ML20147H740

Documents Re Assessment by Office of Mgt & Prog Analysis of the Uses of WASH-1400 in the Licensing Process.Includes Memos,Repts,Transcripts,Etc,Noted by Staff as Pertinent

ML20147H740
Person / Time
Issue date:	12/11/1978
From:	NRC OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND PROGRAM ANALYSIS (MPA)
To:
Shared Package
ML18078B291	List: ML20147H677 ML20147H701 ML20147H714 ML20147H732 ML20147H740 ML20147H756 ML20147H761 ML20147H773 ML20147H805 ML20147H835 ML20147H853 ML20147H892
References
RTR-WASH-1400 NUDOCS 7812270384
Download: ML20147H740 (23)

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i DETAILED RESP 0i4SES RECEIVED FROM MPA l

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[ NOV 21 1978 MEMORANDUM FOR: Harold Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: Norman M. Haller, Director Office of Management and Program Analysis

SUBJECT:

REVIEW 0F REGULATORY ACTIONS AND STAFF POSITIONS WHICH RELY ON WASH-1400 Mr. Gossick's October 27 memorandum on the above subject requested that cffices listed as cc's contribute to the review to the extent possible.

We have conducted an internal MPA survey. The results of our survey do not appear to lend themselves to the categorization of licensing actions in Attachment 1 of Mr. Gossick's memo. However, we want to pass the results along to you to help ensure that you do have available a more complete response.

v Four attachments are relevant:

A discussion of the use of WASH-1400 in connection with abnormal occurrence reporting;

-- A discussion of uses in value/imh ct guidelines and preparation

'of information for Commissioners;e

-- References from the 1975, 1976, 1977 and Draft 1978 NRC Annual Reports listing various applications of WASH-1400; and An extract from the National Journal in which a number of uses are identified.

I hope this information will be useful in preparing your report.

D.

W

• I '

orman M. Haller, Director f ice of Management and Program Analysis Attachments:

p As stated U

CONTACT:

Roger Moore, MPA 492-7851

/ "k UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[ h WASHINGTON, D. C. 20666 -

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November 8, 1978

. MEMORANDUM FOR: Rager H. Moore, Chief ,

Applied Statistics Branch  !

Division of Technical Support, MPA FROM: R. A. Hartfield, Chief Licensee Operations Evaluation Branch .

Division of Technical Support, MPA  !

SUBJECT:

REVIEW 0F REGULATORY ACTIONS AND STAFF POSITIONS WHICH RELY ON WASH-1400 l

Generally, the only use made of WASH-1400 by L0EB is to support reviews of off-normal events for abnormal occurrenm reporting.

For example, a recent use of WASH-1400 techniques was made as indicated in Enclosure 1. However, for this event, the data in the report was not of major importance as to whether or not the event was an abnormal occurrence. The report was used only q as another source of information; the particular data used could have varied by a considerable margin and it would not have affected i

I the determinations. I, In summary, our use of WASH-1400 techniques is to add to our .

analysis, but not as a major decision tool.  !

. i  ;

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R. A. Hartfield, Chi (ef '

Licensee Operations Evaluation Branch Division of Technical Support, MPA j-

Enclosure:

1. Events Reviewed for Abnormal Occurrence  !

cc: N. M. Haller '

'J. L. Crooks'  ::

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Enclosure 1

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( _,, EVENTS REVIEWED FOR ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE DETERMINATION IN WHICH WASH-1400 WAS U5tu A5 ONt SOURCt OF DATA

1. Davis-Besse Unit 1: Diesel Generator Automatic Load Sequence

. Failure:

This event was reviewed by the staff for possible abnormal occurrence reporting but rejected. A description of the event, together with the reasons for rejection (Attachment 1-1) will be included in Enclosure 3 to the Commission paper which forwards the 3rd Quarter .

CY 78 A0 Report to Congress to the Commission for approval.  !

The licensee performed a detailed probabilistic assessment of the

' event based on WASH-1400, including the cases of loss of offsite power before, during, and after a LOCA (both a large LOCA and a small LOCA). The calculated probabilities ranged from 1.4 x 10 -7 tl.2 to 3.2 x 10 -10 1 However, for abnormal occurrence reporting purposes, the important fact is that on-site and off-site power.was not lost simultaneously during the period of sequence failure. The sequence failure alone did not result in a major reduction in public health or safety. Even if the probabilistic analysis was off by a significant margin, the overall risk would be little affected, e- .

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. Attachment 1-1 4

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OTHER EVENTS CONSIDERED FOR ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE REPORTING

• The following incidents are a sample of incidents seriously considered for-abnormal occurrence reporting. The incidents are briefly discussed and the reasons why they are not being reported are stated. All were judged not to have involved a major reduction in the level of protection providea for public health or safety.

This enclosure is provided to the Commission per Commission comments on SECY-76-471; the enclosure will not be a part of the published report.

1.

Diesel Generator Automatic'Loadino Secuence Failure

• On June 5,1979, Toledo Edison Company reported a design error at Davis-Besse Unit No. 1, a pressurized water nuclear plant located in Ottawa County, Ohio.

The licensee notified the NRC that, during a refueling outage surveillance test of the Integrated Safety Features Actuation Systems (SFAS), a design error was ciscovered which would have pre- '

\ vented certain safety systems from functioning during a loss of y) offsite power in combination with actuation of the SFAS. The j design error involved a plant modification made in February 1977, '

which erroneously sealed in certain relays in the SFAS system. This prevented the operation of the autcmatic ioad sequencer wnich serves to bring critical loads onto the emergency power bus at orecetermined intervals. Sequencing is necessary to prevent overloading the i diesel generator if a loss of offsite oower occurred in ccmoir.itien with an SFAS signal.

If an SFAS actuation occurred with normal offsite power availD. the circuit would have performed normally.

The event also raised concerns relative to the management control of modification activities. Manual actuation of these circuits, though available, is not an acceptable alternative in certain postulated worst case accidents since the operator cannot always respond within the time frames reqL ired.

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The apparent cause was a design error and inadecuate testing or ~

operational control proolems. Period 1 surveillance testing is also conducted to verify satisfactory s,istem performance. (The i design error was not discovered at the. time the change was made l

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t because the scope of the testing conducted was not inclusive enough to detect the error.)

The licensee established and implemented a system to verify that slide link connectors (a terminal block with movable metal strips used to make.or break the electrical connection) in safety-related panels tight. are in the correct position and that the holding screws are The licensee established and implemented a program, including acceptance criteria, that verif f es adequacy of procedures used to determine equipment operability. The licensee reviewed all safety-related plant procedures related to the onsite and offsite power systems and verified that design features are not inadvertently defeated or compromised by operator action. The licensee will establish aJJ;ticriai administrative controls to ensure that changes

- or modifications to systems are made utilizing drawings that have been' verified as correct.

The NRC June issued an Immediate Action Letter to the licensee on 12, 1978.

This letter outlined actions to be taken by the licensee to correct the present problem and to prevent recurrence.

An inspector was dispatched to the site to verify corrective measures taken by the licensee as outlined in the Immediate Action g Letter.

On September 1,1978, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to the licensee in regard to the incident and the subsequent investigation.

The forwarding letter also expressed concern in regarc to the effectiveness of management control over testing activities; the licensee was requested to describe the actions taken or planned to correct these inadequacies.

The NRC reviewed the incident and concluded that it did not involve a major reduction in the degree of protection for public nealth or safety. No unscheduled event involving comoiete loss of power to the systems occurred, i.e., both onsite and offsite power were not lost simultaneously. Surveillance testing icentified the deficiency as intended. In addition, postulating an accident, assuming no additional failures, does not lead to consecuences

' exceeding 10 CFR Part 100, since offsite power was available to ,

l power the emergency systems. Finally, the licensee's analysis, and NRC's review, showed that the overall risk of an accident was  ;

not significantly increased. )

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• UNITED STATES '

L [ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMis$lON I D o WASHINGTON, D. C. 20556 ,

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• • • • • NOV 2 1 9

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Roger Moore, Applied Stetistics Branch, riPA FROM: Steve Conver, Analysis and Planning Branch, MPA j j CLARITICATION OF APB'S USE OF WASH-1400

SUBJECT:

In my November 14 memo to you, I indicated that WASH-1400 had been i L

used to prepare Comissioner Kennedy's "I fonnation Card." A more correct statement is tnat WASH-1400 was " considered" in preparing i the card; WASH-1400 results or methods were not actually "used" in .

the sense of being incorporated into the facts presented on the card.

The card contains one section titled, " Average Risk of Fatality by Various Accidents (1975)." This section lists estimates of the numbers E of deaths and the individual chance of decth per year for each of 12 types of accidents, nc- including nuclear accidents. We obtained this information from the Statistical Abstrac'. of the U.S. (1977). Our staff did compara the " statistical abstract" data with that presente; in WASH-1400, and attempted to determine whether the NRC staff had

• developed more accurate or more current information for our use in :l preparing the card. Because neither the NRC staff nor WASH-1400 itself .

offered additional insichts or improvements, our staff used the "statis- [

tical abstract" data exclusively in preparing the card. ,

i I hope this clarifies our use of WASH-1400.

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teve Conver ii i Analysis and Planning Branch {..

cc: N.Hallb  !

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y '*~ p.. .on troducts - 950 540 1.2x 108 1.25 1013 Tota. 8.5 27.500 565 1.2= 108 1.25x 10I3 b Liced Wastes from Reprocessingd 5 8 g"". _ __

Actinides - 150(190lb 22t28015.7a10 (7.1 101 16x101014.7s101 h . -. -.

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- = F,ssen Products - 950(9606 54015801 1.2x10 (1.25 108 ) 1.5 1013tt.0x10131 1100(11501 562(8601 1.2x 10 (1.3n 108 ) 1.5x 1013(1.0x 1013)

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Totai 15 1100(1150) 30158) 8.6a 106 f 8.3x 10 6 ) 5.8 1012(3.641012) eBased on a 1000 MWe PWR 80% Load Factor. Does not include treneuranic wastes. ']

1 byelue in parentneses are for PWR wath plutonium recycle. '

($oent fuel ef ter 150 days cunS mmediately i efter reactor shutdown the radioactare decay heat and total F[,

7 curies of activity w6tl be nearty a f actor of 100 greater. L d High level weste from reprocessing assuming reprocessing immediately after 150 days of coalmg of spent

• 6 fuel. Assumes 0.5% fuel loss lurenlum plus plutonium) to waste stream. W l 3

'Be ed on chorectoristics of solidified weste 10 years after the initial reorocessing r,) 'RCO refers to the radiation control guideline limit concentration for concentrated release, as seven in Federal ', I

r. Rogulatens, Title 10. Part 24 Appendiu 8. Table ll.These units are meant to correspond to a maximum .

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Nueteer 1 09 190 L2 10.3 P'res arid Het $wtistences 7.458 1 m 2$.000 w e sia L. Je, W

Cees Hvere/0eethermai 14.94 2.38 17.70 1 40 211 4.2 27.8 6.0 Dreaa'ng Firearme 6.181 1*loe 16n 30.000 v 1 en ton.000 #

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• UNITED STATES 3'i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[) { ,. - j WASHINGTDN, D. C. 20556 O %fn!}3 *

.... NOV 14 trls NOTE TO: Roger Moore, ASB FROM: Steve Conver, APB

SUBJECT:

REGULATORY ACTIONS RELYING ON WASH-1400 We have surveyed the APB staff to identify those instances where WASH-1400 results or methods have been used in regulatory actions.

