . . 37 1.9 0FFICIAL NRC POSITION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 1.9.1 Information Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 1.9.2 Licensee Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 1.9.3 State / Local Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 1.9.4 Internal NRC Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 1.10 MAJOR POINTS. .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 APPENDIX A. SLIDES RELATING TO VOLUME 5 0F HE SEVERE REACTOR ACCIDENT INCIDENT RESPONSE TRAINING MANUAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 v

LIST OF FIGURES

f. git.

Finure Typical organization of the Base Tess . . ... . . .. . . 16 1.1 1.2 Organization of NRC Headquarters (lead during initial 18 activation) . . . . . .. . .. . .. . . .. . . . ....

1.3 Typical organization of the Site Team (lead during 19 expanded activatica). .. . . . . . .... . . . . .. . .

Expanded activation Site Team organization chart. . ... . 20 1.4 1.5 Federal response management for a radiological emergency at a RUClear power reactor. . .. ... . .. . . . .. .. 39 l

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LIST OF TABLES Table Pggs, 1.1 Typical relationship of accident classifications, NRC response modes, and NRC lead organizations . ... .. .... 9 1.2 Typical NRC actions during a severe nuclear plant accident . . . . . . . ... .. . ... . . .. ... . ... 12 1.3 NRC response organizations responsible for control functions. . . . .. . . . . ...... . . ... . . . ... 15 1.4 Roles of. federal agencies during an emergency response . . . . 38 1.5 Activities of typical federal agencies other than NRC following initiation of the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan. . .. . . . . .. . . .. . ..... . . .. . 40 l

1.6 Location of federal agency decis' ion makers . ..... . .. . 42 1.7 Typical parameters that NRC expetts to be considered for a light-water reactor incident . . . ... . ... .. . . .. . 46 i

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND INITIALISMS FOR VOLUBES 1-5 ALARA As low as reasonably achievable '

AMS Aerial .Weasurements System (s)

ARAC Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability ASC Administrative Support Coordinator AST Administrative Support Team BT Base Team (NRC Regional Office)

BWR Boiling Water Reactor CDPA Civil Defense Preparedness Agency CFA Cognizant Federal Agency CFR Code of Federal Regulations CL Congressional Liaison CRD Control rod drive CRDHS Control rod drive hydraulic system CSF Critical Safety Function DBA Design Basis Accident DOC Department of Commerce, U.S.

DOD Department of Defense, U.S.

DOE Department of Energy, U.S.

DOI Department of Interior, U.S.

DOI Department of Transportation, U.S.

DSO Director of Site Operations EAL Emergency Action Level ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System EDO Executive Director of Operations ENS Emergency Notification System EO Emergency Officer EOF Emergency Operations Facility EOP Emergency Operating Procedure EPA Environmental Protection Agency, U.S.

EPRI Electrical Power Research Institute

.. EPZ Emergency Planning Zone ERC Emergency Response Coordinator ERM Emergency Response Manager i ERO Emergency Response Organization l ERT Emergency Response Team (FEMA organtxation)

ESF Engineered Safety Feature EST Emergency Support Team (FEMA organization)

ET NRC Executive Team ETA Estimated time of arrival FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FDA Food and Drug Administration, U.S.

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FRC Federal Response. Center FRERP Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan FEMAC Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center FEMAP Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Plan FIS Federal Telephone System GLC Government Liaison Coordinator xi ,

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GLM Government Liaison Manager GLO Government Liaison Officer GLT Government Liaison Team

, HHS Health and Human Services, U.S. Department of B00 NRC Headquarters Operations Officer HPCI High pressure coolant inj ection HPCS High pressure core spray HPN Health Physics Network BQ NRC Headquarters HUD Housing and Urban Development, U.S. Department of IE NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement ICRP International Commission on Radiological Protection IDAS Interactive Dose Assessment System IRB Incidence Response Branch IRC Regional NRC Incident Response Center IRDAM Interactive Rapid Dose Assessment Model JIC Joint Information Center LC Liaison Coordinator LNO Liaison Officer LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident LPCI Low pressure coolant inj ection LPCS Low pressure core spray LT Liaison Team LWR Light Water Reactor NCS National Communication System NMSS NRC Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S.

NRR NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation NWS National Weather Service OC Operations Center OSC Operations Support Center (site)

PA Public Affairs PAC Public Affairs Coordinator PAG Protective Action Guides PAM Public Affairs Manager PAR Protective Action Recommendation PASS Post-accident Sampling Systems PAT Public Affairs Team PMC Protective Measures Coordinator PMN Protective Measures Manager PMr Protective Measures Team P-T Pressure-Temperature PWR Pressurized Water Reactor RA Regional Administrator RAT Radiological Assistance Team RBE Relative biological effectiveness RCIC Reactor core isolation cooling RCr Response Coordination Team RDO Regional Duty Of ficer R.G. Regulatory Guide RHR Residual heat removal RI Resident Inspector xii A_

RM Resource Manager RO NRC Regional Of fice RSC Reactor Safety Coordinator RSM Reactor Safety Manager RST Reactor Safety Team SC Safeguards / Security Coordinator SFO Senior FEMA Official SGC Safeguards / Security Coordinator SGT Safeguards Team SI International System (of measurement)

SLC Standby liquid control SM Safeguards / Security Manager SO Status Officer ST Site Team STL Site Team Leader ILD Thermoluminescent dosimeter TMI-2 Three Mile Island--Unit 2 TSC Technical Support Center USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture WHO World Health Organization l

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors wish to express their appreciation for the valuable assistance provided by the following people: Suzan R. Morris, Ursula F. Strong, and Malinda M. Hutchinson, for word processing and coordination; and Larry H. Tyrick and the staf f of the ORNL Graphic Arts Department for preparing illustrations and view graphs.

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1. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY 0010 FISSION RESPONSE 1.1 OBJECTIVES Slides 1 and 2 The objectives of this section are to e describe the roles of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the event of a nuclear power plant accident; e describe NRC response modes, explain the criteria that determine each response mode, and list the basic components of the NRC response organization; e describe briefly the roles, limitations, and composition of the various elements of the NRC response organization; e list the other federal agencies and their roles; e describe how NRC interfaces with the licensee and with state and local officials during an emergency; i

I e describe the ongoing assistance provided to the licensee during an emergency; and e describe the kind of information that can be released as the " official" NRC position during an event (i.e., Status Sammary).

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1.2 OVERVIEW

.THE NRC AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE AT LICENSED FACILITIES Slide 3 In fulfilling its legislated mandate for protecting the public hesith and safety, NRC has developed a plan (NUREG-0728) and procedures (NUREG-0845) that detail the agency's response to incidents-involving licensed material and activities. In its emergency response plan, NRC recognizes that there are two primary decision makers in a radiological emergency at a licensed power. reactor: the licensee and the state or local government. The licensee has primary responsibility for mitigating the consequences of the event by taking the necessary and appropriate' in plant actions and by recommending the appropriate off-site protective actions. The. state or local government has primary responsibility for determining whether and how to implement the protective action as it was recommended by the licensee.

NRC has several ' roles in a radiological emergency at a licensed facility. The primary role is to monitor the activities of the licensee to ensure that appropriate actions are being taken to mitigate the consequences of the incident and to ensure that appropriate protective action recommendations are made to off-site officials. In addition, NRC will support and assist state and local officials by performing independent assessments and confirming, where appropriate, licensee's protective action recommendations. In addition to interfacing with off-site officials, the NRC response organization will be the conduit of technical information from the facility to other federal agencies and will keep the media informed of NRC's actions and knowledge of event status. NRC may be required, in an extreme and unique situation, to take action to direct the licensee's response by issuing formal orders to the licensee and then monitoring implementation of actions ordered. [NRC's intent is that this authority would not be exercised from

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3 Headquarters (BQ) but may be exercised by the Regional Administrator (RA) at the site on the situation-specific approval of the NRC Chairman.]

Significant improvements in NRC's response to incidents have occurred since the accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) in March 1979. These include establishment of a single decision maker for NRC during an emergency, development of a federal and agency response plan, establishment of direct communication lines between power reactor sites and the Incident Response Center (IRC) in Bethesda, Maryland, to improve communications

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capability, establishment of a designated staff of operations officers and an upgrade in their training in reactor systems, an upgrade in response facilities at Headquarters and the regional offices, and finally, development of a means to receive digitized information on key plant parameters directly from the site, which will give NRC valuable current information to assist in accident assessment.

NRC's response to incidents begins with an Operations Officer located around the clock in the Headquarters Incident Response Center in Bethesda, Maryland. Direct lines have been installed between each commercial nuclear reactor (and some fuel facilities) and the Incident Response Center in Bethesda; this

network is referred to as the Emergency Notification System (ENS). All initial notifications of events are reported to this NRC Operations Officer, who has received specific training in reactor systems. All reports of significant events are brought to the attention of the NRC regional duty officers, Headquarters, and the emergency officer. Decisions to place in standby or to activate the NRC emergency response organization are generally made by regional and Headquarters upper management I through these duty officers. In standby, a few members of the Headquarters management and cognizant staff report to the Operations Center (OC), while the appropriate regional office fully staffs its Incident Response Center. The Regional Administrator, who is located at the regional office, directs both organizations in assessing the severity of the event.

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4 Based on the information available from the the licenses, a Headquarters Executive Team (ET) member decides whether to escalate or terminate the NRC response. The decision to escalate NRC's response includes sending a regional team led by the Regional Administrator to the site. It is NRC policy that the emergency should be managed from the site. The Site Team (ST) is generally composed of a leader (Regional Administrator) and specialists in reactor systems and health physics, supported by public affairs, safeguards, and governmental liaison pe rsonnel . These individuals will monitor the licensee's actions in assessing the severity of the accident and in recommending protective actions and will assist off-site officials as warranted.

During this phase of initial activation, the lead for the NRC response moves from the Regional Office (RO) to Headquarters, because the regions 1 decision maker (i.e., the Regional Administrator) is en route to the site. The Headquarters team is an Executive Team directed by the Chairman (or his designee). The Atomic Energy Act was amended to authorize the Chairman to act as a single administrator / decision maker (i.e., to make decisions without Commission vote) during emergency response involving NRC-licensed and -regulated activities. The Chairman may subsequently delegate this authority to the Regional Administrator at the site of the event.

The Executive Teem is assisted by specialists in reactor systems and health physics (including public protective measures), as well as by public affairs, governmental liaison, congressional af fairs, safeguards, and administrative personnel.

In the event of actual or predicted significant off-site releases of radioactivity, additional help would be available from other federal agencies such as the Department of Energy (DOE), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Department of Agriculture (USDA), as identified in the Federal Radiological Emergency n . . .

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Response Plan (FRERP).

Once the NRC Site Team of 12 to 18 specialists is in place (approximately 2 to 6 h after being dispatched) and has been fully briefed on the event status, the Executive Team Director (the chairman) may transfer his decision-making authority to the Regional Administrator.and designate him as the Director of Site Operations (DS0). After designation of the Director of Site Operations, Headquarters continues to provide technical assistance to the Site Team while the staff at the regional office provides logistics support. Additional resources from Headquarters and the other regional offices may be dispatched to

! the site to support the regional response. This would constitute an augmented or expanded Site Team that would be staffed according to the specifics of a significant, extended event.

1.3 INTRODUCTION

Slide 4 The roles of NRC during incidents at nuclear power plants l are to monitor actions by the licensee to ensure that people in the vicinity of the plant are adequately protected and to provide any assistance requested by the licensee or off-site officials. NRC's principal role in the event of a power plant emergency is to encure that appropriate protective actions are being taken. If it appears that warranted protective actions are not being recommended by the licensee or are not being taken by off-site of ficials, NRC will contact the licensee or off-site officials and present its concerns. However, it must be l

recognized that, like the licensee, NRC cannot ordar the implementation of any particular off-site protective action.

l Only off-site of ficist s (e.g. , governors, mayors, county sherif fs, etc.) have that authority.

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6 Everyone involved should also recognize that state and local officials anal 3g.1 nromotiv .t.g initiate nrotective actions. This is crucial for General Emergencies, where prompt ,

i protective action is essential. The NRC response organization should not be' involved in the prompt protective action decision making in'a General Emergency because it may take more than an hour to become fully operational; also, NRC is not necessarily familiar with current site-specific plant and local conditions.

Trying to involve NRC could slow down this critical decision-making process in the immediate, early time frame.

NRC is the lead federal agency concerned with technical aspects of an accident at one of its licensed facilities (e . g. ,

nuclear power plants). The specific NRC response roles are to e monitor the licenses to ensure that appropriate protective-action recommendations are being made off site; e support off-site authorities, including confirming the licensee's recommendation to off-site authorities, 11 reauested; e support the licensee; e keep other federal agencies and entitles (e.g., Congress and the White House) Informed of the status of the incident;

. 6 keep the media informed of NRC's knowledge of the status of the incident, including coordination with other public affairs groups; and e intervene in a limited fashion to direct the licensee's on-site response in some unusual and very rare situations.

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7 In carrying out its roles early in an accident, NRC will concentrate on conducting an independent assessment of in plant conditions and their reistionship to off-site protective actions. NRC will be especially interested in local actions off site during a General Emergency. The specific NRC response is described in NUREG-0728, NUREU-0845, and supplements. In addition, individual team and technical procedures describe step-by-step what the individual does. Each member of the NRC response organization is responsible for knowing and understanding these procedures.

1.4 NRC RESPONSE NODES Slide 5 NRC's basic philosophy is that the accident site is the best place to gather information, understand the situation, and interface with the licensee and off-site officials. Therefore, NRC procedures for serious accidents are geared toward getting the appropriate people to the site as soon as possible (within 2 to 8 hr).

1.4.1 Standby Mode l

l For a situation that is uncertain and that presents a potentially serious conditica requiring monitoring, NRC would enter the Standby Mode. NRC will generally go into Standby Mode whenever the licensee declares an alert or whenever events warrant monitoring. During Standby, the appropriate Regional Incident Response Center is staffed to monitor the situation and a cadre of members with expertise specific to the particular event is called into- the Headquarters Operations Center. A small group of regional personnel may also be dispatched to the site. The Regional Office has the lead during the Standby Mode.

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8 1.4.2 lajtlai Activation Mode The, Initial Activation Mode occurs after NRC management (the Regional Administrator in conjunction with Executive Team members) decides that the event is serious enough to call for an NRC management presence on site. During this period, Headquarters ' takes the lead while the regional staff and Site ,

1 Team leader (usually the Regional Administrator) leave for the I site, and direction of the NRC response is held by the Executive Team Director (Chairman of the Commission or designee) at the Headquarters Operations Center in Bethesda, Maryland. While the regional team is in transit to the site and is being briefed at the site (2 to 8 hr), the Executive Team Director speaks officially for NRC. Headquarters monitors the situation primarily via dedicated and commercial phone lines to the plant and normal phone lines to off-site officials. After arriving and receiving an on-site briefing by the licensee, the Site Team leader will generally be designated the Director of Site Operations. The intent is to transfer as much decision-making authority to the site as necessary, with Headquarters and the Regional Of fice serving in a supporting role.

1.4.3 Exnanded Activation Mode t

Once the Site Team leader has been designated as the ,,, ,

! Director of Site Operations, the mode is called Expanded j Activation. In this mode, any NRC recommendations, information l releases, and guidance will be provided by the Director of Site

{ Operations. The specific authority and responsibility that may i

j be conferred on the Director of Site Operations are discussed in Sect. 1.6.1. After the Director of Site Operations is designated, any questions concerning NRC response at the site

! should be directed to the Site Team. During this mode, Headquarters and the Regional Base Team response organization support the Site Team and the Director of Site Operations. Table 1.1 shows the relationship of accident classifications, NRC

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9 Table 1.1. Typical relationship of accident classifications, NRC response modes, and NRC lead organizations Licensee classification Typical NRC response mode Lead organization Alert and other Standby NRC Regional Office situations that Base Team sarrant monitoring Site Area or Initial Activation Headquarters General Emergency Expanded Activation Site Team Deactivation Region (Regional

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response modes, and NRC organizations.

1.5 ACTIVITIES OF THE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION During normal operatiour, the Headquarters Opsrations Officer (BOO) is the only person staffing the Operaticas Center 24 hr/ day. The Headquarters Operations Officer receives all event notifications, records the initial information, provides an initial syslaation of its classification, and informs the Regional Duty Officer (RDO) and Headquarters Emergency Officer .

(EO). The Headquarters Emergency Officer and Regional Duty Officer are on call 24 hr/ day. The Headquarters Operaticas 4 Officer will' involve the site, the Emergency Officer, and the Regional Duty Officer in a '5 arty line" telephone conference to- j discuss the event. If they decide that further NRC action is necessary, the Emergency Officer and the Regional Duty Officer will contact an Executive Team member and the Regionsi Administrator, who will decide if the NRC should go to Standby or Initial Activation. In addition, notification of incidents reported by non power plant licensees and the general public may be handled by the Headquarters Operations Officer. During non-office hours, all inquiries and notifications to the NRC go to the Headquarters Operations Officer. The Headquarters Operations Officer is the licensee's initial point of contact with the NRC during a reactor incident.

If an event is determined to warrant the activation of NRC response in either the Standby or Initial Activation mode, the Headquarters Operations Officer is responsible for notifying the Response Coordination Team (RCT) members and for calling the Backup Headquarters Operations Officer. The Response Coordination Team member initiates further calls to activate the Headquarters response. Before the Backup Headquarters Operations Of ficer arrives, the Duty Headquarters Operations Officer will be extremely busy setting up the communication links in the Operations Center and receiving calls from the media and the general public.

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l 4- . 11 1.6l 9NRC EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION

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.j a- 4 The NRC response is based on the principle that the agency

( should always have a single spokesperson and that the spokesperson should be located at the site as soon as pomit:1e.

In the Noreal and Standby modes, the lead is with the NR$

Regicaal Office. In Initial Activation, the lead is with

. Headquarters and the Ezeentive Team Director (normally the

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Chairman).- In Expanded Act hation, the lead is delegatedsto the

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.si'te with the designation' of a Director of Site Operations (norma 1Iy the Regional Administrator)'. Table 1.2 shows a

typical NRC response during the evolution of an event; the

, reistion of NRC response to state anl' local actions is also i

listed. The following paragraph / further explain the three components of the NRC response '

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The three parts to the NRC response organization are: (1)

Headquarters, (2) the Regional Base Team (BT), and (3) the Regional Site Team. At some phsse of emergency response cach of I these organizations will have personnel assigned to cover

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, 1. response management,

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2. reactor safety assessment,

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3. Prot.ective measures assessment,

4. safeguards / security assestaent, 9

5. public and mens media information, 1

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l Table 1.2. Typical NRC actions during a severe anclear plant accident

• Time Licensee NRC Beadquartess NRC Regional State / local (h) Office authorities l 0-1 Implements Emergency Decides to activate Nake protective Operating Procedsres (EOPs) action decistoms Classifies event Activate verslag s '" system Activates emergency orge21:ation Give public instractions Implements / directs on-site protective actions and damage control J Recommeads protective actions to off-site i officials l Reports events to Headgaarters (BQ) ha N

Conducts conference calls with Regional Office (RO) and BQ Activates Emergency Notification System (ENS)

Staffs the Technical Support Center (TSC) 1-2 Activates the Emergency Operations renter (OC) Incident Response Complete impleme n-Operations Fac!!!ty (EOF) is -taffed- Center (IRC) is staffsd tation of protective actions near the site Obtains first field Site Team (ST) leaves scattorias results for site Staffs the Health Physics Protective Measures Team Regional Base Team (BT)

Network (BPN) (PKT) assesses taltial contianos to monitor licenses acticas, and koactor situation, establishes Safety Team (RST) assesses counterpart with 30 DC.

core and containment and begins to identify Staff state *and conditions addittomal regional local centers -

resources to be sent RET assesses licensee event" to the site and -

NRC criteria resources to be brokered by headquarters -

4 -

K

___m__-_-_____ -_

. . . .. _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ , _ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ . - - . _~. .. . _ _---_ _ _ . .

. :gg ..

~.

Table 1.2. (Contimmed)

Time Licensee NRC Beadquarters '

NkC Regional ,1 tate / local (h) Office authorities PNT completes very simple lattial dose projections based on i

licenses release estimates (IRDAN computer code)

PNC contacts state to discuss technical leformation If major differences exist la assessments, PNT coatects technical-level licensee and state to discuss Official NRC recommendations from the Executive Team (ET)--only if no;fons required to protect the pubtle are not being takom 2-3 Analyzes first coolant and PKI completes initial dose State monitoring' team coatsimment samples projections based on plaat arrives os site-conditions and core damage estimates from RST (IDAS State representation bd computer code) arrives at the EOF '*

i j PNT starts to laterface with Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC)

(NRC provides source term estimate) j ARAC resulta litograted lato BE assessmoots i 4-3 ST arrives at BOF l

j Briefed by licensee I g-12 ET dels stes authority DSO-approved ST takes to Director of Site Operations (DS0) over lead for NRC (espanded activation)

PNT and BR support ST effort All dose assessments /

protective action ,

assessments coordinated direetly (licensee / Office of Nuclear Reactor Operation /

off-site officials)

PNT and BQ contimme to Addittomal NRC persommel support ST arrive "This listing does not necessarily reflect the segmence of events within a particular time heading. Many activities will be taktag place concurrently.

, .\

l 14 l l

l 1

6. government coordination,

7. administrative support, and

8. response coordination.

In addition, Headquarters has personnel assigned to Congre:sional coordination.

Table 1.3 shows the titles of the individual team members responsible for each of these areas. In general, Headquarters has technical and liaison " teams," led by Directors or Officers, respectively, the Base Team has 'hanagers," and the Site Team has " coordinators" assigned to each functional area.

Slide 8

1. The Regional Office Base Tean is composed of 12 to 15 people, with 1 or 2 assigned to each function. During the Standby Mode, the Base Team will make critical contacts with the licensee and off-site officials and will direct the NRC response. Once NRC goes into the Initial Activation Mode with the authority for agency lead being at Headquarters, the Base Team will continue to monitor the situation and provide support to the Site Team. Figure 1.1 shows the Base Team organization. They will identify additional regional expertise and resources to be dispatched to the site and to be provided by Headquarters.

Slide 9

2. Headquarters is led by the Chairman of the Commission (or a designated Commissioner) as Director of the Executive Team.

The Director is supported by teams for each function. Each team consists of up to 12 people and is supported by other

Table 1.3. leC response organizations responsible for control fasstless

~

Needquarters (BQ) Regional Base Team (BT)

Function [ Operations Center (OC)] [ Incident Response Center (IRC)] Regional Site Team Namagement Executive Tess . Base Team Site Team (ET) Director Namager Leader (STL)/ Director ofSigeOperations (DS0)

Reactor Safety Reactor Safety Reactor Safety Reactor Safety Asse s sme nt Team (RST) Director Namager (RSM) Coordinator (RSC)

Protective Measures Protective Measures . Protective Neasures Protective Measures Assessment Team (Piff) Director Manager (Piel) Coord!astor (PNC) ,

l Sa f egua rds / Security Safeguards Setegstrds/ Security Safessards/ Security Assessment Team (SGT) Director Manager (SN) Coordinator (PNC)

Public and News Public Affaire (PA) Pubtle Affaire Pabilo Affaire U.

Media Information Officer Manager (PAN) Coordlaator (PAC)

Government Government Liaison Goverament Liaison Government Liaison Coordlaation Officer (GLO) Namager (GLN) Coordiastor (GLC)

Administrative Administrative Support Resource Support Team (AST) Director Namager (RN)

Response Coordination Response Coordlaation Emergency Response Emergency Response Team (RCT) Director Manager (ERN) Coordinator (ERC)

Congressional Congresslomat Coordination Liaison (Q.) Officer "The STL becomes the DSO on the transfer of authority and responsibility (declaration of Expanded Activatica).

ll! )!

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17 Headquarters offices and by designated national laboratories. Figure 1.2 shows the Headquarters organization. ,

i l

Slides 10 and 11 l

3. The initial Site Team consists of about 15 people, supplemented as soon as possible according to the nature of the event and situation. Typically, each major fructional area is represented initially by only one person, a Coordinator. (The typical Site Team organization is shown in Fig. 1.3.)

The initial team will be expanded within 24 to 48 hr to enhance coverage of functional areas as well as to provide all response facilities with liaison personnel as appropriate. Depending on the event and situation, this may result in an expanded Site Team of approximately 50 per shift as indicated in Fig. 1.4.

1.6.1 Resnonse Mannaement Slide 12 The primary roles of response management are to direct the NRC response and act as the primary spokesperson.

It is important to note that, although NRC should have no direct role in implementation of early predetermined actions, it is recognized that NRC may be asked to confirm a decision or recommendation. Delay in responding to such a request could delay implementation of a crucial action. The NRC spokesperson l should at least be prepared to say, "NRC has no information to indicate that the recommendations made by the licensee or the actions being considered by off-site officials are not appropria te. "

l l

EXECURVE TEAM CWURMAN, EXECURVE DEECTOR OF OPERATIONS, APO DRECTORS OF OFFICES OF NSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT, NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION, AND NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS-i STATUS OFFICER I I I I -

CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT PUBLIC RESPONSE LIAISON LIAISON AFFAIRS COORDINATION TEAM I I I SAFEGUARDSa RE M E REACTOR SAFETY PROTECTIVE MEASURES BASE TEAM ADMINISTRATIVE SITE TEAM SUPPORT TEAM

• NOT ALWAYS ACTIVATED.

Fig. 1.2. Organization of Mtc Headgaarters (lead during ialtial activation).

SITE TEAM LEADER (DURING INITIAL ACTIVATION)

DIRECTOR OF SITE OPERATIONS (DURING EXPANDED ACTIVATION) l l STATE LIAISON PUBLIC AFFAIRS -

EMERGENCY RESPONSE COORDINATOR COORDINATOR COORDINATOR G

REACTOR SAFETY PROTECTIVE MEASURES _

SAFEGUARDS / SECURITY COORDINATOR COORDINATOR COORDINATOR Fig. 1.3. Typical organization of the Site Team (lead during expanded activation).

DIRECTOR OF SITE OPERATIONS DURING EXPANDED ACTIVATION I

STATE LIAISON - -

PUBLIC AFFAIRS EMERGENCY RESPONSE COORDINATOR COORDINATOR COORDINATOR REACTOR SAFETY --

PROTECTIVE MEASURES SAFEGUARDS / SECURITY COORDINATOR COORDINATOR COORDINATOR 1

l EXECUTIVE TEAM g I

CONGRESS GOV'T PUBLIC RESPONSE LIAISON LIAISON AFFAIRS COORDINATION DIRECTOR DIRECTOR DIRECTOR TEAM DIRECTOR REGION REACTOR SAFETY PROTECTIVE MEASURES SAFEGUARDS BASE TEAM DIRECTOR DIRECTOR DIRECTOR MANAGER Fig. 1.4. Expanded activation Site Team organization chart.

21 They (response management) should recognize that NRC should l

issue recommendations only if required. This means that NRC l adequately understands the situation and feels strongly about a differing opinion. Since many of the response actions have been predetermined, minor NRC recommendations or questions would delay implementation of the predetermined actions and should be avoided.

The Executive Team Director or Director of Site Operations must be assured that all information has been fully coordinated with all affected parties (e.g., off-site officials) before its release. The release of conflicting information could confuse the public and interfere with an effective response.

Slide 13 Some authority and responsibility may be transferred to the Director of Site Operations by the Executive Team Director:

e authority to recommend actions to the licensee; e authority to recommend off-site actions, either confirming licensee recommendations or providing additional NRC recommendations; e authority to direct the licensee to take specific actions--

but only in rare and unusual circumstances; e responsibility to act as the primary spokesperson for NRC in responding to the media; e authority to supervise all NRC personnel at the site; and e authority to represent NRC in interactions with other agencies.

l l

l

22 Before making this decision, the Executive Team has to determine that a Site Team has been deployed and all functions are covered, the Site Team has been briefed by the licensee, and

~

the Site Team leader is ready to assume the responsibilities of the Director of Site Operations.

Slide 14 It is very important that the decision makers have adequate information to support their role. This includes information about:

e significant developments; e assessments of all parties:

- licensee.

- state,

- other Federal agencies. If available,

- other industry experts, if available, and

- staff (assessments that bound the conditions and uncertainties);

e bases and significarce of differences in assessments; e limitations and degree of sensitivity of the analysis; e recommendations and options:

- input about actions currently being taken,

l t

! 23

- basis; and e proper contacts [i.e., the people in charge of various functions (e.g. , protective action. decision making)] .

It'is the responsibility of the various teams or coordinators to

> provide integrated briefings that include options, recommendations, and their bases. To avoid conflicts, the assessments must include input from the licensee and off-site officials. In addition, the assessments must atteant 12 bound 111 x33g1.91 nossibilities. Emergency response is not exact, and the results must demonstrate and account for these uncertainties.

4 Although the other four Commissioners are notified of Operations Center activation, they have no predetermined responsibilities in an emergency. Instead, they are kept informed so that they may assist the Director if requested.

Congress has authorized that, in an emergency, the Chairman or j his designate is the single decision maker for the NRC for that emergency.

i 1.6.2 Reactor Safety Assessments Slide 15 The individuals assigned to reactor safety must assess the

! condition of the core, containment, and other engineered safety features (ESFs) to (1) provide core and containment projections to those assessing the protective measures, (2) provide estimates of core damage and possible release pathway information to allow bounding of possible off-site consequences (doses), and (3) assess the system-related accuracy of the event classification by the licensee. These assessments must first be i

i I

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a - - - ~ . - _ . -

---~-,--,,-..,--,.,-v-, . , - - - - - - . - - - . - - - - - - , - - , - - . , - , - - - , , - -. ,------_---,--.e-,-- -

m _ _ . . _ _ __

24 discussed with.the appropriate licensee staf f before they are forwarded to those in response management. These individuals attempt to describe (1) plant c<nditions and (2) where the accident may be going in terms of failures that could result in off-site consequences. As discussed in Vol. 2, they evaluate the status of the core and contaitment because serious damage would lead to major off-site consequences, requiring protective action implementation. Their assessments form the basis for protective measures assessments. T.tese ladividuals should also assess the accuracy of the licensee's classification because, as discussed in Vol. 3, a correct classification indicates that the licensee recognizes the safety significance of the event, which is essential to implementing an appropriate response.

1.6.2.1 Reactor Safety Assessment Obiectives 4

The objectives of the reactor saf ety assessments are to

1. develop NRC assessments (and/or confirm the licensee's assessments) of current and proj scted core and containment conditions;

2. monitor licensee response [e . g. , implementation of Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs)] to ensure that proper corrective actions are teing taken to minimize the consequences of the accident; l 3. characterize possible core cor.ditions and release pathways for the protective measures d)se assessment; and

4. furnish these assessments to those in response management 4

with advice and direction for the licensee, if appropriate.

i 4

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25 Slide 16 1.6.2.2 Reactor Safety Assessment Methods Those responsible for reactor safety ensure that the j licensee has identified any damage to the core and containment l

l and has made a reasonable projection of the condition of these l . systems. These assessments form the foundation for the protective measures assessments. They look for direct

. indication of core damage (e.g., radiation levels, water levels,

! and temperature) and conduct emergency mass and energy balance calculations to assess trends that could lead to core damage.

They also attempt to identify likely release pathways and levels 1

of core damage (based on temperature projections) to be used in protective measures dose assessment.

1.6.2.3 Reactor Safety Assessment Limitations i

i Slide 17 3

It is very important that Headquarters and the Base Teams l understand their limitations and inform their management of the uncertainties in their analyses. Until the Site Team arrives, Headquarters and the Base Tens must rely on telephone contacts

! for information from the licensee. Information may not be current, and the amount of information available from the licensee is limited. In addition, they are not as famlliar as the licenses with specific plant equipment and conditions.

I Slide 18 l

l 1.6.3 Protective Measures Assessment l

i

( Those responsible for protective measures assessments

( evaluate the adequacy of the protective measures being I recommended by the licensee and being implemented by off-site i

26 officials. They either -confirm the licensee's recommendations or, if appropriate actions are not being taken to protect the public, make recommendations to response management.

They have the responsibility to pull together all available information related to possible off-site consequences and to determine if adequate protective actions are being recommended by the licensee and are being implemented by off-site officials.

They should monitor the implementation of protective action criteria and plans in the existing licenses plans and procedures. Assessments for a severe accident are first based on the reactor safety assessments of core and containment condition to assess the need for immediate protective action in accordance with the concepts discussed in Vol. 4. Those responsible for protective measures assessments may also attempt to bound the possible off-site doses. Discussions with licensee and state radioactive health counterparts are included in their assessments (see Sect. 1.9).

In addition, they will ensure that an interface is established with other appropriate federal agencies (e.g., the Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Agriculture, and the Food and Drug Administration) to obtain their respective technical inputs and to utilise their expertise; this interface is coordinated through the Government Liaison personnel.

1.6.3.1 Protective Measure s Assena= ant Obiectives The objectives of the protective measures assessments are to

1. monitor the licensee's implementation of emergency plans and procedures to assess and confirm the licensee's public protective action recommendational

27

2. obtain the status of protective actions implementation by off-site officials;

3. assess and confirm the on-site protective actions taken by i

the licensee;

4. exchange technical information with the licensee and state and local agencies to evaluate the significance of any differences; and

5. provide independent protective action assessments based om reactor status and dose analyses and evaluate external (licensee, state, local, and other agency) assessments for response management. In particular, those responsible for protective measures assessments must ensure that an immediate (within 15 min) assessment is provided for any licensee protective action recommendation or for any conditions that indicate that protective actions are I warranted.

. 1.6.3.2 Protective Measures Assesament Methods t

Assessments of protective actions are conducted at several i

levels. First it is ascertained that provisions are in place I (procedures or actions are being implemented) if immediate l

action is warranted based on current or projected core conditions (see Vol. 4). Once this is completed, independent i

dose assessments are conducted. These resnits are compared and discussed with the licensee and off-site officials. These dose l assessments consider nrofected or actual levels of core damage and release pathways (based on reactor safety assessments and not on licensee estimates of releases). The calonistions

! conducted at the site by the Protective Measures Coordinator (PMC)

I

s 28 are based on licensee release estimates and use a straight-line transport model. The Protective Neasures Coordinator, however, may request the Headquarters Protective Measures Team (PMT) to perform its analysis and to provide an assessment using the tools available at Headquarters. If all other tools are unavailable, sets of precalculated dose curves for severe accidents are used.

Slide 19 The specific roles of dose projections during an accident are to determine if protective actions based on plant conditions should be expanded and to identify potential areas that should be monitored for ground contamination. Recognizing the great uncertainties in dose assessments, NRC will not normally question the licensee's off-site dose assessments if they are within an order of magnitude (factor of 10) of their estimates unless the results will have a major influence on protective measures.

1.6.3.3 Protective Measures Assessment Limitations Slide 20 NRC must recognize the considerable limitations involved in performing their functions. Until the Site Team arrives, they must rely on telephone contacts for information from the j licensee and off-site officials. In addition, they are not as familiar as the licensee with the specific plant, equipment, response plan, and conditions. They must consider these limitations and should give their management an indication of their confidence levels. The assessments should attempt to encompass these uncertainties, in particular those associated with predicting accluent sequences, source terms, and transport.

29 Slide 21 1.6.4 Safeauards/ Security Assessment Functionr and Objectives t

l The primary safeguards / security functions are to evaluate each event for safeguards (security) and law enforcement significance and to coordinate with appropriate federal law enforcement agencies (e.g., the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)].

Safeguards / security obj ectives are to

1. advise the Executive Team or Director of Site Operations about security and safeguards developments and recommend appropriate actions;

2. provide safeguards information to appropriate law enforcement agencies (including the FBI) and coordinate efforts for evaluating appropriate remedial actions; and

3. give decision makers plant-specific information and analysis concerning the safeguards contingency plan.

1.6.5 Government Liaison Functions and Obiectives l

l Slide 22 Those responsible for government liaison interface with outside interested individuals and groups to ensure that these l

! persons are aware of the NRC knowledge of the status of the

! event and that they understand any actions that may be taken to mitigate the event.

At the Headquarters Operations Center, the Government Liaison Officer (GLO) ensures that a number of federal agencies which have a direct interest in the radiological aspects of the i

emergency are notified and kept informed of the status of the 1

event and response (i.e., Federal Emergency Management Agency,

..- --- -. . - - , . - , . - . - , - . - . - -w --- -

+

l 30 l

Department of Energy, Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Health and Human Services, and Department of Agriculture). The Federal Emergency Management Agency, in turn, actifias a number of other Federal agencies which also might have an interest in the incident. As federal representatives of the technical agencies arrive at the Operations Center, the Government Liaison Officer, in cooperation with the Protective Measures Team, ensures that they are briefed and that their respective technical expertise is considered in Protective Measures Team assessments. As noted in Sect. 1.8.2, some federal agencies will continue to direct their operations from Washington or mahe agency decisions at their national headquarters. Therefore, the Headquarters Government Liaison Officer will continue to support the Site Team after entering Expanded Activation by coordinating with those agencies that operate from Washington. The Government Liaison Officer is also responsible for contacting the governor's office (s) of affected states to ensure that they are aware of NRC actions. The Protective Measures Team also contacts the state, usually the radiological health group, while the Government Liaison team interacts with the emergency services agency, but at a technical level. Therefore, the Government Liaison Officer must work closely with the Protective Measures Team. If an event progresses through Standby, the Base Team Government Liaison Manager (GLM) may have already contacted some state and federal agencies. Consequently, the Government Liaison Officer and the Government Liaison Coordinator (GLC) must coordinate their notification and updates if the response goes to Initial Activation.

At the site, the principal functions of the Government Liaison Coordinator are to contact and coordinate with state and local officials who have authority and responsibility for protective action decision making and to interface with Federal

i f

l 31 agencies at the incident scene. This w112 aid in establishing contact between the Director of Site Operations and these officists in the event the Director of Site Operations needs to l

make (or concur in) a protective action recommendation and will keep the Director of Site Operations informed of the actions of the other Federal agencies. It is expected that, at the scene of the incident, the Federal agencies and off-site authorities will establish emergency centers where the Government Liaison Coordinator should send liaisons:

• State Emergeacy Operations Center, e Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (see Sect. 1.8), and e Federal Response Center.

The Government Liaison objectives are to

1. Inform state and other federal organizations of the status of the NRC response;

2. coordinate with other federal agencies responses related to I on-site activities (see Sect. 1.8);

3. keep federal and state agencies informed (this includes j

establishing contact with the state and off-site protective action decision makers and keeping abreast of their considerations in the event that the NRC decides to make or discuss protective action recommendations); and i

4. brief response management on the status of other agency responses.

b\ n

32 1.6.6 Comaressional Liaison Slide 23 The responsibilities of the Congressional Liaison (CL) (at Headquarters only) in the event of a major incident are to provide adequate, accurate, timely, and consistent information regarding the incident to members of Congress and their staff and to principal Congressional oversight committees.

Communications to and from Congress are channelled through the Congressional Liaison. All Congressional interfaces will be conducted at Headquarters. No one is assigned to the function on the Base Team or Site Team. This is a role delegated to the Federal Emergency Management Agency once the Federal Response Center is established.

1.6.7 Public Affairs Functions and Obiectives Slide 24 These responsible for public affairs ensure that the public and media are kept informed of the course of the event and NRC actions. They also ensure that information is coordinated with the licensee, state and local government, and other federal agencies before its release. The Headquarters team prepares and coordinates releases of information during Initial Activation and supports the Site Team and addresses Washington media requests during Expanded Activation.

At the site, provisions have been made to have an NRC Pub 11c Affairs (PA) representative at the licensee media center.

Additional Public Affairs support is provided by other regions and at the Emergency Operations Facility through the Director of Site Operations.

a 3Dsi ' .

_n. - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _

33 )

i l

l The Public Affairs objectives are to i

1. prepare and coordinate information releases;

2. support response management;

3. monitor national media coverage; and

4. keep the public and media informed of NRC actions.

1.6.8 Resnonne Coordination Functions and Obiectives The Regional Base Team has an Emergency Response Manager who provides guidance and support to the Base Team members.

This individual ensures the proper setup and staffing for the Regional NRC Incident Response Center, ensures that procedures are implemented, and coordinates the deployment and logistical support for the Site Team.

For each Headquarters Response Team (e.g., the Protective Measures Team), a Response Coordinator has been assigned who is r

j responsible for ensuring the continued readiness of his or her response organization. This includes personnel training, j analysis, and development and logistics. The Headquarters Coordinators form the Response Coordination Team during an event and are responsible for initial notifications and start-up of ,

the Operations Center. The Headquarters Coordinators then support their teams as needed.

l The regional Emergency Response Coordinator (ERC) accompanies the Site Team, ensuring that the team's logistical ,

needs are met. The Emergency Response Coordinator also acts as an advisor and facilitator during the response by assisting the Director of Site Operations in all aspects of emergency response and ensuring that procedures are implemented.

A h

- . ~ . . - _ -

34 1.7 ' ROLE OF THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR Slide 25.

The Resident Inspector (RI) will be the first NRC '

representative at the site. Initially, the Resident Inspector will assist the Executive Team and Base Team in evaluating the incident conditions and licenses actions including classification. This information has a direct bearing on appropriate NRC response mode. Early in the event, the NRC Regional Administrator or the Executive Team Director (e.g., the Chairman) may want to consult the Resident Inspector concerning the licensee's actions. The Resident Inspector should remain in the Control Room (CR) or the Technical Support Center (TSC) to stay abreast of the reactor status until the Site Team arrives.

The Resident Inspector should 11 AE 1131 be put in the position of replacing the licensee's communicator on the Emergency Notification System. If no commercial telephone lines

are available, the Resident Inspector may need to use the l Emergency Notification System, for a brief period of time, to brief NRC's response management. The Resident Inspector must be able to stand back, watch, and analyze the event as it progresses. Until the regional Site Team arrives, the Resident Inspector represents NRC at the site. When this team arrives, the Resident Inspector briefs the team members and then follows directions given by the Site Team leader.

i i

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35 1.8 30LES OF OTERR FEDERAL AGENCIES l

Slides 26 through 28 1.8.1 Federal Radioloalcal Emermanov Reasonna Plan The Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan defines l the federal response role la suppot': of state and local agencies. It was published in the Federal Ramister on

, November 8, 1985. Under this plan, four agencies have major roles defined for nuclear power plant accidents. The first is the Cognizant Federal Agency (CFA). The NRC would be the Cognizant Federal Agency for en event at any licensed nuclear reactor in the United States. The Cognisant Federal Agency is I

responsible for dealing directly with state agencies and for all i technical assessments of the accident and for coordinating with d

4 other responding Federal agencies.

Under the Federal Radiological Noaitoring and Assessment Plan (FRMAP) portion of the Federal Radiological Emergency i Response Plan, the Department of Energy is responsible for j coordinating all off-site federal radiological monitoring i assistance. The Department of Energy will establish a Federal l

Radiological Monitorlag and Assess.sent Center (FRMAC) to coordinate the collection and assessment of field monitoring efforts. The Department of Energy will also provide field and airborne monitoring assistance. The Radiological Survey Team will generally be called out as a result of roguests from the state (s) or licensee. This could also be done by NRC l Headquarters requesting assistance through Department of Energy Headgaarters or by the region through the Department of Energy Regional Coordinating Office. The consolidated field monitorlag information and assessments w!11 then be made available by DOE to the state, the Cognizant Federal Agency, and other responders at the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center.

t N h

36 Af ter the situation has stabilimed and the accident moves out of the emergency phase, the Environmental Protection Agency (by agreement with the Department of Energy) assumes the role of coordination of federal off-site radiological monitoring assistance. The Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency together are also an important source of radiological monitoring capabilities and technical assistance for the state (s) and the Cognizant Federal Agency. Normally, NRC does not separately request Environmental Protection Agency l radiological monitoring assistance; the Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency have established l arrangements for requesting Environmental Protection Agency assistance.

2 The fourth agency is the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which coordinates all federal nonradiological assistance in support of the state (s). If NRC needs suFport from other i

federal agencies for which there are no arrangements or i established reistionships, the Federal Emergency Management

Agency will be asked to seek that support. The two primary examples are (1) communications, transportation, and othst logistical support from the U.S. Department of Defense (D0D) and (2) logistical support for the licensee where the source of that support or resource is not apparent.

In initial activation, requests should go from the Government Liaison Officer to the Federal Emergency Management Agency at their Emergency Information Coordination Center to their liaison officer (LNO) once he or she arrives at the Operations Center. In expanded activation, requests should so from the Director of Site Operations through the NRC Operations Center to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, or directly i to the Senior FEMA Official if he has arrived at the site. In any case, the requesting official should obtain periodic updates on the status of requests.

Any substantial request for resources should be cleared

! with the Executive Team, keeping in mind that Department of l Defense costs for air transport can be in excess of $5,000/hr.

l l

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i 37 These costs will be billed to NRC in an incident where there is no Presidential declaration, but this should not be a deterrent l

! in cases where such resources are essential to ensuring that the public health and safety are being protected. Once the federal response is in place, the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Cognizant Federal Agency will coordinate all federal public information activities with the state and licensee, j preferably through a Joint Information Center (JIC). This role I will probably be delegated by the Director of Site Operations to the Senior FEMA Official. The roles of other federal agencies during an emergency response are sammarised in Table 1.4. The organizational structure at the site during the first few days of a response is shown in Fig.1.5. The typical activities of 5 other federal agencies as a function of time are shown in Table 1.5.

Several of the federal agencies (e.g., the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Health and Emmen Services) will send to the Headquarters Operations Center

representatives who have considerable techalcal espertise in assessing radiological consequences. The Protective Measures Director must coordinate actions with other Federal responding agencies and make in11 use of the espertise they represent.

1.8.2 Location of Federal Amancy Dacialon Makers / Coordinator

Slide 29 l

l Table 1.6 sammarizes the locations from which the various agencies will direct their respective activities. Most agencies will attempt to direct their ef forts from locations close to the i

site. Two major centers will be established for coordinating l

2 i

rw a

38 Table 1.4. Roles of federal agencies during an emergency response Agency Role during an es'ergency Nuclear Regulatory Commission Coordint.tes technical evaluation

[ Cognizant Federal Agency (CFA)] assesement Federal Emergency Management Of f-sitt logisticab response Agency (FEMA) i Department of Energy (DOE) Coordinates off-site monitoring and data evaluation Provides technical assistance a' ,

EGFG and Atmospheric Release advisory Capability (ARAC)

Department of Health pad Human Assists with protection of human Services (HHS) health Provides technical and nontechnical assistance ~

Department of Agriculture Assists in the development of (USDA) agricultural protective measures and damage assessments National Oceanic and Atmospheric Provides meteorological services as Administration (NOAA) required Department of Housing and Urban Assists with location of housing, Development (HUD) if required Department of the Interior (DOI) Responsible for federal lands, parks and natural resource facilities Department of Transportation (DOT) Can assist with location and coordi-nation of transportation resources National Communication System (NCS) Can provide communications support to federal agencies

____________n- a

/

GOVERNOR '

DE" TED -;

L RE CS

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~'1 REPRESENTATIVE -

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NRCIFEDERAL EMERG2NCY g

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MANAGEMENT AGENCY '

cFEuA) I I

.xma cOwoaATicN I l

l Federal Techncal Support Federal nan Support

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t. TIC COORDINATES I FEMA COORDNATES g TECmlCAL ASPECTS NONTEOMCAL ASPECTS OF FEDERAL RESPONSE OF FEDERAL RESPONSE I j i .

I I I I I I l l ~

NCS DCO DOC USDA HHS FEMA EPA COT I

I l l ,

, , _____________________i- ,;

l COORDNATES FEDERAL OGICAL Federal Radologmal Monitoring LE W MONITOt'.<G and Assessment Ph (FRMAP) l ,

I I _

I I I I I_ I I- 7 NRC EPA USDA DOC DOE DOD NRC lHHS DOT STATE AND UTLITY Fig. 1.5. Federal response aanasement for a radiological emergency at a nuclear power reactor.

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Table 1.5. Activities of typteel federel agencies other than NEC followtas lattletion of the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plaa Federal Response Estimated Estimated time of Persommet and/or agency role No. of responders arrival on site egalpme nt (h)

Nuclear Regulatory Monitors !!ceasee's actions 50-70 2-6 15-24 Commission (NRC)

Coordlaates federal 6-24 50-70 technical response Provides support to licenses and off-alte authorities Assesses provstive setion rewarendations and actic; Department of Radiologie 1 Assistence 6-10 1-5 Energy (DOE) Teams (.!ATs)

Moalterlag support to b-state O Aerial Messarements 100-150 g-12 Aerial support Systems (ANS) (planes or l helisopters)

Establishes Federal Radiological Noaitorias and Assessment Center (FRNAC)

Coordiaates !sitial off-site #-12 monitoring; assists in monitorlag Federal Emergency Coordientes montechnical off-site 10-20 G-12 Regional Offlee

! Namagement Agency (FEMA) support to off-site authorities l

l Provides logistical support for 5-16 Senior FEMA federst egencies Officer (6P0) l Environmental Protectica Provides snetytical radiologleal 20-25 6-10 Advance team j Agency (EPA) measurements support l Coordleates long-tors off-site 8-16 Nobile laboratory i mesitorias l

l

Table 1.5. (Continued)

Federal Response Estimated Estimated time of Persommel and/or agency role No. of responders arrival on site egulpment (h)

Department of Health Provides medical and radio- 2-4 g-16 and Emmaa Services (BBS) logical assistance and advice ,

and ensures avellability of human services Department of Provides radiological advice on 4-6 2-10 Agricattare (USDA) food prodnets Department of Provides transportation advice 1-2 6-10 Transportation (DOT) and assistance to state and local authorities National Commaalcation Manages commaalcations assets 2-4 6-10 System (NCS) ara assists la solving *-

cosamanication problems for M federal agencies Department of Provides meteorological As requested [ National Weather Commerce (DOC) laformation and resources Service (NWS) offices are continuously staffed]

Department of Pr6vides logistical and As regnested Defense (D0D) radiological assistance

42 Table 1.6. Location of federal agency decision makers Location of decision makers **

Licensee Federal Headquarters (in Emergency Federal Radiological Washington, D.C.,

Agency Operations Response Monitoring and NRC Operations Facility Center Assessment Center Center)*  ;

Department of -(I,C,M)

Energy (DOE)

Environmental I,C,M PR Protection Agency (EPA)

Department of P,R,M Health and Human Ser-vices (HHS)

Department of P,R Agriculture i (USDA)

Federal P,R SFO Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

Nuclear (P,R,1,C) M Regulatory Commission (NRC)

"The agency in the lead for a respective function is indicated by i parentheses.

l

! b M = field monitoring measurements; P = protective action assessment; R = reentry (relocation and resettlement) assessment; C = dose calculations (per hour); I = dose commitment (per hour); SFO = senior FEMA officisi.

• After an agency's representative arrives at the NRC Operations

, Center, information will flow to and from that agency.

l l

43 off-site federal activities:

1. Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center - a

, center from which t1:e Department of Energy coordinates i

radiological monitoring and assessment operations, typically at an airport near the accident site. This center generally need not be located near the on-site or federal-state centers as long as its operations can be coordinated with them.

2. Federal Response Center (FRC) - a center established by the Federal Emergency Management Agency at a location identified in conjunction with the state; it serves as a focal point for coordinating federal logistical and nonradiological support to the state.

For some agencies (e.g., the Department of Health and Human Services), policy decisions will be made from Headquarters in Washington, D.C.

1.9 0FFICIAL NRC POSITION Slide 30 1.9.1 Information Status The NRC will issue Status Summary Reports from either the Operations Center or the site for use by NRC Response Team members. These reports will be the official NRC information concerning its assessment. Any information not contained in a S--- ry Status Renort or official nrens release should not be considered official.

l 44 1.9.2 Licensee Interface There are generally two levels of contact with the licensee: (1) a technical level to discuss plant systems status as it pertains to the event and to discuss the basis for protective action decision making and (2) a management level to discuss assessments and recommendations for actions both on and off site. I 1.9.2.1 Technical Data Slides 31 and 32 l

The NRC has a dedicated Emergency Notification System phone line to each plant. Initially (in the first 1 to 2 h after the l lacident), the NRC will receive basic information concerning

! what happened when and where. This information will normally be obtained by the Headquarters Operations Officer over the Emergency Notification System. The status and parameters of plant systems should be transmitted to the NRC over the Emergency Notification System (both the Regional Office and Headquarters will be manning the line).

The NRC also has the Health Physics Network (HPN) phone line to the plant. Initially, protective action, radiological, and meteorological information is transmitted over the Emergency ,

Notification System. This information should be restricted to the Health Physics Network once it is manned by a qualified person, which is generally by the time the Emergency Operations Facility is fully staffed.

, The licensee can expect NRC to request the following types l of technical information:

1. those items that will be requested initially and that should be updated only if there is a major change:

I

45

e. a description of the abnormal occurrence (including time of occurrence), corrective actions, and/or projected degradation (identify the major indicators on which this assessment is based); ,

b. core condition and projection (identify the major indicators on which this assessment is based);

c. contairment condition and projection (identify the major indicators on which this assessment is based);

d. protective actions recommended to off-site authorities, the basis for such actions, and the off-site official contacted; and

e. names and phone numbers of:

(1) Technical Support Center Manager / Director (to discuss licensee assessment of niant conditions).

(2) Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Manager / Director (to discuss overall resnonse). and (3) Frotective Actions / Radiation Manager / Director 112 discuss the bases and status of crotective action recommendations): and

i

2. parameters that NRC expects will need updating every 30 min for most accidents (e . g. , see Table 1.7). In addition, specific questions concerning plant status may be asked over the Emergency Notification System and Health Physics Network.

46 Table 1.7. Typical parameters that NRC expects to be considered for a light-water reactor incident

• System /Ne twork Information Emergency Reactor vessel liquid level (if available)

Notification System Reactor coolant pressure Hot-leg temperature [ pressurized water reactor (PWR))

Cold-leg temperature (PWR)

Pressurizer level (PWR)

Steam generator level (PWR)

Engineered Safety Feature system status Drywell pressure [ boiling water reactor (BWR))

Suppression pool water temperature (BWR)

Health Abnormal radiation levels from sampling or monitors Physics Network -- Coolant (primary or secondary)

-- Containment

-- Air ejector exhaust (PWR)

-- Standby and off gas treatment (BWR)

-- Area Process j -- Environmental Meteorological information ,

t Weather conditions

-- Wind conditions

-- Atmospheric stability

" The NRC Operations Center would need this information on a regular basis (every 30 min) for any incident. Additional items may be added j during the course of the response to an incident.

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47 1.9.2.2 Discussion of Assessment As was described earlier, Ebadquarters and the Base Team

-w ill attempt to discuss their assessment with the licensee.

This contact is arranged during the Emergency Notification System or Health Physics Network conversations. The individuals responsible for reactor safety assessments and protective l measures assessments are given the names and means to contact the licensee representatives with whom they can discuss their respective assessments. NRC will also request over the Emergency Notification System the name and means to contact the appropriate senior-level licensee representative with whom the Executive Team Director or Base Team Leader can discuss the situation.

1.9.3 State / Local Interfaces There are two levels of contact with off-site officials:

1. a technical level to discuss the basis for protective actions (e.g., dose assessment) between technical groups (NRC/off-site) and

2. a decision-making level to discuss assessments and possible recommendations.

Once the Site Team arrives on site, it is highly desirable for this contact and coordination to be face-to-face.

To clarify protective action recommendations and discuss the basis for any differences of a technical nature, the individuals responsible for protective measures will be contacting the off-site officials responsible for technical analysis of the protective action recommendations (e.g., the state radiation health office). They cannot of ficially represent the NRC's j

position or recommendation to the state decision maker. Contact with the state or local decision makers will be initiated by the

48 Government Liaison Officer or Government Liaison Coordinator.

This will allow the Executive Team or Director of Site Operations to ' provide the official NRC assessments or recommendations to the appropriate off-site of ficials. The purpose is to ensure that off-site decision makers are aware of NRC's activities and that any off-site actions are factored into NRC analysis and, where necessary, to allow response management

'to discuss NRC's assessment with these officials. These discussions will generally be with the Executive Team Director or Director of Site Operations, who will provide the " official" NRC assessmants or recommendations.

The NRC Regional Offices and Headquarters maintaan a list of (1) off-site of ficials with whom the NRC should discuss and compare technical assessments and (2) officials responsible for

' protective action decision making who should be contacted to receive official NRC assessments and recommendations. Once the Site Team is on site and a Director of Site Operations has been designated, these contacts may be face to face.

1.9.4 Internal NRC Interface To ensure a coordinated response, communication links will be established by the Headquarters Operations Officer between the Site, Base, and Headquarters teams and management of the Protective Measures Team and Reactor Safety Team. These lines, which will be used to discuss team assessments and assignments, will be kept open and will be manned continuously. To establish these lines, all parties must call the Headquarters Operations Officer over the Health Physics Network or Emergency Notification System and request to be placed on either the Protective Measures Team or Reactor Safety Team conference lirts or bridges.

49 1.10 NAJOR POINTS Slide 33 6 The principal roles for NRC in incidents at nuclear power plants are to monitor actions by the licensee to ensure that people in the vicinity of the plant are adequately protected and to provide any assistance requested by the licensee or off-site officials.

6 NRC response procedures for serious events are geared toward establishing the lead and focus for NRC response at the site as soon as possible.

• During an emergency, the Chairman or his designee has the authority of the Commission; only one person is in charge.

6 Once the Director of Site Operations has been designated, the lead for NRC is at the site, and the response teams at NRC Headquarters work for and support the Site Team.

6 NRC will not normally question licensee or off-site dose assessments if they are within an order of magnitude of NRC assessments unless the assessments have a major influence on protective measures.

e All response team members must recognize the considerable limitations of performing their functions and provide their management with an assessment of how good their analyses are.

e The Resident Inspector will generally be the first NRC staff member at th'e site and is the NRC person most knowledgeable about the site.

l l

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50 e The Federal Emergency Management Agency is responsible for coordination of the federal nonradiological response to emergencies that require a significant multlagency presence. NRC is responsible for coordinating the technical aspects of any federal response involving NRC-Ilconsed activities.

• Response personnel should discuss their assessments with the licensee before forwarding them to the Executive Team or Director of Site Operations, e All " official" NRC recommendations to off-site officials will be made by the Director of the Executive Team (Chairman) or Director of Site Operations.

e The Status Summary will contain official, approved information that can be released to anyone. Although there will be numerous working-level exchanges of information with the licensee and off-site counterparts, these other discussions will be '%nof fic ial . "

e All data used in the assessment process must be virifiable; if the source of any numbers is unknown, team members should track it down.

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Appendix A SLIDES RELATING TO VOLUME 5 0F THE SEVERE REACr0R ACCIDENT INCIDENT RESPONSE 11tAINING MANUAL i

l i

i 51 l

I APPENDIX A SLIDES RELATING TO SEVERE REACTOR ACCIDENT INCIDENT RESPONSE TRAINING MANUAL:

5 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION RESPONSE VOL.5 NUREG-1210 ORNL/TM-9271/V5 i

Slide 1

OBJECTIVES

• Describe the roles of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in l the event of a nuclear power plant accident

• Describe the NRC response modes, explain the criteria that determine each response mode, and list the basic components of the NRC response

• Describe b iefly the role, limitations, and composition of the various elements of the NRC response organization E i

• List the other federal agencies and their roles

• Describe how the NRO interfaces with the licensee and with state and local officials during an emergency

• Describe the ongoing assistance provided by the licensee during an emergency

• Describe the kind of information that can be released as the " official" NRC position during an event (i.e., the Status Summary) l Slide 2 1

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jj

1 i

i NRC RESPONSE ROLES i

• Monitor the licensee to ensure that appropriate protective action recommendations are being made off site

• Support off-site authorities, including confirming the licensee's '

recommendations to off-site authorities, if requested

• Support the licensee g

• Keep other federal agencies and entities (e.g., Congress and the White House) informed of the status of the incident

• Keep the media informed of NRC's knowledge of the status of the .

incident, including coordination with other public affairs groups

• Intervene in a limited fashion to direct the licensee's on-site response in some unusual and very rare situations Slide 4

l I

TYPICAL RELATIONSHIP OF ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATIONS, NRC RESPONSE MODES, AND NRC LEAD ORGANIZATIONS  ;

l l

l Licensee Typical NRC Lead Classification Response Mode Organization

Alert and other Standby NRC Regional Office (RO)

situations that Base Team (BT) ,

warrant monitoring i Site Area or General Initial Activation Headquarters (Chairman) l Emergency Expanded Site Team i Activation j Deactivation Region (Regional Administrator) ~

l Slide 5

O i

TYPICAL IGIC ACTIONS DURING A SEVERE NUCLEAR PLANT ACCEENT*

, Tinee PWIC ISIC Regional State / Local (h) Licensee Headquarters ONice AuthorNies o.1 implements 0.ep cy Decidos to activate Make protoceve Operating Pruwtres (EOPs) acdon W

(* W event Activate weming syneem i Activates emergency Give putse instructions organization implements / directs oneito protective acuans and damage control Recommends protective

) actions to ofte anciais Reports. events to

: +-- ;,,, (No)

W conference Ca5s with Regional Office (RO) and HQ l

Ac6vates CT w.cy Notmcation System (ENS)

Staffs the Technmal Support Center (TSC)

Slide 6 i

j

TYPICAL NRC ACTIONS DURING A SEVERE NUCLEAR PLANT ACCSENT (Conumsedf Time INIC ISIC Regional State / Local (h) Licensee Headquarters OfHce Authorities 1-2 Activate = the Emergency Operations Center (OC) incident Reeponse Center Complete implementation of Operations Facilit'/ (EOF) is staffed (IRC)is staffnd protective actions near the sita Obtains first field monitoring results {

Staffs the Health Physics Protective Measures Team (PMT) assesses Regional Base Team (BT)

Network (HPN) initial licensee actions, and conhnues to monitor Reactor Safety Team (RST) assesses situation, establishes core and containment conditions counterpart with HQ OC, RST assesses licensee event Staff state and local vs NRC criteria centers resources to be sent PMT completes very semple initial to the site and $

dose protections based on resources to be licensee release estimates brokered by ORDAM computer code) P:"-Peters PMT contacts state to discuss technical information if maior differences exist in assessments, PMT contacts technicaHevel licensee and state to discuss Official NRC recommendations from the Executive Team (ET)-

only if actions required to protect the public are not being taken 1

Slide 6 (Continued)  !

r TYPICAL PMC ACTIONS DURMG A SEVERE NUCLEAR PLANT ACCSENT (Continuedf Time PRC pmC Regional State / Local (h) Licensee Headquarters Office Author 1Ilse 2-3 Analyzes first cooient PMT cviv-;i'.x initial does State monitoring team -

and contaanment pregoctions based on plant arrives on site samples conditions and core damage estimates from RST (DAS computer code) State representation arrives at the EOF '

PMT starts to m' terface with Atmospheric Rainaaa Advisory r'aphiuty (ARAC)

(PMC provides source term estimate)

ARAC results integrated into HQ amaaaaments 4-8 ST arrives at EOF cn Briefed by Econese 8-12 ET delegates authority DSO-epproved ST to Director of Site Operations takes over lead '

(DSO)(expanded activation) for PSC PMT and HQ support AN does asessements/

ST effort protective action asessement coordneted directly (Roonees/Oflice of Nuclear Reactor Reguistion/

off-site officials)

PMT and HQ continue to Addihonal NRC support ST personnel arrive

• This listing doec not necessarily reflect the sequence of events within a partcular time heading Many activities wlN be taidng place concurrently.

Slide 6 (Continued)

1 61 MC RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR CONTROL FUNCTIONS HaWarters (HQ) Regional Base Team Function [ Operations Center [ Incident Response Center (OC)] (IRC)] Regional Site Team Management Executive Team Base Team Site Team Leader (ET) Director Manager (STL)/ Director of Site Operations (DSO)*

Reactor Safety Reactor Safety Reactor Safety Reactor Safety Assessment Team (RST) Director Manager (RSM) Coordinator (RSC)

Protective Measures Protective Measures Protective Measures Protective Measures Assessment Team (PMT) Director Manager (PMM) Coordinator (PMC)

Safeguards /Secunty Safeguarda Team Safeguards / Security Safeguards /Secunty Assessment (SGT) Director Manager (SM) Coordinator (SC)

Public and News Public Affairs (PA) Psblic Affairs Public Affairs Media information Officer Manager (PAM) Coordinator (PAC)

Government Government Liaison Government Liaison Government Liaison Cocrdinator Officer (GLO) Maneger (GLM) Coordinator (GLC)

AdministratNe Administrative Support Resource Support Tesm (AST) Director Manager (RM)

E::;--,se Coordination Response Coordination Emergency Response Emergency Response Team (RCT) Director Manager (ERM) Coordinator (ERC)

Congressioral Congressional Liaison Coordinctor (CL) Officer

• The STL becomes the DSO on the transfer of authority and responsibility (declaration of Expanded Activation).

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l Siide 7 1

A

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61 NRC RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR CONTROL FUNCTIONS Headquarters (HQ) Regional Base Team Function [ Operations Center [ Incident Response Center (OC)] (IRC)] Regional Site Team "r+;+Tient Executive Team Base Team Site Team Leader (ET) Director Manager (STL)/ Director of Site Operations (DSO)*

Reactor Safety Reactor Safety Reactor Safety Reactor Safety Assessment Team (RST) Director Manager (RSM) Coordinator (RSC)

Protective Measures Protective Measures Protective Measures Protective Measures Aaaaaament Team (PMT) Director Manager (PMM) Coordinator (PMC)

Safeguards / Security Safeguards Team Safeguards / Security Safeguards / Security Assessment (SGT) Director Manager (SM) Coordinator (SC)

Public and News Put2c Affairs (PA) Public Affairs Public Affairs Media information Officer Manager (PAM) Coordinator (PAC)

Govemment Government Uaison Government Liaison Government Liaison Coordinator Officer (GLO) Manager (GLM) Coordinator (GLC)

Administrative Administrative Support Resource Support Team (AST) Director Manager (RM)

Response Coordination Response Coordination Emergency Response Emergency Response i

Team (RCT) Director Manager (ERM) Coordinator (ERC)

Congressional Congressional Liaison Coordinator (CL) Officer

• The STL becomes the DSO on the transfer of authority and responsibility (declaration of Expanded l

Activation).

l Slide 7 i

w- _

s ]

r i

TYPICAL ORGANIZATION OF ,

THE BASE TEAM BASE TEAM MANAGER I I I I REACTOR PROTECTIVE EMERGENCY GOVERNMENT SAFEGUARDS /

I SAFETY MEASURES RESPONSE LIAISON SECURITY

MANAGER MANAGER MANAGER MANAGER MANAGER g

(

l PUBLIC RESOURCE AFFAIRS MANAGER MANAGER Slide 8 ,

ORGANIZATION OF NRC HEADQUARTERS (LEAD DURING INITIAL ACTIVATION)

EXECUTIVE TEAM CHAIRMAN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF OPERAT!ONS, AND DIRECTORS OF OFFICES OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT, NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION, AND NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS STATUS OFFICER O

I I I I CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT PUBLIC RESPONSE LIAISON LIAISON AFFAIRS COORDINATION TEAM o l I I SAFEGUARDSa

^L REACTOR SAFETY PROTECTIVE MEASURES B A ADMINISTRATIVE SITE TEAM SUPPORT TEAM

• NOT ALWAYS ACTIVATED.

Slide 9

1 TYPICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SITE TEAM (LEAD DURING EXPANDED ACTIVATION)

SITE TEAM LEADER (DURING INITIAL ACTIVATION)

DIRECTOR OF SITE OPERATIONS (DURING EXPANDED ACTIVATION)

I

, STATE LIAISON PUBLIC AFFAIRS EMERGENCY RESPONSE COORDINATOR COORDINATOR COORDINATOR REACTOR SAFETY PROTECTIVE MEASURES SAFEGUARDS / SECURITY COORDINATOR COORDINATOR COORDINATOR Slide 10 a

EXPANDED ACTIVATION SITE TEAM ORGANIZATION CHART DIRECTOR OF SITE OPERATIONS DURING EXPANDED ACTIVATION I

STATE LIAISON __

PUBLIC AFFAIRS EMERGENCY RESPONSE COORDINATOR COORDINATOR COORDINATOR REACTOR SAFETY PROTECTIVE MEASURES SAFEGUARDS / SECURITY l COORDINATOR COORDINATOR COORDINATOR l

0 EXECUTIVE TEAM  !

l CONGRESS GOV'T PUBLIC RESPONSE LIAISON LIAISON AFFAIRS COORDINATION ,

DIRECTOR DIRECTOR DIRECTOR TEAM DIRECTOR REGION REACTOR SAFETY PROTECTIVE MEASURES SAFEGUARDS BASE TEAM DIRECTOR DIRECTOR DIRECTOR MANAGER Slide 11

RESPONSE MANAGEMENT

• Primary role of response management

- Direct the NRC response

- Act as the primary spokesperson l

• May be asked to confirm a decision or g I

recommendation by licensee or off-site officials

- Must act promptly Slide 12 P -- .

l 1

1 AUTHORITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES THAT MAY BE TRANSFERRED TO THE DIRECTOR OF SITE OPERATIONS

• Authority to recommend actions to the licensee

• Authority to recommend off-site actions, either confirming licensee j recommendations or providing additional NRC recommendations

• Authority to direct the licensee to take specific actions but only in rare e .

and unusual circumstances

• Responsibility to act as the primary spokesperson for NRC in responding -

, to the media

• Authority to supervise all NRC personnel at the site

• Authority to represent NRC in interactions with other agencies i

l Slide 13

l l

l TYPES OF INFORMATION NEEDED FOR RESPONSE MANAGEMF#T

• Significant developments l

• Assessments of all parties

- Licensee l - State l - Other Federal agencies

- Staff

- Other industry experts  :

a Bases and significance of differences in assessments ,

• Limitations and degree of sensitivity of the analysis

• Recommendations and options

- Input about actions currently being taken  ;

- Basis

• Proper contacts Slide 14

OBJECTIVES OF REACTOR SAFETY ASSESSMENT i

• Develop NRC assessments (and/or confirm the licensee's assessments) of current and projected core and containment conditions

• Monitor licensee response [e.g., implementation of Emergency Operating 1

Procedures (EOPs)] to ensure that proper corrective actions are being taken to minimize the consequences of the accident

• Characterize possible core conditions and release pathways for the #

protective measures dose assessment Furnish these assessments to the PMT and the ET/DSO with advice and direction for the licensee, if appropriate Slide 15

.. __ _ -a

REACTOR SAFETY ASSESSMENT METHODS 1

• Look for direct indicators of core and '

containment conditions

• Evaluate trends of direct indicators l

• Conduct mass and energy balance calculations a l

• Identify release pathways and degree of core damage (core temperature)

Slide 16 L _

REACTOR SAFETY LIMITATIONS

• Until the Site Team arrives, the source of information relies on telephone contact l

• Information may not be current The team is not as familiar as the licensee with the y specific plant, its equipment, and conditions The amount of information available from the licensee is limited 1

Slide 17

OBJECTIVES OF THE PROTECTIVE MEASURES ASSESSMENT l

• Monitor the licensee's public protective action recommendations i

• Obtain the status of protective actions implementation by off-site officials

• Assess and confirm the on-site protective actions taken by the licensee

• Exchange technical information with the licensee and state and local agencies to evaluate the significance of any differences n

• Provide independent protective action assessments based on reactor 4 status and dose analyses and evaluate external (licensee, state, local, or other agency) assessments for the ET or DSO

- Ensure that the ET or DSO is given an immediate (within 15 min)

! assessment of:

• Any licensee protective action recommendation

• Any conditions which indicate that protective actions are warranted ,

Slide 18

l ROLES OF DOSE PROJECTIONS DURING A SEVERE ACCIDENT (A GENERAL EMERGENCY)

• If a release is under way, identify the area that should be monitored first to determine if evacuation of sheltered people is required because of

! ground contamination (e.g.,1 rem /h)  :

Determine if protective actions taken on the basis of plant conditions ,

j should be expanded

• Serve as a secondary indicator of a General Emergency (Control Room or

! Technical Support Center dose projection at the site boundary) '

Slide 19 1

I LIMITATIONS IN PROTECTIVE MEASURES ASSESSMENTS

• Until the Site Team arrives, the source of information relies on telephone contact I

i

• Information may not be current l

l

• The team is not as familiar as the licensee with the specific plant, its equipment, the response plan, and conditions l

Slide 20 l

l

l OBJECTIVES OF SAFEGUARDS ASSESSMENT

• Advise response management about the security and safeguards developments and l recommend appropriate actions

• Provide safeguards information to appropriate law enforcement agencies (including the FBI) a

, and coordinate efforts for evaluating appropriate i remedial actions

• Provide plant-specific information and analysis >

concerning the safeguards contingency plan to decision makers 1

Slide 21

)

OBJECTIVES.OF THE GOVERNMENT LIAISON l

• Provide state and other federal organizations with the status of the NRC response

• Coordinate with other federal agencies responses related to on-site l activities i

• Keep federal and state agencies informed g

- Establish contact with state and off-site protective action decision makers

- Be aware of their considerations in the event that the NRC decides to make or discuss protective action recommendations

• Brief the ET and the DSO on the status of other agency responses Slide 22 l

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! RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE 1 I CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON 1

In the event of an incident, provide adequate, accurate, timely, and consistent information to

- Members of Congress t

, - Their staffs l - Principal congressional oversight committees l

1 i

Slide 23 l

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PUBLIC AFFAIRS FUNCTIONS

' AND OBJECTIVES i

• Prepare and coordinate information releases

• Support response management

• Monitor national media coverage

• Inform the public and the media of NRC actions i

l Slide 24 i

}

ROLE OF THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR

• Report to the site

• During the Standby Mode

- Assist in evaluating incident status and licensee actions

- Assist in deciding the appropriate NRC response mode i

, - Interface with the Regional and Headquarters Standby Teams '

l

• During the Initial Activation Mode

- Serve as the NRC representative on site in the TSC, control room, or licensee command center / area l

j - Provide information as requested by the OC and NRC

- Interface with the Regional and Headquarters Standby Teams as l requested to provide perspective

{

• During Expanded Activation Mode

- Join the Site Team .

- Interface as assigned by the DSO 4

j

• Log information l Slide 25

80 I

ROLES OF FEDERAL AGENCIES DURING AN EMERGENCY RESPONSE Agency Role During an Emergency l Nuclear Regulatory Commission Coordinates technical evaluation

[ Cognizant Federal Agency (CFA)] assessment Federal Emergency Management Off-site logistical response

- Agency (FEMA)

Department of Energy (DOE) Coordinates off-site monitoring and data evaluation Provides technical assistance EG&G and Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC)

Department of Health and Assists with protection of Human Services (HHS) human health Provides technical and nontechnical assistance Department of Agriculture Assists in the development of (USDA) agricultural protective measures and damage assessments National Oceanic and Atmospheric Provides meteorological services Administration (NOAA) as required Department of Housing and Assists with location of housing, Urban Development (HUD) if required Department of the Interior Responsible for federal lands, parks, (DOI) and natural resource facilities Department of Transportation Can assist with location and (DOT) coordination of transportation resources National Communication System Can provide communications (NCS) support to federal agencies Slide 26

FEDERAL RESPONSE MANAGFRAFNT FOR A RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY AT A NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR GOVERNOR OR STATE AND DESIGNATED LOCAL RESOURCES REPRESENTATIVE l I I I

i l NRC/ FEDERAL EMERGENCY l MANAGEMENT AGENCY l (FEMA) l g JONT COORONATION l I

Federal Tectwuca! Support Federal Nontechncal Support l l

l l l NRC COORDNATES l

j FEMA COORDNATES TECHNICAL ASPECTS NONTECHNICAL ASPECTS l

OF FEDERAL RESPONSE OF FEDERAL RESPONSE  ! $

1 1 I I I I I I I NCS DOD DOC USDA HHS FEMA EPA DOT I

i l 1 NRC DOE

______________________a

! COORDNATES FEDERAL l

OFF-SITE RADIOLOGICAL Federal Radiologeal Monitoring

) UTILITY MONITOR!NG and Assessrnent Plan g (FRMAP) l I I I I I I I l -l NRC EPA HHS USDA DOC DOE DOD NRC DOT STATE AND UTILITY Slide 27

_ . . . _. . _ .~

ACTMTES OF TYPICAL FEDERAL AGENCES OTIE!R THAN ISIC FOLLOWMG NTIATION OF TIE! FRERP Federal Response Estimated No. Estimated Time of Personnel and/or j Agency Role of Reeponders Arrtval on Site (h) Equipment Nuclear Regulatory Monitors licensee's actions 50-70 2-6 15-20 Commmeion (NRC)

Coordinates federal 6-24 50-70 technical response i

Provides support to licensee and off-site authorses Aaaaaaaa protective action recommendations and achons Department of Radiological Assetance 6-10 1-5

. Energy (DOE) Teams (RATS)

Monstonng support to

state g

! Aenal Measurements 100-150 8-12 Aerial support i Systems (AMS) (planeo or heEcopters) j Estabishes Federal

, Radiological Monitoring l and Assessment Center (FRMAC)

Coordinates initial off-site 6-12

. .mm -.,

i I Federal Emergency Coordinates nontechnical 10-20 6-12 Regional Office Management Agency off-site support to (FEMA) off-site authonties Provides logetical support 8-16 Senior FEMA for federal agencies Officer (SFO)

Slide 28

ACTIVITIES OF TYPtCAL FEDERAL AGENCIES OTHER THAN IBC FOLLOWING INITIATION OF THE FRERP (Continued)

Federal Response Estimated No. Estimated Time of Personnel and/or Agency Role of Responders Arrival on Site (h) Equipment Environmenta! Provides analytical radologmal 20-25 6-10 Advance team Protecten Agency (EPA) measurements support Coordinates long-term 8-16 MobBe off-site monitoring laboratory Department of Provides medcal and 2-4 8-18 Health and Human raw assistance Services (HHS) and adv~ce and ensures availability of human services Department of Provides radiologeal advice 4-6 2-10 co Agneulture (USDA) on food products Department of Provides transportation advice 1-2 6-10 Transportation (DOT) and assistance to state and local authonties National Communication Manages communications assets 2-4 6-10 System (NCS) and assists in solving communcation problems for federal agencies Department of Provides meteorologeal As requested [ National Weather Commerce (DOC) information and resources Servce (NWS) offices are continuously staffed]

Department of Provides logistical and As requested Defense (DOD) radiological assistance Slide 28 (Continued) 6

84 l LOCATION OF FEDERAL AGENCY DECISION MAKERS Location of dociolon makere*

Licensee Federal Headquartens (in Emergency Federal Radiological Washington, D.C.,

Operations Response Monitoring and IRC Operations Agency Facility Center Aseeeement Center Center)'

Department of (X,C,M) l Energy (DOE)

Environmental X,C,M P,R )

Protection I Agency (EPA)

Department of P,R,M Health and Human Services (HHS)

Department of P,R Agriculture (USDA)

Federal P,R,SFO Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

Nuclear (P,R,X,C) M Regulatory Commission (NRC)

• The agency in the lead for a respective function is indicated by parentheses.

%A = field monitoring measurements; P = protective action asesoament; R = reentry (relocation and resettlement) assessment; C = dose calculations (per hour); X = does commitment (per hour); SFO = senior FEMA official.

"After an agency's representative arrives at the NRC Operations Center, information will flow to and from that agency.

l Slide 29 L h

F OFFICIAL NRC POSITION j

• The status summary report is the only official l NRC position ,

• Two levels of contact are maintained with the .

licensee and off-site officials 8 l

l - Technical (data) l

- Management (decisions) t l .

i i

Slide 30 m

, )

i TECHNICAL INTERFACE WITH THE LICENSEE: 1 INITIAL NRC INFORMATION NEEDS

• Description of the abnormal occurrence (including time of occurrence),

corrective actions, and/or projected degradation (identify the major indicators on which this assessment is based)

• Core condition and projection (identify the major indicators on which this assessment is based)

• Containment condition and projection (identify the major indicators on which this assessment is based)

• Protective actions recommended to off-site authorities, the basis for such actions, and the off-site official contacted l

• Names and phone numbers of l - TSC manager / director (to discuss licensee assessment of plant conditions)

- EOF manager / director (to discuss overall response)

- Protective actions / radiation manager / director (to discuss the bases and status of protectivo action recommendations)

Slide 31

CONTINUING TECHNICAL INFORMATION NEEDS System / Network Information Emergency Reactor vessel liquid level (if available)

Notification Reactor coolant pressure System Hot-leg temperature [ pressurized water reactor (PWR)]

Cold-leg temperature (PWR)

Pressurizer level (PWR) $

Steam generator level (PWR)

Engineered Safety Feature system status Drywell pressure [ boiling water reactor (BWR)]

Suppression pool water temperature (BWR)

Slide 32

CONTINUING TECHNICAL INFORMATION NEEDS (Continued)

System / Network Information Health Abnormal radiation levels from sampling or monitors Physics - Coolant (primary or secondary)

Network - Containment

- Air ejector exhaust (PWR)

- Standby and off-gas treatment (BWR)

- Area g

- Process

- Environmental Meteorological information

- Weather conditions

- Wind conditions

- Atmospheric stability The NRC Operations Center would need this information on a regular basis (every 30 min) for any incident. Additional items may be added during the course of the response to an incident.

Slide 32 (Continued)

i l MAJOR POINTS ,

ii

• The principal role for NRC in incidents at nuclear power plants is to monitor actions by the licensee to ensure that people in the vicinity of the plant are adequately protected and to provide any assistance

requested by the licensee or off-site officials

!

• NRC response procedures for serious events are geared toward i establishing the lead and focus for NRC at the site as soon as possible

• During an emergency, the Chairman or his designee has the authority .

of the Commission; only one person is in charge g

• Once the Director of Site Operations (DSO) has been designated, the lead for NRC is at the site, and the response teams at NRC Headquarters work for and support the Site Team (ST)

• NRC will not normally question licensee or off-site dose assessments if they are within an order of magnitude of NRC assessments unless the assessments have a major influence on protective measures

!

• All response team members must recognize the considerable limitations of performing their functions and provide their management with an assessment of how good their analyses are Slide 33

p ,i - _ . . . . . - --_ - - , _ _ . -, . . . .--, . ------.....,-.--s. . - . -_....r.. i, 4 -,a-- . , - - - . - * ..w # - =.%.--. m ,- - 3 #-

9 I

MAJOR POINTS (Continued)

• The Resident inspector (RI) will generally be the first NRC staff member at the site and is the NRC person most knowledgeable about the site

• The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is responsible for coordination of the federal nonradiological response to all radiological emergencies that require a significant multiagency presence. NRC is responsible for coordinating the technical aspects of any federal response involving NRC-licensed activities

• Response personnel should discuss their assessments with the g

licensee before forwarding them to the Executive Team (ET) or DSO l

• All " official" NRC recommendations to off-site officials will be provided I by the Director of the ET (Chairman) or the DSO l

• The Status Summary will contain official, approved information that can l be released to anyone l

• All data used in the assessment process must be' verifiable; if the i source of any numbers is unknown, team members should track it '

j down l

Slide 33 (Continued) i l . _ - . - . . __ __

91 ORNL/TM-9271/V5 NUREG-1210/V5 INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION 1-26. C. W. Miller l 27. Laboratory Records, ORNL-RC l

EITERNAL DISTRIBUTION

28. Office of Assistant Manager for Energy Research and Development, DOE-ORO, Oak Ridge, W 37831 29-30. Office of Scientific and Technical Information, DOE-ORO, Oak Ridge, W 37831 4

4 f

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"' NUREG-1210 Ei $'- BIBLIOGRAPHIC CATA SHEET Vol. 5

$48 tN8TauCTIONS ON TMg atvgast

a. TITit AND su.f sTLE 3 La Avg .LANs Pilot Program: NRC Severe Reactor Accident Incident Response Training Manual ,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Response f . oAn auOar co.,ano

( f .O~ra l u A.

. Av1 Oars.

Oc/ober 1986 C.A. Sakenas, T.J. icKenna, K. Perkins, C.W. Miller, f . oAn auOar >=uno L.M. Hively, R.W. S arpe, J.G. Glitter, R.M. Watkins / oNea l

" Aa

/ February 1987

,. PlaFOaMING OaGAN12 AT.ON N AWS ANo ILsNG ADDal$$ (inc,verig c.dri F. PROJECT /TASE. WORK uNif NuMeta Division of Emergency eparedness and Engineering Response . . N Oa Ga AN, Nu . a Office of Inspection an nforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory , ission Washington, DC 20555 9 A SPONSOnaNG OaQAN12 ATaON NAWE AND MAILING A aESS rearswee to c es it. TYPE OF aEPO.Y Same as 7 above.

. PtaOO COv E.E D isacsus,.e .st.ss in suerteusNrA-v Notes T a n A na Ac, am ,,, ,

\, y a

/

This is one in a series of volumes th c/llectively provide for the U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission(NRC) emergency onse personnel the necessary background information for an adequate response to evere reactor accidents. The volumes in the series are:

o Volume 1 -- Overview and Summary o!Majoe Points o Voluine 2 -- Severe Reactor Accidet Overview o Volume 3 -- Response of Licensee Jind State (and Local Officials o Volume 4 -- Public Protective Acf ons -- Pfindetermined Criteria and Initial Actions o Volume 5 -- U.S. Nuclear RegulatAry Commissiin Response Each volume serves, respectively, s the text fo a course of instruction-in a series of courses for NRC response personnel . These mate'r.ials do not provide guidance or license requirements for NRC licdhsees or state or ocal response organizations.

Each volume is accompanied by anjappendix of slides hat can be used to present this materi&1. The slides are $ tiled out in the text f \1 t

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