ML20056D150

FEMA - Final After-Action Report for the October 22, 2019, Hatch Nuclear Plant Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise

ML20056D150
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	02/12/2020
From:	US Dept of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML20056D150 (71)

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I Final After Action Report I Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise I Exercise Date: October 22, 2019 I February 12, 2020 I

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Final After Action Report I Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Exercise Date: October 22, 2019 I

I February 12, 2020 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I

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I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I Table of Contents I Page Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................. 3 I Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................... 5 Section 1: Exercise Overview ......................................................................................................... 7 1.1 Exercise Details ............................................................................................................. 7 I 1.2 1.3 Exercise Planning Team Leadership ............................................................................. 7 Participating Organizations ........................................................................................... 8 I Section 2: Exercise Design Summary ........................................................................................... 11 2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design ....................................................................................... 11 2.2 Exercise Core Capabilities and Objectives .................................................................. 11 I 2.3 Exercise Scenario ......................................................................................................... 13 Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities ............................................................................................... 15 I 3.1 3.2 Exercise Evaluation and Results .................................................................................. 15 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation .................................................................... 15 3.3 Jurisdictional Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation ............................................. 18 I 3 .3 .1 State of Georgia ............................................................................................... 18 3.3 .1.1 State Operations Center ................................................................. 18 I 3.3.1.2 3.3.1.3 Dose Assessment ........................................................................... 20 Field Monitoring Team Operations and Management.. ................. 21 3 .3 .1.4 Waterway Warning ........................................................................ 22 I 3.3.2 Joint Operations ............................................................................................... 23 3.3.2.1 Emergency Operations Facility ..................................................... 23 I 3.3.3 3.3.2.2 Joint Information Center ................................................................ 24 Risk Jurisdictions ....................................................................... :..................... 25 I 3.3.3.1 Appling County, Georgia ............................................................... 25 3.3.3.1.1 Emergency Operations Center ..................................... 25 3.3.3.1.2 Traffic Control Points .................................................. 28 I 3.3.3.2 3.3.3.1.3 Medical Services Drill ........................... ;..................... 29 Jeff Davis County, Georgia ........................................................... 31 3.3.3.2.1 Emergency Operations Center ..................................... 31 I 3.3.3.3 3 .3 .3.2.2 Traffic Control Points .................................................. 33 Tattnall County, Georgia ............................................................... 34 3.3.3.3.1 Emergency Operations Center ..................................... 34 I 3 .3 .3 .3 .2 Traffic Control Points .................................................. 35 3.3.3.3.3 Emergency Vehicle Decontamination ......................... 36 3.3.3.3.4 Reception and Congregate Care Center ...... :................ 38 I 3.3.3.4 Toombs County, Georgia ............................................................... 42 3.3.3.4.1 Emergency Operations Center ..................................... 42 3 .3 .3 .4.2 Traffic Control Points ................................................. .45 I 3 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant After Action Report Section 4: Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 47 I

Appendix A: Hatch Exercise Timeline ........................................................................................ .49 Appendix B: Exercise Key Leaders and Evaluators ..................................... ,............... :............... 51 I

Appendix C: Extent of Play Agreement .............................................................................. ,...... :.53 I

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I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I Executive Summary I On October 22, 2019, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program staff evaluated I a plume exposure pathway exercise for the 10-mile emergency planning zone for the Edwin I.

Hatch Nuclear Plant. The Hatch Nuclear Plant is located in Appling County, approximately eleven miles north of Baxley, Georgia, and is operated by Southern Nuclear Company. The I Hatch Nuclear Plant emergency planning zone is divided into sixteen emergency response planning zones. The 10-mile emergency planning zone encompasses portions of Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs Counties, with an emergency planning zone population of I approximately 8,700 residents.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency's overall objective of the exercise was to assess I the level of state and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency at the Hatch Nuclear Plant. The exercise was conducted in accordance with Federal Emergency Management Agency policies and guidance concerning the exercise of state and local radiological emergency I response plans and procedures. The previous federally evaluated exercise at this site was conducted on October 17, 2017. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted in October 1980.

I Officials and representatives from participating agencies and organizations demonstrated 11 knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and successfully implemented them during the exercise. The evaluations of out of sequence activities conducted on February 6-7, 2019; August 21, 2019; and October 8, 2019, are also included in this report. The activities included: protective actions for schools; a medical services drill; reception and congregate care I center; and emergency vehicle monitoring and decontamination. All jurisdictions demonstrated their objectives and the corresponding core capabilities identified in Section 2.2 of this report.

Federal Emergency Management Agency staff did not identify any level 1 findings during this I exercise; however, one level 2 finding was identified. The level 2 finding was related to emergency workers demonstrating incorrect monitoring and decontamination techniques and unfamiliarity with radiological exposure limits and the use of potassium iodide. The Federal I Emergency Management Agency REP staff has worked with the State of Georgia on the development of a schedule of corrective actions to address the level 2 finding. Among the corrective actions planned are to: review and update reception center plans and procedures; I provide additional training to remedy the challenges observed with the staff of the Tattnall County Middle School; and the development of visual aids to provide immediate guidance to emergency workers. The state and Tattnall County plans to demonstrate the correction of this I finding during the spring of 2020.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency staff wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the I many individuals who participated in the exercise and made it a success. The professionalism and teamwork of the participants were evident throughout all phases of the exercise.

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I

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I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I Section 1: Exercise Overview I 1.1 Exercise Details I Exercise Name 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise I Type of Exercise Full Scale Exercise I Exercise Date October 22, 2019 I Exercise Off Scenario/Out of Sequence Dates February 6-7, 2019; August 21, 2019; and October 8, 2019 I Locations See the extent of play agreement in Appendix C for exercise locations.

I Program Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I Mission

Response

I Scenario Type Full Participation Plume Phase Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise I 1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership Lawrence Robertson I Central Section Chief, FEMA Region IV 3003 Chamblee Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341 I Elisabeth "Libby" Adkins Site Specialist, FEMA Region IV I 3003 Chamblee Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341 I Jeff Morrison REP Program Manager, GEMA/HS I 935 United Avenue Atlanta, GA 30316 I 7 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report Irvin Gibson 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I

REP Exercise Officer, GEMA/HS 935 United Avenue Atlanta, GA 30316 I

Barty Simonton Environmental Compliance Specialist I

Georgia Department of Natural Resources/Environmental Protection Division 4244 International Parkway, Suite 120 I Atlanta, Georgia 30354 1.3 Participating Organizations I Agencies and organizations of the following jurisdictions participated in the 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant exercise: I State of Georgia Jurisdictions:

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4 Civil Support Team Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency Georgia Department of Agriculture I

Georgia Department of Corrections Georgia Department of Natural Resources/Environmental Protection Division Georgia Department of Natural Resources/Law Enforcement Division I

Georgia Department of Public Health-,

Georgia Forestry Commission *

• Georgia State Patrol I

University of Georgia Ext_ensioi:i Service Risk Jurisdictions:

I Appling County, Georgia _ -,

I Appling County 91r - ,, *- ;

Appling County Coroner _, .

Appling County Board of Commjssibners I

Appling County Board of Educ~tiori Appling County Emergency Managt3ment Agency Appling County Emergency Medica~ Servii;.:~s.

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I Appling County Division of Family and Children Services Appling County Health Department Appling County Public Works I

Appling County Road Department Appling County Sheriff's Office I City of Baxley Fire Department

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I City of Baxley Police Department City of Baxley Public Works I Jeff Davis County, Georgia I City of Hazlehurst Fire Department City of Hazlehurst Fire and Rescue I City of Hazlehurst Police Department City of Hazlehurst Public Works Jeff Davis County Division of Family and Children Services I Jeff Davis County Emergency Management Agency Jeff Davis County Emergency Medical Services Jeff Davis County Fire Department I Jeff Davis County Public Health Jeff Davis County Public Works Jeff Davis County School District I Jeff Davis County Sheriff's Office Tattnall County, Georgia I City of Cobbtown City of Glennville Police Department I City of Glennville Public Works City of,Manassas ,,

City of Reidsville I City of Reidsville Fire Department City of Reidsville Police Department Tattnall County 911 I Tattnall County Board of Corimu.s'sioners Tattnall County Board of Education Tattnall County Commissioner I Tattnall County Coroner * . _ .

Tattnall County Division of Family and Children Services.

Tattnall County Emergency Management Agern;y I Tattnall County Emergency Medical Services:

Tattnall County Health Department. . ,

• Tattnall County Information Tectn616gy I Tattnall County Public Works

• Tattnall County Road Depa~ment Tattnall County Sheriff's Office I *, ' . ,I * :

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant Toombs County, Georgia I

City of Lyons Police Department City of Vidalia Fire Department I

City of Vidalia Police Department Toombs County Board of Education Toombs County Division of Family and Children Services I

Toombs County Emergency Management Agency Toombs-Montgomery Emergency Medical Services I Toombs County Fire and Rescue Toombs County Public Health

. Toombs County Schools Transportation I Toombs County Sheriff's Office.

Federal Organizations: I Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region II I

Private Organizations:

American Red Cross I Appling Healthcare.

. Glenvue Health and Rehabilitation Jeff Davis Hospital I

Meadows Regional Hospital

. ,. , .OptimMedical Center

Pineland Behavioral Health/Developmental Disabilities

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. Southeastern Technical College ,

.... ,, , . SoutbemNuc lear Company

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I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I Section 2: Exercise Design Summary I 2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design I The Federal Emergency Management Agency administers the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program pursuant to the regulations found in Title 44 Code of Federal Regulations parts 350, 351, 352, 353, and 354. Title 44 Code of Federal Regulations part I 350 codifies 16 planning standards that form the basis for radiological emergency response planning for the licensee, state, tribal, and local governments impacted by the emergency planning zones established for each nuclear power plant site in the United I States. The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations also codify the16 planning standards for the licensee. Title 44 Code of Federal Regulations part 350 sets forth the mechanisms for the formal review and approval of state, tribal, and local I government radiological emergency response plans and procedures by the Federal Emergency Management Agency. One of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program cornerstones established by these regulations is the biennial exercise of offsite I response capabilities. During these exercises, affected state, tribal, and local governments demonstrate their abilities to implement their plans and procedures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the I nuclear plant.

The results of this exercise, together with review of the radiological emergency response I plans and verification of the periodic requirements set forth.in- NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l, along with supplements through the annual letter of certification, and staff assistance visits enabled the Federal Emergency Management Agency to provide a I statement with the transmission of this final after-action report to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, that the affected state, tribal, and local plans and preparedness are: ( 1) adequate to protect the health and safety of the public living :in the vicinity of the I nuclear power facility by providing reasonable-assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiological-emergency;;.and (2) capable of being implemented.

I Formal submission of the State of Georgia and involved local jurisdictions of the radiological emergency response procedures for the Hatch Nuclear Plant to the Federal Emergency Management Agency was on June 9, 1980. Formal approval was granted by the Federal Emergency Management Agency on May 5, 1981.

I 2.2 Exercise Core Capabilities and Objectives I Core capabilities-based planning allows for exercise planning teams to develop exercise objectives and observe exercise outcomes through a framework of specific action items.

Using the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program methodology, the*

I exercise objectives meet the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program requirements and encompass the emergency preparedness evaluation areas. The critical tasks to be demonstrated were negotiated with the State of Georgia and the participating I 11 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant counties. The core capabilities scheduled for demonstration during this exercise were:

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• Operational Coordination: Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders I

and supports the execution of core capabilities.

Situational Assessment: Provide all decision makers with decision-relevant I

information regarding the nature and extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the response. I

• Public Information and Warning: Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, I accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard, as well as the actions being taken and the assistance being made available, as appropriate.

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• Environmental Response/Health and Safety: Conduct appropriate measures to ensure the protection of the health and safety of the public and workers, as well as the I

environment, from all-hazards in support of responder operations and the affected communities.

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• On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement: Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas and also for response I

personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.

• Critical Transportation.':* Provide transpbrtatiort (including infrastructure access and I

accessible transportation services) for response priority objectives, including the evacuation of people and animals, and the delivery of vital response personnel, I'* equipment, and 'sefViCeS i'ntO the affecfed ~feas: *.' 1 I

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• Mass Care Services: Provide life-sustaiii'ing and human services *16 the affected population, to include hydration, feeding, sheltering, temporary housing, evacuee support, reunification, and distribution of emergency supplies.*

. ' 'Public Health, llealthcar~, a.;.d.Emerge}1c; JVIedic~l Servic~si Provide lif~saving I

medical treatm~nt via emergency in:ed!cal 'services and related operation.s' and avoid additional disease and fojury by providing 'targeted publi,c. hec:1Itp., 'm~dtc:al, and I behavioral health support, and products to all affected populat16ns. I I

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I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I These core capabilities, when successfully demonstrated, meet the exercise objectives.

I The objectives for this exercise were as follows:

Objective 1: Demonstrate the ability to provide direction and control and make I protective action decisions through the state emergency operations centers, county emergency operations centers, and field activities by exercise play and discussion of plans and procedures.

I Objective 2: Demonstrate the ability to provide protective action decisions affecting state and county emergency workers and public through exercise play and I discussions of plans and procedures.

Objective 3: Demonstrate the ability to implement protective actions for state and I county emergency workers and public through exercise demonstration.

Objective 4: Demonstrate the ability to activate the prompt alert and notification I system utilizing the primary notification system and the emergency alert system through e:,,cercise play., .

I Objective 5: Demonstrate the effectiveness of plans, policies, and procedures in the joint information center for public and private sector emergency information communications.

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Objective 6: Demonstrate the ability to monitor, decontaminate, register, and shelter evacuees.

I Objective 7: Demonstrate the ability to provide dose projection ~nd protective action recommendations ~o c:lecision ,makers for th~ plume phas,e.

I Objective 8: Demonstrate the. al;li.lity to . pr~vic;le appropriate spac~, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide tra~sport:, monitoring, deco~tamination, I andi medical services to contaminated injured individt;ials.

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The following is a surmnary of the scenario d~yeloped)y Southern.Nuclear Company to drive exercise play. Th~* scenario ahd:stipporting documents.were deemed* adequate for I *. the demonstrati~n '.of th~ 'exercis~ objectives and, associated techn1.cal. criteria identified in theextentofplayagreement: ' . ;. ',.,  ;' ,, ,, , .

I The exercise began at 0800 with a thunderstorm warning in effect. At 0805, a loss of coolant accident occurred after excess vibrations in a recirculation pump caused a failure of associated piping. Conditions exist to declare an Alert emergency classification level.

I Between 0904 and 0915, lightning strikes and other storm damage cause various electrical bus failures, and at 0930, the severe weather warning is cancelled. At 0950, I 13 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant drywell pressure decreases rapidly due to containment penetration failure and conditions I

exist to declare a Site Area Emergency. Also, a very small radiological release is occurring through the main stack. I At 1120, an increase in gap release causes drywell radiation levels to increase and a loss of all three fission product barriers occurs. Conditions exist to declare a General I Emergency and the radiological release significantly increases. The plume is expected to contain significant amounts of noble gases along with fairly small amounts of iodines and particulates. Both utility and state projections are expected to show the potassium iodide I administration protective action guideline for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals will not be exceeded (Georgia does not issue potassium iodide to the general public). The expected protective action recommendation from the utility will be to I evacuate zones A, B-5, and E-5; the evacuation recommendation only affects zones in Appling and Toombs Counties.

I At 1245, exercise termination for the utility was expected, with a commitment from the utility to run a simulation cell to provide data to offsite response organizations until offsite objectives were met. The state and offsite response agencies continued I

participation until _approximately 2:00 p.m.

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I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities I 3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results I This section contains the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the October 22, 2019, plume exposure pathway exercise and out of sequence activities of February 6-7, 2019; August 21, 2019; and I October 8, 2019.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated based on the demonstration of core I capabilities and the underlying criteria as delineated in the Federal Emergency Management Agency Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual dated January 2016. Exercise criteria are listed by number and the demonstration status of I those criteria are indicated by the use of the following terms:

• M: Met (no unresolved level 1 or level 2 findings assessed and no unresolved I

• findings from prior exercises) 1: Level 1 finding assessed

• 2: Level 2 finding assessed or an unresolved level 2 finding(s) from a prior exercise I

• P: Plan issue N: Not demonstrated I 3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation The Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program evaluation methodology is an I analytical process used to assess the demonstration of specific capabilities during an exercise. A capability provides a means to perform one or more critical tasks under specified conditions and to specific performance standards. Core capabilities form the I foundation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program evaluations. The core capability summaries below I provide an overall combined assessment of state and local jurisdictions based upon their collective demonstrated performance as it relates to the specific core capability. Each jurisdiction's standalone capability summaries are listed in Section 3.3 of this report.

I Operational Coordination:

I Leadership personnel from various agencies were able to establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure in order to provide effective direction and control.

The decision-making process, led by the State of Georgia, integrated all relevant I stakeholders to make sound protective action decisions based on recommendations made by the utility. The affected jurisdictions integrated various support agencies in order to make effective decisions. The level of participation by senior county leadership across I all four risk counties was commendable.

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report Situational Assessment:

2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I

Georgia Department of Natural Resources-Environmental Protection Division personnel successfully demonstrated the ability to assess plant conditions and to provide sound I

recommendations to decision makers in response to a radiological incident at the Hatch Nuclear Plant. County and state decision makers were provided with relevant radiological information by state dose assessors throughout the demonstration. The I

information allowed decision makers to fully understand the hazards, as well as relevant effects, in order to make appropriate protective actions decisions. I Public Information and Warning:

I The State of Georgia effectively demonstrated the activation of the primary alert and notification system. There were no failures noted; however, the state and counties were able to explain how any failures would be mitigated. News releases were coordinated I among the state and risk counties using an efficient review process initiated at the state level. Pre-caucus meetings held prior to media briefings allowed for the delivery of coordinated information. Media briefings, as well as coordinated print information for I the public, would be delivered from the utility's joint information center. The processes demonstrated enabled prompt and reliable information to be delivered to the public and media. I Environmental Response/Health and Safety:

I Firefighting personnel from the Jan Powell Fire Station and Tattnall County

, demonstrated their ability to perform radiological monitoring of emergency workers and vehicles. In accordance with plans and procedures, proper monitoring and I

, ** decontaminatiori techniques:were followed. Workers were familiar with their equipment and were able to explain radioiogicalexposure limits. ' I Teaching staff from Tattnall County Middle School participated in the* demo~stration of radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees. Though initial monitoring found contamination dn;orre eva:c6ee;the s'ecoildary monitoring point did n'ot locate the I

contamination as indicated on the evacuee monitoring form. Decontamination of evacuees* was not performed in *accordance with plahs and procedures, wHich co11ld shield contamination present., When questioned, two emergency workers were unable' to I

articulate their exposure limits and*the purpose of potassium iodide or demonstrate the

• use of dosimetry. * *

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I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement:.

I City and county law enforcement personnel were able to explain through interview the setup and operation of traffic control points. All law enforcement personnel were provided a radiological safety briefing at their respective locations as well as radiological I safety kits containing the proper equipment to track radiological exposure. They were able to explain their exposure limits as well as the purpose of potassium iodide; they were I also aware of the emergency worker decontamination locations.

Georgia Department of Natural Resources Law Enforcement personnel explained through I interview that they were knowledgeable and capable of alerting and clearing boaters on the Altamaha River for all four risk counties in response to a radiological incident at the Hatch Nuclear Plant in accordance with their plans and procedures.

I Critical Transportation:

I Appling and Toombs Counties' school representativ.es were highly knowle!=lgeable of the actions necessary: to take in order to implement protective actions to protect students and staff in response to a radiological incident at the H£J.tch Nuclear.Plant. Transportation I resources would be readily accessible in order to relocate students and.staff from the affected schools. Notification of parents/guardians and reunification procedures with students were thoroughly described.

I Mass Care Services:

I Tattnall County Jfealth Department personnel, .along with a represent.:.ttive, from the American Red.Cross, succ.essfully demon_strated their ability.to provjde ~ongregate care center services and accommodations for eyacuees. They wer:e able to.properly identify I individuals that had been proces~ed through monitoring and,de~ontfll]linatiom , ,,

Equipment available would be sufficient to support the expected. evacuee population as

, well.as extended sh~lter operations. ,: .. ,: *,:.*, * .1 .,,.,:,

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• 1 fyblic ~ealth, Healthcar~, ~nc!.Emergen~;:l\1~di,caJ Services:,_.,;

I Appll~~ _County EmergencfMe.dical ~e:rv,ides:~~~meqiq, s1,1cc6s~fully dem,onstrated the

,_.abiHty to provide Jreatment and transpor,t of a radiologi~ally contaminated injured individual. While the ~rew. understood that .lifesaving measures took.priority over I radiological hazards, they were able to use procedures effectively in order to demonstrate

. prope~ contamination control during transport.

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant Appling Healthcare personnel successfully demonstrated the capability to provide I

medical treatment to a potentially contaminated injured patient via emergency medical services and related operations. Nurses, maintenance personnel, and Hatch Nuclear Plant radiation protection technicians performed their tasks while preventing cross contamination of the patient and area. The staff demonstrated that medical care was the priority over decontamination. I 3.3 Jurisdictional Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation I

3.3.1 State of Georgia 3.3.1.1 State Operations Center I Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

I Representatives of the Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency

• successfully coordinated response actions to a simulated radiological incident involving the Hatch Nuclear Plant. Overall operationar coordination as well *as direction and I

control of the response was demonstrated by the State of Georgia from the state operations center. State operations c*enter staff maintained situational awareness of incident status and facilitated information sharing among stakeholders which ensured I

welt informed and coordinated protective action decisions were made. *

• The state operations center was recently renovated. The new facility was well equipped I

and designed to support emergency response operations: It had sufficient space;.

equipment, communications, and backup power capabilities, as well as support facilities for extended response activations. Multiple maps, signs, and displays were available and I

-t: ,,:,  ; ;used to'enhance situational awareness ..'.',. ; . . . .

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The state* warhing"pointre'ceived the initial n'titification of the incident over the I

emergency notification netw6rk. 'The'tele-connnunications specialisfwho received the

.. **call p:rortiptly irifotined leadership. in' accordance with plans and procedures. State operationf centei'support staffwete quickly 'mobilized and 'immediately began working I

to support the incident. An open conference bridge line was established and monitored

.* ifor-the' duration df the exeicise:.*ui~cussidns:\Yith th(risk'counties, the emergency i :

• operations facility state liaison, and the jointinfohn:ation center regarding' incident status I

and protective *actions were achieved using !ffitfconference* bridge line. Comnitmications

• equipment functionecl effectively withno observed failures.* Challeriges were observed with the audio ofthe'to11ference'bridge' line, but they were resolvedwithhb impact to the I

• • respo*nse. *Independent backup com:rrturticatiohs were available *in the event they were needed. *: **  : I I

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I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I The operations chief and the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manager employed subject matter experts in the state operations center to share information and I recommendations to all stakeholders over the conference bridge line. Protective action decisions for the public and emergency workers were discussed with appropriate response organizations and concurred by all stakeholders prior to implementation. The I protective action decisions considered all relevant factors and information which included dose projections and plant, meteorological, and offsite conditions.

I For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met:

l.a.1, l.b.l, l.c.l, l.d.l, l.e.1, 2.a.l, 2.b.2.

I a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None I c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings-Resolved: None*

I e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

The Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency External Affairs I staff were responsible for public affairs activities associated with the simulated radiological incident at the Hatch Nuclear Plant.. Staff developed coordinated, accurate, and actionable information for the public within the H~tch Nuclear Plant 10.-mile I emergency planning zone. ,

Information developed in the external affairs workroom withinthe_staJe. operations center was promptly emailed to the state public information officer staff in the joint information center for di~semination to the public;. Developmt'?nt of ne;w~.relec;1ses atthe st:;i.te operations center and dissemination ,froip.th~joint information c~nter was e(ficient.

, Information was. eff,ectively relayeq reg<lfding the incident at ~he Hatch Nuclear Plant

• and,. as .appropi:iaty, the act~ons t*en, and the qssistance m~de avail.able. . .: ,..

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Ext~r:nal affairs staff were nqtified_by the Raqi9Jogical :f:merigency,Preparedness;Program

,manager .via email pf the. A,.lert ~µiergyi;icy clas_sificatio11 level. The notifo;:ation; gdvised staff to report to their assigned positjons in the state operations e~nter. Upon arrival, I external affairs sta:f~ received an initiql briefing, beg,m development of new:s, rele.ase #1, an4 1nitiai~d,.~ontact with the state, public infqrmation officer staff at the j<~int information

.center. The e;xternalaffairs staff used an updat~d n~ws release development and approval I process that streamlined the release of public information and reduced the potential for erroneous messages. A total of four news releases were developed using this process.

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant Following the declaration of a General Emergency, the state and risk counties concurred I

via the coordination call to evacuate zones A, B5, E5, sound sirens, and activate the Emergency Alert System. The sirens and Emergency Alert System were sounded and activated, respectively, from the state warning point by communications staff.

I The pre-scripted Emergency Alert System message met the four Federal Emergency Management Agency requirements; however, the actual wording of the message could I

have caused confusion. As part of the Emergency Alert System demonstration, a message was sent to the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System laboratory. As part I of this test, the Emergency Alert System message was accepted, validated, and would have been broadcasted through the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System if this were an actual event. I For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met:

5.a.l, 5.b.l. I

a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None I

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings-Resolv ed: None I

e.

• Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I

3.3.1.2 Dose Assessment Situational Assessment Capability Summary:

I Georgia Department of Natural Resources Environmental Protettion Division personnel successfully demonstrated the ability to assess radiological and plant conditions and to I

• 1 provide* appropriate* rncommetidati'oris to decision tnake'rs during the response to a i'

.. radiologicalincide nt at the Hatch Nuclear Plint. ' .

. . . .. . I

.

• In accordance 'with the extent ofplay*agreement , Environmental Protection Division

• * ' personnel were pre.:positioned ii'eaf the Georgia: Sfate OperatfonS"c:'.enter and'proinptly responded following the Alert emergency classification level declaration hy' Hatch I

Nuclear Plant personnel. The radiation emergency coordinator received text and email messages from the state warning point. He, in turn, notified members of the Radiological Emergency Response Team by emair directing theni to respond. *The Georgia State I

Operations -Center *had sufficient-equipment and supplies to support ;emergency

,operations. In addition, -staff members brought computers equipj:Jedwith two'different

. dose assessment software programs. *Redundant communication systems were available I

' including landline telephones;' cellulai= telephones, push.:.to-talk: iadib-telephories,:

computer-based message boards, and email. ** I I

20 I

I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I The radiation emergency coordinator directed the state's technical response. He and the assistant radiation emergency coordinator gathered information on plant and I meteorological conditions, performed dose projection calculations, and verified field monitoring teams were positioned to locate and characterize the radiological release. A utility liaison at the Georgia State Operations Center provided detailed information on I plant conditions to state personnel.

I Following the General Emergency declaration, the radiation emergency coordinator provided protective action recommendations to state and county decision makers to evacuate appropriate zones. Since projected thyroid doses were well below protective I action guides, he recommended potassium iodide not be ingested by emergency workers.

When radiation measurements and air sampling results were obtained from field monitoring teams, the radiation emergency coordinator compared the field data with dose ii I

I projections and determined that no additional protective actions were necessary.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met:

I 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.l, 2.b.l, and 2.b.2.

a. Level 1 Finding: None I I b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None I d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I 3.3.1.3 Field Monitoring Team Operations and Management I Environmental Response/Health and Safety Core .Capability Summarrr

_Persqnnel from the Georgia Departmen_t *of Nat~.ral Reso~rc~s- Enyirorupental Protection I Division and the 4th Civil Support Team ~ucce.ss.fuUy c;lemonsti:ated the .ability to perform and manage field monitoring activities in response to a radiological incident at the Hatch Nuclear Plant. Staff men;i_bers ,were_pre-p()sitioned at-the Toombs County Emergency I . Management Agency in accordance with -the extent of play 11greement. The field team

. _memb.e:rs de~cribed how they would,qe notifi~4 to respond throu.gh use of state warning

'p()int communi~atior;is and call-down:procedures_.,_. .

I ~' .. J: .'

• l l  ;

. /.

Equipqi_e!lt, maps, jnstr.umentation, dos_imetry, potassi\lm iodide, and other supplies were sufficient to support. emergepcy operatic;ms. CommlJ.nications capabilities consisted of I push-to:.talk radio-telephone.s,.cellular telephones, and._an internet connected computer.

There. were s01;ne _communic'!,tion cl}allenges with .one field monitoring team which may have been.ca.µ~ed .by.-a cellul~ t9wer putage in the,are:;t; however, this did not have an I .. .

impact on the demonstration.

I -21 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant The field team coordinator provided a briefing to the field monitoring teams prior to I

deployment. Dosimetry use, potassium iodide ingestion, plant status, meteorological conditions, tum-back limits, and other safety topics were discussed. There was no authorization for the ingestion of potassium iodide during the exercise due to the low I

levels of radioiodines in the plume.

I The field team coordinator deployed the field teams in appropriate downwind locations which he modified following shifts in wind direction. Once each field monitoring team located the maximum exposure rate during a traverse, the field team coordinator I requested an air sample at that location. The field team coordinator promptly transmitted results to the radiation emergency coordinator at the Georgia State Operations Center.

Throughout the exercise, the plant and state field team coordinators shared information I and coordinated resources.

The teams inventoried, prepared, and checked all equipment, dosimetry, and radiological I survey instruments prior to deployment. Once deployed, the field monitoring teams used proper monitoring techniques to identify the plume and determine an appropriate area to take an air sample. Each team properly followed their procedures for collection of an air I

sample. The samples were transported to a background location and counted, and results were transmitted to the field team coordinator.

I For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness 'criteria were met:

I.a.I, l.d.l, l.e.l, 3.a.1, 4.a.2, and 4.a.3 ..

I

a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None I

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None I

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Urttesotved: Nohe 3.3.1.4 Waterway Warning'* . ,f :. :

I

, On-Scene S~curity, Protectim.~, and La:w Enforcement Capability Summary:: I Georgia Department of Natural Resources Law Enforcement personnel identified through interview that they were knowledgeable and capable of alerting and clearing boaters on the Altamaha:River for all four risk counties irt response to a radfr>logical incident at I

. Hatch Nuclear Plant in accordance with their plans and procedures~** '*

' < ' I I

I 22 I

I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I Law enforcement personnel discussed that when alerted and upon arrival at the Toombs County Emergency Operations Center, they would receive a just-in-time safety briefing I from the radiation protection officer, which would include: instructions on administrative dose limits and the use of radiation kits which contained dosimetry to ensure their safety I during operations. Radiation kits were issued but not used and were returned to the radiation protection officer at the end of the exercise.

I A Georgia Department of Natural Resources Law Enforcement officer showed the boat that would be used to clear the Altamaha River when ordered. Equipment on the boat included an 800-megahertz radio, a public address system, seating for two, and lights for I night operations. A computer was available in the truck. If any additional assistance was needed for the boat ramps and landings, the local sheriff's department would assist. The law enforcement officer stated that a pre-scripted message would be used to alert boaters I during river clearance operations.

For this capability the following radiological.emergency preparedness criteria were met:

I I

l.a.l, l.d.1,).e.1, 3.a.l, 3.d.l.

a. Level 1 Finding: None I b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None I d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I 3.3.2 Joint Operations I 3.3.2.1 Emergency Operations Facility Operational Coordination Capability SummJ~ry: . . * , '.-., : ,* ;:_

I The Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Secur:}ty Agency had lead agency responsibility for direction, control, and coordination for all radiological emergency I sitqations throughout G~orgia .. A liajson was provided b;y tbe- Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency to the Southern Nuclear Company' s corporate ~mergency,operations facility ...

I *-*

The liai~on .faciJitated the flow of information between, the utility and, state and .county agencies. Protective, actions taken by the state were provided. to the utility by the state I liaison. These included precautionary actions, protective action decisions for the public, and alert and notification system activations. Additionally, the liaison contacted the state-operations center on several occasions with relevant information provided by the utility I before it was officially reported. This provided decision makers with additional time to assess response actions.

I 23 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I

The state liaison worked closely with Southern Nuclear Company personnel in the emergency operations facility to obtain accurate and current plant conditions. She I followed appropriate procedures and protocols and performed her duties in an effective and professional manner.

I For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criterion was met:

2.b.l.

I

a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None I

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings-Resolved: None I

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None 3.3.2.2 Joint Information Center I

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

I The State of Georgia and the risk counties of Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs successfully demonstrated the capability to provide prompt, reliable, and actionable emergency information to the public and media in support of the Hatch Nuclear Plant.

I Emergency information provided in the news releases and media briefings was complete

, and accurate. Instructions provided-by the joint information center staff were: in support

• , of protective action decisions developed by the relevant state and county agencies.

I

.,!.<, *State and county public information officers were alerted and mobilized by their

• *-agenci'es: The joint information center was activated in a timely mann~r and in

• I

'.

• accordance with-plans and procedures. Upoh activation; thejoint'information *center 1

served as the* Central -point of contact for 'the release and distribution of information to the public-and media: The,facility'ptovided;atnple space and communication resources to I

,support emergency -0perations*,

• When the primary communication system failed; backup

• communication systems operated as de*signed; Equipment, maps, displays, and other *

• • supplies were sufficient to* supp*ort emergency operations.

I The ability to provide accurate and timely emergency information and instructions for the public and the media was successfully 'dem6nstrated;

• News-releases received from the I

Georgia State Operations Center were released to the public and media frchri'.thejoint information center. . Three media briefings were held dud.Jig' the exercise.

• Prior to each media briefing, spokespersons' coordinated their messages* and determined the order of I

speakers to prioritize critical emergency information. The spokespersons answered all questions asked of them by mock media and were able to discuss the precautionary and protective actions taken by their agencies. Public inquiry and media monitoring were I

I 24 I

I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I performed by the utility within this facility. State, county, and utility spokespersons were made aware of the calls received in order to address trends and rumors during the media I briefings. Identified trends and rumors were addressed during the media briefings by the utility spokesperson.

I For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met:

1.a.l, 1.d.l, 1.e.1, 5.b.1.

I a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None I c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None I e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I 3.3.3 Risk Jurisdictions 3.3.3.l Appling County, Georgia I 3.3.3.1.1 Emergency Operations Center I Operational Coordination Capabil,ity Supimary:

The Appling County Emergency Management Agency Director and staff successfully I demonstrated the ability to respond to a radiological emergency at the Hatch Nuclear Plant and ensure the safety of the general population and county. emergency '-';Orkers.

The Appling County Manager, City of Baxley Manager, and senior leadership from the I supporting co_unty agencies participated at thy emergency opercJ-tions center throughout the exercise. The support staff notifi~ation of emergency operations Qenter activation

"Yas demonstrated u_sing an automated mass notification system that used .voice, text, and I electronic m.ail messages. Tlu:ough.out the exercise, the directo,r.gathered and analyzed

.* pertinent emergency in.formation, <).nd mad~ appropri?te. deeisions'with.effective -direction and <;:ontrol. Proactive plai;mipg led to effective .discu.ssion and decision~making to I .. simulate the evacu.ation of.the affected population from th~ designated zones .. Periodic staff briefings kept staff inforrned:of. emergency conditions and plant status, and. the staff periodically briefed their status to the director to ~aintain effective internal coordination.

I *C The* em~rgency operations c~nter h_ad.multiple: commu_nicatiort systems to include computer in,t3rnet aGce~s, electronic ma.ii, ~ommercial land lines, cell .phones, and other I han.dheld electronic devices. Backup com.munic.ations .also included facsimile machines,

... and local government radios... _Electroni,c incid_ent management software* was used by staff I

I 25 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant to maintain situational awareness and track resource requests. Status calls and I

discussions among the other risk counties and state concerning protective actions were coordinated using a dedicated conference bridge line. Sufficient equipment and supplies were available for extended operations as required.

I Staff of the represented agencies demonstrated their understanding and responsibility to I assist in implementation of protective actions decisions for the affected population. The radiological protection officer provided relevant briefings to emergency workers who were to be dispatched into the affected Appling County zones. The officer presented a I state-generated video presentation on the conditions and use of radiological dosimetry followed by just-in-time training. Emergency workers interviewed demonstrated an understanding of dosimetry, potassium iodide, and management of radiological exposure. I The staff performed effective planning to assist access and functional needs people and relocate students and staff.

I The Appling County Sheriff and Baxley Police Chief described the establishment of appropriate traffic and access control procedures. Through discussion, a simulated impediment on a major evacuation route was detailed and managed with an '

I understanding of how critical it was to ensure rapid evacuation of residents. The Georgia Department of Natural Resources liaison detailed actions required to prepare vessels for Altamaha River clearance and coordination with adjoining counties.

I When the emergency management'director ordered the opening of the reception and congregate care center, the health agencies worked directly with the American Red Cross, I

• Appling County Public Health,'and Appling County Department of Family and Child

• ** Services to provide staffing assistance.*

f I

• **" For this *capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met:

• • ~:t.'a.1, l.C.1, *l'.d.i', l~e~l, 2.a:1, 2.b.2;2.c.l, 3~a.1, 3.b.l, 3.c.l, 3.c~2, 3.d.l, '3.d:2. I

, 'a. Level lFin~ihg: None

. ,b! ,Ley~l:2 Fi~~iµgJ None I

• c. Not Demonstrated: 'None*

d. Prior :Lrv.el,2 Fi11-ding~ - ~esolved.: .Nqne

*\ ,,

I

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - U!lresolved: None

•  : .*1 ... _*

• Public Information and* Wanting Capability* Summary:

I The Appling County Emergency Management Agency Director and the-Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency liaison assisted in: the I

coordination of public information. News releases were received by email, printed by the liason; and presented to* the emergenci management directorfor review and approval.

Appling County's participation in the approval process resulted in prompt, reliable, and I

I 26 I

I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I accurate information being released to the whole community during the emergency response.

I Appling County demonstrated their capability to perform primary alerting of the public in I a timely manner and ensure electronic notifications i.n areas where a siren failure might occur. Although siren failure was not a component of the demonstration, the communications officer demonstrated expert understanding of the automated mass I notification system. This system was effectively demonstrated for mobilization of key staff for the emergency operations center activation, and would also be used to notify the general public.

I For thi_s capability th~ following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met:

5.a.l, 5.a.3, 5.b.l.

I a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None I c. Not Demonstrated: None

• d. Prior Level ZFindings*-Resolved: None I* e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I Gritical Tr~nspo_rtation <;apability Sumqiary (Schools Int~rv,ew):

The Appling Ccmnty School District Superinten4ent; alo:pg with the transportation I

director, discussed via interview the protective actiops that would.be ,taken at Altamaha Elementary School if relocation was,necessary due to an emergency a.t Hatch Nuclear Plant. School district staff would be nqtified by county emergency qperatiqns. ~enter staff I of the need to implement the precautionary a<::tiqn to ~elocate. stu(ll~o,ts, st:;iff, arid* faculty.

The school would follow standard parental notification procedures through _the use of an automated notice system to notify parents/guardians of tll.e,nee~MP pick :up st_udents from I Altamaha High School; additionally, relocation information wouJd lJe availa~le on the school district website and social media outlets. Buses;'.a1ong*wffhqualified drivers, would be placed on standby and dispatched as neces,swy; bu.ses, c;ipap_le of transporting I access and functional needs individuals would, be available as well. R(?ques~ for county law enforcement escort would be codrdinated wi'thl:n tlfo*emergency' operations center.

.. .: . - ~ . .: . ~ ,* ;:r ~

I Reunification of students and parents and/or guardians would be accomplished through positive identification AS verified wit~ cl_a~,s i:o~tet;s-.obta~ned from assigned.teachers.

Teachers would be responsible for students not immediately retrieved, and additional I assistanseto l9cate par~nts/gmrr,dians would .be-,provided from the school resource

- *officer. _. - ., , , . .- -- .- " . -

• I ) ';,*1  :*,:; .** ._r ;i' _*"i_'. ,. I

,* Fpr this,capability the fo~lowingradiolpgi_cal.em_erg~ncy preparedness- criteria was met:

3.c.2. _ -

• I 27 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I

a. Level 1 Finding: None *

b. Level 2 Finding: None I

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings-Resolv ed:* None I

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I

3.3.3.1.2 Traffic Control Points On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement Capability Summary: I Appling County Sheriff's Office deputies demonstrated their knowledge to provide a safe and secure environment to establish appropriate traffic' and access control. Appling I County would have seventeen -designated traffic control points staffed by a combination of sheriff's office deputies and Baxley Police Department officers.

I All officers were knowledgeable of their dosimetry, radiological exposure, and the procedure for'ingestirtg potassium iodide: Communications and equipment to support the operatioffwere sufficient and available 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />s*a day.' The interviewed deputies I

received a thorough radiological emergency safety briefing which included potassium

• iodide instructions and issuance of dosimetry. The deputies knew the assignments and shifts would be directed from the emergency operations center. They also knew that the I

county and city road and public works departments would provide special barricades,

• signs, and* markers. *For extended assignments, assistance 'Would be provided from

. surrounding counties; the Georgia State Patrol and the Georgia Department of I

Transportation.

' ~. . : .. ' .

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria;Were met:

I l.a.l, l.d.1, l.e.l, 3.a.l, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.

a. Level l*FiiJ.ding: Nbrie *

'. I

• ' ,l,_;r.** . ,

I

. ' *.' L

. ,b. Level 2 Finding:.

' ; ~ :

c. Not Demonstrated: None None .

I

d. J>rio(Level 2 ~in~g~ ::* ~es~lved: N()11y....

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None .:i I

,,  ;: .. * ~. * * ':, i

• I I ~:.' I ** * ~

I I

• 28 I

I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I 3.3.3.1.3 Medical Services Drill I Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services Capability Summary (EMS):

I Appling County Emergency Medical Services paramedics and staff successfully demonstrated the capability to transport an injured and contaminated evacuee during a radiological emergency at the Hatch Nuclear Plant. Paramedics received initial I notification of an injured evacuee from the county 911 dispatcher office over the

• emergency medical services station intercom system. Prior to being mobilized, I paramedics received a radiological protection brief via video. The video covered key radiological protection informatio,n such as instructions *on the wear and use of _

dosimeters; exposure limits and turnback values; authorization to use potassium iodide I and dosage; potassium iodide side effects-and limits to use for pregnant emergency workers; anc;l request and return of radiological kits. Additional instructions co11cerning safety and completion of exposure fornis was provided by the radiation protection officer I at the station. Paramedics were issued suffiQient equipment and communication capabilities to perform medical missions in a potentially contaminated environment.

I Onsite,. p*ara~edi~s took several actions to prevent cross-contamination of equipment and themselv~s. Equipment was placed on sheets to prevent them from being cont~minated

• and paramedics performed numerous glove changes. Dosimeter check~ were ccmducted I

• frequently thto~ghout the demonstration ii). accordance with pians*and procedures .

. Upon arrival at the medical facility, parameclics m~intail).ed. precautionary acti~ns to I *.prevent cross contamination, and a utility radiation.protection technici.a_n was ~:vailable to survey both paramedics and their ambu,lance. Poor n10nitorin,g. t~,chniques and hick of

• contamination avoidance measures by util.ity personnel were notec;l during.the: ; i I demonstration and addressed with utility leadership onsite. Patient transfer Was done effectively and correctly., . . .. .. 1 ,,

I Paramedics were knowledgeable as to the location of the emergency worker decontamination station and knew to go there upon completipn,of;th~ir mission .. , They effectively prevented cross contamination to themselves and the patient. They I coinmunicated regularly with 'each other; 911 dispatch; 'aiid tlie hdspital, maihtaihing good situational awareness. . ,. -. *:

I For this capability the following radibl~gica] 'enie~gency'p~ep~edness 'criteria were met:

l.a.l, l.e.l, 3.a.(, 6.d.l. ,._, :1 ; .

I a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None I c. Not Demonstrated: None I 29 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I

Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services Capability Summary (Hospital):

I Appling Healthcare personnel successfully demonstrated the capability to provide medical treatment to a potentially contaminated patient via emergency me,dical services and related operations. Nurses, maintenance personnel, and Plant Hatch radiation I

protection technicians performed their tasks while preventing cross contamination of the patient and area. The' staff also demonstrated that medical care was the priority over decontamination.

• I After receiving simulated calls concerning an event at Plant Hatch, the buffer zone nurse alerted emergency room personnel of a potentially contaminated patient arriving and used I

the hospital public address system*to alert hospital personnel. Nurses proceeded to properly dress out in protective clothing and dosimetry. One nurse read plans while other nurses performed the steps. This was a very good process to ensure everyone was

• I dressed out correctly.

Plant Hatch technicians prope~ly's~urc~ checked survey in~truments and dress~d out in I

appropriate protec;tiv~ clothing..Poor monitoring techniques and)ack ot contamination avoidance measures by utility.personnel were noted during the demonstratiol). and addres~ed with utihty leadership onsite .. The radiation emergency area had enough I

supplies arid.medical equipmept to monitor, decontaininate,.and medically treat the p~~ienti. : . * * ** ** * * * *

• I

• .

• Mainte~ance persoh~e1 assi~t~din setting ~~- the r~diatioh emergenc; ~ea ip.side and outside. The maintenance personnel were very familiar with setting up the area and used the plans, to properly est~blish.,a, c.0ntrolleq area for _receiving the patient ar14 the I

J'aµibhiaiic {,:'* ' * . : .. * .**',,'"'c!,*'

.* Qn~.e the 1iati~nt.ariived,' th6

~~~s~s ~~hi\jit~d*e~~i~\lent ai~r~~ess o(contarrµ~'1;~ion I

.. co,ntrol and use(very good *d~cqo,taminatiqn techniques. The nurses c.hanged gloves

. frequently arid bad 'the plant technfoian survey thdr hands and* equipment if they were in I

• * . do'ubt of tliefr con~itfori.

• Tp.ey u~~d v~ry goqd t~chniques to *isolate th,~ contarcination areas during the decontarr,iination 'processes to ens~re' np. cross cqntamin:aiion occurred.

While the nurses in the 'r6~~- wer~ perfohltlng.*activities, 'the buffer zone ~urse ~as I

. reviewing the patient decon,ru:nJnatipn chcllt on the wall t9 en~ure thilt no; steps were a(

missed or, p~rf()rmed,put qf sequence:. The '.nurses the bqffer zone exit.logged results I

. and ensured' the riurses wire reinincled to ch/lilge gloves, :remove potentially contaminated

'materials, and check dosimetry. 'Communicat ions ':within tbe ~oom:1;tnd between the .

personnel in the jnterior and ~*teri?r qf the'ro,om were 'very good, :and ~11 personnel

• coorqinated their actions. I I

30 I

I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I

One nurse properly demonstrated how to remove their protective clothing and exit the I radiation emergency area. Hospital personnel performed all activities in accordance with their plans and procedures.

I For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met:

1.a.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.l, 6.d.1.

I a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None I c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None I e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I 3.3.3.2 Jeff Davis County, Georgia 3.3.3.2.1 Emergency Operations Center I Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

I JeffDa~is County Emergency Managemenfpersoimel demonstrated the ability to establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and proc:ess that

,I appropriately integrated all county agencies, other risk counties, ahd the state. *The emergency management director maintained diredion and control and ensured all support agencies coordinated their actions. The mayor, county administrator, sheriff, and city clerk participated throughout the exercise and were involved in decision making and I

• support. * * * *

';',:t Jerf Davis County'EmetgencYManagenieht Agency' st~ff Vsed effective prod~:dures to I alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities 'in a timely manner.

Although personnel were pre-positioned outside the emergency operations center, the

• emergency management director demonstrated their primary and setonciary' notification I systems. More than two COillIIlUJJ.ication*systertis wereavaila~le, and all systems worked

• throughout the'exercise. The emergency operMions c:enter had sufficient space, supplies, arid equipnient'to support op*erations. Each staff position*had a laptop.computer and a I position book that contained the county plans and checklists. . .. '

• • An electronic.incident management system Was used 'to maintain situational awareness I *and track resource requests. Status calls and ~iscussions *am'ong* the risk counties and state operations ceriter concerning*protective actions were coordinated using a dedicated conference bridge line." The em~tgei1cy operations ceriter had multiple communication I systems that functioned during the exercise .. The!' mrun communication systerri for receiving alerts from the utility experienced several lapses in communication ability I . 31 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report throughout the exercise. Emergency management staff had multiple devices available 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I

and were able to maintain communications. The commercial cell phone service was not functioning and created difficulties in communicating with outside agencies and county personnel. Staff were able to work around these obstacles and maintain operations.

I Sufficient equipment and supplies ensured emergency operations could be sustained for extended operations as required. I The emergency management director and operations officer conducted briefings and ensured staff were kept informed of all changes in plant status. The director coordinated I all actions on conference calls and maintained situational awareness. When emergency classification changes would have required county actions, the director discussed the actions with the appropriate support agencies and ensured they could respond I appropriately. Although potassium iodide would ndt be issued to the general public, it could be issued to emergency workers. It was determined that ingestion of potassium iodide for emergency workers was not necessary. The emergency management director I ensured staff were aware of this decision.

Jeff Davis County did not have any people identified as having access and/or functional I

needs. However, the emergency management director and support agencies had resources available if citizens notified them they needed assistance. Jeff Davis County did not have any schools in the 10-mile emergency planning zone. The director and I

support agencies described how they \\'.Ould move school stud~nts and staff to support opening a shelter for evacuees.

I Agency representatives were knowledgeable of appropriate dosimetry, potassium iodide, and procedures to ensure exposure control of emergency workers. Law enforcement representatives provided details on traffic control points and determining the impact of I

impediments on roads, such*as analyzing the effect of closing the Ten Mile Bridge and how it would not influence county traffic flow. All staff members were knowledgeable

- and us*ed checklists from: county plans fo ensure tile safety of the public and emergency I

workers.*'* ,-- '  : *

~ . *:

( . .* ' . ' .' . *,,, '; I I _I*

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met:

I

~*a.l,cl.c.l;LcLl, l.e.C 2.a:l'/2:b.2,::2*.c'.l, 3.a:1, 3.b:1, 3,.c.l', 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d:2.

a,- Levell Finding: Nohe I

, i . ,. '. J I , , .. _~ ) : l j 'r :;*

I 1

c. Not Demonstrated: ,None*--  !- ,..

d. Prior Lev~l 2 Findiµgs '."'" Resolved: None ..

• e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None * ;,

I I

I 32 I

I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I

PubHc Information and Warning Capability Summary:

I The county dispatched a public information officer to the joint information center and had a public information officer at the emergency op~rations center. There were four I state news releases; the county emergency management director reviewed and approved the messages prior to their release. News releases were accurate and provided clear, consistent, and effective messages which informed the public as conditions changed.

I The state and counties concurred on a protective action decision, activation of sirens, and transmitting an Emergency Alert System message. The state had the responsibility for I these actions and would inform the county in the event of a siren failure. In this exercise, there were no siren failures thus backup notification was not demonstrated.

I For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met:

5.a.l, 5.b.l.

I a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None I c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prfor Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None I e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I 3.3.3.2.2 Traffic Control Points

' I ' ' *

. On-Scene Security, Protection, and --

Law. En.fo:rce~ent .

Capability Summary:

I *.!,

The. ability tq establish a11:d maint',1-in traffic c9ntroLp9ints was,c;omplytecl by.int,erview.

The City of Hazlehurst Police Officer interviewed was well-versed in the law .

I enforcement aspects related to traffic control point establishment and management.

' .i i \ ~ 'i The City of Hazl.ehurst Police Offic.er exhibited knowledge o.f dosimetry, personal I protective measures, and aspects related to the ingestion of potassium iodide. The officer was provided information that would assist in responding to queries from evacu~es regarding reception and congregate care centers. Police officers would be equipped with I both vehicle and handheld radio and cell phones. The em~~gericy response vehicles and officers would have the necessary response and safety equipment. .,,,,

I The City of Hazlehurst Police Officer was conversant in idehtifyi~g and resolving traffic impediments. Assistance in the c~~aranc~.o{impediments would be, coordinated through the emergency operations center.

I I 33 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met:

I l.a.1, 1.d.l, l.e.l, 3.a.1, 3.d.l, 3.d.2.

a. Level 1 Finding: None I

b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None I

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None*

I 3.3.3.3 Tattnall County, Georgia I 3.3.3.3~1 Emergency Operations Center Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

I Tattnall County Emergency Manageme nt officials successfully demonstra tedthe ability I to respond to a radiological emergency at the Hatch Nuclear Plant and protect the safety of the general public and emergency workers. The emergency management director had multiple electronic* notification methods to alert the staff to report to the emergency I operations center. Throughout the exercise, the director gathered and analyzed pertinent emergency information, and made appropriate decisions. *Periodic briefings kept the staff informed of emergency conditfoms and maintained internal coordination. I The emergency operations center had multiple communication systems to include

, . computer internet access, electronic inail; corrimercial land lines, cell phones, and other I handheld electronic devices. An electronic incident management system was used to maintain situational awareness and track resource requests. Status calls and discussions among Georgia Emergency Manageme nt artd Homeland Security Agency and the other I

risk counties concerning protective action decisions were coordin.ated using a de~icated conference bridge line. Equipment and supplies on hand were sufficient to sustain emergency operations for an extended time. * \ **

I

' '.l J i I .~ * * ' / ; > '

Agency representatives were knowledgeable of appropriate dosimetry, potassium iodide, and procedures to manage radiological exposure ofemergen cyworkers . Law I

enforcement representatives provided details on the establishment of traffic control points and clearance of impediments. Staff members were know ledgeaofo and effectiv~I y used county checklists to protect the safety ofthe public and emergency workers.

I I

~ ' *

• I ' ~ ,, -,

• J !, ( '

_,)"'*

I 34 I

I

I Radiological Emergency Preparedness :Program After Action Report

• 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met:

l.a.l, l.c.1, l.d.l, l.e.l, 2.a.l, 2.b.2, 2.c.l, 3.a.1, 3.b.l, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.l, 3.d.2.

I a. Level 1 Finding: None I b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None I d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None.

I Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

I Tattnall County Emergency Management Agency personnel demonstrated the ability to deliver prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the general public through coordination with the State of Georgia and the risk counties *.*The State of Georgia was I responsible for the activation of sirens and the release* of the Emergency Alert System message. In the event of a sir~n failure, Tattnall County would use a mass notification systerµ to notify the general public.

I The pu):>lic information officer was assigned to the joint information. center. The Georgia Emergency Managem,ent and Homeland Security Agency issued four news releases I during the exerdse; each was coqrdinated internally by the state and county directors prior to release. The release of public information was the responsibility of.the joint information center.

I For this capability the following radiological emergepcy preparedness .criteria were*met:

5.a.1, 5.a.3, 5.b.l.

I a. Level 1 Finding: None. =.r l:: ~ }! * ' * '-* .r *' .*

' b~ Level 2 Finding:" None .

I c. Not Demonstrated: None

• . 7 '~, I < ' . . :, ~ ' .- ,; j ~ , ; ' 't ,' *

, ~ r

• ' *, I _fo * *

• I d. Prior Level 2 Findings-Resolved: *None

! . _ ,. ,. r /' ' * ".";:. ** ) *: ,

e. J>..rior Leyel 2 Fin~ings.~-.Unre~olved:, Nqne .... *

• "" 1* * ) ~  :~ >-. * *;*, ,/f .**".

,* ~  : ' ,* : t. ~ ' . '

I 3,3.3.3.2 :Traffic ~Q_ntr0I,P;9ints . !

• ,~ ; ' t I ' ' ~*

. ~ .. . ..

• * -~ 1*'

On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement Capability Summary:

I Through interview, Tattnall County Sheriffs Office deputies discussed their ability to establish and maintain traffic control points to support a radiological emergency at Hatch I Nuclear Plant. The Tattnall County Sheriff's Office, with assistance from Tattnall County Public Works and Georgia State Patrol, would have sufficient equipment, maps, I 35 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant and communication capabilities to conduct traffic and access control operations.

I Redundant communications would be available.

The Tattnall County Radiation Protection Officer provided the required radiological I

briefing to deputies prior to issuance of dosimetry and potassium iodide. This was completed using an emergency worker radiological briefing video from the Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency. Deputies were made aware of I

the appropriate tum back values, recording of dosimetry readings, and the ingestion of potassium iodide. I The Tattnall County Sheriff's Office would be responsible for seven traffic and access control points. Assistance with their operation would be provided by the Georgia State I Patrol. Debris removal and barricading equipment would be provided by the Tattnall County Public*Works Department. The sheriffs office would attempt to clear any impediment and would seek assistance from the* county public works department. I For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met:

• l.a.l, l.d.l, l.e.l, 3.a.:1, 3.d.l, 3.d.2.

i .

I

a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Leyel 2 Finding: No~e I

c. Not Demonstrated: None

• d,. Prior:Level 2:'_Findings-'Resolved: None I

e. Prior.Level 2 Findings - Unresolved:' None I

3.3.3.3.3 *Emergency Vehicle Decontamina tion Environmental Response/Health and Safety Capability Summary:

I l . , .* ' * -. l ): I ' .i . j *: *:, * ' I l; ~ < ,*

Emergency vehicle monitoring and decontamination for Tattnall County personnel in support of the Hatch Nuclear Plant was successfully demonstrated by Rogers State Prison I

firefighting personnel at the j an Powell Fire Station located in Reidsville*, OA. Two vehicles were processed through monitoring and decontamination using:established plans and procedures. It was demonstrated that equipment, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, I

and potassium iodide were sufficient to support the monitoring 'and decontamination of emergency vehicles and equipment.. Monitoring yguipment and:dosimetry,were ~ource checked appropriately prior to operational use and were.checked for appropriate I

calibration dates. Radios were the 'primary form o:fbomniU:ni2ation,:wfth sup1ervision having cell phones for backup; they were operational throughout the demonstration without failure.

I I

36 I

I

I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I The Tattnall County Emergency Management Agency Director, serving as the radiological protection officer, successfully demonstrated the capability to issue I appropriate dosimetry and potassium iodide in order to manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with plans and procedures. The use of a state-created I video, along with additional information provided by the radiological protection officer, were effective in relaying pertinent information regarding dosimetry use and exposure limits. Emergency workers read their dosiIUeters at appropriate established intervals, and I readings were recorded on the appropriate exposure record. Personnel assigned within the emergency vehicle decontamination site demonstrated the ability to maintain appropriate recordkeeping of the administration of potassium iodide, if necessary, to I emergency workers. Emergency workers were able to communicate appropriate administrative limits as well.

I As each vehicle approac:hed the vehicle monitoring area, the vehicle's driver was stopped by a portal monitor worker acting as a "recorder," who requested and recorded the appropriate information on the form. It Was noted that the individual acting as recorder I followed the same vehicle from initial monitoring, through the entire decontamination

• process, which proved effective in the processing of the vehicles. The driver was instructed to proceed very slowly through the portal monitor, and both vehicles were I hand-surveyed in accordance with procedures. The contaminated vehicle was decontaminated accordingly, and appropriate processes were demonstrated until the vehicle was clean. Though monitoring was performed in accordance with procedures, I faster monitoring speeds could accelerate the process in order to place critical response vehicles back into service. Lack of supplies such ~s brushes, vacuum, etc., were noted; however, the emergency workers were able to successfully complete monitoring and I decontamination. Both emergency workers were s1:1rveyed ip accordance with procedures using proper techniques. Emergency workers requiring decontamination would be transported to North Tattnall Middle School, which was demonstrated cluring:the I reception and congregate care evaluation.

• ' , 1* ~* .' * ( -';; ' '

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met:

I 1.e.l, 3.a.l, ~.b.l, 6.bJ. *

a. Level 1 Finding: None I b: Level 2 Finding: Nolie

c. N~t Demon.strated: None I d."

• Prior Level 2 Findings .... Resolved: N,one ' *

e. . Prior: Level 2. Fin~ings. - Unresolved: None I

I I 37 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 3.3.3.3.4 Reception and Congregate Care Center 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I

Environmental Response/Health and Safety Capability Summary: I Teachers and staff of North Tattnall Middle School participated in the reception, monitoring, and decontamination of evacuees and emergency workers in response to a radiological incident at Hatch Nuclear Plant. Equipment and monitoring instruments I

were sufficient to support emergency operations, and emergency worker exposure was appropriately managed within the facility. Displays and visual barriers were present I within the initial monitoring area to guide evacuees and emergency workers; however, additional exterior displays and barriers leading to the entrance of the initial monitoring and decontamination facility would be useful. I The vehicle reception area was spacious and would be able to accommodate incoming traffic due to an evacuation. Individuals driving to the facility would park their vehicles I ina secure lot controlled by law.enforcement personnel. Vehicles would be held and monitored for contamination as time would allow. Though there was not ari area designated for decontamination, there would be adequate space to establish a I

decontamination area. It was suggested that monitoring and decontamination of vehicles be arranged in order to avoid excess vehicle storage and potential spread of contamination. Individuals with access and/or functional needs would be assisted by I

• medical personnel on site.* One law enforcement personnel was present for the demonstration.; there was no exterior signage in the parking lot or outside* the buildings observed at the facility to guide evacuees and emergency workers.

I Emergency: workers were provided a safety and radi'ological briefing prior to beginning reception center 'operations. Dosimetry and simulated potassium iodide were *provided, I

along with necessary documentation.* Emergency workers were provided their exposure a:nd,contarriination limits, and dcisime'try'was checked accordingly at the prompt of the radiologicail safety*officei;, Emergency workers were able to demonstrate the placement I

. oflliortitoring*instn.:iinehts intd service:'workers were'also aware of the proper wear of personal protective equipment." , , ;, * *. I Initial monitoring of evacuees was successfully demonstrated through the use of one

,:portal monitor*, which-was verified to be stifficienno monitor the estimated evacuee

. population and emergency w*orkers. *The monitoring area was'Iarge enough to handle the I

portal monitor and separation of clean and contaminated evacuees.' Clearly delineated

. foies with barrier rope*ailowed_for cordoning of clean and-contaminated individuals; those deemed clear of contamination were directed to a clean holding *atea, and those I

showing contamination were escorted to the appropriate locker room. Decontamination and additional monitoring iri.ithe locker roolh'areas were demonstrated with*challenges .

.Knowledge of.exposure limits* and*potassiumibdide were performed-witli challenges I

within the women's decontamination atea:

,*, I I

38 I

I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria Were met:

1.e.l, 3.a.l, 3.b.1.

I For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criterion was NOT I met: 6.a.l.

a. Level 1 Finding: None I b. Level 2 Finding: 031-19-6.a.l.-L2-01 Criterion: Support Operations/Facilities; Monitoring, Decontamination, and I Registration of Evacuees. The reception center facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees (Criterion 6.a. l).

I Condition: During the reception.center dempnstration, emergency workers demonstrated inc;orrect mo,nitoring and decontamination techniques; they wen~ also I unfamiliru: with radiological exposure limits and the use of potassium iodide.

Analysis: ,Emergency workers did .not demon~trate the ability ,to detect possible I contamination and.conduct proper decontamination of evacuees in order to avoid the sprea~ of conta~nation. Inadequate handheld survey techniques resulted in the inability of emergency workers to find.multiple areas of contamination. Small radioactive sources I

I had .been placed on the. evacu~es to simulate contamination .. Emergency workers at the

• portal monitors clearly marked contamination forms wi(h the location on.the evacuee that alarmed the monitor. . The emergency workers in the decontamination area did not use I this information to focus their surveys on.the affected areas. During the demonstration, some areas marked as,potentially contaminated by the portal monitor were not monitored at all by the emergency workers in the ~e.contamination area. Thi.s. resulted -in the I . decontamination area emergency workers ,declaring th_e evacuees, decontaminated even though the small sources were still. on the ev;acµe~s ,and should have alarmed 1the handh~ld survey meters. The soqrces,,Were nqt,d,etyc~edbecause the e:me;gency workers I were not knowledgeable in survey techniques. Th_~ emergen~yworkers held the survey meters too far away from the evacuee and moved the meter too fast.

I ..

.. Emergency workers did .n.ot Burvey: personal iteiµs: that evacuees placed in: a plastic bag in 1 . tbe male decontamin<;ltion area .. The bag w:as allowed to be returned to .the .evacuee

.: without any survey. If theitem~were contarn,inated,and the evacuee put:the-items from I . the b:;ig back_<?~ tp.emselves, an,<;l then enteredthe, general population,.they-.could *possibly

.. ,spre,ad coD:t~_mination..qrre-c;ontamiriate themselv.es . , _, ,. *, .

I *. - l ; 1~. * . *. : ' *' .

- Evacuees, after simulated deconta,mination, wer,e instructed to dress in protective clothing

• . before beingµ10nitored for contamination,. .Th~ protective clothing may preventthe survey instrument from detecting contaminl;\tion9n the evacuees. The plan stated that the I evacuees should be monitored immediately after performing decontamination. The emergency workers performing the monitoring were not knowledgeable of the plan or of I 39 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant the possible interference the protective clothing would provide. When monitoring the I

evacuees in the protective clothing the emergency workers did not conduct a whole-body survey. Even though a radioactive source was still on an evacuee's ankle the emergency worker conducting the survey declared the evacuee decontaminated. The evacuee was I

then released to enter the shelter.

Emergency workers were not familiar with their radiological exposure reporting limit, did I

not accurately record exposure readings on their exposure record, and did not attempt to contact the radiation protection officer to report readings of 0.2 R and higher. An I exposure reading was reported as 115 on the emergency workers exposure record. When the evaluator asked for clarification, the worker indicated that it should be 0.115. The next 30-minute exposure reading on the worker's direct-reading dosimeter was 0.4 R I which the worker struggled to accurately read without assistance. When the reading was recorded as 0.4 R the worker did not rec*ognize that she should report the reading and did not know who to report the reading to. -The radiation monitor consulted the laminated I instruction card to find information on radiation exposure limits and was confused by the mix of units* on the instructiofr card.. . ,.

I When*questioned on the use of potassium iodide, workers were unfamiliar-with how it worked or why they may be required to take it.

I Effect: Though the evacuee who process~d through the women's locker .room for monitoring and decontamination was wearing two radioactive sources, she was determined to be clean and released for registration: Iri-the male decontamination area, I

the evacuee was monitored in protective clothing after simulating decontamination.

These monitoring activities were not demomfrtated in accordance with pfans and procedures. These actions could have resulted in the evacuees being released and I

-* .spreading contamination. * * * * :1 1

, : J Workers did not demonstrate* that they-could manage radiation exposure control for I

themselves/ wllich *could result in unnecessary and/cit improperly documented radiation exposUre:to\.Vorker's*:atthisfaci1ity.::,*_,;* * ,,.

i ', ~ '" ' , '.' ' : . ~. '* ,

. __ . _. *':. *.'*. *.* .* I

References:

L. ,-DNR-EPD-ERP-9.0, Receptibn/Corigregate Care'Center Operations, Retision 8, July

• 15, 2019 - * ,. . .. . ** "

I

• 2.- -*Program Manuali 'Radiological Emergency Preparedness, FEMA P-1028 / January

- 2016. - * '* , ,,, *

.. - . . I Recommendations: ** ' ** ' .. '> .-.

1. Provide additionai- and/or m:ore frequent trainiiig"sessions for wotkers who are issued dosimetry and tasked with performing contamination surveys.

I

2. Enlarge* and print the diagram in the prdcedtlre* that provided guidanc*e for conducting a whole-body contamination survey for use*as a visual prop for the emergency worker I I

40 I

I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I to use while conducting a survey of an individual. Visual reminders could be helpful for emergency workers who do not perform these tasks on a regular basis.

I 3. Revise the laminated reminder card attached to the lanyard to provide consistent

. radiation exposure measurement units, in Roentgen (R), to match current procedures and the information provided in the emergency worker briefing.

I 4. Potassium iodide ingestion would typically not be recommended for workers stationed at a reception center, which is purposely located outside of the 10-mile emergency planning zone; therefore, it is recommended to remove it from emergency I worker kits for this location.

I Schedule of Corrective Actions:

The Federal Emergency Management Agency REP staff has worked with the State of I Georgia on the development of a schedule of corrective actions to address the level 2 finding. Among the corrective .actions planned are to: review and update reception center plans and procedures; provide additional training to remedy the challenges I observed with the staff of the Tattnall County Middle School; and the development of visual aids to provide immediate guidance to emergency workers. The state and Tattnall County plans t~ demonstrate the correction of this finding during the spring of 2020.

I c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None I e. Prior Level.2 Findings - Unr~solved: None I Mass Care Servkes Capability Summary:

Registration of evacuees was successfully demonstrated by a Tattn,all County;employee, I and the ability to provide temporary care and sheltering of evacuees was successfully

. demonstrated by thy disaster workfor~e progra!Jl :r;nanager from the American Red Cross.

Prior

. to registration. and/qr sheltering, each.e~;:i.cuex .was ,req9ired to pre~enta ,

I Monitoring/Decontamination Form to provide proof that he .or, she was .free of*

contamination. Mass care services, to include sheltering and feeding, would be provided in accordance with American Red Cross shelter procedures. The facUity had µbundant I sp&ce and reasonable .ac<;:ommod.at.ions for the,expectt:d evacu~e popul.;1.tion. *The American Red Cross representative, along with the Tattnall County employee, were able tq explain th,e:illlportance ()fensuring_evacµe.es \Vere.clear of cont.;imination prior to I allowing admittance to the shelter. A trailer brought to the facility demonstrated that supplies would be available as necessary to meet the needs of the general public. Any shortages in supplies would be coordinated through the county emergen.cy .operations I center and.the regiona1 prngram manager from th.e American,Red Cross.

For this capapility the foPo'o/ing raµiologi9al ~m~rgency preparedn.tiSS criteria were met:

I 6.c.1... . .

I 41 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant

a. Level 1 Finding: None I

b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None I

d. Prior Level 2 Findings-Re solved: None

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I

3.3.3.4 Toombs County, Georgia I 3.3.3.4.1 Emergency Operations Center I

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

The Toombs County Emergency Management Agency staff succes:sfully demonstrated I the ability to notify and mobilize representatives of pertinent agencies to_ support an effective emergency response to a radiological incident atthe Hatch*Nuclea r Plant. The emergency operations center was populated in a timely manner with all necessary entities I to ensure the safety of the public. Radio and telephone equipment were adequate to

• j:,rovide dependable communications between responding local, state, and federal

- response assets. Back-up communication systems were available and were demonstrated I to be operable. Communication links were established early in the exercise with all necessary response partners and were maintained throughout the exercise. The emergency operations center was equipped with suffi'cient maps, displays, and office I

supplies to facilitate an effectual overall response effort. Responding agencies had access to ample quantities* of dosimetry, potassium iodide,' and training materials to provide

• acceptable levels bf radiological protection td their emergency workers.

I The Toombs County Emergency Management Director successfully provided direction

.* artdcontrol'irt the:emergency*operations center. He demonstrated this* through decisions I

and coordination with state 'artd,cotitity staff.

• The* director managed situational awareness

• through the operations-officer vfa frequentbriefirigs.to*the emergency operatioris*center

, Staff. The director participated in decisfon,Iine calls 'and coordinated protective-action I

• *.. ' .,decisions with state and adjacent risk coiinties in a timely manner.

All precautionary and protective action recommendations were coordinated by the I

Georgia State op*era:tions Center and* agreed to by the ri~k counties.

• The precautionary actions included: recommendation for livestock be put dn stored feed and water; don't consume crops/milk; relocation of access and functional needs and school children; I

restrict air and rail traffic as well as hunting and fishing:; aifo riv~~ deararlce;* The protective action decision was to evacuate zones A, B5, and E5 ..: .{\.ddition.~ly, ,

emergency workers were ordered not to ingest potassium iodide. The *public notification I

process included the Georgia State Operations Center's simufa.ted activation'of the fixed siren system and the broadcast of an Erp.ergency .Alert System with,ipstruGtions to the affected populace. * * * ** * **

I I

42 I

I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I

The Toombs County Emergency Management Director maintained a list of persons with I disabilities and those with access/functional needs. This list included specific needs for each of the individuals identified. The director discussed the process for care and transport of these persons. He explained the notification process, relocation procedures, I and the coordination between the American Red Cross and the Toombs County Sheriff's Office to notify and transport the access and functional needs people.

I The State of Georgia's policy is to not issue potassium iodide to the general public.

Toombs County had no institutionalized individuals within the 10-mile emergency I planning zone. Toombs County schools were ev~luated during out of sequence activities for this exercise and relevant interviews were conducted. During the exercise, the Toombs County School Superintendent was present in the emergency operations center I and simulated contacting the principal of Toombs Central Elementary, the only county school:located within the 10-mile emergency planning zone. It was simulated that school students and staff were relocated utilizing county buses and drivers well in advance of a I radiological release affecting the offsite population.

• Too~bs County emergency workers successfully demonstrated response and I implementation of plans apd procedures concerping public safety in and around the 10-mile emergency planning zone. The radiation.protection.officer provided an emergency worker video briefi11g addressing radiological exposure control, exposure action levels, I potassium iodide, equipment usage, and exposure tracking. The Toomqs County Sheriff's Office and the City of Vidalia Po~ice Depajment explained their roles in establishing traffic and access control points to aid in the eyacuation. They discussed I their capability of i,mpediI11ent removal and priority of ensuring an open flow of traffic on major roadways surrounding the nuclear plant in .accordance wit)J. plans ,and procedures.

Each officer was knowledgeable in the management of traffic and access control.

I Waterway clear.ance of t!;ie Altamaha,river w.as qen:ionstrated by.interview with a Georgia Departmen~ of Natural Resources Law E;nfo,rc,eme.nt emergency worker,, The ufficer I receiv~d an .el;Ilergency worker briefin;g aµd was.

issued equipmeµtprior to deployment for 'Yaterway ctearance. The officer: demonstrated skill in the use of issued equipment and was knowledgeable pf primary .and bac;kup .ac,tions required to safely warn the public I from the river without delay.

, for t,his capabili_tyJhe following radiqlogi(:;al*-e,mergency preparedness criteria were met:

I 1.a.1, Lct'l, 1.d.l; 1.e.1, 2.a.l, 2.lJ.2, 2.c.1, 3-.a,1,3J;d, 3:.c,l, 3.c,2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2 .

a. , Lev~l 1 Finding:. None* .. :

I

b. Level 2 Finding: None*

c. Not Demonstrated: None I . ..t, ' '.

d. Prior Levei 2 Findings-Resolved: NOne

• I 43 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary: I Toombs County successfully participated in the coordination of delivering prompt, reliable, and actionable public information. Primary public notification was simulated through a series of fixed sirens activated by the Georgia State Operations Center for the I

entire emergency planning zone which was in concurrence with the protective action decision. Public information messages were receved and coordinated between the Toombs County Emergency Management Director and the Georgia Emergency I

Management and Homeland Security Agency liasion, both located in the Toombs County Emergency Operations Center. All messages were coordinated with and approved by the I Toombs County Emergency Management Director with a sense of urgency. The Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency liaison in the Toombs County Emergency Operations Center was the coordinfttion link between the state and Toombs I County.

The news releases and Emergency Alert System messages were culturally and I linguistically accurate for public and news media dissemination. The audible and visual notification methods ensured the whole community was alerted with accurate and timely information in accordance with-plans and ptocedures with a sense* of urgency. I For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness* criteria were met:

5.a.1;' 5.a.3, 5.b.1.

• I

a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: .None.

I

c. Not Demonstrated: None I

d?. ,:P~ior;L~ver2 fh.1;di~g~ - ~~ol.".~.d: None e, *Prior Level21?indings* -'Untesolv'ed: None **

' .;_, . ,*; Iv'.*

I Critical Transportation Capability Summary (Schools* Interview): .*.

• • , ;t* .' . ,.

The Toombs Centtal'Elementary School principal, along with the county scho~l district's I

transportation director, discussed via interview the capability to implement precautionary actions for the 556 students, faculty, and staff. Further, knowledge was demonstrated through interview of their roles in relocation of students, faculty, and staff from Toombs I

Central Elementary School to Toombs Middle School. The principal of the school and the transportation director would be notified by the Toombs County Emergency Management Director or the Toombs County School District Superintendent of the I

decision to relocate student, faculty, and staff. Redundant communications systems would be used to facilitate communication among the school and transportation staff to aid in relocation. The school's automated messaging system would be used to notify I

44 I

I

I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I parents and guardians of the relocation; phone and email would be used as well. Though no access/functional needs students were enrolled at the time of the interview, I appropriate accommodations would be available to transport those needing additional assistance. The number of buses and required drivers would be readily available to transport all students, staff, and faculty. Law enforcement support would be coordinated I within the emergency operations center and available to assist in the relocation effort.

For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria was met:

I 3.c.2.

I a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None I c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings-Resolved:, None I e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None 3.3.3.4.2 Traffic Control Points I On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement Capability Summary:

I The primary agency responsible for the direction anq control of traffic .in Toombs County during a radiological emergency at the Hatch Nuclear Plant would be the Toombs County Sheriff's Office. They would be assisted in this assignment by the Lyons Police I Department and the Vidalia Police Department. The sheriffs offioe*explained that they would be able to alert and mobilize their personnel in a timely manner. Law enforcement officers would possess redundant communications and safety eqiiipment to' establish I traffic control points. ) , , ,1 The interviewed deputies were issued dosirrietty' ~rid'receiVed ~-:tho:rough'. *radiological I briefing before deployment. They were ay\:'are of :the nee,d todimit ra.diological exposure.

Both deputies were aware of the need to report to a decontamination site after mission completion qnd ~ac;µ dii;cu~sed t4e !:lbility to,direcLvehicn-1lar traffic. W:he_n gi,ve_n a I hypothetical situation that would result in the blockage of evacuation routes, they were able to describ_e methods 9fclearance and were abte.to describe alternative routes or

, detours as necessary.

I ' .* ; *

• f I . ~ ) . .

I .;

_.); *.

I 45 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant For this capability the following radiological emergency preparedness criteria were met:

I l.a.l, l.d.l, l.e.l, 3.a.l, 3.d.l, 3.d.2.

a. Level 1 Finding: None I

b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None I

d. Prior Level 2 Findings :--Resolved: None

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I

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-1 I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I Section 4: Conclusion I Overall, the exercise was a success. All eight exercise objectives were met. No level 1 findings were noted; however, one level 2 finding was identified. The level 2 finding identified was in I regard to emergency workers demonstrating incorrect monitoring and decontamination techniques and unfamiliarity with radiological exposure limits and the use of potassium iodide.

Officials and representatives from the State of Georgia, the risk counties of Appling, Jeff Davis, I Tattnall, and Toombs, as well as many other agencies and numerous volunteers, participated in the exercise. The state, county, response organizations, and volunteers demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures. The cooperation and teamwork of the I participants was evident throughout all evaluated and training activities.

The risk counties of Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs, along with the State of Georgia, I activated their emergency operations centers in accordance with plans and procedures, allowing for efficient direction and control as well as coordination throughout the response. Leadership's protective action decisions showed that protecting the health and safety of the public was of I utmost importance. All jurisdictions demonstrated knowledge of their plan and procedures.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many I individuals who participated and made this exercise a success.

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I

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- - - - - - ------- ------1 Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant Appendix A: Hatch Exercise Timeline EmergeIJcy '. .* *Tii.:rte Thai. Notificatiort Was*-Receiyed: or,: Action Was Taken 1.

Time, ,,. ~ " . *, '.

Classification- Utility ,*.

SOC/ APPLING JEFF DAVIS TATTNALL TOOMBS Level- or Event .. '*Declared JIC DOSE COUNTY COUNTY COUNTY COUNTY Unusual Event NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA Alert 0850 0900 0857 0903 0858 0858 NIA Site Area 1029 1037 1040 1037 1037 1039 1036 Emergency General Emergency 1153 1202 1203 1201 1203 1202 1158 Simulated Rad.

1029 1037 1037 1037 1037 1037 1036 Release Began Simulated Rad.

Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Release Ended Facility Operational 0923 0932 0925 1040 1103 0900 0931 State of Emergency 1040 NIA 1040 1040 1040 1040 State Local NIA 1000 NIA 1206 1218 1300*

Exercise Terminated 1437 1405 1402 1407 1402 1403 Precautionary Actions:

Livestock on stored feed and water; don't consume crops/milk; AFN and 1052 1052 1052 1052 1052 1115*

school relocation; restrict air, rail, and river; hunter/lol!l!er clearance Protective Action Decision: 1219 1219 1219 1239*

Evacuate: A, BS, ES 1219 1219 Siren Activation 1225 1225 1225 1225 1225 1225 EAS Message 1228 1228 1228 1228 1228 1228 KI Decision: EWs do not ingest 1346 1346 1346 1346 1346 1346

• Denotes time which a decision has been messaged from the ]IC 49

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I

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I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I Appendix B: Exercise Key Leaders and Evaluators I Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) Chair: Randall Hecht I Section Chiefs: J.T. Ackermann and Larry Robertson Site Specialist: Elisabeth "Libby" Adkins I 1. Evaluator Assignments, Out of Sequence:

I

• Location / Venue

' Evaluation Team Core Cai5ability(ies) :

Evaluated' Appling County I Protective Actions for Schools (OOS)

Elisabeth Adkins Critical Transportation Medical Services Drill (OOS) Elisabeth Adkins* Public Health, Healthcare, I Joe Harworth Quintin Ivy and Emergency Medical Services Tattnall County I Emergency Worker Decontamination (OOS)

Elisabeth Adkins*

DeShµn Lowery Environmental Response/Health and Safety I Reception Center &

Deb Blunt Marcy Campbell Elisabeth Adkins* Environmental I Congregate Care (OOS) DeShun Lowery Deb Blunt Response/Health and Safety; Mass Care Services Marcy Campbell I Toombs County Protective Actions for Elisabeth Adkins Critical Transportation Schools (OOS)

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report

2. Evaluator Assignments, Exercise Day, October 22, 2019:

2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I

Location / Venue Evaluation Team Core Capability(ies) I Evaluated STATE OF GEORGIA State Operations Center Matthew Bradley*

Gene Taylor (OJT)

Operational Coordination; Public Information and Warning I

Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

Erica Houghton Kent Tosch Operational Coordination I Joint Information Center Glenda Bryson*

(Vidalia) P.J. Neid Bob Princic Public Information and Warning I

Dose Assessment John Fill Situational Assessment Field Monitoring Team Deb Blunt Environmental Response/Health I

Marcy Campbell and Safety Field Monitoring Team Jill Leatherman Environmental Response/Health I

Coordinator (Toombs)

RISE'. ,COUNTJES.  ;:

and Safety Applin~ County Emergency Operations Center Michael Dolder*

Roy Smith.

Operational Coordination; I

Public Information and TomHegele Warning; On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law -

Enforcement I

J¢ff Davis County . '

Emergency Operations Center Joe Harworthi Robert Nash Operational Coordination; Public Information Jnd

• I Warning; On-Scene Security,

, I ,.. Protection, and Law Enforcement I

.:I Tattnall County , '*,,' -* J.

I 1 ,* ', ',,a EII1ergency,Op~rations ,Center: DeSh,11n. Lowery* . ,. _Op~rational-Coordination;

_ . .David Orti;nan .* . *-*

Publii:; Information and

'*,, ._}:  :*. '1*.* *!:*;.  :*,:l

• t*.

.' Wamil).g; <;)n-Scene Secudty, I

Protection, and. Law

.:. )" '. ~

Enforc,ement

. . :. *- i Toombs County ' '" --

Emergency Operations Center .

Gerald McLemory'.1' Loren:zo Lewis*

Mark Dalton Operational Coordination; Public Informatio'n and ' I Vfarning; On-.Scene Security, Waterway Clearing (Interview)

Lorenzo Lewis

\ ~,' '*..

1,*.;'

1. ,,

'Protection, arid Law*

• Enforcement ; ; **

• on:.Scene Security, Protection, I

and Law Enforcement I

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I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I

Appendix C: Extent of Play Agreement I EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR POWER PLANT I EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE I OCTOBER 22, 2019 .

All activities will be demonstrated fully in accordance with respective plans and procedures as I they would be in an actual emergency. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

Regional Office must receive these plans, guides and procedures at least 90 days before the exercise. This Extent of Play Agreement (EOP A) is written by exception. If it is not listed as an I exception it will be demonstrated as described in the plans, standard operating guides (SOGs) and/or procedures (SOPs). Any issue or discrepancy arising during exercise play may be re-demonstrated if allowed by the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) Chair or as listed herein.

I This allowance may be granted if it is not disruptive to exercise play and is mutually agreed to by the Offsite Response Organization (ORO) Exercise Controller and FEMA Evaluator. Some activities may be performed as a training-only opportunity, and are identified in the participant I description.

Core Capability: Operational Coordination- State and co.unty emergency operations centers I (EOCs); emergency operations facility (EOF).

Definition: Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational stru9ture and process I that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders ::ind supports the execution o{ core capabilities. . .

I Capability Target: Emergency Operations Management Performance Measure: Procedures to alert and notify p~rsonnel will be demonstrated and *.

I personnel will respond only upon notification. Identified *cornrhunications* will be:operationai:

Key personnel with leadership roles will provide direction and control. A particular facility's equipment and supplies must be sufficient and consistent with that facility's assigned role in the I ORO's emergency operations plans. Specific equipment and supplies that must be demonstrated under this criterion'include KI-inventories, dosimetry, and monitoring equipment.

I Participants.: '

State of Georgia; Appling, Jeff Davis,;Tatinall,

& Toombs Counties

'~ l * * . * . . *(

Critical Task:; pROs use, effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency I personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, A.La, e; A.3, 4; C.1, 4, 6; D.4; Kl; 2; H.3, 4; Criterion*l.a.1) **

I I 53 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant Pre-positioning of exercise participants will be allowed. However, exercise participants will I

not be allowed to report to their assigned duty station prior to receiving notification that the exercise has begun, and they are instructed to respond. I

• State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.

All participating counties, to include Appling, Jeff Davis; Tattnall, and Toombs are in agreement with clarifications above.

I Critical Task: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response. (NUREG-0654/

FEMA REP-1, G.3.a; H.3; J.10.h; J.12; K.5.b; Criterion l.b.l)

• I The only facility required to be evaluated under Criterion l.b.1 is the recently renovated State I Operations Center, located at GEMA/HS Headquarters in Atlanta, GA., 935 United Avenue, Atlanta, GA.

• I

• State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.

Critical Task: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to I

that part of the overall response effort for' which they are responsibl~. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, A.l.d, A.2.a, b; A.3; C.4, 6; Criterion Lc,1)

I State direction and control will be provided. from the State Operations Center (SOC), located at GEMA/HS Headquarters in Atla.nta, GA. I All participating counties to include, Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs will provide direction and control from their respective county EOCs. I

• State of Georgia in agreement .with clarifications above.

a '*All p~icfpatiri g c6uiities: to*fr1cliide Appling, Jeff°Davis, Tattnall, and'To~mbs *ktre i~;.

1 agreement' with darifica:dons;above. . '*' . . .' . . .

I

~:.,.:-~* ('  :*, . . *._;:, . * *~. '.l .. 1,', ,J*-,)'

Critical Task: At'leas'ftwo c'orrim;nlcationi/system~: are properly, and communic atioirlirib are established add maintained witli appropriate locations.

available, at'le~;t one operates I Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/

FEMA REP-1, F.l, 2; Criterion l.d.1) . . . . I

• *. , , -,. * . . *, " ' ' . * . , * ,' . *. e_ * \

GEM*AJHS liaisons 'will be deployed*to *each participating county EOC and.the. ***Southern * .* .

. Nuclear EOF iii Birmingham, AL.* th~se' liai'sons* Will assist' in *commun!cations .and* ' . ..

• cocYrdinatfon'between the SOe arid iiiuJfiple off~site tesp_onse'orgap.izatib_~s.*; *'.,.

I

. ,_. ~ - *.

. * * * ** . . i \. -. r- .,:

I

• • * *',. ** -* " * ~'-. ; .~ *. ,. - - ) * ***

• State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.

• All participating counties, to include Appling, Jeff Davis,. Tattnall? and Toombs are in agreement with clarifications above.

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I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I Critical Task: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, Kl, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, H.7, 10; 17, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; I J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b; Criterion l.e.l)

Quantities of KI for emergency workers, Quantities of dosimetry, survey equipment, and I their c~libration/testing were verified during staff assistance visits (SAVs) identified below:

I Staff Assistance Visits:

Appling County Emergency Operations Center Jeff Davis County Emergency Operations Center I 259 West Parker Street Baxley, GA 31513 Date: February 7, 2019 10 Public Safety Drive Hazlehurst, GA 31539 Date: February 7, 2019 I Time: 10:00 AM Time: 3:00 PM Tattnall County Tooinbs County I Emergency Operations Center 194 John 0. Parker Drive Emergency Operations Center 321 North West Broad Street Reidsville, GA 30453 Lyons 1 GA* 30436 I Date: February 6, 2019 Time: 10:00 AM

• Date: February .16, 2019 .

Time: 2:00 PM I

• State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.

All participating counties, to include Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs are in agreement with clarifo;ations above.

I Capability Target: Protective Action Decision Making I Performance Measure: ORO's demons.trate the capability t~; as.sess and control.the ~adiation exposute received by emergency workers; Raciiolog1c*~1 Assessn;ient, P~ot~cti,,'e .i'\9ti~n Recommendations, and Precautionary and/or Protective Action Decisions for the Plume Phase of I the Emergency; and Precautionary ,and/qr Prot~ctive Action ])ec~sion Conside~ation for t4(?.,, , .

of Protection Persons with Disabiliti.es and Access/f\u1ctioi;ial ;Needs.

I

• Participant: State of Georgia ,*

Critical Task: OROs use.a d~cision-making process, considering relevant factors and ..

I appropriate c.9ordinatiim, to ensure that an eiposure' c,onirol syste11J,, including the use .of Kl, is in place for irmerg(incy Workers, incluqingprovisions to: authorize radiation expOS'F!,re in excess of administrative limits or PA.Gs. (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, C.6; J.10.e,f; K.3.a; I K.4; Criterion 2.a.l)

• State of Georgia iri agreement

• I I 55 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report Critical Task: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I

necessary coordination is used to make PADs for the general public (including the recommendation for use of Kl, if ORO policy. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP- 1, A.3; C.4, 6; D.4; J.9; J.10.f, m; Criterion 2.b.2)

I The State of Georgia, to include local counties, does not issue KI to the general public: I

• State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.

Participants:

Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, & Toombs Counties

• I Critical Task: OR Os use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and I appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers, including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or PAGs. (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-'1, C.6;].10.e ,f; K.3.a; I K.4; Criterion 2.a.1)

• All participating c6unties, to include Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs are in

, . . ,'r*

I agreement. ' . I,.

Critical Task.~: A decision-making process involving:considercition of appropriate faciors* and I necessary coordinanon islused to' make PADs forthege1f eral publii' (including the ,.

reconimen dation/or use'*oj Ia/ifOROp olicy)~* (NUREG;.0654/FEMA-REP:. J, A.3; C.4, 6; D.4; J.9; J.JOJ; m; Criterion 2.b.2) 1 I

• The State of Georgia, to include local counties, does* hot issue KI to the general public ..

• . . .;1 ' '  : ,*

I

• All participating counties, to include Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs are in agreement with cl_arifications above. I

'Critictil Task: PAL>s* are*nUide/as' ilpp~oj,riate;for .groups ofpeople with disabilities and those with access I functional needs.* (NURE(J-06547 FEMA-REP-1, DA,..1~:9,- J.JO~d, e; Criterion 2.c.l)

I I

• All participating counties, to include Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs are in

• I ' ' * < 1'i ** ' ** ' * '

• agreement. * * **

• Capability Target: Protective Action Implementation I

Performance Measure: D 1 emoi1strate1the *capability* to 1nipleinen femhgenty w.orket'*exposure control; KI decision for institutional'ized individuals and the general pub'iic; protectjve actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs; schools; traffic 'a~d access control*and I

impediments to evacuation.

Participant: State of Georgia

. . 1  :.-: : ~ .') j I I

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I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I

Critical Task: Appropriate traffic and access control is established .. Accurate instructions are I provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, A.3; C.1, 4; J.10.g,j; Criterion 3.d.l)

I State and/or local law enforcement personnel within each County BOC will demonstrate, by interview, that they are capable of selecting, establishing, and staffing appropriate traffic and access control points consistent with current cond.itions and P ADs in a timely manner.

• State of Georgia in agreement.

Critical Task: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. (NUREG-0(554/FEMA

• ' I ' ' '" ' '

REP-1, J.10.k; Criterion 3.d.2).,

I

• State of Georgia in a,greement.

I

Participants:

Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, & Toombs Counties Critical Task: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage I radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans/procedures.

Emergency workers periodically aµd,a( tfze ~nd of each miss.ton read thef1: dosimeters and record the readings ,qn' the. appr.opria.te exposur,e record or, chart. .Appropriatf record-keeping I of of the admini~tration Klfor,.*e11J,qge17cy:worker:fis maintained. (l'[UREG-Q654/EF;M.A-REP-1, J.10.e,' K.3.a, b; K.4; Criterion 3.a.l) *

• I This capability to be demonstrated during an RPO briefing to selected emergency workers within each County Emergency Operations Center (BOC). The RPO briefing may be *

. conducted out-of-sequence.

I Participating emergency workers will be available following the RPO briefing to d~monsJpi.te, .by intervie~, t~at,tqey1 ~der~t~d;th~ qi!'rc;tiqn,an~\.,.gqi.daµce. givenby the.RP_O I and how to µse

,' . .. . . and;d9c.mment/ltiQp.tlJ.eyhave theequiprileJ?.t . . . been iss,ued .. * ~,,. * .*....

• 1',\\ .,

The GEMA/HS RPO Video may be used to supplement the local RPO Briefing.

I *

• All participating *counties, to include Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs are in agreement with clarifications above.

I Critical Task: Kl and appropriate instr~ctions'"~~ ~ad~ ~;ailable in case a decision to recommen~ .use of KI is made .. A.pprqpriate i,-ecorq keeping of the. administra~ion of Kl for I institutiomillzed)ndividµals and.the genenµ public are.maintained. (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, J.10.~, f; Crite~!Oil 3.b)) . . . . . . . .

I The State of Georgia, to include local counties, does not issue KI to the general public.

I 57 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant There are no institutionalized individuals with the Plant Hatch 10-Mile EPZ.

I The recommendation to administer KI to emergency workers is provided by the State of Georgia Radiological Emergency Coordinator (REC) to GEMA/HS, by agreement with the I

Georgia Department of Public Health.

• The decision to administer KI is coordinated by GEMA/HS with the affected County EMAs. This coordination takes place over the conference bridge line. The administration of KI is the responsibility of the local EMA.

I

• All participating .counties, to include Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs are in I agreement with clarifications above.

Critical Task: P ADs are implemented for people with disabilities and those with I access/functional needs other than schools within areas subject to protective actions.

(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.c, d, e, g;Criterion 3.c.1)

I Demonstration regarding implementation of protective actions for special populations will be demonstrated by interview within-each county BOC by local Human Services representatives and/or local EMA officials. I

• All participating counties, to include Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs are in agreement with clarifications above. .

I Critical Task: OROs!schoolofficials implement protective actions for schools~ (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10. c, d, e; g; Criterion 3.c.2)

I There are no schools in Jeff Davis or Tattnall Counties within the Plant Hatch 10-mile EPZ.

School system interviews for Appling and Toombs Counties wete conducted during their I

scheduled Staff Assistance Visit (SAV).

Appling County ' *,, -** .Toombs Cou*nty I

":' :Emergency Openi.tioris Center- .

• Emergency Operations Center

• 259 West Parker Street Baxley, GA 31513

, -*321 *North West Broad Street

• Lyons*; GA 30436

• " I Date: February 7, 2019 Date: February 6, 2019 Time: 10:00 AM Time: 2:00 PM-: - I e

• All participating counties, to include Appling; Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and-Toombs are ill'.

agreement With clarifications above'. .* .* '. . I!' '* *

.rr '.

I Critical Task: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG.:.0654/FEMA REP..:1., A.3; C.l, 4; J~lO.g,j; Criterion 3.d.1)

I Traffic and access control will be demonstrated by interview within each county BOC by local law enforcement agency representatives and/or local EMA officials.

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I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I

• All participating counties, to include Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs are in I agreement with clarifications above.

I Critical Task: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. *(NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, J.10.k; Criterion 3.d.2)

I Demonstration regarding impediments to evacuation will be demonstrated within each county EOC by law enforcement agency representatives and/or local EMA officials.

I

• All participating counties, to include Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs are in agreement with, clarifications above .

I Core Capability: Public Information and Warning-State/CountyEOCs, .and JIC Definition: Del.iver coordinated, prompt, reliable,.and actionabkinformation to the whole I community tht:ough the use of clear, consistent; accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.

I Capability Target: Emergency Notification and J,>ublic lnforntation I Perfpr"1-ance M~asure: Sirens and th,e,EAS system *will lre. activated, *,if needed, in. a timely 1 **

• manner to alert the general public along.tyith w~terway ')Var;rtiT<Jg; B.ack up route alerting w.ilf*.

take place in case offailure of the primary alert and notification system.

I Participant: ;State of Georgia I Critical Task: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergeµcy officials to notify the public of an e_ll}.ergency ~itt1ation. The initial tnstructiopal message to the I public must include at ~ minimt;tm th:? elements .required b.y current FEMA REP. guidance. .

(NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, E.5, 6, 7;Criterion5.a.l) .,. , . *'

I

• State of Georgia in agreement. '

f'i f

Criµcal Task: OROs provide accurate emergency information and.instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMAREP-1; E.5, 7; G.3.a; G.4.a, c; Criterion 5.b.l)

I

• State of Cieorgia in agreement.

i: .*

I

Participants:

Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, & Toombs Counties

(' * *~ ' ,~ ' ( I ,, :*

I 5.9 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant Critical Task: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are I

completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized .offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include at a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP. (NUREG-I 0654/FEMA REP-1, E.5, 6, 7; Criterion 5.a.1)

The Plant Hatch Emergency Planning Zone ANS is composed of a primary and back-up I

component. The primary component is an Outdoor Siren Warnirig System and the I

Emergency Alert System (EAS). Activation of the sirens and EAS will be simulated up to the point of transmission. The back-up component is a reverse 911 calling system, Code Red. I

• All participating counties, to include Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs are in agreement with cladfications above. ** I Critical Task:' Backup alert and notification ofthe pub1ic is completed within a reasohabl~ time following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. I (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, E.6;,Appendix 3.B.2.c; Criterion 5.a.3) .

A demonstration, by interview, of the reverse 911 calling system, Code Red, will be provided I

in each EOC /Warning Point by local EMA personnel.

'. .. .All participating counties, to include Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and .Toombs are in I

agreement.

Critical Task: OROs provide accufate'2mergency~.foformation: and instructions*to the public and I

the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, E.5, 7; G.3.a; G.4.a, c; Criteriorr5.b:1y *,. . '. *:: . ' . I Participating counties may deploy Public Information Orficers (PIOs) to the Joint Information Center (JIC), located in Vidalia, Georgia. These individuals will serve as.

information liaisons between their 'I'espective county; the State of Georgia, and utility ' '*

I participants at the JIC.

• All participating counties, *10 iri6lude Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, ~nd Tooinbs are i~

I agreement with clarifications above.

Participants:

Joint Information Center

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~ .\

I Critical Task: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mob.iHze emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, AP.a, e; A.3, 4; C.l, 4, 6; D.4; E.1, 2; H.3, 4; Criterion l.a.l)

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I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I Critical Task: At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations.

I Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/

FEMA REP-1, F.1, 2; Criterion 1.d.l)

I Critical Task: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, H.7, 10; 17, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; I J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b; Criterion 1.e.l) _

Critical Task: OROs provi,de accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and I the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, E.5, 7; G.3.a; G.4.a, c; Criterion 5.b.l)

I County PI0s may choose to participate in media briefings or may choose to provide their county information to a State PIO for dissemination during a media briefing.

I A minimum of one (1) media briefing will be conducted. Additional.media briefings may be conducted based upon exercise play.

I Media releases are posted to the SNC WebEOC portal and provided to the JIC for dissemination to media repres_ent~tives.

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• State of Georgia in agreement.

All participating.founties, to include Appling, JeffDavis, Tattnall, and Toombs are in agreement.

I Core Capability: Environmental Response/Health and Safety.

I Definition: Ensure the availability of guidance and resources to address all hazards including _

hazardous materials, acts of terrorism, and natural disasters in support of the respo~der -

• operations and the affected communities ..

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Capability Target: Protective Action Decision Making_ . . ,

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,)!

I Performance Measure: OROs authorized to send emergency workers into the plume exposure pathway EPZ, must demon_strate a capability to assess and control the radia(ion exposure received by emergency workers and have*a decision c,hain in place, as specified in.the ORO's I plans/procedures, to authorize emergency worker exposure limits to be exceeded for specific missions. As appropriate, OROs must demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the _.

distribution and administration of Kl as a protective measure for emergency workers.

I Participapts:* .State of.Georgia .,

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant Critical Task: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and I

appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for EW s, including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or PAGs. (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, C.6; J.10.e, f; K.3.a; K.4 Criterion 2:a.1)

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• State of Georgia in agreement. I

• All participating counties, to include Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs are in agreement.

I Capability Target: Protective Action Implementation Performance Measure: OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide emergency workers I (including supplemental resources) with the appropriate direct-reading and permanent-record dosimetry, dosimeter chargers, KI, and instructions on the use of these items.

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Participants:

State of Georgia; Critical Task: OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage radiological I

exposure to EWs in accordance with the plans/procedures. EWs periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriat'e exposure record or chart. OROs maintain *appropriate recordkeeping of the administration of. KI to EWs. (NUREG-I 0654/FEMA REP-1, J.10.e, K.3.a, b, K.4; Criterion 3.a.l) '

State of Georgia Field Monitoring Teams will be provided a Radiological Protection Officer I

(RPO) Briefing at the Fite Station adjacent to the Toombs County EOC. The RPO briefing may be conducted out.,of-sequence;

• I Field Monitoring Team members will be available following the RPO briefing to demonstrate, by interview, that they-understand the directions and guidance given by the RPO and how to operate the equipment and complete the paperwork they have been I

provided. > . :: , . :

• .* If the GEMARPO video is used to augmentthe briefing, an RPO will be 1available to issue I

the materials and answer any questions ... * *

• State of Georgia in Agreement * * * *

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Critical Task: KI and a]Jpropriate instructions are available if a d~cision to recorrinierid use of KI is made. Appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI for in'stituticinalized

• individuals and the general public*is maintained. (NUREG-0654/FEMA REP..:1', J.10.e,*f;

• Criterion 3.b.1) ** I The State of Georgia, to include local counties, does hot issue KI to the general public.

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• State of Georgia in Agreement I

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I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I

Capability Target: Field Measurement and Analysis I Performance Measure: OROs must demonstrate the capability to deploy FMTs with the I equipment, methods, and expertise necessary to determine the location_ of airborne radiation and particulate deposition on the ground from an airborne plume.

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Participants:

State of Georgia Critical Task: Field teams (two or more) are.managed to obtain sufficient information to help I characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. (NUREG C.1; H.12; I.7, 8, 11; JJO.a; Criteric~m 4.a.2)

I The State of Georgia will deploy two. (2) field Monitoring Teams that are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure.

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• State of Georgia in agreement.

Critical Task: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recqrded at appropriate locations, I and radioiodine and particulate. samples an~ collected . ., Teams wjll move to an appropriate low-background loca,tion to determinewhethei;- any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected* on the sampling media. (NUREG. C.1; I I.8, 9; H.12; J.10.a; Criterion 4.a.3)

The State of Georgia will deploy two (2) Field 1\{qnitoring Teams and equipment to.

I determine the location of airborne radiation and partic.ulate deposition on the gro~nd,from an airborne plume.

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• State of Georgia in agreement with .clarifications . above,* .

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Capability Target: Support Operations and Facilities I Performance Measure: .Radiologi<;:al m.onitoring, decontamination, andtegistfationfacilities for evacuees and emergency workers must be set up and,demonstrated as they .would be in an I actual emergency. For Reception Center and Congregate Care (RCCC), OROs conducting this demonstration must have one-third of the resources.(e.g.; monitoring .

teams/instrumentation/portal monitors) available at the facility ( ies) as necessary to monitor I 2.0 p(!,rce.n/ of the population tvithin ll}2~hourpe,;iod;,this would in.elude adequate space for evacuees',vehicles.i *A mi1J:imum ofsf;t* (6) .evacuees must be monitored per station using

• equipmt;nt, afl,d prpce<!,ures specified in the planslp,roc,edures, ,The monitoring, sequences for:

I the first six simulated evacuees per monitoring team will be timed by the evaluators to , ..

determine whether the 12-hour requirement can be met. For EWD, monitoring of emergency I workers do,es,not have to meet the,12-hour re,quirement, l;wwever, appropriate monitoring procedures must be demonstrated for a minimum of two emergency workers and their equipment and at least one vehicle. Monitoring activities shall not be simulated; I 63 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant decontamination of evacuees, emergency workers and vehicles may be simulated and I

conducted by interview. Provisions for separate showering and same-sex decontamination must be demonstrated or explained. The staff must demonstrate provisions for limiting the spread of contamination; thes</ provisions may be partially simulated to conserve resources.

I In addition, for any evacuee and emergency worker found to be contaminated, procedures must be discussed concerning handling of potential contamination of vehicles andpersonal belongings.

I Participant: Tattnall County I Critical Task: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654*H.7, 10; '1.7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J;ll, 12; K.3.a; I K.5.b; Criterion l.e. l)

• Tattnall County in agreement with exceptions above. I Critical Task:* OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans/procedures. Emergency workers I

periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.* Appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers is maintained. (NUREG-0654 J.10.e, K.3.a, b, K.4; Criforion 3.a.1) *

• I

• Tattnall County in agreement. I Critical Task: Kl and appropriate instructions are rriade available in case a decision to recommend use of KI is made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for

• institutionalized individuals and the gerteral public is mairitairied. (NUREG-0654 J.10.e, f;,

• I Criterion 3.b. l) * , , .,. 1 The State of Georgia, to include local counties, does' not issue KI to the* general pub.lie.

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I Taririall eC?urity in agreement with ciarificaticms above.

'*: * *\ .' * ~ ' \ : . : ;

'*' I Critical Task:

• The receptio'n center facility has appropriate* space, adequate 'tes6urc*es, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees:

(NUREG-0654 A.3; C.4; J.10:h; J.1:2; ~ri~erion 6:a.1)

I A total of eight (8) individuals will be processed through th~ RecepHon Center. Six.

• ,individuals Will represent eva:ct.1ees"ftchntne public '~nd the fofu.ainfog"wifl Fepr~sent .

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• . */emergency workers. bn:e female arid **one male wril be' identified' as contttririn~ted: thiuiring"'

demonstration of the decontaimnat'lori proc'6ss.' The decontamination process\till b~

simulated except for monitoring the individuals for radiological contamination using hand

• 1

'.' I held survey meters. The removal of clothing and showering portions of the_decont~nation process will be simulated. * * * ** * : '* * ** ;1 * **

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I

• Tattnall County in agreement with clarifications above.

I Critical Task: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources to accomplish monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and their equipment and vehicles I (NUREG-0654 K.5.a, b; Criterion 6.b.l).

Tattnall County will conduct the following FEMA evaluated exercises out-of-sequence.

I Emergency Vehicle Decontamination Tuesday, October 8, 2019 Reception Center/ Congregate Care Tuesday, October 8, 2019 I 10:00 am Reidsville. State Prison Fire Station 3:00pm North Tattnall County Middle School 2658 Hwy 147 26189 Hwy23 I Reidsville GA 30453 Reidsville, GA 30453 Emergency Vehicle Decontamination Demonstration:

I The PPB portion will include only tum-out pants and helmets worn by the emergency workers (firefigl;iters ). The remainder of PPB will be simulated .. This due to expected high temperatures.

I A minimum of two ei;nergency vehicles will be processed through.the emergency v~hicle decontamination site. The decontamination process will be fully demonstrated, including I water, with no simulations.

Core Capability: Situational Assessment I Definition: Provide all decision makers with decision-rel~vant information regarding the nature and extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the response.

I Capability Target: Prote.ctiveAction

. Decision Making. . .

I Performance Measure: OR Os must have the, capa,bility Jo iru!~penden;tly project integrated dose from projected or actual dose rates and compare these estimates to the PA Gs. OROs must have the capability to ch9.o~e, ampng. a ra~ge qf protective actfori,r, those mos(appropniate.in, p I given emerg~ncy,

Participants:

State of Georgia DNR-Environmental Radiation Program l . '

Critical Task:, Appropna.te _PARs are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and lice'nsee (lnd ORO dose proje~tions, as well as knowledge of onsite and offsite enviro~mental conditions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA~REP-1, 1.10; Supp. 3; Crityrion 2.b.1) . - -

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• State of Georgia in agreement with clarifications above.

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant Core Capability: Critical Transportation I

Definition: Provide transportation (including infrastructure access and accessible transportation services) for response priority objectives, including the evacuation of people and animals, and I

the delivery of vital response personnel, equipment, and services into the affected areas.

Capability Target: Protective Action Implementation I

Performance Measure: Demonstrate the ability to implement PADs for schools. I Participant: Appling and Toombs Counties I

Critical Task: OROs/School officials implement protective actions for schools. (NUREG-0654/

FEMA REP-I, J.10.c, d, e, g; Criterion 3:c.2)

I There are no schools in Jeff Davis or Tattnall Counties within the Plant Hatch 10-mile EPZ.

School system interviews for Appling and.Toombs Counties were conducted during their scheduled Staff Assistance Visit (SAV). I Appling County Emergency Operations Center

• Toombs County Emergency Operations Center I

259 West Parker Street 321:North West.Broad Street Baxley, GA 31513 *.

Date: February 7, 2019 Lyons; GA 30436

• Date: February 6, 2019 I

Time: 10:00 AM i' ....

Time: 2:00 PM I

• All participating counties, to include Appling and. Toombs are in agreement with clarifications above.

• I Core Capability: On-Scene Security and Protection Definition: Ensure a safe and secure environment through*Iaw enforcement and related *security I

and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas and also for all. traditional and atypical response .personnel engaged in. lifesaving and life..,sustainirig operations. '* :

I Capability Target: Protective Action Implementation I Performance Measure: Demonstrate the capability to select, establish arid staff traffic control and access points; identify and resolve impediments to evacuation; distribute dosimetry and Kl; and implement and manage EW exposure control.

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Participants:

Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, & Toombs Counties I I

• 66 I

I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I Critical Task: Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, KI, and other I supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654 H.7, 10; I.7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b; Criterion 1.~.l)

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• All participating counties, to include Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs are in agreement with clarifications above.

I Critical Task: OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to EWs in accordance with the plans/procedures. EWs periodically and at.the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or I chart. OROs maintain appropriate recordkeeping of the administration of KI to EWs. (NUREG-0654 J.10.e, K.3.a, b, K.4; Criterion 3.a.l)

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• All participating counties, to include Appling, Jeff DaYis, Tattnall, and Toombs are in agreement with clarifications above.

I Critical Task: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654 A.3; C.1, 4; J.10.g, j; Criterion 3.d.l)

I A DNR Law Enforcement Officer will participate at the-Toombs County BOC during the exercise to discuss river clearanGe procedures. The DNR-LE Officer will have with him a I trailered boat and all necessary equipmeut to conduct river clearance operations.

This interview at the Toombs County BOC will be on behalf of all four Plant Hatch counties.

I .. :, :'.

• All participating counties, to include Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall, and Toombs are in agreement wi!h clarifications above. * ; ,,, ,

I Critical Task: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. (NUREG-:0654 J.10.k; Criterion 3.d.2) *fr*1 .*. ,*:: ; ., . *

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Impediments to evacuation will be simulated. **

{ t'

, , *_.I.* .. ;  :' ,- 1 : ..

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• All participating couflties, t6 include Applihg, JeffPavis; Tattnall, and Toombs ate in*

agreement with clarifications above.

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant Core Capability: Mass Care I

Definition: Provide life-sustaining and human services to the affected population, to include hydration, feeding, sheltering, temporary housing, evacuee support, reunification, and I

distribution of emergency supplies.

Capability Target: Support Operations / Facilities I

Performance Measure: OROs establish congregate care centers based upon sheltering plan. I Participant: Tattnall County I

Critical Task: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the ceriters have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with planning guidelines.

Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for I contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate before entering congregate care facilities. (NUREG-0654; J.10.h; J.12; Criterion 6.c.l) *

• I Tattnall County will conduct the following FEMA ev'aluated exercise 6ut~of-sequence.

Reception Center/ Congregate Care I

--Tuesday, October 8, 2019 . '

3:00pm North Tattnall Middle School I

26189-Hwy 23

• Reidsville,*-GA * . I Reception Center All demonstrated activities\vithiti'the'Recept ion Center will be as identified in-current' plans and procedu'tesi. r ' . . ' *-, * ' '

I Congregate Care . .

• -* The North Tattnall County *Middle- Sdiool' is' a certified Americ.in Red Cross (ARC) shelter.

. I The shelter demonstration will include set up of the shelter registration process. The remainder of the shelter demonstfatibnwill be*provided by iriterview:during a walk thru of I

the North Tattnall Middle School facility. This walk thru will be led by the ARC Shelter Manager a:nd the Tattnall County'EMADirector.

'. ,,, .* '  :~

l *

• *, * * ** * * .* : I An ARC supply trailer-will be-available bn site for viewing:ofsupplies used in ari ARC':**

shelter operation. Supply trailer equipment and supplies are for viewing only and will not be set up.

I

• Tattnall County in agreement with clarifications above. I I

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1 I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant I

Core Capability: Public Health and Medical Services:

I Definition: Provide lifesaving medical treatment via Emergency Medical Services and related operations and avoid additional disease and injury by providing targeted public health, medical I and behavioral health support, and products to all affected populations.

Capability Target: Support Operations and Facilities I Performance Measure: Demonstrate the capability to transport contaminated injured individuals to medical facilities and provide medical services.

I

Participants:

Appling County EMA, Appling County EMS, Appling Healthcare System I Critical Task: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient to .

support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/ FEM;\ REP-1, H.7, 10; l.7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; I J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b; Criterion l.e.l) ,,

Critical Task: OROs issue appropriate dosjmetry, KI, and procedures, and manage radiological I exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans/procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters,and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. Appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI for I emergency workers is maintained. (NUREG-0654 J.10.e, K.3.a, b, K.4; Criterion 3.a.1)

• Emergency workers will be provided a Radiological Protection Officer (RPO) Briefing at the I Appling County EMS facility located at 412 Fair Street, Baxley, GA. The RPO briefing may be conducted out-of-sequence.

I Emergency workers will be available following the RPO briefing to demonstrate, ,by interview, that they understand the directions and guidance given by the RPO ancl how to operate the equipment and complete the paperwork they have been provided.

I If the GEMA RPO video is u.sed to augTI1ent the briefing, c,1n R,.PO wUl :be available* to issue the materials and answer any questions.

I

• Appling County in, c,1greement with .clarifications above.

I Critical Task: The facility/ORO has the appropriate spac::e, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated,~njur~d;individuals: (NUREG-0~54 /FEMA REP-:1, F.2;.H.lO;K.5.a, b; L.1, 4; I Crjterion 6.d.J) ,,:*

I I 69 I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2019 Hatch Nuclear Plant Appling County will conduct the following FEMA evaluated out-of-sequence exercise.

I Medical Services Drill Wednesday, August 21, 2019 I

8:00 am Appling County EMS - 471 Fair St, Baxley, GA Appling Healthcare - 163 E. Tollison Street I

Baxley, GA I

• Appling County in agreement with clarifications above.

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