ML20197D373
| ML20197D373 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/16/1997 |
| From: | Mcgaffigan E NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Hoyle J NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20197D326 | List: |
| References | |
| SECY-97-173-C, NUDOCS 9712290038 | |
| Download: ML20197D373 (6) | |
Text
. _ _ _ . . - _ - - - - - - - .. - .
. NOT ATION VOTE RESPONSE SHEET -
TO: John C. Hoyle, Secretary FROM: COMMISSIONER MCGAFFIGAN
SUBJECT:
SECY 97-173 POTENTIAL REVISION TO 10 CFR 50.6G(a)(3) OF THE MAINTENANCE RULE TO REQUIRE LICENSEES TO PERFORM SAFETY ASSESSMENTS ud Approved x } Disapproved Abstain _,
Not Participating Request Discussion COMMENTS:
See attached coments.
SIGNATUR pU 0 Release Vote / '(/ lO / 7
/ '
DATE Withhold Vote / /
Entered on "AS" Yes V' No I TA " 2 PO 2 m ! "
CORRESPONDENCE PDR_
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[p_mm_isioner McGaffican's Comments on SECY 97-173. Potential Revisiort.14_.M l CFR 50.63(a)(3) of the Maintenance Rule to Recuire Licensees to Perform Safety .
A'sessments j 1 approve the staff's recommendation to proceed with proposed rulemaking for 3 the maintenance rule to require that safety assessments be taken into account while performing maintenance activities, using the three alternatives discussed in SECY-97-173, subject'to the following additional considerations. !
In View of the inspection results thus far and the: staff's finding that the ;
number of missed assessments with their apparent risk significance is a safety l concern, I believe that, as a minimum, licensees must be reauired-to take into i
account safety assessments prior to performing maintenance activities, particularly.while at power (Alternative 2 as a minimum),
in addition to the single change proposed by the staff in Alternative 2 in '
this rulemaking, I believe that the following three additional changes are '
also needed. First, " preventive maintenance" as used in the last sentence of '
section 50,65(a)(3) should be changed to " planned maintenance," consistent '
with the guidance discussed in the maintenance regulatory guide _(RG 1.160) and l
the industry guideline endorsed by the regulatory guide (Chapter 11 NUMARC 93 01. Revision 2). Any planned maintenance activity that results in removing equipment from service -whether to perform surveillance testing, post- ,
maintenance testing, corrective maintenance, performance / condition monitoring, l
or preventive maintenance--constitutes a change in equipment configuration and has the same overall effect on performance of safety functions. Second, because section 50,65(a)(3) contains two separate and distinct actions, the !
proposed requirement to take into account safety assessments prior to per. forming maintenance activities reflected in the last sentence of section This change 50.65(a)(3) should be established as a new section 50.65(a)(4).
will not affect.the requirements in section 50.65 but will provide clarity in the regulation. Third, it should be clear that the requirements of the '
maintenance rule, including the assessment of SSCs proposed to be removed from service, are applicable during all modes of plant operation, including normal r
t i i note that the title of this SECY and various paragraphs in the paper describe the proposed 50.65(t)(3) requirement as a requirement to ' perform safety assessments" or "to assess the impact on safety
- The clear language is "an assessment , , . shall be taken into account.' "Take into account" connotes both that the assessment has been performed and ,
action has been taken to control for the effect of the assessment. That more than simply "
, performing a- assessment la required is clear in Chapter 11 of NUMARC 93.01, Revision 2, endorsed by NRC Regulatory Guide 1.160. Hence, I try to consistentlyin my vote use the i
phrase "take into account.'
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plant shutdown operations. Again, this change simply brings the rule into conformance with NUMARC 93 01 Revision 2. Attached is a markup of the i
current maintenance rule with suggested wording to accomplish these three additional rule changes.
I believe that the first two suggested changes are non-controversial and should be included as part of the proposed rulemaking. However, should the third _ suggested change prove to be difficult to support and incorporate into the proposed rulemaking package or otherwise delay the current proposed rulemaking. I would support postponing it for treatment as part of a future ;
separate rule change. .
With respect to the change from "should" to "shall." I am particularly concerned about the staff's finding that the majority of assessments that have been reviewed during the baseline inspections do not meet NRC's current expectations regarding the current paragraph (a)(3). Despite the performance-based nature of the maintenance rule. I believe the staff should develop as part of the regulatury guidance for this proposed rulemaking an acceptable method (s) for taking into account safety assessments prior to performing maintenance activities. Consistent with the Comission's decision on DSI-13.
the staff should interact with industry group (s) in developing this regulatory guidance.
Furthermore, as the staff points out, one of the disadvantages of Alternative 2 is that licensees could use technically inferior methods for conducting safety assessments and could perform maintenance in configurations involving risk levels that may be imprudent yet still argue that they are in compliance with the requirements of the revised maintenance rule to take into account safety assessments, Thus, I would be prepared to consider, as part of a future rulemaking, a staff proposal to incorportte by reference NUMARC 93 01.
Revision 2. examples or attributes of assessments and control of activities under the current section 50.65(a)(3) that satisfy NRC expectations.
Establishing acceptable methods for assessment and control of maintenance in the regulatory guide may be a retreat from the performance based nature of the rule, but I believe that it is in the best interest of safety to piovide more prescriptive measures in this instance. Consideration of this additional rule change should not, however, delay the current initiative to change "should" to "shall" in section 50.65(a)(3).
In this regard.- I agree with Comissioner Dicus that the staff should w-7 e y a 4 e-- y 3y-g- - --- ,g--'=r M - ~: * -V-- W m "- -
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expeditiously proceed with this proposed rulemaking. However. I am inclined ,
to believe that a modified Alternative 2 with at least the two additional changes discussed above (change " preventive" to " planned' and redesignate the last sentence of section 50.65(a)(3) as (a)(4)). will be found to be the simplest and best justified approach and I do not believe that extensive or protracted regulatory analysis of Alternatives 1 and 3 is necessary.
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Attachment to Comissioner Hecaffican's Comments on SECY 97173 50.65 Reauirements for monitorina the effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear Dower DlantS.
(a)(1) Each holder of an operating license under 50.21(b) or 50.22. shall monitor the performance or condition of structures. systas. or cmponents, against licensee-estabitshed goals. In a manner sufft-cient to prov1de reasonable assurance that such structures. systems, and cmponents. as defined in paragraph (b). are capable of ful-filling their intended functions. Such goals shall be established coamensurate with safety and, where practical. take into account industry-wide operating exp.ortence. When the perfonnance or con-dition of a structure. system or co7ponent does not meet estab-11shed goals. appropriate corrective action shall be taken.
(a)(2) Monitoring as specified in paragraph (a)(1) of this section is not required where it has been demonstrated that the performance or condition of a structure, systa, or conponent is being effectively controlled through the performance of appropriate preventive main-tenance. such that the structure. system. or cmponent remains capable of performing its intended function.
(a)(3) Performance and condition monitoring activities and associated goals and preventive maintenance activities shall be evaluated at least every refueling cycle provided the interval between evaluations ,
betwen evaluations does not exceed 24 months. The evaluations shall be conducted taking into account. where practical. Industry-wide operating experience. Adjustments shall be made where necessary to ensure that the objective of preventat!ve preventing failures of structures. systems. and cmponents through ~ ' maintenance is appropriately balanced against the objective of minimizing unavailability of structures, systems, and cmponents due to monitoring or preventat!ve preventive maintenance.
(a)(4)J In perfonning m!toring and preventallve planned maintenance activities (including but:notJimitedlto' surveillance; testing.Tposti maintenance testingLcorrective: maintenance lperfonnancelcondition monitoring, anKpreventive maintenance), an assessment of the total plant equipment that is out of service shculd shall be taken into account to determine the overall effect on performance of safety funct tons.
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i (b) The scope of the nonitoring program spectfled in paragraphs (a)(1) of this section shall include safety related and nonsafety related structures, systoms, and co7ponents, as follows:
(b)(1) Safety related structures. systems, or co7ponents that are relied ?
vpon to ranain functional during nonnal~ operations 1ncluding nornal shutdown operations and during and following design basis events to t ensure the integrity of the reactor coolant. pressure boundary, the -
capability to shut down the reactor and/on maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, and the capability to^p'revent or mitigate the ,
consequences of accidents that could result in potential offsite ,
exposure co7 parable to the 10 CFR Part 100 guldetines.
(b)(2) Nonsafety related structures, systems, or co7ponents: ,
(1) That are relied upon to mitigate accidents or transients or'are used in plant emergency procedures (EOPs); or (li) Whose failure could prevent safety-related structures, systems, and cortponents frorn fulfilling their safety-related function; or .
(iii)
Whose failure could cause a reactor scram or actuation of a safety-related system.
l (c) The requirements of this section shall be inplemented by each licensee no
.later than July 10. 1996. r 1
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