ML20009F744

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LER 81-019/01T-0:on 810707,urgent Failure Alarm for Control Rods Occurred,Indicating Rods Were Inoperrable.Caused by Blown Fuse in Power Cabinet.Fuse Replaced
ML20009F744
Person / Time
Site: Surry 
Issue date: 07/21/1981
From: Joshua Wilson
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20009F730 List:
References
LER-81-019-01T, LER-81-19-1T, NUDOCS 8107310489
Download: ML20009F744 (2)


Text

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SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 1 DOCKET NO: 50-280 REPORT NO: 81-019/01T-0 EVENT DATE: 07-07-81 FAILURE TO SHUTDOWN WITH lNOPERABLE RODS ,

1. DESCRIPTISH OF EVENT:

With th<< unit critical at 0% power curing low power physics testing, an urgent f ailure alarm occurred, indicating that the control cods were inoperabic. This condition existed for more than two hours, but the unit was maintained critical. This is contrary to T.S.-3.12.C.3, and is reportable per T.S.-6.6.2a(2).

2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES:

The rods remained inoperable fer less than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. The unit remained in a controllable state throughout this period, and all control rods were capable of being dropped if required. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected. -

3 CAUSE:

The control rods were Inoperable because of a blown fuse in a power cabinet.

The unit was maintained critical for greater than the two hour period al-lowed by the Technical Specifications due. to inadequate annunciator proce-dures.

4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The blown fuse was located and replaced, making the control rod system operable.

5 SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION:

None required.

6. ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

The annunciator procedure will be revised to provide further guidance to the operators concerning control rod operability requirements.

7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

None.

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