ML20132E367

Summary of 961114 Meeting W/Industry Group on Dynamic Safety Sys Project in Washington,Dc to Discuss Sys Implementation at Licensee Facility.List of Attendees & Matl Used in Presentation Encl

ML20132E367
Person / Time
Issue date:	12/12/1996
From:	Mckenna E NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:	Matthews D NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
References
PROJECT-669 NUDOCS 9612230253
Download: ML20132E367 (42)

Text

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,j UNITED STATES jo 'R NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, o.C. 20665-0001 s...../ December 12, 1995 i

MEMORANDUM T0: David B. Matthews, Chief I Generic Issues and Environmental Projects Branch )

Division of Reactor Program Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation i l

FROM: Eileen McKenna, Senior Reactor Engineer Generic Issues and Environmental Projects Branch

![kg% l Division of Reactor Program Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUMMARY

OF NOVEMBER 14, 1996, MEETING WITH THE INDUSTRY GROUP l ON THE DYMAMIC SAFETY SYSTEM (DSS) PROJECT TO DISCUSS THE DSS DESIGN AND SCHEDULE FOR IMPLEMENTATION AT OCONEE i i

On November 14, 1996, representatives of the Electric Power Research Institute 1 (EPRI) and Duke Power Company met with representatives of the Nuclear l Regulatory Commission (NRC) in Washington D.C. Attachment 1 provides a list of meeting attendees.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the dynamic safety system (DSS) project design and schedule. The DSS is designed to be a replacement for a reactor protection system which is planned to be installed at the Oconee station. DSS is one of three projects for which the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) is a co-sponsor (the others are the EPRI-PLC and ASICs projects). The other sponsor of the DSS project is Duke Power (0conee Nuclear Station). The DSS project encompasses completing a conceptual design for the DSS digital system modification, a cost benefit analysis at Oconee, and determining the level of detail needed to revise the operator tra';ning necessary to accommodate the new tasks consistent with the DSS project. The DSS project at Oconee Nuclear Station consists of four separate phases discussed below:

Phase 1 is the cost benefit analysis and operator training / procedure impact study. Phase 1 is to be completed in early 1997. Upon completion of Phase 1, a report will be made available to the staff. Phase 2 encompasses preparation and submittal of the topical report and is scheduled to begin in 1998. Also included in Phase 2 are the application specific licensing submisd on, and the delineation of modifications to operator training and procedures. Phase 3 is the actual implementation of the DSS at Oconee Nuclear Station (0NS), which is scheduled to begin in the Spring of 1998. The project Phase 4 consists of the project performance verification. Performance verification is planned to conclude in the fall of 2000. Completion of the DSS project may be prolonged bgo 3'  ;.

due to the lack of DOE participation; however, once completed, the DSS project team estimates that the payback in the investment of implementing the DSS is predicted to be forthcoming in 2 to 5 years.

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4 0-David B. Matthews December 12, 1996 During the presentation of the utility perspective and project plan, there was an expressed desire by the project sponsors to get Entergy (licensee for ANO-1) involved. Members of the DSS project anticipate that other utilities which have Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) plants will be participating in this .

project. The reactor protection system (RPS) will be upgraded on the three l ONS units, and the upgrade will include on-line monitoring and integration with the plant computer. The design for the upgrade was presented as being failsafe; an extension of ladder logic to digital design. No on-line surveillances will be required, the design is modular, there will be low maintenance costs, a reduction in spare parts inventory will be seen, and the upgrade will have a low probabili!y of failure. During the presentation of the cost benefit analysis, it was anticipated that spare parts reductions would be on the order of 70 percent to 80 percent.

Some members of the DSS project team had meet previously with representatives of Nuclear Electric's (UK) Dungeness and Sizewell plants to discuss concerns and issues with the DSS and with digital systems in general. The concerns and issues were identified and are being addressed in the DSS project at Oconee. ,

An update on the conceptual design was presented. The DSS can be configured

, as 4 or 6 channels. Each channel is comprised of one or more signal j

conditioners, one or more data collectors, one trip processor, and one actuator drive. The trip processor encompasses the trip algorithm computer i

(TAC) and the vote algorithm computer (VAC). For each channel, multiple signals can feed into multiple collectors which feed into the trip processor.

l The data collector is comprised of a number of hardware and software functions

which provides for the promulgation of diagnostic information to the network.

The trip processor consists of a number of hardware crJ auftware functions.

! Fiber optics are used for transmission of data from the VAC to the monitors.

The actuator drive functions are hardware. Both the TAC and VAC are programmed in Ada. The DSS addresses the diversity issue by using a combination of hardware and software to eliminate the software common mode

failure concerns along with their " fail-safe" concept.

The NRC brought to the attention of the DSS project team the need to consider issues associated . tith analysis of accidents and transients in accordance with j Standard Review Plan Chapter 15, as well as the need to modify the plant simulator based on the changes made to the plant due to the DSS implementation. The DSS project team recognized the concerns raised by the NRC and further indicated that the Chapter 15 issues would be addressed in the Phase 2 portion of the project.

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David B. Matthews -3_ December 12, 1996 A future meeting is planned but the date has not been set due to uncertainties in the funding of this project. The five part slide presentation by the DSS ,

project team is provided as attachment 2. i Attachments: As stated cc w/atts: See next page Project No. 669 l l

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.v4 December 12, 1996 D. Matthews A future meeting is planned but the date has not been set due to uncertainties I in the funding of this project. The five part slide presentation by the DSS project team is provided as attachment 2.

Attachments: As stated cc w/atts: See next page Project No. 669 DISTRIBUTION:

See attached page Document Name: G:\emm\MSUM1114.96 To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" - Copy wi%out attachment / enclosure "E" - Copy withAattachment/ enclosure "N" r-No,fopy j OFFICE PGEB 6% .. l E SC:PGEB//N W E BC:H1CRn r l' E BC#Gj5// E NAME EMMcKeh'n'a ""\ FAkstuledi'cz JWermdeT' DM4blh%s DATE 12/1 /96 '12/d /96 12/f//96 12//7/96 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY i

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NRC/EPRI MEETING ON DYNAMIC SAFETY SYSTEM LIST OF ATTENDEES November 14, 1996 l

88ME ORGANIZATION Deidre Spaulding NRC/HICB i Jerry Mauck NRC/HICB i

Jared Wermiel NRC/HICB i Mike Miller Duke Power /Oconee  :

Ian Smith Campbell Love Associates ,

Graham Adams AEA Technology l Dan Wilkinson EPRI Don Miller Ohio State University 1 Brian Hajek Ohio State University '

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Attachment 1

, DYNAMIC SAFETY SYSTEM PROJECT TEAM MEETING WITH NRC NOVEMBER 14,1996 SHERATON WASHINGTON HOTEL, EISENHOWER ROOM 2:00 pm Introduction and Project Overview Dan Wilkinson/EPRI 2:15 pm Utility Perspective and Project Plan Mike Miller / Duke 2:35 pm Conceptual Design Update Graham Adams /AEA 3:05 pm Training / Procedures Evaluation Brian Hajek/OSU 3:25 pm Cost / Benefits and Phase 1 Report Ian Smith /CLA 3:50 pm General Discussion All 4:30 pm Close Attachment 2 I

.?

DSS Project Overview Project Structured in 4 Phases Phase 1: Completion scheduled for 2/97 Joint funding by Duke and EPRI Tailored Collaboration Two tasks: - Cost / Benefit Evaluations Operator Training / Procedures Eval.

l Meetings Completed With Nuclear Electric Dungeness &

Sizewell plants.

Phase 1 Report i

DOE Participation Under Negotiation Other Utilities

" Licensing Digital Perception" Potential Impacts:

SRP Update National Research Council Study .

Plant Life Extension Plant Economics Under Deregulation Phase 2: TBD Early1997 l

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4 DSS /NRC Meeting November 14,1996 Washington, DC DYNAMIC SAFETY SYSTEMS APPLICATION PROJECT t

UTILITY PERSPECTIVE AND PROJECT PLAN M H Miller Duke Power Company I

u n = ten.wa.o recowam I i

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DSS /NRC Meeting November 14,1996 - Washmgton, DC DYNAMIC SAFETY SYSTEMS APPLICATION PROJECT

+ PROJECT TEAM

- Duke Power Company. Ocor.ce Nuclear Station

- EPRI

- AEA Technology

- Ohio State University

- CampbellIme Associates

. OTHER PROJECT ASSOCIATES 4

- Nuclear Regulatory Commission

- Dungeness 'B' Nuclear Station

- Sizewell 'B' Nuclear Station

- EntergyOperations

- Nuclear Electric u a w.tre-wr mecowa- 2

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i i DSSNRC Meeting November 14,1996 - Washington. DC DYNAMIC SAFETY SYSTEMS APPLICATION PROJECT

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BRIEF REVIEW OF DSS PROJECT

- Upgrade / Replace Reactor Protection System (RPS) on 3 Units at Oconee

- Redundant RCP power monitor, Additional Delta T Trip

- On-line sensor monitoring and integration with plant computer

- Fail-Safe Design - Extenaion of Laddic logic to digital design

- Continuously Self Testing  !

- No On-Line Surveillances

- Modular Design

- Iow Maintenance Costs

- Reduced Spare Parts lavemis

- Iow Cost of Ownership ud ligh Rate of Return

- Extremely Low Probability ofI milure to Trip On Demand u w unee.oun wecoway 3

. I DSS /NRC Meeting November 14,1996 - Washington, DC DYNAMIC SAFETY SYSTEMS APPLICATION PROJECT

+ PROJECT STATUS

- EPRI TC 4385-001 10759 Duke Power Company & EPRI

+ PROJECT REVIEW

- Four Phase Project

- Phase 1 - Cost Benefit Analysis and Operator Trammg/Ptocedure Impact e Activities initiated Spring 1996

- Phase II Licensing and Specification Development n Activities originally Prosected to begin October 1996 based upon Phase 1

- Phase III- Hardware Implementation e Activities projected to begin Spring 1998

- Phase IV - Project Performanw Verification m Activities begin with ist installation and conclude in Fall 2000 m a main.oun me coway 4

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I DSS /NRC Meetmg November 14,1996 - Washington, DC DYNAMIC SAFETY SYSTEMS APPLICATION PROJECT PHASE I ACTIVITIES STATUS

- TASK 1.1 - Develop a Standardized Generic Cost Benefit Analysis for DSS Safety System Application j

m Cost Benefit Analysis Report in Developmental Stage '

• Using EPRITools and Duke Methods e Meetings held with Nuclear Electric in the UK 1

. Dungeness"B"NPS

. Sizewell "B" NPS i n Meeting held with AEA in the UK

> Results to date show payback in 2 - 5 years i

e Phase I Completion impacted by current Oconee Plant status (2/2BS7 to 3/3IS7)

= Phase !! Decision Expected 01/0167 a n =a .omi co-in co- - 5 l l

DSS /NRC Meeting November 14,1996 - Washington, DC DYNAMIC SAFETY SYSTEMS APPLICATION PROJECT

+

KEY POINTS ON MEETING WITH NE AT DUNGENESS"B" NPS

- First computer based protection system on a power reactor in the UK

- Two systems each with five years operating experience

- Low component failure rate confirmed from Seld data

- Routine on-line monitoring has replaced calibration of charmels

- Overall, low cost of ownership confirmed

. m a..o.i.e.e.co ...- 6

i DSS /NRC Meeting Novernber 14,1996. Washington, DC DYNAMIC SAFETY SYSTEMS APPLICATION PROJECT

+

KEY POINTS ON MEETING WITH NE AT SIZEWELL"B" NPS l

- Computer based Pnmary Protection System is combined with an Analog Secondary Protection System

- Tech. Specs do not permit operation of the plant if either of the two protection systems is inoperable 3

- The added functionality of the PPS may have contributed ~IO% '

improvement to power output and reduced fuel costs vs analog SPS on I its own (based on postulated scenarios and discussions with Nuclear Electric staff from Sizewell"B" and Barnwood Design OfIices) u n man. ma rowe.cowev 7 DSSHRC Meeting Novernber 14,1996. Washington, DC DYNAMIC SAFETY SYSTEMS APPLICATION PROJECT

+ PHASE II ACTIVITIES STATUS

- Decision to begin Phase !! based on Phase I results and availability of Duke Power resources and priorities

• PHASE III ACTIVITIES STATUS

- Decision to begin Phase III follows decision on Phase 11

+ PHASE IV ACTIVITIES STATUS

- Decision to begin Phase IV follows Phase Ill activities

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DSS /NRC Meeting November 14,1996. Washington, DC l DYNAMIC SAFETY SYSTEMS APPLICATION PROJFCT  !

l PROPOSED ROUTE AHEAD FOR DSS PROJECT IN 1997

- Review project scope, schedule and funding vs DOE status

- Total project funding levelin 1997 s 3.5 M I

- Total project cost estimated at s 11.498 M

- Schedule dependent on aggressive funding and resources

. Unit 1 Restart Activities

- Some 1996 activities and fundmg may roll over into 1997

- Decision awaited on Phase II m Oconec Units I,2 & 3 cunently shut down

= Other Activities and Commitments have higher resource priority

= Unit 2 Restart A:tivities

• Unit 3 Early Refueling Outage and Restart Activities

• Oconee Service Water Project

• Other major plant modifications e Oconce License Renewal Activities e man.ovu weccwauv 9 l

i DSS /NRC Meeting November 14,1996 Washington, DC DYNAMIC SAFETY SYSTEMS APPLICATION PROJECT l

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+ OUTLOOK FOR PROJECT

- Continue to interest other utilities in benefits of the DSS project

- Duke continues to allocate resources to this project

- Oconee will replace the existing RPS due to obsolescence

- Non-participation of DOE has be a determining factor on interest and schedule

- Competing near term requirements for Oconee resources and priontics will also be a major factor

- License Renewal Activities and strategy may impact IAC Upgrade programs

- Deregulated Industry concerns influence short term planning i

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. receipt of a variety of analog inputs (hardware)

. detection of the state ofvolt-free contacts, (hardware) including mode switches e representation of the above as uniform output (hardware) voltages

. flagging, via keyswitches on the front panel, of (hardware) individual faulty signals 5hde serial no 4 AEA Technology C 1996 AEA Technology plc

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. receipt of analog voltage signals from the Signal Conditioner (hardware)

. sampling of received signals (hardware) e conversion ofreceived signals to digital values (hardware) e automatic checking of ADC operation (hardware)

. detection of" flagged" signals (software)

. arrangement of plant and fixed test values into frame sequences (software)

. output of digital plant signals to the Trip Processor (hardware) e output offixed test values to the Trip Processor (hardware) e output ofdiagnostic information to network (hardware) l Slide serial no 5 AEA Technology C 1996 AEA Technology plc l

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. receipt ofdigital plant and test data (hardrvare)

. reformatting ofreceived data (hardreare) e implementation of trip functions (TAC softivare)

. transfer of trip function results between Trip Processors (hardinare) e implementation ofvote function (VAC softrvare)

. deciphering ofvote function results (VAC softsvare)

. verification ofvote function results (PRL hardrvare) e output ofdynamic signal to Actuator Drive (hardrvare)

. output ofdiagnostic information to network (hardrvare)

. display on front panel oflimited diagnostics (hardivare) i Slide serial no 5 AEA Technology C 19% AEA Technology plc l

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. receipt ofdynamic signal from the Trip (hardware)

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. provision ofdiagnostic signal to the Trip (hardware)

Processor to confinn continued operation

. provision of application-specific output (s) (hardmare) bb AEA Technology

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. programmed in Ada

. . all calculations perfonned in fixed point arithmetic

. test data exercises all trip functions, within 2 bits where possible

. test data exercises all trip function statements and branches

. all program exceptions explicitly handled in the program

. test data also exercises the exception handling mechanism

. no interrupts except those associated with exception handling

. timely program execution enforced by hardware operation b

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! = internal test data exercises all bit-wise voting combinations 1

1 internal test data exercises all vote function statements and branches e vote function accommodates planned trip demands

. all program exceptions explicitly handled in the program e timely program execution enforced by hardware operation

. vote result output to PRL only in event of timely PRL data request e diagnostic data generated in post-trip state .

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. testing of vote function fully automatic

. live values of" bypassed" plant signals available in diagnostic output

. live trip status information available in diagnostic output in post-trip conditions e support functions for TAC and VAC implemented in hardware Shde serial no 10 AEA Technology C 1996 AEA Technology plc

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TAC output board Vote algorithm computer (VAC) VAC input board Output buffer computer (OBC) VAC interface board Vote algorithm computer (VAC)

Pattern recognition logic (PRL) Pattern recognition logic (PRL)

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. channel bypass / trip capability

. on-line set point change capability

. multi-processor TAC program implementation

. flexible vote function

. single chassis Signal Conditioner / Data Collector I

Shde serial no 12 AEA Technology C 1996 AEA Technology plc

l Dynamic Safety System OPERATOR INTERACTIONS WITH DSS Presented by Brian K. Hajek The Ohio State University November 14,1996 1 The Ohio State University

h I

i Dynamic Safety System i PRESENTATION OUTLINE 1

l Control Room Interactions 1

System Security j Daily Operator interactions System Alarms i

Veto Operations i

DSS Maintenance I Channel Maintenance l Preventive Maintenance / checks

Routine Testing 4

l System Faults f

j Training A

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l Dynamic Safety System

.i CONTROL ROOM INTERACTIONS j All Control Room interactions are through the Monitoring System (Calibration Test  !

Computer (CTC)), Veto Key switches, and 4

parameter control key switches.

l l New system will reduce maintenance l t interaction, transferring power level l

. dependent S/P changes to an operator task, possibly through the use of key switches.

The Monitoring System consists of a CRT f

display and a keyboard and CRT.

l DSS faults and alarms, including valid trips, are displayed.

The operator may use the MS to diagnose faults down to the board level.

'T The MS is entirely passive relative to DSS.

No hardware failures can propagate to the DSS equipment.

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. 1 l l Dynamic Safety System SYSTEM SECURITY

! Achieved by:

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1. Using Passwords i

2. Limiting keyboard to accept minimum of data.

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! Passwords NOT needed for normal monitor l functions. '

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Passwords (two) required only for: l

! 1. Monitor Startup/ Shutdown

2. Veto operations 1

3. Changing data parameters (trip levels, test levels, ranges) or passwords

4. Alarm testing i

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! 4 The Ohio State University j

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l Dynamic Safety System i

l SYSTEM ALARMS l Trip System Equipment Faults l 4

1. Initiate CR Alarms

2. Operator acknowledges, and when I condition clears, clears the alarm.

(

! 3. One alarm line available on CR display, j but alarm page available using Hot Key, j to show all currently active alarms.

Monitor System Faults i

1. Initiates Monitor Alarm only.

i 2. Includes everything external to the trip channels.

3. No operator action required.

5 The Ohio State University

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Dynamic Safety System  ;

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VETO OPERATIONS i

, 1. Parameter channel to be vetoed is specified on the Monitor l

2. Operator uses keylock at the Amplifier / Scanner Cubicle (back panel cabinet)

3. Monitor checks veto status for all channels after time delay (scan time) and verifies that veto has been properly implemented

4. Monitor also verifies that channel has no veto implemented, or if veto is to be removed, that channel is vetoed 6 The Ohio State University

Dynamic Safety System

! CHANNEL MAINTENANCE l

1 A single safety channel can be removed for maintenance without causing a reactor j scram.

l

Either the DCS or the TACNAC/PRL functions can be powered down i independently.

At Oconee, the Signal Conditioner, Data l

Collector, Trip Processor, Actuator Drive.

7 The Ohio State University 1

Dynamic Safety System

! PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE / CHECKS i

Component by component checks are specified for performance during DSS startup.

TAC Trip Level Test Signal Generator is recommended to be tested biennially, preferably during reactor shutdowns.

A quarterly test is performed using the inhibit pushbuttons per Dungeness Tech Specs to check the voting logic and contactor operation between the PRL and trip actuators.

8 The Ohio State University l

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Dynamic Safety System i SYSTEM FAULTS '

i l All internais are tested by the software.

l The Monitoring System provides indications l

of hardware failures at the board level.

Fault alarms are displayed on the monitor.

These may deal with component faults in the DCS, TAC, VAC, PRL, monitor.

Additional alarms are provided for logic faults and improper trip patterns.

Operator response and diagnosis is through the Monitor CRT and keyboard.

Repair is typically performed by turning off the failed section, swapping out a bad board, turning the system back on, and completing the startup sequence for the failed channel.

9 The Ohio State University

Dynamic Safety System i

i l TRAINING

Development of training will follow the Systematic Approach to Training process.

I

! Task analyses will need to be performed. l l

I Training objectives will be developed.

! Training materials will be designed and developed to support the objectives.

i l Training will be performed followed by j testing against the objectives.

1 l Results of the training will be evaluated, and the materials revised accordingly if necessary.

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i Dynamic Safety System i

SUMMARY

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l DSS provides a significant amount of l software and hardware checking.

I Fail safe design prevents system with any inoperable components.

Operator interaction with DSS is minimized due to system design.

Operator interaction, except for quarterly surveillance testing, is through the DSS Monitor which provides a one way interaction that does not affect DSS operation.

l Training modules for DSS will need to be developed using the INPO/NANT approved SAT process.

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( )

. DSS OCONEE RPS REPLACEMENT

PROJECT Phase I

Cost Benefit Analysis Ian Smith l Campbell Love Associates

_ MCLA l

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( 3 ( h DSS OCONEE RPS Areas Examined - 1 REPLACEMENT PROJECT ,p , g, %

. Reduced Fuel Purchases Phase 1-Cost Benefit Analysis . Modifications to the Existing Trip Boundanes or Funcuans tan Snuth . Plant Operator Procedures and Trauung Campbell Ime Associates . Plant Operations

( ) ( )

ECLA -. ECLA

( 3 ( 3 Areas Examined - 2 Power Level Increase j

,p . Limited by Design Basis Accidents

. Spare Parts Reductims - Reduction in Instrumentation Uncensinues

- Incre.ase in the Speed of Reponse of RPS

. Standardized Product Platform

- Maximum Allowable Peeking (MAP) Factor

. License Renewal and Obsolescence issues

- Addaion of New Tnp Functions

. Limited by other plant -- -;-N+ts

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TCLA -.

ECLA I I Reduced Fuel Purchases Modifications to the Existing Trip Boundaries or Functions

. Ma '.. sum Allowable Peaking (MAP)

. Provision of New Trip Functions Facto s

- Modifications to the Existing Tnp

. Increase u. AL*.P Factors can also be Fu.uions achieved by readig calculational uncertainties . Md'ications to the Existing Tnp Boun& ries Q J Q _ ]

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( 3 r 3 Provision ofNew Trip Functions Reactor Coolant Pump Power  :

Monitor  ;

Reactor Coolant Pump Power Morutor . Two Pump Coast Down Fault i

• Delta T Trip Parameter (That vs Tcold) - Cannot Guarantec Sensor is "Failasfe"

• Additional Excore Detectors - No credit Taken for Tnp Action by Pump i Power Morutor )

- Second Fastest Acting Tnp is Flux / Flow i

- Provide Second Sensor for Pump Failure 2CLA -.

ECLA f 3 ( 3 Delta T Trip Parameter Additional Excore Detectors

. Main Steam Line Small Bn:ak Fault . Asymmetric Rod Faults

- Delta T Tnp Parameter (not Vs Teold)

- Add one more excore detector in each of the *

- Reduces Cold Water Shieldmg FEccts quadrants

- trip if any two excores go high either in two f {

diferent quadrants or m the same quadrant l

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TCLA I

I Modifications to the Existing D Modifications to the Existing Trip Functions Trip Boundaries

+ Reduction in Safety Analysis Cases l

= Avoid Unnecessary Tnp Action Following - Tnp Boundanes Determme Operating Plant C-mt Failure Envelope

-Ima of one RC Pump - Shape of Tnp Boundanes Set by Analog

. Instrumentation Constraints

- Safety Cases have to be run to cover Regions withm the Operstmg Envelope even if the j ( Regions are not entered in Normal operauon j  ;

ECLA -. ECLA l

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l Plant Operator Procedures and Plant Operations Training

• Simpler by-Pass Action Voting Logic More Robust Agamst

- Unnecessary Trips While Under Maintenance

- Tech. Spec. Requirement to Shutdown

• Improved Post Trip Analysis 1

• Improved Monitoring of Trip Parameters

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l r . 3 r 3 Plant Maintenance Spare Parts Reductions

• Reductions in:-

. Reduction in Inventory Holdmgs

- Surveillance Testmg

- Cahbration (On-Line Marutonng)

- Retesting During Outages

- Diagnostic Time

- Component Failure Rates

- Time to By-Pass Faulty Equipment y j *

-. ECLA -.

ECLA I Standardized Product Platform 3 ( License Renewal and 3 l

l Obsolescence Issues

• Adaptable to a Wide Range of Plant

• Oconee Plants Are Ocod Candidates for Designs License Renewal

• Capable of providing Enhanced

• Decision on License Renewal expected Functionality (CPC) soon

• Capable of Expansion

• Could Determine the Timing of Any

• Providing standard Interfaces to Other Replacement Projects Equipments '

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Y I Interim Results

• Power uprating under reyww

+ Move to 24 month fuel cycles under review License renewal actmties on-gomg

+ laterim results of cost benefit financial analysis on replacement of RPS at Oconee show potential payback in 2-5 years

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-Ah G4e4HM oh & 4A -es.&4+M+d e

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cc:

Mr. Gary Vine i Senior Washington Representative i Electric Power Research Institute 1 2000 L St. NW Washington DC 20036 1

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