ML20002A755
| ML20002A755 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: |  |
| Issue date: | 11/12/1980 |
| From: | Tollison A CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20002A752 | List: |
| References | |
| LER-80-055-03L, LER-80-55-3L, NUDOCS 8011210472 | |
| Download: ML20002A755 (2) | |
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' LICENSEE EVENT REPORT PREVIOUS REPORT DATE 9-4-80 UPDATE REPORT ietEAsE rRiNT OR TYRE Au, REQUIRED INFORMATIOM CONTROL stOCx: l 1
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M i During preparations for start-up following a unit refueline outane, reactor vessel 2
o 3 l conductivity was measured at 10.7 umho/cm . Vessel conductivity limits were exceeded l i
0 4 l again on August 14 (11.76 pmhos) and 15th (11.35 pmhos). This event did not I
Fo l s t I af fect the health or safety of the public.
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?J 34 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27 I
W lThe hinh vessel conductivity was caused by a breakdown of orcanics in the renctor i i ivessel. The conductivity was reduced to within specified limits by a series of !
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g g order to lower the organic concentration.
I U_L_1 I sa OTHER STATUS is O RY DISCOVERY OESCRIPTION
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LER ATTAC10!ENT - RO # 1-80-55 .
Facility: BSEP Unit No. 1 Event Date: 8-12-80 An extensive investigation has determined that the organic intrusion appears to be from processed salt water. Portable demineralizers were being used in the radwaste system to process a large amount of salt water from a service
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water leak in the. turbine building. The anion resin in these demineralizers absorbs the organic molecules. When the resin is depleted, it can exhibit a'" throw," a condition where it releases large amounts of organics very rapidly. This appears to be the cause of the organic intrusion. At the time of this event, no method of monit ring for organics was in use at the Brunswick site. Equipment has now been purchased and installed and is in use to allow for organic analysis. This analysis is performed on both j condensate returned to the reactor vessel and condensate returned to the condensate storage tank to ensure that the water does not exceed established limits.
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