ML20134N673
| ML20134N673 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/19/1996 |
| From: | Racquel Powell NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM) |
| To: | Calandra D AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20134N676 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-96-408 NUDOCS 9611270074 | |
| Download: ML20134N673 (3) | |
Text
1 g
- I%, f(' /b RESPONSE T yPE
! >r' ) RESPONSE TO FREEDOM OF #
x I FINAL (2nd) l l PARTI AL INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) REQUEST o^1e g) y (e...e / DOCK E T NUMBE R tSJ t/t apphcacie/
REQUESTE R Darlene Calandra ,
1 PART 1.-AGENCY RECORDS RELE ASED OR NOT LOCATED fSee checAed boxes) l l
No agency records subject to the request have been located.
No additional agency records subject to the request have been located.
l Requested records are available through another public distribution program See Cor- nts section, l Agency records sublect to the request that are identified in Appendix (es) are already available for pubhc inspection and copying at the NRC Pubhc Document Room. 2120 L Street, N.W., Washington, DC.
Agency records subject to the request that are identified in Appendix (es) are being made avadable for public inspection and copying st the NRC Public Document Room,2120 L Street, N.W., Washington, DC, in a folder under this FOI A number.
The nonproprietary version of the proposal (s) that you agreed to accept in a telephone conversation with a member of my staf f is now being made available for public inspection and copying at the NRC Pubhc Document Roon ,2120 L Street, N W., Washington, DC,in a folder under this FOI A number.
Agency records subject to the request that are identified in Appendix (es) may be inspected and copied at the N RC Local Pubhc Document Room identified in the Comments section.
Enclosed is mformation on how you may obtain access to and the charges for copying records located at the NRC Public Document Room,2120 L Street, N W., Washington, DC.
Agency records subject to the request are enclosed Records subject to the request have been referred to another Federal agencyhes) for review and direct response to you.
X Fres X You. billed by the NRC for f , totakng s 11P.70 You will receive a refund from the NRC in the amount of $
in view of N RC's response to this request, no further action is being taken on appeal letter dated , No. l PART 11. A-INFORMATION WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Certain information in the requested records is being withheld f rom public disclosure pursuant to the exemptions described in and for the reasons stated in Part 11, B, C, and D. Any released portions of the documents for which only part of the record is being withheld are being made available for pubhc X inspection and copying in the NRC Pubhc Document Room,2120 L Street, N.W , Washington, DC in a folder under this FOI A number, COMMENTS Copies of the releasable portions of the records identified on lippendix B are enclosed.
The fees for processing your request are:
1.5 hrs. professional review @ $33.30 per hr. = $50.10 g Duplication of 343 pages A $0.20 per page = $68.60 r 1 l
TOTAL = $118.70 3 c-SIGNATUME, DIRE CTOR, DiylSION OF (REEDJN O 1NFORM AIION AND PUBLICA flONS SE RVICE S
~ kt., , Y & - }L U
/
9611270074 961119 PDR FOIA CALANDR96-408 PDR CRM 464 (Part il 11-91) j
FotA NUMetiHS) DATE RESPONSE TO FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) REQUEST FOlA 408 /g y g '
(CONYlNUATION) l PART 11.8- APPLICA8tE EXikMPTIONS I Records subject to the request that are described in the enclosed Appendix (es) O are being withheld in their entirety or in part under the Exemption No.(s) and for the reason (s) given below pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(b) and 10 CF R 9.17(a) of N RC regulations.
l 1. The wethheld mformation is properly classified pursuant to Executive Order. (Exemption 1) 2, The withheld mformation relates solely to the meernal personnel rules and procedures of NRC. (Exemption 2) l l3.. The withhald information is specifically exempted from public disclosure by statute indicated. (Exemption 3) usctions 141 145 of the Atomic Energy Act, which prohibits the dirclosure of Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data (42 U.S.C. 21612165).
Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act, which prohibits the desclosure of Unclassified Safeguards information (42 U.S.C. 2167).
- 4. The withheld mformation is a trade secret or commercial or fmancial mformation that es being withheld for the reason (s) indicated. (Exemption 4)
The snformation is considered to be confidential business (proprietaryl mformation.
The mformation is considered to be proprietary information pursuant to 10 CFR 2 7904dH1).
The mformation was submitted and received m conhdence pursuant to 10 CFR 2 790 ldh 2L
- 5. The withheld mformation consists of interagency or mtraagency records that are not available through descovery dunng litigation (Exemption 5). Applicable Privilege:
Deliberative Process. Disclosure of predecisional information would tend to inhibit the open and frank exchange of ideas esser'tial to the deliberative process.
Where records are withheld m their entireN the f acts are mentricably mtertwmed with the predecisionalinformation. There also are no reasonably segregable factual q portions because the release of the f acts .. odd permit an mdirect mouiry mto tae predecisional process of the agency. !
Attorney work product privilege (Docur' mts prepared by an attorney m contemplation of litigat.on i j Attorney client privilege. (Confidential commumcations between an attorney and his/her chent.)
- 6. The withheld mformation is enempted from public disclosure because its disclosure would result in a clearly unwarranted mvasion of personal privacy (Exen stion 6)
- 7. The withheld mformation consists of records compded for law enforcement purposes and is bemg withheld for the reasonts} andicated- (Exemption 7) ;
IY I I
@j Disclosure could reasonably be expected to interfere with an enforcement proceedmg because it could reveal the scope, direction, and focus of j enforcement efforts, and thus could possibly allow recipients to take action to shield potential wronWoeng or a violatson of N RC requirements from investigators. (Exemption 7 ( A))
i Disclosure would constitute an unwarranted mvasion of personal privacy. (Exemption 7(C)) j X 1 The mformation consists of names of mdividuals and other information the disclosure of wheth could seasonably be enuected to reveal censities of conhdential sources. (Exemption 7 (D))
OTHEH l- PART li. C-DENYING OFFICIALS Pursuant to 10 CFR 9.25tb) and 'or 9.25(c) of the U $. Nuclear Regulatory Comm+ssion regulations, it has been determined that the informeGon withheld is exempt from pro-duction or disclosure, and that its production or disclosure is contrary to the pubhc interest. The persons responsible for the demal are those offtCials identified below as denying officials and the Director, D+ston of Freedom of Information and Pubhcations Seroces. Office of Administration for any denials that may oe appealed to the Executive Director for Operations (EDOL DENYING OFFICIAL TITLE 'OF FIC E RECORDS DENIED APPELLATE OFFICIAL l
Director, Office of l Mr. Guy P fSputn b estig t4 p. ADD. B X l
I l
l l PART 11. D- APPEAL RIGHTS The d)nial by each danymg official identified in Part ll.C may be appealed to the Appellate Official identified there. Any such appeal must be made in writing within 30 days of receipt of this response. Appeals must be addressed, as appropriate, to the Executive Director for Operations. to the Secretary of the Commission, or to the inspector General, U.S. Nuclear Reguistory Commission, Washlngton, DC 20b55, and should clearly state on the envelope and in the letter that it is an " Appeal from an initial FOI A Decision?
NRC FIRM 464 (Part 2) (191) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION J
i-I Re: FOIA-96-408 l
l
! APPENDIX B l ' RECORDS BEING RELEASED IN PART 1
i l
MQi DATE DESCRIPTION /(PAGE COUNT)/ EXEMPTIONS l
- 1. 08/08/95 3xhibit 5 to ROI 2-94-036S, Transcript of Proceedings, Interview of Individual, (86 pp) l EX. 7(C)
I 2. 08/31/95 Exhibit 6 to ROI 2-94-036S, Transcript of Proceedings, Interview of Individual, (130 PP) EX. 7 (C) l 3. 08/31/95 Exhibit 7 to ROI 2-94-036S, Transcript of l Proceedings, Interview of Individual, (75 pp)
EX 7(C) i j
I i
I I
I 4
. .. . ~ . - . ~ . . ~ . . . . . . . ~ , . - - . - . . ~ - - - _ - - - . ~ . - - -
- - . . . ~ . , . ~ .
- e
'i s j p .); . .l WINSTON & STRAWN i 3' 35 WEST WACKER DRIVE 1400 L STREET, N.W. 6. RUE DU CIRQUE' !
, CHICAOO, ILLINOIS 60601 9703 75006 PARIS, FRANCE WASH.dGTON D.C.20005-3602 200 PAMK AVENUE SULAYMANiYAH CENTER l NEW YORK, NY 10166-4993 (202) 371-5700 AlYADH 11495, SAUDI ARABIA j FACSIMILE (202) 3715950 43. RUE DU RHONE 1704 GENEVA. $WITZERLAND WRITER *8 DIRECT DIAL NUMBER FOlA/PA REQUEBr
-(202) 371-5905 jg October 11,1996 Date M M db4 _ .
Action Off- 8al- . . . .
Related Case:
l Mr. Russell Powell '
Chief, FOIA/LPDR Branch
. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
~ Mail Stop T6D8 -
Washington, DC 2055$ ,
i Re:- Freedom ofInformation Act Request; Further Request Related to NRC FOIA Request Number 96-330
.I
Dear Mr. Powell:
]
On behalf ofF' .ida Power Corporation and Pursuant to the Freedom ofInformation Act j (5 U.S.C. { 552), I hereby request copies of the listed exhibits from the following documents: ,
- Investigation Report No. 2-94-036 ;
Exhibit 8: Transcribed Interview ofindividual, dated December 1,1994 Exhibit 9: Transcribed Interview ofindividual, dated December 1,1994
- Investigation Report 2-94-036S Exhibit 5: Transcribed Interview ofindividual, dated August 8,1995 Exhibit 6: Transcribed Interview ofindividual, dated August 31,1995 , l Exhibit 7: Transcribed Interview ofindividual, dated August 31,1995 l For each and any requested item (or portion thereof) that you withhold pursuant to a Freedom ofInformation Act exemption, please provide an index itemizing and describing the items withheld and individually disclosing the specific basis for the withholding. Whatever expenses may be associated with this request will be acceptable, up to a maximum of $1000.00 and for any fees or expenses incurred pursuant to this request, please forward the charges, along I
$---llf 0(S.ff~ ' i
WINSTON & STRAWN Mr. Russell Powell . l October 11,1996 j Page 2 j
- I 1
i with the requested records and information, to my attention at the above address. In order to accelerate this process, please use the enclosed prepaid Federal Express manifest and send the - j
! requested documents to us via Federal Express Priority Overnight Service. Ifyou have any ]
. questions, please contact me at the number indicated above.
i l Sincerely, i n
/
I Darlene L. Calandra
} Legal Assistant i
i I
s I
d 2
1 1
4 l
4
'1 4
4 J
i I
i 4
4 i.
f i
1 l
e i
i i
l i
EXHIBIT 5 i
i i
4 i
i i
i e
1 i
I: ?r::. ;.;*:., h " . . . ,*l',d ?::5 dit*cd
- i;r caufr.0..t n t;i 'n0 dam of informai!on is.L_ESPl' iO!A .
'*$'$M_I_-
~ ,b' .
5 Case No. 2-94-036S EXHIBIT 5
~Cj G l OffD~f7n~~
GfHetal Transcript of Proceedings ,
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
- 1
- i
Title:
Interview of Mark Van Sicklen
! l
- Docket Number
- 2 94-03P- l i
! Location: Crystal Rive'r, Florida 1
i .
l Date: Tuesday, August 8,1995 t
i i
Work Order No.: NRC-298 Pages 1-85 i
4 NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
^
Court Reporters and Transcribers E)(HIBIT I --
{ 2-94 -036 1323 Rhose Island Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005 PAGE__ / -OF_77 PAGE(S)
! (202) 134 4433 9
- y , -*
^
~ -
/r f-
. 1 )
1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA !
.2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l i
4
, 3 + ++++
4 OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS !
5 INTERVIEW 6 ----------------------------------x !
J 7 IN THE MATTER ~OF: :
8 INTERVIEW OF : Docket No.
9 MARK VAN SICKLEN : (2-94-036) !
10 :
i 11 ------------
s--------------------x 12 Tuesday, August 8, 1995 13 14 Conference Room - Second Floor i
15 Florida Power Corp. Admin Bldg. ,
- 16 Crystal River Plant i
17 3745 N. Tallahassee Roao 18 Crystal River, Florida 19 20 The above-entitled interview was conducted at 21 1:54 p.m.
22 BEFORE: .
23 JAMES DOCKERY Senior Investigator 24 JIM VORSE Senior Investigator 25 CURT.RAPP Reactor Engineer NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSO40ERS 1323 RMODE ISLAND AVENUE, N W.
(202) 2344433 WASHINGTON, D C. 20006 ~ Gof) 2344433
- - . . . _ _ . - _ - . _ - . . - - - . - . . . . - . . ., . . ~
t 1 APPEARANCES:
2 On Behalf of the Nuclear Regu?.atory Commission 3 JAMES DOCKERY,-Senior Investigator 4 JAMES VORSE, Senior Investigator 5 Region II NRC Office of Investigations 6 401 Marietta Street 7 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 ,
)
8 9 CURTIS RAPP 10 Reactor Engineer - NRC, Region II 11 6745 N. Tallahassee Road 12 Cif,stal River, Florida 32629 t
13 14 .
15 On Behalf of the Interviewee 16 BRUCE H. MORRIS, ESQUIRE ;
17 Finestone & Morris 18 Suite 2540 Tower Place 19 3340 Peachtree Road, N.E.
20 Atlanta, Georgia 30326 21 22 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS ,
COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRISERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
(202) 23M433 WASHINGTON D C. 20006 (202) W
i d
1 1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S '
I I
2 MR. DOCKERY: For the record, my name is 3 James D..Dockery. 'I'm a Senior Investigator for the 4 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Investigation.
5 The date i;s August 8th, 1995. The-time is approximately 6 1:54 p.m. The location of this interview is the --
7 MR. VAN SICKLEN: Site Admin Building.
8 MR. DOCKERY: -- Site Admin Duilding --
9 MR. VAN SICKLEN: Crystal River.
10 MR. DOCKERY: -- for the Crystal River 11 Nuclrear Plant, Crystal River, Florida. The inquiries 12 we're considering here -- or under consideration Lere I
today pertain to OI Investigation Number.2-94-036.
i 13 14 And I'd like to identify the other 15 . participants of this interview today, starting with Mr.
1 16 Vorse.
17 MR. VORSE: My name is James Vorse, V-O-R-S-18 .E. I'm with the Office of Investigations, U.S. NRC, 19 Atlanta, Region II.
20 MR. DOCKERY: Mr. Rapp? l 21 MR. RAPP: My name is Curtis W. Rapp. I'm a 22 Reactor Inspector for Region II, NRC.
23 MR. DOCht :'Y : And Mr. Morris?
24 MR. MORRIS: I'm Bruce H. Morris and I'm here 25 representing Mr. Van Sicklen.
NEAL R. GROSS ;
COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRISERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE N W.
(202) 234 4433 WASHINGTON, D C. 20006 (202) N J
.s 1 MR. DOCKERY: Mr. Van Sicklon, wa'll have you 2 identify yourself further after I administer the oath.
3 MR. VAN SICKLEN: Yes, sir.
4 MR. DOCKERY: Will you stand and raise your 5 right hand, please.
6 MR. VAN SICKLEN: Yes, sir. (Complies.)
7 WHEREUPON, 8 MARK EDWARD VAN SICKLEN,
, 9 being first duly sworn by the Investigator, was examined 10 and testified as follows:
11 ,
MR. DOCKERY: Thank you. Please be seated.
12 THE WITNESS: (Complies.)
13 MR. DOCKERY: Now, would you fully identify 14 yourself for the record and including the spelling of your 15 name.
16 THE WITNESS: Mark Edward Van Sicklen. M-A-17 R-K E-D-W-A-R-D V-A-N S-I-0-K-L-E-N.
18 MR. DOCKERY: And, Mr. Van Sicklen, would you 19 give us your date of birth and Social Security number, 20 please.
21 My THE WITNESS: Qorn 22 Social Security number is i 23 MR. DOCKERY: Mr. Van Sicklen, before we went 24 on the record today I provided you with a copy of the 25 wording of Title 18 of the United States Criminal Code, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
(202) 234 4433 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20006 m (202)
/(. /d Kf W :
.- .~. - . _ . . __ -._ . . - --.-.. . -. _ .. -. - _ .. - ~ . -. - . .
6 1 licanza?
2 THE WITNESS: Since December 12th, 1990.
3 MR. VORSE: Would you describe your duties ks 4 you use that license?
5 THE WITNESS: My duties as chief nuclear 6 operator are twofold. One is on the control board to 7 operate the control panel. The other-is out on the 8 clearance desk writing-clearances for the shops.
9 MR. VORSE: I want to you to give me a lot of 10 Ldetail on this.next question, as best you can remember.
11 Okay? .
12 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
13 kR. VORSE: We need to know your involvement 14 in the makeup tank evolution that was conducted, we 15 understand, on September 4th'and September 5th, 1994, 16 during the midnight' shift. And we're. talking about'the 17 evolution for the makeup Lank.
18 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
19 MR. VORSE: What do you recall about both of 20 those evolutions? We'll start with September 4th.
21 No. Let me back up. Let's go back to 22 September 2nd when Mr. -- I believe it was Mrs Bergstrom 23 told one of you people, it might have been you, that we're j 24 going to close out the makeup tank curve issue.
25 THE WITNESS: They presented us that f
NEAL R. GROSS coum nenerEas me ramscaeEas 1333 RMOCE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
(202) 2364433 WASMWGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) M
?
j 1 Szptember 2nd lotter. Wa cctunlly received it that night, 2 I guess.
3 MR. VORSE: Would you describe all of the ,
4 4 events' subsequent-to that September -- You know, the i
j 5 September 2nd letter dated -- was a letter dated September
] 6 2nd, and in detail just give me the story all the way up i
7 through the 5th of September evolution. Can you do that.
< 8 for me?
f 9 THE WITNESS: I will try. It's been hard to ,
l
~
10 remember all the facts. I will give you everything I 11 know.
12 MR. VORSE: The best you can. Best you'can, 13 S'HE WITNESS : Best I can.
l 14 MR. VORSE: And when you use names, give me i
i
- 15 last names, not first names. And I need to know what ,
l 16 interaction you had with other members of the shift, what 17 you looked at, what your discussions were. So just i .18 picture in your mind the whole -- just like a movie, the
- 19 whole thing from start to finish.
The September 2nd letter came 20 THE WITNESS:
i 21 out. We came in on watch. I believe the day was I 22 September 3rd for our first midnight.
i 23 Since it was the midnight shift, I don't 24 suppose Carl Bergstrom specifically handed me the letter.
4
- 25 I think we got a copy of it. I think it was actually i
NEAL R. GROSS 1
' COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRISERS 1323 MH00E ISLAND AVENUE. N.W.
WASHNW370N, D.C. 20006 (202) 2344433 (202) 2364433 l
U I hnndgd to Dava Fields, the shift sup3rvicor, because ha 2 had on the top of it write any comments and give them back 4
3 to me. And he'd made me a copy of the letter. And I 4 believe I received that on September 3rd.
5 We read the letter. I can't think of anything 6 specific that I remember from December 3rd. I know I 7 .probably had -- The same problem now, I can't remember 8 specifics. I probably had some discussion with probably i 9 Rob Weiss as he went in and out to get coffee. My desk is 10 right outside the Control Room as you go'into our Break J
11 Room where the coffee machine is.
12 I can't remember anything more on December 13 3rd.
14 I think it was December 4th --
15 MR. MORRIS: December or September?
16 THE WITNESS: September. I'm sorry.
17 September 4th that I caught Rob Weiss over in fn nt of my
- 18 desk.
i 19 MR. VORSE: And Rob Weiss is?
I
~
20 THE WITNESS: The assistant shift supervisor 21 on the unit. And I was the one that brought it up to him.
I 22 I carried this concern, the concern that I've had over the 23 makeup tank level of pressure, for a while. And it --
- 24 What I did led up to the problem report 149 that got 25 issued from that May draft that I gave you last time on NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRISERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N W.
(202) 2344433 WASHINGTON D.C. 20005 (202) 2 % 4433
10 1 pump and it would always flow.
2 That wouldn't happen anymore now that we were 3 keeping somewhat pressure on the makeup tank head-wise.
4 It just -- You'd open up that suction valve and it would 5 just continue to suck off the makeup tank valve. So that 6 was our first concern that we thought about.
7 Bruce also --
f.
8 MR. VORSE: Bruce Willms?
9 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
10 MR. VORSE: Please remember last names.
11 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. Mr. Willms also had 12 an Appendix R concern, in case of a fire what would 13 happen. And'he was trying a bring about the credibility 14 of having two accidents. I didn't much get involved in 15 his concern too much over that.
16 He was talking to the engineers, trying to 17 lump together both Appendix R and, I guess, Chapter 14, 18 FSAR, put accidents together where now you have an 19 accident with a fire. And he didn't get anywhere with 20 that.
21 And that concern went on. I kept bringing 22 that up. Mr. Halnon took over in January and we talked to 23 Mr. Halnon on that. And we were just starting to get into 24 -- on the curve itself just from operating the plant. It 25 wasn't followir.g exactly like the curve.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHOOE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W (202) 23 4 433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005 (202) 23 4 433 th
11 1 But it wasn't too -- The biggest concern to me 2 was the emergency boration, not being able to emergency 3 borate unless you started a second makeup pump. Unless 4 you have a problem with inventory, you're going to run out 5 of that right away.
6 And in May of 1994 we did SP-630 during the 7 outage. Our crew was on for that. I was the one reading 8 the procedure. I had two board operators, one operating 9 one ES panel makeup valves, and one operating the second 10 panel makeup valves. And we had at least half a dozen 11 SROs there with us.
12 And during that SP is when we found tha 13 biggest differential. We started the SP. We had proolems 14 with the fuel transfer canal water level, so we'd put 15 water into the fuel transfer canal, taking it out, put 16 water in, taking it out. And we'd started the SP at a 17 lower level than what the SP, from what I understand, was 18 normally run. It was normally run with 30 feet at BWST.
19 We started it with 20 feet and a BWST.
20 MR. VORSE: Did you say on the record what SP 21 stands for?
22 THE WITNESS: SP stands for surveillance 23 procedure.
24 MR. VORSE: What is a surveillance procedure?
25 THE WITNESS: It's a testing, I guess, would NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHOOE ISLAND AVENUE, N W.
(202) 234 4433 WASHINGTON. D C. 20005 (202) 2; 4 433
12 1 b2 tha b30t ntma for it. A testing proceduro. We surveil 2 equipment to make it operable.
3 If you took a pump and rebuilt it, before you i 4 can exit your action statement on the pump there would be !
1 5 a certain surveillance procedure you would do on that pump
- l 6 to prove its operability.
7 And this surveillance procedure that I'm )
8 talking about, SP-630, is one done on an 18-month to two- l l
9 year frequency and it surveils the full flow of the high 10 pressure injection pumps., the makeup pumps.
11 You bring the makeup pumps up to 540, their 1
12 rated fiow, during the surveillance to show that they can 13 make it to their rated flow. And you do that with the 14 head off the core sucking.from the BWST, the borate water 15 storage tank, and you flow at 540 gallons, and it just J
16 comes out the head of the core into the transfer canal.
17 During that evalution I wrote four 18 discrepancies up. One of which was'directly related to we 19 started with 70 inches in the makeup tank at approximately 20 12 pounds of hydrogen overpressure, way below the curve, 21 and it went right to the curve, a few dots over the curve.
22 And we thought that was very unusual. We 23 didn't expect that response. It took the makeup tank all 24 the way down to 18 inches because of how low the BWST was.
'25 And all the time we were trying to feed to the makeup tank NEAL R. GROSS count nearrns ANo TnANsensens 1323 RHOOe 18 LAND AVENUs, N.W.
(204 2364433 WASH 6NGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 2344433
13 l
1 trying to g in lovel, but the b2st wa could feed at was 2 150 gallons a minute. And we were taking out of it at 540 4 l
-3 gallons a minute.
4 So it was a losing battle. By the time we got 5 to the third makeup pump we'd realized it and we stopped feeding altogether and just let it go down to whatever it 1
6 7 was going to equalize between the makeup tank and the l 8 BWST, because they both hooked to the suction of the pump.
9 And then --
10 MR. MORRIS: Give you a hundred bucks if you 11 understand that.
12 MR. VORSE: Go ahead.
13 THE WITNESS: If I'm getting in too much l
14 detail, I don't mean to. I'm trying to let you know 15 everything I can. I'll try not to bore you.
16 During that evolution we noticed a big l
17 discrepancy over what the curve shows and what's happening 18 on the plant. And we brought that back up to Halnon. And 19 Dave Jones was the administrative shift supervisor.
20 Halnon said, talk to Dave. And Dave arranged a meeting.
21 The first problem report 149 got written over 22 that. It was -- We also had to trip a pump during that 23 evolution because it cavitated. We had to back up and 24 flow and shut a pump off and then continue on.
25 And I forget what the fourth procedure NEAL R. GROSS CDURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRISERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
(202) 2M WASHINGTON. D.C. 20006 (202) M
14 1 discrepancy. :I have thsm all that I wrote up that night.
2 And my shift supervisor signed it and we sent them over to 3 Dave Jones, who was in-charge of the procedures, to say, 4 hey, you know, this one didn't run how we planned, 5 something is wrong here.
6 Dave Jones arranged a meeting. Again, I've 7 had 8 -- Between that time and the time he arranged the meeting 9 of July 19th the engineers had come and talked to me on 10 several different occasions, me and Bruce Willms, trying 11 to explain the response that we were getting.
12 ,
And every time they'd come up with something, 13 me and Bruce 'would give the:. something -- me and Mr.
14 Willms would.give them something more. And they'd go back 15 and they kept looking into it.
16 And we felt, okay, they're working on it.
'17 We'll juFt keep letting the. Work on it.
18 July 19th Dave Jones set'up a meeting between 19 Carl -- well, between me, Mr. Willms, Mr. Hinman, who was 20 a system engineer, and Mr. Steve Roe, who at the time, I 21 think, was an Operations engineer.
22 MR. VORSE: Who was the last name?
23 THE WITNESS: Roe, R-O-E.
24 MR. VORSE: Thank you.
25 THE WITNESS: Steve Roe. He'd spent some NEAL R. GFU3SS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRISERS 13lt3 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N W.
(2Gt) 234-4433 WASHINGTON. D.C. 2206 (202) 23N
15 I tima as a shift technical cdvisor. And Carl Bergstrom_ cat i 2 in'as.-- to lead the' meeting. And-we turned over 3 everything that we could to.the two engineers there.
4 We had taken the graph that I'd given you back 5 in December, the May loth graph, and we took OP-103. And t
6 from all the makeup pump runs, we had to run the makeup 7 pumps because we tripped one four times. Three makeup 8 pumps, one got run twice because we had to trip it for 9 air. ,
t 10 And we plotted all those where it started and 11 where it finished on the OP-103, and we gave them to them
- 12 showing that we were starting way under here, but' it 13 seemed to keep going to the curve, like it would cross i 14 over the curve.
15 Out of that their action items that Carl i 16 Bergstrom assigned the system engineers -- I say system 17 engineers. I don't know what Steve Roe's title au the i 18 time. I think it was Operations engineer. Both of those 19 two were going to go back and independently review the- '
l
, 20 calculation that came up with the curve. And that's all l
!- 21 we got out of that. That's all. That ended and we went i 22 on our separate ways.
23 I never got any feedback out of that back to 24 me. I went back to Carl Bergstrom and said, I haven't 25 heard anything over what's going on with this, what's the NEAL R. GROSS coum = - = A,e rm ca.u m 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
WASH 4NGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 234 4433 (202) 2344433
+
16 1 progrecs. And I did the same with Grsg Halnon. I brought 2 him in there when I was getting off shift and showed him ,
3 that, hey, I'm still not getting any feedback here, can 4 you help me get some feedback.
5 And I still --
1 6 MR. DOCKERY: Excuse me. When did the 1 7 conversations with Mr. Bergstrom and Mr. Halnon that's i
l 8 referred to take place?
1 I 9 THE WITNESS: Sometime between July 19th and l 10 September 3rd. I don't have specific dates. That left us l
l 11 up to the September 2nd letter that we got. l l 12 I think one comment that I think Carl -- but i i
13 I'm not even'sure who told me the comment --
that the ;
14 engineers had reviewed the calculations. They didn't 15 independently redo the calculations, but they'd reviewed 16 them.
17 So when the sep ember 2nd letter came, i
L 18 somewhere between July 19th and September 2nd Mr. Willms, 19 who was on a different shift from me now, basically he'd 20 lost all concern. He just -- He was very frustrated. I 21 was frustrated. We were both frustrated that we kept 22 trying to bring it up. It didn't look like we were 23 getting anywhere.
24 He basically just dropped it and said, I'm I
25 done, I don't want to pursue it anymore. I'm just going L NEAL R. GROSS COURT MEPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE !$ LAND AVENUE, N.W (202) 234 4433 WASHINGTON, D C. 20005 (202) 2W
1 17 !
1 to operate the board.
2 MR. RAPP: Did Mr. Willms give a reason for 1
3 dropping it?
! 4 THE WITNESS: His words to me and other
[
i 5 operators was basically he was told, just' shut up and
- 6 watch the board, it's not a big deal.
7 MR. DOCKERY: Did he say who told him that?
8 THE WITNESS: I don't think anybody i
9 specifically. That's why I said those were Bruce Willms' 10 -- the feeling that~ Bruce Willms got from whichever, from i
- 11 -- The last time we'd gotten together was July 19th and.I 12 .w as on a aifferent shift. And he just dropped it and felt 13 that we just'do our job.
1 14 MR. DOCKERY: Was there an event that 15 occurred July 19th that caused it to be specific in your
.i 16 mind? Was it the meeting you had?
17 THE WITNESS: It was just the meetiaJ, the
- 18 E-mail that --
i 19 MR. DOCKERY: I see.
20 THE WITNESS: -- he'd gotten back to me that 21 I just remember it was July 19th that we had the meeting.
22 Carl Bergstrom had written his complaint also.
23 MR. VORSE: But he decided to drop the whole 24 matter much later on, right? Didn't he get involved in 25 some kind of -- not evolution, I guess evolution --
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRl8ERS l 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N W.
(202) 2344433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 ( 4 2364433
18 1 THE WITNESS: Who 13 hn?
2 MR. VORSE: Willms.
3 THE WITNESS: Mr. Willms?
4 MR. VORSE: Didn't he kind of get involved in 5 --Didn't he do some -- The reason that he dropped the 6 issue was because wasn't he kind of conducting some.little 7 evolutions to --
8 THE WITNESS: I didn't know about any 9 . evolution he'd done until he talked to me in December. )
10 And that's when I found out that sometime.in July he'd 11 conducted an evolution similar to what we did. And he had 12 brought that data back to Mr. Bergstrom and shown it to 13 Mr. Bergstrom.
. 14 MR. VORSE: When did he show that, do you.
15 know? In July?
16 THE WITNESS: In July, I assume.
17 MR. VORSE: Okay. Did he show that data to 18 you?
19 THE WITNESS: He didn't show that data to me. l i
20 I had no idea. And.even in what -- With me talking to him 21 I didn't get that from him. All I got was, I'm done, I'm 22 frustrated enough that I'm just going to shut up and watch 23 the board.
24 That was about where I was at when the July --
25 September 2nd letter came out. And like I told you in NEAL R. GROSS i munt womas mo TamscaeEas l 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE. N.W. j I
(202) 234 4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 2344433 i
20
.1 And all along Pat Board, the president,
-2 everybody, we'd just gone through empowerment training.
3 And they sit there and tell you, you know,.if you think 4 you've'got something and you're right, don't just let it
-5 drop. 'That's the wrong thing to do. Keep -- Keep going 6 .and keep trying to go through the channels to get it done 7 right.
8 And that's all I did. I tried. I talked to 9 Management. There was nothing done that - .I just kept 10 trying to go through my supervisors, it'd almost gotten 11 out of the shift supervisor realm and I was talking 12 directly with the manager, Frank Halnon.
13 NR. DOCKERY: I believe you used tne term a 14 problem to'the plant. What -- Could you be'more specific 15 for us, why was it a problem'for the plant,'in your mind?
16 What could have been the outcome.of the y 17 problem?
18 THE WITNESS: The outcome of'the problem, we 19 didn't know where that curve would end up. If it -- What 20 was presented to us was that curve was just a pressure 21 volume relationship, a P-1, V-1 equals P-2, V-2.
22 And it's just like you take the water level in 23 your cup and you bring it to a certain level with a 24 pressure and you drain the level down halfway, physics has 25 pressure goes to a certain value.
NEAL R. GFH3SS coum aerommas ANo nwescaissas 1323 MH00e ISLAND AveNUs. N W.
(202) 234 4 433 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20006 (202) 2344433
21 1 And that's all that that tank should have buen 2 doing. And if it doesn't follow that relationship, then 3 there's something wrong.
4 MR. VORSE: What are the consequences of that 5 something wrong?-
6 THE WITNESS: The consequence if it's allowed 7 to cross over that curve, the end point we don't know 8 where it would be. And I -- We still don't know where the 9 end point will be.
10 We brought it down to 55 inches. And on the 11 worst case data, which is what we used for our problem 12 report, think we used 1.7 pounds, the recorder showed 13 less than that.
14 And we tried to get -- Now I'm getting ahead
-15 of the story. But'we ended up writing a short term 16 instruction, the assistant. I say we. The assistant 17 shift supcevisor -- I don't even know whether it was Rob !
18 Weiss or Rob Stevens -- wrote one to state two pounds
-19 under the curve. And then Engineering came back and said,.
20 no, let's state two and a half pounds.
21 And we've written E-mail -- Rob Weiss wrote 22 E-mail, he sent me a copy, that somehow we've got to 23 interpolate this down to zero where you expect that tank 24 would go on an accident to see what kind of margin we have 25 there, because the end result would be if you don't have NEAL R. GFU3SS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRSERS 1323 MH00E WLAND AVENUE N.W.
(202) 2*d adii WASHINGTON, D C. 20006 (202) N
22
-1 cnough mnrgin, that you'd got hydrogan into your pump and 2 the pump would break.
3 MR. VORSE: And if the pump broke, what would 4 happen?
5 THE WITNESS: You'd lose one-half of your ECS 6 train for your H valve. And that's not --
7 MR. MORRIS: In English what's the result or 8 the consequence of that happening?
9 THE WITNESS: You take your safety margin of 10 the plant where you have two trains and you cut it down to 11 just one.
You take away 50 percent of your --
12 ,
MR. DOCKERY: In your mind --
13 THE WITNESS: -- high pressure injection.
14 MR. DOCKERY: -- was the entire issue somehow 15 safety related?
16 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. That pump there, we 17 didn't know -- if it didn t follow that curve, we weren't 18 assured of the end point. And if the end point was over 19 that curve and it surpassed -- I know from reading the 20 calculations we had a two-foot safety margin, which is 21 only a pound or something. Plus, they had other -- We'd 22 gotten the calculations that night, and I'll get into 23 that.
24 But from all the assumptions we didn't know 25 whether there would be enough safety margin to protect NEAL R. GFK)SS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSQWSERS 1323 RHODE 68 LAND AVENUE, N.W.
(202) 2M WASHINGTON. O C. 20006 (202) 2M
23 j 4
1 that-pump. And that pump going cway is a cafety, beenuse 2 that is a safety pump. That's its only function. It sits i
3 there in standby. '
i 4 MR. DOCKERY: Up until September the 2nd is 5 it fair to say that you felt you were encountering some 5 6 kind of resistance in going forward with the issue of the 7 curve?
8 THE WITNESS: I don't know whether it was a 9 resistance or just they were as frustrated as I.
10 MR. DOCKERY: Who is they?
11 THE WITNESS: Mainly, I think it was Pat i
12 Hinman, the assistant engineer. He's the one I kept
~
13 talking to. 'It was his sy tem for the makeup system. And l
14 it was -- I don't even think it was his calculation. I 15 think it was a calculation we paid somebody to do.
1 16 MR. DOCKERY: That had been contracted for 17 outside of --
18 THE WITNESS: Of Florida Power, I believe.
19 And then I think -- And I don't even know who he is. I 20 know his name, Mr. Clauson. I can't even tell you who he 21 is. But his name -- He, I guess, reviews this calculation 22 when we get it.
23 But I kept bringing it to the system engineer, 24 Pat Hinman. And my manager, Halnon, you know, don't let 25 this thing drop, it's something that we're just not NEAL R. GROSS coum aEpomEns um Twsem- .:
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N W.
(202) 2:k4433 WASHtNGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 2344433
24 4
- 1 fooling vary comforteble with. And thst's where it was. ,
i 2 So on that I'll get back to my story of l L '
l 3 September 4th.
l 4 MR. VORSE: All right. Yeah. - You stopped.
5 You were having a meeting. .I guess you were --
6 THE WITNESS: Rob Weiss. l
)
7 MR. VORSE: -- talking it over with Mr.
i- 8 Weiss. Yes.
9s THE WITNESS: And I mentioned, hey, let's --
10 can we put this right on.the curve and bleed. water out and J
11 just see what the response is and give that as feedback l
12 back to Engineering.
13 MR. VORSE: How would you do that?
}
~
14 THE WITNESS: We'd plot it and just give it E15 to them.
16 MR. VORSE: -How would you plot it?
17 THE WITNESS: He was going to get it -- At 18 the time I wasn't sure. You're getting ahead on -- His 19 idea of the best way to do it was to get it from the plant 20 computer, the plant computer.
21 Rob at the time -- I still can't do it, but 22 there's a way to go into -- The plant computer looks at 23 all the data points and it puts it into this program 24 called REDAS. And I don't know what that stands for.
25 It's recall of data.
NEAL R. GROSS coum nEmmas ANo rnaNscaseEns 1323 nHOOE ISLAND AVENUE. N W.
(202) 2344433 WASHINGTON D.C. 20006 (202) 2364433 l
_ ,. _. ._. . , _ . . _ . _ ~ . . _ _ . . . _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . . _ . . . . _ . _ - . _ . _ _ . _ . . _ _
25
- j. 1 And you go back in cnd you pull out that point-4 4
2 and say, well, what did that point do from this time to !
! 3 this time.
4 i.
And Rob Weiss was real good with it.
4 He's a -
5 - He's very good with computers. He's able to take that i
~6 . stuff and put it on graphs. And he was one of the best i.
. 7 that we had in~the department. He was actually at the
! 8 time writing the manual for everybody to follow on how to :
9 do that,;how to take raw data and' set up an excel-p
!' 10 spreadsheet and come out'with a graph.
- 11 ,
So he went in and. talked to the shift ,
I 12 supervi,or,-Dave Fields. Sometime they'd come.back and I-j 13 think Rob was the one, Rob Weiss, come out and give'it to j 14 me and said, hey, let's go talk to Dave Fields what you i
i 15 want to do, he's got the letter,'too.
l
! 16 And I explained to Dave Fields -- You know, he l 17 -knew I was boncerned.over :he makeup. tank. level pressure
[n 18 and that I was talking with-Halnon and other. Management j 19 and Engineering officials.
20 And he thought.about my suggestion and he 21 ' decided that we could do it. And we looked at the OP.
i' 4
i 22 'MR. DOCKERY: OP being?
1: 23 1THE WITNESS: OP-402. That.would give us the i, - 24 guidance.
That was the procedure we'd use. And he'saw f' - 25 .'nothing wrong with going'from 86 to 55.
NEAL R. GROSS couar aEmuns um nweeneEas
< 1333 mMODE WLAND AVENUE N.W.
.: (302) 3364433 WASHINGTON. D.C. 30006 - (302) 33 6 4 .--.
i
,- - ~ r 4 , - ~ ,, .,, - . , . . , - . . m-- .-. . - . . - - -
1 26
.1 1 I didn't ovan coma up with values. You know, 2 I was -- I wanted to put it up and bleed it. And then 3 we'd go in.there and talk in, you know, what are the 4 limits' . He said, oh, well, 86 to 55. And that's where it 5 came out to be on 86 or 55, because those were their 6 limits on the procedure for the tank water level.
7 So we looked at OP-402. Jack and Christine 8 were the board operators.
l 9 MR.'DOCKERY: Names, last names.
10 THE WITNESS: Jack Stewart and Christine l
11 Smith, Rob Weiss, Dave Fields, and myself were all in the i 12 Control Room. ,
We pulled out OP-402 and looked at it. I 13 think Jack pulled out AR that goes with the makeup tank.
14 MR. VORSE: Would you explain AR. Explain 15 AR.
16 THE WITNESS: Annunciator response procedure.
17 MR. VORSE: And who pulled that?
18 THE WITNESS: I believe it was Jack Stewart.
19 And we looked to see whether or not we-had 20 procedure guidance to do what we wanted to do.
21 And Dave determined that, hey, you know, 22 that's 23 -- we have a procedure, we can use the procedure. The 24 alarm, at the time there was two ways of putting hydrogen l 25 into the tank to get the value that we'd been running with NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRISERS 1323 RNODE ISLAND AVENUE, N W. ,
WASHINGTON, D.C 20006 (202) 2 % 4433 (202) 234 4433 l
27 1 for tha pact 18 months. Ona -- Bscauco the rcgulator was 2 limited. The regulator was limited to 19 pounds.
3 One was to bleed the water down in the makeup 4 tank, add hydrogen, and then compress it. And the other, 5 which they just changed the procedure because a lot of the 6 people were using, and they put in the procedure to cover 7 what they were doing, was to go up and bypass the 8 regulator so that now you'd have 50 pounds available to 9 you. And you'd bring it up to the curve.
10 And the alarm would sometimes be in and out.
11 The alarm wasn't a surprise. We've taken a watch before 12 with the alarm in. We do the same thing when you fill the 13 SW surge tank. When you fill the SW surge tank, you have 14 a 15-pound band. When you close the valve, sometimes it 15 takes ten pounds worth for that valve to go closed and the 16 alarm comes in.
17 The same with tne emergency feed tank level 18 alarm. When you fill it, if you hit the high level alarm 19 at it, the alarm would stay in.
20 Nobody considered that if you did it during 21 the evolution to fill the tank, that you'd pick up the AR 22 and turn around and drain the tank back out. It would 23 just sit and go away by itself. That was within the power 24 of almost the board operators to make that determination, 25 followed by the shifter, because we have to call out every NEAL R. GROSS COUf17 7" f : 51f HS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE leLAND AVENUE. N W.
(202) 2344433 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20005 (202) 234-4433 l
~
i 28 .l 1 alarm that comes in. If he's got any question, you 2 explain it to him.
3 So the alarm being in before, it wasn't 4 questioned whether or not the alarm -- if we got the i
5 alarm, we looked at what we needed to do. But having the ]
l 6 alarm in was basically a call for the shift supervisor.
7 And Dave Fields made that call that, hey, we l 8 can go from 86 to 55, we'll gather the data between that !
9 level and then we'll c rrect the alarm. If the alarm is 10 in at that point, we'll just raise the level back up and 11 see whether the alarm clears.
I think that's what Jack l
12 did on the 4th. ]
4 13 Getting into --
. 14 MR. VORSE: ' Jack? l 15 THE WITNESS: Jack Stewart. Getting back to ;
s 16 what I remember of the 4th, we discussed what we were
^
17 going to do. Jack Stewart called the Aux Building 18 operator, let him know. And he added hydrogen.
19 And all I did was observe. I don't even know 20 whether I stayed in the Control Room the whole time. But 21 I observed. And Chris just -- she observed, too. It's a 22 one-man operation to do the bleed and feed.
23 MR. DOCKERY: Chris is Christine Smith?
24 THE WITNESS: Christine Smith. I'm sorry.
25 Rob Weiss and Dave Fields both observed. And I don't NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRtBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
(202) 2344433 WASHINGTON. D C. 20006 (202) 2W
29 1 remember much else from the 4th. I don't recall Jack 2 having to vent at all. I think he just bled it down, fed 3 it back up, didn't need'to vent.
4 And then Rob Weiss took over trying to get the 5 data. And he was going to put the data on a curve and 6 compare it to the OP.
7 I don't even recall ever seeing the data taken 8 from the 4th. I don't know whether it was something that 9 ever got saved or shown, or whether Rob Weiss took it home 10 and tried to finish. He was doing a lot of this at-home 11 on his home computer.
12 The problem report, 267, that eventually got 13 written up, the graphs that he attached to that was all 14 done at home where he put the formula in.
15 Sometime during that weekend, and I believe it 16 was the 4th, and again, I believe -- It's so hard to try 17 .and remember ~the details of that weekend at all. It just la goes'together.
19 Rob Weiss had told me, you know, never once 20 did we go and look at the calculation itself that draws 21 that curve. But Rob Weiss had told me where I can go to 22 get it and to go get him a copy. And he told me exactly 23 what filing cabinet to go in the nuke Admin Building where 24 it was. So I was the chief. I was allowed to leave the 25 Control Room. I'm not assigned.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRISERS 1323 RHODE ISUWD AVENUE, N W.
'(202) 2344433 WASHINGTON. D C. 20006 (202) 2364433
30 1 So he sent me out. I got the security officer 2 to let me into the nuke Admin Building. And I went to the ;
3 file cabinet. I think I couldn't find it the first time.
4 Juld I called him up and he told me exactly where it was. ,
-l 5 And I went and got the calculation. There's a 6 calculation that -- an inch thick. So they -- The 7 calculation that comes up with that curve. And I brought )
8 that up to him. And I made me an extra copy so that I can 9 just sit over at the chief's desk and page through, trying j
10 to make sense of it.
11 ,
And he was looking through it. And I think -
)
12 he, out of that, got the formula because he was able to 13 actually put the OP-103 curve on his spreadsheet.
l 14 But from what I understand, the data that he'd 15 used to do on the 4th was in one-second REDAS. You have 16 your option of taking it every so often. The best you can 17 get is one second and that's only available for a short 18 period of time. Then the computer dumps all the one 19 second because that's a huge file.
20 And he'd used one-second data. And from what 21 I understand, what he got on the 4th he wasn't happy. It 22 looked like scatter points because he had so much data 23 points all over from the computer while the tank was 24 lowering in level.
25 When it came in on the 5th, Rob's the one that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRSERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
(202) 2M WASHINGTON. D C. 20006 (202) 2M
31 1 wmen't convinccd that whnt he'd gotten on the 4th was 2 anything conclusive to give to Engineering. So he wanted 3 to do it again. And that's where I came into play on the 4 5th.
5 The 4th, I don't recall doing anything except 6 for observing. I don't think I plotted. It's hard to 7 remember.
8 The 5th, I was specifically assigned to plot.
9 And I had two, one on the computer and one on the level 10 ' recorder that was in front of Jack.
l 11 And they decided to go ahead and do the same 12 as what we did on the 4th. We looked at OP-402. Jack got 13 it out and he got out the Ar.. And I think Dave Fields 14 made the comment that, you know, now this time let's -- I 15 don't even know whether it was a different Aux Building 16 operator that prompted. !
I 17 But he had Jim actually dress out, or 18 somebody. I don't think it was Jim that actually did the l 19 dressing out. But somebody over in the Aux Building 20 actually dressed out to stand by to vent the tank at his 21 order, whenever he wanted to.
22 They pumped up. And we'd left the hydrogen
! 23 gas just a little bit below the curve,-I believe, and let 24 it stabilize to come to the curve, or whatever he wanted.
25 And then they bled from 86 to 55. And he was calling out NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRSERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE N.W.
I (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 234 4433 l
l
32 I 1 tha dste pointo for ma to plot on th2 curve. )
1 2 He went to 86 to 55. The alarm came in during l l
3 that. I think he waited there for a period of time to let l 4 it stabilize so that when Rob would get his data this time i 1
5 off the computer, it wouldn't be changing so much right ]
6 away, that he'd be able to say, okay, this is the data i l
7 from what we did, and not get any data from going back up ll 8 or coming back down.
1 9 So we did basically the same thing, go from 86 10 to 55. And then Jack restored the level and he had Jim l
11 vent some of the gas off. And that was it on the 9th. U 12 Rob Weiss had taken that data home again. I 13 don't know whether I saw any data, whether he had the ,
1 14 chart there at all on the 5th. The 5th was -- All this i
15 was Saturday, Sunday, and the 5th was actually a Monday.
16 It was Labor Day. So it was a holiday, so it was still j l
17 like a weekend. l 18 I don't recall when I first got the data back 19 from him, whether it was that night later, or whether it 20 had just been the next day. He'd gone home and put it on 21 his home computer, put it on a spreadsheet.
22 Sometime between the 5th and the 7th, the 7th 23 morning I know he had color graphs where he had actually 24 put the OP-103B curve on it and the system response, what 25 the system did as we bled.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N W.
(202) 2344433 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20006 (202) N
33 1 And he decided that, yeah, this is important 2 that -- not only to give this to Engineering, but we need 3 to write a problem report on this. This is -- This 4 doesn't look good.
5 So he decided to write -- Rob Weiss is the one 6
~
that wrote the problem report up. And he attached a copy 7 of that graph that he had made up to the problem report.
8 Yes, sir?
9 MR. DOCKERY: Mr. Van Sicklen, would it be 10 fair to say that the resulting graph, the data that you 11 all coll :ted, somehow verified the basis'for your 12 concerns?
13 THE WITNESS: I think it showed concern on-14 everybody now, that the whole point of that was to give 15 that back to Engineering, don't close this out, here's 16 more data. We think -- Not only does Mark think, now 17 everybody here on shift agrees that, you know, this is e 18 problem.
19 And, in fact, I think he talked to Paul 20 Fleming and -- !
21 MR. DOCKERY: Who is he?
22 THE WITNESS: Senior licensing engineer.
23 MR. DOCKERY: No, no, no. I'm sorry. You 24 said,-I think he talked to Paul --
25 THE WITNESS: Rob Weiss.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRieERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE. N W.
(202) 2344433 WASHtNGTON. D.C. 20006 (202) 2344433
.- - - .- . - - ...- - . _ - - -.-. - ~ . _ _ _ . . - - . - -
a.
1 MR. DOCKERY: Okay.
2 THE WITNESS: On whether or not to attach 3 that to Problem Report 149, which is the one that they i 4 were pending to close. He wanted to make it a separate I 5 one. And I think Paul Fleming is the one that told Rob, I 6 think this is important enough to write its own separate 7 problem report. l 8 So that's what we did. He wrote it up and he 9 submitted the problem report. I know the NRC resident l
10 that morning was there. And he had even gotten a copy of 11 the problem report before the site manager.
12 Either-the plant manager or the shift manager j 13 was in the Control Room. I think it might have been the ;
i 14 shift manager, because I think he's got to review all the 15 problem reports.
16 I mean, everything we'd done we felt like we'd 17 done something good and something right. And hi.s comment 18 back to -- I think it was Dave or Rob -- I -- Just 19 coincidence I was in the control room --
20 MR. VORSE: Dave Fields or Rob Weiss?
21 THE WITNESS: Right. The shift managers was, l 22 it's good to challenge Engineering. You know, give them 23 .the data. This is good.
24 MR. DOCKERY: Who said it's good to challenge 4
l 25 Engineering?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRISERS 1323 RHODE ISt.AND AVENUE N W.
(202) 234 4 433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 234-4433 i
i
35 1 THE WITNESS: The communt wts made and I'm 2 not sure whether -- I think it was Larry Moffatt. It 3 might have been Bruce Hickle. I'm not sure.
4 But everything that we'd done we thought we 5 did.right by the procedure, with the shift supervisor's 6 concurrence. And we thought it was within his power to do l
7 everything that we did. I 8 I know there has been newspaper articles 9 saying that I spearheaded this thing. And the motivation 10 has almost turned into something personal with me. And I 1
.11 assure you it's not.
12 The only motivation here was to get the curve 13 corrected. ind we thought wnat we'd done that-day was 14 good. And we gave it to the plant. I mean, we turned it 15 right ovar.
16 And everything turned into the 5th over the --
17 What got s:apled to the proclem report was the data that 18 Rob had gathered from the 5th. And I think he used one-
'19 minute REDAS to draw that curve.
20 MR. VORSE: Assuming that the -- Give you a 21 chance to catch your breath. l 22 Assuming that the -- that this curve was not a 23 design basis curve. And I believe you recognized that it 24 is and that you all didn't know that.
25 But assuming this was just, in reality, an NEAL R. GROSS muar nearnas moinescasens 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
(202) 234 4433 WAsHlNGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 2364433
JO 1 oparctionn1 curva or en cdministrntiva curve -- I've hsard 2 both terms used -- when you went into the unacceptable --
3 when you were plotting your data on the 5th and you were 4 going to the unacceptable region of the curve --
5 THE WITNESS: It's not labeled unacceptable !
1 l
6 region. It's labeled acceptable and it wasn't labeled ,
1 7 anything on the other side, and it was just a curve. I l
8 MR. VORSE: So you had acceptable on the l l
l 9 right and nothing on the left.
10 THE WITNESS: That's correct, sir.
11 MR. VORSE: And you plot your data and you )
12 see that you are on the left side of the curve. It is an )
13 administrative procedure, operative procedure, not a 14 design basis.
15 And then a annunciator goes off. Are you in 1
16 violation of anything if you fail to take action to 17 ccrrect the alarm and the fact that you are off th: curve?
18 THE WITNESS: At September 5th, 4th time 19 frame, whichever -- I keep using the 5th because the 5th 20 is where we got all the data from -- that was totally up 21 to the shift supervisor. ,
22 Like I'd explained befere, when we fill water 23 into the emergency feed tank or the SW surge tank, alarms 24 come in. And the annunciator response for them is to 25 drain the tank, vent the tank. The same with the makeup NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE. N W.
(202) 2344 433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005 (202) 234 4433
. -. - . . .. . - . - - - ~ -. . ..
a/
1 tcnk whare it says vent the tank.
2 We thought that was well within. We didn't i
3 even question the authority of the shifter because it's i 4 within'the shifter's authority.over administrative 5 procedures. OP is just general procedures. AI-500 gives !
i 6 .him the power of determining what action we needed to 1
7 take.
8 So we call off the alarm. And because even 9 that particular alarm for the makeup tank pressure had 10 been in in the past. When this first started, it was.in l
) 11 for two solid months as we raised pressure before they 1
12 evengot{.healarmchangedfroma15-poundalarm.
13 Ac were totally in agreeme".t. Nobody I i
. 14 questioned. I mean, you asked me the day I signed my 15 interview, why didn't you get that. shift manager in there.
16 And my only response back to you, even then, we didn't 17 think we n.eded the shift mtnager. We thought that was 18 totally within the power of the shift supervisor to make 19 that call as we were coming down.
20 MR. VORSE: Have you concluded your testimony 21 about September through the 5th evolution?
22 THE WITNESS: I can't'think of anything more 23 I can tell you between the 3rd and the 5th.
24 MR. VORSE: All right. I have some canned 25 questions that I'm going to ask you. Okay?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRISERS 1323 RHOOE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
(202) 23u433 WASHINGTON. D C. 20005 (202) 23 4 433
.> o 1 THE WITNESS: Yes.
2 MR. VORSE: Okay. And I asked you this last 3 time we talked, but I didn't ask you under oath. So I'm 4 going to do it under oath.
5 In either of these evolutions on 4 or 5 6 September, 1994, did anyone say, this is wrong or this is 7 not a good idea?- I'm talking about anyone on the shift or 8 anyone that you know of, period.
9 THE WITNESS: No, sir.
10 MR. DOCKERY: To put it another way, was 11 there any resistance at all that you know of to going 12 ahead with this -- conducting this evolution?
13 'UIE WITNESS : No resistance whatsoever. We ,
4 14 brought it to the shift supervisor. That would have been 15 what we all do. And that was the shift supervisor's call.
16 I know of no resistance.
17 PIR. VORSE : Lid you think it was a good call?
18 THE WITNESS: I thought it was within his 19 power. I didn't question it. It's --
20 MR. VORSE: Do you think you would have done l
21 the same thing if you were in his position?
L l
22 I know this is net a good -- probably not a 23 good question. Let's drop that question. That's --
24 -Because that's not within the scope of your license. So I v
. 25 won't ask you that question. Okay?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCR68ERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
(202) 234 4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 234 4433
JJ.
1 Did cnyono on tha chift =ny thera muy ba coma 2 procedural violations, this may be a procedural violation, 3 THE WITNESS: No, sir.
4 MR. VORSE: Something in the evolution 5 process, a procedural violation?
6 THE WITNESS: No, sir.
7 MR. VORSE: Did -- And once again, I'm going 8 to ask a repeat question from the last time we talked.
9 Prior to either evolution of the 4th or 5th of 10 September of 1994 did anyone say, we need to get advice 11 from another source, such as a shift technical advisor?
12 THE WITNESS: (No verbal response.)
13 MR. VORSE: Did anyone say that? Did anyone 14 say that, we need to get -- check with somebody else?
15 THE WITNESS: No, sir, as I just explained in 16 my last comment. And I know you asked me that even as I 17 left in January. And --
18 MR. VORSE: Okay.
19 THE WITNESS: -- even the shifter didn't 20 think that he needed to call the shift manager.
21 MR. VORSE: Okay. Did anyone say, Management 22 needs to know about these evolutions that we're going to 23 conduct? This is prior to your conduct -- prior to 24 conducting the 4th and 5th September evolutions.
25 THE WITNESS: Prior to doing the evolutions NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE N W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 234-4433
40 -!
1
-1 did cnybody cay, stop, wa need ManEgamnnt to know?
2 MR. VORSE: Management. Yeah. We need a .-
3 Management to know about this. We need to have somebody 4 check this.
5 THE WITNESS: The shift supervisor is part of
- i
- 6 Management.
7 MR. VORSE: So in your view, the shift 8 supervisor was the manager. He was the manager of the 9 whole reactor that night.
10 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
11 ,
MR. VORSE: On both nights.
12 ,
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
13 MR. VORSE: Did anyone on the shift say, 14 wait, this is a design basis curve? Did anyone say 15 something like that?
16 THE WITNESS: No, sir.
17 MR. VORSE: Do you know what 10 CFR 5 .59-is?
18 THE WITNESS: I'know 50.54 is the -- you can 19 read tech specs 50.59. Oh, that's what's in front of all 20 our procedures, a 50.59 review. That's a review that you 21 do on procedures before they get issued. Somebody does a 22 50.59.
23 MR. VORSE: Was 10 CFR-50.59 ever discussed 24 prior to or during these 4th and 5th of September, 1994, 25 evolutions?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRISERS 1323 MHOOE $$ LAND AVENUE, N.W.
(202) 2344433 WASHtNGTON. D.C. 20006 (202) N
i 41 1 THE WITNESS: No, sir.
2 MR. VORSE: Why didn't you tell us about the l
3 september 4th evolution last time we talked? I i
4 THE WITNESS: If I had thought that it was I 5 significant, that you even wanted to know, I would have l l
6 told you. I spent that whole time with you, I talked 7 almost the whole time about a safety concern. And I know 8 we started out the interview talking about whether it 9 could be confidential.
10 Even in my interview, my deposition, back on l 11 one of the pages, and we must have been an hour into it, I 1
12 made the scatement that, you know,-I'm telling you a whole i
13 bunch here on safety concern and it-seems like all you 14 want to know is the 5th.
15 And'your response is even in there. And we i 1
16 just came right off of being off the record for a while.
17 But your r2sponse was you wanted to hear everything about 18 my safety concern. You were shaking your head that, yeah, 19 I'm interested in your safety concern.
20 And I remember Mr. Curt Rapp there and his
~
21 head was, no, just September 5th. And it never even -- I 22 was under -- When you came last time, I was trying to tell 23 you about a safety concern. And I spent that whole hour 24 and a half, or whatever time I spent with you, very open 25 and honest as I am now telling you everything that I know.
NEAL R. GROSS -
COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRSERS 1323 RHOOE ISLAND AVENUE. N.W.
(202) 23M433 WASHINGTON. D C. 20006 (202) 23 4 433
42 1 And I didn't -- If I thought you wanted to 2 know about the 4th or any details, there's nothing in the .
3 4th that's worth hiding. I would have told you, there's l
4 nothing in there that I'm ashamed of. We did everything l
\
5 on the 4th the way we did on the 5th.
6 And now the way Management has put it, I don't 7 think -- I think it's very clear to the shifters there 8 that they don't have that power anymore.
9 MR. DOCKERY: Mr. Van Sicklen, I'm going to 10 ask you basically the same question, but perhaps in a more l
11 direct manner right now.
, l 12 Prior to your meeting with and interview by i
i 13 Mr. Vorse and Mr. Rapp did anyone in Florida Power, !
14 Management or attorneys, tell you specifically not to 15 discuss the events of September 4th, 1994, with the NRC?
16 THE WITNESS: The only one we've talked to --
17 Well, there'= two discussions I can bring up wi'_). that.
18 one of them was with me and Christine didn't get 19 interviewed when everybody else did. We were in Las 20 Vegas. We came back.
21 At the time the others got interviewed I think 22 Mr. Gerald Williams, the company lawyer, had met with them 23 all. Me and Christine only got to talk to him over the 24 phone. And his advice to us was to stick strictly --
25 answer any questions honestly and directly and stick to NEAL R. GROSS 03URT REPORTERS AND TRANSCNSERS 1323 MH00E ISLAND AVENUE. N.W.
(202) 2344433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 2344 433
sa 1 just tha sysnts that they're asking cbout.
2 And I think he brought up the 5th. The 5th 3 was 4 -- Everything turned into the 5th over that's the day the 5 data got used.
6 MR. DOCKERY: Do you recall him mentioning 7 September the 4th to you during that telephone call? {
l 8 THE WITNESS: No, I do not. Also, I talked -
9 -
10 MR. DOCKERY: Can you say with any degree of ]
11 certainty that he did not mention September the 4th, 1994?
12 THE WITNESS: I am almost positive his words 13 were just st1ck to the even on the September 5th and just 14 answer their questions. That's all I can remember from 15 that point.
16 I had also talked to Greg Halnon and Christine 17 had it ir her planner. It was December 5th we talked. We 18 had our interview on.the lith.
19 I had gone up when I had gotten back from Las !
20 Vegas. I'd gotten with Bruce Willms to get -- Remember
-21 when I came in, I had a whole briefcase full of f
22 information for you. He had given me everything that he 23 had gotten.
24 And in that I saw something that was similar 25 to what we'd done. And it looked like some other shift NEAL R. GROSS CXXJRT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRSERS 1323 RHODE ISLANO AVENUE, N W.
(202) 2344433 WASHtNGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 2344433
44 1
1 h d gone from 86 to 55. '
l 2 And Halnon asked me and Christine to come up 3 to his office so that he can brief us on what was -- your 1
4 interviews with everybody else. )
. 1 5 And during that he kept bringing up September l 6 5th. And I tried to say you know, this is not the only 1
7 time that this has been done, September 5th. And he 8 wasn't interested in any other time. I didn't even get to 9 show him the data that --
the graph that I'd been given by q 10 Bruce.
l' 11 Also -- I 12 MR. RAPP: Excuse me. Let me interjart here l 13 for one oecond. During that conversation with'Mr. Halnon i
14 did he come out and say, I only want to talk about the 5th 15 or I don't want to know --
16 THE WITNESS: That's the words he used. It 17 was, we're here just to talk about the 5th. That',what
+
18 you all are here for. And that all I want right now -- I 1
19 don't know what his exact words back. I know he used l~
20 September 5th, but I don't know what his exact words were.
21 He wasn't interested-in what I had.
a 22 MR. VORSE: So what was your perception of 23 what he was trying to tell you? What was your perception
, 24 of what his words were?
25 THE WITNESS: That we're here just to go in,
- NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRISERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
(200 2344433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 2344433 I
45 ]
1 answar your qu25tions that you ask us. And that's it.
2 MR. DOCKERY: At that time did Mr. Halnon 3 mention September the 4th to you?
4 THE WITNESS: No, sir. I know that Rob Weiss i 5 --And that's why the September the 4th incident just went 6 out of my mind. Rob Weiss had told Licensing, Paul I
7 Fleming, that it had happened both the 4th'and the 5th.
8 .And that was the last I ever heard of the 4th. ,
9 The 4th,.to me, it was insignificant. Everything was 10 gathered around the data that we stapled to the problem 11 report,, which was gained from the 5th.
12 ,
And I didn't even have -- If I had even known I
13 that you wanIted to hear any hing more about other l l'4 evolutions or anything else that I knew, I would have told ;
15 you. j l
16 I was trying to stick last time to a safety l l
17 concern that I had. And even my comment back again that, l 18 you know, if you're here just for the 5th, I think my 19 . comment back on that deposition was, I think you know 20 everything already about the 5th. I was your last 21 interview with you that I probably can't help you about 22 that.
23 MR. DOCKERY: Is it fair to say --
24 THE WITNESS: I'm just here on the safety 25 concern.
NEAL R. GFU3SS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRISERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
(202) 2344433 WASHINGTON, D C. 20006 (202) W
4 46 1 MR. DOCKERY: In it fair to any that the data 2 that was collected on the 4th, on September the 4th-was 3 inconclusive?
4 THE WITNESS: I believe that's what Rob 5 Weiss' words -- What I've got in my memory was scatter 6 data. And whether that was his term or somebody else's 7 term, Rob Weiss' words was he wasn't convinced of what he 8 got from the 4th, that he wanted to do it again on the
]
9 5th.
10 MR. DOCKERY: Is that what caused September 11 the 4th to be insignificant to you, or to appear 12 insignificant?
13 THE WITNESS: It was insignificant that we'd 14 already told -- We wrote the problem report, Rob Weiss y 15 did, and told everybody what we'd done.
16 The fact that we did it on the 4th and nothing ;
4 17 conclusive ecme out of it, as long as he told License 18 about it, you know, I didn't have any -- it meant nothing l .
19 to me after that. It really didn't. ,
1 20 What we focused on was the data that we had 21 gained from the 5th.
22 MR. VORSE: Did anyone ever discuss the data, 23 you know, let's not tell anybody about the 4th, or let's 1
24 just keep it kind of low key, the 4th of September issue, 25 because the data really wasn't -- you know, we looked good NEAL R. GROSS l COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRISERS 1323 RH00E ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
. (202) 2M WASHINGTON. D.C. 20006 (202) W
47 1 on ths 5th, but wa don't look co good on the 4th baccuse 1
2 the data was scattered and it didn't really come out the I 3 way we thought? Was that ever discussed?
1 4 THE WITNESS: No, sir. The data, what was i 5 gained on the 4th, I believe that. System Engineering had 6 already when he told License and they'd already pulled all 7 that data back up and looked at it. And I don't know what 8 they got off of the data on the 4th.
9 The only data I'd ever seen any time after 10 this was just the data from the 5th.
11 ,
MR. VORSE: Are you familiar with 10 CFR 1
12 50.9, completeness of information?
13 MR. DOCKERY: That's completeness and
]
14 accuracy of information provided to the NRC. j 15 MR. VORSE: Are you familiar with that?
16 THE WITNESS: Was that -- I don't know -- I 17 know the package that you sent me, I know it had 50.5 in 18 there. That's the deliberate misconduct.
11 9 MR. VORSE: 50.59 is -- If you didn't know 20 about it, then that's --
then you don't know what 50.59 21 is.
22 MR. DOCKERY: Now, let's make a distinction.
23 You said 50.59.
i 24 MR. VORSE: Yeah, I know. I caught myself.
25 It's 50.9, which is completeness and accuracy of i
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTER $ AND TRANSCReERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
(202) 2344433 WASHMGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 2344433 l
l
48 1 information. You waran't fcmiliar with that.
2 THE WITNESS: I wasn't even familiar with 3 50.5, deliberate misconduct, until --
4 MR. VORSE: Was 50.9 ever discussed amongst
, 5 members of the shift?
6 THE WITNESS: No, sir.
7 MR. DOCKERY: And again, since you've said 8 you weren't familiar with that, that's regarding the completeness and accuracy of any information that is 9
10 provided to the NRC.
11 What you're saying is that was not a concern 12 at the time of --
13 MR. VORSE: Interview.
14 THE WITNESS: If I'd anywhere thought that 15 you were looking for data or information about the 4th or 16 any other time, I would have told you. I don't -- To me, 17 it was insignificant all the way up to when my law,ar come 18 up just before pre-decisional conference and we were just 19 rambling on and we -- and it came up.
20 MR. VORSE: You -- The last time we spoke you I l
21 mentioned something about telling the resident inspectors 22 about your concerns.
23 Can you go into a little more detail -- or a 24 lot more detail on that, tell me who it was you talked to 25 and exactly what was said, and how many times.
NEAL R. GROSS couaT as- ANo Tnanscnesas 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE. N.W.
(202) 2344433 WASHINGTON D C. 20006 (202) 2344433
~ .- . . . _ . . . _ _ _. _. _. _ _ _ . _
-49 l ~
l 1 THE WITNESS: I brought my concern up to Todd 2 Cooper. He was the one that come up to the control Room 3 most.
4 MR. VORSE: When?
5 THE WITNESS: Before September 4th or 5th.
6 On four different occasions. I can't give you dates. I 7 can't give you specifics. I'd mention it to him that I 8 got this concern over this curve. And he put it on.what 9 he called his hit list, that he was going to look into it.
10 And I guess I brought it up to him on the four 11 different occasions.
And he was looking into it, looking 12 into it, looking into it, but I never got any results back 13 from him.
14 I think I told you last time that we had gone 15 off the record on one of those occasions with Todd.
l 16 MR. VORSE: Yeah. But then we got back on 17 the recora and talked ab;ut it.
18 THE WITNESS: And then --
19 MR. DOCKERY: Well, now, I think you're 20 making reference to in your last transcript you and the 21 resident inspector went off the record --
22 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
23 MR. DOCKERY: -- to discuss concerns you had.
24 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, 25 MR. DOCKERY: Actually, I kind of had a
- NEAL R. GROSS l- COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRWERS l i m R u m m u NO m HUE.N w.
l (200 234 4433 WASHINGTON, D C. J0006 (200 2M
30 1 qucation cbout that. You ware -- You considsrad it to be 2 off the record. What was said?
3 THE WITNESS: I don't -- I know the last time 4 we had'our -- there was three different occasions that you 5 wanted to go off the record and go talk down on the 6 balcony. And I would see no need to do that.
7 MR. VORSE: Well, we were discussing 8 confidentiality.
9 MR. MORRIS: No. He's asking you now --
10 THE WITNESS: Okay.
11 ,
MR. MORRIS: -- if you had an off-the-record 12 conversation with Todd Cooper regarding your concerns 13 about the cu've, r 14 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
15 MR. DOCKERY: And can you relate to us here 16 on the record what the --
17 THE WITNESS: Can I talk to my law; s whether 18 or not I can talk about something I talked to --
19 MR. DOCKERY: Absolutely. As a matter of 20 fact, we've been at this for a long time.
- 21 MR. VORSE: Yes.
i 22 MR. DOCKERY: Let's take a short --
l I
23 THE WITNESS: Okay. !
l 24 MR. DOCKERY: We'll go off the record.
25 (Whereupon, a recess was taken at 3:00 p.m.,
i NF.AL R. GROSS count aponTEns ANo inANscaeEns j j
1323 RHOOE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASMWGTON. D.C. 20006 (202) 2344433
I
' 51 f
1 after which ths.procnadings resumnd et 3:03 p.m., on tapa
- 2 number three, as follows:)
MR. DOCKERY: We'll go back on the record.
3 S
4 It's now approximately 3:08 p.m.
5 Mr. Van Sicklen has had an opportunity to 6 confer with his counsel'and it's my understanding we're
.7 ready to proceed. -
)
i 8 MR. MORRIS: Correct. j 9 MR. DOCKERY: Mr. Van Sicklen, I have to 10 remind you that you continue to be under oath for this j 11 proceeding.
i 12 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
13 MR. DOCKERY: C. cay , let's get back to the 4
14 subject you were discussing.
15 THE WITNESS: I was talking to Todd Cooper.
16 And again, I remember all this on the clearance desk, with
- 17 the-clearance chief, and he'd walked out of the Control ~
-18 Room and come over and talked to me. And we got into 19 talking about the makeup tank again, what I'd talked to 20 him about on previous times.
21 And I guess I was just frustrated and he
' 22 sensed the frustration that I had. He hasn't been able to 23 do anything, I ain't been able to do anything that would 24 really clue them into, hey, you know, an operator has.a 25 concern here that needs to be looked at.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRISERS 132 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE. N.W.
(202) 2344433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 2344433
. 52 1 And thsn hn w:nt off tha record. And whnt we 2 talked about off the record was what an option that I had.
1
- 3 What he told me off the record was you can 4 make an allegation. I'd never even heard what an 5 allegation was before. And he explained, you know, you
, 6 can make an allegation against the company over this. But 7 if you do that, then it goes directly to the Region.
1 8 MR. DOCKERY: The Region being?
9 THE WITNESS: Region II. And it's out of our 10 hands --
-11 ,
MR. DOCKERY: Of the --
12 ,
THE WITNESS: -- it's outlof his hancs 13 anymore -He'says that, I don't even get involved in 14 allegations. That the Region takes over all of that if 15 you make an-allegation.
16 But we were --
he was still working on it and i
17 'I was-still working on it, and I felt like, you kn:w, no, 18 I'm not ready to take it out of our hands. I want to -- I 19 want to continue working on it with you.
20 MR. DOCKERY: For clarification, Mr. Van 21 Sicklen, Region II, reference to Region II, you understood
.22 it to be kegion II of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 23 right?
24 THE WITNESS: Region II of the Nuclear 25 Regulatory Commission. Region -- whatever department in NEAL R. GFH3SS
'OOURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRISERS 1323 RHOOE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
(202) 23u433 WASHINGTON. O.C. 20006 (202) 2344433
h 53 9
1 tha R2gion, it would ba out of hio h nds, ha caid, cnd it 2 would be out of my hands. You make a -- basically, he 3 says, you make it against the company. You make an 4 allegation against the company. And then'the Region steps 5 in and they handle it.
i 6 And so I said, well, I'd rather try to 4
- 7 continue through Management then. You know, let's try to 8 do it the way we're doing it, the right way. I'm not i
9 ready to just make an allegation against the company and 10 give it to the NRC, I guess. As long as -- he was working 11 with me and we were both going to try to solve it.
12 And then we went back.on the record and he 13 says, okay, r.ow I'm an NRC, do you have -- do you want to 14 make an allegation? And I said no, I don't want to make :
15 an allegation.
i 1
16 MR. DOCKERY: By off the record, I think what 17 you're refarring to is he wanted to make it clear to you 18 you understood what your options were.
19 THE WITNESS: He wanted to -- he went off the 20 record to say, hey, you can make an allegation and it 21 would go directly to Region. And it would be out of our 22 hands -- his hands. He wouldn't be involved with it 23 anymore if that's what I did.
~
24 MR. DOCKERY: And there's nothing improper 25 about.that. So please go ahead.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRISERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N W.
(202) 2344433 WASHMGTON. D C. 20006 (202) 2344433
os
(
1 THE WITNESS: That's -- Ha mado it --
ha 1
2 made me feel like, and I felt that way myself, that I'd 3 still like to work with my Management. I'd been talking 4 to them all the time with this. And that's what was 1 5 discussed. And he kept assuring me that, you know, it's 6 on top of the list of things. He was working on it with 7 me. We were both trying to get it done.
8 MR. DOCKERY: This might be a time for me to 9 interject a question I have here.
l 10 You -- you just earlier in your testimony and 11 just now you've used the term frustration.
The l 12 frustration that you felt. I think earlier I used the 13 term resista'nce in asking you were you feeling resistance l 14 from some level of management or supervision that caused i
15 you this frustration.
16 Was that the case? Is there somebody you felt i
17 was not doing their job?
18 THE WITNESS: It wasn't -- It wasn't as much 19 as somebody as when I'd get together with the Engineers 20 and I'd get together with Greg Halnon. Me and Bruce 21 Willms, we both felt that nobody would ever come back and 22 tell us what was going on.
23 MR. DOCKERY: Did you get --
24 THE WITNESS: That was the most frustrating 25 part, you know. We'd bring it all up to them, we'd give
! NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE N W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005 (202) 2344433 (202) 2344433
55 1 them all th003 graphs end chnrto, cnd th:n we'd haar i
2 nothing for a month, until I'd go back over to Greg. You 3 know, I'm not hearing nothing on the makeup tank. As you 4 know it's still a concern of mine. We're still operating 5 the plant. You know, I'm totally subordinate. l 1
6 I mean, I had a conversation on the board with I l
7 one of the assistants. It was Mr. Gary Becker. He was i I
8 sitting in getting his seven days of quota on the board. .
1 9 Some of the shifts would run, I mean, they'd open the l
10 bypass and run it right on the curve. Some would stay a 11 little bit away. And it was varying. And it got to the !
12 point where it was put in the shift supervisor's log. An 13 OSP entry was made on the shi#t supervisor's turnover 14 sheet.
15 Somewhere in upper Management they'd even 16 taken hydrogen cc's per kg, that they were trying to 17 achieve by making the hydrogen this high, and they'd Iut 18 in on the plan of the day, in the graph form. And you'd 19 see where sometimes there was dips and sometimes it was 20 right back up.
21 And there was an OSB entry that I got here 22 somewhere, that Dave Jones had come back and said, well, t 23 you know, some of the perceived concerns of the operators 24 are so and so, but we need to maximize cc's per kg.
25 And I was on the board as the board chief.
l NEAL R. GROSS COUFT REPORTER $ AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE. N W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON D C. 20005 (202) 2344433
30 1 Mr. Backer,w25 tha assictort. And, you know, he was on.
2 the shift supervisor's. turnover sheet. He was the i 1
3 assistant. You know, make sure you maximize.it, put it i
4 right on that curve. And we were maybe five' counts off )
5 the' curve or so. And he'd come over to me and he asked me i 6 to add the hvdrogen, get it right back up on that curve. i
. i 7 And I immediately, I turned around and I i
8 . started adding the hydrogen. And then I turned back to i 9 him and I said, okay, I'm going to do what you say. I'm )
10 100 percent subordinate to you, but I have some concerns 11 that maybe you're not aware of since you don't-normally 12 sit there. That it's not.following this curve and I don't ,
t 4
13 .like to ;tay'right on the curve. ,
- t 14 And his response to that, and I know Dave 15 Fields was sitting there as the shifter, and there was l
16 Bill Marshall was sitting rignt behind him as the shift t
17 manager. And he just pulled:out his wallet with P-*. ]
18 Beard's_home' phone number. Says, I'll call Pat Beard and l 19 he can explain to you why he wants it.right on the curve.
l 20 And he actually dials his home phone number, but nobody I 1
21 answered. t l
22 And I made it real clear, you know, if that's ]
l The hydrogen's already going in, I'll j 23 where you want it. l 1
i 24 run it right there for you. I just wanted to tell you 25 what my concerns were. That's all. And that's where it
( NEAL R. GROSS cou. . Om 1 - .c -
1333 RMODE ISLAND AVENUE, N W.
(202) 2344433 WASHINGTON, D C. 20006 (202) W l
I 57 l I
1 cnd d. j 2 MR. RAPP: Let me ask a question then. It 3 may be somewhat obvious.
4 Was this done -- Was this action done in a 5 manner to intimidate you into complying or was it done in 6 a manner to say --
7 THE WITNESS: I think he --
8 MR. RAPP: --
to say,.let's explain what the 9 problem is here and let's get it all aired out and make 10 sure that everybody understands what everybody else is 11 doing?,
12 ,
THE WITNESS: I felt it was total 13 intimidation'. He didn't even turn around to the shift 1
14 supervisor, which'is his boss, and the shift manager, they 15 both sat there together. He just got out the senior vice-16 president's phone number and said, well, you can talk 17 directly uo him. And I wac, I was going to feel free to 18 talk to him if he was home and, you know, I would have 19 explained that this is what I've got.
20 MR. RAPP: What was Mr. Fields' comment to 21 this, this action?
22 THE WITNESS: He thought that the assistant 23 was a big jerk. That's --
24 MR. RAPP: The assistant is subordinate to 25 Mr. Fields, correct?
NEAL R. GFU3SS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCfWSERS 1323 MH00E ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
(202) 234 4433 WASHINGTON, D C. 20006 (202) 23M
oo .
1 i
1 THE WITNESS: Yosh, thn cocistant is 2 subordinate to Mr. Fields, but Mr. Fields, you know, he, 3 okay, if they want it right on there it's on the shift sup 4 -- you'know, go ahead. And Mark just, don't worry about i
, 5 it.
6 And I put it right on the curve where they i 7 wanted it. And that's -- And the frustration that I get i
8 is not over.any certain individual. It's just a matter.of ,
l 9 I kept talking to -- from engineers to the administrative 10 shift supervisor to the manager. And it-was just -- the 11 frustration was just no feedback, basically.
l 12 MR. DOCKERY: We try to make it as clear as l l
13 possible, be'cause I'm trying to understand.
14 Did you feel that any individual was resisting I
15 your attempts to have this issue dealt with? i 16 THE WITNESS: I don't think I can point to --
17 if you wanted me to point to probably the most II.dividual?
18 I'm not sure what you want. )
i 19 MR. DOCKERY: I don't want you to point to 20 any individual unless you feel that they were somehow 21 actively trying to stifle your ability to put forward your 22 concerns.
23 THE WITNESS: ' System Engineering, I think, i
24 was standing pretty firm on their calculation. Ana I 25 think the Management was just trying to play management.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRISERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
(202)2344433 WASHlNGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) N l
os 1 Look at.tha (unintelligible) operator having a concern, 2 and~you got System. Engineering saying, no, you ain't got I 3 no concern.
4 And I just kept, just like Pat Beard had told !
5 us.to do, if you really feel,'just don't let it drop. And j
6 I thought that.it was important enough that, you know,-I-7 kept calling my manager. And he was pretty good about, 8 you know, he set up the meeting, but he never really fully 9 got. engrossed. He's much too busy.
10 MR. DOCKERY: Okay. There's another way --
11 I'm trying to think of another way to possibly 12 characterize this.
And tell me if this could be correct.
13 in any organize ion there's a certain degree 14 of what I'll term inertia. It's just hard sometimes'to 15 get things rolling. Was that the problem you were facing.
16 here? Or once you think you've gotten things rolling, t'o 17 continue that, that process?
l 18 THE WITNESS: Well, I'd started it rolling 19 and my manager seemed like he supported me. And never
)
20 once did my manager turn around and say, you know, shut l 21 up, Mark.
22 MR. VORSE: Who was your manager, again?
23 THE WITNESS: Greg Halnon. But it seemed 24 like somewhere whether this whole thing started over a 25 quote that everybody's familiar with what Pat Beard says. )
i NEAL R. GROSS cOuar nemmas ANo taaNacaeEas 1323 RNODE ISLAND AVENUE. N.W.
(202) 2344433 WASNINGTON. D.C. 20006 (202) 2344433
60 1 Pat Batrd, tha roncon why this hydrogun was put on tha 2 curve and why we went away from our old alarm of 15 3 pounds, takes us up to 30 pounds, was for the cc's, an MPO 4 good practice.
5 And -- Now, this is going back probably of 6 August of '93, I went to a meewing. And we started 7 talking about emergency boration. I was invited, with 8 Ernie Gallion, one of the shift supervisors, to go down to 9 the nuke Admin Building and sit in on a meeting where they 10 discussed, okay, let's get Engineering together. And I 11 think it was Brian Murtaw was the one running the meeting.
12 And he basically had a dozen engineers in there, and we 13 talked maout' hydrogen overpressure.
14 MR. DOCKERY: You weren't being shut out 15 then, in your opinion, were you?
16 THE WITNESS: No, I never felt like I was 17 shut out. Nobody -- I kept feeling from my manage.nent, 18 which was Greg Halnon and even Dave Jones, it was almost 19 above the shifters that, all right, Mark, you know, we'll 20 get you with Engineering again and keep working on it.
21 And that's why I felt comfortable with, I got 22 time off, I'll keep working on it. I didn't want to just 23 drop it. And I thought that I was pursuing it. And that 24 was good. And I know it got turned into, and I don't why, 25 that's why you're asking that it -- by other people that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRSERS 1323 RHOOE ISLAND AVENUE. N.W.
(202) N WASHtNGTON. D.C. 20006 (202) M
4 61 l 1 look outoida and look in, wara thinking that it was a raml
{
2 conflict between me and Engineering. !
' And it's not what the other people are
'3 I
4 perceiving, that this whole thing was a personal thing.
5 You know, Phil Saltsman, one of the System Engineers, he 6 got hired the same time as me. -Our wives do something f
7 with our kids together. I have no problem with it. It's 1
3 8 not a personal thing. l
- 1 2
9 MR. DOCKERY: Okay. But understand, you had j 10 been the one who's used the term frustration several times 11 today.
d s- 12 -
THE WITNESS: Yeah. ]
a 13 f!R . DOCKERY: All we're trying to do is to
, 14 the extent possible pinpoint the source of frustration --
15 THE WITNESS: What that-frustration --
b 16 MR. DOCKERY: -- to be the cause of that ;
17 frustrati n, if that's posrible. j
'18 THE WITNESS: The biggest cause is Pat Beard l i
19 said he wanted it on the curve. He made it so far as to 4 20 put it on the plan of the day so that he could show
, 21 everybody. Every day the plan of the day gets put up 22 there in the Contial Room and they give it to all the 1
23 shops. And the only purpose of having hydrogen ec's per 24 kg was to see whether it was being maximized. And the
- 25 only way to maximize it was to -- to run right on the L
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRISERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVCNUE, N.W.
(202) 2344433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 2344 433
62 1 curva es much no wa could.
2 And the engineers -- and this is something 3 that I started to bring up out of that meeting -- they 4 react a lot to what Pat Beard says. A Senior Vice-5 President tells you to do something, you do it.
6 .That pressure was never put on me as a plant 7 operator from my management. Nobody ever came down to me 8 and said, Mark, you shut up. And I, you know. They had 9 the -- the -- I think they were just trying to back what 10 Mr. Beard wanted. And they wanted to show that, hey, we 11 can get this cc to kg.
12 ,
And half-way through that meeting we all got 13 to 14 -- you know, all the System Engineers down there, me and 15 one of the shift supervisors talking mostly'then with the 16 emergency boration. And an hour into it we said, you 17 know, why are we trying to do this, you know, what's the 18 problem, why do we need some many cc's per kg, 19 Oxygen, as far as when they sample oxygen from 20 the RCS, is undetectable. It's less then. And hydrogen 21 goes in there to combine with the oxygen, that's water.
22 And that's where it came up in that meeting, 23 and it's just, Pat Beard wants it there, it's an MPO 24 recommendation to run there. I think a BMW water 25 chemistry manual, end up putting in 25 cc's per kg, and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRl8ERS 1323 RHOOE ISLANO AVENUE. N W, (202) 234 4433 WASHtNGTON. O.C. 20005 (202) N
bJ 1 that's wh ro wa're going to run.
2 I hope I've -- I can't give you a pinpoint any l 3 more'than that, I don't think.
]
1 4 MR. DOCKERY: And I don't ask you to tell me l
- 5 any more than what you can tell me. ]
1 6 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry.if I'm being too l
I 7 lengthy. I'm trying to answer as fullest, 100 percent 8 that I can.
I L 9 MR. DOCKERY: And we appreciate that.
10 MR. VORSE: Curt, you got anything?
11 ,
MR. RAPP: Yes, let me go over a couple of, 12 couple of items. ,
Excuse me.
J 13 Back in July of '94, Mr. Willms had some l 14 concerns about this curve as well, correct?
15 THE WITNESS: All the way through, from the
, 16 point back in '93, me and him were on the same shift. I 17 was the lead in, he was the junior. And we worked 18 together and we made little graphs of the emergency
[ 19 boration. He had concerns over the. regulated. That was a I
20 violation that we got, whether the regular being set j 21 wrong. And he was more on the appendix R, concerned over 22 trying to prevent two accidents.
23 MR. MORRIS: See if you can preface your 24 answer with yes or no and then explain.
~25 THE WITNESS: Okay.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRISERS 1323 MHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N W.
(202) 234 4433 WASHINGTON, D C. 20006 (202) 2M
04 1 MR. RAPP: All right. Then, going back to i
2 the July of '94. Were you aware that Mr. Willms conducted 3 similar type tests?
4 THE WITNESS: No, sir.
5 MR. RAPP: Were you involved in a meeting 6 with Engineering where Mr. Will.7.s presented this 7 information to Engineering?
8 THE WITNESS: When you say similar type 9 tests, do you mean going from 86 to 55?
10 MR. RAPP: Yes. Drain down the makeup tank.
11 THE WITNESS: No, sir, that was not presented
- 12 on the July 19th meeting. We presented data that we had 13 graphed'from'SP surveillance procedure 630. And he'd also 14 had graphs from doing normal makeup tank feeds and bleeds.
15 Where it was getting routine, and it still is today, when 4
16 somebody does a 200 gallon add, they'll mark where it 17 started and began. And that's what was plotted.
1 18 Does that answer your question?
19 MR. RAPP: Okay.
20 THE WITNESS: It was not presented on the 4
21 July 19th meeting. I found out in December when I'd come 22 back he'd given me a graph that he did sometime in July 23 after that meeting where he went from 86 to 55 on a 24 different shift.
25 MR. RAPP: But you were not involved with NEAL R. GFH3SS coum apOmas ANoin4Nscansas 1323 aH00E ISLAND AVENUE. N.W.
(202) 234 4433 WASHtNGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 234 4433
i OD l l
1 thnt, thtt cctivity?
2 THE WITNESS: No, sir.
l 3 MR. RAPP: You weren't on that shift either? l 4 THE WITNESS: No, sir.
5 MR. RAPP: Well, all right. Let me get on to 6 a couple of other issues down here.
7 Do you know of any documents, procedures, or 8 administrative documents within Crystal River that 9 constitutes or defines what a test is?
10 THE WITNESS: No, sir.
11 MR. RAPP: Okay. . What is your definition of 12 a test?
13 iFE WITNESS: I've never even thought about 14 it until what happened, but our definition. We look when 15 we do something whether or not we have a procedure to do 16 it. If we have a procedure to do it, then it's within our 17 bounds. T'e shift supervisers always have the option on 18 ops to even pick out pieces and parts to do certain items 19 that he wants to do. He would even go as far sometimes as 20 to take it out of surveillance procedures.
21 One of them that comes to mind is the 22 engineers wanted to know what the dp flow for the nuclear i
! 23 services closed cycle cooling pumps is. And we don't have 24 any procedure to cut in the instrumentation to show them 25 that. But in the surveillance procedure, which actually NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
l (202) 234 4433 WASHINGTON. D C. 20005 (202) 23W l
oo 1 tacts that pump to make it.opartblo, you cut in the valvos 2 to do that. But we had no general operating procedure to 3 do'that.
4 So the shifter would pick out of the -- even 5 the surveillance procedure the steps necessary to do that 6 and say, okay, now we have a procedure, you can go do 7 that.
8 MR. RAPP: Is the 50.59 risview for the 9 procedure for each individual step within the procedure or 10 .s i it for the procedure as a whole unit?
11 THE WITNESS: I haven't done very many 12 procedure changes, but the 50.59 review that gets signed 13 off in the front is done for, I think, the whole 14 procedure. And even like when you do a rev to a 15 procedure, even that revision gets a 50.59 to make sure 16 that the changes done are still within the intent of the 17 procedure.
18 So, I don't know -- I don't know-the exact
, 19 answer to your question whether or not -- there's only one 20 50.59 done with the procedure and that's done every time 21 even the procedure's changed, even if'you change one spec.
22 So , you know, I don't -- we just look at is 23 there guidance to do what you want to do. And then ops, i
24 it's totally within the shifter if the shifter -- if l i
25 you're doing a valve lineup it's in a procedure. And the NEAL R. GROSS 2
(X)URT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRSERS j
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE. N W.
(202) 2344433 WASHMGTON, D C. 20006 (202) 236 4433 !
~. . - ~ . ..
o7 I 1 shifter snya, no, I don't nord thsca valves out of that 2 valve lineup done, he-just NA's them, or tells you to NA
-3 them, and_you NA and you do just what you need to do to do 4 the job that you're trying to do. )
5 MR. RAPP: Whenever there was a test, a 6 surveillance procedure going to be run and there was going 7 to be a change to the lineup for that procedure, would 8 they implement another procedure that may contain the l l
9 guidance to do that additional lineup, that alternate i
10 lineup, or would they rev the procedure and conduct a j l
11 50.59 review?
i l \
12 THE WITNESS: Surveillance procedures were 13 kept at a higher level than .he ops. The shifter could l 14 change anything he wants in the OP. i i 15 A surveillance procedure, like I used before, .
l 1
.16 they pulled pieces out to do certain things, but if you're l 17 doing the surveillance procedure that's due, like when I l
18 wanted to cut in the Barton for the SW pumps, the nuclear 19 services pump, the surveillance wasn't being done at that i 20 time. We used portions of that surveillance to do what we 21 wanted to do.
22 Your question, from what I think you're l
23 asking, is when surveillance procedure, whatever, is being 24 done for its surveillance. Say you want to test the i
25 operability of the decay heat pump and you're doing that l
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRSERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N W.
(202) 234 4433 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20006 (202) 2344433
0C J 1 survaillcnca, and now you want to go outside the 2 sr.veillance, what we've done in the past is just make a
)
3 note and the shifter has to sign the note. And if it was 4 within'the intent of the procedure, and this has changed 5 some now, he would just sign the note. i 6 Now we're getting fnto, and I say now, post 7 September 5th, even some of it before September 5th, 8 depending on what shifter it was. Some shifters felt 9 comfortable, some felt like you needed to take the whole 10 procedure back. And now I think that's the general for 11 right now.
12 If you gave me today a surveillance p:ccedure 13 to do a:2 I couldn't do it step by step, line by line, 14 .there was something that had to be changed about' lineup or 15 something, you bring that back up to the shifter and he 16 will still make the determination. And most of them now 17 are leaning like some of the shifters did back the . That 18 now you send this whole thing back and you either make a 19 ITC, a uemporary change to the procedure, or issue a new 20 rev.
21 We had a big thing the end of last year over 22 notes. We used to write a lot of notes. Like in our 23 surveillance procedure, our daily logs was a surveillance 24 procedure, SP-300. And you take your daily readings every 25 day. If an instrument is out of service, we'd just write NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRl8ERS 1323 RHOOE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
(202) 2 % 4433 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20006 (202) M
on 1 :out a carvica work rcquast number cnd put a noto, Commtnt 1 2 One, running, or secure due to maintenance, or something.
3 Even that has become under more scrutiny since-4 that is a surveillance procedure that you're doing for its 5 frequency. Our notes in that are scrutinized a lot now, u
\
6 It might not be acceptable now if that meter's out of 7 service to just write Out of Service. It might be that, I
8 hey, you know, the intent is you want a reading on that !
9 you might have to go get it locally or do something to i
.10 fulfill that requirement, where before, in the past we 11 just put a note.
12 ,
I hope I didn't go again into too much depth.
13 bR. RAPP: Thnt's all I have right now, Jim. i 14 THE WITNESS: I got one-in this. Can we take 15 another brief recess right here for a minute? I'd like to 16 talk to --
17 MR. DOCKERY: We'll go off the record. Okay.
18 (Whereupon, a brief recess was taken at 3:30 19 p.m., after which the proceedings resumed at 3:35 p.m. as i
20 follows:)
21 MR. DOCKERY: We're back on the record. The 22 time is approximately 3:35 p.m. We went off the record at 23 Mr. Van Sicklen's request to discuss some matter with his 24 counsel.
25 Mr. Van Sicklen, I'll remind you at this time NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRSERS 1323 RHOOE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
(202) 2M WASHINGTON. D.C. 20005 (202) 2N
lo a .
1 that you continua to b3 undar onth hnre, j 1
~
2 THE. WITNESS: Yes, sir. l I
I 3 MR. DOCKERY: And was there something that 4 you wanted to respond to?
5 THE WITNESS: No , sir.
' J 6 MR. DOCKERY: Was there anything that you 7 wish to discuss or bring up --
T 8 MR. MORRIS: No , he just had a question for' 9 me.
l 10 MR. DOCKERY: Oh, okay, fine.
11 ,
MR. RAPP: I'have nothing further right now.
I 12 MR. DOCKERY: HI'd like to note that, Mr. Van 13 Sicklen, youve brought with you here today what appears 5 .14 to be a sizable amount of documentation. Is that correct?
15 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
16 MR. DOCKERY: Without going into detail what
! 17 those documents are, is tnat the same documentation that 4
- 18 you had with you when you'were previously interviewed by 19 the NRC?
i 20 THE WITNESS: Some data has been added to it.
T 21 MR. DOCKERY: I'd just like to know i
- 22 specifically, is there any documentation that you have
- 23 here today that you also had at your previous meeting with 24 the Office of Investigations that pertain to September the i
25 4th, 1994?
j s
NEAL R. GFU3SS
+ COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCMSERS 1323 RHOOE ISLAND AVENUE. N.W.
(202) N WASHN3 TON. D.C. 20006 (202) 2W
.. .- . ~ .
iL 1
1 THE WITNESS: I hnva no documnntetion on tha 2 September 4th.
3 MR. DOCKERY: I see. And that includes 4 today?'
5 THE WITNESS: That includes today.
i 6 MR. DOCKERY: Okay.
7 MR. VORSE: So, maybe the only person that i 8 does have documentation would be Mr. Weiss, because he 9 took it home and did this on computer --
10 THE WITNESS: If anybody's got what happened 11 on September 4th it would probably be Mr. Weiss.
12 ,
MR. DOCKERY: Let me ask you this, because 13 there was some apparent confusion earlier.
14 We've discussed your limited knowledge of an 15 evolution which occurred during July of 1994. You were 16 not part of the shift that conducted that evolution. My 17 understanding, you came to know about it after the fact.
18 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
19 MR. DOCKERY: Okay. We've discussed at some 20 length your knowledge of an involvement in evolutions that 21 were conducted during September the 4th and 5th of 1994.
22 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
23 MR. DOCKERY: Were there any other evolutions 24 that you're aware of or that you took part in that were 25 conducted to address the same issues that we've discussed l NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSOWSERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N W.
902) 2364433 WASHINGTON, O C. 20006 (202) 2%d433
.~ .
72 1 hara todty?
2 THE WITNESS: No, sir. The only ones I know, l
3 the 22nd, that I found after the fact. The 4th and the j l
4 5th. I've no --
l 5 MR. VORSE: Twenty-second of what?
6 THE WITNESS: The .2nd of_ July is what I 7 think Bruce.Willms said that his data was taken out of.
l l
8 And that date I'm not sure. That's the date that stuck in 9 my mind.that he told me, but I don't know what date -- the i
10 company should have all that now. I gave the company l 11 everything that I knew about it. I turned over all the 12 original graphs that Bruce Willms gave me.
I gave them 13 all to Hatnon.
14 MR. DOCKERY: So that we're talking about as l
l 15 far as your knowledge extends to one degree or another to l 16 only three evolutions. July the -- on or about July the 17 22nd, September the 4th and September the 5th, all .a the 18 year 1994?
19 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. In doing a normal --
20 would you consider this part of your question that you're l
l 21 asking me right now. If I did a normal 200 gallon add i
22 because I needed to add 200 gallons of water to the makeup 23 tank, and I plotted where I started and where I ended?
24 MR. DOCKERY: Mr. Rapp, I think you'd be the 25 one to address that.
l NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRISERS
(. 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE. N W.
(202) 236 4433 WASHINGTON. O C. 20006 (302) N
7.4 1 MR. RAPP: I was ravicwing somD othar 2 information. What --
3 THE WITNESS: He's asked me specifically over i 4 I know'of three different occasions where it was bled down 5 strictly to get data, I guess to give somebody, that he 1
6 calls a test, that went from 86 to 55 that I know of. Any 1 i
7 time that we did an add, I know I told you that when we l
)
8 gave data to Engineering on the 19th, just from doing a )
9 normal'200 gallon add because I need to add 200 gallons to 10 the makeup tank and I plot where I started and where I ,
l 11 ended, would that be within the scope of what he's asking?
q 12 MR. DOCKERY: I'm trying to determine -- ;
13 'HE WITNESS:
T Is there any other tests done, 14 I think. ,
15 MR. DOCKERY: Well, I wouldn't use the word 16 test because I'm not qualified ---
17 THE WITNESS: Skay.
18 MR. DOCKERY: -- to make that determination 19 by any means. But just the confusion we had previously 20 over a September 4th evolution, that's all I know it by, 21 that occurred that was not addressed previously by OI 22 because we were unaware of it. Now we have since been 23 made aware of a September 4th as well as a September 5th, 24 1994, evolution. And --
25 THE WITNESS: And the July --
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRISERS 1323 RHOOE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
(202) 2344433 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20006 (202) 234 4433
- l i
1 MR. DOCKERY: Now n July. I'm juct anying 2 are_there any others we should be aware of. And you're 3 asking whether or not the scenario --
4 THE WITNESS: My answer is no. And what I j 5 asked you is if I do put 200 gallons into the makeup tank 6 and I plot where I started --
7 MR. RAPP: Were there evolutions -- Were 8 there evolutions performed where it was specifically done 9 only to gather data?
i 10 THE WITNESS: No.
11 MR. RAPP: Besides the ones that we already 12 know abouc? _
13 THE WITNESS: No, sir.
14 MR. DOCKERY: We just want to make sure we 15 have that question covered and answered.
16 MR. MORRIS: Done and done.
17 THE WITNESS: I agree.
18 MR. DOCKERY: We'll go off the record for a 19 minute, please.
20 (Whereupon, an off the record discussion was 21 had at 3:40 p.m., after which the proceedings resumed at 22 3:43 p.m. as follows;)
23 MR. DOCKERY: We're back on the record. The 24 time now is approximately 3:43. I remind you, Mr. Van i 25 Sicklen, you continue to be under oath here. And if you'd NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCMSERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N W.
(202) 234 4433 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20006 (202) 23'4433
to l
l 1 ccknowledga that varbnlly.
2 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
3 MR. DOCKERY: I noted just a minute ago that 4 Mr. Van Sicklen has brought with him today numerous 1
5 documents and records of his own. And while we were off 6 the record we discussed the fact that we certainly.want to 7 afford Mr. Van Sicklen the opportunity to bring forth any 8 documentation that he feels important. And he understands 9 that he will have that opportunity. We don't feel we 10 necessarily have to do it here today on the record. And 11 Mr. Van Sicklen has agreed that any documentation that we 12 request of him that is in his possession will certainly be 13 provided.
14 MR. MORRIS: That's correct. i l
15 MR. DOCKERY: Mr. Morris, is --
16 MR. MORRIS: Okay. That's correct.
17 MR. DOCKERY: One further question at this 18 point.
19 Mr. Van Sicklen, from -- between September the 20 5th, 1994, until today, have you had an opportunity to or j 21 been requested to tell your story, your version of events, i 22 to Florida Power Company?
23 THE WITNESS: No, sir.
24 MR. DOCKERY: Okay.
25 MR. VORSE: Were you not interviewed by NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE. N W.
(202) 2344433 WASHINGTON,0 C 20006 (202) M
1 Florida Powar before tha pro-enforctmant ptnel? Hava you
! 2 been interviewed by FPC regarding the 4th and 5th
- 3 evolutions?
4 THE WITNESS: No, sir. The only -- only time 5 we came up, and that was me and Christine, came up to Greg 6 Halnon's office after you had already.come and interviewed 7 the other four, and he basically told us, you know,: this l
8 is all I can recall from what the other four.
9 MR. VORSE: Are you telling me that you 10 haven't been interviewed by the special team, Mr. Poole 11 and Mr. Carter?
12 THE WITNESS: Oh , I misunderstood ycur 13 questior. I' thought you meant before I'd talkea to you.
14 Yes, between today and the 5th, last week I ;
l 15 had interviews with Mr. Carter and I had Dave DeMontfort 16 sit in with mine. He's one of the guys on their team. ;
I 17 And I just wanted somebody else in there that --
like Mr. j r 1 l
18 Rapp. He's the simulator instructor. And we put him in 19 our joint defense agreement so that he could explain 20 everything to Mr. Carter. That was the time that I l
l 21 explained it all to the company.
22 MR. DOCKERY: Okay. I just want to make sure l
l 23 that I'm clear on that. When I said provide your version 24 of events to Florida Power Company I also would include, d
25 of course, attorneys for Florida Power Company, either NEAL R. GROSS count neonrEns mo Tamscamens 1323 nHOOE ISLAND AVENUE. N.W (202) 2M WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 2M i
1 thnir counsol or outsido counsal.
2 THE WITNESS: And when you say afford, I 3 requested of my attorney --
4 MR. MORRIS: Yes, let me object to the form of 5 'the. question.
6 If you could ask him -- I draw a distinction 7 between being interrogated about an event and giving --
8 being given an opportunity, as you phrased it, to give i 9 your version. Okay.
10 MR. DOCKERY: That's a fair distinction.
11 ,
MR. MORRIS: So if you could ask both of 12 those questions separately, you'd get different answers, I 13 believe.
14 THE WITNESS: 'And that's what I kept bringing.
15 up to him here recently, that I'm welcoming -- I-ve inade 16 it clear to him that I'd love to sit down with Pat Beard 17 and just tall my side of the story.
18 MR. DOCKERY: Mr. Van --
19 THE WITNESS: That hasn't been -- I've 20 answered questions from Mr. Carter, and that's what has so 21 far gone on.
22 MR. DOCKERY: Okay. You responded to 23 questions from Mr. Carter. Mr. Carter is who? I'm sorry.
24 THE WITNESS: He is corporate security. He 25 was put in charge of the investigation that the company is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRISERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N W.
(202) 234 4433 WASHINGTON O C. 20006 (202) 2344433
10 1 doing. It w22 Mr. Ccrter, Mr. Dan Poole, Mr. Dava
- 2 DeMontfort, and Mr. Vic Hernandez.
3 MR. DOCKERY.: But that was on -- that was the 4 most recent discussion. /
5 THE WITNESS: That was last week.
6 MR. DOCKERY: Oh, okay. Prior to that were ;
1 7 you ever interviewed by anybody from Florida Power Company l
)
8 --
l 9 THE WITNESS: That's what I thought you were 10 asking the first time. And that answer is no. l 11 MR. DOCKERY: So --
1 i
12 ,
.THE WITNESS: So between September 5th and we )
13 were getting' ready to come up to a pre-decisional 14 conference, and never once has the company ever talked to 15 any of us.
16 MR. VORSE: Did you -- Was Mr. Fields or Mr. l l
17 Weiss ever talked to by tne Management Review Team l 18 concerning the September 4th and 5th evolutions?
19 THE WITNESS: I don't know what went on. Mr.
20 Fields and Mr. Weiss were'put on a Manager Review Board l 21 and they got to talk to the managers of the company, but ;
22 none of the bargaining unit every did that.
, 23 MR. DOCKERY: Mr. Van Sicklen, you testified 24 much earlier today that you had discussions with an 25 attorney for Florida Power Company before meeting with Mr.
NEAL R. GFK)SS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRSERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE. N.W.
(202) 2*d edii WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) N
.s 1 -- cnd baing interviewad by Mr. Vorce cnd Mr. Rapp. Am I !
2 correct _in my recollection?
3 THE WITNESS: We didn't discuss the details 1 4 of the' event. All that we did was it was a phone 5 conversation from the lawyer down in St. pete to me and 6 Christine we took in Carl Bergstrom's office. And he 7 basically said, you know, here NRC's going to just come 8 down and they're just going to ask you some questions.
9 Feel free to answer their questions to the best of your 10 knowledge. They're going to specifically ask you over 11 what went on your evolution of September 5th. And answer 12 freely anything that they ask but just try to stick to 13 what they ask. Don't -- Don't offer any -- and I'm not 14 trying to say this to -- offer might be a bad word. His 15 advice was just answer their questions. Don't get into an 16 elaborate --
17 MR. DOCKERY: Okay. I'm flirting with 18 privilege here again.
19 THE WITNESS: Okay.
20 MR. DOCKERY: But, is it fair to say you were 21 not asked at that time what your testimony to the NRC 22 would be?
23 THE WITNESS: No, sir.
24 MR. DOCKERY: All right. I don't have 25 anything else at this time.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCfMERS 1323 RHOOE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
(202) 2364433 WASHINGTON. D C. 20006 (202) N
.. . . . - - -,- . . . . . . . _ - - . . . - _ . . - - - - ... - ~ - . - .
ov I
1 MR. VORSE: Mr. Van Sicklen,.wa've talked a i
2 lot today and-I'm going to give you an opportunity to tell Y 3 -us anything else that's bothering you that you think is a.
4 safety concern that you need to get on the table.
^
You 5 know,.just leave it open, leave it open to you.
6 THE WITNESS: 09o response.)
7 MR. DOCKERY: Would you like to consult with .j i
8 your counsel before bringing anything else up?
! I 9 MR. MORRIS: You can say'anything you want to 10 say, son.
11 THE WITNESS: I don't think I have anything l
l^
12 that pertains to what you're investigating right now. So.
How about it if we ask it this t .
l 13 MR. DOCKERY: l
- -14 way. Is there anything that you feel perhaps we-should 1 1
l 15 have brought up that we didn't?
l 16 THE WITNESS: Let me talk to my counsel one 17 more time.
I i l
18 MR. DOCKERY: We'll go off the record.
l 19 (Whereupon, a brief recess was had at 3:50 l 20 p.m., after which the proceedings resumed at 3:53 p.m. as 21 follows:) i 22 MR. DOCKERY: We're back on the record. The 23 time is approximately 3:53 p.m.
24 Mr. Van Sicklen, I remind you that you l
25 continue to be under oath here?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRSERS 1323 RHOOE ISLAhD AVENUE, N.W. !
(202) 2344433 WASHINGTON. O.C. 20006 (202) 2344433
1 THE WITNESS: Yos, cir.
2 MR. DOCKERY: And before we get to whatever i 3 else you might want to ask, we also consulted among 4 ourselves and I -- Mr. Rapp, I think you have some j 5 questions?
6 MR. RAPP: Yes. Back to reviewing my notes 7 here.
I 8 Previous interview, there was a statement made
-9 that there was a training session that Mr. Halnon -- ;
10 THE WITNESS: That's what I was just --
11 ,
MR. MORRIS: We're all on the same line.
12 THE WITNESS: That's what I just went out to 13 ask'him about.
14 MR. RAPP: Okay. Go ahead.
15 THE WITNESS: Because I didn't mention.that.
16 Thought I might as well. That's what I thought'something 17 else that you might want to know, but'I didn't --
18 MR. RAPP: Go ahead.
19 THE WITNESS: Yes. In this here room, we got 20 in January talking about event free ~ operations. And I was 21 sitting right where Mr. Vorse is. And there was two 22 shifts in here. It was after midnight for us. Mr. Halnon 23 brought some donuts in and he had the OSS shift come in.
24 And he was goingiover a presentation of event free 25 operation.
NEAL R. GFU3SS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCMSERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
(202) " d'91 WASHMGTON. O C. 20006 (202) 2344433
o.
1 -And in that discussion ths makeup tank got i
2 brought up again. And he brought it up in a way like that 3 was a single event. And, I meen, I don't think anybody 4 else in the room would probably rer. . it. It was just )
5 something that after what's happened to me personally I ;
i 6 picked up on the way he worded the question, or the l 7 answer, the discussion, whatever it was. And I brought l 1
8 back up to him that, you know, that wasn't a single time 9 that that was done. It was done at other times. And his 10 replay back to me was, yeah, I'm aware of several other !
\
1 4 11 timee that it happened. And that was it. I shut up. .]
l 1
12 And that was what I just talked out there that l 1
l 13 maybe that should be brought up he.re.
I 14 MR. VORSE: And the date again?
15 Approximately. I 16 THE WITNESS: It was sometime in January I 17 think he was doing all hrs event free. He came ait with !
)
1- these free plant tags and brought all the shifts in. j 18 i
19 MR. DOCKERY: When you say January, you're 1
20 talking --
21 THE WITNESS: 1995.
4 22 MR. VORSE: End of January, early February --
I 23 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
24 MR. VORSE: And these training records are 25 located where?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCR18ERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE. N.W.
(202) N WASHm0 TON. O C. 20005 (202) 2N
OJ 1 MR. DOCKERY: To tha extent that you know.
2 THE WITNESS: Mr. Halnen would probably be 3 able to answer that for you.
t 4 MR. RAPP: Was there an attendance sheet?
5 THE WITNESS: Yes, he had everybody in 1
1 6 Operations was required now. When you say there's an 7 attendance sheet, I cannot 100 percent for sure say I 8 signed one. I know we kept records so that everybody in 1
9 Operations attended it. It was a plant-wide. It wasn't a 1
, 10 formal, like a recall training session. It was something
~
11 new that he was getting into. He had these new tool bag-12 plant cards and he was bringing in all of Operations. Not i
l 13 a required training though.
l 14 MR. RAPP: Yes. That was the only issue I l 15 wanted -- area I wanted to go into further. .
16 l4R. VORSE : Anything else? !
4 17 THE WITNESS: !;o , that's what I talked to my 4
18 lawyer about thatLI was --
19 MR. VORSE: Mr. Morris?
. 20 MR. MORRIS: Yes, I have one question.
21 Mr. Van Sicklen, I want you to assume that you l 22 were interviewed by Jerry Carter on July 22nd, 1995, 23 regarding the September 4th evolution. I want you to
~
24 assume the date is July 22nd, 1995.
25 Between September 5th, 1994, and July 21, NEAL R. GROSS coum neromas ANoin4Nacaisens
< 1323 RHODE 18 LAND AVENUE, N W.
(202) 2344433 WASHINGTON. D C. 20006 (202) 2344433
Os )
1 1995, hn2 cnyono et Florida Pow 2r Comp ny evar offered you 2 the opportunity or asked you to explain the events of the 3 evolutions of September 1994? l l
4 THE WITNESS: No, sir.
5 MR. DOCKERY: Counselor, just for 6 clarification, is he assuming the date of July 22nd, '95, i
7 or is he assuming that the interview or the meeting with
]
8 Mr. Carter took place? I wasn't clear.
9 MR. MORRIS: I'll rephrase it.
q
.10 I want you to assume that you were interviewed l 7
11 by Mr. Jerry Carter on July 22nd, 1995.
12 ,
THE WITNESS: Okay. That's the time I talked i 13 to him a-d explained what I --
I 14 MR. MORRIS: You were, in fact, interviewed l 1
15 by Mr. Carter, correct?
16 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
17 MR. MORRIS: And the contents of that 18 interview were intended to be privileged, correct?
i 19 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
20 MR. MORRIS: Without getting into the content 21 of that interview, prior to that date had anyone from 22 Florida Power Company ever asked you to explain what 23 occurred regarding the evolutions performed on the makeup 24 tank?
25 THE WITNESS: No, sir.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRISERS 1333 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N.W.
(202) 2344433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 234-4433
1 MR. MORRIS: Oksy. :
l l 2 MR. DOCKERY: The fact that the meeting with 3
i I
- 3 Mr. Carter is not an assumption on your part, you know f, 4 that happened?
i 5 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
6 MR. MORRIS: The only assumption was.the 7 date.
8 MR. DOCKERY: That's what I thought we were 9 getting at. I wanted to be sure.
10 MR. MORRIS: Okay.
11 MR. DOCKERY: I have nothing else. l
". ?
12 MR. VORSE: Okay. If no one else has (
13 anythingelsh,thenwe'llgoaheadandconcludethis 14 interview. And the time is 3:57 p.m. on August 8th, 1995.
15 Thank you. ;
16 (whereupon, the proceedings were concluded at i
17 3:57 o' clock p.m.)
- l 18 j 19 .
20 :
21
'22 23 j 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS count neonvens um vnesonmEns ;
18E3 nHDDE WLAND AVENUE. N.W.
tact) 3344433 WASHWGTON. D.C. 30005 @02)3344433
N
{
1 CERTIFICATE I 2 This is to certify that the attached proceedings 3 before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 4 the matter of:
. 5 Name of Proceeding: Interview of Mark Van i
i 6 Sicklen,.
7 Docket Number (s): 2-94-036 Place of Proceeding: Crystal River Fuclear Plant I 8
9 Crystal River, Florida 10 ;
11 were held as herein appears, and that this is the original 12 transSript thereof for the file of the United States 13 Nuclear Regulatory Consnission taken by me and, thereafter 14 reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the 15 court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true 16 and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.
i 17 18 19 JM/l > & '
20 S. May 21 Official Reporter 22 Neal R. Gross and Co., Inc.
23 24 1
25 0
l f 1 4
l 4
1 b
i 4
1 1
a 1
4 i 1 l l l 2
h I
i I
.1 1
I I i EXHIBIT 6 L
a i
I 1
i i'
b a
i t
1.1 formation in this reit viv> Fe'Od i in a:coidar.ce with the Frab a cl i;;ferm:2n u
! A:!, excapti as ik
, D!A- -bu,M _. EXHIBIT 6 i Case No. 2-94-0365 ,
2 9611270049 961109
- PDR ADOCK 03002556
__.____R _PDR . _ . _.
', I 4
! G'fnetal Transcript cf Proceedings !
4 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1
Title:
In the matter of ,
j Interview of I David A. Fields i
e
~
- l l Docket Number: (not assigned) !
I 1 1
- Location
- Atlanta, Georgia l Date: August 31,1995
, 1 i !
j m i
i ,
! i' i ,
)
- I Work Order No.
- NRC-319 Paaes 1-128 l
i i
1 l l NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC. g-j Court Reporters and Transcribers EXHlBIT i 1323 RhodeTsland Avenue, N.W.
, Washington, D.C. 20005 PAGE__ / _OF _JWAG@
f I 2-94-036 (202) 2 % 4433
/
q i im
- ,, r-
I i ,g Page 1 i BEFORE THE ,.
j ..
f U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1
In the Matter of: )
i )
INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEW OF: )
)
DAVID A. FIELDS )
)
(CONFIDENTIAL) )
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Constission 101 Marietta Tower Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia
. Thursday, August 31,.1995 The above' entitled matter convened for.
INVESTIGA IVE INTERVIEW pursuant to notice at 1:05 P.M.
APPEARANCES:
On behalf of the U.S. NRC:
JAMES D. DOCKERY, Senior Investigator
' JAMES Y. VORSE, Senior Investigator-CURT RAPP, Reactor Engineer Inspector WILLIAM McNULTY, Field Office Director U.C. Nuclear Regulatory Commission-Region'II-101 Marietta Tower, Suite 2900 ,
Atlanta, Georgia On behalf of the Witness:
RICHARD W. HENDRIX, Attorney Finch, McCranie, Brown & Thrash-225 Peachtree Street, NE 1700 South Tower -
Atlanta, Georgia man,n. anoes a co.. zuc.
(202)234-4433
- -. ___ _ __. _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ . . ~ _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ . _
l 2
Page 2 J
1 P'R O C E E D I N G S
$ 2 MR..-DOCKERY: For the record, today is August.the 3 31st, 1995. The time now is approximately 1:05 P.M. My 4- name is James D. Dockery. I'm a Senior Investigator with 5~ the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,- Office of Investigations.
'6. During this proceeding, which will be recorded for 4
7 transcription, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of j 8 Investigations, will be conducting an interview of Mr. David l 9 Fields. This interview pertains to Office of
- E10 Investigations' Case #2-94-036. - The location of.this 11 interview is the NRC Regional Office, Region II, J.tlanta, f
.12 Georgia.
{
13 We have others in attendance here today, and I'm 4
14 going to ask them to introduce themselves for the record, f; 15 starting with Mr. McNulty.
j 16 MR. McNULTY: My name is William McNulty, M-c-N-u-17~ 1-t-y. I'm he Field Office Director for the Atlanta area l' 18- field office, the Office of Investigations.
i' 19 MR. VORSE: My name is James Y. Vorse. I'm a )
[ 20 Senior Investigator with the Office of Investigations, i 21 Region II, Atlanta, Georgia, i
22 MR. RAPP: I'm a My name is Curt Rapp, R-a-p-p.
j23 - Reactor Engineer Inspector for Region II, U.S. NRC, Atlanta,
,. 24 Georgia.
l-i 25 MR. HENDRIX: I'm Richard Hendrix, and I'm I l i usas,n. amoss a co., zwe.
3 (202)234-4433 r M w we-1 y ye ,w w e g **-~n -
Page 3 1 attorney and counsel for David Fields.
2 MR. DOCKERY: Mr. Fields, if you'd please stand 3 and raise your right hand.
i 4 Whereupon, !
l 5 DAVID A. FIELDS l 6 appeared as a witness, and having been duly sworn, was l 7 examined and testified as follows:
8 EXAMINATION j 9 BY MR. DOCKERY:
10 Q Would you state your full name, please, sir; date 11 of birth; and Social Security number, for the recor d.
. i 12 A Dav$d A. Fields, F-i-e-1-d-s; date of birth, 13 Social Security number 14 Q Mr. Fields, before we"went on the record here 15 today I provided your counsel with a copy of Section 1001 of 16 Title 18 of the United States Criminal Code, and I asked 17 that he allow you to read-that. Did you read that section?
18 A Yes, sir, I did.
19 Q Do you understand it?
20 A Yes, sir.
21 Q And do you understand that it does apply here 22 today in this proceeding?
23 A Yes, sir, I do.
24 MR. DOCKERY: Mr. Vorse?
25 BY MR. VORSE:
NEAL R. St088 & CO. , INC.
(302)334 4423
, , ,~
.l . - /fl ' ' I
. - - . .. .. . . . - - . - - . - - . .. . - - . - - . . . - . - ~ _ . -
I Page 4 1 Q Mr. Fields, last time we talked, in December.I.
2 believe it was...
3 A Yes, sir.
4 0 ...of last year, we discussed the September 5th, 5 1994 evolution that your shift conducted.
6 A That is correct. ^ 1 L 7 Q On the makeup tank. And then we've come to later 8 understand that a similar evolution was-conducted on the 4th 9 of September. Can you describe exactly how'that was done?
10 A Well, as you said, it was a similar evolution. We 11 -- we reviewed our procedures, we felt comfortable that we 12 were autho'rized to perform that evolution legally. We L 13 filled the makeup tank -- well, we got together the shift I
i 14 and discussed that, why we wanted to do it. And we filled 15 the makeup tank to 86 inches. And as the procedure OP 402 1
16 required, pressurized it to the maximum allowed by Curve 8, l 17- OP 103B. And then we selected the bleed handle on the main i l . !
18 control board to the bleed position, and we bled the tank
! 19 down to 55 inches as allowed by OP 402. )
i p 20 At the time we were plotting data and watching the i
21 control board analog instrument plus plotting the computer 22 points as they came up. As I recall, and in talking to the l-23- board operator, as soon as we pressurized up to the level of 24 the curve, to the maximum allowed by the curve, we did get 25 the high pressure alarm. And we did the bleed, immediately NEAL R. GROSS & Co., INC.
(202)234*4433 i
l
Page 5 1 started the bleed, bled down to 55 inches. It was about ten 2 minutes, I recall. 'And we immediately_ selected the "off" to-3 stop the bleed, and then we raised level. And as -- in 4 later conversation with the reactor operators, they believe 5 that the alarm just cleared by adding water to the tank, 6 there was no requirement to bleed the pressure off of the 7 tank in the Auxiliary Building. l 8 So it took about ten minutes. It was'very similar I
- 9. to the event performed on the 5th. And that -- that's about ;
10 it.
11 Q Can you tell me why you didn't tell us about this 12 last time when we talked?
13 A Well, the question wasn't~ asked. And I think the 14 data from the 4th was -- that's what we saw from the data 15 from the 4th, is when we delogged the computer it was very 16 erratic, it didn't show anything. It was -- it jumped 17 around. It didn't prove what we thought we would see. We 18 thought we would see a nice, smooth curve develop that would ;
19 show that -- that Curve 8 was -- was not correct, and it 20 didn't show that.
21 So -- so after that test was performed the chief 22 operator pulled the engineering. calculation, he got with the 23 assistant shift supervisor and they reviewed it, you know, 24 for -- for some time, and then they came up with a reason 25 why they thought that the -- the previous test had been NBAL R. GROSS & Co., INC.
(202)334 4433
I 1
c .Page 6 i
1 . inconclusive.
2 -Now, why we didn't bring it up was, I=would have 3 to say that we were counseled'before -- before we talked to ;
i 4 you by Mr. Gerald Williams, the FPC corporate counsel, to j 5' answer only the questions that you asked,' answer truthfully, I
'6 . but don't volunteer.--' don't volunteer any information. He l
7 . was.-- I had no reason to not believe what he -- what he l 1
-8 said in it. And in my mind'it was an unimportant piece of 9 the' puzzle because it was -- it was flawed data. The 10 important -- the'important event was September 5th, where we
- 11. conclusively showed that' Curve 8 was not accurate and a 12 valid safe'ty poncern existed. 4 13 So Mr. - .I'm not going to put all the blame on 14 Mr. Williams but, you know, he just said you guys are -- you 1 i
15 guys are coming up to talk to us. And you're not -- like I
16 you say, you're not technical type people, you're policemen.
17 You know, and he made some -- some not-so-kind cotaments .
18 about what he thought of you, but...
19 Q Well, I'm wanting to hear what'he said.
20 A Well, basically it was, you-know, "These guys are 21- just cops, you know. Well, they're not even cops, they're ;
J22 just' cop want-to-be's." And, you know, he talked about your 23 career with the NRC. And I -- I don't know what that had to
~
.24 do with anything. But he -- basically it was, "I don't know 25 how these guys are going to react, you know. They're not NEAL R. 3 088 & % , INC.
(202)234 4433
- - - _ _ . . - - - _ - - . _ - . . - . . - ~ --. - . - . - . _ - - - - _ - -
Page 7
~
i 1 here to do -- they're not here to do you.any favors, so just 2 answer their questions. Don't expound on anything, you 3 know, and let it go at that." !
4 So that -- that was I guess my. reason for it. You 5 didn't --
I reviewed'my transcript yesterday, and no,;you 6 didn't ask me that question. 'I l
^
7 Q That's true, we didn't ask.
8 When you did the September 4th evolution,-did you 9 station anyone down in the Aux Building to vent.the hydrogen 10 'like you did on the 5th?
11 A I -- I can't say for sure. I know we had a 12 different operator on the 4th than we had on the 5th. On .
~
I' 13 the 5th we had a lot more -- a lot better. understanding.of
~i 14 why the curve was wrong. We. read the calculation, you know, 15 and it became obvious this is -- no-wonder this' darn thing 16 is wrong,-you know. We.could see the bad assumptions in it.
17 On the 4th we didn't really have that information; all we i 18 had was we think it's wrong based upon some data we had i 19 taken on performing SP-630 during-the outage.
20 My board operator remembers, he.says, "I know I 21 called the Auxiliary Building operator and had him -- said, 22 'We're going to be bleeding the tank. If I call you I want 23 you to get in there and vent the tank off.'" So I don't ,
24 believe we had a guy stationed, but we_did notify the man in 25 the field. And -- And part of that is -- you just -- I just NBAL R. etOSS & CO. . INC.
(202)234 4433
. . . _ _ . ~ . . __. . _ _ . _ . ._ _._ _.. . _ _ _
- 1. !
i Page 8
- 1. don't remember because the 4th was really fairly 2 insignificant and it's been a year now. So -- so I'm not .
3 trying to. dodge any issues, but to the best of my 4 recollection-the man was not dressed out like on the 5th, 5 but he was notified via the control board operator to stand 6 by and be ready to vent the tank if necessary.
7 Q When the enunciator on the 4th and the 5th -- when 8 the enunciator alarm came on did you -- did you feel a need 9 to get -- to take some corrective action?
-10 A We had reviewed the enunciator response procedure 11 and knew what response was required, and knew that basically 12 it says to', ypu know, vent the pressure-off or 3 wer the 13 level, I believe is what it says. Nothing in our -- you i
14 know, if it was going to come in we knew we expected the l 15 alarm and why -- and there was a valid reason why the alarm 1 16 came in. So we, in our mind, decided that there was no l
17 requirement to immediately clear this alarm. Our p.ocedures l 18 allow us to receive expected alarms because of manipulations 19 of the' plant, and that's -- that's allowed by AI 500. So we 20 felt procedurally very comfortable with it.
21 And I know on previous procedure, previous times 22 in the past, you know, my shift has taken the watch and the 23 darn alarm is in. My shift was one of the shifts that 24 refused to operate the plant with that much pressure in the 25 makeup tank. You know, .that's why they came to us with, "Do mm m. mon o m., rue.
(202)234 4433
Page 9 1 you want to do something?" because we had been the most 2 vocal, we were involved with SP 630.
3 But I've come in -- I've come in to take the watch 4 and that alarm is in, and apparently these other shifts 5 didn't -- didn't think it was that significant. You know i
6 why it's in. You can see that you're right on the curve.
~
7 You've got the alarm in, so they just wait till the next 8 shift comes in. So we would take the watch, my board ~
9 operator would ask me, says, "I don't want to operate here.
10 Can I bleed -- vent the tank down?"
11 I say, "Yes, go ahead and vent the tank down."
12 And we w-ild yent it down. So I didn't feel at all 13 uncomfortable, and I know other shifts didn't feel 14 uncomfortable operating in alarm. You know, because 15 remember, it was -- it was an operating curve, it was not a 16 design basis curve, it should not have been a design basis 17 curve.
l 18 Q And as we discussed before, did you know at the 19 time that it was a design basis curve?
20 A Absolutely not.
21 Q The shift technical advisor was Mr. Marshall on l
22 the 4th, is that -- do you remember?
23 A I don't remember. It -- it could have been. They i 24 have a little bit different schedule -- schedule than I do.
s 25 I know it was Larry Moffatt on the 5th.
NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
l l
,1 i
' Page 10 i 1 Q Did -- did you have a reason for not at least j l
2 consulting with the shift advisor, do you -- on the 4th or 3- the 5th?
4 A I didn't feel that I had a -- a reason to because h 5 'it was such a simple evolution. It was an evolution -- you 1
j
- 6 know, every day you bleed water from the makeup tank. We l
- 7 had looked at it to see that, yeah, we're covered by j 8 procedure on.this. And it wasn't one of these things that 9 we saw it as a test in any way. So we looked at it, talked 1
, 10 among ourself, and no, I did not notify Mr. Marshall. j i -
1
. 11 Q We've discussed, you know, test before. And I'd l 12 like to on'ce again ask you how you could consider tha.
13' routine when you put someone down on the Aux Building to
]
. 14 vent the makeup tank in the event of a LOCA. l 1
15 A We were expecting the alarm the first night. And-16 we knew that that was the required procedural requirement to 17 clear the alarm. Plus we didn't -- you know, we didn't have l l
18 in our minds fully how it was -- how it was going to react, j
- 19 being right on the curve and bleeding down. And when we 20 looked at it we said, "Well, if anything unusual comes out 21 we'll have a_ guy ready to -- to bleed it down."
22 Now, the second night, after_we had reviewed the 23' calculation, we were a. lot more familiar with, well, why was i 24 this curve designed, and we saw that, yeah, during a loss of 25 coolant accident the amount of pressure in the makeup tank NBAL R. GA088 & CO., INC.
l (202)234-4433
, . . . - - - - - . . . - . - . . - . ~ . - - . _ . - . _ - . . - . . - ~ -- ~ - - . .- ..
i-Page 11 j
f 1 has some significance. You know, it -- it said that if you n
, '2 were supplying two makeup pumps on one suction line that.you-
~
j 3 . would draw that tank down and you would still have 1.7. feet c
4 of -- of head in the suction of the pumps.
5 BY MR. DOCKERY:
i '6 Q Let me interject something. Mr. Fields, for the
.7 sake of clarity, you've -- you've used the term "we," the
- 8. word "we." Could you identify who you consider "we" to be 4 9 in this context.
l
[ 10 A The shift operators involved were myself, the l 11 shif t 'sup arvisor; - Rob' Weiss, the assistant shift supervisor; 12 Mark Van S'ickJ en, chief nuclear operator; Jack Stewart, 13 chief nuclear operator; Christine Smith, reactor' operator.
14 And on the night of.the 5th I know we -- we got -- involved ;
15 the other -- the other reactor operator who was actually 16 standing the Auxiliary Building watch, Jim Atkinson. Juid 17 then on the night of the 4th, all I know is that my chief 18 operator said he talked to the Aux:.liary Building operator, l i
19 who was Paul Tempesta that night. !
20 Q Thank you. ,
1 21 BY MR. VORSE:
?22- Q I forgot to ask you-I'd asked you last time, but I -- I should do it this time, too-I need to know what kind- j
'23 24' of a reactor operator license you had.
I have a senior reactor operator's license. I -- I
-25 A l
NBAL R. 3 088 & CO., IMO.
(202)234-4433 .
1 ;
Page 12 i
l' I had; I don't anymore.
l 2 Q ~ And you -- you -- once again, you were the shift f I
3 supervisor?
4 A That is correct.
5 Q When you're shift supervisor and you're operating 6 on let's say midnight shift, are you basically in charge of 7' that reactor?
-8 A Decisions regarding the reactor, I am the final i
9 decision.
10 Q- So the shift technical advisor really isn't a-11 player in this or -- or...?
12 A 'Dur,ing an accident he becomes my advisor.
13 Q And how long have you had your -- had you your SRO 14 license?-
15 A January or February of 1983.
16 Q You've been at Crystal River the whole time?
17 A Yes, sir.
18 Q When -- when management started reacting'to -- in 19 an adverse way to the September 5th evolution, was there any 20 discussion amongst the shift -- your shift not to tell 21 - management about the September 4th evolution?
22 A Not at all.
23 Q Would you -- if they had asked you, would you have 24 told them?
25 A Absolutely. That's how they found out that it NBAL R. WtOSS & CO., INC.
(203)234-4433 p
Page 13 1 happened.
2 Q How did -- how did they find out it happened?
3 A On July 19th Bruce Hickle called me down to the 4 office. We were getting ready-to come to Atlanta for the 5- pre-decisional enforcement conference. And the day before I 6 was supposed to go-I was supposed to make my presentation 7 on the 21st-Bruce was going to present the. operator action 8 section of the -- the company's presentation on July 25th.
9 And he just called me to his office and wanted to go over, 10 you know, "This is kind of going to be what my presentation 11 is going to look like." And he asked me, he says, "Now, 12 I've heard grpund rumblings about some sort of data-taking 13 or even a previous evolution on the night before."
14 I -- I said, "Yes, we did do that the night 15 before." Said, "It was inconclusive," and I told him, you 16 know, the reasons we thought it was inconclusive. And I 17 told him basically the reason it didn't -- it dide.'t come up 18 to the Office of Investigation was that -- that we were 19 advised not to by. Gerald Williams. But that's -- that was 20 their concrete source of information. I've heard that 21 there's been some sort of anonymous safety concerns given to 22 either Mr. Williams or somebody about, you know, "These 23 operators did something and they're withholding 24 information." But the confirmation came from me and I 25 didn't hesitate. I had no reason to lie.
NEAL R.1lst088 6 CO. , INC.
(202)234-4433
i l
I Page 14 l 1 MR. VORSE: You have something?
2 BY MR. DOCKERY:
3 Q Mr. Fields, did -- did you ever specifically 4 discuss the evolution of September 4th with Mr. Williams?
5 Did he bring it up with you?
6 A No. You know, I think -- I think it's important 7 to bring up also that, you know, the company should have 8 known about September the 4th. You know, I fully agreed 9 with that. But they -- they didn't -- we performed the 10 evolution; we presented the problem report to the company.
11 And, you know, we thought we were just doing something
~
12 fairly noble and saying, hey, this has been a nagging issue 13 for a long time. Here's some documented evidence to say 14 that this curve is not correct. And we issued it in the 15 form of a problem report.
16 Well, somehow it got turned around; the company 17 decided, "Oh, my God, you've done a -- an unauthorized test.
18 You violated a design basis curve." And we became-not part 19 of the solution-we became the problem. Rob and I were j 20 brought up before a Management Review Board, and they 21 weren't asking questions about, "What did you do? What did I 22 you see? What were your thought processes?" They were 23 there to fire me, they were there to fire Rob Weiss.
i 24 And basically all I did was sit there and say, 25 "Yes, sir. No, sir. I'll never do that again, sir." None ItBAL R. GROSS & CO.. INC.
(202)234*4433 l
l
_.._.7.-..__.
2 l 1
i I Page 16-
'j~ .
- . me. The only -- the only time I talked to anybody was 2' September 15th, which is the Management Review Board, and-i 3- then again whenever Mr. Gerald Williams talked to-me in
? 4 . April 25th of 1995. And his questions weren't -- and, you-i
. 5 know, by that time itlhad been a long time. It was -- the
[ 16 important event was September the 5th. -September 5th showed
- 7. clearly that the plant was: operating ' outside design basis. )
h 8 I didn't.take the plant outside design basis; it was-already-
- l 9 outside design basis just by operating where management -
- 10 , insisted we operate. And nobody investigated that with the 4
L 11- operators.. 1 j 12 'They would have told. Nobody -- you see, we had i 1 13 -- we presented the problem report. . We wanted management to This is-what we did;
~
i= 14 review it. We said, "Here's the data.
<^
j 15 this is what we think's wrong." .You know, we didn't feel ]
- j. 16 like the events of September 4th were -- were that
{ ;17 important, but we-certainly-didn't feel they were something 18 to conceal. It was just -- it was just -- in my -- in my f
5- 19 understanding or my opinion, it was just a piece of-the i
] 20 puzzle that we kind of used to fit together and'say, "Ah, 4
21- that's why the September 4th didn't work. We -- we added
!~
[ 22 cold hydrogen, we.added cold water, and we didn't let the i;
i 23 system stabilize." And that's what'we did to correct it for L
.24- September Sth and the system response was a much smoother 12 5 curve.
}
NEAL R. GROSS & CO,, INC.
J (202)224 4433 i
_ _ . . _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ . ~ _. . __ _ _ . . . . _ _ _ . _ . _ . ... _
Page 17 1 But we had no reason to talk -- no reason to hide 2 .it. Nobody investigated it. The company didn't investigate 3 it. When I talked to Gerald Williams on April 25th his 4 questions weren't technical in nature. He'was asking more 5 questions about, "Well, how are we going to present this to 6, the NRC?" and, "Well, why didn't you. notify the shift 7 -manager, " and.he wanted to have that kind of an answer.
8 And,E"Well, why didn't you immediately respond to~the...?"
9 He -- he was looking for things like: This is how best to
-10 present the.information so that the NRC would -- would look 11 more kindly on it, .I think. It was kind of second guessing 12 what the NRC , wanted to see. But he wasn't aski..g technical 13 questions.
14 BY MR. McNULTY: j 15 Q- Can I ask a question about the design basis. Your I
16 understanding of the curve, Curve 8, was that this was a 17 operating (sic) limit?
~
18 A Yes, sir.
19- Q Yet you felt that the curve was non-conservative?
20 A That's correct.
21 Q Did you have any understanding of what the design 22 basis should have been for that circumstance or that 23 situation?
24 A I guess I_just assumed that someplace to the left
- 25. of it, left of that curve-excuse'me-there would be a design M EL R. W M 8 & CO.. DC.
(202)234-443)
Page 18 l 1 basis curve where there was no margin. That on one side of 2 the curve your high pressure injection system is good; on 3 the other side it's not.
4 O So in preparing -- ir. preparing to do your 5 evolution-excuse me-you knew you were going to go outside 6 the administrative limit?
7 A I suspected that I might.
8 Q You suspected. Did you make any effort to try to 9 determine where the design basis was?
10 A No, I didn't. ~You know, I'm not really -- I'm not 11 really trained in that. You know, I'm not -- you know, we ;
12 had -- wo Ilact raised our concerns to engineering dur'ing the 13 outage and they didn't come back with any words about design 14 basis, you know. It's -- that's not -- you know, that's an i 15 engineering type function as we, as operators, operate the 16 plant to operating limits. )
17 Q Well, if -- if the operating limit curve, Curve 8 18 was accurate, and your actions would have taken it beyond i
19 the administrative limit, weren't you afraid that there was l I
20 a point there that you might exceed the design basis curve !
21 if it was a little further out there?
22 A I wouldn't say that that was my thought process, 23 but I know that we watched it carefully so that it would 24 come down. And we suspected it would follow the curve ;
25 fairly closely. I think what we had the guy stationed for i
NEAL R. GROSS t. Co.. INC.
(202)234*4433
Page 19
-1 and-everyone watching the information come down is'if for 2 some reason it would-take a sharp turn to.give us something i
3 really unexpected. So we were watching it fairly closely, !
i 4 but I wasn't thinking, oh, there's a design basis curve over. l 1
l 5 here and we don't want to exceed that.
6 BY MR..DOCKERY:
7 Q Mr. Fields,.would it be fair.to say.thatfor would .I 8- you be in agreement with the statement that engineering 9 somehow dropped the ball with respect to that Curve:8?
10 A I fully agree with that 11- Q To your knowledge, did anybody in engi..eering'ever 12 -undergo any negative employment consequence because ci 13 errors that'were made or failure to address -- adequately 14 address the issue?
15 A Not to my knowledge. I think engineering has --
16 has played a very important role as sort of guiding --
17 guiding the' decision-making process here. They have spent 18 all their time. casting negative light on the operators: How 19 dare these operates challenge us. And -- and I think i
120 they've done the plant a disservice by -- by their actions.
-21 They have focused their attention and management's. attention 22 upon me and my integrity and my reasons for doing this I 23 think so that the NRC will not look at what group of idiots 24 could not see that this curve was -- was wrong.
25 They were tasked -- we wrote the problem report HEAL R. OR088 & Co., INC.
(202)234 4433
1 i
Page 20 1 during the outage: We think this curve is wrong. And ;
1 2 engineering was going through the -- the cause and the i 3 corrective action, and their answer came up with: The curve 4 is accurate and reasonably conservative. In fact, we think 5 we can increase the pressure in the tank. Which was exactly 6 what management wanted. Management wanted more hydrogen in 7 the reactor coolant system.
8 But when we pulled that calculation it was 9 absolutely obvious that the curve was calculated based on l 10 wrong assumptions and different -- different emergency 11 operatin3 procedures. Engineering could not have pulled.
12 that calcu'lation to make that -- to have written that 13 letter. It was sloppy engineering. Before -- before they 14 came out with the September 2nd letter saying accurate and 15 reasonably conservative, my boss, Greg Halnon, asked two 16 engineers, Pat Hinman and Steve Rowe, "I want you guys to 17 independently work up a calculation to verify that -- that 18 Curve 8 is okay."
19 They came back to him, they said, "We can't do it.
20 We don't know how."
21 And then Pat Hinman wrote the letter that says, 22 "Well, it's -- it's accurate and reasonably conservative."
23 How could he say - how could he have said that?
24 Q Who wrote that letter?
25 A Pat Hinman. He's a senior -- or a discipline NEAL R. GROSS & Co., INC.
(202)234-4423
4 i
e
! Page 21 1
1.
1 engineer.for the makeup system.
2 Q Could you spell that for us, please. l
[ - .
1 3 A Hinman, H-i-n-m-a-n. !
4 .Q In your -- in your mind is there any single j i :
j 5 individual or individuals in engineering'or over engineering 6 who are responsible for what we now know was a -- was a 7 failing with respect to Curve 8?
- 8 A Well, I think the -- the engineers who were-9 involved, the two engineers who were -- they were ,
a 10 responsible for the makeup _ system, Mr. Hinman and Phil
. a
! 11 Saltsman, I guess I -- in my opinion are guilty of just j 12 ~incompetenceq Now, how their organization-works, you know, j; 13 they have a -- they have a supervisor; their supervisor has i
14 a manager; their manager has a director; and the director 15 reports to the senior vice president. Well, how high do you 16 go? I don't know.
17' Buh I know that Mr. Beard, a-senior vice 18 president, was very influential'upon the engineers and their 19 decision making. He was demanding 25 cc's per kg, he was 20' monitoring it daily, he had the Chemistry Department 21 monitoring it hourly. And the only reason to monitor it l22 hourly is to. find out which shifts -- which. shifts operated 23 on the curve and which shifts df.dn't operate on the curve.
24 Pat Beard told Greg Halnon, said, "Greg," at 10:00 meeting, 25 "Greg, you go up there and get those operators straightened usu n. mon a co., zwe.
(2c2)234 4433
. . . . - . - - . . . - . - - - . _ - . . . - . . - ~ . - _ . - - . - . . . . -
)
1 l
)
i Page 22. l 1 out."~
2 -Q How do you know he said that?
3 A Because I heard that'. I'll.-- it's in my letter-
~
4 as a "I heard that." I cannot say -- I'was not in at the 5 meeting, but somebody-who was at the meeting told me.
.6 Q Do you identify-that individual in...?'
7 A I do not identify'that individual, butlI.have 8 prepared a list of questions in-an allegation that I-have 9 attached here, requesting you guys -- you folks to ask' 10 Mr. Beard that question, "Did.you tell Greg Halnon, 'Go up-11 there'and get these operators straightened out'?"
12 Q 'WouAd you right'now identify the individual who 13 related that conversation.to you?
.14 A I would if I could remember, and I can't remember.
15 I'm not trying-to withhold any information here. I'-- it
'l 16 was just one of those. things when they said it, itLstuck in
- 17. my mind. And it's stuck in .ny mind ever'since. 9it I know 18 .Mr. Beard, because -- I mean, I know he was having an 19 influence upon hydrogen concentration in the maket.p tank.
l 20 I've submitted in previous letters to Mr. Ebneter the E-mail ;
21 messages from my management. It was a hot topic of the day,-
22 makeup tank hydrogen, you know, telling you how to do it-and 23 telling you he wants it done. Two separate E-mail messages.
24 We knew -- we knew that that's what management wanted.
I 25 Q Okay, you stated just a few minutes ago that, if I l
(202)234-4433 ,
- . ... . - - - _ _ . ~ . - - _. . _. . . --
i i
Page 23 1 understand correctly, you or your operating people pulled 2 the calculations on which that curve was based, is that ;
i 3 correct? !
4 A That's correct, 190 -- I've got a number if you 5 think that's important. Calculation I90-0024, Revision 5.
f 6 Q When you say you pulled'it, did you cg) somewhere i
7 in document control and obtain it?
8 A Yes, siri that's right. Mark Van Sicklen went i'
9 over to document control. I remember that Mark went over l 10 the night of the 4th to get it. Rob Weiss says, "I don't 4 11 know if he went over the night of the 4th or the night of 12 the 5th." ' Sq one of those two nights.
I 13 Q And if I understand you correctly, on its face, ,
i 14 that calculation or set of calculations appeared to you, at' !
15 least, and your peers in operations to be faulty or j 16 incorrect?
17 A It's-obvious that it's faulty or incorrect.
18 Q Should it have been obvious to an~ engineer, 19 somebody in engineering that it was faulty and/or incorrect?
} 20 A It was clearly -- clearly that way. You couldn't
- 21 have read it and said Curve 8 is conservative and accurate.
22 You just could not have done that.
1 23 Q Did you make any attempt to go to engineering, who 24 I assume is responsible for generating that calculation, and 25 say, "We feel you should look at this"?
4 NBAL R. GROS 8 8. CO., INC.
4 (202)234-4433 O
ee , -
Page 24 1 A We felt that engineering had made their statement >
2 in the 2nd -- September 2nd letter. ;
3 BY MR. VORSE:
4 Q Can you tell us what that September 2nd letter 5 said?
6 A Well, it's the one that... ;
7 MR. HENDRIX: Is it in our notebook?
8 THE WITNESS: Yes. ,
9 MR. DOCKERY: Counselor, if we may, let's -- let's 10 make reference to those again. And...
11 MR. HENDRIX: Okay.
12 301.,DOCKERY: ...I'd like to identify at this time 13 for the record by how they're... !
14 MR. HENDRIX: Okay, we have--- we have -- we :
15 discussed in Rob Weiss' testimony that we had prepared an 16 exhibit to be jointly referenced by both of my clients. And 17 it's -- we've entitled it, "In Re: David Fields Pre-Decision 18 Enforcement Conference," because this is what he intended to 19 produce at the pre-decision enforcement conference. And we 20 -- during one of our discussions with you gentlemen about p 21 today, we thought it would be best to produce these 22 documents today, maybe, and we included in here 39 exhibits.
! 23 24 And we've already talked about #25 being slightly
- 25 in need of correction. But these 39 exhibits are the heart j NBAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234 4433 p I
Page 25 1 of what happened. And in.here:is the September 2nd memo, I !
2 believe, from engineering; is that-correct, Dave? i 3 THE WITNESS: That is correct. .
4 MR. HENDRIX: You want to refer that? )
1
- 5. MR. DOCKERY: Okay, I -- I just want to -- we l
6 didn't really title...
7' MR. HENDRIX: Yeah, there's two notebooks, two i 8 spiral notebooks with 39 exhibits. And again I would also l
9 incorporate by reference the chronology of events memorandum i 10 that I presented to Mr. Vorse on behalf of both of my 11 clients. I think that also is entitled, "In Re: Divid 12 Fields." 'Junt we had discussed among ourselves M . Fields 13 was the senior person and he wanted his names (sic) to be on 14 these documents because he feels responsible for the people 15 working underneath him.
16 MR. DOCKERY: Okay, and we'll acknowledge that i
17 we're going.to take receipt of those documents at the 18 conclusion of this testimony.
19 MR. HENDRIX: It was not included in there?
20 THE WITNESS: No,.it's in here, but I...
g 21 MR. HENDRIX: Can't tell by the way it's 22 described? You might just have to flip through.
23 (The witness reviews certain material.)
24 MR. HENDRIX: Is that not it?
25 THE WITNESS: Here it is. Here it is, Exhibit 5.
NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433 l:
t Page 26 t
~1 .All~ right, that would be Exhibit 5. It's a letter to Bruce ~ ;
2 Hickle'from Pat Hinman, Nuclear Project Engineer, and co-3 1 signed by Jerry Campbell, Manager, Nuc Plant Tech Support. '
4 MR. RAPP: What's the date of that letter? i
'5 THE WITNESS: That's ' September 2nd, 1994.
6 MR. RAPP: Is'that the letter *of memorandum where 7 it had been penciled on top, "Do you have anything further 8 to provide?" or something to that effect?
9 THE WITNESS: I can't read...
10 MR. HENDRIX: On our copy it's not fully legible.
11 MR. RAPP: It's not legible? Okay. ;
12 Gt.,HENDRIX: Yes. !
13 BY MR. VORSE: L i 14 Q But that was engineering telling you.that they 15' were going to close the -- that was the letter that-16 engineering used to tell -- tell you that they.were going to 17 close that issue?
18 A That is correct. And my management -- my 19 management' brought the letter to me; Carl Bergstrom, who's
.20 the support shift manager in operations. And he says, 21 " Dave, I know your shift has been interested in this and 22 you've taken lead on this issue. Well, engineering's going 23 to close it out. You know, the final report's going to be 24 closed out. We're going to have to operate at -- on the 25 curve. Is there anything you want to do or respond to this 1
JEAL R. 3 088 6 CO., INC.
f (303)334-4433
J
- - Page 27
. 1- before it gets closed out?" And I -- and I felt'that that 2 was my management coming to.me and requesting that I take
- 3 action. And I thought that'the action we took was.
t 4 conservative and expected and useful.
- 5 BY MR. DOCKERY
- j
.i
- - 6 Q. Let's be very clear here. When you say, "The I i
7 action we took," what are you referring to, Mr. Fields? '
1 i 8 A The performance of the data-taking on September !
9 4th and September 5th in preparation of filing Report 94- l l 10 267.
11 BY MR. VORSE:
3 12 Q 'Are,you saying, Mr. Fields, that you felt, Lased
- - 13 on that September 2nd letter telling you they're going to
~
j 14 close out -- or they're asking you for your final input on .;
l 15 that,-did you think that that was giving you permission to j
- 16- go ahead and do your evolutions?
i i
- 17 A ses. You know, 1 -- you-know, I -- I feel like l 18 explaining what the shift supervisor does out there, as long i l
- 19 as I'm operating to procedures I'm authorized to do these i ,
20 sorts of things. One of the plates -- you know, and it's 21 expected of me. That's my j ob. You know, if operators have 22 concerns, a safety concern, I feel like, well, that's-valid, i
. 23 I better listen to the guy. Well, these -- these concerns ;
24 had been brought up to management and they had been brought 4
25 up to engineering and they were blown off. And I felt like- l i .. . . . ... m .
a (202)234 4632 i
I
4 Page 28 j 1 I did my job by listening to the guy.
2 And we said, "Well, what can we legally do to --
3 to show this, so it won't be closed out?" We reviewed our 4 procedure OP 402, we looked at the enunciator response
- 5 procedure, we took precautions to -- to make sure that it 6 was a controlled evolution, and we performed it and we
- 7 presented the problem report. I felt like I did everything
(
- 8 that a shift supervisor should do, that it was expected of 4 9 me.
i 10 Let me reference one plate in here, or I. guess one 11 tab.
12 'MR.,HENDRIX: Didn't do a good job of putting them 13 in order, did I?
i 14 THE WITNESS: We'll find it, Pat and Gary's 15 expectations.
16 In the fall and winter of 1993 all the supervisors 17 were -- were given empowerment training. And Gary Bolt and 18 Pat Beard, the senior vice -- the vice presidents of -- of 19 nuclear operations, attended every one of these. It was a 20 one-week course. Under Pat and Gary's expectations in 21 writing, you know, he presents these expectations, but he --
22 he and Gary -- he and Pat presented these together. It 23- says, " Challenge the process." It says, "Be an innovator 24 and initiator of needed change. Avoid getting trapped by 25 bureaucratic policy and the status quo. It's okay to NEAL R. QR088 & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
-. m. . _
4 Page 29 1 question any requirement, including regulations and company ,
2 policy that doesn't make sense. Rigid and blind obedience 3 is not in the best interest of nuclear safety." And I 4 believed that. l I
5 MR. DOCKERY: Mr. Fields, would you identify which 6 exhibit, within your documentation, that is.
7 THE WITNESS: This is Exhibit 22.
4 8 MR. DOCKERY: Thank you.
9 THE WITNESS: And I -- I felt like, well, that's 10 my job. I'm a shift supervisor. And -- and they -- they're 1
11 kind of like I'm this rogue operator, by management; but I 12 am management,at the plant. I was bef' ore I was fired. I--
- 13 I-felt, you know, that was my responsibility, my authority 14 to do what I did. And I -- I'm very disappointed that my 15 senior management has turned their back upon me and -- and 16 somehow offered me as -- as the guilty party here, because I 17 don't feel like the guilty party. I think some other people 18 did a lot poorer job in their efforts than I did. And I 19 honestly feel fairly proud of what I did.
20 You know, I think it has to be emphasized over and 21 over again it was a safety concern. We had nothing to gain.
22 It was a safety concern, that we had brought the concern to 23 engineering; they blew us off. We brought the concern to 24 management; they blew us off. They were insisting operate 25 on that curve. In fact, we're going to raise the pressure NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC, (202)234-4433
. . _ . . ~ _ _ _ , _ . . . . _
.- ._ . m. .. ._- . - . _ . . _ . . _ . _ _--_mm . - _ ,
i
- f. k l
Page 30 l
-1 in that curve. My; operators didn't feel comfortable.with. i i
1 2 that. They weren't sure.why, but.they said, "We don't like 3 this." l
! 4 And we looked at what we could' legally do, and we l 5 did it, and we presented it as a problem report,.says, "This I 6 is a safety concern.- This -- this affects the, safety of the I 7 plant." And we were right. And the things'that have 8 happened to me, being' fired over bringing up a valid safety- 1 j '9 concern, this -- this just seemed like an injustice that I
- l. 10 -- I just am having a difficult time with.
11 BY MR. McNULTY:
- ' 12 Q Wha,t didn't the operators like about operating on i
- 1. 13I the curve? ;
i I. 14' A They. knew that excessive pressure in the tank -- -j f
15 they weren't -- they weren't sure, but they felt like, well ,
j 16 -- you know,-they knew that if that tank blew down in an
.17 accident situation and you actually got hydrogen Jn the-l l 18 suction of the -- of the high pressure injection pumps, the l L i
- 19 pumps would fail. We knew that because we had burned up a. ,
20 pump once before just by inadvertently... Not "we" as....
21 A group of operators inadvertently closed the 7
i 22 suction valve, and the pump destroyed itself in eight i
23 seconds; pieces, parts every place. We knew that was a
{ I' j 24' concern.
L 25 My operators' first concern that they brought up
-i nau, n. amo u . co., rue. ;
(202)234-4433 ;
} )
4 N
l o !
~
! Page 31-
~
t 1 18-months prior to that was, well, if we have'all this
? .
2 pressure here and we need to shut down the reactor and we .l1 3 want to inject -- we want to make sure that highly borated ,
4 .w ater gets in, normally you would just open the suctions of 5 the borated' water storage tank and it would be the preferred
.l p 6 source to go'in. But with all'the pressure.in the makeup. :
L !
7 -tank, that was still^the preferred source and you wouldn't .l L 8 .get the highly borated water-I'm directing this to Mr. Rapp
(- 9 right now-but you wouldn't get the highly borated water.in, l 10 you'd just get the RCS concentration in, and you wouldn't l- . 11 get your -- the shutdown that you'-- that you wanted. That 12' was the in'itial concern. l 13 And -then shortly thereafter there were concerns- j i :
l 14 about Appendix R fire regulations, that with the regulator L
l 15 set at such a high pressure and you had a fire and the j l 16 regulator failed in.the open position:you couldn't'g'at to l l '
l 17. the building and.it would keep on injecting hydrogen _and i-l- 18 causing you some problems there. And -- and it's still an e
V l -19 issue, it's still an open issue as far as emergency i -
20 boration. We've been tasked by the NRC to write an
. 21 emergency boration procedure.
22 The Appendix R concern that we just -- that we l 23 brought up 18 months ago; four months -- three months ago i
1
! 24 they came out with a' letter that'said keep that valve --
i 25 keep that valve isolated; only un-isolate it when you're usu. m. amoss a co., nee. ,
f (202)234-4433 L
l 4 , - . - - .
1 l
Page 32 )
1 going to add hydrogen because of Appendix R. And then from )
i 2 our problem report we showed that the excess hydrogen and 3 the hydrogen binding of the pumps is correct. So we as 4 operators were correct on all three -- all three of our i
I 5 concerns have proved to be correct. And it's taken 18 6 months.
- 7. BY MR. RAPP:
8- Q So all these other issues were being pursued by 9 your shift or by the -- by the people on your shift, the 10 emergency boration'and Appendix R?
11 A Eighteen -(18) months prior to that I didn't have 12 the same s'hifg members; but basically Mark Van Sicklen 13 probably on my shift took the lead. .He was the original 14 group.
15- Q So he's the one that had the -- he had concerns 16 about emergency boration and Appendix R?
17 A That is correct.
18 Q No other operators?
19 A The.only other operator I know, that he was --
20 when the -- when the curve first came out, raised a concern, 21 was Bruce Willms, who was on another shift. W-i-1-1-m-s.
22 But he -- he was not on my shift.for the past year or so.
23 BY MR. VORSE:
24 Q Are you familiar with AI 500?
25 A Yes, sir.
mut a. eus a m., we.
(202)234-4433 I
i l
Page 33 1 Q Can you tell me basically what it says?
2 A Well, it's the administrative procedure that tells l l I 3 ---title is, " Conduct of Operations," and it provides the 4 administration of how the -- how the Operations Department 5 works. The -- the operations manager, Manager of Nuclear 6 Plant Operations, puts out his: This is how we do this. -
l 7 This is how we stand the watch. This is the reporting ,
8 requiremente. You know, he implements a lot of things from 9 an administrative side. He doesn't implement, you know:
l 10 This'is how you operate the -- the makeup and purification l J
11 system. But he implements how you use procedures, how you ;
3 i
! 12 use enunciator response procedures, how you use sther type 13 things.
1 14- Q When -- when you went into the alarm mode during j 15 these two evolutions and plotted the data, we were in the l 16 unacceptable region of the curve, is that correct?
17 A Yes, sir.
18 Q When you're in the unacceptable region of the 19 curve is there something that you're supposed to do to -- to 20 fix it, to correct it?
21 A There are two -- I could find two places in AI 500 l 22 that related to that. And -- which...?
23 MR. HENDRIX: It's in the notebook, I know, on the i
24 -- that second notebook, AI...
25 THE WITNESS: Okay. I've got it, AI 500, on July NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(302)234 4433 i
Page 34 1 19th,-the presentation that I was going to make to _
2 Mr. Ebneter, which never happened. Well, anyway, it was... j 3 I ---I included as attachments-the AI 500. Under jj 4 Section 4.3.2.2, enunciator alarm response procedures of AI. I 5 500, " Enunciator. response procedures, ARs, shall be used as
'I 6 follows: Enunciator response procedures shall be used to l 7 diagnose alarms not expected," in parentheses, "(not ,
1 8 directly related to intentional manipulation of plant 9 controls and for any alarm that the operators are not 10 explicitly familiar with.)"
11 And I read that to be if it's an expeceed alarm, 12 you know w'hy it's in, you're not required-to take immediate i 13 action. That.says nothing about the alarm comes in you've 14 got 30 minutes, you've got 20 minutes,.you've got five
~
15 minutes to clear the alarm. They do give us some credit for 16 understanding, well, why is that alarm in. Juld we fully 17 understood why the alarm is. We could see it on the control- l 1
18 board. You know, it's right on the curve, it was just 19 inside the curve.
20 Q What -- what typically would be to -- I know 21 immediate action is -- this is, I understand, not a first-22 tier alarm that requires your immediate response, it's kind 23 of-about third down from the -- from the top of the ;
i 24' importance list. What's a reasonable amount of time to --
25 to get back on -- to take corrective action to get that NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC. ,
(302)234+4433 '
. . . . . ... .. . - . . ..- - .. .. - . - , . - . ~ , . _
. ~ . -
i t
i Page 35 '
1 enunciator off the'line in a -- in:a situation such'as-this? e 2 A- In this situation we felt comfortable with drawing ;
the curve from-86 inches to 55 inches..-We felt that we had-
~
3 4 'just given engineering, in a problem report,94-149, it was 5 _just a piece of it that'didn't.. cross the line, and we said, .
i
.6 "It looks like it's going to cross the line." That's what j 7 we wrote the problem. report on.
8 Well, engineering rejected:that. No , it's not ,
l 9 going to cross the line. Everything's going toward zero.
10 It's not going to happen. We felt compelled to say.they're 11- not going-to believe us if we don't provide a nime, smooth 12 curve to s'how.them exactly, well, this is how the system 13 responds. And I think it's important.to note we didn't...
14 You know, I read it in the newspaper at home about 15 how I drove the plant to the unacceptable side of the curve.
16 I didn't drive the plant any way.- All I did was plot the 17 plant response.. OP 402, in one case, says, " Establish 18 hydrogen pressure in the makeup tank if desired. Step 1:
'19 Refer to Curve 8, OP 103B, for maximum makeup l tank pressure 20- -- overpressure." And that's -- that's what you do on the 21 curve. You refer to the curve and you either raise level, 22- add hydrogen; but anyway,'at 86 inches we did exactly that.
23 And then OP 402 doesn't refer to this curve ever' 24 again. It's not in the limits and precautions. It just 25 tells you when you're' pressurizing up to refer to it so you ME R. mMa & m. 2E.
(302)334 4433
)
l
_ . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . .. ..._.. ~ __ ,- ._ _ . . . . _ _ . _ . _ _
(
)
j Page 36 j
- - 1 don't-go over the curve, and we didn't go over the curve.
2 And the reason that is-a ' u 'ralid reason, there's
- 3 nothing wrong with.th' ,edure-the reason it'is,,if;you
.4 pressurize here.you should be able to lower level and come !
5 'down right on the curve, add water and raise level and come i 6 right back on the. curve. We didn't drive the plant any way. '
7 We performed OP 402 and we simply lowered. level, as allowed j 8 by this procedure, and showedlthat the plant response wasn't' f 9 this curve, the plant response came inside a little bit.
t 10 And at 55 inches we could. measure the' difference.
i .
1
- 11 And that was the most significant piece.o.
T
-9
[ 12 'informatio'n wp found: At 53 inches, if you converted that !
.13 pressure to a height of water, it was more than the i
j 14 calculation I90-24 accounted for. We could see, my God, j
^
i j 15 you're sitting; unknowingly you're going to hydrogen-bind i l 16 .
your high pressure injection pump. We felt that was ;
1 ,
l 17 significant, and I think it was significant, j
! ,18 BY'MR. RAPP:
Would that have resulted in a. loss of all high --
.' 19 Q
[- 20 high pressure injection pumps?
! i
[ 21 A No, sir. One.
L 22 Q Just one pump?
23 A Yes, sir, your other pump is independently lined
- 24 up to the -- the borated water storage tank.
- 25 Q So you still would have had capability for high.
4
,,=. . . o.ou . . . . m .
i (303)334-4433 l
E e -- wm 2
y i
Page 37
'l pressure injection?
2 A You would have had your high -- half.of your high a
3 pressure injection system. But you were sitting _there 4 unknowingly -- the shift would unknowingly know that if you 5- had an accident you're going to drain down and you're going 6 to blow up one of your pumps. We, as operators,. don't need 7 that' kind of. distraction in an event. You know, it's --
8 it's significant, you know. A high pressure injection is a 9 significant event, by itself. But when your equipment 10 starts to fail on you,-you're going to react,.overraact, try 11 to cross-tie them, you might do something stupid and destroy
.12 - 'your secon'd ppmp.
13 It was -- it was a significant safety. issue, and
-1 14 it-hasn't been treated as a safety issue.. Mr. Beard calls i
- 15. it a technical concern. And it's not come out, you know.
16 Nobody has emphasized that if you were on this-curve you 17 were outside design bases. Not if you were -- not'if you 18 drain down and was where I was at 55 inches. If you were on 19 the curve you were outside design bases. And we had been 20 operating there for 18 months. My shift operated there for 21 35 minutes one night and ten minutes the next night, and we 22- knew what we were doing. We had people watching it closely.
23 Those other. operators were sitting there for --
24 just doing what management wanted them to do. And they were 25 set up. Engineering set them up. They put a design basis NBAL R. StOSS & CO.. INC.
(202)234-4433 i
-. - . . ~ - - - _ . . .
i Page 38 l' curve'that they didn't understand into our operating 2 procedures, and management, given the opportunity -- given 1
3 -the opportunity to respond to concerns, blew us off and 4 said, "Nah, your concerns aren't valid. You know, you're 5 just a bunch of stupid operators. And we're going to --
6 we're going to -- not only are we going to go with this 7 curve, we're going to raise the pressure in it."
8 Absolutely the response from engineering and the 9 response of management was inadequate. It was -- isn't what i 10 you people in the NRC expect. It isn't what I expect as an i
11 operator, you know. When my people come to me with a 12- concern, I' at,least owe them enough to listen to them, and I l 13 did.
14 BY MR. VORSE:
15 Q Did you -- I've just got a couple more and then 16 I'm going to let Mr. Rapp talk to you for a little bit. But 17 did you log that September 4th evolution?
18 A No, sir, I did not.
19 Q There's nothing -- nothing -- there's no log 20 entry?
21 A No.
22 Q Did anybody log any entry? .
J 23 A I don't know if they did or not. The board 24 operator should have logged the bleed. By AI 500 he should 25 have said bled so many gallons, added so many gallons. I NEAL R. GROSS & CO,, INC.
(202)234-4433 j
i Page 39 1
1 don't know if he did or not. I do know on the 4th, though, l 2 that in talking to Paul Tempesta, that you had his log' entry 3 from that night and it says, "Added hydrogen to the' makeup l l
4 tank." So I know he logged that information. i 5 Q What do you think of your ECP program, your 6 ECP...? Is it termed ECP, Employee Concerns Program at --
7 at Crystal River? Is that what the name of it is? Or is it !
8 something else? i 9 A Yes, sir, your Employee Concerns Program.
10 Q What do you think?
1 11 A Not good. ,
12 Q 'Why,? ,
i 13 A In -- in my written submission today what I've 14 presented here is a letter written to you, Mr. McNulty.
15 It's abouc six pages long -- well,.seven pages long 16' describing everything I know about September 4th. Attached 17 to that, I've attached three allegations. Allegation #3 is 18 titled, " Ineffective Employee Safety Concerns Program."
19 I'll just read the first paragraph.
20 "FPC Nuclear Operations instituted a program 21 several years ago to collect and address employee concerns.
22 The program is designed to allow employees to raise a 23 concern, even a suggestion when he/she thinks it is 24 ~ detrimental to the nuclear plant. A dedicated 25 representative, Vic Hernandez, reports directly to Pat NBAL R. Stoss & Co. , INC.
(202)234 4433
i I
Page 40 l' Beard, Senior Vice President' Nuclear Operations; 2 investigates and prepares a report for each concern 3' presented.
4 "The employees should have confidence that'their 5 concerns are being raised to the_ highest-level in the 6 organization and are being thoroughly investigated. Since 7 the program.was instituted approximately three years ago, I 8 have submitted two safety concerns. These concerns are H 9 discussed below to support my allegation. The safety 10 concerns program is ineffective."
'll So I have -- I have two events in my last three 12: years as a' nuclear shift supurvisor where I_used the 13 Employee Concerns Program, and both times the response was 14 two months after I submitted it; both times the investigator
~15 did not come to me and ask me, "What are you! talking about 16 here?" He.just wrote his response. And his response in i
17- both cases was wrong. Says, "I have investigated. You have I 18 no concern." j 19 And I don't -- let me -- let me just say one i
20 thing. And I can't understand. It's Pat Beard's program.
21 My first_ concern was a safety concern. I said, " Management !
22 manipulated the clock on a shutdown order, shutdown tech 23 spec requirement." And I - -I fully expected within hours 24 or if not the next day.to get a phone call from Pat Beard 25 saying NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC, (202)234 4433 I
Page 41 1 "How -- what are you talking about? You're a 2 shift supervisor and you're saying management manipulated a 3 clock?" I didn't get_a response for two months back -- two 4 months later. He just says, 5 "You have no concern." In my -- in my'two -- two 6 -- two uses of the program, I -- I just -- I have no faith 7 'in the program. I don't think Mr. Beard is really that 8 interested.
9 BY MR. DOCKERY:
10 Q Did either of those two uses of the Employee 11 Concerns Program have any involvement with what we Ie 12 addressing' here today?
13 A Only from the standpoint that at the Management 14 Review Board, which was conducted I believe September 15th 15- of 1994, Paul McKee, the Director of Quality Programs -- Vic.
16 Hernandez works for him but reports direct to Pat Beatd...
17 BY MR. VORSE:
18 Q Now, Mr. Hernandez.is the ECP guy, right? He's 19 the head of the ECP?
20 A Yes. He asked me why I had not used the Employee 21 Concerns Program for resolving my shift safety concerns over 22 the makeup tank issue. And I know why I didn't, 'cause I 23 had seen -- I had seen two -- two employee concerns written 24 by both Mark Van Sicklen and Bruce Willms talking about this 25 emergency boration concern that they had. And they never NEAL R. GROS $ & Co., INC, (202)234-4433
1 i
Page 42 1
1 submitted them. I didn't tell them not to submit them, but l
2 I didn't really encourage them to because I don't think -- I l
3 didn't really have that much faith in the program.
4 My response to Mr. Mcxee, when he asked me that, I 1
l 5 was I just didn't - .I didn' t -- I didn' t include my l :
6 previous involvement in the program because, you know, I was )
l 7 -- I was getting ready to get fired that day. You know, I '
! '8 was--- they weren't ---they weren't here to -- there to hear y 9- about my criticism of their program.
! 10 But my -- the-Employee Concerns Program doesn't
. l 11 work. You know, these -- these two examples are my.
12 examples; ycni, know, I think somebody in the future.needs to ;
l ,
! 13 make an allegation concerning the emergency feed water !
14 control system. .That Employee Concerns Program has been on j l
15 the~ street for two years and they're doing nothing about it.
16' It's all-driven by, "Well, parts will be available in Refuel 17 10 and Refuel 11," and stuff like that. The system is -- I 18 the concern program should address -- should be addressed 19 rapidly. If it's a valid concern, it's a valid concern. It 20 should be addressed. And that's not what the system is L 21 being used for.
l l 22 BY MR. VORSE:
l l 23 Q So what you're saying is that you just did not l
24 have confidence in the ECP?
l 25 A I had no confidence based on previous experience.
I NMA R. SMS & M. , DC.
(202)234-4433
i i
l Page 43 1 Q And that's the reason why you-didn't tell them 2 about your concerns about the makeup tank?
3 A It never -- it entered my mind to -- to -- to give 4 a employee concern, but it was -- I guess I rejected it in 1 5 my, mind because, well, this -- this program doesn't work. I 6 can legally do an OP 4 -- 402 draw-down-of the makeup tank 7 -and give them, you know, visual proof that the curve is 8 inaccurate, and that's what I chose to do rather than -- )
9 than this method. In both -- both these cases it's a two-10 month turnaround. l 11 BY MR. DOCKERY:
12 0 'bhr . , Fields , I want to paraphrase, if I may, what I i
13 think you just said. You felt you had a -- a legal-lack of 14 a better term-way of proceeding without going to Employee 15 Concerns, is that fair?
16 A Yes, sir, absolutely.
17 Q And that is the course of action you undertook on 13 September -- basically September the 5th?
19 A- Yes. You know, it --
when you asked the question 20 about the log entry; well, much mere important than the log 21 entry was the preparation of the problem report. That was 22 the proper mechanism to identify the problem that existed.
23 And that's what we used. You know, that -- that goes 24 directly to management as soon as it's submitted.
25 BY MR. RAPP:
unu. n. amou s, co., we.
(202)234+4433
.i i
Page 44 ;
1 Q Why didn't_you just1 write.another problem report
{2 .when engineering said they were going to.close out the first l
3 one?-
4 A Well, it.would just be the same problem. I, guess.
5 I don't understand why I would do.that. 'You know, they've
]
i 6 already closed it out, they're not going to accept.the.
.]
7- second.one.
8 Q Well, it.just gives you another mechanism to-keep 9 pushing--the' issue through -- through a...
10 A Well, you could. But, I.mean, it would take --
11 it's a fairly quick turnaround. They've got -- they've got~
12 their reas'ons,'for -- for closing'out the first one;'it'
~ 13 doesn't take them long to -- if someone comes up with the 14 same' concern written on another piece of paper and say, ;
15 "We've already answered this question. Closed out." You l 16 know, I don't - I guess I don't understand why you.would I 17 think.that=would be~ effective. I don't -- because I don't i 18 'think it would have been.
19 BY MR. DOCKERY:
20 Q Mr. Fields, was -- are we dealing with a -- just a
~21 ~ difference of professional or-technical opinions here?
22 A As.far as -- I don't understand.
23' Q As far as operations, members of your operation 24 shift and yourself feel very strongly about what you 25 characterize as a safety issue. And yet, based on what I've NBAL R. StOSS & CO. . INC.
(202)234 4433
1 i
. l Page 45 1 heard here, it appears' you can't -- you were unable to get 2 it adequately addressed.
L 3 A That is correct. But I thought it was -- I l
at thought we'd used the proper method, was what we did. You .
1I 5 know, the -- the problem report,-you know, they could look j 6 at it and say, "Oh, yeah, this -- this curve is not 7 accurate. This is the real curve." You know, and I felt 8 like, well, that was -- I was responding to my operator's 9 concerns, and I said, 10 "Well, this is the way to do it. This i- the most ;
I l 11 -- this is the quickest, the most legal that I knew of, and )
L 12 the way -- yop know, the way to present the information." I l
13 Q It -- it sounds to me, though-I'm not putting 14 words -- creating testimony-but it almost sounds like a ,
l 15 last-ditch effort, after you'd tried other avenues. l i
16 A Well, I felt like the -- the September 2nd letter :
I 17 was, you know, brought to me and said, you know, "They're 18 going to close it out. Do you have anything you want to do I 19 or do you want to respond to this?" And I felt that was my 20 -- you know, what went through my mind, my operators came to 21 me and said, 22 "You know, if we used OP 402 we could really just 23 draw the system response, and we've got a procedure to do 24 that." And after we got the data, we -- we thought, well, i 25 now, the best way to present this data is with a problem ImAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433 l
l l
l
Page 46 1 report, and.we did that. I mean, I don't -- I don't want to 2 give the impression that, you know, we're out there 3 screaming and nobody will listen to us. It was just a kind 4- of a routine, yeah, we go -- you know... I didn't feel like 5 it was anything out of the ordinary.
6 Yeah, we'd had a kind of a difference of opinion 7 with engineering and we felt like they had done kind of a 8 sloppy job. But we weren't mad at them, we just said, 9 "Well, don't close it out. It's not -- you know, that we 10 don't think this curve is accurate, and here we drew you the 11 real system response." You know, it --
was it a last-ditch 12 effort? I't was -- I thought it was an effective way and the 13 proper way'to present.the data.
14 MR. HENDRIX: May I ask a question. When you 15 submitted that last problem report what is the s*andard 16 response to that? What -- what should be the standard 17 response?
18 THE WITNESS: Problem reports are submitted to the 19 shift manager. The shift manager evaluates it, you know, 20 initially just to say, well, what's the safety significant.
21 (sic). And then he'll -- I think every problem report is 22 evaluated at the 7:30 meeting where the plant manager and 23 all the department heads talk about it, and they assign it 24 -- well, we're going to assign this one to engineering.
25 Engineering would get the problem report and they would need NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234 4433
Page 47.
1 to evaluate it, do -- what's the cause here.
2 Engineering should then get involved with the You 3 people who ran the evolution and say, "What'd you do?
4 know, where's your data? Let's take a look at it and see if 5 we see something that we missed in this September 2nd 6 letter." There shouldn't have been any conflict here, it
- 7. should have just been a problem report and two organizations-8 getting together to -- to' resolve it.
9 BY MR. DOCKERY: l 10 Q Why, in your opinion, was there a conflict?
11 A Well, I -- I'm not sure why, but engineering took 12 great offe'nse,at operators challenging their data. I guess j 13 they had' spent quite a bit of time coming up with the 14 -September 2nd letter, and they had pretty much stated-I'm 15 just maki.1g this up; I mean, I'm -- I'm giving you an 16 opinion, I'm saying-that the curve is accurate and 17 reasonably conservative. And then a few days later it comes 18 up with: No, it's not. It's not accurate at all. In fact, 19' the margin that's described-in the -- in the calculation is 20 not there. And I_think they took great exception to -- to 21 us presenting that information. They felt somehow slighted 22 that we were challenging their calculations. You know,...
23 MR. VORSE: Go ahead.
I 24 A ...they - .you know, we were accused within days, 25 you know, of: You violated a design basis curve. I didn't NRAL R. GROS $ 6 Co., INC.
(202)234 4433
Page 48 1 know it was a design basis curve.
2 But it took from September 5th -- or September 3 7th, when the problem report was submitted, to November 17th 4 before management even called in the NRC and said, "There's 5- a one-hour reportable. We exceeded design basis." Well, l 6 what the heck were they doing in all that time? If they 7 knew it was a design basis on the day they started yelling 8 at me, they should have called the NRC within one hour of 9 that. They were spending the whole -- the whole time 10 between September 7th and November 17th trying to discredit 11 the data.
12 'It wasn't -- it we.:n't us w rking u with operations 13 and trying to find out what's going on. They didn't come to 14 me, they didn't come to my assistant, they didn't come to 15 the four operators. They didn't care what we had done. It 16 was: They'll work independently, and you guys are in 17 trouble. And that's the way it's been since Day One.
18 Somehow, you know, it just flabbergasts me, because I've see 'l 19 a lot of times operations issues a problem report, you work 1
20 together to get it solved, and that's the end of it. And in i 21 this case the operators were -- were quickly branded as --
22 as rogue operators who -- well, I guess we'd done an 23 unauthorized test the -- test, and we had violated design j 24 bases, and we were totally ostracized.
25 MR. HENDRIX: Can I ask a question. The j NEA1,R. GROSS & CO., INC. 1 (202)234 4433 1
l I
Page 49 1 calculation'that you referenced earlier that.you went and 2 ' looked-at, .y ou say upon analysis it appears to.be, from an 3 . engineering standpoint, totally indefensible. Is that the 4 same calculation that.was used'to-justify the plant being.
5- operated.all the time at 25 cc's per-kg, to your knowledge?
6 13E WITNESS: That was -- that was the calculation 7 that'gave us the curve, Curve 8. When they installed this' 8 modification, basically the modification was to_give us an 9 ' alarm -- that alarm on a sliding. scale. It was a variable 10 alarm. When they did this modification they had the 11 calculation. The calculation had also been used, i believe,_
12 ' because i ds J90-1990-had -also been used by engineering to 13 -- to evaluate I&E Notice 8823 which was back in 1988.
14- The NRC came out and said, "Well, are you going to 15 hydrogen bind your high pressure injection pumps?" And I 16 think 190, Rev 5 was one of the iterations that came up:
17 It's okay. .You know, you won't hydrogen. bind your - your 18 high pressure injection' pumps. So it was kind of a dual 19 calculation, you know. It was -- it was used initially to 20 answer this I&E notice, and it was used a second time to 21 justify this curve where they started increasing the 22 pressure.
23 BY MR. VORSE:
24' Q- Do you feel that the engineering people were, even 25 though they -- do you think that they thought that that mm m. m. m. , n e.
(303)334 4433
.. . . . . - . . . . . - . . - - . . . . - . . _ . . ~ - . ~ . - . . . . . - - . - - . . . ~ - . . -
i Page 50 i 1 curve might'be inaccurate, but they were just following
- 2 orders and they -- that was why they weren't budging?
l 3 A It would be my opinion that they allowed Pat i 4. Beard's desire:for 25 cc's per kg to kind of influence them.
~
~5 As far as their technical competence, they couldn't -- in my -
6 opinion, they couldn't have reviewed the calculation and t 7' come out with the September 2nd letter. They just - -they l 8 just didn't do it. I don't know what they did, but they
}- 9 didn't review that calculation.
p 10 BY MR. DOCKERY:
11 Q That troubles me right there, because if it was 12- that obv'$us,,if the inadequacy of that calculation was that
] -
13 obvious to you-not to-impugn your abilities or knowledge-to 14 you and the other operators, is it possible that engineering ;
i i 15 could have ignored it? i i
16 A Well, I think they -- I don'tLthink they looked at 17 it.
i 18 Q If they had looked at it, inLyour opinion -- and j 1
19 opinions are worth what you pay for them.
20 A Right. i 1
21 .Q In your opinion,.if they had looked at it, is it 22 your belief they would have realized it was inadequate?
l 23- A It's my belief that they couldn't have looked at 24 it and -- and saw that it was accurate. Let me just --
25 Allegation 1, which you'll get or I guess you've got now, i
NBAL R.13 TOSS & CO. , INC.
'(202)234 4433
Page 51 1 basically it says, "FPC management misinformation and 2 manipulation of-facts concerning the makeup tank evolution 3 in violation of 10 CFR 50.7." -You know, I'm alleging that 4_ my management, with a lot of help from engineering, has had 5 a campaign since Day One to focus all attention on me rather
~
6 than get to the real issue of -- of management oversight of.
7 the activities at that plant. And what'I've'done, you'know, 8 you can't just give you'19 different reasons for this. -What 9 _I've done is, I've prepared a list of questions to strategic
- 10. people wit.hin management andLengineering that I'm requesting-11 you to ask.
12 Q 'Is At fair to say, before we go too' deep into 13 -this,...
.14 A Okay.
15 Q ...since it is another allegation, is it fair to 16 say that.the questions we're asking you here are also part-
- 17. and parcel of this allegation?
18 A They'are part and parcel. Let me just read 19 Question 11 that I've' proposed for Pat Beard. -"What has 20 been engineering's role in the makeup tank issue in which a 21 concern was first documented'in Problem Report 94-149?"
22 "Have you been satisfied with their efforts to close out.the 23 problem report?"- "Have you ever heard of or read j 24 Calculation 190-0024, Rev 5?" "Are you aware that the l l
25 -calculation was only good througn Refuel 8?" "Are you aware !
l NEAL R. St*18 6 CO. , INC.
(2 02 ) :ra i -4433 l
l
1 Page 52 )
i i that it assumes hydrogen acts as an ideal gas and does not j 2 go into solution with the water in the makeup tank?"
3 "Were you aware that it was based upon engineering 4 procedures that direct operators to sg) to piggyback mode 1 5 based upon a reactor building level, not borated water 6 storage tank level which is currently used?" "Do you'think 7 engineering reviewed this calculation when they issued the 8 letter to Bruce Hickle, the NPO on September 2nd, 1994, and 9 proclaimed that Curve 8 was' reasonably conservative? Would 10 you have expected them to?"
11 That's the question I'm -- I'm asking you guys --
- 12. I guess I'm rgally asking you guys to do a lot. You know, 13 it's -- it was this -- this investigation comes down to a 14 close, it would be fairly easy just to-kind of finish this 15 up and go to the pre-decisional and -- and go on with that.
16 But now I'm asking you to say: Wait a second. There's a 17 lot bigger issue here thar my personal integrity. There's a 18 lot bigger issue than my shift taking some data and 19 presenting a problem report. l l
20 There's an issue here of other people's integrity, 21 that they have manipulated the information, they have given 22 you disinformation. And that's -- that's the allegation. I 23 think it's a serious allegation that I'm -- I'm asking you 24 guys to say, " Wait a second. Let's take -- let's step back 25 and take a little better look at this." And I think these NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
i (202)234-4433
i i
i 1
1 1
Page 53 1 are valid questions. I don't think they're -- I don't think l 2 they're unreasonable questions. I just don't think they've 3 been asked yet. And I think questions asked to these people 4 in management are important, because I think there's going 5 to be some answers in there they can't defend. Why would 6 they have given you these answers?
l 7 MR. DOCKERY: We'll go off the record, please. !
8 (A discussion is held off the record.)
9 MR. DOCKERY: We'll go back on the record. The 10 time is approximately 2:27 P.M., and Mr. Fields, I remind 11 you that you continue to be under oath in this proc:eding.
12 And if youd acknowledge that verbally, please.
13 THE WITNESS: I acknowledge that.
1 44 BY MR. DOCKERY-15 0 Okay, during the -- the break we went through with 16 the witness and his counsel, and discussed how we will 17 handle the written allegation-or allegations, I should say, 18 with attachments-that we have received from the witness.
19 We received two copies of this allegation. It's 20 basically a cover letter addressed to Mr. McNulty dated 21 August 31st, 1995. We have two copies of this. One copy
'22 will be maintained for the Office of Investigation's use by 23 Mr. McNulty and those of us who are investigating the issue.
24 The other copy we inte0d_to forward to the Region II Office 25 of the Allegation Coord!.nator. And the purpose for that, as STEAL R. GROSS & Co.. INC.
(202)234 4433
. . _ . . - - . . - - - _ ~ . - - - - - ~ . - ~ - ~ ~ . -. - .--
1 t
Page 54 1 I explained off the record, is for them to log the
, 2 allegation, see that-it's appropriately addressed from the
{ 3 standpoint of technical issues. We will handle that via j.
~4 cover letter by 'the Office of Investigations.
t
- '5
- MR. VORSE: Okay, Curt, do you have any questions 6 you want to ask Mr. Fields?
7 MR. RAPP: Yes, I've got some here I'd like to go 8 through. I'm going to be referring back to the transcript, i
9 and I understand you all don't have copies of that. Do you i 10 have your copy, Jim, of Mr. Fields' transcript?
11 MR. VORSE: I believe I do. -!
l 12 MR. RAPP: That'd be easier. That'way we can... I 13 Okay, great. All right. There's that.
14 (The witness was handed certain material.)
15 BY'MR. RAPP:
16- Q I want to go to Page'4, Line-14. This is just-17 basically to get some additional information thar vasn't put 18 -- wasn't in the transcript when we first interviewed you.
19 Basically it says here, "I am responsible for safe
.20 operation of the nuclear plant. I am a senior licensed 21 operator. I am the senior licensed person on site the back 22 shifts that supervise safe operation of the plant."
23 Is a shift manager also a licensed individual?
24 A- No, he-is not.
l
'25 Q lle's not licensed? i NBAL R. GR088 & CO , INC.
(2C2)234-4433
i l'
s-Page 55 i j 1 A He could have at a previous time had a license. j i . . 4
! 2 Q 'But it's not' required for him to have a license?
~
v l
[ 3 A And none of them presently do have active license,
. 4 that I'know of. j i:
{ 5 0 .Okay. Do they manipulate controls, then,- or F 6 direct. activities, licensed activities?
j i
i
.7 A No , they're not -- they're not allowed to do that.
} 8- Q Okay. Let's go to Page 10, Line 20, then. "We j 9 said" -- let's see here. Yeah, "We said we think we can as
- 10. .a shift, talking to management, we can demonstrate the curve i 11 .isn't accurate."
i -- .
- ~ 12 When did that conversation take place or that --
I 13 that' interaction take place?
- . 14 A Well, it initially happened on September.the 4th, L 15 and then I -- I'm sure it happened again on September the l 16.- 5th, we' kind of reiterated and -- you know, in fact'we had a i- 17 better -- probably a better understanding on' September the L .
l 1.: 18 5th. But on September the'4th we had basically a 19 discussion, also. ;
e 1
[
20 Q Okay. Nobody came earlier, like the 3rd or when l .
l; 21' this engineering letter.came out and said...? )
I 22 A It didn't -- it'didn't come to be. Now, Mark Van l .
I 3
23 Sicklen may have talked to Rob. Weiss a couple.offnights l 1 I g 24 before where they kind of -- they thought about.it and they
.25 -- well, can'we do this, can:we do this. TheyLcame to me on
}
unu n. anou s co., suc.
(202)234 4433 i
j.
Page 55 1 A He could have at a previous time had a license.
2 Q But it's not required for him to have a license?
3 A And none of them presently do have active license, 4 that I know of.
5 Q Okay. Do they manipulate controls, then, or 6 direct activities, licensed activities?
7 A No , they're not -- they're not allowed to do that.
8 Q Okay. Let's go to Page 10, Line 20,-then. "We 9 said" -- let's see here. Yeah, "We said we think we can as 10 a shift, talking to management, we can demonstrate the curve 11 isn't accurate."
. L 12 When did that conversation take place or that --
13 that interaction take place? :
14 A Well, it initially happened on September the 4th, I l
15 and then I -- I'm sure it happened again on September the
]
16 5th, we kind of reiterated and -- you know, in fact we had a l 17 better -- probably a better understanding on September the 18 5th. But on September the 4th we had basically a 19 discussion, also. I 20 Q Okay. Nobody came earlier, like the 3rd or when 21 this engineering letter came out and said...?
22 A It didn't -- it didn't come to be. Now, Mark Van 23 Sicklen may have talked to Rob Weiss a couple of nights 24 before where they kind of -- they thought about it and they 25 -- well, can we do this, can we do this. They came to me on NEAL R. StOSS & CO,, INC, (202)234-4433
Page156 1 -- on that night,. September' thel 4th. And, you know, it's-2 always easier to get'the shift supervisor.to do something if 3- you've got a proposed solution in your hand. And they had:
4 Dave, I think we can -- I think we-can get some good data j i
5 here, and I think we've got a procedure that allows us.to do 6 it. That was how it was presented to me.
7 Q: Let's see here. Okay, Page.13, Line 11. The y 8 question was asked, "What covered this evolution?"
9 "It was decided OP 402 provided adequate.
10 guidance," etcetera, etcetera, basically down to Line 23.
! -11 Okay, how was that decision reached? What -- what was the-12' process.that paid that you Imd adequate gtidance'through OP l 13 402?. j l
14 A Well, when - .when they suggested that we think OP. q 15 402, we'll -- we'll look at it, well, I asked some questions l- .16 about, well, all.right,.what does it say? It says 17 pressurize the-tank to the limit of Curve 8. And then --
18 then they showed me the section that said, "And then-you 19 . bleed down for this section," where it says bleed down from 20 86 inches to 55 inches. And we looked at the limits and 21 precautions and there was no -- nothing there that -- that 22 would prevent us from doing that evolution.
' . . i 23 Q Okay. And who made the decision that these 1 24 procedures or this guidance was adequate? l 1
25 A I did, and that -- that's my prerogative per -- l MEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC. .
(202)234 4433 l o
i .
i
, n ., , . . , , - . . - , - , .- , , , - , -,- -
r
Page 57 1 per AI 500.
2 Q Are you familiar with NOD 12?
3 A Just vaguely. It's one of these -- one of these 4 NODS that's kind of come out of the wall just within the 5 last few months, and I -- I haven't read it in a long time.
6 Q Was NOD 12 in effect when -- when this 7 evolution...?
8 A I assume that it was. That's -- an NOD is a 9 higher tier of documents of -- of management expectations to 10 the personnel.
11 Q Is there any procedure, guidance out there that 12 would have' assisted you in determining whether c not it was 13 appropriate to use OP 402 or that a special test procedure 14 was required?
15 A I -- I can't think of a document that would have 16 provided me that guidance. I looked at it from the 17 standpoint of OP 402 includes everything that I wart to do.
18 And -- and OP 402, the operation of the makeup tank was not 3
19 an infrequently performed evolution. You know, it was 20 fairly -- it was familiar to all the operators, you know.
21 They do feeds -- feeds and bleeds in the makeup tank without 22 even referring to it, they know it that well.
23 Q Is it a common or accepted practice, then, to take 24 sections out of procedures to accomplish a certain task or a 25 certain evolution?
HEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234 4433
i I
Page 58 l 1
1 A Yes, sir, it is. 1 2 Q So I could take three different procedures and put 3 together certain sections or steps, as the case may be, to 4 accomplish an evolution that thare's not a particular l 5 specific procedure for?
6 A Yes, you could. But you have to rely upon the 7 shift's knowledge of those procedures to make sure that, you 8 know,... It's difficult to write a procedure for every 9 evolution that they do, but if you have a piece of it that 10 works to bleed down the 55 inches, and another procedure 11 thac would tell you to direct the water not to a ulced tank 12 but to sc e qther tank, you could use those two sections 13 together, you know, as basically two -- performance of two ,
14 separate procedures to give you one common result.
15 Q Are you familiar with the 50-59 process?
16 A Yes, sir.
17 Q W uld that 50-59 process for those procedures 18 still be valid, then, using themi'n combination or -- or 19 using subsections of them?
20 A I believe that they are. I think that you could 2
.1 probably -- I'm not sure what examples -- come up with an 22 example that it would be inappropriate to do that. You 23 know, I can't -- you know, I can't see me stringing together 24 nine procedures to accomplish something that I want to do 25 with bits and pieces. But I -- but I saw in this evolution NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
Page 59 1 basically all I did was OP 402.
2 O Is -- I guess then let me ask this a different 3 way. Is the entire procedure 50-59, or is each section in 4 the procedure reviewed under 50-59?
5 A The -- the entire procedure is 50-59, but the 6 review -- the review process to get it to final approval, 7 .you know, you have technical reviewers and you have other 8 department reviewers, you have interdepartment reviewers 9 reviewing the whole procedure to make sure that all the 10 changes are adequate. The 50-59 is for the procr'ure as a 11 whole.
12 0 'A ll right. So in using the steps or the sections 13 out of procedure, then, to accomplish a particular_ task 1
14 would not present an unreviewed safety question?-
15 A No, sir, it wouldn't. And OP 402 was designed in .
l 16 different sections. It gives you a section on how to fill l 17 and vent the makeup system, gives you a section on how to 18 swap makeup pumps, gives you a section on how to bleed water 19 from the makeup tank or add water to the makeup tank. It's 20 -- that procedure is designed to be used in discreet groups 21 or discreet steps.
22 O Okay. Again, referring to Page 13, Line 24, 23 'through Page 14, Line 6, or Line 5, actually, excuse me.
24 Okay, it says in here that there's -- no time was this 25 evolution considered a test. Do FPC procedures define what HEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
Page 60 1 a test is or an experiment?
2 A I believe AI 402B doesn't really define a test but 3 gives you a kind of a checklist if you're writing a 4 procedure, to kind of rule out a test. You know, if you 5 answer one of these questions "yes," then you need to look 6 at it from the standpoint if a test procedure is required.
7 I can't think of any document that says this is defined as a 8 test that I know, other than AI 402B, I believe.
9 Q Would this evolution be considered an infrequent 10 evolution defined by AI 400B?
11 A No. We perform bleeds daily.
12 0 'So ii. wouldn't fit in that category?
13 A It wouldn't -- it wouldn't fit in that category at 14 all.
15 0 You said earlier you're familiar with AI 500, 16 conduct of operations. In there, in AI 500, it has some 17 guidance on when a pre-job briefing should be done.
18 A Uh-huh (affirmative).
19 Q And basically do you feel that there should have 20 been a pre-job briefing done by the shift manager prior to 21 this evolution?
22 A No, sir, I didn't at the time. And I -- I still 23 don't. We considered it a routine evolution and that's kind l
L 24 of what we went on. We -- we gave it a pre-job briefing of, 25 well, why are we doing this; what do we need to look at; NEAL R. GROSS & Co., INC.
(202)234-4433
1 l
Page 61 1 what'are you going to look at; what are you going to do. !
l 2 You know, we felt like we gave it an adequate pre-job l l
3 briefing, but as an -- we didn't consider it an infrequently 4 performed evolution or a test that would have required a 5 special approved procedure or shift manager involvement.
6 Q Okay. Is -- basically AI 500's a pretty good-size j
7 procedure. I mean, it goes on for... i 8 A Very -- very big.
9 Q ...a hundred and some pages. Is it a useful l l
10 procedure? .
. 1 11 A It -- it's a fairly cumbersome procedure. It 12 probably has,a lot of things in it that needs to be removed i
13 and it needs to be streamlined. But I've been a shift 14' supervisor -- I had been a shift supervisor for eight years.
l 15 You know, I pretty much knew when different sections were 16 added, why they were added. I felt pretty comfortable with 17 the procedure.
18 Q Does a...?
19 A You know, we referred to it a lot.
20 Q Excuse me. Does AI 500 contain conflicting or 21 contradictory guidance?
22 A I don't know.
23 Q You can't...?
24 A I can't think of a specific example of that.
25 Q Would you -- it be fair to say, then, that some of NEAL R. GROSS & Co., INC.
(202)234-4433
. - - .. - __ - - . - - . . - .. ~ .. . -. - .- - . .
4 Page 62 1 the guidance in there is subject to interpretation? <
2 A Yeah.
3 Q That you could read it one way and a person could i
- read it some other way?
4 5 A Right.
6 Q Come up with a different answer?
7 A I agree with that.
8 Q So it's not -- it's not clear in there as to what 1
9 -the -- what the intent of a particular section is or...?
10 A Well, I'm -- I'm not -- I guess I don't understand 11 where you'ra going with this. One of the -- one of the 12 items that I referenced in -- in AI 500 was written 13 procedures. This is 432.3.2. " Written procedures are 14 needed for those evolutions that would affect a change in 15 system flow plant -- flow paths or operating parameters.
16 The boundary between an evolution and a task may not always 17 be clear, and as such it is axpected that p2 ant operators 18 will encounter situations where the adequacy of existing 19 procedures may be questioned. In these instunces shift 20 supervision will ma:ke the determination as to what procedure 21 requirements are applicable."
22 And to me, I look at that and I'm not sure -- I'm 23 not'sure what an evolution is and what a task is, but it 24 looked like it gave me clear guidance to determine that AI 25 -- OP 402 was adequate to perform the evolution that we were wiu, n. amoss a co., zuc.
n o i n. .u n ]
. _.. . -. - - - - - = _ . -. . - _ ._ .-.
Page 63 1 going to do. And it gave me -- it authorized me to make 2 that decision.
3 Q Okay. But " shift management" could also be 4 interpreted to mean the shift manager?
5 A "In these instances shift supervision will make 6 the determination..."
7 Q Oh, excuse me.
8 A "
...as to what procedural requirements are 9 applicable." I don't consider the shift manager part of 10 shift supervision.
11 Q Okay. Going on here, Page 14, Line 6, then. "We 12 expected a' makeup pressure alarm to come in -- into alarm."
13 Basically the -- one thing is that's come up repeatedly, I 14 guess, is you didn't take immediate action on this 15 enunciator.
16 A That's correct.
17 Q And basically how long would you have had to take 18 action on this enunciator?
19 A We were prepared to take action immediately. We 20 didn't take action because we wanted to draw the curve from 21 86 inches to 55 inches.
22 Q So that was your sole reason for not addressing 23- the alarm, that you want to take your data?
2'4 A Yes. Yeah, we -- we didn't think a piece of 25 information was going to be adequate. Engineering had --
NEAL R. GROSS & Co., INC.
(202)234*4433
i l
I
.I I
Page 64 1 had rejected a piece of information before, and we felt like 2' the smooth curve would be, you know, like incontrovertible.
3 Hey, this is what the real curve -- this is what the real 4 system response looks like.
j' 5 Q Do tech specs define any type of time limit or j 6' actions for this enunciator?
7 A Not that I know of.
l l
8 Q So this alarm or this particular curve is not 9 covered under tech specs?
10 A It's.only covered under tech specs in that it's a 11 design basis curve. Being a design basis curve, it becomes
, -12 an NRC parameter.
s l
I 13 Q But otherwise...
14 A And that's how it gets tied into that, you know.
15 And I can't -- I can't violate NRC parameters via the 16 administrative section of tech specs. But you've got to 17 remember, I -- I didn't know it was a. design basis curve, 18 and I certainly didn't consider it NRC parameters.
19 Q But what I was asking is, there's -- is there a 20 tech spec that says, " Curve 8 is this, and if you're outside 21 of it these are the action statements that you have..."
22 A No , sir, there...
" ...and these are the time limits you have for j 23 Q 24 those actions"?
25 A There is no -- there is nothing with respect on 3
i NEAL R. GROSS 4, CO., INC.
(202)334-4433 l
l l
( , - - -
. - . - _ . _ . . _ _ . _ . _ _. _. .. ...____.m-_ m. ..
Page 65 1 Curve 8.
2 Q Okay. . Was - earlier you said that.it was routine l 3 or normal to have the makeup tank high pressure alarm or 4 enunciator in for extended periods or when you took...
5 A~ I wouldn't say it was-routine, I would say on 6' occasions I have come in and taken a watch with the: plant in 7 alarm. ,
'8 -Q Do you know how long it-had been in alarm before
-9 you came in?
10 A No.
11 Q Was that logged-anywhere or should that nave been
. 1 12 logged? ,
L 13 A No , do -- do not log.
.14 Q 'Was the makeup tank high pressure alarm a high 15 priority alarm?
16 -A It wasn't a red alarm, it's a white' alarm which is 17 not -- you know, I guess that prioritizes alarms. I guess 18 by that previous statement I was saying I wasn't-the only l 19' -shift that ever operated with that tank in alarm.
20 Q Was the high pressure alarm or having the makeup 21 tank pressure above the set point or the curve, was that 22 regarded as.a significant operational l problem, or was that
~23 just kind of a nuisance'that had-to be addressed when --
24 whenever time permitted?
25- A I can't speak for everybody. We never -- we NEAL R. GROSS & Co., INC, (202)234-4433
Page 66 1 didn't get the alarm because we actively stayed well below 2 the curve. 'We didn't -- we didn't think it was appropriate l 3 to operate with that much pressure in the tank.
4 But other shifts did Their shift supervision 5 required that they. operate on the curve. How they responded 6 to it, I'm not sure. All I can say is that I've taken the 7 watch before with the -- with the tank.in alarm. You know, ,
1 8 to clear the alarm you can either drain the level in the 9 tank or you can send somebody down to the -- the valve alley 10 and dress out, go inside and open the valve and vent the 11 pressure off. Well, that's a -- that's kind of a time-12 consumir s evolution. If the guy sees it's just right at the i
13 curve and he's in alarm he may say -- tell the Aux Building 14 operator, "When you get around to it go ahead and vent the
- 15 pressure off the tank."
16 Q Are there other normal evolutions that result in 17 exceeding Ldministrative limits or alarm set points when !
- 18. you're performing them? j 19 A Yes. l 20' Q So it's not uncommon, then, that you would pick
(. 21 up...?
! 22 'A No. You go into the control room and there are several enunciators lit. You know, if you know why it's in, 24' .you know, that's kind of like you know the abnormal 25 condition, you know why it's in. Every night on the IfEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234 4433 l
\
l l
I
. _.. _ _. - _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ ~ . . . . . _ . - . . . _ _ . .._ . _ -._ .._. _ ._.___ _ _ _ m. __
4
- Page 67 1 midnight shift you're required to review all the lit i
2 enunciators and -- and be able'to explain in your mind why
- 3 you'have those enunciators in. You know, the~ emergency feed-
- j . 4 water tank level is in' low, you know, and it's a 35 foot 3 5 tank, and if it's reading 34-9 you're in -- in alarm or
\
i 6 whatever, you know why it's~in, it's just barely in.
. When i
- 7 your Turbine' Building operator goes outside for his outside
-; 8 reading you'll contact' Unit.2, ask them to send over-some !
l- -9 water, he'll manipulate the valves. It's -- it's one of l 10 those things, you'll.take care of~it when you get to it.
~
$ 11 Q Okay. '
i .
12 BY MR. DOCKERy:
l
! 13 Q Mr._ Fields,_you say you have taken overla, shift 4 .
1 14 and an enunciator has been in. - Is that something that you !
15 log?-
4 5 .
i 16 'A No,-sir, we' don't -- weidon't. -- do not log j 1
i: 17 enunciator alarms.
1 3
[ 18 :Q One other question on that. When you -- when you E
i 19 -say you have taken over a shift and' enunciators have been 20- actuated or in, are you referring to that particular 0
4 21- enunciator?
4 -j
- ' 22 A .I -- I'm referring to that particular enunciator.
l
- 23; Every. night you come in, every shift you come in there are L 24- enunciators 11it. I mean,.every -- every once in awhile 4
- j. 25 we'll have a black board with nothing lit. But those days
- 1. !
j NEAL R. GROSS & CO. , INC.
(202)234-4433 4 I
-- --< < < - . ,- r --
l l
Page 68 l 1 are very seldom.
4 2 BY MR. RAPP:
3 Q Did operations have any input or say if this high l 4 makeup tank pressure was a reasonable operating value that 5 was reasonable for plant operations?
6 A Well, we -- we had the input as far as we 7 initiated Problem Report 94-149 where we questioned it. My l 8 operators had raised concerns with other people in our 9 management; my boss, Greg Halnon, had asked engineers, l
10 "Would you please validate this curve?"
11 Yeah, I think -- I think we had raised our i
)
12 concerns to ,- to several people. And my shift was pretty 13 much known as: This -- this is the issue that we had. All i 14 -- every shift -- there's six shifts out there. You know, 15 this shift'll have one issue that they're working on; this )
16 shift will have an issue that they're working on. Our issue 17 just happened to be the -- the Curve 8 and operating the 18 makeup tank with that much hydrogen pressure.
19 Q Do you have any, like, knowledge before that when 20 this issue first came up of maintaining 25 kg's -- cc's per 21 kg, as to whether or not operations said that, " Wait a 22 minute. This -- this high makeup tank pressure you're 23 wanting to run is -- is...?"
24 A Right, we -- that came about on my shift. That 25 was my shift's first involvement. Both Mark Van Sicklen and NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
Page 69 1 Bruce Willms expressed their concerns at that time, said, 2 "We don't feel comfortable with this at all."
3 Q This is before it was implemented?
4- A This was after it was implemented.
5 Q Oh, after it was... I'm talking about before it 6 was implemented.
7 A I don't know what input we had on the review 8 process. I don't know.
9 Q All right. Is -- is " unacceptable time frame" 10 defined by FPC procedures?
11 A I don't know. I don't think so.
12 Q 'What would be an unacceptable time frame?
13 A Well, if you lose subcooling margin and you don't 14 trip your reactor coolant pumps within two minutes, that's 15 unacceptable.
16 Q What about on normal administrative limits?
17- A I would think it would be unacceptable if you had 18 an alarm condition in and you didn't recognize it. You have 19 a -- if you had a -- one of your control rod drives static 20 temperatures (phonetic) high, and that's a computer alarm, 21 if you -- if you didn't recognize that it was a high 22 temperature condition and you didn't know how long it had 23 been in, I think that would be unacceptable.
24 Q So it would just depend on what's -- what's 25 happening-in the plant and what evolutions are in progress NEAL R, GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
Page 70 4
1 and how you would...?
2 A I think so. I think -- I think if you -- you have 3 an alarm condition in and you know why it's in and you know 4 where the plant is, I don't -- I can't give you a time frame 5 to say that it would be unacceptable to not take action.
6 And that's not specified in any procedure that I know of.
7 Q Did engineering take operator or operations' 8 concerns seriously? I mean, not just this particular issue, 9 but I mean in general?
10 A Well, a lot of it sort of depended on the 11 engineer. You know, operations sort of had some favorite 12 engineers'tha,t they felt, well, that that engineer that had 13 that system was really responsive and if you called that guy 14 you got a quick answer back. I can't -- I don't want to 15 characterize the whole department. I think in this instance 16 I don't think they were very responsive. I think their --
17 the efforts that they made were very shallow and not 18 correct.
19 Q Were there issues you had or where other people on 20 your shift had with engineering that weren't adequately 21 resolved?
22 A I would say that the emergency feed water control 23 system is an issue that's been going on for four or five 24 years that operators are not --
are not happy with the 25 response that they've gotten.
x m. m. anoss a co., me.
(202)224-4433
i Page 71 1- Q Did engineering. explain the basis or limitation of 2 operating limits or curves they provided to operations?
3 A Not in this case.
4 Q In general?
l' 5 A1 Only -- only if -- if somehow they would transmit 6 the -- the information to the Training Department. You
]
7 know, and it's all.a new system and -- or.a new component or 8 something like that,'and then in the. training phase the l
.9 trainers'would present,'well, this is -- this is the limits )
i 10 and this.i why the -- the limit is there and stuff like !
11 'that; You know, in this case I don't remember any training 1
'l' 12 on the new' curve, it was just instituted: Here, use this i
13 curve. .
-14 Q Were you aware that during an ESF actuation that 15 makeup tank level would go below indication?
16 A- I' knew it was a concern. It was a concern that I 17 had personally with -- with the makeup tank issue of: If I 18 lose level what action am I going to take? Am I going to ;
19 believe my indication and immediately trip that high 20 pressure injection pump?. Or am I going to believe that'
'21 -there is water someplace in the pipe below the indication 12 2 range and that that pump is safe? And I included that in my 23 ~ submittal for the previously scheduled pre-decisional 24 enforcement conference, that that was my personal concern 25 with it, was losing indication in the makeup tank. And --
WEAL R. (Rosa & CO., IWC, (202)234 4433 1
)
j Page 72
.! 1 wid that shouldn't be the way we operate.
- 2 You know, I -- I knew what~I was going to do. 'I
! 3 had it in my mind the action-I was. going to take~if I. lost
{ 4 level. But I don't know if the other. shift supervisors had.
5 made that -- that decision on their own. And I think a i 6 decision like that~needed to be firmly in place: This is ,
l 7 what you'll do. And as far as I know, that -- that
'8 guidance,-management direction has-not been presented.
- 9 Q When you talked to management about theseLissues,.
10 the overpressure.in the makeup tank, gas binding, the 11 Appendix Are, emergency boration, did they take there; l
concerns s'eripusly or did they just take them and say, 12 13 "Okay, fine. Go on back. We understand your concerns. Get
-14 makeup tank pressure up"?
15 A That was the end result ~. Maybe engineering felt 16 like they did a good job with the evaluation when they:said 17 accurate and reasonably conservative. !
i 18 Q I'm not necessarily t'aiking about engineering 19- management, I'm talking about your management, operations 20 management.
21 A I -- I can't say that I -- I was pleased with the 22 way Greg Halnon handled it. He didn't -- he didn't seem to 23- fight as much as I thought he should have. You know, it was 24 just like, "Here, they're going to close it out. You want
.25 to do something?" You know, it wasn't -- he didn't take the w w. m. amo u a co., rec.
(302)234 4423
i Page 73 1 ball and roll-with it, he didn't go over to engineering and ;
1 2 say, "Now,.why -- why did you come back and say:that the - -
l
\
j 3 the pressure is okay here?" He pretty much -- it was just i
4: thrown back to me. l 5 'And he-had asked engineers to;do independent.
- 6. calculations and they'didn't do them. They-said, "We'can't' 7 do that. It's too hard." I think~that was their response. ,
8 BY-MR. DOCKERY:
1 9 .Q ' Excuse me. ~Do you know that was theirLresponse?'
10 lDid.they respond that way'in your presence?
11' A No.
12' Q Was,that related - .that response related...?
13 A That was related to me, that.they were requested 14 to do independent. calculations and they didn't doithem. .
15 Q Who related it to you?
-16 A I believe that'cameEfrom Rob Weiss, Once again,'
' 17 ' that's in-. Allegation 1 in my list. of: questions to Greg 18 Halnon: Did-you ask these individuals to perform an .
19 independent evaluation and did they do it?
20 BY'MR. RAPP:
211 Q. Were you -- were you ever~ told that there was 22- going to be a special test ran during.the next refueling 23- : outage to' validate the either acceptability or 24 unacceptability of Curve 8?
25 A I was told that it was planned. Greg Halnon had usu. m. mou a co., 2nc.
(303)234 4433
l Page 74 1 requested I believe Garrett Hebb to - " Garrett,:make sure~.
2 we re-run SP 630 during the outage." There was no specific 3 "to validate Curve 8," but I think we would have used that. ;
l 4 After this event was over I'was at a strategy meeting where-l
'S Pat Beard was there,-and I -- I insisted that during the ]
-6 upcoming refueling outage we re-run this -- that we're-run _
7 :SP 630 with the same conditions that we had on September I 8 Sth, and that'would be Action Item 8 added to Problem Report 9 94-149, and_then Item 9 would be validate the validity of 10- Curve 8 using.that test data. As far as I know, that is.
11 still planned to be -- to be'done.
~12 Q ' Is it common to run SP 630 following each j i
13 refueling outage? '
14 A No, it's -- I don't know what the frequency-is, 15 whether it's every two years, every... I don't -- I think 16 to be scheduled -- I think for SP 630 to be schedu. led for 17 this outage would be out of' sequence and only. scheduled for
'18
~
that one -- for that reason.
19 Q But it's not a refueling outage test? ,
20 A It is a refueling outage test, but is it required 21 ever;' refueling; I don't think so.
22 Q Okay. Where in -- where in FPC procedures does-it
[23 define or describe what constitutes an' authorized evolution? -
24 -A I don't know what specific document that would be.
25 An authorized or unauthorized?
wiu,n. amou a co., zwe.
(202)234 4433
Page 75 1 Q Authorized.
2 A An authorized evolution? I don't -- I can't think 3 of a document that talks about an authorized evolution.
4 Q What in your mind are authorized evolutions? q 5 A If it's a operating (sic) procedure which has been l 6 through an approved operating procedure, that's an 7 authorized evolution. I can perform the evolutions within 8 that procedure.
9' Q When you went through requal you talk about 1
- 10 industry events; correct? l 11 A Yes, sir.
' 12 Q 'Was,there any discussion of similar type industry 13 events where unauthorized tests or evolutions had taken 14 place? Was that ever discussed?
15 A There was a requal cycle sometime~in the -- in the 16 first part of -- first quarter,-second quarter of 1995 that '
17 they talked about --
I don't know if they were unauthorized 18 ' evolutions or what they were, but the makeup tank evolution 19 was brought up, and as one of the example (sic).
20 Q Prior to this test, prior to this evolution?
21- A I can't_think of any, but I'm not saying that 22 there wasn't. There probably were in the past. I can't 23- ,think of any specific examples.
24 Q Has PPC management ever came out and said, "You 25 know, we know in the past that you folks -- the shift NEAL R. GROSS 6 Co., INC.
(202)234 4433 a
q ..
. . ~ - . . .. -- -. _.--- - - - _.- -.-. - -
Page 76 1 supervisors had these allowances, but now here's a new box, .
2 and.you're supposed to stay within this new box"?
3 A Yes. You know, that -- that, I believe, is Greg 4 Halnon -- could be defined as Greg Halnon's event-free 5 operations program where he's kind of just defined if you're 6 inside the box you're okay; if you're outside the box you're 7' not. That came -- that came out in 1995. There's been --
8 since this evolution there's been a lot of stuff coming out 9 .from management saying everything performed at the plant 10 willibe performed per procedure. If the procedure doesn't
'11 work, get it changed.
12 Q' What about prior to that?
13 A I can't -- I guess I can just kind of recall the 14 .most recent stuff. I know -- I know, years gone by,-you had 15 a lot more leeway as far as fairly simple stuff, you could 16 do that. There are not procedures written for every 17 evolution at that plant. And now the focus of the -- you 18 know, it's more the requirement now to have a procedure.for 19 everything you do at the plant.
20 Q Did -- did operations management or did FPC' 1 21 management come back after the fact in certain cases and
- 22. say, "No, you're not allowed to do that, that that was not l 23 within your allowed authority to perform this..."? I'm not l J
24 talking specifically about this makeup tank issue, but I'm 25 saying before did they ever come back and do that to
,wsu,m. amou a co.. zwe.
(202)234 4423
Page 77 1 somebody that you're aware of?
2 A I'm not -- I know in -- in the context of 3 installing modifications on the plant, you know, some --
4 somebody would think, well, this would be easy to do. I'll l 5 just string some PVC pipe from here to here and I've -- I've ]
1 6 got a new drain on this system. They go, "You can't do 7 that. That's not within your authority."
8 This makeup tank evolution, I was absolutely 9 shocked that my management came down as hard on me as they 1
10 did with this, like, self-righteous, "How dare you do such a l 11 thing," when they knew that I was well within my authority 12 and well w'ithin what they wanted me to do, to do what I did.
13 You know, they -- they just turned their back on me. You l
14 know, I'm not sure why, but, you know, it -- it was clearly 15 in my mind something that I was authorized to do, empowerad 16 to do, and it was the right thing to do. I don't understand 17 why they didn't just say, "Thankt.' But that's not the way 18 it happened.
19 MR. RAPP: That's all the questions I have.
20 BY MR. VORSE:
21 Q I may have asked this already, but just in case I 22 didn't I'm going to ask it again, maybe. Did you or any l 23 other member of your shift on the 4th or 5th of September of l
24 '94, you know, after the evolution, discuss amongst one 25 another not to talk about the September 4th evolution?
MuL R eMa6 m., DC.
(3:2)234-4433 l
l l
1 Page 78 l
1 A I can't say that -- well, what I want to say is i
2 that there was no conspiracy. I think that -- I know that 3 we've had a discussion on how valid is September the 4th or i 4 what -- what's the significance of September the 4th. And 5 we said, well, it has no significance. You know, for -- the 6 real data that we presented was September the 5th. There's 7 no reason to talk about -- you know, there's no reason to, 8 at this late date, bring in September the 4th, you know. I I 9 know I had one discussion with Rob Weiss where -- where is i l
10 it a -- you know, I'm not afraid to bring it up. You know, 11 it was no different from September the 5th.
12 'Because it -- you've got to remember, I'm the guy .
I 13 that -- that told Bruce Hickle, "Well, Bruce , I think we '
14 ought to bring it up." He was -- he was still debating in i
15 his mind: Do you think we ought to bring it up? I said, 16 " Bruce, I think we ought to bring it up," you know.
17 Q Chen was this?
18 A This was September -- Cuay 19th.
19 Q This July, this -- of '95?
20 A Right.
21 Q Okay. So do you -- did you think that because the 22 data that was plotted on the -- en the 4th of September was 23 -- would have hurt your case as far as, you know, your --
24 your presentation in the PER, you know, with engineering to 25 change the curve, the fact that you -- you got one -- one NBAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
Page 79 1 data base that wasn't necessarily accurate, then you had 2 another base that you thought was -- was accurate and told
, 3 you the story? But did you think that maybe that 4th of 4 September, you know, if you told everybody about it...?
5 Because there's a lot of documentation, I mean, a 6 lot of, you know,_PERs and letters and -- and no mention of I 7 the 4th of September. And - .and I'm -- I'm just concerned 8 that, you know, well, why? Youknow)why?
9 A Well, we thought we had a good reason for why the 10 data was erratic on the 4th. But I -- if engineering had i
11 just evaluated the problem report, you know, if we hadn't j
. 1 12 been ostracized from the who2e discussion, if they had come 13 up and said, "Well, what did you do? What kind of data did 14 you take? Let's -- let's work together to get -- to get the 15 right curve on the street," it would have been obvious to 16 the -- well, here's the REDAS data, here's the REDAS data i
17 from the 4th. Now you can see that this data is really 18 erratic. And it would have come up. But it was never done 19 that way.
20 You know, Rob and I were just interviewed in -- in 21 the forum of a Management Review Board. That was: You're
- 22 going to lose your job today if you don't wave your head 23 "yes." The reactor operators were never interviewed.
24 Nobody asked them anything.
25 MR VORSE: Does anybody have anything else?
NBAL R. (NtOSS & Co., INC.
(202)234 4433
~ _ . _ _ - . ._ . - . _ . . . - . _ _ . _ _ ... _ ._ _ _ . _ .. _ . . _ _ . _ _ . _ . . . _ - .
1
.Page 80
~
1~ MR. DOCKERY: Yeah.
2' BY MR. DOCKERY:
3 Q. Mr. Fields, during the course of this 4 investigation if we became aware'that a.similar evolution to.
5 that of September 4th or 5th occurred approximately. July 6 21st, 22nd, in that area, of 1994, do you have any firsthand.
- 7 -knowledge of that incident?
8 A I have only secondhand knowledge.of that incident.
4 9 MR. HENDRIX: We do have the graph.
i
- 10 A This graph is the -- the plotted data, and this l l
11 woe.ld be - well, let's just say it's.one of the -- one of j i
12 the enclos'ures in the book, you know. And I dian't realize 'l 13 it at.the time,!but this was -- this.was the plotted data of 14 that evolution, and I've heard just within the past three 15 weeks that it was performed on the 21st'and the 22nd'. But, 16 you know, this is.the plot of MU14LIR1,.which is.the --
17 which is the control boarl analog instrument, and this is 18 the' plot of the computer point. And it was given to Carl.
~
19 Bergstrom and he put it in his file.
20 MR. HENDRIX: Can I ask'a question on this. If 21 someone suggests that based on review of that data, that 22 whoever did that evolution on July 22nd did not go past the 23- curve, what would be your response to-that?
24 THE WITNESS: By the plotted data of the computer a 25 point they clearly went to the unacceptable side of this NBAL R. M OSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
a . . - . . -s , e - - .e., .x.. <. .w.-- - - + a n 4
i l
1 Page 81
-1 curve. I don't understand -- I know -- see, the company had i
2 their internal investigation and this was brought up. But, l 3 see, I wasn't part of the internal investigation. All I 4 got, I got called in one day and it took ten minutes to fire 5 me.
6 But it's my understanding that the company is 7 saying, "Well, the 21st and the 22nd of July, that -- that's j 8 insignificant because they didn't cross the line." This is 9 the plotted data. They did cross the line. '
10 MR. DOCKERY: Okay, we need to, for the record, 11 make sure that we characterize exactly what this document i 12 is. ,
13 MR. HENDRIX: This would be -- what exhibit number 14 are we looking at?
15 MR. VORSE: Did you -- did you talk about that in i i
16 your -- your allegations? Or in your...?
17 THE WITNESS: I talked about it from the 18 standpoint of in the first six page -- seven pages of this 19 letter about my conversations with Greg Halnon about the 20 21st and the 22nd, July 22nd. You know, and Greg Halnon l 21 told me, " Erase that date from your mind." You know, I l
22 think there was a conscious effort to exclude any other; i
23 "Let's just base this on what happened September the 5th."
24 MR. HENDRIX: Exhibit #16 in our notebook is a 4
i 25 copy of what he's been referring to. Exhibit #16.
SfEAL R. GROSS 4 CO., INC.
(202)234-4413 l
l
l +
i l i l~ -l Page 82= l o . .
l 1- MR. DOCKERY: Okay. And I want to make sure I ;
i
! 2 understand how that was generated.
3 BY MR. DOCKERY:
4 Q Who -- who created that document?
l .
l 5 A I don't -- I don't know which shift did.it. I 6 .know that OI interviewed Garrett Hebb, Ed McLeod, Bruce ;
7 Willms, Mark--- Mike Schirochman, and Carl Bergstrom, I ;
8- believe. And I'would assume that that was the= shift that --
l- 9 that did it. And.-- and it looks to me like they took the i
10 plant to about 83 inches,-82 inches, or the make"p tank to -l 11 82 inches,. and they pressurized up where the computer point.
l 12- was just'belqw the curve and they bled down to -- looxs like 13 they bled down to about 53 inches.
- 14 , Q Mr. Fields, may I look at the. copy that you're --
15 you're holding there.
16 (.Mr. Dockery was handed certain material.)
l 17 Q Okay, this doesn't appear to'be dated.
l I A No , it doesn't.
'19 Q But am I correct that this -- this graph pertains 20 only to data that was collected on July -- either 21st or j 21 22nd?
l 22 A That's my' understanding.
23 Q How did you obtain this?
, 24 A It was in Carl Bergstrom's file. And Carl i
25' Bergstrom's file got given to Gerald Williams, and Gerald L
F NBAL R. (ROSS & CO., INC, (202)234-4433
Page 83 1 Williams mailed a copy to my attorney. It was just kind of 2 there. It's just kind of been there.for a long time. And, 3 you know, I know it was given to Carl Bergstrom because you ;
i 4 can't read it, but the writing on the bottom, that's his j 5 handwriting. And I know that he had a file on the makeup 6 -tank issue. ,
7 Q And your interpretation of this graph is that 8 during that evolution the curve was exceeded? ,
1 9 A Absolutely.
10 BY MR. VORSE:
11 Q And by that you mean that they went into the 12 unacceptable pegion of the curve because it's over -- it's 13 to the -- to the right?
i 14 A Well, to the left. ]
15 Q To the left, rather. Okay, to the left.
16 A Yes. j 17 Q Okay.
18 A And see, I don't have access'to the company's I 19 internal investigation. In fact, the company told me, when 20 they fired me, was that they weren't going to give it to 21 you. They were going to give you the conclusions and they 22 weren't going to let you see the investigation.
l 23 But -- but I -- you know, it's my understanding 24 that the company is taking no action, pursuing nothing to do l
25 with July 21st and 22nd because they didn't cross the curve.
NEAL R. GROSS di CO., INC.
(202)234 4433 l
l
l l,
Page 84 1 You know, looks to me like they're manipulating the 2 information to say, well, they didn't cross the curve with 3 the control board instrument. But it's clear to me that the 4 computer point crossed the line, and we have a letter from 5 engineering that says the computer point is more accurate ;
6 and they requested us to use it.
7 BY MR. DOCKERY:
8 Q And that -- that data there, the graph we've been 9 referring to tells you that the computer point did cross the 10 curve?
11- A Yes, sir.
12 Q 'Okay.
13 A And I -- I think that's_a -- you know, that, to 14 me, is a -- if that's true... You know, I can't --
I can't 15 go out and take depositions from these people at the plant.
~16 If that's true, that to me is a clear example of' 17 manipulating information. If they're just going to say,
'18 "Well, MU14LIR1 didn't cross the line; therefore there's no 19 problem," knowing that the computer point did, then I think 20 they're manipulating information. And they've got'the REDAS 21 data, I don't have access to it. It's available to you.
22 MR. McNULTY: We are conducting an investigation 23 on the July 21st and 22nd, separate from this.
24 BY MR. DOCKERY:
25 Q Mr. Fields, during -- leading up to the events of NBAL R. GRCSS & CO., !WC.
(202)234-4433 i
l
1 1
l Page 85 l
1 September 4th and September 5th, did you ever consider going l l
2 to the NRC as a viable option with respect to getting your j l
3 concern addressed?
4 A My operator, Mark Van Sicklen, did go to the 5 resident inspector on four different occasions. I remember 6 -- I remember t'.le last occasion that he talked to the NRC 7 was he had -- it was before turnover. I saw him talking to 8 Todd Cooper. After turnover was over he came over to me and 9 said, "The NRC's not going to help us with this. He just 10 told me how to write an allegation."
11 Q Did Mr. Van Sicklen take that action with your 12 knowledge? Qid you suggest it to him?
13 A No , I did not.
14 Q Did he ask you about it beforehand?
15 A He had told me beforehand on a previous occasion 16 that he had talked to Todd, and Todd was going to look into 17 it.
18 Q Did you concur with him doing that?
19 A Oh, he's -- he's got that right.
20 Q Oh, absolutely. I understand that. But, I 21 mean,...
22 A I didn't -- I felt -- you know, I didn't disagree 23 with him. Sometimes -- sometimes you have more 24 communication with the NRC resident inspector than you do 25 with your own management. You know, they have a lot more itEAL R. GitOSS & Co., INC.
(202)234-4433
Page 86 i l' horsepower than -- than you, individually. If the resident 2 -inspector takes an interest in -- in something, you know, he 3 can make some things happen. And I think that was what 4 -Mark's hope was, but Todd just kind of left it, "If you~want 5 to make an allegation, write an allegation," and that was a 6 lot more than Mark Van Sicklen wanted to get involved with.
7 MR. DOCKERY: Okay, I think we're -- we appear to 8 be coming to the end of the questions. Curt, do you have 9 anything specifically?
10 MR. RAPP: No , I do not.
11 MR. DOCKERY: Jim?
12 MR.,VORSE: No.
13 MR. DOCKERY: Mr. Fields, at.this time, before we 14 close'out the record, I'd like to give you the opportunity 15 to make any kind of statement you feel is appropriate. 4 16 Given that we have here in writing your documented 17 allegations...
18 THE WITNESS: You don't want me to read this to 19 you?
20 MR. DOCKERY: I'd really rather you didn't.
21 THE WITNESS: All right.
22 MR. DOCKERY: We won't prohibit you from doing 23 that, but we do again acknowledge the fact that you have 24' documented various concerns and opinions on this matter and 25 we -- we have a copy of that.
NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
. _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . - _ . . _ . _ _ . . _ . _ _ . _ . . _ . . _ ~ . . _ __. ._ . __
l
^
Page 87 1
j; -1 MR. HENDRIX: I would want to say one thing. .The l t 1 I 2 . cover l letter, itself, is not an exposition onfthe 3 allegations'. The cover letter was his effort to give you
-l 4 everything he knows about September 4th in'a concise matter i I
n 5 so you have -- have it all right there in front of you.
1 Then the allegations are sort of attached to that. So
[ 6
- 7 they're not really, you know, intertwined within his cover 8 letter, for'whatever,that's worth to you.
1 9- BY MR. VORSE:
- i 10 Q There's one other question I forgot to ask, just j 11 for the record. Besides the 4th and the 5th of September of l
'12 1994, were there any other cimilar evolutions conducted-by. )
- 13 you or.anyone on your shift that you know of?. 1 i '14 A Not that I know of.
15' Q Thank you.
16 A I know I didn't authorize any.
17 nR. DOCKERY: Okay,-Mr. Fields, inevitably in a 18 situation like this there are -- there .are questions that.
19 perhaps we don't ask, that you feel should have been asked.
20 Or there are issues that aren't raise, that we don't raise, 21 that you feel should be raised. Like to afford you the 22~ opportunity now to -- to address those issues, and please do
-23 so.
24 THE WITNESS: Well, I don't really have a whole 25 lot prepared here. I guess I'm trying t'o present to you MEL R MMS & m. , DC.
(202)234*4433
_ . . - -. _ _ - . _ . - _ _ ~ . _ - . _ . . _ . . _ _ , _ . _ . _ , _- . - . _ .... _ .
m 1
Page 88 1 1 that -- that this whole issue is not about me. You know,
- 2. I'm not-the-problem. You know, I'm not -- I wasn't'some i 3 . sort of rogue-operator who tried to pull a fast'one and do l
-4 something that was unauthorized or illegal on the 4th;or the j 5 5th. But -- but I feel like I did my job correctly,:I:did 6 what was expected of me. And for what -- whatever reason, I
.7 'believe that my management, my former management has used me ]
8 as the scapegoat to I guess keep the real issue of-9 management oversight and the lack thereof, incompetent 10 engineering and the lack thereof, and -- and employee 11 concerns and how those are resolved and the lack themeof.
12 'They've -- they've manipulated the infurmation
. 13 that'has gone to the NRC. They've used me.as: You did an 14 unauthorized test. When the NRC came out with an apparent l 15 violation, that, "No, you -- you violated procedures," then 16 you -- then my company says, 17 "Yes, you violsted procedures." You know,.they're 18 --
they're spending more of their time trying to tell you --
19' or trying to react to what they think you're going looking 20 -for, to keep me in focus, to keep me the bad guy, to shield i
21- themselves their own liability. And I'm hoping that the ,
. 22' allegations that I'm presenting will give you the 23 ' opportunity to see that. If the questions are asked and l
- 24. they ask -- answer them truthfully, I think it will become,
- 25 in my opinion, fairly obvious that that's what they're NBAL R. StOSS & Co.. INC.
(303)334-4433 1
I l i
i l -
l Page 89 l 1- attempting to do.
2 You know, to me why was the pre-decisional 3 enforcement conference canceled? You know, it was -- they l
, 4 called you guys on the night of July 19th with this panicky 5 call. It was like, "Oh, my God, we've. uncovered something." l l 6 Well, they didn't uncover anything. .The plant manager and I I 7 had talked about it-several hours before and said, l
8 "Well, I guess it wasn't that significant, but I 9 think we ought to bring it up. And I'll bring it up in my.
10 presentation, the company will bring it up in their i
11 presentation on the following Tuesday." I -- I firmly 12 believe tnat,they saw me going in first and saying, "This i
13 data was taken on September 4th, you know, that hasn't been I
14' reported before, but -- but I did take it. And, you know, l
15 it had no significant bearing." They felt like.that -- in l 16 my opinion, it was their concern then that it was going to 17 show what a crummy job they did evaluating the problem 18 report. They didn't evaluate the problem report. They 19 spent all their time crucifying me, my assistant, the four 20 operators that reported to me.
21 It was -- it was spin control, it was manipulation f 22 of how you were going to react, how they thought you were L 23 going to react. And I think that's.-- I don't understand 24 why.they're doing that. I think the utility needs to be 25 just up front. If something's wrong, if something's not NBAL R. 2 088 & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433 l
l
__ . . _ . _ . _ , _ _ . _ ~ ,
c Page 90 l' working you fix the problem. You don't try to make Dave-2 ' Fields.and his shift the bad guys, fire them, and then'come:
3 .back to you and'say, "Well, we've solved our1 problem."
4 .Well, they. haven't solved their problem.
5- BY MR.-DOCKERY:
'6 Q Mr.' Fields, do.you believe something's being
.7.' covered up here?
8 A Yes. I think if -- if.they tell you that they 9 didn't cross the line and'this is the actual plot of the ,
L10 . data taken on July 21st or 22nd. they're~ lying te you. If 11 this -- if -- I don't'~even know who the operator ~was that 12 plotted tNis., If he plots this as the -- as the computer ;
13 point and you verify it.with the REDAS data.of that computer 14 point and you've got-the' company report in your hand that
{
15 says, " July 22nd is not significant because they didn't i 16 cross the curve," to me that's - .that's evidence'that 17 they're coveringTq) something.
18 PGL. DOCKERY: Go on with your statement.
19 10iE WITNESS: The licensee event report, which.was
- 20. sent on I believe 31 days after November 16th, they talk I :21 'about -- says, "Each time the operating point was..." This
-22 is under the "Cause" section. "Each. time the operating 23 point was deduced to be on or near the curve, as indicated 24 by the main control. board instrument, the makeup tank may
! 25 .have been operating outside the design bases." That
- usar. m. amoss a co.. zuc.
[ (202)234 4433
1 i :
i 1
- 1 J-i i i l 4 Page 91 4
i
[
c 1 -statement right there is a -- it may not be false, but it's j l' - 2: a manipulation. Because if you were on the curvt3 you were
(
3- outside design bases. It's not "may have been."-
.i 3
- 4 And
- they used the word'" main control board ;
- 5 instrument." If you were using the main: control board-6 . instrument you.would clearly.-- by the-computer points you'd 5.
l 7 clearly be inside the curve and outsidel design bases. 'But 1
[ 8 'the important issue is that for.18 months we operated on the-i.
9 curve. Management insisted we operate on the curve. We e 1 i 10 were outedde design bases unknowingly for that. length of l 11 time.
1 12 'nd,my A shift performed a simple little evolution i 13 to show that the curve -- the plant response was not that
-14 'way, and we learned that it was.a. design basis curve, and we-15- learned that it was an incorrect. design basis curve,-and we' )
i 16 learned that operating in'that situation-you unknowingly
~ 17 could have lost half of your high pressure injection system.
18 .This statement in this licensee event report is 1
19 not -- it's not up front, it's not... Why didn't they just )
20 come out and say, "Every time a shift operated on that curve 21 by any instrument the plant was outside design bases and 1 22' half the HPI system was compromised"?. And that's the
~
23- significance of this_whole thing. It was a simple safety
- 24- concern. My guys wouldn't let it go, they felt strongly i
25 about it, they brought it to me, they brought a way to HEAL R. 3085 & CO., !WC.
(202)234 4433 i
. - ~ ._. -.- -.. . . ~ . . . - . - . - - - . - . . - - - - - .
i Page 92 1 demonstrate it which I determined was an appropriate way, a 2 legal way. I felt empowered by my own management.-to make 3 that decision, and I did it.
4 And we didn't have anything t'o gain under -- other 5' than operating the plant safely. And.what's: happened to me 6 and what's happened to my assistant, what's happened to the 7- two chief operators, their careers were over. . Their -- they 8 'might as well have gotten fired; their careers are over,
, 1 9 Over this incident is a crime. You know, and I --LI don't 10, know.
11 I -- in one of the letters I wrote to.Mr Ebneter 12 I took res'ponsibility for some of the decisions.' made were 13 . incorrect'. I should'have notified the shift manager. I q
-14= should have - .I'm the one -- I have'an engineering degree, 15 and I said I -- I should have been the one that could have 16 looked at that calculation and said, " Boy, this looks like a. !
l 17 design basis here," You know, I -- I might have had that 18 ability if I'd really looked at it closely.
19 And-I also admitted that my chief operator had 20 concerns when he was working with engineering, he was 21 working.with Greg Halnon. I should have got more involved l
22 with him and helped him out, you-know, because I know how to 23 write -- write letters better than he does and I know how to 24 get a point across a little better than he does, and I 25- didn't do that. So I -- I took responsibility for what I usu. a. amou a co., rue.
(202)234-4433 i
Page 93 1 did wrong. But the company is not taking responsibility for 2 what they did wrong.
3 The company is -- has gone beyond that. I mean, 4 what they're doing is unethical and immoral to -- to fire 5 people because they have a safety concern, to send them down 6 the road. What kind of a message is that sending to the 7 rest of the people at the plant? People won't do anything.
8 You raise your hand and say, "I don't think that's right,"
9 they're not going to do that anymore.
10 You know, I -- I have never seen management take 11 an action like this before. The operators at Peach Bottom 12 didn't get' fired over it, you know; the people at the 13 Limerick Plant didn't get fired over it. It -- this is --
14 this is incredible. I'm just --
I guess I'm trying to use 15 this as a forum to say, "This shouldn't be over yet."
16 MR. DOCKERY: And I think you've said that.
17 THE WITNESS: And I -- I just -- you know, my 18 integrity has been attacked over this, and I -- in my mind 19 and in my heart I don't think I did anything wrong. And --
20 and -- but I can't say that of the people that -- that )
l 21 manage me right now. I think what they're doing is wrong 22 and they know it. They're -- they're manipulating what they 23 think you're going to do. They're giving you bits and j 24 pieces of information. They're focusing all their attention 25 on -- they're going to try to convince you that firing me is ]
j NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC, (202)234-4433
. ..- . . - . - .. . . . . . - - -- - - - - - - - . . ~ _ - _ - . _ ~ . - . ~
Page 94 i
11 -- is the solution to their problem. Strong management 2 oversight. Well, it's not.
3 Have I left anything out, Richard?
4 MR. HENDRIX: No. The -- if I just... You don' t' ;
5 have.the answer to the question as to: Did engineering --- l
.6 were they under any pressure from Mr. Beard to sort of go -
7 along with the 25 cc's per kg? You don't know,that. But' i is they didn't do anything, I mean, to prohibit it or to review 9 it. So we're not making allegations about things we don't 10 know, but there are some interesting questions here that are 11- out there, and we put those in the allegations.
12 ' Do you feel like you've covered your ~ allegations, ,
q 13 -just the parameters.of it? I know you don't want it j
14 repeated, but there's one'in there that you - .I don't think.
1 15 'we've really' discussed it.
16' THE WITNESS: Allegation 2, I talked about j 17 previously performed tests at the plant. And I -- and 18 that's why~I said I was just' flabbergasted dhat they came ,
19 back .cn1 me and said, "How dare you perform this -- this j 20 unauthorized test," when they knew that they -- it was i
- 21 ' fairly-routine, you know. That's how most of the procedure -
22 steps were written, people do something and say, "Well, this l 23 works. Let's put this in a procedure," and stuff.like that.
24 i 25 And I'v3 seen my own boss three months, four 1
- 4 k. StOSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
i Page 95 1 months before I did this evolution running around with a 2 relay tech, and he's got a jumper in hisihand, doing stuff 3 without a test procedure. And he's -- he's looking down at 4 me and saying, "How could you dare -- how could you possibly 5 perform an unauthorized test." You know, so all I did was 6 list-four -- four tests that I know of.that were fairly i
7- recent that were performed without..a. procedure, without a j 8 50-59 evaluation. And -- and I guess in all cases 9~ management knew about them. Management didn't do anything 10 about it; they encouraged-it.
11 MR. HENDRIX: The only other thing I think that 12 you might want to address i: . now, Mr. Saltsman's with .
13 engineering. And Mr. Saltsman, we understand, had.a large 14 hand in the development of the LER. And it's his department 15 that is responsible for approval of the curve, it's his 16 department that would be protected from that. And 17 therefore, the LER is writchn in such a way to totally 18 remove the focus from his department and place it.all on 19 these people who exposed engineering's problems. Do you 20 know anything about that or...? We've heard about the 21 racquetball game or...
22 THE WITNESS: Well, I know that he -- I know that 23 he was part of the review process for the... You know, that 24 LER went through six iterations, and he was in the process 25 for all six of them. In fact, on the sixth one he and Pat u m a. anons 6 co., rue. )
nm n..un 4
l
1 Page 96 ;
1 1 Beard went-off into an office-secondhand information-and j 2 wrote the final-draft, and nobody else reviewed it, and they 3 sent.it off. i 4 MR. DOCKERY: Do you have anything else, i
5 ' Counselor? i I
'6 MR. HENDRIX: That's it.
7 THE WITNESS: I have one more thing. 3 I
8- MR. DOCKERY: Okay.
9- THE WITNESS: And that's just a... As I read my 10 letter today, Allegation 3 has a list of attachments.
11 Unfortunately it doesn't attach one of the two empaciee 12 concerns.that,I talk about, that I need-to mail;you that I I
11 3 concern to be part of the package.
14 MR. VORSE: Do it through him.
15 MR. HENDRIX: Just give it to me and I'll'give it ;
i 16- to them.
17 THE WITNESS: Ckay. And if -- if you'go to the 18 section in Pat' Beard of his list of questions, okay, that 19 would be Page 2 of Allegation 1,... Well, that's -- that's 20 correct. In one of the places I refer -- there's one curve, 21 OP 103A, Curve 22, that we're operating above the naximum 22 limit right now. I presented this.to Mr. Ebneter on July 23' 19th. It's in'his package.
24 I'm asking Mr. Beard and Mr. Hickle and Mr. Halnon 25 the question in here: Are you aware that we're operating i
IRAL R. CNt088 & CO., INC.
(303)334-4433
Page 97 1 '.above the maximum limit of OP 103A, Curve 22, at this -- at 2 this very moment? I think in one of the - ,one of the --
3 one of the list of' questions I list that as Curve.8 and that 4 really should be Curve 22, but...
5 MR. McNULTY: Page 3, Line 16 you have it listed 6 as Curve 22, is that...?
7 THE WITNESS: Right, and that's the' correct one 8 because...- Well, wait a second. All right, here's the 9- correct information. It is Curve 8, OP 103A.- This is the-10 expected value;'this is the maximum value; this is the
'11 plotted point, which is clearly above the maximum level 12 right now.' ,
13' MR. McNULTY: So instead of Curve 22 it should be-14~ Curve 8?
'15 THE WITNESS: It should be Curve 8. 'And I don't 16 -- and', you know- 2 you know, they talk about where you.
17 can't violate these curves and you can't do this. Well, 18 here they're clearly violating it. You know,'and Greg 19 Halnon -- you can see they all end at 24-72 megawatts. 1The 20 plant's licensed at'25-44 since 1981. All the curves are --
21 they haven't been revised since 1981. You know, to me that 22 tells me a little bit about engineering and management 23 oversight, that you would_ operate the plant off the curve 24' for 15 years, 14 years, and in this one case you're 25 operating above the maximum limit.
se u. n. m o u n, co., suc.
caesin..un i l
i I
. . .. . . . .. - . . . - . ~ . - . . . - - . . . . . . - - . _ - -
0 Page 98 i 1 And Greg Halnon, when we -- after we did this OP ,
2 103 -- after we learned this curve was a design basis curve )
j 3 they said let's look at all the other curves. And'they 4 : evaluated and said, well, we're all -- they're all bad 5 because they haven't been updated. So Greg Halnon, he just l
6~ dispositioned it with an E-mail message that says we-7 recognize that they're not - haven't been revised since 24-i Go ahead and use them.
8 72.
i 9 You know, and that -- that's not the way you do 10 business. You evaluate each one individually, ymt write a 11 -problem -- you write a procedure change, and you evaluate it l 12 with a 50-59 process and a review process. You know, but --
13 but if I make a decision to use OP 402 to demonstrate that l
14 Curve 8 of 103B is. incorrect, I get fired. Greg Halnon i 15- writes an E-mail message and says, "This whole frmily of )
16 curves is incorrect, but go ahead and use them anyway." I 17 -- I don't see the difference -- you know, what'c :he 18 difference there? He's one level above me. You know, but 19 they're not -- they're not going to -- there's no 20 cons).stency there.
21 MR. DOCKERY: Anything else?
22 THE WITNESS: I have nothing else.
23 MR. DOCKERY: Okay, if I may, then, I'd like to 24 try and summarize something that I believe you testified to 25 here during the course of the afternoon. But I want you to NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
Page 99 1 listen very carefully and make sure that I'm getting this 2 correct.
3 BY MR. DOCKERY:
4 Q The night of September 5th you were the senior 5 manager, operations manager responsibility for' conducting 6 that evolution, is that correct?
7 A I was the senior licensed person on the site. My 8 responsibility as a reactor -- I -- I report to the shift 9 manager. But I make all decisions concerning the operation 10 of the ra=.ctor.
11 Q Was it your decision to conduct that evolution?
12 A ' Absolutely.
13 0 Is it fair to say that you made the decision to 14 deliberately go beyond the bounds-whatever is technically 15 correct to say-of Curve 8?
16 A I suspected that we_would.go -- that the plant' 17 recponse wculd go to the left of Curve 9. I suspected that 18 that would happen, and as we watched the drain-down occur it 19 did draw a curve on the inside of chat curve, and I allowed 20 that to continue. I made that decision that I was 21 authorized and empowered to do that.
22 Q At that time what did you believe'that Curve 8 23 constituted?
24 A Curve 8 was an operating limit on how you operated 25 the makeup tank. On the night of September 5th I knew that NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
L L
l
- - Page.100 l
1 -- after-having read the calculation, I knew that if you had 2 a.high pressure injection signal and you. operated two HPI 7
3 pumps off of a single suction and you were on that curve,
'4- you would always have at least 1.7 feet of water at the ,
1 5 suction of-the pump.
6 Q Is'it fair to say what you did or caused to happen d 7 was done intentionally?
! 8' A Yes. '
9 Q Did you know at the time that Curve #8 was.a .
10 design basis' curve?
11 A I did not know Curve 8 was a design basis curve.
12 Q. When didLyou find out Curve 8 was a design basis' I-
.13 curve? l !
l-i l- '14 .A It was probably September 8th. And nobody came up 15 cnd -- you know, it 'first came up from -- a senior licensing l
'I 16 ' engineer came and kind of said, "You can't'do that. It's;a H l
j..
- 17. design basis curve." You know,'and -- and then it wasn't
'18 confirmed -- well, the company,didn't. confirm that it was a l
19 design basis curve until-November the 16th. But at.the i 20 September 15th Management Review Board meeting I was being l l 21- admonished for violating a design basis. curve.
22 Q If you had known on September the 5th that that !
23 wasia design basis curve, would you have taken the same 24 action that you did?
~25- A Absolutely not; nor September 4th.
1 ' NEAI, R . GROSS & CO., INC.
l (202)234-4433 l
l
I Page 101 i 1 Q Have you ever exceeded a design basis curve l 2 intentionally?
3 A No, absolute not.
4 Q If you had intentionally exceeded a design basis 5 curve, do you -- in your opinion, would what has happened to ;
3 I 6= you have been' justified, as far as being terminated?
7 A No. ,
4 4
8 Q It would not have been?
9 A Well, I mean...
J 10 MR. HENDRIX: Do you understand his question?
11 THE WITNESS: Well,... j
~
12 MR.,DOCKERY: I phrased it badly.
13 THE WITNESS: ...if I -- if I knew it were a 14 design basis curve I absolutely would not have done the
[
15' test. If I had inadvertently violated a design basis curve, 16 I would have taken-the proper action and notified the NRC 17 wi-hin one hour under 50-72. I would never have gotten l
18 myself into a situation of getting myself fired. You know, 19 I didn't -- I don't lie, cheat, or steal when I'm in a 20 control room. You know, I take my -- I took my 21 responsibility fairly seriously, is why I was there in my 22
- authority to do what I did.
23 BY MR. DOCKERY:
24 Q Mr. Fields, do'you believe that you have in some 25 way been retaliated against by your former employer?
ma n. aoss a m., 2we.
(203)234-4433
l l
1 Page 102 1 A Absolutely. ,
l 2 QL Do you feel it was in response to your raising 3 health and safety concerns?
l l
4 A I think partially; I think the letter that I wrote 1 5 to Mr. Ebneter in June was probably the -- that -- that kind 6 of broke the back. It says they're not going to take I 7 anymore of this. You know, basically the company wrote a ,
8 letter to Mr. Ebneter saying that we were guilty, we've l
9 taken strong action against these guys, and I was told that 10 I would never be a shift supervisor again. And I told 11 Mr. Pat Beard, I said, "I don't agree with this. I'm going 12 to send my own letter." And after I sent that letter, I 13 think I became expendable.
14 MR. DOCKERY: Are you familiar, Mr. Fields, with 15 the recourse that you have under -- going through the 16 Department of Labor in this...?
17 THE WITNESS: I would appreciate it if you would 18- give me a quick summary.
19 MR. DOCKERY: Okay. Section 2-11 of the Energy 20 Reorganization Act prohibits a licensee from adversely 21 affecting the employment conditions of any employee who 22 brings forth health and safety issues regarding regulated 23 activity.
24 THE WITNESS: I have read bits and pieces of 2-11.
25 MR. DOCKERY: Okay. The procedure that you have NEAL R. GR088 & Co., ZWC.
(202)234-4433
. ..m. . m . . _ _ , . . . _ _ . - - , _ . _ _ .- _ _ _ . . _ . _ . . . . . _ . ._ _.
i 4
Page 103 1 l l 2 1 available-is to u file a complaint with the Department of 1 . .
2 . Labor, Wage and Hour Division. Now, that complaint can be 3 'as simpl'e. as a letter to ' the Wage and Hour Division-or it 4' can be' addressed to the Secretary of Labor-but notifying 5 them that-you feel.that you have a cause of action under
.6 S6ction 2-11 of the Energy Reorganization Act.
7- You have 180 days from the-date that you were 8 negatively impacted to. file that complaint. Now,;the 9 Secretary of Labor is the only form of recourse, personal 10' recourse that you have. The NRC.can't provide you - we 11 can't restore your job directly. Our interest in your
- 12 complaint is ; regulatory, to wae to' it that the -- the 1 31 licensee' takes the correct action. But I just want to make 14 sure you. understand that you have that recourse.
15 THE WITNESS: And I -- and I have been working 16 with Mr. Bruno Urich (phonetic) . And the Department of 17 Labor is a cig -- big organization. I've been bounced from 18 Wage and Hour to EEOC to NLRB. And I finally'went back to 19 Mr. Urich and said, "I -- I don't know who to call here."
20 And he said, "I'll find you a name and a phone 21- number to call," and supposedly he's done that.
22 MR. McNULTY: Wage and Hour.
23 MR. DOCKERY: Wage and Hour, yeah. And I -- the 24; thing I'm not sure of, whether it's in Tampa or Orlando, but 25 it really doesn't matter.
manz,m. amoss a oo., rue.
(203)234-4433
a i
I Page 104 4
1 MR..HENDRIX: Well, Wage and Hour didn't know 2 anything about it. They sent him to the EEOC.
3 MR. VORSE: Sometimes people will attach documents l
4- -like you gave to -- you know, with a cover letter,-just'so I 5 they don't!have to read -- do the whole -- whole thing. But 6 Wage and Hour is where you want to be.
1 7 MR. McNULTY: When you're talking to Wage and Hour j 8' you need to make sure you tell them that -- that you want --
9 if you say ERA'they might get you confused and put you.into 10: the EEOC. I 11 THE WITNESS: Talked to one lady in NLRB and she
. l 12 said, "I'll tile a complaint and an investigator will:get' 13 with you in about two months." So anyway, I'm working with 14 Mr. Urich to try to find the.right person to actually. talk i 1
15 - to.
16 BY MR. VORSE:
17 Q I have a very important question for you, 1
18 Mr. Fields. Do you know what our conclusion was on-the ]
19 deliberate violation? Do you know what the conclusion was?
20 Did you ever hear about what that was? l 1
21 A I read the -- yes, I read -- I read the 22 conclusion. I -- I disagreed with it. I was flabbergasted 23 as he wrote it.
24 Q Did you see -- did you see our report of 25 investigation?
w ur. n. amou s co., rue.
(202)234 4433
l i
Page 105 i
l' A No, I did not. Only the conclusion. l 2 Q Here's what we say: That -- that you, Weiss, Van 3- Sicklen, and Scewart deliberately violated plant procedure 4 when.they exceeded the allowable makeup tank overpressure-5 was when you were_ plotting the data, right?-and failed to l 6 take appropriate action to reduce makeup tank overpressure. U 7 !
Can you convince me that I'm wrong?
8 A Well, che way I read the~ apparent violation, which ;
9 was a document that said I had violated AI 500 and that I I 10 violated OP 402, and I had violated AI 500 in that I had not 11 taken prompt action _to the enunciator response.
12 Q 'That's not s
that's not what our concl'usion was.
13 Our conclusion was that you violated plant procedure when I 14 .
you exceeded the allowable makeup. tank overpressure and 1 j 15 failed to take appropriate action to reduce makeup tank l
16 overpressure. '
17 MR. HENDRIX: What plant procedure are you ;
i I t
18 referencing?
2 i
19 MR. VORSE: We're referencing AI 500, " Conduct of l
- . 20 Operatior4, " Paragraph 4. 2.1, " Procedural compliance." It
- 21. states, "It's the duty of every member of the Crystal River ;
22 Plant work force to comply with procedures."
j 23. THE WITNESS: And that's all it says. It also 24 says that, " Written procedures are also needed for those 4
- 25 evolutions that would affect a change in the system flow NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234 4433
Page 106-1 paths or operating parameters. The top boundary between an 3 2 evolution and a task may not always be clear, and it is 3 expected that plant operators will encounter situations 4 where the adequacy of existing procedures may be questioned.
5 In these instances shift supervision will make the 6 determination as to what procedural requirements are 7 applicable."
8 And you're -- and we've got Curve 22 right here.
9 Every operator right now that's operating the plant is in 4
10 violation of this curve.
2 11 MR. HENDRIX: Curve 8?
12 'THE WITNESS: Curve 8, OP 103A. So does it --
13 does that mean every operater should be fired? I don't
.14 understand. You know, I'm the shift supervisor. I wasn't i
15 -- I wasn't violating a curve to be violating a carve. I 16 took the plant to on the curve where management demanded 17 that it be, and I performed the evolution and pluc:ed the
'18 plant response and showed that the plant response was not 19 correct by that curve.
20 If you were on the curve you were outside design 21 bases. For 18 months the plant had been outside design
, 22 bases. I was outside for 35 minutes. And I reported my 23 results to management.
24 MR. HENDRIX: So if you re-read your -- the basis 25 of the procedure, he does deny that he violated plant NEAL R. GROS 8 & Co.. INC.
(202)234-4433
l 4
1 Page 107 !
1 procedure. The procedure -- everything he did was bounded !
2 within plant procedure. Now, if the procedure is sloppily i 6
3 drafted or there should have been more. precise procedures, i 4 that's another matter. But.everything he did is bounded by !
5 plant procedure. Everything. Hopefully we've communicated 6 that message in the-procedures. !
-7 MR. VORSE: Do you agree with that? '
8 MR. HENDRIX: If not, we need to debate it !
l 9 .further, because he very strongly. feels that that is the -
10- case. i
. i 11 MR. RAPP: Let me interject at this point. I 12 ' don't disdgre,e.that what yoL did was bounded by OP 402. All ;
13- right? I think that technically you were working within the l 14 plant operating procedures. The issue becomes, in AI 500 I 15 " Conduct of Operations," in there it says that you-will
'16- operate the plant within the administrative limits. And in~
17 .taking the plant outside of the Curve 8 and plotting the --
18 in order to plot your data, that becomes the action that.was 19 in violation of AI 500. And'therefore we could reach no --
20 no other conclusion'than that it was a willful act and that 21 you continued to do it, even though you' recognized you were 22 outside that administrative limit. ;
23 THE WITNESS: Plant operating curves are only 24 referred to within procedures. OP 402 refers you to j j
R25 Curve 8. It refers you there when you fill the tank with usu, n. amoss a co., zwe. I unin...us
J I
i-
.' Page 108 i 1 hydrogen.
4 2 MR. RAPP: I understand.
-3 THE WITNESS: There is no limit and precaution at I 4 'the beginning of the procedure that says, "Thou shalt never 1
5 ' violate this procedure," it's only referred to by this 6 procedure, and that's what we did. It doesn't say that when 7 you drain down, oh, make sure that you don't exceed Curve 8.
8 They're only refer -- and that --
Curve 8 of OP 103A, l
9 they're already above the max. How do you handle that?
]
10 What -- what are you going to do? I don't understand what I 11 did wrong. I really don't see it. I-didn't violate -i 12 .anything.' ,
13 MR. HENDRIX: He's getting ready to connect it up 14 for you. Now, listen to him so you can respond.
15 MR. RAPP: We're not --
we're not taking' issue 16 with the fact that OP 402 did not reference Curve 8 in 17 precautions limitations, and it was only referenced in the
^
18 -- in the fill procedure, on the'section where you fill with 19 hydrogen. That was not included in the OI report. The part 20 that we do have the problem with is in where AI 500 it says 21 .that the plant shall be operated within the administrative 22 limits.
23 THE WITNESS: . Read that -- could you read that to 24 me in AI 500.
25 MR. RAPP: I knew you were going to ask me that.
NEAL R StOSS & CO. , INC.
(202)234-4433
Page 109 1 We didn't reference that part, did we? We referenced 403, 2 right? 431.
3 THE WITNESS: Now, I've read 431.
4 MR. RAPP: Right.
5 THE WITNESS: That's...
6 MR. McNULTY: I mean, I would -- I would think 7 there's a reason why they refer to it as an operating limit.
8 I mean, the idea is that you're supposed to stay within the 9 limit, wouldn't you agree with that?
10 TFE WITNESS: We had a concern with this curve for t
11 18 months. We voiced our concern to management, to 12 engineer'dg, ,and the response was the curve is accurate and 13 reasonably conservative. I made the decision that I was 14 empowered to perform OP 402 to demonstrate -- I didn't drive 15 the plant to the left of the curve, I jast let the plant 16 response show that it was different than Curve 8. The ;
i 17 operating curves -- as you can see, they haven't even been 18 revised since 1981, in most cases. It's not something that 19 we look upon as -- or management came out with, "Oh, you 20 never violate one of these curves." Well, we're violating 21 half of them right now. You know, we're -- we're off the 22 page. Curve 8 of OP 103A, we're clearly above the maximum 23 level.
24 You know, I --
I don't -- I don't see your 25 argument that I wasn't authorized, empowered to do that.
NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
-. - .-.. . - - - .. . - - - ~ . . - - . - . _ - - . - . ~ . . . . - . . . - - - - . ~
)
i
?
l-3 Page 110
?-
. 1 Gary Bolt, Pat Beard comes to me and says, " Don't live with 4
i i
2 'something that's wrong. You're empowered to change it if 3 it's not in the.best interest of nuclear safety."
4 My management came to um and said, " Dave, is there 5 anything you want to do, because the-issue is going to be 6 closed'out?" I certainly felt'within my authority and'my 7 responsibility to do this. And my_ management cannot come up '
~
8 with any time that-they told me, "Itou shalt never violate-9 one of our operating curves." It's just not there; the 10 expectation wasn't therrs.
'll But my -- their expectation with me is'to make.
12' good decisions on how to operate the plant. I felt 13ke 13 that I made a good decision to present important. safety j 14 information to-my management. And if they.came back'- zand 15 they came back and said, "All right, you did something 16 wrong. You can't do that." That's fine. And that's what- 1 17 they'did. That's'what Greg Halnon's memo said in'his E- l 18 mail, and I concluded that several times. It-says, "The i 19- controls on the evolution were excellent. The thought 20 process was excellent. This was excellent." Used the word
.21' " excellent"Lfive times. He said-the place that we let '
22 -ourselves down-and he said "we,". management, engineering,-
23 operations-is that we didn't clearly define the- _
24 expectations.
25 That was an honest assessment of where we were. ,
usu, n. eau s co., zue.
(202)234 4433
2 Page 111 1 If that was what their expectations were after I did it, 2 that's fine. And then from that point on I would know, 3 " Dave, you're not authorized to do that." But to set their !
4 expectations up after I did it, after I showed that the 5 plant was in a -- a situation where half of their safety 6 injection system was inoperable, and get fired over it, I 1
7 don't see how you make this conclusion. I 8 MR. HENDRIX: The accurate -- the characterization.
9 of deliberate misconduct implies a knowing and willful 10 breach of a standard that is known to be a line, a ;
11 demarcat on line where beyond which you shall not i
12 transgress'. And that's not what happened here. So to j 1
13 characterize it as deliberate misconduct is what's so 14 damaging. We still contend vociferously that he -- he 15 hasn't engaged in any misconduct and everything he did was 16 within bounded procedure.
17 THE WITNESS: You know, and Greg Halnon freely 18 admitted management, operations, engineering didn't have the 19 expectation out there. But you're not investigating any 20 managers and you're not investigating any engineers.
21 MR. McNULTY: So we're at the point where all the 22 operating curves should have like little asterisks, then, 23 and -- that says, "Well, if you agree with this stay within 24 the boundaries. But if you don't, you can go right ahead 25 and go outside."
NEAL R. GROSS & Co., INC.
(202)134-4433
I Page 112 1 THE WITNESS: Absolutely not. The expectation was 2 not there; Greg Halnon said the expectation wasn't there.
3 Management failed; operations failed; engineering failed.
4 And he, in that memo, put out the expectation. When they 5 give me the expectation and they reinforce it, then I 6 understand. But up until that point I've got Gary Bolt, Pat l
l 7 Beard saying, " Don't live with something that's wrong, you 8 know. You're empowered to take actions that are reasonable
- 9. to do this, this, and this, you know. It's part of your 10 job."
11 I'm not -- I'm not trying to tell you tha+ I have 12 permission to make decisions on what's safe and snat's not 13 unsafe, when-I can -- when I can use procedures and when I 14 cannot use procedures. In my mind on September 4th and I 15 September 5th I was absolutely within my authority and my 16 responsibility to make that decision.
17 And -- and I want to get one more time: I made 18 the decision. My assistant shift supervisor works for me, 19 my chief operators work for me; my reactor operators work 20 for me. I made the decision. If anybody goes down, I'll go l
21 down, but I don't want these guys losing their jobs over it, 22 and they have. You know, what...
23 MR. HENDRIX: Plus, as I cite, if you're in the L
24 position as a result of management failures... In other
! 25 words, the position he was in was as a result of management i
um, m, amou a co., zwe.
(202)234-4433 I
l l
l l
l I
i 1 I
Page 113 1 and. engineering failures. He.was there. And under.your own i 2- operating rules and procedures there cannot be a finding of )
1-3 deliberate misconduct against the individual who has tried 4 to' correct it. Which he tried and his shift tried. That's-2-
i 4
5 why we -- it's the " deliberate misconduct" in the context we i j 6- just feel is very, very unfair. And, 'cause he -- they did
<- 7 everything-they possibly could do. And he was put in the l
- l. 8 position.
9~ And again, he-did not drive the plant outside. He 10 didn't drive it, he didn't go over it, he just did what they 11 told him.was accurate. They're the ones that say it was ;
12 accuratt. 1Hg just tested it.
13 MR. McNULTY: He just -- he just forgot to bring ]
14 it back teithin the boundary when he should have by the i 15 -procedures.
16- THE WITNESS: I didn't forget. I knew to do it. l 17 ~ I had my man stationed to do it.
18 MR. McNULTY: You just waited-32 minutes so you I 19 could get your test data.
20 THE WITNESS: I felt that a smooth curve for the 21- full length would be incontrovertible. That would be the 22- proof that engineering needed, because they had rejected 231 bits and pieces. .I didn't-knowingly violate anything.
24- There was no misconduct on'my part. If I -- if I -- I don't 25 know how to convince you that -- that I didn't do that.
But usu, n. anoes a co., rue.
(202)334-4433
h I
l Page 114 1 at the time I felt-justified to do what I did. After the 2 fact they.said,'"You can't do that." i 3 MR. RAPP: Mr. Fields, I -- I know full good and 4' well there was no malice involved in that action; that your 5 intentions were to-get this issue resolved. But whenever.
l6 you put the plant in a. situation in which it's going to be
- 7. .outside of its administrative limits and you're going to j
.. . 1 8 ' continue to operate in that vein, then there becomes'the I 9 issue of willfulness. Am I misstating anything?
10 MR. HENDRIX: What about Florida Power? What f 11 about Florida Power? They've been doing that for years.
'12 MR.,RAPP: All I can say is that issue is going to 13 be addressed.
14 MR. HENDRIX: On many of-the so-called 15 - administrative limits. On-maybe'the majority of them.. And.
16 'to take this issue,'given the fact that he had tried to
- 17. correct it on many occasions and failed, and had been told,
- 18. "Last' time. It's over. Last time."
19 MR. VORSE: See, we don't -- we don't feel it was' 20 a malicious act, it was_just a Catch 22. You know, you had 21 to ---in order to plot the data you had to -- to violate the l:
u 22 procedure. I mean, it's that simple. I mean,...
-23 THE WITNESS: I didn't violate the expectation, j .24 That was clearly presented by Greg Halnon. Management j' 25 failed; engineering failed; we as operations failed. He~
4 NBAL R. GROSS & Co.. INC.
! (202)234 4433
= .- . . - _ . - - . . . - . - - . - _ _ .
.. .-. _ . . _ _ - _ - . - . . - _ _ - . . - - ~ _ . _ _ -- .- -_ .-- . - - . . . .
i-i I
Page 115 l' i said, "I personally failed because I didn't present the j 2 expectation that I -- that is now required by the NRC." i
- j. 3 You know, if I had knowingly done it, I said, "By 4 God, I'll just do whatever I want," I'd be guilty. But if I 5 thought that I was authorized-to allow the system response 6 to draw the real system response to show these people that 7 the curve they presented was not correct, then I didn't 8 willfully do anything, any misconduct. I willfully tried to-9- present a safety concern, and as a result of that found out l'0 that for 18 months . if you operated on the curve you were j 11 outside design ~ bases. And we've got examples right here, 12 Curve 8 c5 OP,103A. Everybody's operating outside the 13 maximum.
14 MR. HENDRIX: And we're wondering... !
15 THE WITNESS: The expectation is not there.
16 MR. McNULTY: That doesn't affect your activity, ]
17 though. !
18 MR. HENDRIX: Well, we're wondering whether 19 engineering may have known.that anybody operating on the 20 limit would have been in this situation, anyway, and would ;
21 have known that if you're on-the limit you're going to 22 potentially...
- 23. MR. McNULTY: That still remains for us to 24 , discover.
25 MR. HENDRIX: And if they knew that, then they put NBAL R. StOSS b Co.. INC.
(202)234-4423
Page 116 I
1 him in this situation, because he was operating within -- on l
2 the curve, as they wanted him... They wanted him to operate !
3 on the curve.
4 MR. RAPP: One thing to keep in mind is that j 1
5 whenever we -- and NRC is a regulation body. We look at 6 procedures and what is approved plant documents. We can't ,
1 7 go to the expectations that they give you at some i
8 empowerment training.
9 THE WITNESS: You can't?
10 MR. RAPP: No, we cannot go to those expactations.
11 We can say that's a ndtigating factor. Okay? We can say 12 that that nuty, have factored into the mind set or 4.nto the --
13 the dynamics that went on here, but here's a concrete 14 document that says this is what was violated. Okay, we 15 can't -- we can't take those expectations and say, "Well, 16 we'll just ignore this violation because these expectations 17 were out there floating around."
18 THE WITNESS: But you've put me in a situation 19 where I've been fired, and then you've told me my rights 20 under the Department of Labor. They're going to throw it 21 out. Because you folks said that it was willful misconduct.
22 It wasn't willful misconduct. I didn't violate anything 23 knowingly. You know, I -- I presented -- they came to me 24 and said, "Do something. If you're -- if you -- if you 25 still have a concern you got to do something because this is NEAL R GROSS & CO., INC, (202)234-4433
- n. - - . . . .
1
)
)
I I
l Page 117 i 1
1- -going to be closed out." My management came to me and told )
1 2 me to do that. I used my procedure to do that. I 3 Did I willfully violate anything? I did not. And 4 if you say that I did,.it's over. The company wins. I've
~
5 lost everything. My assistant has lost everything. My 6' chief operators have lost their careers.
7 For willful. misconduct? They didn't willfully-8 , misconduct. They -- they had a safety. concern. They didn't 9 try to hide it. They presented it to management. They had 10 nothing to_ gain by doing it. It's...
.11 MR. HENDRIX: If he had engaged in deliberate l
12 misconduct he's not going to write a. problem. report about-
- 13. it. Because if you engage in deliberate misconduct you're
~
i 14 not going to take credit for it and point it out as, "Look 15 what we did here." If you know it's deliberate misconduct 16 you're not going to do that. So-clearly, I mean, the best-17 evidence we can offer to you is:the fact that they prepared 18 a problem report-and went in to management. They were proud-19 of the work they had done,'and thought that they were doing i
20 a good job.
21 Now, on hindsight it's easy to say, "Well, you 22 know,.. " But if you get into the dynamics, again, if you 23 find -- and we hope that you will find deliberate conduct-24 that may have arguably transgressed some very ambiguous,_
'25 poorly drafted procedures, and that were created under a NEAL R. GRoea 4 CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
4-Page 118 1 situation that he had -- and his shift had tried to correct 2 on several occasions. So he engaged in deliberate conduct.
3 But to say deliberate misconduct is the damning --
4 that's it. It's over forever. His career, his reputation,
) 5 his integrity. Deliberate misconduct implies willful, bad 6 intention. And that's what we really are trying to get 7 reversed.
8 THE WITNESS: And we've given you examples of 9 other curves that are being violated right now. Is that 10 willful misconduct? I mean, I'm not -- I see you chuckling 11 over there. I don't understand. You know, these other 12 curves are important curves that we operate to. This curve 13 just happened to be a design basis curve. It shouldn't have 14 been inserted into our operating procedures. It shouldn't 15 have been there. Engineering shouldn't have let that 16 happen. It should have been an accurate design basis curve.
17 But that's -- that's its only-special -- that's the only 18 thing special about this curve. And if I hadn't taken my 19 action we'd be still operating outside design bases,-
20- unknowingly, ready to destroy half your high pressure 21 injection system.
22 The significance of these other curves? I don't 4 23 know. But they're curves or operating limits and the 24 operators are violating them. I think that's... If that's 25 what I'm being charged with and that's the final conclusion, NEAL R. GROSS 8 CO. . INC.
(202)234-4433
1 Page 119 1 what about these other curves, what about these other 2 operators? I don't -- I don't see where you draw the line 3 that says deliberate misconduct here; oh, we don't care 4 ab'out these curves over here.
5 MR. McNULTY: Well, you're the first one who's 6 told us that there are other limits that other operates at 7 Crystal are exceeding right now. That's the first time 8 we've heard this in this investigation. Maybe you could 9 have brought-that up to us when we talked to you in 10 December.
11 THE WITNESS: I wasn't aware of Curve 8 until like i 12 a week be$org the pre-enforcement conference.
13 MR. McNULTY: So how does their -- how does that 14 activity now justify what you did on September the 4th and 15 5th? lt don't understand that analogy.
16 THE WITNESS: I guess I'm trying to tell you that 17 there are many -- there are many operating -curves that are i 18 being exceeded. You've chosen one curve to make j 19 significant; me.
20 MR. McNULTY: Were you aware on September 4th and 1
21 5th that people violated operating curves all the time?
22 THE WITNESS: I was aware that they were not very 23' well written; that they were very old. I was aware that 24 they were -- they.maxed out at 25-40 -- 24-72 megawatts, j 25 most of them.
NBAL R. StOSS & Co. , INC.
(202)234-4433
i l
l 1
Page 120
-1 MR. McNULTY: Did that mean, then, in your mind, 2 it.was okay to go ahead and operate-outside of one?
3 THE WITNESS: It didn't -- it didn't--- it didn't.
4 key me in to think that I was violating an NRC parameter or 5 a design bases in any way, shape, or form.
-6 MR. McNULTY: I'm trying to understand what you're 7 -- I hear your rationale. And your rationale says that when 8 you found out later on that people operated outside the 9 ~ curves; well, that doesn't affect your decision to operate 10 on September 4th and'5th. That's later on. That's an l i
11 excuse as opposed to reason. I'm trying to understkud what 12 your reaso'n was that you thought that you.could operate j
'13 outside the curve on September 4th and 5th.
14 MR. HENDRIX: It's not a -- I want to say I' don't 15 think he's offering it as an excuse. I think what he's 16 really trying- to ldo is: of fer it as an example of following 17 his logic on it, not...
18 MR. McNULTY: It's after the fact.. It doesn't go
-19 'to the logic of making the decision on the 4th and 5th, and 20' that's what we're trying to get to. That's'what we say was 21 an intentional, willful act.
22 MR. HENDRIX: Well, we agree with that;
-23 . intentional, willful act. It's the intentional, willful act 2-4 of misconduct, a bad.act, that'we disagree'with.
25 MR. VORSE: We don't -- we don't say misconduct.
wiu,n. amoss a co., zwe.
(202)234*4433
. _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _._._._.___.m_._ _ _. ,
1 Page 121
.1 MR. McNULTY: We don't make that call. That's 2- something enforcement brings to us in a package.
3 MR. HENDRIX: Well, we -- we need you to make i
4 the... R l
5 MR. VORSE: We say we have a -- we have a i 6 violation of procedure that is willful. '
7 MR. McNULTY: Our call is intentional and 8 deliberate call. When-you_get to the enforcement panel 9 that's where the...
10 MR. RAPP: Misconduct.
11 ... deliberate misconduct issue comes
~
MR. McNULTY:
. i 12 in. Not with us. And again, what I'm trying to say is that )
i 13 what -- what's happening now doesn't justify the action that i 14 you did on September 4th and 5th. Now, if you had-something 15 .that occurred before that, that led you to believe that you 16 can operate outside an operating limit because of whatever, l
17 we'd certainly be interested in hearing that.
]
18 THE WITNESS: Well, let me just go-over it one 19 moreLtime. We raised the concern, we initiated Problem l
\
20 Report 94-149. It was evaluated by engineering as, "It's 21 all right. We're going to close out the issue." We had 22 management demanding that we operate on the curve. They 23 were monitoring it hourly. It was brought to me, after the 24 September 2nd letter was written, "Do something or it's 25 going to be. closed out."
M EL R. M OSS & M .. 18C .
(202)234 4433 ;
l I
i
- - _ --. .. .- . ~ . . ~ . . . . . .
l Page 122 j 1 MR. McNULTY: Now, you would think, with 2 management monitoring this and checking it every hour, that 3 operating -- that that curve was pretty important to them. !
l 4 THE WITNESS: Only the maximum pressure was l
~
5 important. You know, I'm sure they would have been happy to l l
- 6 see us operate above it if we got the 25 cc's per kg. It I
. 7 wasn't -- they were not concerned that we wanted to operate 8 five or ten pounds below the maximum. That was -- that was i
9 disregarded. Our concerns were not looked at. Our concerns j 1
10 were poorly evaluated and rejected, and we were -- and we !
1
- 11. were right. And the health and safety of the puolic in ,
1 12 Crystal River,in Citrus County is better because of it.
13 MR. McNULTY: And what if you're wrong? What if 14 it turned out the curve was accurate?
4 15 THE WITNESS: If it's what? Turned ouw...
]
16 MR. McNULTY: What if you were wrong? What if it i 17 was accurate?
18 MR. HENDRIX: If it was accurate...
. 19 THE WITNESS: If it was accurate I would have 20 followed the curve right down, it would have followed -- the 21 plant response would have followed the curve.
22 MR. McNULTY: Would that have justified your 23 activity if you were wrong?
24 MR. HENDRIX: He was following the curve.
25 THE WITNESS: It was my procedure. I followed my NEAL R. CutOSS 8. 03. , INC.
(202)234-4433
Page 123 >
1 _ procedure. If I had driven the plant somewhere... (
2 MR DOCKERYi If I may paraphrase: If the curve 3 had been correct you could not have been wrong in what you '
4 did, is that correct?
l 5 THE WITNESS: That's right. I would -- I would 6 have concluded that, well, looks like the plant response is 7 -- is with that curve. I guess I'll have to agree that 8 engineering is correct. '
9 MR. HENDRIX: See, what he did was follow the' 10 curve. He didn't go beyond the curve, he followed the curve t .
11 and then plotted it to show that the curve that I'm i
- 12 following'is pot accurate. But he followed the procedure; ]
13 he didn't violate the procedure. He did not transgress the 14- administrative operating limits. He put it on it and j- 15 watched'it.
16 MR. McNULTY: And started it. And started. But i
g 17 when it want:beyond the limits he didn't take actions to 18 bring it back.
- 19 MR. HENDRIX
- He's not required to under.the 20 procedure. Because when the enunciator alarm comes in and 21 you're expecting it and you've looked into it, then it gives 22 him the discretion, as the senior shift supervisor.
l 23 MR. RAPP: And I do not disagree. That's why in
- 24 the OI report we.did not reference OP 402 or the alarm 25 response; okay? Because my -- my evaluation of that with MEAL R. GROSS & Co., 2NC.
(202)234 4433 1
4 e
t eg + ~ . . , -
ec .
. .. -. - - .- -- . _ - - - . - . - ~ ..
Page 124 1 the plant procedures, the administrative procedures, those 2 were not valid issues.
3 MR. HENDRIX: But I think that those should be 4 referenced as the basis for his acting within procedures.
5 That was the -- his basis. In other words, he did not go-6 beyond the. curve. I think that's what -- if I understand 7' your finding, the finding is.-- is that he transgressed... l 8 MR. McNULTY: No. 1 9 MR. RAPP: No. l l
10 MR. McNULTY: The finding is that he alle- ed the 11 plant to operate... Why don't -- and we get pretty confused 12 herc with'at ,what point this happened and what p int he 13 crossed the line. I -- in my mind, one', you don't conduct 14 evolutions to collect data. When you do that you're 15 conducting a test.
16 MR. HENDRIX: There's no definition for a test. .
17 MR. McNULTY: I know that. That's why it's not 18 cited; okay? But what's cited is that -- what's cited is 19 that he didn't follow the appropriate procedure as far as 20 safe operation of the plant by allowing the plant to go 21- outside an operating limit and not -- and that's the bottom 22 line. The bottom line is that he started off, he set out 23 with the idea that we're going to spin this line, because 24 outside the limit we're not going to do anything till we get
- 25. our data. And that to us is -- that's not acceptable. The wa n m. amoes a co., :ve.
(202)234-4433
I 1
-Page 125 l 1 agency doesn't view that as acceptable.
2 THE WITNESS: And the apparent violation,'I...
l
'3 MR. McNULTY: Well, that's -- those:are more 4 important to be addressed,in an enforcement conference. -
-l 5 That's...
6 MR. VORSE:
That's not ours. j 7 THE WITNESS: So you don't.-- you don't have '
8 anything to do -- you don't do that?
-9 MR. McNULTY: No. That's...
10- MR. VORSE: That's not ours. .
11 MR. McNULTY: We -- we report what we feel is in 12 our report, which you don't get to see, You get.-- you 13 maybe get.to see the synopsis. And'then they'look at our 14 report, the interviews, they look at all the. technical 15 input, and the agency arrives at their enforcement package.
16 So the. enforcement package is -- may be somewhat based on 17 our report. There are times when the agency disagrees with 18 us and they'll choose to disregard our investigative report 19 and write their own. l 20 THE WITNESS: But you -- you have no problem with 21 the crew thati..
-22 MR.'McNULTY: Do we? No, but:we have an inspector 23 general, I guess, who on occasion may decide-that what- l 24 happened here wasn't right'. l 25 THE WITNESS: No , I mean -- I mean, about the --
(202)234 4433
l I
Page 126 i 1 the events on July 21st and 22nd.
2 MR. McNULTY: We're' investigating those. .In-fact, 3 Mr.'Dockery is the case agent for that investigation, so 4 it'll be separate.
i 5 MR. VORSE: We're just getting started.
6 MR. DOCKERY: Which is a very recent 7 investigation, that's why it's difficult to address any 8 question you might have about it, and be premature, because 9 it's under investigation. Although we appreciate the input ;
10 ~ that you have, that you've provided on it.
l 11 MR. HENDRIX: Well, again, all we can nsk you to 12 do, you got to. call it like you see it. :
i 13 MR. McNULTY: Well, we weren't aware of that one 14 until...
15 MR. HENDRIX: And we want you to do that, but I 16 don't know how else -- how nuch else explaining we can do.
17 I think you know what our position is, and hopefully you 18 appreciate the situation he was in as a result of factors 19 over which he had no control. It's very harsh to -- to be 20 alleged to be guilty of willful misconduct and for the 21l company to be going, "That's right. That's right. Get him 22 out of here."
23 MR. McNULTY: Well, we're -- we've reopened this.
24 We're looking; we can change our conclusion if we feel that 25 it wasn't correct the first time or additional information NEAL R, GROSS & Co.. INC.
(202)234-4433
i Page 127 1 has a different... So we have-reopened the September 5th 2 incident and we're looking at the September 4th incident in 3 conjunction with that.
4 But besides that, we're conducting a separate 5 investigation:on the July 21st-22nd incident. And I.- I
~
6 suspect that once your allegations reach the allegation ,
7 . floor, that we'll be opening an additional investigation.
MR. HENDRIX:
8 Of course, as to the allegations, we 9 still contend that this report, your final report on this 10 ' incident, should not be issued until you have actually 11 reviewed the entire situation. Then maybe you need to be...
12' 'MR.,McNULTY: I tidak that's probably the way 13 it'll go. We're going to be looking at this for some time. l 14 I don't think anything's going to happen for at least six 15 months; three to six months.
'16 MR. VORSE: Does anybody have anything else?
17 MR. DOCKERY: -Just want to ask -- want to make 18 sure that we've afforded you the. opportunity here today to 19 -- to address the issues you wanted to address. We don't 20 'want to cut you short here, but just want to make sure that 21 you were satisfied that you were given the opportunity 22 today.
23 THE WITNESS: I think that I have. If I forgot to 24- bring something up, that's'my fault.
25 .MR. VORSE: Well,'if you do remember something MEL R. W 88 & M .. !NC.
, (202)234-4433 l
l 1
Page 128 1 else, contact Mr. Hendrix here and...
2 THE WITNESS:
And I -- and I -- you see, I -- this 3
is the first time I've talked to anybody about the events of-4 the 4th, you know. I didn't participate in the company's .
l 5 internal investigation. They came to their conclusions and l l
l 6 took it to the board of directors and they fired me.
7 MR. McNULTY: I'd just like to say, just-like you 8 to know that as we get into this we may need to talk to you-9 again, and we'll certainly. contact Mr. Hendrix.
MR. HENDRIX: We're happy to talk to you.
10 See, the government pulled the plug 11 THE WITNESS:
I don't h 7e a 12 on my lawyer., Today is his last day.
13 lawyer. I don't have a job, I don't have a lawyer, I don't have -- don't have any money. Be sure you get that in.
14 MR. VORSE: Thank you.
15 16 (Whereupon,.the hearing was concluded at 3:25
- 17. P.M.)
18 19 20 21 22 I
l 23 24 25 NEAL 1. stoes & Co., INC.
(202)234 4433 i
It9 CERTIFICATE This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory CommisJion in the matter of:
Name.of Proceeding: Interview of David A. Fields Docket Number:
2 Place of Proceeding: Atlanta, GA Date: August 31, 1995 were held as herein appears, and that this is the original ;
transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and, thereafter reduced to typewrit.Ag by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.
MELANIE L. SCHALLOCK
- Official Reporter NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
l l
NEAL R GROSS & CO., INC.
t (202)234 4433
F l
4 1
4 i
l 1 1
! i b
i l
)
l EXHIBIT 7 l
I l
l l
Information in this record was deleted in accordance with the freedom of Information Act, ext E01A4h* - glipasW UM Case No. 2-94-036S EXHIBIT 7 9611270082 961118 PDR FGEA CALANDR96-408. PDR 2. .
i
- (Etfielal Transcript of Proceedings 4
l NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,
l l
l
Title:
In the matter of i Interview of
! Robert P. Weiss i
{
! Docket Number: (not assigned) 1 Location: Atlanta, Georgia 1
Date: August 31,1995 j.
Work Order No.: NRC-319 Pages 1-73 NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
MlBIT /
Couri Reporters and Transcribers 2994 =0 3 6 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W. PAGE / OF '7( PAGE(S)
Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 234-4433 -
l--'If
3 Page 1 BEFORE THE _,
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of: .) l
)
INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEW OF: )
) '
l ROBERT P. WEISS )
)
(CONFIDENTIAL) ) l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l 101 Marietta Tower l Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia Thursday, August 31, 1995 The above entitled matter convened for INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEW pursuant to notice at 10:30 A.M.
APPEARANCES: i l
On behalf of the U.S. NRC: l l'
JAMES D. DOCKERY, Senior Investigator JAMES Y. VORSE, Senior Investigator CURT RAPP, Reactor Engineer Inspector l WILLIAM McNULTY, Field Office Director j U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Tower, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia On behalf of the Witness:
RICHARD W. HENDRIX, Attorney Finch, McCranie, Brown & Thrash 225 Peachtree Street, NE 1700 South Tower Atlanta, Georgia NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
.. ._ y
Page 2 1 PROCEEDINGS i
! 2 MR. DOCKERY: For the record, the date is August 3 31st, 1995. The time is approximately 10:30 A.M. My name 4 is James D. Dockery, Senior Investigator, Nuclear Regulatory 3
5 Commission, Office of Investigations.
-6 During this proceeding, which will be recorded for 7 transcription, the NRC Office of Investigations will conduct 8 an interview of Mr. Rob Weiss. The interview pertains to OI j 9 Investigation #2-94-036. Location of this interview is the 10 NRC Reg 16aal Office, Region II, Atlanta, Georgia.
11 Ceveral others are in attendance at this 12 interview,' an,d I'd like to ask them to identify chemselves 13 for the record, starting with Mr. Vorse.
14 MR. VORSE: My name is James.Y. Vorse, and that's 15 V-as.in Victor-o-r-s-e. I'm a Senior Investigator, U.S.
16 Nuclear Regulatory Commissior Office of Investigations, i
17 Region II, Atlant3, Gecrgia.
18 MR DOCKERY: Mr. Rapp?
19 MR. RAPP: My name is Curtis Rapp, R-a-p-p. I'm a 20 Reactor Inspector for'te91on II, NRC, in Atlanta, Georgia.
21 MR. DOCFSE7 Mr. Hendrix?
22 MR. MENLklX: Mi name is Richard Hendrix. I'm an 23 attorney here in Atlanta, representing my client, Rob Weiss.
24 MR. DOCKERY: And if the witness would stand and 25 raise his right hand, please.
NEAL R. GROSS & CC., INC.
(202):234-4433 1
Page 3 1 Whereupon, l
2 ROBERT P. WEISS-3 appeared as a witness, and having been duly sworn, was 4 examined and testified as follows:
5 EXAMINATION 6 BY MR. DOCKERY:
7 Q Would you please state your full name; date of 8 birth; and Social Security number for the record, please. j 9 A My name is Robert P. Weiss. I was bor ,
~
10 l My Social Security number is 11 Q Mr. Weiss, before we went on the record today we 12 provided ou,and your counsel with a copy of the verbiage 13 from Section 1001, Title 18 of the United States Criminal 14 Code; is that correct?
15 A That is correct.
l 16 Q And have you read that section?
17 A Yes, I have.
18 0 Do you understand how it applies here today?
19 A Yes.
20 Q You seem reluctant. If you have any questions, 21' please ask your counsel, or if you have questions of us 22 we'll answer them. l
'l 23 This is considered an official proceeding, and l
24 consequently it is subject to the provisions of 18 USC 1001 25 and/or the federal laws pertaining to perjury. The point NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
.# s -
[
Page 4 !
1 being,.we just want you to tell the truth.
]
2 A No problem. :
I 3 Q Good.
4 Mr.'Vorse? )
5 BY MR. VORSE: I 6 Q Okay, Mr. Weiss, what type of. license do you have? .
7 A I don't have a license at this time.
8 Q Okay. When you were employed by FPC what license 9 did you have?
10 A A senior reactor operator's license.
11 Q And how long had you had that senior reactor 12 operator fice,nse? ;
i 13 A 'I believe it was since 1989. l 14 Q Okay. And how long were you employed by FPC.in an 15 operator capacity? !
16 A Approximately 15 years. j 17 Q And before that what did you do?
A Before I worked for Florida Power Corporation I l 18 19 managed a drug store.
20 Q We last talked about the September 5th, 1994 and i 21 we got some detail. We're probably going to go into it a 22 little bit more today. But we also understand there was a 23 somewhat similar evolution conducted on the 4th of September 24 1994, the night before the 5th-obviously-evolution. Can 25 you describe in detail what led up to that and how it was conducted?
NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
l l
l Page 5 ;
i 1 A Well, basically we did the same thing on the 4th 2 that we did on the 5th with one exception. We didn't -- we l 3 didn't wait a half hour for the temperatures to stabilize 4 after we added the gas. We had not seen the calculation at 5 that point and we were having some trouble calculating what 6 the limit was accurately enough to plot on a computer graph.
7 And when we looked at the data it appeared inconsistent, and 1
8 we decided we needed to find out more. So we came in the 9 next night and we pulled the calc and we did some research .
10 on it and decided to try again.
11 Q dhen you conducted the September 4th evolution can 12 you tell me hpw you plotted the data?
13 A Well, you can plot the data off of the recorder, 14 which isn't very accurate; or you can use the read-off 15 system to pull the computer point history out of the plant 16 computer. You can do it ei-her way. We tried to do it with 17 the plant computer, and when you do that you get an accurate 18 representation on the computer points, but you have to try 19 and read a graph to get the limit curve and put that in, and 20 it wasn't working very well.
21 Q Did you do an analysis of this before the 22 September 5th evolution? Did you look at this data and then 23 cone back and discussed that you needed to do more?
24 A Yes.
25 Q When you -- when you reviewed all the procedures NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
Page 6 1 on the 4th did you do it again on the 5th just to be sure 2 you were okay; or were the procedures done on the 4th, they i 3 just went right into the evolution on the 5th? Do you 4 remember which way it was done?
5 A I don't recall specifically. I know that we were 6 checking the procedures. We had procedures for what we did.
7 Q On the 5th of September you posted one reactor 8 operator in the Auxiliary Building and I guess a nuclear 9 operator-is that what they call him?-auxiliary operator in ,
10 an anti-C gear to -- to vent the hydrogen, just in the event 11 of a LOCA. Did you do that same thing on the -- or the 4th 12 of Septemb'er?,
13 A I don't recall if we actually had a guy dressed 14 out in the valve alley. We had discussed I think with the l l
15 Aux Building operator venting the makeup tank if we had to, l l
16 but I can't remember now whether we actually had the guy 17 dressed out in there or not. It's been quite a while.
18 MR. DOCKERY: For the record, I think we should 19 just reflect that the Field Office Director of the Region 1
20 II, NRC Office of Investigations, Mr. William McNulty, has 21 just joined this interview.
22 BY MR. VORSE:
23 Q Mr. Weiss, did you all make a logbook entry on the 24 evolution of the 4th of September?
25 A I don't think that there was a log entry made on NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
-Y Page 7 1 it.
2 O Would that normally -- would you normally make a 3 log entry for something like that?
4 A Well, in -- in my position I don't have a logbook; 5 okay? The shift supervisor has a logbook, and the nuclear 6 operators have logbooks. Normally the nuclear operator 4
7 would log additions and removals from makeup tank.
I 8 Q All right. When you -- when you did the evolution l 9 on the 4th September, did you ever go across -- did you ever
- 10 get into the unacceptable region of the curve? I 4
11 A I believe we did recause the alarm came in.
12 Q 'Wh4t'd you'all do when the alarm come in? I l
13 A Well, once we'd gotten down to our 55 inches we )1 14- added water. I believe that the alarm cleared when we added 15 the water, but I'm not sure. And I -- remember, I'm trying i 0 16 to remember something that happened, what, 11 months ago, 4
17 that I didn't think was very important at the time. I think 18 that we did vent the makeup tank after that, as I recall.
19 Q Why didn't you tell us about the 4th of September 20 1994 when we interviewed you last time?
21 A Well, first of all, I didn't think it was 22 important; okay? I didn't think I'd done anything wrong 23 that night or the 5th. When we were talked to by the 24 corporate counsel, Gerald Williams, in preparation for the 25 interview, the -- when I talked to you earlier, he -- he had NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
i i
Page 8 1 a lot to say about you guys. Basically, he said that you 2 were cop want-to-be's, and that you personally had just 3 screwed up and gotten demoted and probably were going to 4 have a real attitude. He said, "These guys are just out to 5 make their case, you know. They don't care about you."
6 Said, " Don't volunteer anything." He said, " Answer the 7 questions truthfully that you're asked, but don't volunteer )
8 anything." And I -- you know, I hadn't read all these laws 9 or the enforcement policy at that time, I was going on the 10 advice of the counsel. And you didn't ask me about the 4th.
11 Q Okay. When -- when Mr. Halnon approached you and ,
12 asked yo" abo,ut the 4th evolution on -- the September 4th i
13 evolution, you said you didn't want to muddy the water. i 14 Who's "we"? l
. i 15 A Didn't want to muddy the water? What was that?
16 Q Didn't want to muddy the water. That was your 17 response, according to Mr. Halnon, when he asked you about 18 the 4th of September evolution.
19 A He called me on the telephone and asked me if we 20 had run the evolution on the 4th and I said yes, we had.
21 And then he asked me, "Well, why didn't you say anything 22 about it?" And I told him, well, at first I hardly even 23 thought about it 'cause I didn't think it was important.
24 And then, you know, it had gone on long enough that -- that 25 I felt that to bring it out then would be ridiculous, that NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
1 l
l 1
Page 9 I 1 I'd get fired for -- for nothing, you-know. ]
2 Basically they took actions we took trying to :
1 1
3 resolve a nuclear safety concern and they stuck a bad label ]
l
- 4. on it and notified the NRC that we had done.something wrong. ;
5 And -- and you guys have just bought right into it, you j
)
6 know. Basically I was in a situation where I was being 7' threatened with being fired for bringing up a. nuclear safety 8 concern.
9 BY MR. DOCKERY:
10 0 Can you go into that in great detail, please, the 11 statement you just made. l 12 A 'Okay. Basically we performed an evolution . hat we 13 were authorized to perform, we weren't doing anything that l
14 unusual. We had procedures for what we did. Okay?
15 You got to realize that the response of the makeup 16 tank to a LOCA is a rapid drop in level;-okay? You put 17 pressure on the curve. Well, whether you drain down the 18 makeup tank by using a let-down system or you drain the 19 makeup tank with a LOCA, it really doesn't matter; okay?
20 Tank level's going to drop and your pressure response is 21 going to draw the curve. So the fact that that pressure 22 response pulled above the line as we drained the -- drained 23 the tank level down, that's what it would do in a LOCA.
24 Anytime you put pressure on the curve, you were there. It made no difference whether you were where I was during that 25 NEAL R. GROSS & Co., INC.
(202)234-4433
i Page 10 1 30 minutes, or sitting there on a curve like we had been 2- for-what?-18 months. You know, we'd been trying to get 3 this thing resolved for a while, the operators on my shift 4 'had, and they'd been pretty much been consistently shut down ,
5 by engineering. _ Engineering wasn't listening to what they 6 had to say,.they weren't doing any; kind of thorough analysis 7 on it.
8 If you look at the calc that was the basis of the 9 curve, it says clearly, in the design assumptions, that the 10 . calc was only good through Refuel 8. And yet_ engineering j 11 didn't find that out; okay? Through this whole tima of 12 operator concprns and their resolution of it, thcf had never 13 even looked at the calc. Either that, or the only other 14 option would'be that they realized it and covered it up.
15 I'm not going to accuse them of that. But I think'they just 16 never even pulled the calc to look at it.
17 So we wrote this. problem up; okay?. And, you know, 18 initially the response from the plant manager was, you know, 19 " Good job, you've challenged engineering on it." But I 20 think that they started to realize that it said some pretty 21 bad things about their Engineering Department, about their 22 management. And I know for a fact that one of the system 23 engineers, Phil Saltsman, got together with Bruce Hickle in 24 a racquetball meeting and suggested this thing be portrayed 25 as a.tect. And the next thing I know, they're threatening NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
Page 11 1 to fire me; they pulled me into something they called a 2 Management Review Board that they made up for the occasion, 3 which basically was a very intimidating session; and then 4 they reported to the NRC as an illegal test. ,
5 Well, all this -- this whole thing has been I 6 think a deliberate effort to shift the focus from the.
7 failings of FPC's management and Engineering Departments by 8 putting us in a spotlight and making it look like -- like we 9 had done the bad thing, and it seems to have been working 10 pretty good.
11 Q Mr. Weiss, when you use the word " threaten" and 12 " safety co'nce,rn" in the same sentence or context we become 13 very concerned. Who -- who do you feel was threatening you?
14 A Well, I was told that Bruce Hickle had my pink 15 slips in his back pocket.
16 Q Who told you that?
17 A I think that was Greg Halnon. It was prior to the 18 Management Review Board. It was a very tense time.
19 Q Can you amplify that any further? Did you feel 20 threatened in that regard by anybody else?
21 A Well, look, there was a curve that a lot of 22 licensed operators out there felt was bad. No one could get 23 it listened to. I'm the one that listened to my people 24 enough to follow up on it and to get something done about 25 it. And we were right; okay? The curve was bad. Now, I'm 4
NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
M Page 12 1 the one with my integrity being questioned, and I'm the one 2 who got fired by Florida Power. I think I'm the only one --
3 me and the guys on my shift are the only one in this entire 4 affair that's shown any concern, any real concern with 5 nuclear safety.
6 You know, look at motives. I -- I wasn't going to 7 get a raise out of this, I wasn't going to get a promotion.
8 I expected to get some flack because the issue had become 9 pretty political with Pat Beard wanting his 25 cc's per kg 10 and the Engineering Department doing anything they could to 11 give it to him. I thought anymore flack on this iFsue, that 12 I was going go take some heat on it. And I was willing to 13 do that, in part from the ethical standards that I've heard i
14 from you guys by what you expect from a senior licensed 15 operator. Well, I stood up for nuclear safety and I'm 16 fired. And I've got to worry about feeding my kids now.
17 And I'll tell you something else, I'm -- I'm still i
18 in touch with some people out there. I don't think you're 19 going to see anybody coming up with a safety concern at that 20 plant for a long, long time.
21 Q Where do you think that the reluctance to address 22 the issues that you were concerned about emanated from?
23 A I think it came from the Engineering Department.
24 Q Well, that -- that's kind of an amorphous being.
25 A The system engineers Phil Saltsman and Pat Hinman NEAL R. GROSS & Co., INC.
(202)234-4433
Page 13 1 were the ones primarily involved. But their management 2 chain must be involved, too, because they signed off on the 3 letter saying that they believed the curve was accurate and 4 conservative.
5 Q Who's covering their ass here? If you'll pardon 6 my -- my French.
7 A Well, my perception is that engineering is 8 covering its ass for doing a totally incompetent job, you 9 know. And if you take a look at some of the other things 10 going on in engineering you'll understand this is not an 11 isolated incident. They're already feeling the heat from 12 that. And I ,think that management's covering its butt, 13 because I know that they've been in some kind of trouble 14 with you guys for a while now. I believe you phrase it as a 15 lack of program commitment.
16 Well, you know, look at this: You had numerous 17 operators with a safety concern that got shut down by 18 management, that let engineering do a shoddy job. It didn't 19 look good for them, but they've shifted all the focus to us.
20 MR. DOCKERY: Before I go any further, 21 Mr. Hendrix, when you decide it would be a good time to 22 introduce this material, go ahead and do so. l i
23 MR. HENDRIX: Well, maybe this might not be a bad i l
24 time because, for the record, we had brought today-and I 25 think I discussed it with Mr. Vorse; maybe it was with i
NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC. j (202)234-4433 1
l Page 14 1 Mr. McNulty way back when-that we would bring source 1
2 documents to help elaborate on and amplify on any questions 3 you had. So we tried to identify the main documents-that j 4 sort of help explain what. happened during this evolution and
- 5 how it came to even be performed. And so we've identified 6 two spiral notebooks.
7 We've also produced to Mr. Vorse a chronology of 8 events, which I'd like to have that made part of the record 9 here today, as well, which sort of sets forth what the ;
i 10 position of both Mr. Weiss and Mr. Fields-who I jointly I 11 represent-are relative to the chronology of the evsats and 12 our -- our vi,ew of the -- cf those events.
Juld ;s I would 1
13 like both the spiral notebook and our chronology of events l 14 paper, if you will, to be marked as exhibits to -- to this 15 transcripc.and to be afforded the protections of the 4-
- this 16 proceeding, as well, which I understand is confidential. So 17 we would like to tender those into the record.
18 I would also like to ask whether I can ask l 19 questions of my client from time to time which I think might 20 amplify something he's being questioned about?
21 MR. DOCKERY: I think, on a case-by-case basis, 22 certainly if it amplifies -- if in your belief it amplifies 23 the -- his response, by all means.
24 MR. HENDRIX: I would -- I would like to do that 25 now because I think this is important to understanding some NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
Page 15 1 of the things that Mr. Weiss is saying.
2 But let me just ask you now, Rob, the evolution 3 that you performed you found out later was a design basis 4 issue, did you not?
5 THE WITNESS: Right.
6 MR. HENDRIX: Now, based on the evolution and the 7 data that you collected on the 5th, could you tell these 8 gentlemen your opinion about the design basis for the plant 9 for 18 months and how that pertains to what you did for 30 l l
10 minutes on the 5th. i
- j 11 THE WITNESS: Well, the plant had been outside the 12 design bas'is ,every time we operated on the curve. That's 13 -pretty obvious, especially when you look at the new curve.
14 It's well under the old curve.
15 So we had been being pushed by management to 16 operate right on the curve 'cause they wanted to maximize 17 hydrogen pressure; okay? Those shifts that were complying 18 with that directive were operating outside the design basis, 19 and this had been going on ever since we came up from 20 refuel.
21 Now, when you look at the trace that we drew it 22 looks bad because you look at it and you say, "Well, look, 23 that line goes above the other curve, goes above the limit 24 curve." Well, that's the line you're going to draw in a 25 LOCA every time you're sitting there. So what I did really NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
l
- 1 i
1 Page 16 i 1 had no significance; I didn't drive the_ plant farther (sic) 2 outside design basis'than it already was all the time. And !
3 yet,;you know, Florida Power, when they write their LERs, it 4 sort of implies that, you know, we were -- you know, we l
, 5 drove it outside design basis. You know, that's not true.
6 They-had.been continuously outside design basis on this 7- thing.
8 MR. DOCKERY:
If we can step back for just a j i
j 9
'second, I think we should note for.the record -- acknowledge 10-receipt of the -- the two spiral notebooks, each c 7taining 11 about an. inch'to an inch and-a quarter of documentation.
12 And as w_' refer to'this documentation, we'll identify it by 13 the record, rather than make this an exhibit. '
14 BY MR. VORSE:
- 15. Q You're familiar with AI 500; Administrative 16 Instruction 500?
17 A Yes.
18 Q Okay. When -- when you conducted the evolutions 19 on the 4th and the 5th September of.1994 and you went into 20 the alarm mode was there -- do you all have a reason why you 21 -
didn't violate AI 500?
22 A- AI 500 does not set standards on how quick you 23 have to respond to an alarm. That's left up to the 24 operator's judgment. I don't think that it was an excessive 25 amount of time. I think AI 500 says that you should pull NEE R. GROSS & CO. , INC.
(202)234-4433
l l
Page 17 l 1 the alarm response procedure for those alarms that aren't a 2 result of activities in progress. Well, you know,
. 3 technically you didn't even have to pull the AR because it 4 was a result of what we were doing. We-expected to get the 5 alarm because we expected that the curve was bad; okay?
6 And we -- we took the actions in the alarm i
7 response procedure. We didn't take them right away. We --
8 we waited till we dropped level down to 55 inches. But 1
9 there's no standard set in AI 500 for that. There's nothing 10 that says, hey, you have to do it within one minute of the 11 alarm coming in or ten seconds. If there's no standard,_you t
12 know, how'are,you saying I violated anything?
13 MR. VORSE: Curt, have you got some questions?
14 MR. RAPP: Yes, I do. Do you have the transcript 15 from the earlier interviews with_you?
16- MR. HENDRIX: We've asked for a copy but we didn't 17 get a copy.
_ 1 18 MR. RAPP: No? Okay. '
19 MR. HENDRIX: We reviewed them yesterday.
20 MR. RAPP: You reviewed them yesterday?
21 MR. HENDRIX: Yes.
22 MR. RAPP: Okay.
23 BY MR. RAPP: l 24 Q I have a couple of questions relative to the 25 transcripts from the first interviews. On Page 5, Line 15, i NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
. - _ _ - ... - _ - . - . - . ~. - . . . .-
i i
I Page 18 1 it states in here.that there was a question asked, "Before 2 you did this was there some discussion about this test? Can 3 you recall the discussion and who was there?"
4 You said, "And we discussed what we planned to do, 5 to put makeup tank level at the high end normal operating 1
6 curve -- normal operating event and put makeup tank pressure l 7 to the curve, then bleed the tank down.to 55 inches, which 8 is the lower limits of the operating curve." Can you recall 9 when that discussion took place? Was that on the 5th, was I
10 it on the 4th? 1 11 A We had that discussion on both days.
12 0 'On poth days?
13 A Yeah.
14 Q Okay. Was that during shift turnover?
15 A No. ;
16 Q 'Was that part of the shift turnover?
17 A No, because the first day Mark came to me during '!
18 the shift'to discuss what he wanted to do; okay? And we 19 talked about it. We decided that we were covered by OP 402 20' to do the evolution, and we basically just had an informal 21 pre-job briefing, you know, where we got everyone together 22 and we talked about it.
23 Q Okay.
24 A And when we came in on the 5th, you know, we did 25 not originally plan to redo it that night. We pulled the NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
.- . .~. . - -. - - ... . . . - . = - . - . . _ . . .. - . - - - .
. l 4
Page 19 1 cale and we saw some things and-figured out how to do it,
! 2 and decided to go ahead and do it again. ,
a 3 Q Okay. When you had this discussion was the. shift 4- manager present in the control room?
5 A No.
i
, 6 Q Or was the shift...?
17 A IEdon't think he was.
f 4
- 8 Q Was the shift manager available?
9 A Yes, he's available.
10 Q Okay. My question is really, then: Wbv wasn't 7
11 the shift manager' included in that discussion eitner on the
, 12 4th or the'Sth? : <
13' A It just didn't seem like a big deal, honestly,-you 14 know. We were going to put -- put water in the makeup tank ,
i 15 and lower level back down on the makeup tank and then apply 1
p 16 pressure. It did not seem like anything that bad. ;
4 17 Obviously, in~ retrospect, maybe we'should have called the-
]
18- . shift manager. But that's Tip to the shift supervisor's-
, 1 i 19 judgment. l 20 Q Did anyone suggest that the shift manager might l
21 need to be involved? '
.22 A No.
23 Q No? Okay. And going back to the transcript, I'll 24 probably --'just be easier for me to give this to you.
4 25 Page 7, Line 16, if you could just read that. And could you i NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
I l
l l
Page 20 1 tell me when -- when this discussion occurred. l 1
2 (The witness reviews certain material.) l 3 A I'd say it happened both nights.
4 Q Okay. Was that the only time that you discussed 5 using OP 402 for the test or for this evolution?
6 A Could you restate the question. i 1
7 Q Was that the only occasion in which you discussed I 8 whether 402 was adequate to cover the evolution? l 9 A I think both times before we did it, we talked 10 about the fact that we were going to be doing it pe- OP 402. i 11 It's -- I guess I don't understand what you're looking for.
12 Q ' Wha,t I'm trying to find out here is, is that: Was j l
13 -- was there a discussion, prior to either the 4th or the l l
14 5th, where somebody said, " Hey, we got OP 402 here. This'11 )
l 15 tell us how to do it. We can just use OP 402, put hydrogen 16 pressure on the curve, bleed the tank down, take the data, 17 and then refill it." Was there any discussion prior to the 18 4th or the 5th about how to do this evolution?
19 A Well, on the 4th and the 5th we talked about it.
20 Q Okay, but what...?
21 A Prior to?
22 Q Prior to that?
23 A No, not that I know of. This didn't (
24 -- till the 4th, you know, the first time we die 25 Q Okay. Then if you can go to Page 10, NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
p I Page 21 3
~
1 MR. HENDRIX: If I might, on that.last one, I I- 2 believe that the engineering response.to th'eir problem t
3 before closing it out, wasn't that September 2nd that sort l
l !
4 of came back saying that they had...
i 7
5 THE WITNESS: That letter?
! 6 MR.'HENDRIX: Yeah, that they.'were closing,it out, 7 it was over. It wasn't too many days before you all had ;
i i
- 8 this discussion.
9 THE WITNESS: Right. ,
- - 10 MR. VORSE
- It was -- it was-my -- to.the best of d 11 my recollection, it was September 2nd.
12- 'THE, WITNESS: I believe it was September 2nd, 1
2-
- 13 so...
14 ' . MR.'HENDRIX: He would have had occasion to --
15 after being asked, "Do you all have anything_further.to say. !
f.
l- 16. about~it?" on the.4th is when you all first started talking
- 17 about it, is'that right?
18 THE' WITNESS: Right, on the 4th is -- you know,
! 19 Mark'came to me'and said, "Let's try this," you know.
- '2 0 . .MR. RAPP
- Okay.
j 21 BY MR. RAPP: l 22 Q Then on Page 10, Line 13 through Line 20, if you
-23 could just read that section.
24 -(The witness reviews.certain material.) >
i
- 25 A Okay, NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
f F (202)234-4433 i
3 1
)-
l i
i
- Page 22 1 Q Okay. Is a shift manager considered to be part of 3
2 that operating: crew or,is it'just another person that 3 happens to be there at'the same time?
4 A The shift manager is in charge.of.all the l
5 departments out there on the back shift. So he's not only a 6 member of the operating crew, he's got other functions. And 7 he also functions usually as the STA, you know. q 8 Q Okay.
- 9. A Does that answer your question?
l 10 Q. You earlier said the shift manager was not 11 included in the discussions or the pre-job briefing on ,
1 12 either the 4t,h or the 5th. .ias there any discussion with ,
i 13 the shift manager about this before that,.say like on the
-14 2nd.or the 3rd when you -- when you got this letter?
15 A No.
16 Q When you were made aware of this letter?
17 A Not-that I know of.
18 -Q No? Okay. Okay, thank you. If I can get that 19 back.
20 (:Mr. Rapp was handed certain material.)
21 Q Just some general questions, then. Earlier you 22 said that there - .there was a decision made at management 23 levels to have 25 cc's per kg hydrogen in the retro cool 24 system. And who made that decision?
25 A Well, it was coming down from Pat Beard, is my NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
9 Page 23 J
1 understanding. . Pat wanted to achieve the -- I guess it's j 2 recommended by EPRI and INPO to have 25 cc's per kg.
3 Q _Okay. Is it kind of. typical or common that --
1 4 that other organizations would come to operations and say, )
I 5 "Here's how you're supposed to operate"? !
6 A Well, in the case of chemistry, yeah, they -- we 7 -generally follow chemistry's recommendations as far as, you 8 know, when to add lithium hydroxide, whatever, you know. i 9 This is kind of in the chemistry area. And, you know, they 1
10 don't specifically tell'us how to operate; they'll request 11 that we keep a higher pressure in the tank. Thel.-thay start 12 trending it. ,And if they weren't getting their *5 ccs per 13 kg, you know, we get pressure from above to -- " Hey, you 14 guys need to' keep that pressure up there so we can make
-15 this," you know.
16 Q " Pressure from above" meaning who?
- 17. A Line. management, from the -- the NPO and the i
18 manager of Nuclear Plant Operations.
19 Q Those would be who? I 20 A Greg Halnon, Bruce Hickle, Pat Beard.
21 Q Did operations have any input into -- or say that
-22 this overpressure or this high hydrogen pressure was a ;
23 reasonable operating parameter?
24 A No, we were just told to do it. Like I said, a 25 lot of people had concerns about keeping that high a NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
Page 24 1 pressure in there. We had concerns that the curve wasn't 2 right. We were told to go ahead and put pressure up on the 3 curve.
4 There was one licensad operator, he used to be on 5 my shift and I -- and I knew him well. He's a real good, 6 dedicated man. And he'd been having a lot of concerns with j 7 the hydrogen pressure and keeping the pressure on the curve.
8 And he was just beating his head out against engineering and j 9 he kept getting told to go ahead and put the pressure up, 10 and he didn't want to do it because he had -- he had l
11 concerns about it.
12 'Jux% they finally just beat him down to where he's 13 gone around saying, "Well, I don't care, I'll put'1000 14 pounds in the tank if you want me to." And -- and I heard 15 that, you know, and I just felt ashamed of our management 16 that we had shut him down like that. And I think that may 17 have had something to do with my decision to follow up a 18 little more aggressively when Mark came to me.
19 MR. HENDRIX: We have included as exhibits E-mail 20 from management saying, " Stay on the curve. You are to stay 21 on the curve." That's -- is that right? I mean, is that 22 what was happening?
23 THE WITNESS: Right.
24 BY MR. DOCKERY:
25 Q Who in management was -- was saying that, if you NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
)
Page 25 1 recall? We can certainly refer to the exhibit, but if you-2 recall off the top of your head.
3 A Well, we would get the direction from our 4 management, which would be Greg Halnon. Now, he'd be 5 getting told from -- from above him, Bruce Hickle, you know.
6 I don't have personal knowledge of when they originate, but 7 you hear stories. And the impression I got from what I'd 8 heard was that Pat Beard himself was very concerned about 9 achieving a 25 cc's per kg.
10 Q Why, in your opinion-and I understand this would 11 be hearsay, but we would like your opinion on it--why would 12 that be impor, tant to Mr. Beard?
13 A Because they take INPO requirements very 14 seriously. They -- they want to look good to INPO and they 15 want to look good to the NRC.
16 Q Since I'm a layman, can you tell me what the 17 significance is, why -- what does it save or how coes it 18 improve the operation of that plant to stay on that curve?
19 A Well, we dissolve hydrogen in the water, and the 20 RCS is an oxygen scavenger. My understanding is that EPRI 21 did a study and figured, well, you can't directly measure 1
22 how much oxygen you actually have in the -- in the reactor.
23 And I think that their theory was that if you drive up the i i
24 dissolved hydrogen enough that it'll cut down the amount of l
25 free oxygen and that'll help you with your life extension l NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC. ,
(202)234-4433 l v
j
Page 26 1 and control of corrosion and stuff. You know, we weren't 2 having problems with oxygen control at our -- at our lower 3 pressures. But this is dealing with a concern where you 4 can't measure it. It's all theoretical stuff, I think.
5 Q Is there a financial benefit in any way in any of 6 all this?
7 A To Florida Power?
8 0 Yes.
9 A There's a financial benefit if it affects life 10 extension, I suppose. Anytime you cut down on the 11 corrosion, yeah, there's a financial benefit. But I think 12 it's more - ,when you start dealing with -- with INPO, my 13 understanding is that if you get a good INPO rating it 14 directly affects your stock ratings, your bond ratings. So 15 complying with a7.1 this INPO directives is business.
16 0 In your opinion, is that what -- what drove this?
17 A My opinion is that Pat Beard directed that we 18 achieve the 25 cc's per kg. I think there was a lot of 19 pressure put on the Engineering Department to achieve that.
20 Now, you know, I think that it started getting political, 21 that there started to be a lot of pressure going on down 22 there; there were all these concerns coming in; and -- and 23 the engineers are kind of caught in the middle, you know.
24 They were trying to do what their boss is telling them to do 25 and, you know, we kept coming up with concerns about it.
NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
Page 27 l
1 And I think they started getting pretty frustrated with the 2 whole thing.
3 Q Mr. Weiss, is it fair to say that you were 4 frustrated? l 5 A I -- I don't think " frustrated" would be the right 3 l
6 word. I was very concerned about the pattern I saw of 7 licensed operator safety concerns being shut down. I was 1 8 very concerned about that, and I did what I felt ethically 9 was the right thing to do. I stood up for the guys with the 10 concern. We got the problem fixed, but we've paid the price 11 for it.
- 12. O "Wel,1, when you say " stood up," are you saying that i l
13 euphemistically, or are you referring to some meeting that J 14 you -- where you raised the issue? What do you mean when 15 you say you stood up?
16 A I'm saying that we went ahead and took the data j 17 that showed the curve was bad, and we -- I wrote the problem i 18 report. You know, I was willing to take the heat for, you 19 know, picking the scab off of this thing one more time, and 20 I expected to take some heat for it.
21 Q In retrospect, was there any other course of 22 action you felt you could have taken short of conducting the 23 evolution?
24 A The problem was, is we had data taken under the 25 curve during SP 630. That data was clearly approaching the NEAL R. GROSS & Co., INC.
(202)234-4433
Page 28 t
1 curve; it looked like it was going to cross it. And that --
2 that was documented in the problem report,94-149. And you 3 look at the response to that, and it was basically closed 4 out by engineering with a statement that boils down to, 5 "Well, it looks to us like they're getting closer 'cause.
6 they're-both approaching zero." Well, that's -- that's just 7 sophomoric. That's shallow engineering. l 8 There's no analysis going into it; they obviously 9 didn't pull the calc and look at it, did they? Or they )
10 would have known it was only good through Refuel 8. They 11 just. looked at it and wrote it off with appearances. You 12 know, the'que,stion wasn't: Are the pressures both 13 approaching'zero? You know, the question is: Hey,.what's 14 the level going to be in the pipe when they get to zero, you 15 -know? I don't think they put any serious analysis into 16 dispositioning that.
17 So I felt that any data taken under the curve was 18 going to be ignored. Now,.you know, I could have gone to 19 meetings and stuff, but we weren't having much luck, you 20 know, getting anything done. We were being told -- you 21 know, engineering would tell us in their judgment the curve 22 is good and accurate, you know.
23 Q Okay, if I didn't use the term before let me use 24- it this time and ask the question a different way. Did you 25 -- was running that evolution in your mind a last resort?
NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
Page 29
. L1 /A - Yes.
2- Q .Had you considered going'to the NRC with your 1 concern? ,
4 .A Well, you know, Mark had talked to the residents'a 5 : few-times and nothing happened, you know. There was ru) big 6 ' pressure put on engineering to take a good look at:it or 7 anything. .You know, and -- and I think they told him, you 8 -know, "Well, you know, you need to call in an allegation,"
9 you know, and give him some number for calling in.an 10 allegation Well, you know, that's viewed as kind of a
- 11. serious thing to do. And...
12 Q 'Wogld you identify Mark for me, please.
.13 A ...we were kind of-hoping that we could work it 14 out. Mark Van-Sicklen. We were hoping that --
that...
15 You know, I - I'was a loyal company employee.. I 16 wanted to work it out within the system, you know. .I said, 17 -"Well, if we'just get some -- some data that clearly shows 18 the problem.and give that to engineering, then they'll have 19 something to work with. They'll have to realize that there 20_ is a problem here, you know."
21 BY MR. VORSE:
22 'Q Whenever you do something that's unusual-and I 23 think that we can say.that'the September 5th was non-routine 24 'cause you did the -- you were in alarm status and you were 25 plotting data-do -you -- ch) you have avenues -- let's --
NEAL R. GROSS f. CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
4
),
Page 30 )
1 1 could you have held a safety meeting or gone to management !
2 and said, " Hey, we.want -- we wamt to do this. Let's have a j 3 safety analysis," or whatever? Do you think that you had 4 that avenue if you had wanted to pursue it?
5 A Well, you know, in retrospect ~I'd be a lot better 6 off if I had said, "Okay, let's write a test procedure to do 7 this." I didn't think one was needed because I thought _I-8 had approved procedures. I also.think that if I had sat 9 down and wrote up a test procedure,.that it would have gone 10 to engineering for a' review and it would have,been shot 11 down. I don't think'they would have done it.
12 Q 'Do you think the reason you didn't do something 13 like that was because you just felt that -- that that wasn't 14 going to get through the bureaucracy?
-15 A No , I didn't think that we needed a tesc 16 procedure. We had approved operating procedures to do every 17 step of what we did.
18 BY MR. McNULTY:
19 Q Maybe we're missing something here, then. What j 20 procedure says that you can exceed the operating limit, 21 place the plant in alarm status, and gather' data for half an 22 hour, just out of curiosity?-
23 A The curves are referential in nature; okay? They !
24 are referenced by operating procedures. Curves that are 25 continuously applicable, you'll find them referenced in the !
NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
Page 31 1 limits and precautions of the procedures. They say stay --
2 stay vichin the bounds of this curve or that curve, you 3 know. Well, you look at OP 402, there's no reference to 4 Curve 3 in the limite and precautions. It's only referenced 5 in the section where you do hydrogen addition and I think 6 venting; okay?
7 Obviously because the assumption is made that when 8 you add gas you stay under the curve, then from that point
, 9 on it's -- it's never going to go over the curve, I guess is 10 the assumption, because assume that the curve is right. You 11 know, I -- I had a procedure to put pressure on tne curve, I 12 had a proc'edupe to drain down the makeup tank. and, you 13 know, the only part of the evolution that -- that references 14 Curve 8 is when you actually add the gas. And we did not go 15 over the curve while we added the gas, we complied with it.
16 Q So you -- you didn't have to do any additicnal 17 manipulations that weren't covered in the procedure to get 18 outside the curve?
19 A No, that's the whole point. The system pulled the 20 pressure above the curve. That's -- we drew the actual 21 response of the system. If you had a LOCA, just sitting on 22 the curve, you would draw that same thing. We didn't add 23 gas to drive it over the curve, we put it to the curve and 24 we reduced level, and the pressure response of the system 25 pulled it up.
NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
l J
Page 32 l 1 In other words, pressure didn't drop off quick i
-2 enough, as quickly as the curve predicted it would. Which
-3 sort of makes-sense, because you look at the calc and they 4 assume that they've got an ideaA gas loss-situation going
~
5 there when they've got a system designed to drive hydrogen i
gas into solution, you.know. And - and they didn't look at :
)
7 the gas coming out of solution. .And once again, I consider.
8 that pretty shallow engineering.
9 -Q You mentioned ~the other-licensed operator who had 11 0 'a concern about taking the' tank to the limit, the enerating 11 curve limit.
12 A 'Right.
- 13. .Q Was there -- was there a shift that just refused l'4 to bring it to that limit, and stayed well on the acceptable i 15L . range, that'you're aware of?
16 A Well, our shift would tend to run well below the 17 curve. And I've heard other. shifts would. .I think it was :
18 about half and' half about-the shifts that.would bring it to !
19 the curve, and then others would -- would-come in and drop j i
20 pressure down because.they just didn't believe in it. '
21 Q And -- and did you receive'any questioning by
' 22 management about that?
. 23 A Yes, there vae a lot of flack about that. And, j 24 you know, they were; starting to send these E-mails out 25 saying, " Hey, you -- you need to operate on the curve, you NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433 i
- . . - - , .. ,- ,m---- , ,.
l l
1 Page 33 !
1 know. Chemistry's going to start trending this hourly, you
~2 know." And -- and I've heard, you know, that it was getting 3 to the point where Pat Beard was.-- now, I -- I've just 4 heard this, this is just hearsay. But I've heard he was
.5 saying, " Hey, if they won't operate on the curve then fire !
6 them," you know.
7 BY MR. DOCKERY:
8 Q Do you know who you heard that from?
9 A That was -- I might have heard that from -- from 10 Dave who haard it from Mark, something like that I'm not 11 sure. i 12 Q 'Ide,ntify Dave and Mark fully, please.
13 A Dave Fields. You'll be talking to him shortly.
14 And Mark Van Sicklen. But there was definitely pressure to 15 operate _on the curve.
l 16 BY MR. McNULTY:
17 Q So wouldn't you think that there'd be a similar 18 action taken for someone who operated beyond the curve?
19 A I don't think that -- if I had added hydrogen, 20 taken it up past the curve and willingly operated up there, 21 then'I -- I'd say that I violated the procedure, because 22 _ when I added the gas I -- I.took it up past the curve. .You 23 know, I -- I think that this thing has been pretty unfairly 24 characterized right from the very start. We challenged the 25 curve, we didn't violate the curve. We placed the system in NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433 l
i-
I
.i 1
Page 34 1 a legal position and challenged the response to match the l 2 assumed response, to match the curve, and it didn't.
i- 3 Q So I guess based -- I want to make -- I want to l
4 make -- get clear on this. You didn't do anything different '
i 5 than a normal evolution, is that what you're saying? You
- 6 didn't -- you didn't do any additional manipulations or- I i '
7 anything to insure that -- that it continued to drop or -- I 8 or anything like that, the water level?
- 9 A Well, we -- we diverted the -- you know, you I 10 divert let-down to a bleed tank to drop makeup tank level.
11 You have a procedure to do that. No, there was ncLhing --
12 -we forced'the, water level to drop, but we didn't force the 13 pressure to do anything.
' l 14 BY MR. RAPP:
15 Q Let me -- let me clarify. I think what 16~ Mr. McNulty is asking is: Did you do anything that was out-17 of the norm with the way the system was normally operated in l 4
18 order to accomplish this evolution? )
19 A No.
20 Q Is that -- is that it?
21 MR. HENDRIX: And what -- and if I might 22 interject, I mean, what they established was that if you 23' operate on the curve, which they had been compelled or asked 3.
- 24 to do for -- and had been done for 18 months, you're outside 25 the design basis. They established that. But they, I
! I NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
)
l (202)234-4433 l w -
+ . . - . . - - - - - -. - - - . - - - .
l Page 35 1 themselves, did nothing other than operate on the curve, is 2 that -- that correct? In other words, you did not do 3 anything that was not bounded by existing procedure?
4 THE WITNESS: That is correct. You know, it's...
5 MR. RAPP: But you've -- but you've also j 6 maintained you didn't know that was a design basis curve.
7 MR. HENDRIX: No one did.
i 8 THE WITNESS: No, it took the plant-what?-two 9 months to figure that out, didn't it? You know,...
10 MR. HENDRIX: But he's been terminated -l'egedly )
11 for operating the plant outside of the design basis for 30 12 minutes, a'nd it'd been operated outside the design basis for i 13 18 months because of engineering incompetence.
14 THE WITNESS: Is it the position of the NRC that 15 they would rather the plant was still operating design 16 basis, that this hadn't happened, that I just shut up?
17 MR. DOCKERY: It's not appropriate for us to 18 comment on what the position of the NRC is. You have to 19 understand, we -- with the exception of Curt here, we're 20 with the Office of Investigation.
21 THE WITNESS: I understand.
22 MR. DOCKERY: So we really can't make a statement t
- 23 -regarding that.
l 24 MR. VORSE: Any other questions?
25 MR. McNULTY: You'd have -- an appropriate time to NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
Page 36 1 ask that question would probably be at the enforcement 2 conference. This is mainly -- for us it's a fact-gathering.
3 THE WITNESS: Very well.
4 BY MR. RAPP:
5 Q You said earlier that there was no special 6 procedures required for this, that you thought the plant 7 procedures you had in hand were adequate.
8 A Correct.
9 Q Are you familiar with NOD 12?
10 A Which one is that?
11 Q Well, NOD 12 is a -- is a nuclear operations l 12 directive-I guess is what it's called-that details when 13 procedures are required and how to go about evaluating to ;
1 14 determine if a procedure's required, Reg Guide 1.33 ;
1 15 activities.
16 A Okay. l 17 Q Have you ever used NOD 12?
18 A I don't recall using it for anything.
19 Q Is there -- is there an' understood practice or a 20 --
a common practice that is used to determining (sic) when 21 procedures are required?
22 A Well, procedures are required for almost anything L 23 you do in a nuclear plant. But if you already have approved 24 normal operating procedures that'll do the job, you wouldn't 25 normally have to go and write a new procedure.
NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433 i
1
~1 Page 37 1 Q Well! let'me -- let me ask this' question, then.
2 Is it'a common practice or'an understood practice that if~I
'3- want to accomplish a task, that I can'go to Procedure Y and
.4.- pul'l'.out steps from that, and Procedure ~Z and pull out steps 5 from that, and Procedure Q and pull out steps from that to i
6 accomplish this task? I 7 A If your task can be broken down into a series of 8 normal' operations and you have a section of the procedure 9 dealing with'each of those operations, then you can use
'10 those sections in the procedure. Now, you can't pick and
-11 choose steps to do,.you do the procedure.
- 12 Q 'Okay, so you can pull sections out of -- out of 13 particular procedures?
14 A' You know,.thers -- there's'a section in OP 402 for 15 adding the gas; you follow that. There's a - there's a 16 section in OP 402.for reducing makeup tank. level,.and you 17 follow that; another section for putting water back in.
.i
'18 You're using the procedures the way they were designed to be ;
i 19 used.
~
~ 20 Q Do FPC procedures define what a test or experiment
- 21 is?
22L A No , I-haven't been able to find any definition of
.23 that, even in, you know, what I've seen of the CFR.
- 24. Q' Do FPC procedures define what'an infrequent 25 evolution is?
NEAL R. GROSS &'CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
Page 38
~' ~
1 A Yeah, they do talk about infrequent evolutions, I 2 believe, the AI 500.
3 Q Are you familiar with AI 400B?
4 A Vaguely.
5 Q Vaguely? Okay. This is a copy of.AI 400B, and 6 Definition 3-1-4 there for infrequent evolutions. Would the 7 evolution you performed fall into that definition?
8 (The witness reviews certain material.)
9 MR. HENDRIX: Well, if I might interject, the 10 definition is "any test or operational sequence." And I 11 don't know that the term " test" is defined anywhere, Dut...
12 BY MR. RApP: ,
13 Q Well, it -- it lists several categories in that 14- definition. Does your evolution fall into any of'those 15 categories?
16 A First of all,...
17 Q Those activities?
18 A ...this is " infrequently performed." Adding gas 19 to the makeup tank is not an infrequently performed 20 evolution.
21 Q Okay.
-22 A Reducing makeup tank level is not an infrequently 23 performed evolution.
24 Q Okay.
25 A This is -- this is intended basically for, you NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
Page 39 11 know,. big tests that you -- surveillance procedures and 1
2 stuff that are hardly ever done, you know. It's -- it's not 3 -- this is kind of out of context.
4 Q Okay. So then what you're telling is that.this 1
5 evolution would not fall under that definition? i
-l 6 A No . .
I.
'7 Q .Okay. Thank you.
8 A Basically, the -- the rule of thumb we use for a 9 -test, I think, is you ask yourself: Do I.have procedures to.
10 do what I want.to do? If you have procedures,.then it's 11 already been through a 50-59 review. If you don'c have 12 procedures, then you need one. And at that poir.. you'd .
13 write a test procedure. But we had procedures for
, 14 everything we did.
l 15 BY MR. VORSE:
16 Q Did you feel that --
that you were -- that you 17 were. adequately covered under 50-59 to - .to do the j 18 evolution?
l 19 A Yes, because we were using approved procedures. ,
!- 20 BY MR. RAPP:
21- Q Okay. Are you aware of any other evolutions that .
i
- 22 have been performed solely for the purposes of_ gathering l- 23- data to verify plant response?
I
[ 24 A I have-heard that it had been done-before. I 25 don't know to im/ personal knowledge.
- NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
1 (202)234-4433 l . -, , , . . . - - - ., - .- _-
Page 40 I
1 Q I'm -- I'm not talking about the makeup tank, I'm 2 talking in general. Is it a common practice that people l l
3 will manipulate systems to take plant data or to verify l
4 plant response?
5 A Yeah, I -- I'd say that -- that's an accepted 6 practice out there. They -- they do things like -- they 7 want to take the spent fuel system out of service, they'll 8 go ahead and shut down all spent fuel cooling and plot a 9' heat-up rate on it so they can figure out how long -- how !
10 long they'd have to have it out of service. You know, 11 there's -- there's no specific procedure to do that.
12 Q 'Okay.
13 BY MR. DOCKERY:
14 Q Mr. Weiss, for my clarification on that, if -- had 15 you ever had occasion to perform any similar evolutions to 16 the one we're discussing here today?
17 A No, none that I can think of.
18 Q To plot data?
19 A This is kind of an unusual circumstance. Normally 20 you're not in the position of doubting the validity of your 21 curves.
22 BY MR. VORSE:
23 Q Are you aware of any similar evolutions that were 24 conducted in July of '94? Were you familiar with those?
25 A I have heard that that happened, but I don't know NEAL R.' GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433 t
Page 41 1 any details about it. I know I've -- I've seen some -- some 2 hand-plotted data that was purported to come from that, but 3 I don't know...
4 THE WITNESS: Do we have that in the book?
5 MR. HENDRIX: That may be in the book, some hand-6 plotted data of an earlier procedure.
7 BY MR. VORSE:
8 Q You answered the question earlier, but I just need 9 to ask you one more time. There was a lot of 10 correspondance, you had a problem evaluation rep--t on the 11 evolution, you had a lot of correspondence such as went to 12 the evolut' ion, and everything -- and of course when we 13 talked everything pointed toward the 5th. And the 4th was 14 never mentioned. Can you once again tell me why the 4th was
, 15 never mentioned?
16 A First of all, I fcit it was invalid data; okay? I 17 wanted to make sure in my mind that there was a real problem 18 before I got the Engineering Department all stirred up about 19 this thing. And we got a thing and said, hey, we just put 20 cold gas in here. Maybe that cold gas was just heating up 21 and that drove the pressure higher, you know. I considered 22 it an invalid test because we didn't let the temperature 23 stabilize. I wasn't trying to hide it. You know, if I was 24 trying to hide it or cover it up, why did I write a problem 25 report on what I did on the 5th? I didn't think there was !
l NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC. 1 (202)234-4433 I
l
- i I
i 3-l Page.42- )
l 2-1 anything wrong with what I did. I went ahead and identified )
, l 2 it. I forgot -- your question again? -j i
3 Q Okay. There'was a lot of correspondence after the ;
l 4 5th evolution, l
- 5 A Yeah.
I 6- Q You know, you talked about the 5th' evolution, but l
): 7 you never. talked about the 4th evolution,'which you think I
8 would be a logical thing to talk about the 4th and then_ lead 1
9 up to the 5th and'-- you know, and then you've got'the whole 10 story of how you collected the data. And then on the 4th 11 and then what-you did and... And that probably woulu have, 12 you know,'begn information that~ --
that'I would tnink that 13 -- that you would want to present, but you didn't.
14 A Well, I -- I didn't think, like I said, that the 15 data was valid. We wrote the problem report on the 5th, and
-16 everything past'that'all -- everything focused on the 5th 17 from that point on,-you know.
l 18 Q Let me'ask you this: If you had: told them about 19 . the' 4th--if you' d told "them, " I mean management, 20 engineering -about the 4th because the data was j 21- inconclusive, do you think that they would have used that to 22 ---to disprove what you came up with on the.5th?
23 A Well, I don't'think they could do that.
I don't 624 think that would be a valid argument. But,-you know, I 25 think engineering knew about the data from the 4th right NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433- l i
I Page 43
.1 from the start. They were all over the REDAS data. I don't
.2 think that was any surprise to them. When I.first brought
'3 the problem. report to licensing I told Paul-Fleming that we
'4 Lhad done it-both. days. I didn't think it.was any big deal.
5 BY MR. McNULTY:
6 Q Is there anybody else you can think of that you
'7 told that you'd done it on both days,.Mr. Weiss?
8 A No. My impression was that Greg'Halnon. knew about 9 it from things I had heard that he said. I thought it was 10 one of those situations where he -- he knew about it'and 11 didn't want to talk about it, I guess.
121 Q Do you know who brought it up to him,.the person?
13' A Not specifically.
'14. BY MR. DOCKERY:
15- Q When did all of.this become a problem for_you, l'6 Mr. Weiss? o 17 A .Well, you know, define " problem." It's been 11 18 . months of hell ever'since, you know, the' Management Review i
19 Board; you guys got involved in it. You know, they've --
i 20 they've been playing you guys like a banjo, you know.
21: They're - 'they're sitting back there laughing right now.
221 Q Who's "they"?
23- JL Management.
12 4 Q' Anybody in particular?
25 A Well, you know, you've'got Gerald Williams, who's NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
l Page 44 1 the counsel,-and -- and he's -- he's advising, you know, Pat
! 2 Beard and those guys. And, you know, they've come up with a
- j. 3- strategy and it's worked just great, you know.
i 4 -Q Maybe I.need to clarify my question. .W hen I say a
5 " problem for you," I mean a -- when -- at what point'did i- ..
, '6 that evolution of September 5th begin to have a negative
$ 7 ~ impact on.your employment circumstances with FNL? ,
!, .8 A FPC?
i;
- 9- Q FPC, I'm sorry.
10 A- -Well, after Phil SaltsmanLhad his talk with Bruce
- 11. .Hickle on the' racquetball court and they came -- they came
.12 in, at that p,oint things. started going downhill. They had
< 13 this Management Review. Board.
14 BY MR. McNULTY:
15 Q Excuse me. Do you know when that was, what time 16-frame that was? )
17' A I don't know the exact:date. It was sometime i 18 between when the problem -- problem report'was issued and j
- 19 the Management. Review Board, which happened, I don't know, 20 something like the 14th or 12th or-something, I'm not sure.
I 21 BY MR.'DOCKERY:
- 22 Q 14th or 12th of' September? ;
23 -A' I don't'know the exact date. .It seemed like_it l 24 was a couple of weeks _after the problem report was issued.
25 Q Are we in the month of September of 1994?
NEAL~R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
'Page 45
, 'l . A' Yeah.
2 MR. McNULTY: Could be October. -1 3 A Jmd there may be something-in there with the date .
y 4- on, the minutes of the review board, I'm not sure. But
'1 5 right away, you know, we were basically severely counseled, i 6 you know. .They said that -- said that they weren't happy 7 with us.
8 Q Let me'ask you to be specific. When you say' l 9 "they," we'd like.to know.who "they" is.
10 A We were counseled -- the Management Review Board j 11 was supposed to look at all the issues, is what we heard. I l
' 1:2 . But'they b'asipally sat us down in there and accused us of-l 13 performing a test,. an unauthorized test. And that had a lot.
14 'of the senior managers -- you know, you had Bruce Hickle and l l
15' Ron Davis and... I can't remember everybodyfthat was.there, ]
j 16 .but they were all' manager-level people. Greg Halnon was l
17- there. And all -- all.they really looked into wao our u 18 actions, you know. No one's-ever looked into engineering's
'i '
19 handling of this whole thing, you know. I don't think any l 20 engineers have suffered any consequences for their l .
21 incompetence. It's just all been focused on us from the 22 ' start.
23 Then they -- just before all this stuff started 1 l
24 happening I had been moved -into the EOP coordinator job. So-
! 25- I was already off shift. I think some point they wrote a l NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433 c
~
Page 46 I 1 letter and said -- they wrote a letter I think to Ebneter
[
2 and said we had been restricted from licensed duties. Well, 3 that was the first I'd heard of that. I hadn't been told a
3 4 I'd been restricted from licensed duties.
5 Q When did you become aware that you'd been 6 restricted from licensed duties?
J 7 A When I read the letter Pat Beard wrote to Ebneter.
8 Q How long after the fact was that? ,
9 A I'm not sure.
10 Q I mean, that letter would have a date on it.
11 A Yeah, but I don't know the date of the letuer. It 12 was.-- I'm not sure.
13 Q Are you testifying that - that you were never 14 formally advised, or even informally advised by your 15 management that you.had been removed from licensed duties?
16 A That's correct. I -- I wasn't told that until 17 they wrote the letter to Ebneter, you know. l l
18 MR. HENDRIX: Is that the same letter that says 19 that the operators on your shift were counseled?
20 THE WITNESS: Oh, I'm not sure if it's the same l 21 one. But, you know, in one of the letters they -- they 22 wrote that they were going to counsel all the licensed 23 operators on my shift, and I don't believe they ever talked 1
24 to anyone on my shift.
25 MR. RAPP: Anything else? Okay.
NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
l i
-l Page 47 I
l' BY-MR. RAPP: ,
l 2 Q 'Back to the questions I have here. Did 3 engineering explain the basis or limitations of the 4' operating curves or limits they gave you, or did they just-t 5 say, "Here's this. Use it"? ;
6 A Just, "Here's the' curve. Use.it."
7 Q Okay. .W ere you aware that during an ESF actuation. i 8 that makeup tank level would go below indicated?
9 A No, we had-no' idea that, you know, this calc was' ;
10 going to'let it go down toitwo feet in the pipe where you~ !
11 couldn'hevenseeit. j 12 Q hs p licensed operator what would have been your '
13 actions if makeup tank level had gone below indication?-
14 A Probably would have shut down the pumps rather 15- than lose them. It'd -- it'd be a real tough choice'to b
16 make, 'cause if --nif you've got an ESF you don't-want to be 17 . shutting down your HPI pumps. But if you see your makeup 18 tank level go down, I don't know, you'd -- you'd be sitting 19 there watching the amps, ready to trip them off, I guess. .I 20 think it would be a case-by-case basis, just how they 21 reacted.
22 Q Was -- now, you talked about the' hydrogen gas 23 . binding of the.HPI pumps. .Was that the'only concern with 24 .this curve?
25 A That was the concern that -- that we were NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC. l (202)234-4433
-l
. - - - = . - . _ . ~ . . _ - - - . . . . - . - . . _ . - . - . - . - . . . . - . - - - , - .
a l
l r Page 48 j i specifically involved in. The --'the other licensed i 2 operator that had a concerns (sic) was looking into like the i 3 Appendix R aspects of it, things like that.
l 4- Q Who was that operators
)a
~
5 JL That was Bruce Willms.
- 6 Q Okay. 'Did operations management take all these 4 .7 concerns-the gas binding of the HPI pumps and the' l 8' Appendix R concerns-seriously?
, 9 A Well, I don't know. From my perspective, the 10 operators were getting' shut-down on the concerns of-hydrogen t- .
11' . gas binding or -- you know. They -- they were' accepting
{s-
- l. 12 engineeridg's, word that, " Hey, we think this is.a good 13 curve." I guess I'm not sure what.you're looking for.
14' Q What my -- my question relates to is: Was-i' 15 -operations management.just saying, "Go back and watch the-16 boards and -- and this is okay, and let's get our 25'cc's .
17 .per kg and -- and meet the Pat Beard goals and -- and go l.
] 18 on"?- or -- or were they saying, "Well, we'll go run this by
?
I 19 . engineering and'get engineering to reevaluate this"?
20- A Well, they were being told to have us operate on' 21- the curve; okay? I think'that, you know, our -- I think 22- 'probably Greg Halnon,.you know, . would have a different 23- perspective on it than Pat Beard would, and he would want us
- 24. to go ahead and follow up'on it. But when you follow up on 25 it and you run into a brick wall and nothing happens, then NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
I Page 49 4 1 l someone's got to do something at that point.
2 Q Well, where was this brick wall coming from?
'3 A Well, from engineering. When you -- when you show 4 them -- when you give them your concerns and -- and they i
5 blow them off, you know, apparently without even looking at ;
6 the calc, I just think that there was a real resistance l 7 there to anything that could make this thing more
'8 ' complicated than it already was. They didn't want to get ;
9 into it 'cause they were trying L meet their 25 cc's goal.
10 MR. HENDRIX: Can I ask a question here' i 11 MR. VORSE: Sure.
~12 'MR.,HENDRIX: When the LER is written, is'it your i
13 understanding that engineering-Mr. Saltsman-had a voice in 14 the drafting of the LER?
15 THE WITNESS: Yes, I think so.
16 MR. HENDRIX: And the LER was not written to say 17 that as a result of engineering calculation --
'18 miscalculations, this plant has been outside design basis 19 for 18 months. They didn't write it up that way, did they?
20 THE WITNESS: Originally, you know, Draft 0 of the 21 LER was pretty straight-forward. "We've been outside design 122' basis 'cause we had some faulty calculations." Draft 1 23 comes back, after some engineering input, and it's, you 24 know, " Makeup system' evolution causes the plant to be 25 operated outside design basis." And it was very deliberate NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433 ,
l t
I
j i
j Page 50 i spin control going on there. It's, you know -- the thing 2 went through about six revs. And I think, you know, there's I 3 -- there's been a lot of spin control going on in this whole 4 thing. It'r -- it's.all.a deliberate attempt to put all the I 5 blame on the operators and shift all the attention away from 6 the -- the' management failures, the: engineering problems.
7 BY MR. RAPP:
8 Q Earlier on you said that you had -- you had not 9 talked to the NRC resident inspectors personally. '
10- A ~That's correct.
- 11 Q Did you ever represent this as a safety concern to 12 plant management? Did you ever come up and say,-'"This'is a 13 safety concern"?
14 A Well, as far as -- no, you know, I don't think'I 15 'ever went to management. See, .this had been. going on for a 16 long time; okay?' It had been going _on with -- with' Bruce 17 Willms for.quite a while before they gotLhim shut down; and 18 then Mark kind of picked up the ball and he'd been going.and 19L talking to engineering-and everything. I think it was 120 pretty well perceived that - -that it was a safety concern. R
'211 That's pretty obvious if you're questioning,_you know, this >
22 calc. But I think that the first time I ever specifically.
'23 'said to management,=" Hey, this is a nuclear safety concern,"
'24 was infthe Management Review Board.
-25 Q Did you ever consider contacting the Employee NEAL R. GROSS & CC., INC.
(202)234-4433
l Page 51 1 Concerns Program and -- and taking that route to get this --
l 2 this issue addressed? i 3 A No, that thing's a joke. They don't take those 4- seriously. Dave Fields had run a couple of concerns through 5 that. program, and they basically just blew his concerns off.
6 Q So the Employee Concerns Program was perceived'as 7 being ineffective? y 8' A Yes.
9 Q Okay. Going back to this' makeup tank high-10 pressure enunciator, is -- is that-enunciator cov rad in 11 technical specifications? j 12 A 'No . ,
13 0 Is-there a technical specification that woul'd-14 relate to'the time limit that you have'to respond to'this 15 alarm?
16 A No.
17' Q Is that high pressure enunciator set up'to be like
~
18 an "immediate action required" type alarm?
19 A No.
20 Q Was it routine or normal.to have the high pressure 21 alarm in for extended periods?
22 A I think that sometimes, you know, people would add 23- -gas, and if the alarm'came in they -- they might wait-a 24- little while t'o let pressure drift down, and it would clear.
25 It had come in before when people were adding gas.
NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433 I
i l
Page 52 1 Sometimes they go ahead and vent the pressure down. I mean, 2 it -- you know, even if you-just got the alarm and say, 3 "Okay, I'm going to vent the pressure off," by the time l 4- that, you know, you get geared up, get people in -- in the i-l 5- valve alley and everything you've probably been -- you've 6 probably had it.in as long as we had it in that night. It's 7 not a real quick thing to go vent the makeup tank.
].
8 Q Especially when you have to dress out for a 9 contaminated area.
10 A Right.
-11 Q Was-the makeup tank high pressure enunciator 12: regarded a's A significant operational problem?
13- A Significant operational problem?
14: Q Yeah. .Was this -- was this alarm regarded that 15 when itLcame in.the plant's in a significant condition here 16- that we have to take some action on right away?
17J A No , it was just -- just an alarm saying, "Okay, 18 you've hit the limit of your curve. You need to get back 19; below the curve." Curve wasn't perceived as a' design basis 20 curve or, you know,-being right at a design basis limit.
21 That's nuts,.you know. We don't normally.have curves that 22 as'soon as the alarm comes in you should run over and make a 23: one hour report to.the NRC.
24 BY MR. DOCKERY:
25- Q If you had known it was -- that curve was design 1 i'
NEAL R. GROSS & CO.,- INC.
(202)234-4433
l L 1 l
Page 53 L '
1 basis-would your reactions have been any different on-the- ;
j 2 evening of September 5th? l l
3 A- Well, probably. I probably would have taken it a 4 lot more seriously when that alarm came in, would l- 5 .immediately stopped, I think. But.I didn't know it was 6- design basis. And it - you know, when you're on the curve 7 you were there;>okay? Stopping and getting back to the 8 curve does.not buy you any safety.
l .
i l' 9 MR. HENDRIX: Can you elaborate on that, when you )
.say, "When you're on the curve you're there," so that they i l -
11L understand what...
l 1
i '12
'THE, WITNESS: If the response to a. drop'in the i l 13 tank level is as shown by our evolution, that's the response j L ,
L 14 you're going-to.have in a LOCA. So anytime you're on the 1
- 15 curve lyou were at the same-place we were. To stop and go. ;
- i
! 16 back to the curve, have-you made'yourself safe? No. You've l 0 '
-- 17 just'put yourself back to the initial condition for binding-18 .your pumps in a LOCA because your curve is no good.
19 LBY MR. DOCKERY:
1 20 Q Okay, when you say your curve is no good, are you L
21 saying that curve was no good?
22- A- Right, the old Curve 8.
23 Q. The Curve 8 as it existed on September the 5th?
24 A Correct.
! 25' Q It's'now known that that curve was no good. Would 1
NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC. l (202)234-4433
A I
Page 54 1 it be fair to say you were certain it was no good on i
2 September the 5th? j l
3 A I'd have to say that we strongly suspected it was 4 no good when we started dropping level and the alarm came 5 in.
6 Q Would you ever intentionally violate a design 7 basis curve?
i 8 A No {
1 9 MR. DOCKERY: I'm going to suggest that-we've l l
10 been at this a little over an hour now-that we go off the i 11 record for a few minutes so that we can talk; and, I
. 12 Mr. Hendrix,,if you need to talk to your client. We'll go 13 off the record.
14 (A short recess was taken.) j 1
15 MR. DOCKERY: Okay, we're back on the record. The 16 time is approximately 11:53 A.M. -- or P -- yes, A.M. The 17 -- the people present are the same as at the beginning of 18 this record, with the exception that Mr. McNulty has left.
i 19 And, Mr. Weiss, I'd like to remind you that you continue to I 20 be under oath here, if you'd acknowledge that verbally.
21 THE WITNESS: I understand.
22 MR. DOCKERY: Curt, I believe you had... l 23 MR. RAPP: Okay, I'll go ahead, continue with me 24 -- finish up with my questions here.
25 BY MR. RAPP:
NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
-. _ - . - . - . . ~ - - ... - . . - -
'i 1
- l. Page 55
- 1 Q We were discussing the makeup tank high pressure 2 ' alarm. 'Are there any other normal evolutions, plant
~
} 3 evolutions that would cause alarm set points or 4
4 administrative limits to be exceeded that you can think of 5- or.that you remember?.
- 6 A Well, sure, it's pretty -- pretty routine that you 7 generate alarms wh'en you perform evolutions. That's --
8 that's not that unusual.
[- '9 Q And when that occurs are you required.to take I i
} 10 ~immediate. action for those alarms, or -- or what's the-
. 11 response?
12 A Immediate action is not required. Now, I think if 13 you look in 500,it'll tell you that you should pull the AR 14 if the. alarm's not as a result of an evolution that you're f15 - performing, some -- or words to that effect. You pull the 16 AR and you look at the required actions. You know,-if it's 17 an expected alarm, if you know why it came in and -- and 18 'it's not~a' problem then - .then it's-not a problem.
19 Q Okay. Are you familiar with AI 500, context of 20 operations?
21 A Yeah.
l22 .Q Is AI 500 a usable procedure?
- 2 3' A It's very difficult to read, you know. You follow 24 the requirements in it, but...
25 Q Could it be. interpreted in many different ways?.
NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433 )
1
-l
Page 56 1 A I don't know. You'd have to, you know, 2 specifically look at'something and then look at AI 500 to l 3 see if there's any doubt about it. I don't know.
4 Q Well, in particular enere's directions in AI 500 5 that says when procedures are required for activities.
6 A Okay.
7 Q Is -- is there interpretation on -- on how that --
8 how that can be applied?
9 A Can I look at the actual section and see?
10 Q Sure. Do you have AI 500?
11 A Yeah, I think we've got an AI 500 in here 12 '3omewhere.' ,
13 MR. HENDRIX: Here it is. It's obsolete now.
14 THE WITNESS: Well, that's the one that was in 15 effect at the time that we did it. I 16 MR. RAPP: You got it there?
17 BY MR. RAPP:
18 Q All right, it's Section 4-3-2-3-1. I mean, excuse l
19 me, 4-3-2.
20 (The witness reviews certain material.) I 21 A 4-3-2-3?
22 Q Right.
23 MR..HENDRIX: What page?
24 MR. RAPP: Yeah, the next one down from that.
25' It's Page 45. That may not coincide with your copy.
NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
- _ . . _ . _. _ _ _ . . . ~ . . _ _ . - - . _ _ _ . .... _ . - . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . ..__ -_ __ _ .._.-
l 1
.j Page 57
- 1. THE WITNESS: 45?
l . .
t2 MR. HENDRIX: And the number again? 4-3..
3 THE WITNESS: Section 4-3'-2-3 is " General 4 Practices for Procedure Implementation," is that what you're j
'5 looking at?
6 MR. RAPP: Yes.
7 THE WITNESS: Okay.
8 BY MR. RAPP:
9 Q And so the Paragraph 2, " Written procedures are 10 also needed-for evolutions that would affect a cMnge-of 11 flow paths!or operating parameters."
.12 A 'Okay.
13 Q -All'right. Could that be interpreted that a 14 special test procedure was needed for this evolution, or l
-15 could that be interpreted that the administrative - the i i
16 approved operating procedures you had'in hand were adequate? )
17- A~ If you have written-procedures you're meeting the~
18 requirements of that. .If you've got a nomal operating 19 ' procedure to do.what you'r's doing, then you are meeting
- 20 that. And if -- you know, look -- look.down at "A," you.
L 21- know. The. shift supervisor is the guy that decides what
'22 requirements are applicable. Well,.: Dave did that. He
- 23. looked'at it, said, "Okay,'OP 402 covers us." You know, we
- 24 didn't violate AI 500.
25 Q- 'Okay. Is there anything in FPC procedures that NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
F (202)234-4433 L
L l-i
. . - . , , , . . - . ,.-.m.. . . _ . . _ . . _ . _ . . . . . - _ . - . , . . - . . - . - . -~ .,
l Page 58 i i define and describe what constitutes an approved or i 2 authorized evolution, that you're aware of? l i
3 A Well, anything that you have an approved procedure )
1 I
4 for, obviously it's been approved and authorized; right?
5 Because it has to go through the 50-59 process.
6 Q Okay, but there's not a -- a statement tbst says, 7 "This is an authorized evolution," and -- and describes that J l
8 activity or those activities?
9 A Not that I know of. I can't think of anything.
10 Q All right. l l
11 A AI 500 talks about evolutions and tasks prebably l 12 pretty mudh where we were just looking, but that ; the only 13 thing I know of.
14 'O All right. During your requal training you go 15 over industry events; correct?
16 A Uh-huh (affirmative).
17 Q Was.there any -- any type of industry events 18 discussed with you where people had performed unauthorized 19 evolutions and you were told that this was not within your 20 license or within your -- your authority to do this?
21 A Not that I recall.
- 22. Q Similar industry events?
23 A Not that I remember.
24 Q Okay. Did you attend any meetings with 25 engineering on this matter, like the HPI pump binding issue NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
Y 1
i I
Page 59 'i 1 ~ or the Appendix R where.this makeup tank curve was
- j. 2~ discussed?
3' A Well, I was there at the design bssin .
'41 - determination ' meet.ing .- That. was nfter the 4th and the 5th.
3 1 5 -Q~ Prior to that? i 6- A- Prior to that? No, Mark. Van ~Sicklen was pretty.
1 h 7 .much interfacing with engineering on that.
8 -Q Are you aware or did anyone ever tell you from_
i F ,
9- engineering that the HPI_' pumps.were not important during a f: 10 LOCA, so that' gas binding was not a problem?
l 11 A Engine'ering stated-I think this was'after the 4
l 12 event, though-that no credit is taken for HPI in the large
- 3 13 break LOCA analysis, which is a correct statement. The l' 14 reason it's a design basis issue is.the -- specifically.the l
15 core. flood line break.
i
- 16 Q Were you ever told that.there was~a special-test i
17 planned for the next refueling. outage to verify this curve, 18 to check the-response of the plant against this curve?
19 A No, they -- that letter, I think, that starts out ]
l ,
20 at the top, it says, "There are no plans to change Curve 8.
p 21 We believe it's accurate and reasonably conservative," okay?
- j. 22 Q You're referring to September 2nd letter that t I l ,
- 23. engin>oring sent out?
i
( '24 A Is that September 2nd letter? Yeah. I think it 1_ ]
i d 25~ had some reference to doing something in the next refueling j NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC, (202)234-4433 ,
I v ,
Page 60 1 outage down toward the bottom. You know, I don't think it's 2 acceptable to wait until refuel, operate with a bad curve 3 until refuel.
4 Q I mean, if you operated for 18 months, why not 5 wait another-what?-six months or eight months?
6 A Do you think that's acceptable, you know, to -- to 7 say, well, you know, we just found out that we're outside 8 design basis, but since we've already been there 18 months 9 we can go another six months, you know. If the core flood 10 line drops off we'll melt the core, but...
11 Q .Tne point is nobody knew that was the design basis 12 at that po' int,.
13 A Right. Correct.
14 Q Did you think that engineering would actually do 15 this test?
- 16. A I -- I don't know of any real detailed plans to do 17 a test. There was some reference in the letter but... !
18 Q Well, just a vague allusion to it.
19 A Yeah.
20 Q There wasn't anything like, "We've planned this or 21 scheduled tais."
22 A Fight. They pretty firmly say at the top that 23 Curve 8's accurate and reasonably conservative.
24 Q Okay.
25 A And they had no plans to change it.
NEAL R. GROSS & Co., INC.
(202)234-4433
i Page 61 I
.1 ~Q All right, thats all I have. Thank you.
2 BY MR. VORSE:
3- Q Going back once again to the September 4th, after 4- you -- you and Mr. Fields and the other shift members found 5 out that --:that management was getting' agitated-I think 6 that's a good word-about the . evolution of the 5th, did 7 anyone discuss not telling anyone about the 4th based on the 8 fact that management was.getting stirred up, and it was just 9 kind of, " Don't ---unless you're asked, don't --~ don't---
10 don't tell anybody"?
11- A No. No, there was no effort'or intent to cover 12 this thing' up,. I've -- I've answered truthfully when I'm j 13 . asked about it. I didn't volunteer it; I'didn't think~it q 1
14 was that.important. i
'15 Q- 'Okay. That's all I have.
16 BY MR. DOCKERY- !
17 Q- One last point I'd.like uo'bringLup. I'd like to 18 revisit something, Mr. Weiss, that you mentioned early in 19 your testimony, and that was that you at some point began to 20 feel threatened, threatened from a -- an employment 21 standpoint; is that correct?
22 A Yes.
I 23 .Q And.that you felt that that threat emanated from 24 management?.
25 A Yes.
l NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC. ,
(202)234-4433 '
-Page 62 1 Q Assuming that you felt that way at that time, do 2 you now feel that you have'been in any way retaliated 3' against by your management?
4 A Yes, I do.
5 Q Do you feel that that retaliation results from 6 your having raised health and/or safety issues related to 7 the operation of the plant?
8 A Yes.
9 Q Okay, I don't mean to -- I know you're very ably 10 counseled here by an attorney, but it's necessary for us to 11 mention to you on the record that you have the ability to 12 seek redress,for any retalit. ion against you through the 13 Department of Labor. Iet me ask you, are you familier with 14- that --
that path?
15 A Yeah. Department of Labor's not that easy to get 16 a hold of, but...
17 Q Do you understand that all you have to do is file j i
18 a complaint with the~ Department of Labor, and that complaint 19 is really nothing more than a letter stating briefly what 20 has happened to you and why you feel it has happened?
21 A Yes.
22 Q Okay, I just want to make sure that -- that you're 23 aware of that option.
24 A I would like to get the address and who to send it 25 to.
i NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
i Page 63 1 Q Okay, I think if you check in Tampa _under 2 Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, you'll -- ,
3 you'll find the address that you need. I don't know it off 4 the top of my head, that's all I'm saying. I 5 A Okay.
6 Q And the action is -- is taken under Section 2-11 7 of the Energy Reorganization Act. If you were to call the 8 Wage and Hour Division they could - -could give you any 9 additional information you might be...
10 MR. VORSE: And you -- you need to understand it I 11 . has to I)e done with -- it has to be filed within si:: months l 12 of the incidept.
13 THE WITNESS: I understand that. Of course, you 14 know, the problem I've got here is the company has 15 characterized what we did as a bad thing to do. They said 16 we did an unauthorized test. Well, you know, I guess that 17 the NRC couldn't support that 'cause they'didn't charge us 18 with an unauthorized test, they said we violated procedures.
19 Didn't violate any procedures.
20 But basically, you know, the company has got you 21 guys cocked and going on a wrongdoing charge against us and 22 it sort of chills any chance I think that I have to get 23 redress, you know.
24 MR. DOCKERY: Let me clarify something right there 25 that I should have mentioned earlier. The NRC, I want you NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
4 F Page 64 1 1 to understand, can offer you no form of redress.
2 THE WITNESS: Yes, I understand that.
3 MR. DOCKERY: And your complaint, if you decide to 4 make one, is purely regulatory. The only redress -- method l 5 of obtaining redress that you have is through the Department 6 of' Labor; or I assume there may be -- there may be civil !
7 statutes, state -- state.of Florida statutes that you can 8 pursue. I wouldn't be familiar with those.
9 THE WITNESS: Well, what I want to know...
10 MR. HENDRIX: Of course, we think -- we think that 11 the NRC can offer him redress by vindicating his' integrity l 12 and his.fr'ofepsionalism by finding that he did not engage in 13 deliberate misconduct. And the company is hoping and i 14 praying that you will find that ho engaged in deliberate-15 misconduct, because if you do that will. obviate any chance
-16 he has of redress before the Secretary of Labor, because l 17 then his termination would have been for cause.
! 18 So they're hoping that you'll find he's a liar,-
19- that he's not credible, that you can't believe him, and that 20 -he's given misinformation to you about whether he believed
! 21 what he was do:ng was authorized, and whether he believed 22 that this was a valid safety concern.- And also on the red 23 herring issue of whether he, you know, withheld information
( 24 from the NRC or the company, which is bogus.
- 25 And so we do believe that you can do something to NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433 l
l
l Page 65 1
1 help redress him by simply saying you find him credible and
- 2. believable, and that will go a long way towards affording 3 him the right to get redress.
4 THE WITNESS: I guess what I'd like to know, you i
5 know: You guys are an office of investigation. Well, so 6 far all you've done is investigate us. You haven't really 7 taken a good, serious look at the situation that we were
[ 8 struggling against down there.
9 MR. DOCKERY: Would you like to make a very clear 10 allegation regarding that situation at thir. titce?
11 MR. HENDRIX: We do have an allegation to make at 12 the conclu'siop.
13 THE WITNESS: Yes.
- 14 MR. HENDRIX
- We're going to furnish you with that i 15 allegation and ask you to pursue it, and we have put it in 16 writing and we're going to give it to you at the end of the 17 day. Mr. Fields has addressed the letter because he feels, l
l 18 as being the -- the senior manager responsible for his 19 shift, that he wants to be the one to bring it, so Mr. Weiss l
20 did not sign this letter. And we address this at our second 21 interview where we -- we do make specific allegations and we 22 will present it to you during his testimony. But he wanted 23 to be the one to bring it, not Mr. Weiss. He feels l
24 responsible for the people working underneath him, and so he 8
25 wants to be the one to put it in writing.
NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
- (202)234-4433 I
I
s Page 66 j l
if MR. DOCKERY: That's fine. And just so you-2- understand procedurally,'we -- we'd be happy to -- to' accept i
3 that allegation from ycu;.however, for the time being we're
]
4' just a conduit tolour allegation people.
5 .MR. HENDRIX: I understand.
6 MR. DOCKERY: And'we'll -- we'll be happy to 7 handle that for you.
8 MR. HENDRIX: We will furnish it to you today. ;
I 9 THE WITNESS: I guess it just bothers me that the
~ 10 NRC took the company's word,-you know, that --
that we had 11 done a bud thing, and didn't look into any of the l 12 circumstances,around it, any.of the problems'in r%e 13 Engineering Department that we were hitting. And they 14 basically took the company's word that we were bad = guys, and 15 started taking action against us. And I tell you something, 16 you let them get.away.with this and there will.be no' safety They all'know
~
17 culture at'CR-3. People are watching this.
18 it could have been them just as easy, 19 MR. DOCKERY: Mr. Weiss, let me interrupt you just 20 a second, because-we want.to afford you an opportunity at
'21 the end of this to make any final statement you might wish 22 to make.
23 THE' WITNESS: Very well.
24 MR. DOCKERY: And we may have reached that point 25 'where it's time to do that. Are there any other questions?
NEAL R.. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
l i
l .
Page 67 1 MR. VORSE: No, no further questions.
i l 2 MR. DOCKERY: -Then,_Mr. Weiss, if you would, go l
l 3 ahead and make any comments you wish to make. And 4 particularly if there is any questions that you felt we l 5 should have asked you and didn't, please feel free to go l
l 6 ahead and address that.
l 7 THE WITNESS: Well, I'd like to state, first of l-
! 8 all, that the actions I took, I took not out of any' desire 9- for personal gain. I took the actions I took because I had l 10. a concern for nuclear safety; because I believed in the 11 professional ethics associated with having a senisr reactor 12 operator's" license, all the responsibilities that go clong_
13 with that. And I don't think that those responsibilities 14- can be nailed down in a little box and say, "Well, you know,
! 15 you only have to be worried if you're here." It's -- you 16 look at the big picture of nuclear safety.
! 17 And I stood up for the guys who had nuclear safety 18 concerns. The concerns were valid, they were correct. I 19 think that the company deliberately characterized what we 20 did as an unauthorized test to mislead the NRC and to keep l
21 the focus off the management and engineering failures 22 associated with the event. And I just think that you really l
23 ought to look at a wider picture than just taking the 4
24 company's word for what happened. They're the ones with 25 something to gain from this. I didn't have anything to gain NEAL R. GROSS & Co., INC.
(202)234-4433 l
l l
, . . . _ . - . - . . . . - . - - .. . - . - . . . _ . ,_.- ---__.__ -- =
L 1
Page 68 1 from it. I. acted in good faith, I tried-to do what was l
l 2 right, and I've been severely punished for that. My 3 ~ professional reputation's been ruined. I doubt I'll'be able 4 to get another job in the nuclear industry with that kind of-p 5 a reference hanging over my head. So I'm -- I'm probably
! leaving the industry behind.
6 -
7 The NRC is charged with maintaining the industry's l 8 safe. And if they let people get fired for.taking action on 9 a nuclear action concern, then they've just pulled the ,
i 10 cornerstone out of the safety culture. Because nobody's 11 going to risk what happened to me for a safety. concern. Not
- 12. if you let'them fire people for it.
13 And if all they got to do is stick a. bad label on 14 it and call up the NRC and say, " Hey, we got a couple of: bad 15 guys," if that's all it takes, you know,... People are i
- 16. watching this, people know that it could have been them l
l 17 going down the road.
18 You.need to realize tha't anytime you were on the
-19 curve you were where we were that night. That we had been 20 outside design basis for 18 months, and that what we did l'
21 didn't drive the plant outside design basis, it was already 22 there. I can't think of anything else I really need to say.
l 23' MR. HENDRIX: I would like to ask you a question.
l 24 or two. The -- did-you -- were you' asked to review or sign 25 for accuracy the very last LER that was submitted to the NRC NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
i (202)234-4433
Page 69 1 on this?
2 THE WITNESS: No, that came straight from Pat' 3 Beard.
4 MR. HENDRIX: And have you read it where it talks 5 about whether the plant, as a result of the work that you 6 all did, your shift did, and the -- and the determination 7 that the curve was invalid and non-conservative, have you 8 read the LER when he references where the plant was or was 9 not outside the design basis?
10 THE WITNESS: I don't remember exactly how they 11 a put th't. I think they - didn't they phrase it that the 12 plant may'hav,e-been' outs'ide'the design basis from time to 13 time?
14 MR. HENDRIX: From time to time? Do you agree 15 with that statement?
16 THE WITNESS: I think we were outside design basis 17 -all the time as tong as we were operating on the cerve.
18 Now, you know, if one of these crews that was dropping-19 pressure, maybe they dropped it far enough. I think we were 20 basically outside the design basis all the time. Anyone 21 operating on the curve was, and they were being told to and 22' threatened if-they didn't, so...
23 MR.'HENDRIX: And management' knew that everyone 24 was being requested to operate on the curve, and yet they 25 report to the NRC that maybe from time to time the plant was NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
Page 70 1 outside the design basis. And the focus of the report is 2 that you guys for 30 minutes were outside the design basis, 3 is that right?
4 THE WITNESS: Yes, they rewrote the LER to 5 maintain the focus on the actions of the operators. And the 6 intent all along has been the NRC -- keep the NRC focused on 7 the' actions of the operators.
8 MR. HENDRIX: That sums it up. Anything else?
9 THE WITNESS: No.
10 BY MR. DOCKERY:
11 Q Mr. Weiss, one other comment that you mada during 12 your testi' mony here today war in response to a q: scion 13 about whether or not you considered availing yourself of the 14 Employee Concerns Program. And I believe your response was, 15 quote, "That thing's a joke," unquote.
l 16 A That's correct.
17 Q Is that correct?
l 18 A I had never put in a concern through that program
]
19 myself, but my supervisor, Dave Fields, had put two of them 1
20 through and was very unhappy with the kind of responses that 21 he get. And he could probably tell you a lot more about l
22 that. !
1 23 Q Had the Employee Concerns Program not been a, 24 quote, " joke," unquote, would you have considered using --
25 using that to address your issue?
NEAL P. OROSS & CO., INC. ;
(202)234-4433
Page'71'
'l A Yes. You know, if they had a -- a real serious' 2 program that would force an investigation into things when 3- there was a safety concern not.getting resolved, then. yeah, j 4 if it'd have been a ' good tool I'd have used it.
5 Q Did L you feel it.would have been an appropriate 6 means for you to. seek action on -- on what you felt was a 7 . safety issue?
8 A You mean as it stands now?
9 Q No , sir, if -- if it had been -- if in your-10 opinion it was an effective program?
11 A Right. What was needed is some. oversight *here.
- 12. I mean, yo'u kpow, someone tnat would come.in and not 'ast. j a
13 sit down with the engineers, go, " Hey,-is this curve any' ,
14 good?" the engineer nods, and'they go away. That's --
15 that's not what's needed. .You need someone that's going to-T 16 .go in there and find out all the sides of the story, go back ,
17 a'nd look at the cales, you know, look at the whole -
18 situation, you know. Someone that has some authority, I ,
19 'mean. All anyone had to do was -- was walk down the hall !
20 and open up a filing cabinet and pull that calc and they 21 would have seen, "Only valid through! Refuel 8."
22 Q Specifically<regarding the Employee Concerns 23 Program, in your opinion is that -- is that program
( 24 something that- from a regulatory standpoint, that the NRC 3
25 needs to take a look at?
1NEAL R. GROSS & CO ,'INC.
(202)234-4433
1 Page 72 1 A Yes, I think so.
2 MR. DOCKERY: I don't have any further questions. i 3 MR. VORSE: All right, then, Mr. Weiss, if you i 4 have nothing additional to add...
i 5 MR. HENDRIX: Well, we do here. We have talked l
6 about it, but we've never really did it. ;
7 MR. VORSE: #257 8 MR. HENDRIX: #25 on the record. We got these 9 together and then we realized that we needed to change'that.
10 Why don't you tell them why -- what that exhibit is. number 11 one, and -- and what changes need to be made to it. I 12 h5HE WITNESS: Well, basically this was -- this was 13 a curve that I was trying to put together for my 1
14 presentation at the' enforcement conference. And part of my' 15 presentation I was going to talk -- you know, I wanted to 16 show-where the two foot of water line was if you took that 17 two feet away. And the problem is, is that I just made a 18 mistake in how I did that, so that one line on this curve 19 you should disregard. That'd be the line labeled, "New 20 Curve 8 plus two feet of water."
21 MR..HENDRIX: We can get that corrected, but he 22 just didn't have a chance, when he came up,'to get it 23 corrected before we gave it to you today. Not that it's all 24 that material I guess today, because -- I mean, can you 25 explain...?
NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
j, Page 73 1 THE WITNESS: Well, the other data on it is valid, 1 2 you know. You -- you've got the old Curve 8, and you've got i
I
-3 the test datt from the 5th, and you have the new Curve 8.
4 And it's pretty clear if you compare the old Curve 8 and the 5 -new Curve 8, the new Curve 8 is below the old Curve 8, and 6 they never cross. And they're -- that's really called the 7 design basis. So anytime you were -- they were near the 8 curve you were outside.the design basis. So anyway, I'll !
l 9 just ask you to just disregard the line labeled, "New Curve 10 8 plus two feet of water." That's incorrect.
11 NR. VORSE: We don't have anything else, 12 Mr. Weiss,' so, we'll go ahead and conclude this interv ew at 13 12:20, August 31st, 1995. Thank.you.
14 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded at 12:20 15 P.M.)
16 17-18 19 20 21 22 23 l
24 25 NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
- (202)234-4433 l
l
lY I
CERTIFICATE This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:
Name of Proceeding: Interview of Robert P. Weiss Docket Number:
Place of Proceeding: Atlanta, GA Date: August 31, 1995 i were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatorf Commission taken by me and, thereafter'r76tced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the t,urt reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.
l
- M; '
MELANIE L. SCHALLOCK Official Reporter ;
i NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
NEAL R. GROSS & CO., INC.
(202)234-4433
_ _ - _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _