ML20148D664

Forwards NRR Mgt & Operations Policies for Implementation. Familiarity of Staff W/Policies Should Be Ensured So That Policies Implemented Consistently & Effectively.Alertness for Potential Improvements & New Policies Also Requested

ML20148D664
Person / Time
Issue date:	08/12/1987
From:	Murley T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Crutchfield D, Rossi C, Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20148D501	List: ML20148D498 ML20148D664 ML20148D674
References
FOIA-88-105 NUDOCS 8803240141
Download: ML20148D664 (52)

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, a-gq ta mk o[ fb K-1, MEMORANDUM FOR: Steven A. Varga, Director O Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director AM Division of Reactor Projects - III IV, Y and Special Projects Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational Evs M 7,ssessment Laurence Shao, Director Division of Engineering and Systems Technology James G. Partlow, Director Division of Reactor Inspection and Safeguards Frank J. Congel, Director Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness Jack W. Roe, Director Division of Licensee Performance and Quality Evaluation FROM: Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nucle:e Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

NRR MNAGEMENT ANC OPERATIONS POLICIE!

Enclosed for your implementation are NRR Management and Operations Policies. ,

These policies represent NRR's management and operations goals, approaches anc protadures for selected areas. You should ensure that your staff is familiar with the co_licies so that they are implementec consistently and effactively.'

.. _ _~ _ . . . .A As we gain experience, the policies ill be_ updated.as the effectiveness and efficiency of our managementoperations. and_necessary to improve Also, new policies for additional areas, including the ones recomended in your connents,  ;

will be considered and issued as appropriate. Tnerefore, as you implement the l i

CON?ACT:

J. Funches, PTSB 49-28037 -

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N R Division Directors 2 policies, you shoalo be alert for potential improvements and the need for new policies. Any suggestions for improvements or new policies should be provided to your supervisor or Jesse Funches for Executive Team consideration.

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Thomas E. Murley, ctor Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

cc: J. Sniezek R. Starostecki

f. Miraglia NRR Assistart Directors NRR Project Directors NPR Branch Chiefs l

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NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS POLICIES 4 -4 e

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s a Contents

1. INTERNAL MANAGEMENT /0PERATIONS 1.1 Concept of NRR Operations 1.2 Project Manager Role 1.3 Inspection. Licensing and Research Integration 1.4 Events Review and Coordination -

1.5 Emergency Situations Response 1.6 Regional Performance Reviews 1.7 NRR Office Procedures 1.8 Management Briefings 1.9 Management and Program Information Systems 1.10 Recruitment and Professional Development

2. SAFETY AND REGULATORY POLICIES 2.1 Policy Issues

3. LICENSING REVIEWS AND INSPECTIONS 3.1 Near-Term Operating License (NT0L) 3.2 FRA-Based Inspections and Licensing 3.3 Team Inspections

4. EXTERNAL INTERFACES 4.1 Vendors and Owners Groups Interface 4.2 FEMA Interface 4.3 Regional Interface 4.4 AE0D Interface 4.5 RES Interface 4.6 OE Interface 4.7 NMSS Interface i

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SECTION 1 INTERNAL MANAGFMENT/0PERATIONS

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$ 1.1 Concet of NRP Operations The new NRR organization is set up as a matrix organization. That is, there are Project Divisions and Technical Divisions. In order for NRR to function effectively, it is critically important that there be good teamwork and good comunications throughout the organization.

The Director of NRR, the Deputy Director, the Associate Directors, and the Director, Program Management, Policy Development and Analysis Staff will function as an Executive Team for the Office. The Executive Team will be responsible for establishing policies, and providing overall guidance for the resolution of major issues. They will be iri daily contact and will have a comon position er issues facing NRR. As a general rule, any one of the Executive Team can speak for NRR. This will ensure that issues from the staff can get raisec, can get the imeciate attention of a member of the Executive Team, and can be resolved in an expeditious manner. It is expected that a significant portion of the Director's and Deputy Director's activities will be outside NRR, dealing with the EDO, the Comissioners, Congress, licensees arc' industry groups. Therefore, the Associate and Staff Directors will be the main focal points for hearing and resolving issues within hRR. They will also be the primary conduit for downward comunications to the NRR staff.

The Division Directers are responsible for the day-to-day management of the activities ano staff in their divisions. They will be held accountable for the quality and timeliness of their division's work. The Directors of the Technical Divisions will have to develop good working relations with their ,

counterparts in the Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AE0D) and the Office of huclear Regulatory Research (RES) to ensure NRR stays abreast of activities in those organizations. The Directors of the get Divisions will be a primary focal point for NRR comunications with senior licensee management. They must ensure those comunications are handled professionally and promptly.

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c The Project Managers will be expected to be cognizant of all significant issues and activities at their plant, including both licensing and inspection activities. They are responsible for coordinating NRR actions on their plant ano for keeping their management informed of potential or actual problems.'

Where there are internal difficulties in NRR that cannot be resolved swiftly,

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the Project Managers should imediately elevate the issue to their manage-

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ment, in short, Project Managers are responsible for the NRR interface with their plant and they will be held accountable for the effective functioning of that relationship.

The technical staff experts have been placed in Technical Divisions in order to maintain the vitality and currency of NRR's technical expertise. They are responsible for the quality and timeliness of material they produce for NRR regulatory decisions. It is essential that the technical staff work as a team with the project management staff and h responsive to their requests for

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technical ' assessments.

The Program Managerent, Policy Development and Analysis Staff (PMAS) has six broac functions, each of which is critical to the successful operation of NP.P.

First, there is the traditional function of providing acministrative services for the Office. Spcial emphasis here will be placed en developing useful management information systens. A second role for FMAS is central management of Comiterical Contracts and interagency agreements with the DOE hational Labor-atories. Overall project management is perfomed by PMAS, while the program divisions provide day-to-day technical oversight and supervisien. A third major function is the identification, tracking and development of NRR positions on major policy issues in NRC. Staff members will be assigned policy issues and will be expected to follow them much like a project manager. A fourth major function is to provide technical assistance '.o members of the NRR Executive Team. A.fifth function is the integration of research and licensing activities, which is particularly important now'that the generic safety issue resolution function is in RES. The sixth major function for this staff is the integration of licensing and inspection activities in NRR. This work must be perfonted in conjunction with the Project anc Technical Divisions. Its success will be critical to the overall effectiveness of NRR.

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6 s 1.2 Project Manager Role Y The rcle of the Project Manager (PM) whether assigned to a licensing review or _to an operating reactor has evolved over the years. The Project Manager's Handbook, published in May 1985, describes that role. The discussions in the Handbook about the PM's overall role, qualifications and responsibilities (with some minor updating) are generally applicable to the PM's role in the new organization.- The detaileo discussions in the Handbook, which cover the many aspects of the PM's role, are thorough and well-conceived and is not repeated here. Each PM has been provided with a copy of the Handbook which also is useo as a text for newly assigned PM's.

However, to a large extent, the Handbook emphasizes the role of the PM in the review of license applications, a greatly reduced activity, and in the processing of amenoments to operating reactors. Significant additions to the role as depicted in the Handbook will be requirec. The role of the PM under the new organization is considerably expanded to include cognizance of the status of NRR program implerentation in the Regions to ensure that appropriate regulatory attention is devoted to each licensed facility.

Although in the past the PM has been more or less aware of inspection and enforcement activities, the PM's review of and involvement in these activities has been minimal. The PM_is now expected to be familiar with all NRC/ licensee correspondence related to the assigned projec_t. This includes inspection reports, safety evaluation reports, generic letters, bulletins, information no_tices, t enforcement corresponcence and licensee submittals. The PM will identify necessary corrective action regarding any NRC action, inaction, or correspondence that is not consistent with licensing and inspection guidance -

and will ensure that corrective action is taken by the regional offices or .

! approprihte NRR staff. Such corrective action will t(initiated after consultation with the technical organization or policy development staff, as l appropriate. The Office of the Executive Director for Operations will be promptly informed of significant matters.

In carrying out this active and participatory role, the PM is expected to have

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fnquent comunications with regional counterparts regarding regional and headquarters activities associated with the assigned project. The PM should 1.2-1 August 12, 1987

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attend all_ regional and headquarters meetings for the assigned project and ensure that appropriate NRR staff are infortned of such ineetings. The PM' should also inform the appropriate regional personnel of all headquartd's meetings to be held with licensees.

As can be seen, thelajor change in the PM role is the ccJnizance by the PM of all regional and headquarters activities concerning the assigned project.

Just as7he PM has established working relationships with headquarters technical review managers and staf f, eoually clge relationships must be established with the managers and staff that will implement inspection activities assigned to NRR headquarters and the Regions, it is expected that the PM will have frequent f ace-to-face discussions with the new headquarters oLqanizations integrated under NRR as well as_wititheir regional counterparts (particularly with the resident inspectors). The PM will make frequent visits to both the Regions and to thE site of the assigned project. (For further discussion of the PM interaction with the Regions, see Policy 4.3, "Regional Interface.")

Ot primary importance is the Establishrrent of direct lines of comunicai. ion with the Regions, the resident inspectors, and the licensee site management in order for the Project Manager to be fully inforrred of all significant inspection ano .sperational activities regarding the assigned project.

A passive role on the part of the PM simply will not do. If information is not being directed to the PM, the PM must go directly to the source and ensure that he/she is inforned of all activities concerning the assigned project. The PM can no longer separate What was IE and Regional activities from his/her awareness and evaluation of such activities if his/her project is involved.

Just as a PM is involved today-in the preparation, status and content of safety evaluations on a license amendment application, so must'the PM be involved in the status and content of regional activities and operational events.

It is obvious that the demand on the PM in the new organization has significantly increased. The added workload in terms of regional activities, travel, pre-paration of safety evaluations and integration of all headquarters licensing and inspection functions may well require some restructuring of the project manage-ment _alignrnent as we gain more experience in the new NRR organization.

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1.3 Inspection, Licensing and Research Integration The licensing and inspection guidance (e.g., SRP, Inspection Manual) shall be maintained and modified, with new guidance developed as necessary, so that the programs ernphasize those aspects of power plant design, construction and opera-tion most important to safety. The licensing and inspection guidanca shall optimize the best attributes of the licensing and inspection techniques and shall eliminate unnecessary duplication of effort in functional areas (e.g.,

health physics, quality assurance, maintenance). Such guidance shall reflect the current findings from the licensing, inspection, research and operational analyses programs. The licensing and inspt.ction programs shall be designed to be accomplished with the resources assigned for conduct of the programs.

The Inspection, Licensing and Research Integration Branch (ILRB) shall receive  ;

input from the projects and technical staffs and t.he Regions regarding areas ir, which new or revised guidance is required. ILRB is respcnsible for promptly developing or coordinating the development of guidance that is requested by these organi:ations. All new and revised inspection guidance shall be provided to the regions, and the projects and technical staffs for connent. The Director, Program Management, Policy Development and Analysis Staf t (PhAS) has approval and issuance authority for licensing and inspection guidanco, after receiving concurrence frota the pro]ects and technical organizations.

ILRB shall establish controls to ensure that only approved versions of the SRP and Inspection Manual are used for the licensing and inspection programs, both in the_ Regions and NRR. The projects and technical organi?ations are responsible for presenting new and revised licensing guidance to the CRGR for review as required by the CRGR Charter.

ILRB shall supoort the projects and,,

technical organizations in such presentations.

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e ILRB shall provide for NRR continuity with the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES); shall remain cognizant of the status of all RES activities (e.g.,

research, rules, codes and standard development, and generic safety issue resolu-tions) that may impact NRR licensing or inspection programs; and shall be the point of contact with RES regarding NRR feedback for RES activities. ILRB shall ensure that the appropriate projects and technical staffs are informed of all RES activities that may affect their functional areas and shall identify the need for these staffs to interact with RES regarding such activities, when appropriate. The Director, PMAS, has the authority to concur in, comment on and request initiation of RES projects on behalf of NRR, after coordinaticn with the projects and technical organizations.

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1.4 Events Review and Coordination l l

The Division of Operational Events Assessment (DOEA), specifically the Events Assessment Branch (EAB), is responsible for coordination with AE00 and follow-up of all 50.72 reports. Significant reports will be promptly directed by phone '

to the Emergency Officer in accordance with the NRC Operations Center Procedures. _._

Events at the alert level or higher will be immediately brought to the attention of the NRR senior managers (Division Directort, and above). All 50.72 reports and informatien provided by the regions in daily event reports will be reviewed by EAB each working day. Events requiring prompt follow-up via telephone call with the licensee will be the responsibility of EAB, but will be perforred with the involvement of the appropriate Pr ' ject Manager and recional manager e/etaft EAR ray request that technical branches perform initial screening if their unique expertise is required.

EAB will chair a weekly division interface meeting with all NRR divisions to review status of daily events follow-up. Assignments of responsibility for longer term follow-up will be rade at these meetings. Accountability for a specific issue for longer tem follow-up will rest with either the project or technica1 branch, as assigned. A tracking system will be developed to assure appropriate feedback and assignments are completed. Weekly briefings of NRR senior r.anagers will be held, in addition to the interface meeting, to highlight status of events and review assignrents.