Because of the nature of work in our Branch, we do not have any

" regulatory actions" that have used WASH-1400. We do have two applications in our Branch:

1. Value Impact Guidelines - suggests using WASH-1400 results under certain circumstances (high expected impacts on safety, data available).

2. Preparing Information for Comission. WASH-1400 used Q to prepare information for Comm. Kennedy "information card."

I hope this information satisfies your request.

Steve Conver, APB cc: H. Bassett l

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_.. M 27 gp 77 - gpg g y GUIDELINES FOR CONDUCTING VALUE-IMPACT ANALYSIS The objectives of these guidelinesare to provide NRC staff with criteria

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for application and techniques for preparing value-impact analysis.*

These guidelines are intended to provide general instructions. Each NRC office should develop its own specific guidelines (e.g., emphasizing format) which are adapted to the particular issues analyzed by that office.

What is Value-Imoact Analysis?**

Value-impact analysis is a method enabling comparison of consequences associated with alternatives identified to satisfy 'seme objective or to meet some goal. Examples of objectives associated with NRC ,

policy actions are:

O 1. Increase the level'of safety (or decrease adverse health effects and property damage) associated with the operations of a nuclear reactor by: ,

a. Redu'cing routine emissions of radioactive materials, or

b. Reducing the probability of accidental release of such

. materials, or ~ l

c. Reducing the magnitude of undesirable effects associated with accidental- release of such materials (e.g. , through regulations related to siting decisions).

Criteria are discussed and applied to a sample of Comission papers in Appendix.I.

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In order to promote unifemity and to avoid misunderstanding, an Q analys.is should be referred to as "value-impact" rather than

" impact-value" or "value/ impact."

Enclosure F

Value-Impact Analysis .

If expected value or cost is high and data are available, more detailed analysis should be attempted.* For example, a more detailed analysis of the value (imoact or costs are discussed in a subsequent section) .of inerting would apply "Rasmussen's techniques'* and V6]

through the following steps:

a. Utilize a dispersion model and actual data on population density around a model or reference plant site to estimate the man-rem dosage associated with the accident. -

b. Estimate the probability of an explosion in terms of reactor years and multiply this probability times the man-rem numbers developed in step "a" to provide a "best estimate" or " expected

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value." I l

c. Multiply the amount in step "b" by $1,000 per man-rem (or other agreed upon value). .

I Where value or cost appear to be substantial, more effort should be devoted to collecting appropriate data when the analysis is initiated.

• • See the Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400.

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1 Value-Impact Analysis d. Estimate the dollar loss of plant and equipment, the value of replacement electricity which would have to be purchased after the explosion, the decrease in property values associated with

.an accident, and the costs of decontaminating property (and any revenue losses during the contamination period), and multiply these estimates by the probability of an explosion. These are expected costs which could be avoided through inerting and thus can be included as part of the value of inerting when comoared with the status ouo.

e. Add the dollar amounts in step "c" to those in step "d" to obtain the expected value or benefit of requiring that reactors O be inerted. *

f. Repeat steps "a" to "e" for any other alternatives which would either reduce the probability of an explosion or would reduce l

the magnitude of the release if there were an explosion. '

5. Cost or Imoact Estimate  !

This element should include all undesirable consequences associated with various alternatives. This consideration is particularly important when evaluating changes to engineering systems; if one sub-system or component of a system is changed other components may become less effective or less reliable. -

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. . UNITED STATES

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t NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,.. . . . . .

s WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555

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-r.. _. 1 0881CE OF Septaher 8, 1978 "--

MANAGEMENT AND 8- "'""'

PROGRAM ANALYSi$ b --- -"::ran:

1.. .

Note to Norm Haller - - " - " " '

Re your note on WASH-1400, attached are pages "

from the NRC 1975, 1976 and 1977 Annual Reports . . . - - . . . """"

indicating usage of the methodology employed in . . _ . .

the Rasmussen report for regulatory purposes. =--

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Another use. I seem to recall, was to assess the , .. . ]

risk of another Browns Ferry-type fire. . . . - . .

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Bill Dooly

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4ttachments: ~$ .. _._.

Sages fm 1975, 1976 and 1977 annual reports

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Conclusion:

Risks Very Low i acidents over the Ievels indicated in the draft, although tisk levels remain very low ',

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Among specific conclusions in the study were the following:

compared to nonnuclear risks. With regard to accident probabilities, the final report

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• Nuclear power plants are about 10,000 differs only in minor respect: from the times less likely to produce fatal draft report.

accidents than'many nonnuclear activi- d NRC Chairman Anders said of the final ties or events, such as fires, explosions, report:

toxic chemical releases, dam failures, "The Commission believes that the r

airplane crashes, earthquakes, tornadoes,' Reactor Safety Study report provides an j and hurricanes. obiretive and meaningful estimate of the

• Nonnuclear accidents involving com- Jublic risks associateciwith the opera- I parable large dollar value damage are tion of present day light water power about 1,000 times more likely than reactors in the United States. The final re.  !

I nuclear power plant accidents. port is a soundly based and impressive

• The chance that a perso, living in the work. Its overall conclusion is that the risk  ;

r general vicinity of a nuclear power attached to the opuation of nuclear power plant will be fatally injured in a reactor j plants is very low compared with other '

accident is one in five billion per year, natural and man made risks. The report as compared with one in 4,000 for a reinforces the Commission's belief that a , I motor vehicle accident and one in nuclear power plant designed, constructed 4 10,000 for a fall. The chance that a L and operated in accordance with NRC's

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person will be injured in a reactor  ; comprehensive regulatory requirements 3

accident is one in 75 million per year. ; provides adequate protection to public

• In the event of an unlikely reactc4 health and safety and the environment. Of accident, with a probability of one in

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} course, such regulatory requirements must ,

a million per reactor per year, latent be continually reviewed in the light of new .j-health effects, such as cancer fatalities knowledge, including that derived from a i and genetic defects, would be such a vigorous regulatory research program." ...

small percentage of the normal inci- [.'

r dence rates that they would be essen-tially undetectable. Another latent Significant Step Forward g

health effect, thyroid nodules, would Since there have been no nuclear power $

occur at about 15 percent of the nor- accidents to date which have resulted in ,

mal incidence rate, so that the in- Significant releases of radioactivity to the i crease would be detectable. These environment, nuclear risks could only be Y nodules can be diagnosed readily and estimated in the study. Many of the

• NJ treated successfully. methods used in the study, including j

" event trees" and " fault trees," were

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Calculations Improved developed by the Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space -

The final report differs from the August Administration in the last 10 years. The i

\ 1974 draft report with regard to the conse- specific application of these methods in quences of accidents. Based on advice from the reactor safety study represents a 4].

cminent scientists in all relevant disciplines significant step forward in risk assess- j calculations were substantially revised. In ment capability. .

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/O most cases, the improved calculations re. Following publication of the finalNRC f b '1 sulted in increasing the consequences of report, copies were made available for pub-4

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, ,1 potential reactor accident risks. This

} de inspection in the Commission's public

[\-f;- document room at 1717 H Street, N.W. in trashington, D.C., and the NRC's five knowledge can be used to achieve a better balance of effort in the safety reMews of reactor plants, and can eliminate from p regional offices in Philadelphia, Pa.;

,rtlanta, Ga.; Chicago, Ill.; Dal,las, Texas, these reviews itmes that are not contribu-h snd San Francisco, Calif. (Copies may be tors to the risk. This will reduce the effort 3 spent by the industry and the government ,

h purchased from the National Technical l in the licensing c.f reactors and should L Information Service, Springfield, Va.

result in a decrease in licensing time and in l l I 22161.)

a stabilizing of the process.

h Plans o'ver the next year call for the

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f Use of Techniques to Be Studied = Offices of Nuclear Re3ulatory Research L and Nuclear Reactor Regulation to coop- l y, l

• The publication of this report raises the crate on the:

question of how the advanced techniques (1) Identification of areas that are potentially fruitful in this regard, '

g. employed can be used in the future in '

(2) Analysis of each identified area to p connection with NRC's licensing responsi-determine a suitable course of action 3 - bilities, to be taken, and

{ As part of NRC's ongoing effort,it is E planned that the insights gained in the (3) Implementation of appropriate

@ l study will be used to identify the relative modifications to reactor technical l review procedures.

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1 Analysis: The ability to predict the behavior the potential liquid pathways for radio- .

of an HTGR system under transient conditions active material to reach man from a land is a necessary prerequisite for predicting system based plant comparable to a floating nu-

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t response to various accident smuaung events. clear power plant; N _/ The initial version of the CHAP program,

• Review of the draft environmental impact which models large HTGR systems, has been statement on the transportation of radio-completed. The code is structured as a modular active materials; and system to facilitate adaptation to other reactor

• Development, using statistical modeling, of types. improved testing schemes for diesel gen-erators.

. Additionally, a computer code has been de.

Risk Assessment veioped for detaiied anaiysis of nuciear power

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phtnt reliability data. The code may be used Ways are being explored in which the prob. to calculate the sensitivity of system unavail-  ;

abilities 3nd I sk i assessment techniqua deve_1. 9 ability to variations in test related characteristics ,

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oped in the Reactor Safety Study (WAm.A and to design changes.

pan be implemeritect in the regulatory Several studies were concluded to provide  ;. l process and applied to help resolve both specific infor. nation needed in risk assessment and 11 i and generic technical issues. Several such issues, censing. These included: (1) one phase of a including those suggested by th'e ACRS and the study to fonnulate a teethodology, based on Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation have ).V.ASJH.1400 techniques, to examin7tCk  !

been identified. to the public of reprocessing of nuclear fuels; I The Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (2) nn.tlysis of the eHect of engineered safety ,,

has provided assistance to other offices of NRC features on the risk of hypothetical LMFBR O'

.in several areas; for exa5ple, in: accidents; and'(3) an analysis of data on fires

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• Preparation of the environmental impac at nuclear power plants to be used in the de-  ;

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statement and assessment of the proposed velopmer t of a risk assessment.

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reliability programs for the CRBR;

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• Review of portions of the generic study of

.To-. f.a.c'litate transfer of the technioues used in the Re6M gtq EEC, staff an'd ll ,

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to contractor personnel, courses on " System During 1976, implementation of the safe- ~

Safety and Reliability Analysis" and " Human Factors Engineering" were conducted.

guards research program formulated in 1975 was initiated. Individual projects are divided

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into three categories. , )

! Projects in the fint category are directed l- Safeguards Research toward identifying measures of eKectiveness for each of the safeguards subsystems and de.

Nuclear materials safeguards are those activt. veloPi ng methods and models for evaluating ties which protect the public against death, them. Some work has already been done on injury, or property damage resulting from these, but the first major results will be obtained malevolent use of nuclear materials or sabbtage in fiscal year 1977. Analytical methods will be of nuclear facilities.The main safeguards ques- developed to predict and evaluate the perform-tion arising in recent years has been directed ance of safeguards subsystems for LWR plu-to whether the risk of these societal consequences tonium recycle facilities. In fiscal year 1978 is " acceptable,".that is, whether or not safe. these models will'be improved and translated guards are effective enough.' This question has into operational use, while work will begin on two aspects--scope and level of protection. application to highly enriched uranium facili.

" Scope of protection" refen to the spectrum ties, including enrichment plants, and high level of possible adversaries, and malevolent acts to waste storage facilities. I be protected against and target materials to be Projects in the second category are in direct l

protected. " Level of protection" refen to the response to requirements of other NRC offices.

l residual level of societal risk in the presence of Work in fiscal year 1977 will emphasize devices j current safeguards protection. and techniques in support of inspection and  !

the design of the integrated safeguards infor.

The main thrust of the safeguards research program has been to provide methods of assess- ****'I'***' .

Pmjects m the third category are not yet firm ing as quantitatively as possible the level of .

m detail, as they will depend on research protection achieved by licensee safeguards sys- '

tems. Although the safeguards issue, like the r*5ults 15 **ll 15 Perational and pokey de.

vel Pments m the coming months. However, 4 safety issue, can be expressed in terms of public -

w rk is planned on communications effecove.

risk, the socioeconomic elements of the safe-guards problem make it unlikely that an ade-ness mg wie e m ustn, the public and )

quate quantitative assessment of the abso-the potendal adhes; on the parameten snv Ived m, naconal pnen,ues; and on ways lute levels of societal risk can be made; how-of increasing flexibility and responsiveness of the ever, a quantitative expression of safeguards regulatory process. i eHecu,veness can be denved m tenns of other l relevant parameters. The goals of the research

• I" Projects were contracted through j

program related to the NRC regulato'ry func- with Sandia Watones on physical Protecc.on and transportation evaluau,on and tion have therefore been expressed in terms of ,

• **"** '"""' ***Y'"***

providing technical bases for improving the

• • "* c ntm and accoun6g evaluation. In following ' capabilities: j addiu.on, studies to develop new concepts for '

(1) The capability for assessing the effeco,ve- Safeguards systems and subsystems were initi. )

ness and socioeconomic impact of safe-ated with private firms through competitive guards policy options and alternauve p,,p,,,33, .

national strategies or procedures; During these first years of independent NRC (2) The capability'for predictive evaluation existence, the safeguards research pmgram is of the eKectiveness of licensee safeguards being pursued across a broad front and into I Proposals; and new areas. The results of these early efforts will (3) The capability for assessing the eKeetive- provide a basis for selection nf promising tech.

ness of licansee safeguards as imple- niques for intensive further develcpment. The mented. keynote of this relatively new program is l

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I tion of radioactive materials are adequate: how- underway for tm., with a nuclear core, unticipated to begin in the spring of 1979. {

ever, studies are continuing on certain aspects to I determine whether changes should be maue. in Significant progress also was made in research I

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this regard, the NRC staffis preparing r,n environ-mental statement on transportation d radioactive programs supporting advanced reactor safety, safe.

guards, and the fuel cycle and the environment. l

, N RC efforts in risk assessment were con &b materials through urban areas, and conducting a  ;

joint study with DOT of the adequacy of existing trated on the use ci tecrLmoues develooed in ths '

TiemrSafetL1m(y(also known as the Rasm s.

requirements for shipment oflow-level radioactive -

En Report) and further development of probabilis.

materials.The results of these studies will be useful to the Commission in considering a petition from tic analysis and risk assessment and their applica-tion in thelicensing and other regulatory functions.

• two Congressmen and several consumer-interest A seven. member group of scientists from outside and environmental organizations asking that regu-the NRC was appointed by the Commission in mid-lations on shipments of radioactive materials be

• 1977 to review the Reactor Safety Study and com-amended. ments received on it. The panel conducted several Public concern over increasing shipments of highly enricher' uranium through Chicago's O' Hare public meetings during the year. The report of this independent group, expected in mid 1978, will Airport led to a decision in December 1977 that clarify the achievements and limitations of the Re-such shipments would be moved through other air-actor Safety Study and present recommendations ports until completion of a joint study by the N RC to the Commission on the further development and and the Office of the Mayor of Chicago. An NRC use of risk assessment methodology.

task force was participating in the study at the end I During 1977 the NRC investigated the pros and

' of the year. A New York City ordinance, passed in cons of constructing a facility in the range of one-1975, which virtually bans the transport of signifi-third to one half the actual size of pressurized water cant amounts of radioactive material within the reactor vessels to conduct tests conceming emer-city, continued in litigation. A hearing was held on the matter in November 1977 by DOT, which is gency core coolant bypass and steam water mixing considering the compatibility of the ordinance with phenomena. In December, after considering the Federal regulations.

staffs proposal and comments of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, the Commis-The NRC expects to be able to certify to the g Congress early in 1978,in response to P.L.94 79.

sion decided to defer a request for funding in the fiscal year 1979 budget pending further study and Q) e

/ that it has developed and tested a container for air the consideration of possible alternatives.

transport of plutonium that can withstand virtually At year end the Commission established a re. ,

any type of aircraft accident.

, search review group to implement an amendment

,' l (P.L 95-209)of the Energy Reorganization Act of

1974 which directs NRC to " develop a long term  !

t plan for projects for the development of new or im- l i pr ved systems f r nuclear p wer plants."The l l RESEARCH Congressional intent behind this effort is "the im-l provement of reactor safety and not the enhance-ment of the economic attractiveness of nuclear j power versus alternative energy sources."

The third year of NRC's research program pro-duced substantial results, particularly in the area of ,

light water reactor safety research where the prin-g cipal effort is concentrated' - THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE I Results of the NRC's confirmatory research add to the understanding of the margins of safety which N RC licensing requirements are intended to pro-l

' vide in nuclear power plants. Important advances The relationship between United States foreign were made in the loss-of fluid test (LO FT) pro- policy interests and domestic decisions concerning the future course of civilian nuclear power was re.

gram,in measuring the oxidation of truclear fuel cladding,in computer code development,in fracture defined during 1977 Salient developments rega'rd-mechanics, and in the area of fire protection re- ing the fuci cycle included (1) President Carter's search, Experimental data from LO FT tests are nuclear policy statement in April in which he said that commercial reprocessing and recycling of plu.

,g ' showing good agreement with predictions. The non-nuclear tests in LOFT-N RC's largest experimen. tonium produced in U.S. reactors would be deferred I ji indefinitely,(2) establishment in October of an Vj tal facility-were completed, and preparations ara

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. signed to retain its co...

its under conditions equivalent to the crash and explosion of a high fly- e improving rnodeling capabilities in regard to ing aircraft. Performance test standards for this seismic effects, fire effects, human errors, and package were developed by.NRC and reviewed by common cause failures.

the ACRS Academy and a select ofScience. committee of the National Methodology Applications Other plutonium package research is underway .

to determine the containment required to prevent the escape of powdered plutonium oxide and other The methodology employed in the Reactor powders through fractures m vessels and vessel Safety Study has proven usefulin a number of

' seals. Major test fixtures were designed and dehv.

areas. These are discussed in the following para-cred during 1977 and some initial results have been 8 teable effort is underway to examine reac.

Other major research tasks are directed at pro- ' tors whose safety festiire designs are significantly k viding the hcensmg staff with analytical methods t ~

evaluate the performance of shipping packages. different from those of the two reactors e One task saw an mitial version of a computer pro- engineering in the RSS,in order to extend the applicability insichts gained in the RSS and to ex-

~

1 gram called SCALE completed. The program is plore their effects on predicted risks.This effort '

capable of performing the criticality safety, ther- will aid in the future application of probabilistic mal and radiation shieldmg calculations which are techniques to licensing processes and risk assess-required in the analysis of safety during transport. * * "

gn A second task mvolved measurements ofshock and ouse analyses an. d research to assist other vibration experienced by shielded casks during ac.NRC offices contm.ues as a maj.or effort. Reques.s 3 tual truck transport. y from the ACRS and the various NRC program of- r fices attest to the growmg recognition of the useful ness of probabilistic techniques in regulatory p esses. Examples of such applications are the assessed impacts of seismically induced fires, tur-Risk Assessment Research bine missues, DC battery raiiures. reactor vessei

- overpressuritation incidents and computerized

' reactor protection systems.

Methodology Developrnent The FRANTIC computer code (NUREG,0193),

which estimates reactor system reliability as a func.

In order to improve ths quality of future risk .

istics, was transmitted to the Office o assessments, a sigmficant amount of work is now actor Regulation (NRR) by Research Informatio being done in the area of methodology develop. Letter /18, November 1977 The s code is used by ment.This work includes: NRR to establish improved tecnni"I <necificati(ne k

• ,. ToItbg a'ho allow 3d do'wn' times, n a n M = $ fy m.g Reactor Safety Study The computer code OCTA VfX has been devel-SS methodolory and insights 16The nucig i tdule biWp&bilik ' '

r of pressure vessels, and in particular, to assess the t al,e f hi level was ag log media, fuel processing and the management of potentialimpact se ntegt ty. of overpressure transients o ,

radioactive gases, are designed to provide in. l formation important to safety. One result of Studies h' ave been performed on safety improvI -

ments achievable by alternate containment de.

this work will b: theidentification of areas signs. Work is underway to provide a quantitative

, where resources should be directed to gairi more information. Programs covering the assessment of the risks from accidents equivalent to i

front end of the nuclear fuel cycle and the orless than the design basis accident in severity, management orlow level wastes are in the Work also is underway to examine ways in which planning stage, probabilistic techniques can be used to aid'inspec.

tion and enforcement processes. And work is un.

• Checking and improving the RSS consequence de.rway to provi'de a technical basis for guidance to modelin regard to meteorology, the effect of s ates on emergency plans.

rain, and better predictions on health effects, as well as making sensitivity studies to deter. A program has continued for the training of mine important parameters. NRC personnel in the techniquas abd applications of the Reactor Safety Study methodology. Five

= ry , ,pr- w--:-wy ry+

~ __. ~ _ _ _ . . _ _ _. _ .~ _ . _.

181 6

-two wcek courses have been conducted, and more Risk Assessment Review Group -

are planned. Plans are also being developed to train '

Im h N RC personnel to help develop probabilistic analy-sis capabilities in the work of other offices. Dur.ing the report period, the Commission ap. ,

pointed a Risk Assessment Review Group to review -

the peer comments in the final Reactor Safety There is some opinion that it is necessary to de. Study (RSS) report, to cla rify the achievements 6ne criteria for an acceptable level di risk for nu- and limitations of the study, and to make recom.

clear power plants. The quantitative determination mendations on the further development and use of of acceptable levels of risk on a broad socially ac- risk assessment methodology in the regulatory pro -

ceptable basis for any endeavor is a formidable cess. The group consists of seven distinguished task. Although the Reactor Safety Study made a o scientists under the chairmanship of Professor .

nrst step in quantitative risk assessment, the quan , Harold Lewis of the University of California, tification of benefits and the comparison of risks Santa Barbara.The group has met monthly since and benefits in commensurate terms appear to be August 1977 and expects to report to the Commis-extraordinarily dif5 cult tasks which may require sion by June 1978. It has heard presentations from many years of research. It has been determined the staff of NRC and other Federal agencies, critics that such analyses would be a useful,long term of the RSS, experts in risk assessment from over-program, and such a program is now in the process ~

seas and distinguished scientists in the many disci-of formation. plines involved in the RSS.

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ments will provide assurance that t NRC has considered those activiti s under its enntrol to reduce risks from radiation exposure from nuclear power plants.

Value Imoact Analysis for ATWS

!oi V The staff prepared a value-impact analysis for its proposed requirements for Anticipated Transients without SCRAM (ARWS). The staff determined that

, ATWS had the potential for core-melt accidents with significant offsite releases, and proposed requirements to reduce the probability of such accidents to 10 -6 per reactor year.

Employing methods developed during the Reach Safety Study, the staff estimated the dollar value of the risk that woulcLbe averted by the proposed ATWS requirements and weighed that valve against the costs entailed in meeting the new requirements. This risk analysis tended to 1

I support the reasonableness of the requirements.

ADVANCED NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS l v-In October of 1976, then President Ford stated that the United States and c.

othernations"...shouldincreasetheiruseofnu[learpower...,"butthat

... reprocessing,and recycling of plutonium should not proceed unless...the world community can effectively overcome the associated risks of proliferation of nuclear' weapons capabilities."

Shortly after-taking office, President Cart.er expressed similar views and, on April 7, 1977, issued a statement on Nuclear Power Policy which reconI firmed the share that nuclear energy was to have in the total energy prospects of the country. The President's program would also defer indefinitely the commercial reprocessing and recycling of plutonium produced in nuclear power

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1 ENERGY REPORT g g u

_A.uc_ ear Sa,e~y Repor: l Is No: So 'Fai-Sa ~e' A=er C l 1

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Since 1975, the so-called Rasmussen Report has been used to prove nuclear reactors are safe. But now rnany of the report's conclusions have been questioned. l l

'BY WILLIAM J. LANoUETTE industry official commented recently. Rasmussen Report's basic methodology "All other accidents . .that have was sound, the document and many ofits The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is been examined in this study," declared components were not. Its prose, the in a quandary. the report's widely distributed,12-page Lewis Report complained, is "in.

As the federal agency charged with executive summary, "are much more scrutable," and "the executive summary l regulating the safety of nuclear power likely to occur and can have conse- is a poor description of the contents of the plants. the NRC must soon make a quences comparable to or greater than report, should not be portrayed as such, difficult public admission. It must nuclear accidents." and has lent itself to misuse in the somehow explain that the principal The Rasmussen Report's main con- discussion of reactor risks."

document used to show that reactors are clusions received wide attention from the The Lewis Report also said that the

,m safer than many other hazards is mis- press, which created an impression that Rasmussen Report suffered from: l

/ j leading and technically flawed. scientists had somehow proved that e a data base that was at times "very l

\ / A recent review of that document fo- nuclear plants were safe. "There was a skimpy";

the NRC, sharply questioning its cor great hue and cry from the (nuclear]

• an " arbitrariness" that in some in-clusions, could become the vehicle 'or industry side, that, by George, there has stances " boggles the mind";

renewed national attention to reactor now been verification that things were ea peer review process that was safety in the next Congress, okay. ," NRC chairman Joseph Hen- hampered by shortcuts and "often defen-The document in question, known as drie said at a commission meeting last sive" responses from the NRC staff; the Reactor safety study, was begun in month. "1 think you can certainly say that *a few techniques for determining 1972 by the NRC's predecessor, the was an excessive use of the report." probabilities that were deemed "un-Atomic Energy Commission, and Added NRC commissioner Victor necessary and plain wrong."

directed by Norman C. Rasmussen, a Gilinsky: "It became a propaganda Most disturbing to Lewis's group, professor at the Massachusetts institute tool . . . it got misused." however, was the fact that after more of Technology. It attempted to quantify Hendrie, Gilinsky and the three other than a year's review of the Rasmussen

. the risks and hazards of nuclear powerso commissioners, in discussing the Report, they still could not say whether that Congress could have a frame of Rasmussen Report and the year long the report's estimate of the probability of reference when considering whether or review of that report just completed at a serious nuclear plant accident was not to extend the Price Anderson Act, a their request, were wondering aloud how correct "I doubt that we could do so even federal insurance and indemnity program it had been used and misused. They have if we were given three years and the for nuclear plants first passed in 1957. already held three public meetings on the megabucks that were involved," Lewis A staff of more than 60 completed the new Risk Assessment Review Group told the commission. "What we are 53 million in house study in two years, Report and plan more in December. The certain of is the error bounds shown in releasing a draft in August 1974 and a review was conducted by a seven-man (the Rasmussen Report) for this risk final report in October 1975, panel headed by Harold W. Lewis, a estimate are too small."

The most memorable calculation to physicist at the University of California Lewis added, "Anyone who tries to emerge from the 2,300-page "Rasmussen (Santa Barbara). Ark with the thing and learned how any Report" showed that the odds of dying "The problem is that a methodology of sven calculation was really done comes from a nuclear power plant accident are this kind, which tries to look through away drinking heavily."

about as great as being struck by a accident sequences for complex systems The Lewis group also warned that the meteorite-about one in a billion. This like a nuclear power plant, must deal with Rasmussen Report should not be used in p calculation, and others, were heralded by zillions of accident sequences," Lewis setting government nuclear policy, a some commission officials, nuclear in- told the NRC commissioners in present- finding that sent the NRC staff scram-i j V dustry spokesmen, electric utility ex- ing his group's report."1 don't know what bling to find out how often it had been ecutives and publicists, pro-nuclear zillions are, but they are certainly larger used Not very often, a preliminary j Members of Congress and nuclear than billions. And, it is just physically survey revealed, because the NRC str.ff proponents in several state referenda. "It impossible to do that." itself found many of the Rasmussen was useful when we needed it," a nuclear Lewis's group concluded that while the Report's data and calculations outdated 1860 NATION AL JOURNAt M,18!78

or unreliable, according to Lee Gossick, Lewis group's comments are taken into their statement on nuclear safety by the the commission's executive director for account." end of the year.The Union of Concerned ope ations. Said A. Dave Rossin of the Com- Scientists, a public policy study group rnonwealth Edison Co., a Chicago-based critical of nuclear power, has sent the USING THE REPORT utility with seven reactors: "I don't see NRC a draft statement it wants the

,The Rasmussen Report has been used changes coming from industry. I think commission to issue. Predictably, the

_to set pohey on a iew ocLasions, nowever. some critics (of nuclear power] may try1o proposal is tough on the nuclear industry, f' For example. it su pportea an en. capitalize on it. . , We have handed out it calls for possible suspension of reactor j

hronmental impact statement minimiz- lots of copies of the Rasmussen Report's construction permits and operating ing mc potential hazaros at tne Ulablo executive summary to people who asked licenses, among other measures.

l.anvon nuclear plant m Catuornia.;m -- us about nuclear plant safety. If they Two other draft statements were stati members used probatus__nealth come back, I'd be pleased to give them the prepared by the N RC staff, but both were effects from the Rasmussen Report, aR Lewis Report-but not copies of the denounced by commissioner Richard (iiecuic ugures from the report were newspaper coverage of the Lewis Report, Kennedy as being "so much mumbo.

quoted m speeches by former commission because they were mostly based on jumbo" and " guff.""We have te describe chairmen utxy t_cr Ray, wimarfi X. Lewis's summary, which is more negative [ reactor safety) in terms 220 million Anders and Marcus A. Rowden. NIT than the body of the report?' people can understand," Kennedy said at researchers also used snme nf the recon's David Comey, a critic of nucicar power a commission meeting,"and we don't do t calculations in at least 37 studies of at Citizens for a Better Environment in that very often."

potenttat reactnr safety problems. Chicago, said the Lewis Report is "a The commission faces yet another task

~ "Some of the numbers are being used, healthy start on the outside review resulting from the Lewis Report: prepar-explicitly and implicitly," Stephen process that should be pursued in many ing a response to Rep. Morris K. Udall, Hanauer, an N RC technical adviser, told other nuclear arcas. l'm also concerned D-Ariz., the chairman of the House the commission this interior and Insular month. -

wj , Affairs Committee.

There are several gs -g it was Udall who levels to this, said nm v asked for the sort of gi study that Lewis's Gilinsky in an inter- @ M,7 Ng -N'y i view. "On technical level, we'd a N0r@GDW T

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• s group A(ter conduCled.

holding like to know where ' ,

-N (. D,h'#, # hearings in June 8

. ,& 1976, Udall conclud-p (the Rasmussen '/ \ g

• Report) was used in JIMD2 , "yk ed that "the Reactor

( the regulatory

^ Safety Study was x --

re- n , presented in a process. It may have -

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been used, and we r

g/ manner which created a misleading certainly want to make corrections ,,

l', ,,. impression of the where they are g# certainty and com-

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necessary.

< prehensiveness of its I "A more impor- i ,'- conclusions." l tant task, however, ,

Lewis war even is to right the h i more critical when l balance on that he told the NRC report's use in the A commissioners: "On ,

the specific issue of larger debate about nuclear energy. The whether I can learn i' report was used as part of the effort to sell about how the Rasmussen Report has anythmg from [rne Rasmussen Report) nuclear energy and was certainly used been used. It has been used in everv that will enab'e me to say whether uncritically. So the commission has got to [ nuclear planti construction _ permit hear- reactors are 'tably safe or not, I try to correct its own former statements mg where the N RC staff took the position can't. I didi it from [the report]."

and issue a new statement about what it That unresolved safety nroblems need not Thus. ely unnoticed in the thinks can and cannot reasonably be be resolved pnor to plant operation nuclear ar, the Lewis Report concluded about nuclear safety on the because the probability of those problems could

• mie in future debates, basis of the original report." iniuaung an accident a too sman to oc Ye e report's conclusions Not much has been made of the Lewis signaicant.~ may ha, round effects abroad.

Report-by either boosters or critics of "Thev're dning it right - nn the nine- 7h, wo # recently reported nuclear power-in the weeks since its cracking problem with General WeM" that the e, wit' of the Kurchatov release, but over time it could focus reactors, saymg the probability o_f_ pipe Institute o; mic Energy, aned about renewed attention on questions of reactor rupture is so low that they can continue to the Soviet s 3 ion's optimistic view of safety. "I have not observed a reaction let the plants operate without replacin( nisclear power, "said Russian scientists one way or the other,said an official of the stamiess steel pipmg that one of their the Atomic Industrial Forum Inc., the o'wn reports saio should be replaced." study, headed ~ were by D buoyed r. Norman by the trade association for the nuclear industry. Rasmussen, that said the chance of a "We have a brochure on reactor safety. PREPARING A RESPONSE person's being killed in a major nuclear but we haven't reviewed it to see what it The N RC staff plans to determine how power plant accident are about the says. The next time it comes up for it used the Rasmussen Report by Dec.1, same as the chance of being hit by revision, though, we'll make sure the and the commissioners hope to complete a meteor." O N ATION AL JOU RN AL.11/18 s 788 1861

- _ _ . _