Infonnal comun1 cations among the Regions, Project Managers and NRR staff are encouraged.. ,,, ln

_ ,__th ose instances where events may be brought to _the_ attention of NRR staff through these_ infonnal channels, the Chief, EAB, should be_promptly informed of the event so that a coordinated NRR follow-up is achieved.

The daily event reports from the Regions will continue to be required and will be screened by EAB. Revisions and updating of instructions dealing with these and Preliminary Notifications (PN's) ray be necessary. Copies of the regional reports, 50.72 computer print-out, and PN's will be made available (prior to 8:15 a.m.) to each NRR SES-level manager. The Director, DOEA, or his dcsignee will hold a morning conference call at 8:15 a.m. with appropriate NRR Division Directors and Branch Chiefs to overview and screen items of interest since the 1.4-1 August 12, 1987

. last working day. EAB personnel will follow individual events. Within NRR.' PN's w&be provided promptly to both the PM and EAB. Significant issues need to be elevatea within the organization promptly.

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- 1.5 Emergency Situations Response An emergency situation is any event or circumstance which causes (1) the agency to activate its response plan at the STANDBY mode or above, or (2) the Operatiors Center to be placed in the augmented staffing mode in order to more closely monitor and understand the licensee's response to a situation. The AE00 Opera-tions Officers are the agency focal point for receipt of licensee telephonic notification of events. Upon receipt of such calls, the Operations Officers follow the agency's internal notification procedures. The point of contact for NRR notification during normal working hours is the Director, Division of Opera-tionel Events Assessment (DOEA) (or designated backups). During other then normal working hours the point of contact for NRR rotification is the NRR Emergency Officer. ,

Upon receipt of a notification of an event, the Director, 00EA, or NRR Emergency Officer shall, in accordance with the acercy's response procedures, determine whether the agency should be placed in the STANDBY mode or above. Prior to doing 50. an NRR Executive Team member should normally be consulted. If possible, this should be the Director, NRR, but the agency response shuuld not be celayed because of an inability to centact the Director NRP.

For any reactor event that is judged to warrant augmented staffing of the Operations Center, but not activation of the agency's response plan, all agency actions shall be directed and coordinated by the Director, DOEA, or designee, and shall be conducted in coordination with the AE00 staff. All NRR staff are expected to provide whatever.. support is necessary in responding to such a.

situation. Likewise, any HRC staff member may be ca.lled upon to provide the necessary expertise. Also, when augmented staffing of the Operations Center is warranted, the following NRR pctsonnel shall be informed by the Director, DOEA, during normal working hour, and by the NRR Emergency Officer during non-working hours:

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- 1. Director, DOEA, who will coordinate NRR responses;

2. Associate Director for Inspection and Technical Assessment, who will notify the Director and Deputy Director, NRR. The Director, NRR, will notify the ED0; and,

3. Associate _Di nctor for Projects, who will notify Projects personnel, i NRR internal notifications in the event of agency response plan activation will be consistent with the agency response plan, 0

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- 1.6 Regional Performance Reviews With respect to the construction and operation of reactors (including research reactors), hRR is responsible for providing the Regions with the necessary guidance for inspection and licensing activities, as assigned. This guidance must include the technical nature and scope of licensing and inspections as well as the attendant implementation policy. In this regard, the Regions are agents of NRR and as such. NRR must clearly define at the beginning of each fiscal year the goals, objectives and expected accomplishments. Therefore, Regional Opercting Plans must reflect NRR goals and objectives ano other guidance, as well as expected performance indicators. Potential indicators include: FTE utilization, timeliness of work products, volume of work products, etc. These performance indicators are only symptoms, and the role of the program review is to under-stand how effectively and efficiently the Regions are carrying out the guidance.

The purpose of the hRR prograr review is to evaluate the adequacy of the guidar.ce provided to the Regions, the adequacy of implementation, and the effectiveness of both, in this regard, NRR's ability to assure consistent interpretation and uniform treatment of the NRR guidance requires a varie'ty of approaches in carrying out program reviews since regional cuccess or failure in carrying out effective licensing and inspection programs cannot be measurec solely by a statistical analysis.

The Regions are assigned responsibility for a variety of activities. Some of them can be subdivided into specific technical functions. Consequently, the general approach.is to review the following broad activities:

inspection program resident inspector program operator licensing program regionalized licensing programs 1.6-1 August 12, 1987

. However, within each activity there are specific technical functions that need to be examined. Such observations will focus on adequacy of technical guidance and success of implementation. The Regions' performance is a reflection of the NRR involvement in assuring guidance is properly prepared, disseminated, and implemented. Therefore, reviews by technical branches will be carried out in the following areas-emergency planning operator licensing security / safeguards engineering cally event reporting >

response to operating events SALF assurance of quality radiation protection generic correspondence follow-up and tracking Reviews by the hRR technical branches in these areas are referred ta herein as "technical program reviews." These technical program reviews will te scheduled in coordination w'th the Inspection, Licensing and Research Integration Branch such that each R.gion should have a Regional or on-site audit team sisit quarterly. These reviews should not impose an undue burden on the Ragion and l shculd be scheduled such that they are compatible with regional work in the I area being reviewed. The review teans should generally be composed of a l Section Leader and two staff members; the review will be an "in-process" evaluation with some overview of documentation where such guidance hat l been_

issued, e.g., examiner standards. The results of such reviews will be shared with the responsible Regional Division Director at an exit meeting and a follow-up raiew report issued by the responsible Branch Chief. In surnr.ary, each Region should have four working-level technical program reviews ar.1ually, although each Region will most likely have different technical areas a(dressed.

These reviews are to be constructive with a focus on what is working at d what is not.

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$RR team inspections will be conducted _throughout the course of the year and will include regional partichMhn. The focus of these inspections will be on

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. licensees and their performance; notevithstanding, during the conduct of such inspections, observations of regional effectiveness will be noted. (for further discussion of team inspections, see Policy 3.3, "Team Inspections.")

Such observations will be documented by the Director, Division of Reactor Inspection and Safeguards (DRIS), and discussed with the respective Project Division Director. The responsi'le c Project Assistant Director and Project Manager are expected to participate in this effort, The documented insights developed during these inspections will be shared with the regional managers.

Each Region will be visited at least once a year by an NRR management team which will be led by the Deputy Office Director or an Associate Director. This team will be provided the results of technical program reviews and team inspections, and an agenda will be developed based upon the results of the reviews and input from the Regional Administrator. If there are significant obsr.rvations and insights available as a result of routine interactions with tne Region, these should be provioed during the formulation of the agenda (e.g., the Events Assessment Branch may have perceived significant strengths or weaknesses as a result of working with the Region). The management team evaluations will attempt to identify specific issues for improvement both in the Region and hRE.

The management team visit will include interviews at the Region as well as on-site with resident inspectors. The integrated overview and assessment of results will be provided to the Regional Administrator and to the Deputy Executive Director for Regional Operations. It is expected that representatives from the EDO staff will participate in these management team visits.

In sumary, the evaluation process is intendedko p ov5de frequent o;casions throughout the course of the year to assess the adequacy of guidance to the regions and their implementation. The focus should be on operational safety and the effectiveness of the Regions' programs to identify deteriorating or weak licensee perfomance. Feedback from the Regions is essential in assuring a proper distribution of agency resources to carry out assigned programs.

Successful programs and initiatives should be identified so that they can be shared among all Regions and NRR. _,

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The review / evaluation process is to be constructive in its comments. If better guidance is needed, IIRR is obligated to provide it. Weaknesses found in the Regions need to be identified and corrected. Performance indicators will be used as a supplementary tool to monitor performance on a more frequent basis.

Hovtever, the use of performance indicators such as FTE utilization, timeliness of inspection reports, etc., is not intended to be an end product or a substitute for performance. Anomalies may result in accelerating the type and nature of technical program reviews er management team visits. Consequently, the process is intended to deal with any problem (s) causing poor indicators or symptoms and not just highlight the symptoms. ~.

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1.7 NRR Office Procedures Adequate consnunication of philosophy, policy and expectations of performance is one of several necessary steps in ensuring that an organization functions in a consistent ano competent manner. It is therefore important that NRR have written p*ocecures to guide implementa*. ion of its mission. Likewise, it is >

important that all levels of the NRR staff have input into the procedure development process and that steps are taken te foster an understanding of the hRR Office Procedures by the staff.

NRR Office Procedures will be used to provide guidance to the staff iri areas that transcend the projects, technical or policy development organizations. Examples of such areas are: Visits to Reactor Sites, Standard Review Plan Responsib',11 ties, Handling Part 21 Notificatior.s and Staff Training. Procedures necessary for guiding the functions of individual organizations will be the responsibility of that orgdnization. For example, the Project Manager's Handbook would be the responsibility of the projects organization.

The following guidelines govern the development and issuance of hRR Office Procedures:

1. The policy development organization (Policy Development and Technical Support Branch (PTSB)) is responsible for maintaining the overall systera for NRR Office Procedure development, issuance and training.

2. A codified set of NRR Office Procedures shall be maintained by each .

organizational entity in NRR above the section level.

3. NRR Office Procedures will be written by the assigned NRR organization, will normally be coordinated with the policy development, projects and technical organizations and will be approved by the Director, NRR.

4. Revisions to NRR Office Procedures are to be by complete procedure replacement. Pen-and-ink and replacement pages are not allowed.

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5. A system for indicating revicions tithe procedures will be used.

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, 6. Supervisors will noru lly .eview the content of a new or revised NRR I Office Procedure with tt.cir affected NRR staff within 2 weeks of issuance. l When deered appropriate, fonnal training sessions will be conducted by '

PTSB.

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t 1.8 Management Briefings An essential ingredient in successfully managing NRR is having effective internal communications, both upward and downward. The senior managers of NRR must know what is going on at the staff level, what the problems are, and what issues are developing that could turn into problems. Similarly, the staff must know what the senior managers are doing in order that they understand NRR policies and the reasoning behind the policies. One method to foster good consnunications is to have regularly scheduled management meetings and briefings. The initial plans for these briefing are shown below. Of course, the naturo and conduct of these and potential new briefings will evolve over time.

Dy Meeting Subject Attendees Duration Monday Preview of Week's Schedule Exec. Team 30 min.

Tuesday Operating Ever.ts Exec. Teart, 60 min.

Div. Dir., AEOD, RES, EDO Wednesday Internal NRR katters Exec. Team 30 min.

Thursday Plant Review by PMs Exec. Team 75 min.

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PM, Regions EDO, AEOD, RES Friday Internal NRR Matters, Exec. Team 30 min.

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1.9 Manacement and Program Information S.ystems In order for NRR managers to do their jobs effectively, there needs to be an effective approach to management information reporting. This is simply a set of tirely reports to NRR managers on the status of their work activities, trends and projections and status of activities outside NRR that impact NRR Programs.

Most, if not all of this information should be obtained from various NRR and agency-wide systems with data / chart: tailored for upper management review through PC applications.

With few exceptions, management and program information reports will be updated on a monthly basis and will address seven major information categories which are:

Program Perfomance: Information to assess the perfomance of NRR programs, both in Headquarters and the Regions, against operating plans.

Licensee / Plant Status: Infomation pertaining to characteristics, performance, events, and operating status of plants and licensees.

Key Issues: Primary focus is on items identified in the EDO Priority Issues Report.

Action Items: Infomation to assess the status of action itens and on-time performance.

Resource Utilization: Information to assess the utilization of NRR Headquarters and regional resources against budget / plan to include FTE, technical assistance funds and travel funds utilization Personnel: Infomation depicting the status of NRR Personnel to include on-board status in headquarters and regions, recruiting, personnel actions and awards.

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. Interface with Others: Information to identify the status of selected activities 1 i

or deliverables from other of fices or organizations having impact on NRR programs.

Since information needs vary throughout the NRR management structure, management and program information reports will be tailored to three review levels. Level I reports will focus on the needs of the Executive Team. Level !! and Level !!!

reports will provide management information for Division / Assistant Directors and Branch Chiefs / Project Directors, respectively, i

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1.10 Recruitment and Professional Development Recruitment It is recognized that line managers are responsible for interviewing and  ;

selecting professional staff to satisfy their needs in accordance with the approved staffing plan. However, to make the process more efficient and to elevate the importance of attracting good candidates, certain steps need to be taken in consultation with the Office of Personnel (0P) to streamline the following:  ;

routine screening of 171s referrals college recruiting These steps are intentionally highlighted in order to identify opportunities for prompt response by managers to hiring opportunities.

l OP receives unsolicited 171s from numerous sources. To ensure prompt iderti-fication and interview of selected professionals from these sources, a limited number of NRR staff (about three) at the GG-15 level, representing projects, technical and policy needs, will be designated to work with OP to periodically screen 171s and participate in job fairs. The initial screening and partici-pation in job fairs shoulo result in identifying good candidates whose 171s would subsequently be reviewed by the responsible line manager who has the vacancy.

. Referrals should also be encouraged. The designated individuals noted above-will be the points of contact to talk to the referred applicant and to assist in furthering the applicant's understanding of the NRR organization and the administrative needs that must be met to be considered for t.mployment.

College recruitment will be primarily oriented toward "grow-your-own" candidates.

Therefore, the entry-level training program will not be oriented solely to the needs of any particular division or branch within NRR. OP will organize and coordinate college recruitment.

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One NRR SES-level manager will be Gsignated as the NRR fotal point for college recruitment and that person will become knowledgeable of the NRR training / development program.

Professional Development Professional development for technical staff consists of two parts: entry level /new hire training and career enhancement training. In addition, rota-tional assignments will be an integral part of career development and profes-sional enhancement.

Entry-level and Other New Hire Training - Recent college graduates will be hired and undergo a sufficiently broad multifaceted training program to enable them to qualify for work in any NRR unit with subsequent opportunity to transfer to a region. As such, the training program must be broad and prepare the indivioual for virtually every aspect of job performnce, including inspection. The training program will have universal application within NRR and will allow deviations based on the applicant's skills and NRR needs. The underpinning of the program is e management comitment to make it work and the use of a senior staffer to interface with the individual on at least a weekly basis irrespective of where the training occurs. The training will essentially consist of formal courses, reading assign-ments, on the job training assignments, trips and rotational assignments.

Professional Enhancement Training - A generic training plen,will be developed for specific categories of staff, i.e., project managers, technical reviewers, entry level, and inspectors. For each category, a list of formal and infonnal training experience which would typically qualify the individual will be developed. Lead responsibility for developing the generic training plan will be assigned to the division (s) having the functional area for each category of staff. Responsibiltty for developing generic categories for some types of positions will be shared by divisions. Follow through and completion of such a genaric training plan will require a strong comitment by both the employees and their supervisors to provide adequate time to attend. Detailed training records and a tracking system to show who took what courses will be developed so that training needs and schedules as well as refresher training needs can be readily identified.

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Rotational Assignments - To further professional advancement, formal course work can only develop 'nowledge of a discipline, it is just as important, and may be more so, to develop an awareness of how that knowledge is used within the organization. As such, it is NRR policy to encourage rotational assignments outside a staff member's organizational unit. In particular, assignnents to a regicnal office on an exchange basis for periods of a month or more are encouraged. To foster a consistent approach, the Associate Director for Inspection and Technical Assessment will coordinate all such assignments with the Regions. A formal program of expectation, lessors learned and feedback will be instituted. Each SES manager will be tasked to identify potential candidates for such a program and to see it through completion for each one. For SES-level managers within NRR, rotational assignaents will be accommodated to foster manager.ent development.

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SECTION 2 SAFETY AND REGULATORY POLICIES

2.1 Policy Issues NRR will mininnize the need to develop policy in reaction to specific events.

Therefore, NRR will identify issues for which an NRR position is likely to be needed in the future. For such issues, evaluations / analyses will be perfonned and an NRR policy position decided. The Policy Development and Technical Support Branch, Program Management, Policy Development and Analysis Staff, will have lead responsibility for such issues and .iill either evaluate the issue or act as a "project manager" to ensure that the issue is evalueted.

The following are potential policy issues which NRR will have to be prepared to address ir. the interface with other offices.

1. Severe Accident Policy o Degree of incorporation into regulatory decision making o Trade off between prevention, mitigation, and emergency preparedness o Scope and conduct of Indivijual Plant Examinations o Use of Individual Plant Examination results

2. Safety Goal Implementation o Use in regulatory decision making o Generic issues o Plant-specific issues o Impact on licensing / inspection program

3. Source Term o Incorporation into regulatory decision making o Impact on license review effort o Impact on inspection program

4. Containment Improvements o Need for containment performance design objective o Mark I o large Dry o Ice Condenser I o Other BWR 2.1-1 August 12, 1987 L

. 5. Standard Plant Designs o Scope of standardization o Review priorities o Desirable attributes o The NRC customer

6. Advanced Reactor Design o What constitutes good, design o DOE relationship o Concept review vs. licensing review

7. Unresolved Safety Issues o Acceptance of generic resolution o Prioritization o Integrated treatment of related issues (e.g., diesel generator reliability, station blackcut)

8. Reactivation ef Deferred Plants o Cecctivation requirements o Reactivation requirements o Backfitting issues

9. Fitness for Duty o impact on licer.see programs o Impact on licensing / inspection programs

10. Interfact wi_th States o Participation in licensing meetings o Participation in inspections o Feedback on events

11. Low-level Waste o Decommissioned reactor containment as repository o Waste below regulatory concerns o Waste reduction programs 2.1-2

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. 12. Regulations o Elimination of unnecessary regulations o Tailoring regulattens to current needs o Establishment of new regulations

13. Balance of Plant o Appropriate licensing posture o Appropriate inspection posture 14 Investigations o Use of allecations in NRR programs o NRR role in investigations o Use of investigation results

15. Use of PRA in Decisionmaking o Generic PRA; i.e., NUREG-1150 o Plant-specific PRA

16. Performance Indicators o Role in resource application at licensees o Role in enforcement decisions c Quantitative vs. Qualitative

17. Life Extension Programs o Hardware considerations

.o Operational performance considerations l o Management considerations

! - 18. Enhanced Industry Initiatives o Credit in regulatory process o Appropriate NRC follow-up o NRC encouragement

19. Enforcement i o Paterial false statements o As a means of improving performance l 2.1-3 l

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20. Technical Specification Improvement Allowable deviations from standard technical specifications Review process / procedure for conversion to new technical specification

21. Maintenance s.

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SECTION 3 LICENSING REVIEa'S AND INSPECTIONS l

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. 3.1 Near-Term Operating Licensing (NTOL)

In the year or so prior to issuance of a full power license, the NRR licensing activities become intense and require a great deal of management attention. As of mid-July 1987, there are 3 plants holding low power licenses,1 plant holoing a zero power license,11 plants under active construction and 5 plants holding a CP but with no firm schedule for completion. Although the major focus of NRR activities will be on operating plants, we must manage our business so that NTOL's are handled routinely and do not become an undue distraction for senior management at the time of licensing.

In order to be in a position to handle NT0L's in a systematic manner, the Project Divisions should have the following infonnaticr. available for each NTOL:

An internal NRR best-estimate schedule with rajor milestones prior to licensing (to include: start of preoperational testing, fuel load, initial criticality ard completion of low power testing).

A coordinated plan for frequent meetings with regional management and licensee F.anagement in the Region and at the site.

A written regional assessment of the status of construction completion and remaining construction issues at the start ci preoperational testing (to include: allegation status, 01 referral status, transition plans, planned inspection coverage, and major regional issues with ASLB, FEMA, etc); and

( a quarterly update until fuel load.

A comprehensive listing of licensing and inspection open issues that require resolution prior to licensing (six months prior to the estimated fuelload).

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• A comprehensive list of NRR and regional actions needed for licensing (one month prior to projected completion of preoperational testing).

3.1-1 August 12, 1987

A written regional and hRR assessment of the conduct, progress ano results of preoperational testing prior to a fuel load decision.

An integrated NRR/ Region plan for operational readiness assessment team inspections prior to low power and full power license decisions.

A written assessment of conduct, progress and results of low power testing.

A plan for NRR and E00 pre-briefings in advance of the Connission meeting on a full-power license decision to include: updated construction assessment, updated preoperational testing assessment, low-power testing assessment, and readiness for operation.

One month prior to projected license issuance cate, the following should be sent to the applicant: the final technical specific 6 tion for certification; a request for cartification that the plant has been designed, built, tested and will be operated in accordance with the FSAR, SER and other licensing documents; and a draft operating license for coment.

Plants with contestea hearings pose even more demands on management attention.

In these casu, NRR senior management should expect to be involvec early in the dr.velopnent of overall NRC policy and the bearing strategy in the case.

Prior to any pre-hearing conferences or hearings, the Project Mar,ager ano case l cttorney should brief and review with senior NRR management the litigative l strategy. Preparation of all staff testimony and briefs has to be scheduled l

to allow senior management review for policy implications prior to any filing.

The Technical Division Directors are responsible for the technical content and accuracy of all NkR staff filings before the ASLB or ASLBP.

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. 3.2 PRA-Based inspections and Licensing RES will be responsible for conducting reviews of full-scope PRAs. The Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness (DREP), Risk Application Branch (RAB) will assist ILRIB is ensuring that the results, of PRAs and RES reviews are integrated into NRR licensing and inspection activities. RAB will remain cognizant of the most recent RES activities related to the conduct or review of PRA's. PRA applications for licensing and inspection will be a topic for counterpart meetings and RES progress for NRR programs will be reviewed quarterly to better focus the results to satisfy NRR and regional needs.

PP.A perspectives will be used to help focus on technical issues of merit from both a licensing and inspection standpoint. This will include inspections, operating reactor licensing actions, errergency preparedness, event assessrrent and licensing of future reacter designs. Major contributors to risk will be ioentified for consideration in formulating inspection plans, licensing guidance and research requests. PRA insights will be used to develop a prioritization scheme for resource allocat'on, budgeting and preparation of inspection procedures to assure that significant safety issues are addressed. Management controls, including maintenance, surveillance and procedural adherence will be considered for PRA impacts in coordination with the Division of Licensee Performance and Quality Evaluation. That is PRA results will be examined for their sensitivity to operational constraints imposed by operators.

A training program will be impleirented to farniliarize the Regions, in particular resident inspectors, and the Project Emagers with an appreciation of what co_nstitutes the major contributFs

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risk. The purpose is not to duplicate the fonnulation of the PRA, but to recognize the possible system interactions and man-machine interfaces that can be controlling.

Plant-specific inspection guidance will be developed for those plants having completed PRA's. At the current time, it is envisioned that plant-specific PRA l

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results will be acopted for regional / resident inspections. The experience gained from ongoing programs, primarily in Region I, will be the starting point for this effort. NRP will foster and support similar programs in all regions, and ensure that methoos are applied in a consistent and technically sound manner, by developing guidance documents and inspection strategies.

PRA inspection strategies will involve individual inspectors and team inspections.

Individual inspectors, such as resident inspectors, will receive assistance in better understanding and focusing their daily efforts to reflect PRA-based insights. Team inspection techniques relying on PRA insights will be developed in conjunction with the Division of Reactor Inspection and Safeguards. That is, RAS will develop inspect' ion planning approaches tc utilize PRA results in the conduct of novel inspection approaches. PRA-based tecm inspections will be con-ducteo by regional staff under NRR-sponsored teams and inspection plans.

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o 3.3 Team Inspecticns NRR inspection activities will be coordinated through the Division of Reactar InspectionandSafeguards(DRIS). The DRIS staff will normally staff and conduct reactor team inspections, such as performance assessment, safety system functional inspections, operational safety team inspections, safety systems outage modifi-cation inspections, Regulatory Effectiveness Reviews (RERs) and other special team inspections. Evaluation team inspections consisting of regional staff specialists and NRR technical specialists will be one of the principal means employed to introduce new concepts and new techniques and to assure a more consistent approach among regions for a given technical issue. The taam composition will include regional staff, NRR staff other than DRIS, and may incluce AE00 members as well.

Such inspections will foster cross training. onsistency among regions and feed-back. The team leaders will be from DRIS, and will be responsible for planning /

coordinating the scope and conduct of the effort with the appropriate NRR Branch e Chiefs. Ir. addition, SES management involvement will be included through the role of a "team canager". Although the team leader will be responsible fer planning and executing the inspection, the concept of a team manager is to foster increased participation by SES managers in the evolution of the t.eam findings and insights.

Team managers wili work with the team in monitoring the status of findings on a daily basis, hRR team inspections will result in technical reports that focus on substantive l issues and problems. NRR inspection reports will be oriented toward assessing l technical adequacy and reaching a technical finding consistent with the purpose of the inspection. As such, NRR reports will be sufficiently complete to l allow a knowledgeable reader to understand the conclusion. NRR will not prepare l

notices of violations, open items or unresolved items, but will document significant concerns in a separate memorandum for the regions to follow-up.

The Regions and the Office of Enforcement staff will exercise their judgment in taking appropriate follow-up actions based upon the NRR report.

l A training and qualification program will be developed and maintained to provide qualified tearn leaders and to enable NRR staff to meaningfully participate in team inspections. (For further details, see Policy 1.10. "Recruitment and professional Developaent.")

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. Tear; inspections associated with major milestones (e.g., prior to full-power licersing of NT0Ls, restart after extended outages, reviews of major plant modifications) will generally be carried out by Regioris with NRR participation.

The planning and conduct of such efforts should be integrated from a schedular standpoint with the critical licensing decision point. (For more details, see Policy 3.1,"Hear-TermOperatingLicensing(NTOL).")

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SECTION 4 EXTERt;AL INTERFACES l

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l 4.1 Vendors and Owners Group Interface 1

Utilities with similar reactors, plant designs or problems have regularly joined together to poul their knowledge and resources to address a technical area connon to all. Industry is to be encouraged to address, generically, issues that are i applicable to a class of plants, types, etc. NRR has encouraged the fonnation of these groups as an effective and resourca efficient technique for both the utilities and the staff.

Owners Groups (OG's) have become more active over the recent years in addressing issues and responding to problems via the Regulatory Response Groups (RRG's).

The types of issues raised by the 0G's cover areas such as generic responses to the ATWS rule and the Technical Specification Improvement Program. The typical composition of the 0G's includes representatives from utilities with a similar reactor design as well as an NSSS vendor representative. However, the vendors can work individually or in a.oncert with the OG's. Comunication and coordination with vendors directly are also important to understand proposed design changes, analytical methods, etc.

The purpose of the RRG's is to rapidly provide the NRC with a basis for logical ano reasoned regulatory response tn new potential, near-term generic, significant safety issues that have (1) occurred at an operating facility, (2) Mer idertifiea as a result of industry research or design analyses, or l (3) been identified by NRR. The RRG's are typically composed of knowledgeable utility personnel, an NSSS vendor representative, and AIF, HSAC and INPO representativas. The RRG's are activated by the Chairman of the RRG at the request of senior NRR management, a plant superintendent of an operating plant, a member of the RRG or a utility RRG representative.

Routine interactions between NRR management and industry groups, specifically l OG's and RRG's, are encouraged so that issues can be addressed at an early stage.

Once a technical issue is identified and brought to the staff for review, a tirely and comprehensive review needs to be completed and documented. As such, there are two discrete activities with OG's and RRG's that warrant attention.

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General discussions related to schedules, status, items of interest, comniunication, coordination, etc., should be conducted routinely with OG's as well as vendor representatives. To assure such discussions occur on a routine basis with each of the four 0G's, as well as the vendors, the responsibility for initiating such activities and ensuring effective dialogues will be assigned as a collateral duty to specific NRR managers.

These assignments are intended to allow senior NRR management a feedback loop that can identify notential problems and issues at a sufficiently early stage so that remedial measures can be instituted, as needed.

The senior NRR ranagement contacts with the vendors and the OG's are the following:

Associate Director for Projects - CE and B&W Associate Director for Inspection and Technical Assessment - GE and W.

The Associate Directors will form an NRR Owners Group Team for each 00. This loosely knit tear will be the group that deals with the OG's on specific technical issues. The Associate Directors rnay designate an individual of each Team to be the day-to-day contact with the OG working-level staff. The Associate Directors may also delegate the authority for activating RRG's.

Once a technical issue is identified, or a topical report is submitted by a vendor /UG, the review, resolution and interaction or. that issue becomes the responsibility of the appropriate NRR Division Director. Tracking systems will be used to monitor progress on assigned topics. The responsible Division Director also has the obligation to periodically brief the Associate Director who is assigned the responsibility for the OG or vendor interface. Consequently, I

routine correspondence with OGs on a specific issue will be handled by the responsible line managers for that topic. Overall coordination, status review and interaction with the owner groups' executive comittees are the responsibili-l ties of the Associate Directors.

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e h2_ FEMA Interface The NRC/ FEMA interface will be developed so that issues are identified before they become problems. To this end, more emphasis will be placed on line managers in NRR to have routine contacts with FEMA counterparts. The Associate Director for Inspection and Technical Assessment will be the normal senior management contact for NRR with the senior management of FEMA. He will be kept informed of the staff contacts with FEMA and especially of impending emergency preparedness issues with FEMA.

The Chief, Emergency Preparedness Branch will, as a matter of routine, have frequent cantact witn FEMA management to share insights obtained from their respective regions ano staffs. Feedback from NRR/ Regions will be developed such that results/ impressions from RAC activities, exercises, events or prepara-tion for exercises will be solicited en a routine basis to identify precursors for future problems. The Director, Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness, similarly will have routine quarterly meetings with FEMA. Semi-anrual meetings of the senior NRR/ FEMA managers will focus on those matters needing a change in, or clarification of, policy. The intent is to encourage more dialogue between the Regions and headquarters such that subsequent correspondence will not result in "surprises" or new information.

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.' 4.3 Regional Interface 1

' NRR's primary function is to ensure that nuclear oower plants and research I reactors are designed, constructed and operated in a manner that ensures the protection of public health and safety. This is accomplished through the NRR licensing and inspection processes. Whereas the majority of NRR's licensing activities are centralized in headquarters, NRR inspections are primarily conducted through regionalized programs.

In conducting regionalized NRR programs, inspections or licensing, the Regional Administrator is acting as the agent of the Director, NRR, and is responsible to the Director, NRR, for the execution of these programs. It is the resporsibility of the Director, NRR, to remain cognizant of the status of NRR program execution in the Regions and, in conjunction with the Regional Administrators, to ensure that the appropriate regulatory attention is devoted to each licer. sed facility. The Director, NRR, will keep the ED0's office currently and fully inf ormed. Consequently, it is important for NRR to establish and maintain a good feedback mechanism and lines of comunication with the Regions and within NRR r9garding licensee and NRC activities.

The NRR focal point for NRC activities associated with a specific project is the projects organi1ation. This incluces maintenance of a good knowledge of

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all activit[ies associated with a specific project, independent of whether l they are licensee,, regionai or headquarters. All levels of the project orgar.ization are expected to have frequent (several times a week) comunication with the regional counterparts regarding regional and headquarters activities associated with their assigned projects. The prq.iects orcanization should nonnally attend all regional and headquarters reetings _(e.g., enforcement conferences, sal.P. special inspection exit I

meetings) for the assigned projects and should ensure that the appropriate technical organizations are infonned of all such meetings. The technical l

organization should attend and participate in all such meetings requiring their technical expertise. Likewise, the projects organization should inform the appropriate regional personnel of all headquarters meetings to be held with licensees of their assigned projects.

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. ' R gional questions regarding interpretations of requirenents pertaining to a sp~ecific project will' he directed to the projects organization, which wilIbe responsible for ensuring a prompt response to the Region. All such respor.ses shall be developed in coordination with the technical organization, which will be responsible for the technical adequacy of the response.

Regional questions of a generic nature will be addressed to, and be the respon-sibility of, the technical or policy development organization, as appropricte.

The projects organization will be promptly informed of all generic interpretations, and the policy development organization will codify all generic interpretations in the appropriate licensing and inspection guidance docurents.

It is expected that hRR headquarters menagers will have frequent face-to-face discussions with their regional counterparts regarding licensing ano inspection policies, procedures and implementation of same. Likewise, i_t is expected that the supervisors and Project Managers in the projects organization will haye_a good knowledge of the sites and personnel assigned to the site organization.

The managers in the technical and policy development organizations are expected to have a complete understanding of the effect their programs have on licensee operations. To this end, the following guideli.ies for regional counterpeirt meetings, regicnal visits and site visits are established: -

Counterpart Meetings

1. Each Projects Division should conduct at least one counterpart meeting per year;

2. Each Technical Division should conduct at least one' counterpart neeting every 2 years. The Divisions shall coordinate their meetings so that not more than four such meetings are held by the technical assessment directorate in any year; and

3. Counterpart meetings will normally be conducted at the Divistor level; however, counterpart meetings may be conducted at the branch level when., for example, the technical disciplines / responsibilities in a NRR Division viry significantly.

4.3-2

Regional Visits

1. All managers in the projects organization should spend approximately l 1 week a year in a regional office (s); and l

2. All managers in the technical organization should spend approximately 1 week i; year accompanying inspectors, reviewers or examiners on conduct of program implementation in their areas of responsibility.

Site Visits

1. All managers in the projects organization should spend at least 1 week a year at a site (s);

2. Projects c6nagecs should spend at least 1 week a quarter at iteir assigned site (s). Up to 25 oercent of this time may be spent in the ragional off ee or the licensee corporate office; and

3. All NRR technical staff should spend at least I week every 2 years at a site (s). ,

In order to ensure th6t office objectives are met by the Counterpart Meetings, Regional Visits and Site Visits, the Policy Development and Technical Support Branch (PTSB) shall develop and promulgate NRR Office Letters _ to guide the condu_ct of such meetings and visits.

4.3-3 1

4.4 AEOD Interface i.RR has several major interface areas with the Office for Analysis and Evaluationof.0p:rationalData(AEOD): Operations Center Activities, Events Assessment, Generic Comunications. Licensee Performance Evaluation and Operational Assessment Inspections. (Operations Center activities are discusseo in Policy 1.4 "Events Review and Coordination" and Policy 1.5 "Emergency Situations Response."

The Division of Operational Events Assessment will develop means to utilize AEOD products and insights in the analysis of reactor events anti should work with AEOC to minimize duplication of effort between AE0D and NRR. An example of such interface is the daily reactor events briefing regarding "Duty Officer" calls. NRR is respcnsible for prompt short-term analyses and resolution of reactor events whereas AE00 nonnally perfonns longer-range studies with emphasis on trends and patterns and identification of items which may beve been previously overlooked. NRR is responsible for ensuring the agency has required, and the licensees have taken, appropriate action in response to the results of NRC evaluation of events. NRR will issue generic comunications based on the results of NRR and/or AE00 analyses, as appropritte. The final decision regarding the appropriateness of and type of generic comunications rests with NRR. The Division of Operational Etents Assessment will keep the other NRR Divisiens fully and currently informed of the results of events assessment and may call upon the other Divisions to assist in such analyses when necessary.

AE0D is responsible for the conduct of diagnostic inspections resulting from NRC manag2 ment decisions to gain greater insights regarding licensee performance. On occasion, the Director, NRR, may request that AEOD conduct such an inspection. The Division of Reactor Inspection and Safeguards (DRIS) will interface with AE0D to ensure that NRR's program of special inspections and the diagnostic inspections are coordinated and that NRR's insights are fully reflected in the planning for diagnostic inspections. Likewise, DRIS l should ensure that NRR personnel with appropriate expertise are participants in the diagnostic inspections and should encourage the participation of appropriate AE0D personnel in NRR's special inspections.

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. " AkOD manages NRC's system for developing and displaying quantitative performance indicator information. hRR is responsible for evaluating the overall performance of licensees by integrating quantitative and qualitative data from all the agency's programs. The Division of Licensee Performance and Quality Evaluation is NRR's focal point with AEOD regarding the performance indicator program and will evaluate the overall effectiveness of licensee perforrence by analyzing the results from all NRC programs.

4.4-2 1

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- 4.5 RES Interface NRR is responsiole for ensuring that the operation of nuclear reactors does not endanger the health and safety of the public. In accomplishing this mission, it is necessary to have prompt and comprehensive feedback from the agency programs under the auspices of RES. Research, rulemaking, standards setting, Generic Safety Issue Resolution and PRA findings are of special importance to the NRR mission.

The Inspection, Licensing and Research Integration Branch (ILRB) is the NRR focal point for liaison with RES and is responsible for maintaining an in-depth knowledge of RES programs and efforts that could have an impact on any of the NRR prograns. ILRB should promptly inform the projects and/or technical assessment organizations, as appropriate, of the RES work thet may affect their programs. All NRR requests to RES for initiaticr of work, concurr'ence on RES projects and hRR concents en RES work should be by the Director, Program Management, Policy Development and Analysis Staff. It is expected that all such requests, comments and concurrences will be fully coordinated with the projects and technical assessment organizations, and, in most instances, the NRR coments and requests for initiat. ion of RES work will likely be developed by the projects or technical assessnent organizations.

Two areas that require special rention are prooabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and Generic Safety Issues. RES is responsible for NRC review of full PRA submittals from licensees and resolution of Generic Safety Issues. Hcwaver, in order to carry out our responsibilities in the licensing and operational assessrent areas, NRR must be fully cognizant of and understand the emerging results of RES work and the basis for such results on a real-time basis.

Therefore, the cognizant NRR staff will closely monitor the progress of all such RES work on a continuous basis. This will enable NRR to fully utilize the products of RES promptly and in the proper manner. The licensing decisions resulting from RES work are the responsibility of NRR.

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• 4.6 OE Interface NRR's role in the agency's enforcement action stems from the use of enforcement as a means to foster the safety of reactor operation. Therefore, it is imperative that NRR's input on proposed agency enforcement action be timely, technically correct and consistent. To foster such action, the following guidelines apply:

1. The Office of Enforcement (OE) has the ultimate agency responsibility for enforcement; therefore, all NRR enforcement activities will be coordinated with OE.

2. The project management organization has the NRR lead for enforcement and shall remain cognizant of the facts of the case from the inception stage.

3. The Project Manager shall attend all enforcement conferences and other enforcement meetings associated with assigned project (s). Significant conferences / meetings shall be attended by an appropriate level of projects organization managerrent and, if warranted because of technical controversy with the licensee, the appropriate level of technical assess-ment organization management.

4 All proposed escalated enforcement packages and associated inspection reports shall be reviewed at the earliest possible stage. The Associate Director for Projects r shall have coment authority and, after consultation with the Associate Director for Inspection and Technical Assessment, shall provide NRR coments to the Director, OE, and Regional Administrators, as appropriate. Such coments should nonnally be provided within 4 workdays of receipt of the proposed action and shall be in the fonnat prescribed by CE.

5. The NRR recomendation should be aimed at an enforcement action that provides the greatest incentive for the licensee to implement or continue effective corrective action. In arriving at NRR's conclusions regarding the proposed enforcement action, the following factors should be considered:

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• a. Technical soundness of finding;

b. Actual safety significance of violations;

c. Potential safety significance of violations;

d. Licensee's previous and current performance record; and

e. Timeliness of enforcement action.

6. The Policy Development and Technical Support Branch shall develop an NRR Office Letter specifying NRR procedures for enforcemant interface.

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.4 v,)* 4.7 NMSS Interface a

NRR is responsible for ensuring that the operation of nuclear reactors does not endanger the public health and safety. To accomplish this, NRR must interface with NMSS in two areas: (1)safeguardsand(2) waste.

Within NRR the Division of Reactor Inspection and Safeguards (DRIS), with assistance by the Division of Operational Events Assessment (00EA), will be responsible for the evaluation and resolution of safeguards events affecting the safety of reactors. NMSS will provide event data in support of NRR. The Safeguards Branch, DRIS, will represent NRR on the IAT as described in the IAT Charter. The Events Assessment Branch, DOEA, will also be represented on the IAT and provide NRR expertise in the evaluation of the safety implications of threats to licensed reactor facilities. NMSS will continue to be the designated NRC contact with the Intelliger.ce Community and be responsible for NRC threat assessment. NHSS studies will include trend and pattern analyses and identification of threat-related items which may be generic or could impact safeguards policy. NRR will be responsible for studies of reactor safeguards events as they impact site specific and implementation questions.

AMSS will continue to publish the Safeguards Sumrary Event List (SSEL). Based on its threat assessment activities, NMSS will recomend improvements to NRR in the requirements for physical protection of licensed activities at nuclear reactors. DRIS will develop means to utilize NMSS products and insights in assuring public health ano safety and the comnn defense and security and will ensure the agency has required and the reactor licensees have taken appropriate action in response to toe results of the NP.C evaluation of safeguards events.

NRR will issue generic cunnunications based on the results of NRR, NMSS and/or other organization analysesT as ap.9topriate. DRIS_ will develop input and recom-mendations to NMSS for the formulation of NRC safeguards policy.

The Policy Development and Technical Support Branch (PTSB) is the NRR focal point for liaison with NMSS on waste issues that involve NRR program. PTSB will coordinate with the projects and/or technical assessment organizations, j as appropriate, in developing NRR positions, coments, etc. With regard to l waste issues.

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• c. UNM ED STATES

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[i, i NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION W AS*NGTON O C 205%

e September 4, 1987 MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution FROM: Frank J. Miraglia Associate Directo* for Projects Richard W. Starostecki Associate Director for Inspection and Technical Assessment

SUBJECT:

PROJECT MANAGER REVIEW RESPONSIBILITY The staf f has bee.'. exploring ways to more ef ficiently use our limited technical resources to focus on safety significant issues. Effective immediately, the Project Managers will be responsibile for conducting more technical reviews of license amendment requests than have been done previously. It should be noted that where this memorandum uses the term Project Manager for a specific plant, the Project Directors are at liberty to substitute a Project Engineer or another Project Manager if appropriate.

Enclosed is a detailed procedure discussing the Project Manager and review branch responsibilities under this program. Basically when an amendment is l received, the Project Manager still place it in one of three categoriet.

I Category 1 is where the technical submittal by the licensee is inadequate to commence the review. Category 2 is for amendments where a prrpsed "no significant hazards considerations (NSHC)" finding can be matfe by the NR'. and where the request does not require specialized deceiied techrical review.

Category 3 is for amendments which require a detailed technical review war-ranting participation by the technical review branches. lmendments placed in Category 3 will be noticed with an opportunity for a hearing with no comments concerning significant hazards considerations.

Because of the nature of the issues raised in reload amendments, it is under-stood that assistance of technical review specialists may be needed even for fairly routine reload requests. Fcr reloads, categorization is to be based on the complexity of the issues involved rather than on the participation of tech-nical review specialists. Similarly, there is no intent to affect the common practice of contacting the Region or technical branches concerning information relevant to emergency technical specification (TS) change requests. Such requests should be categorized based on the complexity of the issues rather than on the basis of contact with the Region or technical branches.

CONTACT: J. Thoma X28285 fi C ? -? 3 0 9 7 W-Mt .

Distribution September 4,1987 The Project Manager will discuss the review with the appropriate review Branch Chief or Section Leader before commencing the review or making a NSHC determination. This serves two purposes. First, it assures that the Project Manager is aware of the most current policy or review guidelines on a given topic. Secondly, it allows review branch input to ensure consistency in reviews. If the project Manager prepares the safety evaluation, the appropriate review branch will be on concurrence on the final amendment package. If a hearing is requested on an amendment, the technical review branches and the Project Manager will be responsible for supporting the Agency's actions.

Presently it takes six months or longer to issue an amendment. Under this program, it is anticipated that a typical amendment involving NSHC will be issued in two months or less after raceipt. It is recognized that we may now issue a notice for hearing for an amendment which we previously have issued on other plants as a NSHC. We may even be challenged by the licensees (or this "apparent" change in position. The focus of the program is aimed toward optimum use of agency resources, recognizing that if an amendment truly involves "no significant hazards considerations," then its respective technical review should not involve a significant amount of NRC review effort, other than the effort which is part of the responsibilities of the assigned PM.

This review process will be periodically audited to determine its effectiveness.

We will consider issuing the program as an NRR Office Letter after program experi-ence is obtained.

This program is effective for amendments received after the date of this

[3 (j

memorandum. The Project Directors in conjunction with their Project Managers will review amendments in progress before the date of this memorandum to determine which ones would have been placed in Category 2. The technical r uiew branches will be consulted on the status of the review; and on a case-by-case basis, it will be decided if the Projec.t Manager is to be assigned the review. Unless specifically notified otherwise, the technical review branches are to continue reviewing amendments in progress at the agreed upon schedule.

As stated above, the purpose of the program is to allow the technical review branches to focus their limited resources on safety significant issues. We a knowledge t?.Lt the program will increase the burden on the Project Manager, and that problems may arise in the initial program implementation. It will require the support of all personnel to make this program offective.

hfd )r i ostecki Frank J.CHiGgl' R chard W.

Associate Director for Projects Associate Director for Inspection and Technical Assessment

Enclosure:

As stated cc: T. Hurley J. Sniezek J. Scinto

l OlSTRIBUTION Steven A. varga, Director Division of Reactor Projects 1/11 Bruce A. Boger, Assistant Director l for Region I Reactors Gus C. Lainas, Assistant Director I

for Region 11 Reactors Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director Division of Reactor Projects _ III, IV, V and Special Projects Gary H. Holahan, Assistant Director for Region III and V Reactors l Frank Schroeder, Jr. , Assistant Director for Region IV Reactors and Special Projects .

Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational Events Assessment Lawrence Shao, Director Division of Engineering and Systems Technology James E. Richardson, Assistant Director f o &- Engineering Ashok C. Thadani, Assistant Director for Systems James G. Partlow, Director Division of Reactor Inspection and Safeguards

' Frank J. Congel, Director Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness Jack W. Roe, Director -

Division of Licensee Performance and Quality Evaluation

. - ~ - . - .__. . ._---. _

L l . .

l.

l ENCLOSUQE AMENDMENT REV! W PROCEDURE Menager categories. (PF), the PM should determine that the amendm with the appropriate technical review Branch Chief The or Section L discussion is to accomplish several goals.

the PM on current review guidelines and policy in a given area.First, Second, it it is to educate aids the. review branches to ensure consistency of approach. Third, it provides an independent assessment of the amendment as to the adequacy of the submitta:

and whether or not a detailed technical review is required.

should take less than one man-day of effort. This consultatier Project Directorate reading files will also become a valuable source ofAs review infc mation on how similar amendments were treated.

Based on the above discussions, the amendment will be placed in one of three categories. Each category is discussed in turn:

Categorv 1 The packsce it fr. adequate based or a general overall review. A letter will be sent ta the licensee documenting reasons why the package is inadequate and stating the corrective action the licensee needs to take before resubmittal. The rejection letter is to describe general areas which are either omitted or inadequately addressed in the licersee's submi tti,1.

It it not a detailed technical rejection or a disguised request for additional information, as both of these actions are more appmpriate i'or Category 2 or 3. This is not a rejection of the licensee's of (mendment request but is a rejection of the overall adequacy the request.

For multiplant activities (MPAsl or plant-specific items which are an outgrowth of MPAs, the proposed resubmittal date. letter sent to the licensee should request a If the TAC was opened to cover the entire MPA review, it should remain open until the issues are resolved. I' the MPA Specs areincludes issued. Tech Specs, the TAC should remain open until the Tech If a plant-specific TAC (which is not the result of a previous MPA or NRC initisted action) was opened to cover this review and the licensee is not planning to respond in a timely manner Isix months or less) to the rejection letter, then this plant-specific TAC is to be closed by the PM.

.p.

Categor.y 2 The package, based on its face value alone, has adequate technical justification to conclude that no detailed specialist review is necessary and the amendment involves no significant hazards considerations. The PM prepares the Sholly notice, performs the safety review, and prepares the amendment package simultaneously. Thirty days after the $ holly notice has been published the amendment should be issued. This time frame, although not an exact requirement, should be a standard rule of thumb. The amendment package should have the concurrence of the appropriate technical review Branch Chief to ensure consistency in approach.

Amendments which can be classified as Category 2 must clearly satisfy the "no significant hazards considerations" requirements. Specifically, they muct (1) not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, (2) not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, and (3) not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Examples of amendments which would usually be classified as Category 2 include the examples of "no significant hazards considerations" found in

, the Sholly procedures. Amendments involving these examples should require little detailed technical review effort.

For case of reference, they are repeated as follows:

1. I purely administrative change to technical specifiestions; for example, a change to achieve consistency througnott the technical specifications, correction of an error, or a char.ge in nvaencletcre.

2. A change that constitutes an additional limitation, restriction, or control not presently included in the technical specifications, e.g. ,

a more stringent surveillance requirement.

3. For a nuclear powerireactor, a change resulting from a nuclear reactor core reloading, if no fuel assemblies significantly different from those found previously acceptable to the NRC for a previous core at the facility in question are involved. This assumes that no significant changes are made to the acceptance criteria for the technical specifications, that the analytical methods used to demonstrate conformance with the technical specifications and regulations are not significantly changed, and that NRC has previously found such methods acceptable.

4. A relief granted upon demonstration of acceptable operation from an operating restriction that was imposed because acceptable operation was not yet demonstrated. This assumes that the operating restriction and the criteria to be applied to a request for relief have been established in a prior review and that it is justified in a satisfactory way that the criteria have been met.

^

.s 3

5. Upon satisfactory completten of construction in connection with an operatine facility, a relief granted from an operating restriction that was imposed tiecause the construction was not yet completed setisfactorily. This is intended to involve only restrictions where it is justified that ennstruction has been corpleted satisfactorily, f.

A change which either may result in some increase to the probability or consequences of a previously analyzed accident or may reduce in some way a safety margin, but where the results of the change are clearly within all acceptable criteria with respect to the system or corponent specified in the Standard Review Plan, e.g., a change resulting from the application of a small refinement of a previously used calculational model or design method.

7 A change to conform a licerse to changes in the regulations, where the license change results in very minor changes to facility operations clearly in keeping with the regulations.

8.

A change to a license to reflect a minor adjustment in ownership shares among co. owners already shown in the license.

9.

A repair or replacement of a ma,4or component or system important to safety, if the following conditions are met:

a. The repair or replacement process involves practices which have been successfully implemented at least once on similar components or systems elsewhere in the nuclear industry or in other industries and does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated or create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluat@ and i b. The repaired or replacement component or sys*w does not result in a significant change in its safety funct reduction in any safety limit (or limiting ,'or. or a significant andition ef operation) associated with the component or system, i 10.

An expansion of the storage capacity of a spent /uel pool when all of l the following are satisfied:

a.

The storage expansion method consists of either replacing existing racks with a design which allows closer spacing between stored spent fuel assemblies or placing additional racks of the original design on the pool floor if space pennits;

b. The storage expansion methnd does not involve rod consolidation or double tiering; i c. The Keff of the pool is maintained less than or equal to 0.95; and

d. No new technology or unproven technology is utilized in either the construction process or the analytical techniques necessary to justify the expansion.

i 4

There may be proposed amendments which would possibly fit within the language of one of the examples, but which would in fact involve complex technical issues. For example, there may be a review invol-ving a spent fuel pool reracking which clearly fits the examples above but the review is so complicated that the Project Manager cannot reason-ably be expected to conduct the review. In such cases the review will be treated as a Category 3.

Although the same general principles apply to reload amendment requests, because of the specialized nature of the issues addressed, it is expected that PMs may well need the assistance of Reactor Systems Branch in even a f airly routine reload application. Therefore, categorization of reloads should be based on the complexity of the matters involved rather than on whether the assistance of the technical review branch specialists is needed.

Similarly, in processing emergency TS changes it is common practice to ob-tain the views of the Region concerning the status of the plant and the cir-cumstances leading up the emergency request and the technical branches for adequacy of the proposal. There is no intent to affect such practice. Cate-gorization of emergency requests should be based on the complexity of the issues involved rather than on the basis of contact with the Region or the technical branches.

Category 3 The amendment requires a detailed specialist review. The PM, after consulting with the appropriate review Branch Chief, will notice the amendscnt with an opportunity for hearing. Simultaneously, a work request will be generated sending the package to the technical review branches. Note for purposes of this procedure, the resources available in the Regions, with the exception of the resident inspectors, are to be considered a technical review branch. The PM and resident inspector are important technical resources but fall in a different category than specialized technical reviewers.

Work on the amendment request will then proceed in the normal fashion.

The Project Manager and assigned reviewer will negotiate a mutually acceptable schedule for the review. All contact with the licensee will be via the Project Manager. The safety evaluation will be formally transferred by the reviewer to the Project Manager via a memorandum signed by the appropriate Branch Chief or other authority if so determined by NRR Office Letter 101, Delegation of Signature Authority. The Project Manager will prepare and issue the formal amendment or denial as appropriate.

If a hearing is requested and granted, the Project Manager will work with OGC to assure necessary staff support is provided. Issuance of the amend-ment would await the outcome of the hearing process, or as otherwise advised by OGC.

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pedo:

1. ?, UNITED STATES

[- % ' 'g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-

, WASHINGTON. D C. 20S$5 S -

September 14, 1987 g . .s ,...f MEMORANDUM FOR: DRSP Project Directors DRSP Project Managers ProjectEngineers Licensing Assistants FROM: Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director Division of Reactor Projects III, IV, V and Special Projects

SUBJECT:

TECHNICAL REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES OF PROJECT MANAGERS Please plan to attend a meeting on the above subject to be held at 10:30 until 12 noon on Monday, September 21, 1987 in Room P118. The purpose of this meeting is to discuss the emerging NRR policy regarding the utilization of projects staff to complete technical reviews for certain licensing actions.

This new policy was briefly outlined by Dr. Murley at his recent presentation.

It is discussed in more detail in the attached memorandum. See you on Monday.

Denn .C c'hfiel d , ector Division of Reactor Pro ects III, IV, V and Special Projects

Enclosure:

As stated cc: F. Miraglia G. Holahan F. Schroeder R. Dudley M. Caruso R. Wright J. Thoma 4

?? ? ?! ? ? :E E Af i A3l

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,r'* ,, ir.27'T M l R E

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/s / 1 NUCL E AR REGUL A10RY COMMISSION f / i v.a p.iscios o c w m I,_

• • • • • Se,te.ber 4, 1*;17 MEMORANDJM FOR: Distribution

^^

FROM. Frank J. Miraglia

, Associate Director for Projects Richard W. Starostecki Associate Director for Inspection and Technical Assessment SUBJEC1: PROJECT MANAGER REVIEW RESPONSIBILITY The staf f has been exploring ways to more ef ficiently use our limited technical resources to focus on safety significant issues. Effective immediately, the Project Managers will be responsibile for conducting more technical reviews of license amendment requests than have been done previously. It should be noted that where this memorandum uses the term Project Manager for a specific plant, the Project Directors are at liberty te substitute a Project Engineer or another Project Manager if appropriate.

Enclosed is a detailed procedure discussing the Project Manager and review branch responsibilities under this program. Basically when an amendment is received, the Project Manager will place it in one of three categories.

Category 1 is where the technical submittal by the licensee is inadequate to commence the review. Category 2 is for amendments where a proposed "no

( significant hazards considerations (NSHC)" finding can be made by the NRC and

where the request does not require specialized detailed technical review.

Category 3 is for amendments which require a detailed technical review war-

, ranting participation by the technical review branches. Amendments placed in l Category 3 will be noticed with an opportunity for a hearing with no comments

concerning significant hazards considerations.

l i

Because of the nature of the issues raised in reload amendments, it is under-l stood that assistance of technical review specialists may.be needed even for fairly routine reload requests. For reloads, categorization is to be based on the complexity of the issues involved rather than on the participation of tech-nical review specialists. Similarly, there is no intent to affect the common practice of contacting the Region or technical branches concerning information relevant to emergency technical specification (TS) change requests. Such requests should be categorized based on the complexity of the issues rather than on the basis of contact with the Region or technical branches.

CONTACT: J. Thoma X28285 l

NO?I7II 7

! __ . . _ _ L _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

~

1 Distribution The Project Manager will discuss the review with the appropriate revie,. Rranct Chief or Section Leader before commencing the review or making a NSHC determination. This serves two purposes. First, it assures that the Project Manager is aware of the most current policy or review guidelines on a give*

topic. Secondly, it allows review branch input to ensure consistehty in reviews. lf the Project Manager prepares the safety evaluation, the ap;rccria'.e resien branch will be on concurrence on the final amendment package. If a hearing is requested on an amendment, the technical review branches an0 th6 Prcject Manager will be responsible for supporting the Agency's actions.

Presently it takes six months or longer to issue an amendment. Under this program, it is anticipated that a typical amendment involving NSHC will be issued in two montns or less after receipt. It is recognized that we may no-issue a notice for hearing for an uendment which we previously have issued on other plants as a NSHC We may even be challenged by the licensees for 3

this "apparent" change in position. The focus of the program is aimed towarc optimum use of agency resources, recognizing that if an amendment truly involves "no significant hazards considerations," then its respective technical review should not involve a significant amount of NRC review effort, other than the effort which is part of the responsibilities of the assigned PM.

This review process will be periodically audited to determine its ef fectiveness.

We will consider issuing the program as an NRR Of fice Letter af ter program experi-ence is obtained.

This program is ef fective for amendments received af ter the date of this

. memorandum. The Project Directors in conjunction with their Project Managers will review amendments in progress before the date of this memorandum to determine which ones would have been placed in Category 2. The technical review branches will be consulted on t5e status of the review; and on a case-by-case basis, it will be decided if the Project Manager is to be assigned the review. Unless specifically notified otherwise, the technical review branches are to continue reviewing acendments in progress at the agreed upon schedule.

As stated above, the purpose of the program is to allow the technical review branches to focus their limited resources on safety significant issues. We acknowledge that the program will increase the burden on the Project Manager, and that problems may arise in the initial program implementation. It will require the support of all personnel to make this program effective.

W# h*" N O r o :. .. u ..... . 1 Pra.: .* u . :. u Frank J. Miraglia Richard W. Starostecki Associate Director for Projects Associate Director for Inspection and Technical Assessment sa d 01STRIBUT10N:

DRPR r/f T. Murley OGC cc:

J. Sniezek N raglia J. Scinto RStarostecki JThoma l

• SEE PREVIOUS *: CURRENCE d lj I

]

TA/0RPR oma v

a D/DRSP+

DMCrutchfield OGC

• hFM

/

raglia DMA JS rostecki p/l6/87 8 /87 8/ /87 8/ /87 8/p7  %/ /87

D15iRIBUTION

$tesen A. varga, Director Disision cf Reactor Projects 1/11 Bruce A. Boger, Assistant Director for Region ! Reactors Gus C. Lainas Assistant Director for Region 11 Reactors Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director Division of Reactor Projects , !!!, IV, V anc Special Projects Gary M. H91ahte. Assistant Director for Region 111 and V Reactors

• Frank Schroeder, Jr. , Assistant Director f or Region IV Reactors and Special Projects Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational Events Assessment Lawrence Shao, Director Division of Engineering and Systems Technology James E. Richardson, Assistant Director for Engineering Ashok C. Thadani, Assistant Director for Systems James G. Partlow, Director Division of Reactor Inspection and Safeguards Frank J. Congel, Director Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness l

Jack W. Roe, Director Division of Licensee Performance and Quality Evaluation l

l l

l

l l

DCLOS$!

AMENDw!> T FEvity ppec[9got WWin ahnut FC working days a#ter a license amentreet is received by a DrrJect Penener (PP?, the PK should deterrine that the amendment it'Is in one o' three categories. The Pro.iect Vanager IPPi should rfiscuss each arendment reovest with the appropriate technical review Bree.ch Chief or Sec*. ion Leader. The

! diset;ssion is to accorr.p9th several goals. First, it is to educate or upda's the PM on currert review ouidelines and policy in a given area. Second, it sids the review branches to ensure consisterey of approach. Third, it provider an indeptedent ssessment of the amendmer.t as to the adequacy of the submittel and whether or not a detailed technical review is recuired. This consultatier should take less than one NFL-day of effort. As revMis are completed, the Project Directorate reading files will aise become a valuable source of infonnatien on how similar amendrents were treated.

Based on the above discussions, the amendment will be placed in one of three categories. Eech category is discussed in turn:

Categerv 1

~

The packeoe is inadecuate based er s 9eneral overall review. A letter will be'sent to the licemte doevmenting reasons why the package is inadequate and stating the corrective action the licensee needs to take before resubmittal. The rejection letter is to deserthe general areas which are either teitted or inadequately addressed in the licersee's submittal. It is mrt a detailed technical rejecticr. or a disguised request for additional inforNtion, as both of these actions are more appropriate for Category 2 or 3. This is not a rejection of the licensee's amendment mquest but is a rejection of the overall adecuacy of the request.-

For multiplant activities (MPAsl or plant-specific items which are an outgrowth of MPAs, the letter sent to the licensee should request a proposed resubmittal tie te. If the TAC was opened to cover the entire MPA review, it shoofd namin open until the issues are resolved, l' the MPA includes Tech Spets, the TAC should remain open untti the Tech Specs are issued. If a plant-specific TAC (which is not the result of a previous MPA or N#C initiated action) was opened to cover this review and the licensee is not planning to respond in a timely manner Isix months or less) to the re.iection letter, then this plant specific TAC is to be closed by the PM.

. g.

Catece 3 ?

The pacLage, based or, its f ace value alone, has adecuate techn'ical justification to Conclude tht; n0 cetailed specialist review is nectti!*.

and the amenoment involven no significant hazards considerations. 1he PM prepaets the $ holly notice, perf orms the sa'ety review, and prept en the amenctent package simultaneously. Thirty days af ter the 5501),

notice hat been published the amendment should De issued. This timt frame, although not an exact requirement, should be a standard rule c' thumb. The amendment package should have the concurrence of the appropriate technical review Branch Chief to ensure consistency in approach.

. Amendments which can be Classified as Category 2 must clearly satisfy the "no significant hazards considerations" requirements. Specifically, they must (1) not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, (2) not create the possibility of a ne= or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, and (3) not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Examples of amendments which would usually be classified as Category 2 include the exartples of "no significant hazards considerations" found in the Shelly p-ncedures. Amendments involving these examples should require little detailet technical review effort.

For ease of reference, they are repeated as follows:

1. A purely administrative change to technical specifications; for example, a change to achieve consistency throughout the technical specifications, correction of an error, or a change in li.9menclature.

2. A change that constitutes an additional limitation, restricibn, or control not presently included in the technical specifications, e.g.,

a more stringent surveillance requirement.

3. For a nuclear power. reactor, a change resulting from a nuclear reactor core reloading, if no fuel assemblies significantly different from those found previously acceptable to the NRC far a previous core at the facility in question are involved. This assumes that no significant changes are made to the acceptance criteria for the technical specifications, that the analytical methods used to demonstrate conformance with the technical specifications and regulations are not significantly changed, and that NRC has previously found such methods acceptable.

4. A relief granted upon demonstration of acceptable operation from an operating restriction that was imposed because acceptable operation was not yet demonstrated. This assumes that the operating restriction and the criteria to be applied to a request for relief i

have been established in a prior review and that it is justified in i

a satisfactory way that the criteria have been met.

l

5. Open satisfactory completion cf construction in connection witr ar operatine 'acility, a relief grerted from er operating re'strictier that was impeted because the construction was ret yet completed srtisfactorily. This is ir. tended to involve only restrictiers w*ere it is justified tha*. cnnstruction has been corrleted satisfactor ly, d

f. A change which either trey result in some increrte to the protab li ty or conseovences of a previously analyzed accidert or may recute ir.

sore way a safety margin, but where the results of the change are clearly within a'l acceptable criteria with respect to the tyster or cerponent specified in the Standard Review Plan, e.g., a change resulting from the application of a small refinement of a previous')

, used calculational model or design method.

7 A chance to conform a licerse to changes in the regulations, where the license change results in very minor changes to facility operations clearly in keeping with the regulations.

8. A change to a license to reflect a minor adjustment ir ownership shares among co. owners already shown in the license.

, 9. A repair or replacernent of a mafer component or systee important te safety, if the following conditions are met:

a. The repair or replacement process involves practices which have been successfully implemented at least once on similar components or systems elsewhere in the nuclear industry or in other industries and does not involve a significant increase in the prebability or consequences of an accident previously

, evaluated or create the possibility of a new or different kind l

t of accident from any accident previously evaluated; and

b. The repaired or replace nent component or system does not result i

in a significant change in its safety funt' ion or a significant reduction in any safety limit (or limiting condition ef operation) associated with the component or systeet.-

l 10. An expansion of the storage capacity of a spent fuel pool when all of

! the following are satisfied:

l a. The storage expersion method consists of either replacinc existing racks with a design which allows closer spacing between stored spent fuel assemblies or placing additional racks of the original design on the pool floor if space permits;

b. The storage expansion methnd does not involve rod consolidation or double tiering;

c. The Keff of the pool is maintained less than or equal to 0.95; and

d. No new technology or unproven technology is utilized in either the construction process or the analytical techniques necessary to justify the expansion.

4 .

There ma,s te t-crosed amenoments which woule poss$bly fit withir, te e language cf cne of the emanples but which would in f act involwe co*cles technical issues. for esaecle, there may be a revied insc'-

sing a spent fuel pool reracking which clearly fits the examples etc.+

t ut the resie is 50 complicated that the Project Manager cann01 reat .

at') be earecte: to conduct the re ie. In such casts the resie. w ct treate: as a Categcry 3.

Although the same general princicles apply to reload amen: ment rec.e$it ,

because of the sDecialized nature of the issues a:Oresse:. it is esLecte:

that PMs may ell need the assistance of Reactor Systems Branch in e,e a

fairly routine reload application Therefore, categorizatic9 Cf relca:t should be based on the complemity of the matters involved rather tha c*

whether the assistanc? of the technical review branch specialists is neece:

Similarly, in processing emergency 15 changes it is common practice tc oc-tain the views of the Region Concerning the status of the plant and the cir-cuestances leading up the emergency request and the technical branches fc-adequacy of the proposal. There is no intent to affect such practice.

Cate-gori2ation of emergency requests should be based on the complexity of the issues involved rather than on the basis of contact with the Region or the technical branches.

Category 3 The amendment requires a detailed specialist review. The PM, after consulting with tne appropriate review Branch Chief, will notice the amendment with an opportunity for hearing. Simultaneously, a work request will be gener&ted sending the package to the technical review branches. Note for purposes of this procedure, the resources available in the Regions, with the exception of the resident inspectors, are to be considered a technical review branch. The PM and resident inspector are important technical resources but fall in a dif ferent category than specialized technical reviewers.

Work on the amendment request will then proceed in the normal fashion.

The Project Manager and assigned reviewer will negotiate a mutually acceptable schedule for the review. All contact with the licensee will be via the Project Manager. The safety evaluation will be formally transferred by the reviewer to the Project Manager via a memorandum signed by the appropriate Branch Chief or other authority if so determined by NRR Of fice Letter 101, Delegation of Signature Authority. The Froject Manager will prepare and issue the formal amendment or denial as appropriate.

If a hearing is requested and granted, the Project Manager will work with OGC to assure necessary staff support is provided. Issuance of the amend-ment would await the outcome of the hearing process, or as otherwise advised by OGC.

1

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MEMORANCUM FOR: Distribution FROM: Frank J. Miraglia, Jr.

Associate Director for Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Richard W. Starostecki Associate Director for Inspection and Technical Assessment Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

PROJECT MANAGER REVIEW RESPONSIBILITY Our memorandum of September 4, 1987, on this subject, did not address the processing of applications for amendments of physical security plans, guard training and qualification plans or safeguards contingency plans pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90. Until further notice, such requests should be processed as described in the enclosed draft procedures which will be incorporated shortly in an NRR Office Letter.

! Comments on this draft should be directed to Gene McPeek, X24968, or Jane Gibson, X28457.

. y Frank k Mi 'i a , J r.O Ri hard . Starost cki Associate Director for Projects Associate Director for Inspection Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and Technical Assessment i Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation f

Enclosure:

NRR Safeguards Review Procedures

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cc: w/ enclosure T. Murley J. Sniezek J. Scinto, OGC 97ll  ? ? : ?? loff

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DISTRIBUTION:

Steven A. Varga, Director Division of Reactor Projects I/II Bruce A. Boger, Assistant Director for Region I Reactors Gus C. Lainas, Assistant Director for Region II Reactors Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director Division of Reactor Projects III, IV, V and Special Projects Gary M. Holahan, Assistant Director for Region III and V Reactors Jose A. Calvo, Acting Assistant Director for Region IV Reactors and Special Projects Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational Events Assessment Lawrence Shao, Director Division of Engineering and Systems Technology James E. Richardson, Assistant Director r for Engineering Ashok C. Thadani, Assistant Director for Systems James G. Partlow, Director  !

! Division of Reactor Inspection and Safeguards Frank J. Congel, Director Division of Radiation Protection and'""-' ~~~~

Emergency Preparedness i

Jack W. Roe, Director Division of Licensee Performance and Quality Evaluation i

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-D R A F T -

NRR SAFEGUARDS REVIEW PROCEDURES The Reactor Safeguards Branch (RSGB) in the Division of Reactor Inspection and Safeguards is responsible for all reactor safeguards-related matters and serves as the focal point within NRR for all such matters.

This Office Letter establishes NRR procedures, policies and responsibilities for safeguards reviews to assure that NRR's overall responsibilities are implemented effectively and consistently.

I. General

1. Formal Headquarters communications with licensees / applicants on safeguards-related matters, except as specified below, should be made through or with the cognizance of the Facility Project Manager (Facility PM) by the RSGB staff.

2. The Facility PM is responsible for establishing and maintaining overallprojectschedules. Any safeguards review activities which are incompatible with established project schedules must have the concurrence of the Facility PM.

3. RSGB maintains the NRR files of all safeguards and security informationwhignusjjestoredandhandledinaccordancewith 10 CFR 73.21 and 2.790 requirements and as described in NRC Appendix 2101. This information is always available for review by Facility PMs and other cognizant personnel. Facility PMs sh'ould be familiar with the content of security plans for their facilities.

4. RSGB keeps track of the status of all ongoing safeguards issues and reviews and coordinates, as necessary, with the Facility PMs to resolve review problems and to assure that reviews are complettd on the desired schedules.

2

5. Annual Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) inputs on overall licensee performance with respect to safeguards matters are provided directly to the cognizant Region. Apart from these annual assessments, individual SALP inputs prepared by RSGB accompany Safeguards Evaluation Report (SGER) inputs for license amendments and new operating licenses.

6. Whenever these procedures specify that a package shou'd be returned to RSGB for assembly and dispatch after signature, it is because the package contains "SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION" requiring special handling.

II. Operating' Power Reactors A. 10 CFR 50.90 Amendment Reviews

1. When a safeguards amendment request is received from a licensee, RSGB will screen it to determine that the submittal is complete.

If the requested amendment involves any safety implications, it is sent to the Plant Systems Branch, Division of Engineering and Systems Technology, for technical review. RSGB prepares and forwards a Technical Assistance Request (TAR) to the Plant Systems Branch for the technical review. Completion dates are based on programmatic needs and verbally negotiated on a case-by-case basis with cognizant Facility PM. RSGB also prepares a proposed "no significant hazards" finding for the , ,,

Federal Register "Sholly" notice. All safeguards information is handled in accordance with 10 CFR 73.21.

2. 'By copy of the "no significant" hazards consideration finding, the Facility PM is asked to obtain a Technical Assignment Control System (TACS) number to account for NRR resources expended on the effort and to assure that all NRR participants receive a copy of the TACS form.

, 3

3. The cognizant Project Directorate completes the prenotice package and processes it for publication in the Federal Register.

4. If additional information is required to complete the review, RSGB prepares a transmittal letter to the licensee for signature by the appropriate Facility PM. After signature the letter is returned to RSGB for assembly of the package, dispatch to the licensee and proper distribution.

5. When the review is complete, RSGB forwards the proposed license amendment, the non-safeguards portion of the SGER presenting the results of the technical review, SALP input, and any supplementary documentation by memorandum to the cognizant Project Directorate, with copies to the Licensing Assistant and the Facility PM, for preparation of the license amendment and associated paperwork. The "safeguards information" portion of the SGER is retained permanently by RSGB.

6. The Facility PM follows the procedures for processing license amendments. RSGB is on concurrence for the completed license amendment and receives two copies of the amendment package upon dispatch. A copy of the amendment is sent by the cognizant

! Project Director to the appropriate Regional Director.

7. When the amendment is iJsued, the Facility PM closes the TACS number for this specific review effort.

B. 10 CFR 50.54(p) Oversight Reviews

1. Responsibility for review of 10 CFR 50.54(p) security plan changes has been delegated to the Regions. When a Region l transfers responsibility for a 10 CFR 50.54(p) review to j Headquarters in accordance with the established criteria and guidance for regionalized safeguards functions, RSGB performs a

Y review of the item and then prepares and forwards a TAR to the Plant Systems Branch, if safety-related issues are involved. The TAR includes a target completion date based on programmatic needs and verbally negotiated on a case-by-case basis among RSGB, the cognizant reviewers and the Facility PM. RSGB sends copies of the TAR to the appropriate Regional Divisionr iirector and the Facility PM. RSGB assures that all "safeguards information" is handled in accordance with 10 CFR 73.21 and tracks the subsequent review status.

2. NRR personnel use TACS number M51592 with Planned Accomplish-ment Number 113 for effort expended on the review.

3. If additional information is required to complete the review, RSGB prepares a transmittal letter to the licensee for signature by the cognizant Facility PM. The signed letter is returned to .

RSGB for assembly of the package, dispatch to the licensee and P

proper distribution.

4. When the review is complete, RSGB prepares a letter to the licensee for signature by the cognizant Facility PM. The letter should reference the licensee's original submittal and the Region's letter to the licensee concerning the transfer of review responsibility to Headquarters. The signed letter is returned to RSGB for assembly of the package, dispatch te the licensee and proper distribution. A copy is sent to the appropriate Regional Division Director.

C. Regulatory Effectiveness Reviews (RERs)

1. RSGB, in coordination with the Regions] identifies plants to undergo RER and establishes schedules. RSGB coordinates site visits with the appropriate Region, resident inspector, and Facility PM, and coordinates the RERs with the licensees through the Region. The Region participates ir,all the RERs.

-S-The Facility PM may participate in the entire RER and should at least attend the exit briefing.

2. RSGB sends a draf t letter for the licensee to the Region, along with a request for regional support. The Region forwards the letter to the licensee, with copies to the Facility PM, RSGB, and the resident inspector advising the licensee of the upcoming RER, explaining the purpose of the RER and identifying the necessary information and personnel to be available at the time of the visit. This letter should be sent with as much advance notice as possible, preferably no less than 30 days prior to the scheduled visit date.

3. Before the site visit, RSGB asks the Facility PM to obtain TACS numbers to account for NRR resources expended on the effort.

R$GB prepares the RER report which is coordinated with the regional team member. The Vital Area Definition portion of the report may be sent later under separate cover, and a separate TACS number may be needed for that effort.

4, RSGS preperes a letter to the licensee, for signature by the ccqnizant Division Director - Projects, transmitting the RER repo"t.

The signed letter is returned to RSGB for assembly of the package, dispatch to the licensee, and proper distribution.

The Project Directorate furnishes a service list for proper distribution of the transmittal letter.

S.

When the letter to the licensee is issued, the Facility PM closes the appropriate TACS number for this specific review effort.

6. When a response to the RER report is received from the licensee, it is forwarded to hSGB for action and the Facility PM obtains a TACS number to account for NRR resources expended on the effort. '

D. IAEA Safeguards Under an agreement between the United States and the Inter-national Atomic Energy-Agency (IAEA), the IAEA is permitted to perform certain safeguards inspections in selected U.S. nuclear power reactors. The IAEA identifies facilities from an eligibility list provided by the U.S. These facilities are then subject to IAEA safeguards inspections for sou fixed term, usually a few years. The objective of the inspections is to permit the IAEA to verify that source or special nuclear materials are not removed from the facilities, except as provided by the Agreement. RSGB is the cognizant group for coordinating all NRR responsibilities for the interoffice Safeguards Agreement Implementation Group chaired by NMSS. The relevant procedures are as follows:

1. RSGB prepares the reactor portion of the annual update of the eligibility list. This list is furnished to NMSS (International Activities Section), for transmittal through the State Department to IAEA.

2. When facility selections have been made, RSGB notifies the cognizant Facility PM. RSGB also prepares the correspondence, notifying the affected licensees of the requirements under 10 CFR 75, for the Division Director's signature. RSGB dispatches this correspondence after signature. ,

3. RSGB provides the NRR interface and coordination between NMSS and the cognizant Facility PM during the entire duration of facility participation. This includes facility visits, preparation of facility attachments (the U.S. and IAEA develop facility attachments which define the IAEA and U.S. safeguards responsibilities), preparation of Sholly notices, and te:1nina-tion amendments. In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 75, pertinent portions of the facility attachments are incorpo-rated in the licenses as conditions.

E .

E. Information Assessment Team (IAT)

The IAT provides a multi office on-call group within the NRC to rapidly assess the seriousness of threats involving licensed nuclear facilities, materials, or activities; to review and evaluate safety-and safeguards-related data to determine the consequences of the threatened act; and to recommend appropriate actions to senior NRC management. The IAT is composed of members from each of the

. Regional Offices, HMSS, and NRR. The NRR representatives of the IAT are members of the Events Assessment Branch and RSGB staff. In this capacity NRR is responsible for:

1. Screening pertinent data and determining and initiating the appropriate IAT response mode including notification of appropriate NRR management.

2. Providing technical support regarding safety / safeguards implications and system consequence analyses for threats involving power and non power reactors.

3. Assuring that the NRC Operations Center has a current call-up list of NRR-IAT representatives.

III. Operating License Reviews of Security Submittals (Physical Security,_

Safeguards Contingency and Guard Training Plans)

These reviews parallel those outlined in section II. A. except that a "no l significant hazards consideration" need not be made.

l l IV. Non-Power Reactors l Non power reactor (NPR) safeguards reviews of revisions to previously approved plans and submittals for new security plans [10 CFR 50.90 or 10 CFR 50.54(p)] parallel those outlined for power reactors in sections

! II.A., II.B. and III respectively.

All NRR resources expended on these efforts are recorded by appropriate docket number and planned accomplishment number 1415.

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- t hs DEC 0 21987 Pr. Troy R. Conner, Jr. , Eso.

Conner f. Wetterhahn, P.C.

1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.

Washington, D. C. 20006

Dear Mr. Conner,

Thank you for your letter of November 6,1987, comenting on the staff's internal procedures for processing amendment requests.

The internal procedures set forth in the memorandum you refer to in your letter were established as part of ar effort to utilize the linited resources of the staff more effectively. We believe that these changed procedures can have the benefit of reducing the myiew effort for amendment requests, which includes an initial review to determine whether the amendment involves a significant hazards consideration for purposes of determining the nature of the initial notice and a subsequent review of whether the amendment properly ensures adequate safety. If things in fact turn out as you speculate and there is evidence that these procedures give rise to an untoward increase in unwarranted hearing requests that could strain resources, we would modify our internal procedures again in an effort to use our limited resources more effectively.

With respect to the three groupinns, the first is a traditional screening review to determine whether or not the incoming request contains sufficient information to pennit initiating a technical review. This is similar in approach, but of course much smaller in scope than the predocketing review of initial license applications. Generic letter 86-03, issued February 10, 1986, stated that amendments would be returned for inadequate "no significant hazards consideration deteminations." This procedure now takes this process one step fatrther. You indicate that it had been comon in the past for some staff Pro.iect Managers to take the initiative of contacting applicants to request additionai infomation. This meant keeping the request in a dormant status pending receipt of such information. The administrative effort involved in tracking the status of such requests, awaiting the eventual receipt of missing information, and essentially conducting a double review wastes cur

limited resources. Accordingly for such defective applications the staff will infonn the licensee of the deficiencies in the application and will not process the request further. The applicant may of course rectify the deficiencies and refile its amendment request. This action does not preclude a request for additional infomation once the detailed review comences. Rather it is an initial screening stating that the detailed review will not comence until the packace is properly presented.

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. Mr. Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esq. -?-

The distinction between the second and third categories is straightforward.

If, on review of the materials submitted with the incoming application, the Project Manager can readily ascertain that the amendment involves no complex safety issues, the Pro.iect Manager will categorize the application in the second category and prepare a proposed finding that the action involves no significant hazards consideration and will proceed to complete the safety review so that the amendment may be issued shortly after the notice period is completed. On the other hand, if the Project Manager cannot determine from the licensee's materials that the action does not involve complex or significant safety issues or safety considerations, the Project Manager will categorize the application in the third category, issue a notice of opportunity for prior hearing, and arrange for the technical review effort to begin.

Categoriration may to some extent depend on the expertise and attitude of the Project Manager assigned to the project; categorization will, however, depend to a far greater degree on the quality of the materials submitted by the licensee in support of the amendment request. A well prepared submittal by a licensee that clearly and fully addresses the safety aspects affected by the proposed amendment and that provides a thorough and technically sound evaluation of the effect of the amendment on facility safety can be the most significant element in detemining whether the application will be categorized as category 2 or 3.

In short, the principal effect of the new procedures will be that licensees who believe that the amendment they propose involves no significant hazards considerations must assure themselves that the application materials are thorough, clear, and provide a technically sound basis for such conclusion, with respect to each of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92. After three years of case-by-case discussion and guidance by the staff with respect to the revised Notice provisions of 10 CFR 50.91 and 50.92, licensees should understand criteria utilized by the NRC. NRC staff resources are too limited to pemit the staff to rewrite inadequate "no significant hazards consideration detemina-i tions."

Your concern that the procedures set forth in the memorandum attached to your letter would amount to a de facto modification to the provisions of the Comission's regulations, is misplaced. The standards for determining whether an action involves a "significant hazards consideration" remain those set forth in 10 CFR 50.9?. Similarly, the provisions governing notices set forth in 10 CFR li 2.105 and 50.91 are not changeti. Your reference to a renuirement in 10 CFR 50.91(a)(2)(ii)(A) is also misplaced. 950.91(a)(2) relates to notices l of proposed actions "for an amendment for which it (the staff) makes a proposed l detemination that no significant hazards consideration is involved." Unde r i the provisions of i 189(a)(2) of the Atomic Energy Act, a notice providing i opportunity for public coment on a proposed no significant hazards considera-I tions determination is required only for those amendments which the Comission i

proposes to issue under the provisions of i 189(aM2)(A),

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Mr. Troy P. Conner, Jr. , Esq. -3 These internal processing procedures do not affect the regulatory standards determining whether a proposed license amendment involves "significant hazards consideration"; rather they relate only to minimizing technical staff resources expended on deficient amendment submittals and on submittals for which the licensee's request does not provide a clear, thorouah, convincing evaluation demonstrating that the proposed arrendment in fact satisfies those standards.

Thank you for your coment on the "flow chart." Picase be assured that the advice of the Office of the General Counsel remains an important input to the regulatory actions of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Pegulation.

We are preparing, and expect to issue shortly, a generic letter explaining in more detail specific aspects of this new procedure.

Sincerely.

Originai Sig1ed By:

James hl Tay!or

\ictor Stello, Jr.

Executive Director for Operations DISTRIBUTION: (EDO.003285)

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' ew's reauest does not provide a clear, thorough, convincing evaluation demo .s t i at uig t' at the proposed amendment in fact satisfies those standards.

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s. e , a; time at the Atmic Energy Commission, the advice of the Of fice of t '.c ;eneral Coonsel remains an important input to the regulatory actions of the

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ae ee .a epe 'og, avid expec t to issue shortly, a generic letter explaining hre Jetill specific aspects of this new procedure. ik%-pee yetit regttest, t'a s letter does advise. you of the Stef f's position on the points you have iusa - Jhe internal procedur44 change is not an appropriate subject for C a<a. i s s i on ru l e ma ki ng .

Sincerely, Victor Stello, Jr.

Executive Director for Operations 015fWlBui!0N: (EDO-003285)

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" o""oO "*Ed' "'" " " " -November 6, 1987 43Olill 833-3800 CABLE ADDR ESS: ATOMLAW Mr. Victor Stello Executive Director of Operations United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Re: New Amendment Review Procedure and Project Manager Review Responsibility Dear Mr. Stello A short while ago, I obtained a copy of the attached memorandum from Frank J. Miraglia, Associate Director for Projects and Richard W. Starostecki, Associate Director for Inspection and Technical Assessment, dated September 4, 1987. The memorandum is entitled "Project Manager Review Responsibility" and includes an enclosure entitled "Amend-ment Review Procedure."

Although the stated purpose of the new procedures - to reduce the "six months or longer (it takes] to issue an amendment" - is laudable, the practical impact of the change is likely to be increased public hearings and consequent delays. As a legal matter, these documents appear on their face to enact de facto amendments to Parts 50 and 2 without review by the-Commissioners and without the notice and opportunity to comment required by the Administrative Procedure Act and the Commission's regulations.

My purpose in writing on behalf of our firm and some of our clients is therefore to obtain clarification as to whether the procedures described in the memorandum and enclosure are intended to supersede existing procedures for considering and issuing license amendments under 10 C. F. R.

SS50.91 and 50.92. The memorandum appears to set different and more stringent standards and to create new procedures for Staff review of amendment applications. The effect in some cases would be to delay issuance of needed license

amendments while a requested public hearing is held.

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, Mr. Victor Stollo November 6, 1987 Page 2 Under the procedures described in the memorandum's enclosure, it will be the responsibility of the Project Manager to place the amendment application in one of three categories based upon the technical adequacy of the applica-tion and the necessity for detailed technical review.

Assignment to Category 1 is "a rejection of the overall adequacy of the request," resulting in a letter to the licensee "documenting reasons why the package is inadequate and stating the corrective action the licensee needs to take before resubmittal." The routine action the NRC has always taken on an application which lacks sufficient information or technical support is simply to ask - for the additional information. We do not see why this practice should be eliminated in favor of rejecting the application out of hand.

Our main problem is with the differentiation between Category 2 and Category 3 designations. To be assigned to Category 2, the Project Manager must be able to conclude that the application, "based on its face value alone, has adequate technical justification to conclude that no de-tailed specialist review is necessary and the amendment invoJves no significant hazards consideration." If so, the Project Manager simultaneously prepares the Sholl notice for publication in the Federal Register, performs a safety review and prepares an amendment for issuance.

In stating that the application must justify this treatment "based on its face value alone," the amendment is unclear as to what kind of extrinsic information or techni-cal knowledge the Project Manager is precluded from relying upon in reaching his determination. In other words, under the stated standard, it appears that categorization of the application will not conform to a defined regulatory stan-dard, but rather will substantially depend upon the personal expertise and attitude of the particular Project Manager assigned to review it.

It is also unclear to what extent the procedure de-scribed in the memorandum is intended to preclude the Staff Project Manager from consulting with appropriate technical members of the Staff with regard to the categorization of i applications.

The memorandum defines a Category 3 amendment as one which "requires a detailed specialist review." It then states that Category 3 amendments "will be noticed with an opportunity for a hearing with ne comments concerning l

significant hazards considerations."

~ .

. Mr.. Victor Stollo November 6, 1987 Page 3 This conflicts with the provision of Section

50. 91 (a) (2) (ii) ( A) that the published notice will contain the Staff's proposed determination under Section 50.92(c) as to whether the proposed amendment "involves no significant hazards consideration." As the memorandum recognizes, the necessary consequence of failing to make a "no significant hazards consideration" determination is to withhold issuance of the amendment until the outcome of a hearing, if one is requested. The regulations, on the other hand, contemplate that a final determination of "no significant hazards consideration" will be made in every case, and that the amendment will be issued, even if a hearing is requested, where a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" has been made. See 10 C.F.R. 550. 91 (a) (4) .

The memorandum states that the purpose of these new procedures is to obtain "optimum use of agency resources, recognizing that if an amendment truly involves 'no signifi-cant hazards consideration,' then its respective technical review should not involve a significant amount of NRC review effort, other than the effort which.is part of the respon-sibilities of the assigned PM." Of course, the nuclear industry shares the objective of optimizing the use of agency resources, but it is specious to assume that a significant hazards consideration exists simply because it takes the Staff a longer time to reach its determination.

At least that concept has not been incorporated in the regulations, which provide applicable standards under 10 C.F.R. 550.92.

The real threat that we see in these procedures is that intervenors will.come to accept a Category 3 designation as the Staf f's acknowledgement that the application is techni-cally weak, marginal or unjustified on its face and thus vulnerable to attack. This will result in more requests for l a hearing.

It is also likely that the designation will influence licensing boards in granting intervention and admitting f contentions. For example, any amendment not listed among the 13 examples of Category 2 amendments is likely to be regarded as a potential safety problem. The listing of these examples is also contrary to the Commission's existing approach in having listed those amendments which are likely l

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Mr. Victor Stallo Novembar 6, 1987 Page 4 to involve a finding of a significant hazards consid-eration.1/

Moreover, while it should be clear by now that the "no significant hazards consideration" determination by the Staff is procedural and non-reviewable, some boards incor-rectly view the determination as c hearing issue.2/ In our view, the creation of new categories of amendment applica- i tions, some with and some without the "no significant hazards consideration" determination, will perpetuate this confusion.

As a final point, we note that the flow chart attached to the memorandum does not provide for any input from the General Counsel, except to coordinate hearing activities.

We assume that the new procedures were not intended to eliminate the traditional role of the General Counsel in concurring upon the issuance of amendments.

If the Staff believes that changes in existing proce-dures for issuing amendments and making "no significant hazards consideration" determinations are needed, the proposed changes should be the subject of Commission rule-making. In any event, we wish to be advised of the Staff's position on the points we have raised.

Sincerely, Troy B. Conner, Jr.

Enclosure cc: Thomas E. Murley 1/ See 48 Fed. Reg. 14864, 14870 (April 6, 1983).

2_/ In one such proceeding, the Licensing Board stated that "the issue under the notice of hearing is whether the

'no significant hazards consideration' determination is correct" and added that "an allegation of any significant decrease in the margin of safety flowing l from a 'no significant hazards consideration' amendment would be a fairly litigable issue . . . .

Philadelphia Electric Company (Limerick Generating Station, Unit 1), LBP-86-9, 23 NRC 273, 276-77 (1986).

_. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ _ __