ML003771530

NRC Staff Brief and Summary of Relevant Facts, Data and Arguments Upon Which the Staff Proposes to Rely at Oral Argument on Environmental Contention EC-6

ML003771530
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Site:	Harris
Issue date:	11/20/2000
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ML003769831	List: ML003677142 ML003771530 ML003771535
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+kBR1SISP20060712, 50-400-LA, ASLBP 99-762-02-LA, FOIA/PA-2001-0189, RAS 2403
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RAS2403UNITEDSTATESOFAMERICANUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONDOCKETED11/21/00BEFORETHEATOMICSAFETYANDLICENSINGBOARDIntheMatterofCAROLINAPOWER&LIGHTCOMPANY(ShearonHarrisNuclearPowerPlant)

))DocketNo.50-400-LA

)

)ASLBPNo.99-762-02-LA

)

)

)NRCSTAFFBRIEFAND

SUMMARY

OFRELEVANTFACTS,DATAANDARGUMENTSUPONWHICHTHESTAFFPROPOSESTORELYATORALARGUMENTONENVIRONMENTALCONTENTIONEC-6I.INTRODUCTIONPursuantto10C.F.R.§2.1113,theNuclearRegulatoryCommissionstaff(Staff)herebysubmitsitswrittenpresentationsummarizingallthefacts,dataandargumentsof whichtheStaffisawareandonwhichtheStaffintendstorelyatoralargument,scheduled forDecember7,2000.Forthereasonssetforthbelow,theStaffsubmitsthatthereisno genuineandsubstantialdisputeoffactorlawrelatingtotheBoardofCommissionersof OrangeCounty's(BCOC)EnvironmentalContentionEC-6.Thiswrittensummaryis supportedbytheaffidavitofGarethW.Parry,StephenF.LaVie,RobertL.Pallaand ChristopherGratton.II.BACKGROUNDOnDecember23,1998,CarolinaPower&LightCompany(LicenseeorCP&L)filedanapplicationforalicenseamendment,pursuantto10C.F.R.§50.90,fortheShearon HarrisNuclearPowerPlant(HarrisorHNP)(Application).TheApplicationsoughtapproval toincreasespentfuelstoragecapacitybyaddingrackmodulestotwospentfuelpools("C" and"D")andplacingthetwopoolsintoservice.OnJanuary13,1999,theNRCpublished 1OrangeCounty'sRequestforHearingandPetitiontoIntervene,February12,1999.

2Applicant'sRequestforOralArgumenttoInvokeSubpartKHybridHearingProceduresandProposedSchedule,July21,1999.

3OrangeCounty'sRequestforAdmissionofLate-FiledEnvironmentalContentions,January31,2000.anoticeofproposednosignificanthazardsconsiderationdeterminationandopportunityforhearing.64Fed.Reg.2237(1999).OnFebruary12,1999,BCOCfiledarequestfor hearingandpetitiontointervene.

1ThepetitiontointervenewasgrantedbytheAtomicSafetyandLicensingBoard(Board)byMemorandumandOrder(Order),datedJuly12, 1999.CarolinaPower&LightCo.(ShearonHarrisNuclearPowerPlant),LBP-99-25,50NRC25(1999).TheBoardadmittedtwoofBCOC'stechnicalcontentionsforlitigation.Id.at38.OnJuly21,1999,pursuantto10C.F.R.§2.1109,theLicenseefiledarequesttoinvokethehybridhearingproceduresofSubpartKandfororalargument.

2 OnDecember21,1999,theNRCissuedanEnvironmentalAssessment(EA)andFindingof NoSignificantImpact(FONSI)forthelicenseamendmentapplication(BriefExhibitA).64 Fed.Reg.71514(1999).OralargumentonthetechnicalcontentionswasheldonJanuary21,2000andonMay5,2000,theBoardissuedaMemorandumandOrderdenyingahearingonthe TechnicalContentions.CarolinaPower&LightCo.(ShearonHarrisNuclearPowerPlant),LBP-00-12,51NRC247(2000).OnJanuary31,2000,BCOCfiledamotionforadmissionoflate-filedenvironmentalcontentionsbasedupontheissuanceoftheDecember21,1999,EAandFONSI.

3Themotionwasgrantedastoonecontention,designatedasEnvironmentalContentionEC-6 4 SeeNRCStaffBriefandSummaryofRelevantFacts,DataandArgumentsUponWhichtheStaffProposestoRelyatOralArgumentonTechnicalContentions2and3,at3-4,January4,2000.bytheBoard.CarolinaPower&LightCo.(ShearonHarrisNuclearPowerPlant),LBP-00-19,52NRC85(2000).InaccordancewiththeBoard'sOrdersand10C.F.R.§2.1113,theStaffherebysubmitsitswrittensummaryofallthefacts,data,andargumentsknowntotheStaffand onwhichtheStaffintendstorelyatoralargumenttorefutetheexistenceofagenuineand substantialdisputeoffactastoEnvironmentalContentionEC-6.III.STATEMENTOFFACTSShearonHarrisNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1(HNP)isathree-loopWestinghousepressurizedwaterreactor(PWR)operatedbyCP&LinWakeandChathamCounties,North Carolina.Thesitewasoriginallyplannedasafourunitsiteandthefuelhandlingbuilding (FHB)wasdesignedandconstructedwithfourseparatepoolscapableofstoringspentfuel.

Atthepresenttime,twopools,AandB,locatedatthesouthend,oftheFHBareinuse.

ThelicenseamendmentrequestseekstoplacepoolsCandD,locatedatthenorthendof theFHB,inservicebycompletingtheSFPcoolingsystemandinstallinghighdensityspent fuelracks.

4ThespentfuelstoragesystemattheShearonHarrisplantishousedintheFHB,areinforcedconcrete,seismicallyqualifiedstructurelocatedadjacenttotheUnit1 ContainmentAuxiliaryBuilding,theReactorAuxiliaryBuilding,andtheWasteProcessing building.AffidavitofGarethW.Parry,StephenF.Lavie,RobertL.PallaandChristopher GrattonInSupportofNRCStaffBriefAndSummaryofRelevantFacts,DataAnd ArgumentsUponWhichTheStaffProposesToRelyatOralArgumentonEnvironmental ContentionEC-6(Affidavit)¶43.Thebuildingisdesignedtoprotectitscontentsagainstnaturalphenomena,suchastornadoes,hurricanes,andfloods.TheFHBhousesthefour fuelpools,thenorthandsouthendspentfuelpoolcoolingwatersystems,theFHB ventilationsystem,andothersystems,structures,andcomponentsreliedupontosupport refuelingandfuelstorageoperations.SpentfuelfromtheoperationoftheHarrisUnit1 nuclearreactoristransferredtotheFHBthroughthetransfertubelocatedinthesouthend transfercanalandstoredinspentfuelpoolAorB.TheHarrisfuelstoragesystemalsoacceptsspentfuelfromtheRobinsonandBrunswicknuclearstations.Id.Thefuelstoragesystemconsistsoffourseismicallyqualified,reinforcedconcretefuelpoolsandacaskloadingpit.Thefuelpoolsandthecaskpitarelinedwithstainless steelforcompatibilitywiththepoolwater.Affidavit¶44.Spentfuelisstoredinseismically qualifiedstorageracksatthebottomofthefuelstoragepools.Transfercanalsare providedbetweenthecaskpitandthepoolssothatspentfuelassembliescanbesafely transferredunderwaterfromonepoolstoragelocationtoanother.Isolationgatesare providedbetweeneachpoolandtransfercanal.Thegatesareconstructedofsteeland haveinflatablerubbersealstominimizeleakage.Thegatesextendfromthepoolsurface toapproximatelytheelevationofthetopofthefuelstorageracks.Id.Twospentfuelpoolcoolingandcleanupsystems(SFPCCS)areprovidedtoremovedecayheatfromthespentfuelstoredinthefourfuelpools.Affidavit¶45.OneSFPCCS servicesthesouthendpools(poolsAandB),whiletheothersystemservicesthenorthend pools(poolsCandD).ThesystemsaredesignedtoseismicCategory1requirements,and thesystempumpscanbepoweredfromonsiteemergencypower.EachSFPCCSconsists oftwo100%capacitypumps,twoheatexchangers,filters,andapurificationloopwitha demineralizer.Whileindependentofeachother,thecoolingsystemscanshareinventorythroughthemaintransfercanal.TheUnit1ComponentCoolingWaterSystem(CCWS) removesthedecayheatfromboththenorthendandsouthendfuelpoolheatexchangers, andtransferstheheattotheServiceWaterSystem.Id.Eachfuelpoolcoolingwatersystem(northandsouth)iscomprisedoftwo100%capacitycoolingloops.Affidavit¶46.Thefuelpoolcoolingpumpsareremotelyoperated fromthecontrolroom.Controlroomandlocalalarmsareprovidedtoalertoperatorsof abnormalwaterlevelandhightemperatureinthefuelpools.Shouldalossofoffsitepower occur,thefuelpoolcoolingpumpscanberestartedfromthecontrolroomusingemergency powerprovidedbytheemergencydieselgenerators.Id.Eachfuelpoolcoolingwatersystemincludesanonsafety-related,nonseismicallyqualifiedpurificationloopdesignedtoremoveimpuritiesandlowertheactivitylevelsinthe fuelpoolcoolant.Valvingisprovidedbetweenthecoolingsystemandcleanupsystemto permitisolationofthisnonsafety-relatedsystem.Affidavit¶47.Periodically,coolantmakeupisrequiredtooffsettheeffectsofevaporation,sampling,andfueltransferactivities.Severalmethodsforaddingadditionalcoolanttothe spentfuelstoragesystemareavailabletooperators.Affidavit¶48.ThecontainmentbuildingatHarrisisasteel-lined,concretereinforcedcontainmentintheformofaverticalcylinderwithahemisphericaldomeandaflatbasemat.Affidavit at¶65.Thebasematisaminimum12footthickreinforcedconcreteslab.Id.TheBoard'sorderadmittingEnvironmentalcontentionEC-6forlitigationinthisSubpartKproceedingrequiresthatthepartiesanalyzetheprobabilityoftheoccurrence ofaseven-stepaccidentsequenceinvolvingthespentfuelpools.Thesequencebegins withadegradedreactorcoreaccidentcausedbyanunspecifiedinitiator.AsdiscussedbelowandintheStaff'sAffidavit,inanalyzingthesequence,theStaffhasconsideredall identifiableinitiatorsofadegradedcoreaccident,utilizingbothsitespecificandgeneric dataandanalyses.Thesecondstepiscontainmentfailureorbypass.Again,asdiscussed belowandintheStaff'sAffidavit,theStaffhasconsiderednumerousdegradedcore accidentsthatcouldleadtocontainmentfailureorbypassattheHarrissite.Thethirdstep islossofallspentfuelpoolcoolingandmakeup.TheStaff'saffidavitaddressesall identifiabledegradedcoreaccidentsthatcouldinvolveeitherconcomitantorsubsequent lossofcoolingand/ormakeup.Inassessingstepsfourandfive,extremeradiationdoses precludingpersonnelaccessandinabilitytorestartcoolingormakeupduetoextreme radiationdoses,theStaffhasconsideredallpathwaysofradiationthatcouldpreclude restartingcoolingormakeuporthatwouldleadtostepsix,lossofmostorallpoolwater throughevaporation.Stepseven,initiationofanexothermicreactioninpoolsCandDhas beenconservativelygivenaprobabilityof1,foralleventsthatresultinuncoveryofspent fuel,andhasthereforenotbeenanalyzed.ThefactsuponwhichtheStaffrelieswithrespecttoEC-6aresetforthintheaffidavitofDr.GarethW.ParryandMessrs.StephenF.LaVie,RobertL.Pallaand ChristopherGratton.TheprofessionalqualificationsoftheStaff'switnessesare summarizedintheiraffidavitandsetforthindetailinExhibits1through4oftheaffidavit.

Dr.ParryisqualifiedasanexpertinProbabilisticRiskAssessment(PRA)byvirtueofhis education,experience,anddemonstratedknowledgeandskillregardingthatsubject.Mr.

LaVieisqualifiedasanexpertinradiationdoseanalysisbyvirtueofhistraining, experience,anddemonstratedknowledgeandskillregardingthatsubject.Mr.Pallais 5SubpartKwaspromulgatedinordertoimplementSection134oftheNuclearWastePolicyActof1982(NWPA).Pub.L.97-425,January7,1983,96Stat.2201,42U.S.C.§10101.SeeCarolinaPower&LightCo.(ShearonHarrisNuclearPowerPlant),LBP-00-12,51NRCat247,254(2000).qualifiedasanexpertinsevereaccidentanalysisandcontainmentbehaviorbyvirtueofhiseducation,experience,anddemonstratedknowledgeandskillregardingthosesubjects.

Mr.Grattonisqualifiedasanexpertinreactorsystemanalysisbyvirtueofhiseducation, experience,anddemonstratedknowledgeandskillregardingthatsubject.IV.THEREGULATORYFRAMEWORKA.SubpartK,10C.F.R.§2.1101,etseq.Thisproceedingisgovernedbythehybridhearingproceduresof10C.F.R.§2.1101etseq.(SubpartK).SubpartKprovidesthatitsproceduresmaybeused,attherequestofanyparty,incontestedproceedingsconcerning,interalia,applicationsforalicenseamendment"toexpandthespentfuelcapacityatthesiteofaciviliannuclearpower plant,throughtheuseofhighdensityfuelstorageracks...."10C.F.R.§2.1 103.5Theproceduresincludesubmissionofadetailedwrittenpresentationthatmustcontainallthe facts,data,andargumentsknowntothepartyandonwhichthepartyintendstorelyatoral argumenttosupportorrefutetheexistenceofagenuineandsubstantialdisputeoffact.

10C.F.R.§2.1113(a).Allsupportingfactsanddatamustbesubmittedintheformofswornwrittentestimonyorotherswornwrittensubmission.Id.Thewrittensubmissionsaretobeservedsimultaneouslyonallotherparties.Id.Afterconsideringthesubmissionsandtheoralarguments,thepresidingofficerwillissueanorder(1)designatinganydisputedissuesoffactandlawforhearing,and(2) disposingofanyissuesoffactorlawnotdesignatedforhearing.10C.F.R.§2.1115(a). Indesignatingissuesforhearing,thepresidingofficer"shallidentifythespecificfactsthatareingenuineandsubstantialdispute,thereasonwhythedecisionoftheCommissionis likelytodependontheresolutionofthatdispute,andthereasonwhyanadjudicatory hearingislikelytoresolvethedispute."Id.Asfortheissuesnotdesignatedforhearing,onlyabriefstatementofthereasonsforthedispositionisrequired.Id.SubpartKprovidesforaformofsummarydispositionprocedure.50Fed.Reg.41662,41664(1984).Theburdenofdemonstratingtheexistenceofagenuineandsubstantialissueofmaterialfactisonthepartyrequestingadjudication.Id.at41667.AsstatedbythisBoardinitsdecisiondenyingahearingonthetechnicalcontentions,"with respecttoameritsdispositionofanysubstantivematteratissueinthisproceeding(i.e.,the admittedBCOCcontentions),relativetothecentralsubpartKissueoftheexistenceof disputedmaterialfactsrequiringanevidentiaryhearing,'theburden...[is]ontheparty requestingtheadjudication.'"Harris,LBP-00-12,51NRCat254-55.InpromulgatingSubpartK,theCommissionemphasizedthatthethresholdforanevidentiaryhearingisstrict:AstheCommissionpointedoutinconnectionwiththeproposedrules,thestatutorycriteriaarequitestrictandare designedtoensurethatthehearingisfocusedexclusivelyon realissues.Theyaresimilartothestandardsunderthe Commission'sexistingrulefordeterminingwhethersummary dispositioniswarranted.Theygofurther,however,in requiringafindingthatadjudicationisnecessarytoresolution ofthedisputeandinplacingtheburdenofdemonstratingthe existenceofagenuineandsubstantialdisputeofmaterial factonthepartyrequestingadjudication.50Fed.Reg.at41667.Therefore,inthiscase,theburdenofgoingforwardandof demonstratingtheexistenceofagenuineandsubstantialissueofmaterialfactthatcan onlyberesolvedbytheintroductionofevidenceatanadjudicatoryhearingisonthe 6Thiscriterionisfarstricterthanafindingthatanissueismaterialpursuanttothesummarydispositionrules.

See10C.F.R.§2.749(d).Intervenor,BCOC.SeeHarris,LBP-00-12,51NRCat255.Inorderforanyissuetoproceedtohearing,theBoardmust"identifythespecificfactsthatareingenuineand substantialdispute,thereasonwhythedecisionoftheCommissionislikelytodependon theresolutionofthatdispute, 6andthereasonwhyanadjudicatoryhearingislikelytoresolvethedispute."10C.F.R.§2.1115(a).

B.NationalEnvironmentalPolicyActof1969,42U.S.C.§4321,etseq.ContentionEC-6challengestheadequacyoftheStaff'senvironmentalreviewoftheproposedlicenseamendmentundertheNationalEnvironmentalPolicyActof1969,42 U.S.C.§4321,etseq.("NEPA").CongressenactedNEPAinordertocompelFederal agenciestoconsidertheenvironmentalconsequencesoftheiractionspriortomaking agencydecisions.NEPArequiresFederalagenciestoprepareanEnvironmentalImpact Statement("EIS")detailingthepossibleenvironmentalimpactsofanymajorFederalaction thatmaysignificantlyaffecttheenvironment.SanLuisObispoMothersforPeacev.NRC

,751F.2d1287,1298(D.C.Cir.1984),cert.denied,479U.S.26(1986).PreparationofanEISensuresthattheenvironmentalgoalssetforthinNEPAare"infusedintotheongoing programsandactionsofFederalGovernment."Marshv.OregonNaturalResources Council,490U.S.360,371n.14(1989), citing115Cong.Rec.40416(1969)(remarksofSenatorJackson)("Marsh").SeealsoLouisianaEnergyServices,L.P.(ClaiborneEnrichmentCenter),CLI-98-3,47NRC77,87(1998)("LES").Specifically,forallproposed majorFederalactions,section102(2)(C)ofNEPArequiresagenciestoincludeadetailed statementoftheenvironmentalimpactoftheproposedaction,anyadverseenvironmental effectswhichcannotbeavoidedshouldtheproposalbeimplemented,andthealternativestotheproposedaction.42U.S.C.§4332(2)(C).EverymajorNRClicensingactionwhichsignificantlyaffectstheenvironmentisamajorFederalactionsubjecttotherequirementsofNEPA.ScientistInstituteforPublicInformationv.AEC,481F.2d1079(D.C.Cir.1973).TheNRChasimplementedtheNEPArequirementsinitsregulationsat10C.F.R.Part51.Theregulationsrequirethe preparationofanEISforcertainactionsmeetingthecriteriain10C.F.R.§51.20.For thoseactionswhichdonotmeetthesecriteria,theNRCisrequiredtopreparean environmentalassessment("EA").10C.F.R.§51.21.Under10C.F.R§51.30,anEA mustidentifytheproposedactionandincludeadiscussionoftheneedfortheproposed action,alternativestotheaction,andtheenvironmentalimpactsoftheproposedaction.

OncetheEAiscomplete,theNRCmustdecidewhethertheimpactsaresignificantand requirethepreparationofanEIS,orwhethertheimpactsareinsignificant.Iftheimpacts aredeterminedtobeinsignificant,theNRCwillissueaFindingofNoSignificantImpact

("FONSI").10C.F.R.§51.31.TheFONSImustidentifytheproposedaction,statethatthe CommissionhasdecidednotprepareanEIS,andpresentthereasonswhytheproposed actionwillnothaveasignificantimpactontheenvironment.Id.ToaidintheinterpretationofNEPAanditsrequirements,aruleofreasonhasbeendevelopedandappliedinordertodeterminewhetheranagencyhasadequatelyanalyzed theenvironmentalconsequencesofaproposalforaction.NaturalResourcesDefenseCouncilv.Morton,458F.2d827,834(D.C.Cir.1972).Theruleofreason,broadlystated,requiresthat:iftheenvironmentalaspectsofproposedactionsareeasilyidentifiable,theyshouldberelatedinsuchdetailthatthe consequencesoftheactionareapparent.If,however,theeffectscannotbereadilyascertainedandifthealternatives aredeemedremoteandonlyspeculativepossibilities, detaileddiscussionofenvironmentaleffectsisnot contemplatedunderNEPA.EnvironmentalDefenseFund,Inc.v.Andrus,619F.2d1368,1375(10 thCir.1980).Agenciesarenotrequiredtoconducta"crystalballinquiry,"butmustcomplywithNEPA's requirementstothefullestextentpossible.Id.Incaseswherenewenvironmentalinformationisbroughttotheattentionofanagency,applicationoftheruleofreasonmustbebasedonthevalueofthenew information.Marsh,490U.S.at373.IndeterminingwhetheranEISisrequired,theagencyshouldconsiderthesignificanceofthenewinformationanddeterminewhetherit presents"aseriouslydifferentpictureoftheenvironmentalimpactoftheproposedproject fromwhatwaspreviouslyenvisioned."HydroResources,Inc.(2929CoorsRoad,Suite1010,Albuquerque,NM),CLI-99-22,50NRC3,14(1999)(rejectingIntervenorsrequests forasupplementalEIS),citingSierraClubv.Froelke,816F.2d205,210(5thCir.1987).Thenewinformationmustbeconsideredwithinthecontextofthebroaddiscretiongranted toagenciesbyNEPAtokeeptheirinquirieswithinappropriateandmanageableboundaries.

LES,47NRCat103.ThisbroaddiscretionensuresthatNEPAwillnotbeconstruedtoobroadly,whichwouldresultinavailableagencyresourcesbeing"spreadsothin"that agenciesareunabletoadequatelypursueprotectionofthephysicalenvironmentand naturalresources.Id. V.THEADMITTEDCONTENTIONInitsAugust7,2000Order,theBoardadmittedoneenvironmentalcontentionforlitigationinthisproceeding,designatingitEC-6.Harris,LBP-00-19,52NRC85.Thecontentionreads:IntheEnvironmentalAssessment("EA")forCP&L'sDecember23,1998,licenseamendmentapplication,theNRCStaffconcludesthatthe proposedexpansionofspentfuelstoragecapacityattheShearonHarris nuclearpowerplantwillnothaveasignificanteffectonthequalityofthe humanenvironment....Therefore,theStaffhasdecidednottoprepareanEnvironmentalImpactStatement("EIS")fortheproposedlicense amendment.TheStaff'sdecisionnottoprepareanEISviolatesthe NationalEnvironmentalPolicyAct("NEPA")andNRC'simplementing regulations,becausetheFindingofNoSignificantImpact("FONSI")is erroneousandarbitraryandcapricious.Infact,theproposedexpansionof spentfuelstoragecapacityatHarriswouldcreateaccidentrisksthatare significantlyinexcessoftherisksidentifiedintheEA,andsignificantlyin excessofaccidentsriskspreviouslyevaluatedbytheNRCStaffintheEIS fortheHarrisoperatinglicense.Theseaccidentriskswouldsignificantly affectthequalityofthehumanenvironment,andthereforemustbe addressesinanEIS.TherearetworespectsinwhichtheproposedlicenseamendmentwouldsignificantlyincreasetheriskofanaccidentatHarris:(1)CP&LproposesseveralsubstantialchangesinthephysicalcharacteristicsandmodeofoperationoftheHarris plant.Theeffectsofthesechangesontheaccidentrisk posedbytheHarrisplanthavenotbeenaccountedforinthe Staff'sEA.Thechangeswouldsignificantlyincrease,above presentlevels,theprobabilityandconsequencesofpotential accidentsattheHarrisplant.(2)Duringtheperiodsincethepublicationin1979ofNUREG-0575,theNRC'sGenericEnvironmentalImpact Statement("GEIS")onspentfuelstorage,newinformation hasbecomeavailableregardingtherisksofstoringspent fuelinpools.Thisinformationshowsthattheproposed licenseamendmentwouldsignificantlyincreasethe probabilityandconsequencesofpotentialaccidentsatthe Harrisplant,abovethelevelsindicatedintheGEIS,the1983 EISfortheHarrisoperatinglicense,andtheEA.Thenew informationisnotaddressedintheEAorthe1983EISfortheHarrisoperatinglicense.Accordingly,theStaffmustprepareanEISthatfullyconsiderstheenvironmentalimpactsoftheproposedlicenseamendment,includingits effectsontheprobabilityandconsequencesofaccidentsattheHarrisplant.

AsrequiredbyNEPAandCommissionpolicy,theEISshouldalsoexamine thecostsandbenefitsoftheproposedactionincomparisontovarious alternatives,includingSevereAccidentMitigationDesignAlternatives

("SAMDAS")andthealternativeofdrystorage.Id.at93-94.Inadmittingthecontention,theBoardsaid:"thecruxofthecontention...iswhethertheaccidentproposedbyBCOCinbasisF.1ofthecontentionhasaprobability sufficienttoprovidethebeyond-remote-and-speculative'trigger'thatisneededtocompel preparationofanEISrelativetothisproposedlicensingaction."Id.at95.TheBoardadmittedthecontentionbutconfinedconsiderationofittotheseven-stepaccident sequencepostulatedbyBCOC(discussedbelow)andtheassociatedprobabilityanalysis.Id.at98.Thesequence,asadmitted,reads:(1)adegradedcoreaccident;(2)containmentfailureorbypass; (3)lossofallspentfuelcoolingandmakeupsystems; (4)extremeradiationdosesprecludingpersonnelaccess; (5)inabilitytorestartanypoolcoolingormakeupsystemsduetoextreme radiationdoses; (6)lossofmostorallpoolwaterthroughevaporation;and (7)initiationofanexothermicoxidationreactioninpoolsCandD.Id.at95.TheBoardalsorequestedthepartiestoaddressthefollowingthreequestionsintheirwrittenpresentations:1.Whatisthesubmittingparty'sbestestimateoftheoverallprobabilityofthesequencesetforthinthechainofseveneventsintheCP&L andBCOC'sfilings,setforthonpage13supra?Theestimates shouldutilizeplant-specificdatawhereavailableandshouldutilizethebestavailablegenericdatawheregenericdataisreliedupon.2.Thepartiesshouldtakecarefulnoteofanyrecentdevelopmentsintheestimationoftheprobabilitiesoftheindividualeventsinthe sequenceatissue.Inparticular,havenewdataormodels suggestedanymodificationoftheestimateof2x10

-6peryearsetforthintheexecutivesummaryofNUREG-1353,Regulatory AnalysisfortheResolutionofGenericIssue82,BeyondDesign BasisAccidentsinSpentFuelPools(1989)?Further,doanyofthe concernsexpressedintheACRS'sApril13,2000lettersuggestthat theprobabilitiesofindividualelementsofthesequencearegreater thanthosepreviouslyanalyzed(e.g.,isthechanceofoccurrenceof sequenceelementseven,anexothermicreaction,greaterthanwas assumedinthedecade-oldNUREG-1353)?3.AssumingtheBoardshoulddecidethattheprobabilityinvolvedisofsufficientmomentsoasnottopermitthepostulatedaccident sequencetobeclassifiedas"remoteandspeculative,"whatwould betheoverallscopeoftheenvironmentalimpactanalysisthestaff wouldberequiredtoprepare(i.e.,limitedtotheimpactsofthat accidentsequenceorafullblownEISregardingtheamendment request)?TheStaff'sanalysisoftheseven-stepaccidentsequence,theprobabilityanalysisandtheanswerstotheBoard'squestionsarediscussedbelow.VI.ARGUMENTA.IntroductionandSummaryofArgumentThelicenseamendmentapplicationsubmittedbyCP&LproposestomodifyHarristoincreasethespentfuelstoragecapacitybyaddingrackmodulestospentfuelpoolsC andD.TheIntervenorclaimsthattheNRC'senvironmentalanalysisoftheproposed licenseamendmentfailstomeettherequirementsofNEPAbecausetheStaffdidnot considertheaccidentsequencepostulatedbytheIntervenor.PursuanttoNEPAand10 C.F.R.§51.21,theNRCStaffpreparedanEAforthelicenseamendmentapplication.Brief ExhibitB.TheNRCpreparedanEAbecausethislicenseamendmentactiondoesnotfallwithinthecriteriaformandatorypreparationofanEISunder10C.F.R.§51.20.TheEAcontainedalltherelevantenvironmentalinformationrequiredbyNRCregulations.BriefExhibitB.AfteridentifyingtheproposedactionrequestedbyCP&L,the EAstatedthattheproposedactionwasnecessaryforthelicenseetoprovidespentfuel storagecapacityfortheCP&LunitsatBrunswick,RobinsonandHarristhroughtheendof theircurrentlicenses.TheEAthenexaminedtherelevantenvironmentalimpactsfromthe proposedlicenseamendment,includingradioactivewastetreatment,gaseousradioactive wastes,solidradioactivewastes,radiologicalimpacts,andaccidentconsiderations.The EAalsodiscussedthealternativestothelicenseamendment,includingshipmentofthefuel toapermanentfederalfuelstorage/disposalfacility,shipmentofthefueltoareprocessing facility,reductionofspentfuelgeneration,analternativecreationofadditionalstorage capacity,andthenoactionalternative.Id.Afterconsiderationoftheenvironmentalimpactsandthealternatives,theNRCissuedaFONSIforthelicenseamendment.Id.IntervenorBCOChasassertedthattheStaff'sEAwasinadequate,andthatthereforetheresultingFONSIwasimproper,becausetheStafffailedtoconsiderthe accidentsequencepostulatedbytheIntervenor'switness,Dr.GordonThompson.BCOC claimsthatthisaccidentsequencewouldresultinsignificantimpactstotheenvironment andthattheStaffshouldhavepreparedanEISontheproposedlicenseamendment.The LicensingBoardhasclarifiedtheissuesraisedbythiscontentionbyposingthethree questionsstatedabove.InitsmemorandumandorderadmittingEnvironmentalContentionEC-6,theBoardcitedtheCommissiondecisioninVermontYankeeNuclearPowerCorp.(VermontYankee NuclearPowerStation),CLI-90-4,31NRC333(1990).Inthatcase,ashere,theintervenorssoughtpreparationofanEISinconjunctionwitharequestbythelicenseeto expanditsspentfuelpoolcapacity.VermontYankeeat334.ThesequenceassertedwasverysimilartotheonepresentedbyEC-6andhadbeenrejectedbytheappealboardas remoteandspeculativeforNEPApurposes.Id.IndiscussingtherequirementsofNEPA,theCommissionsaid:WhatisimportantforpurposesofNEPAconsiderationisthelikelihoodofoccurrenceoftheaccidentinquestion.Ifthe accidentsoughttobeconsideredissufficientlyunlikelythat itcanbecharacterizedfairlyasremoteandspeculative,then considerationunderNEPAisnotrequiredasamatteroflaw.Id.at334-35.TheCommissionremandedthemattertotheAppealBoardforfurtherproceedingstodevelopmoreinformationon"theplausibilityorprobabilityofthe[accident sequence]atissue..."inordertodeterminewhethertheaccidentisremoteandspeculative.Id.at335-36.TheCommissionfurthersaidthatiftheAppealBoardfoundthattheprobabilitywasontheorderof1E-4(1x10

-4),thecasewastobereturnedtotheCommissionforfurtherreview,butotherwise,"theAppealBoardshouldmodifyorconfirm itsjudgmentastotheremoteandspeculativenatureoftheaccidentonthebasisofthe accidentprobabilityderivedonremand."Id.at335-36.Inalateropinion,respondingtotheAppealBoard'srequestforclarification,theCommissionstatedthat"futuredecisionsthat accidentscenariosareremoteandspeculativemustbemorespecificandmoresoundly basedontheactualprobabilitiesandaccidentscenariosbeinganalyzed."VermontYankeeNuclearPowerCorp.(VermontYankeeNuclearPowerStation),CLI-90-7,32NRC129,132(1990). 7Inthissubmittal,twoformsofnotationareused.So,forexample,2x10

-7mayalsobewritten2E-07.Asdiscussedmorefullybelow,theStaffhasanalyzedtheaccidentsequencepostulatedbyBCOCinordertodetermineitsbestestimateoftheoverallprobabilityofthe accidentsequence.TheStaff'sbestestimateisthattheprobabilityoftheaccidentsequenceisextremelylow,withanupperboundof2x10

-7/reactoryear.

7Affidavit¶251.AlthoughtheStaffhasprovidedthisnumericalestimateofprobability,theStaffalsonotes thattheprobabilitymayinfactbelowerthanthisnumber,asmanysourcesofconservatism weretakenintoaccountindevelopingtheestimate.Id.at124,127-131,206,207,245,254-256.Basedonitsbestestimateoftheprobabilityanditsbeliefthattheactual probabilityofthesequencemaybelower,theStaffsubmitsthat,pursuanttoNEPA requirements,theprobabilityoftheaccidentsequenceissolowastoberemoteand speculative.SinceNEPAdoesnotrequireconsiderationofremoteandspeculative impacts,theStaff'sEAfortheproposedlicenseamendmentisadequateandfurther environmentalanalysisisunnecessary.Therearenorecentdevelopmentsthatsuggestanymodificationintheestimationoftheindividualeventsintheseven-stepsequence.Inaddition,nothingcontainedinthe ACRS'sletterofApril13,2000suggeststhattheprobabilityofthesequenceorits componenteventsisgreaterthanpreviouslyanalyzed.IftheLicensingBoardreachestheconclusionthattheaccidentsequenceisnotremoteandspeculativeandthatfurtherenvironmentalanalysisoftheaccidentsequence isnecessary,theStaffsubmitsthattheappropriatetypeofenvironmentalanalysisatthis stageintheprocesswouldbeareconsiderationoftheoriginalEAandFONSIforthe proposedlicenseamendment.ShouldthepreparationofanEISberequired,theproperscopeshouldbelimitedtotheenvironmentalimpactsfromtheproposedlicense amendmentandtheappropriatealternativestotheproposedaction.

B.TheTestimony/Affidavit/DeclarationofBCOC'sWitness,Dr.GordonThompson,ShouldbeAffordedLittleWeightBCOChasprofferedGordonThompsonasitsexpertwitnessforContentionEC-6,ThestaffsubmitsthatBCOChasnotadequatelydemonstratedDr.Thompson'sexpertise inProbabilisticRiskAssessmentoranyotherdisciplinerelatedtothedeterminationofthe probabilityoftheoccurrenceoftheseven-stepaccidentsequencethatisthesubjectof EC-6.Itiswellestablishedthatpersonswhoseektopresentexperttestimonymustbequalifiedtodoso.Inordertoestablishanexpertwitness'stestimonyasreliable,aparty seekingtooffersuchawitness'sexpertopinionmustshowthatthewitnesshasthe necessaryqualificationstoofferanexpertopiniononthematter,ormustbecapableof questioningthesoundnessoftheexpertopinionsofpersonswhodoappearaswitnesses intheproceeding.10C.F.R.§2.733(1999);seee.g.,DukePowerCo.(WilliamB.McGuireNuclearStation,Units1and2),ALAB-669,15NRC453,475(1982).This standardisattheheartoftheCommission'srequirementofreliability.WhiletheFederalRulesofEvidencearenotdirectlyapplicabletoCommissionproceedings,NRCadjudicatoryboardsoftenlooktothoserulesforguidance,andhave adoptedthestandardforexpertwitnessesenunciatedinRule702asallowingawitnessto bequalifiedasanexpertby"knowledge,skill,experience,training,oreducation"totestify

"[i]fscientific,technical,orotherspecializedknowledgewillassistthetrieroffactto understandtheevidenceortodetermineafactinissue."McGuire,ALAB-669,15NRC at475;SouthernCaliforniaEdisonCo.(SanOnofreNuclearGeneratingStation,Units2and3),ALAB-717,17NRC346,365n.32(1983);PhiladelphiaElec.Co.(PeachBottomAtomicPowerStationUnits2and3),ALAB-701,10NRC1517,1524(1982).IntheMcGuirecase,proposedexperttestimonyonhydrogencombustionandcontrolwasexcludedasnon-expert,wherethewitness,aphysicalorganicchemistwitha master'sdegree,claimedtohavean"abilitytounderstandandevaluatemattersofa technicalnature,"basedonhis"academicandpracticaltraining"and"yearsofreadingAEC andNRCdocuments,"butlackedspecificexpertiseinthesubjectinissue.McGuire ,ALAB-669,15NRC453.SeealsoPhiladelphiaElec.Co.(LimerickGeneratingStation,Units1and2),ALAB-819,22NRC687,733(1985)(Arttherapist,withnobackground relatingtotheissue,notqualifiedtogiveexperttestimony);PacificGas&Elec.Co.(DiabloCanyonNuclearPowerPlant,Units1and2),LBP-87-25,26NRC168,182(1987)

(TestimonyofPh.D.inphysicswithnoexperiencewiththetechnicalsubjectsunderreview:

nuclearengineering,nuclearsystems,nuclearcriticality,seismicdesign,etc.,admittedbut onlygiventheweightappropriateconsideringhisPh.D.andyearsofteachingphysics);PhiladelphiaElec.Co.(PeachBottomAtomicPowerStationUnits2and3),ALAB-701,16NRC1517,1523-24(1982)(Ph.D.inchemistrynotqualifiedtogiveexpertopiniononhealth effectsofradonreleases,duetolackofeducationorexperienceinmedicine,healthphysicsorotherareasrelatedtohealtheffectsofradon).Cf.FloridaPower&LightCo.(TurkeyPointNuclearGeneratingPlant,Units3and4),LBP-86-23,24NRC108,(1986)(TestimonyofPh.D.inmathematicswithnotrainingorknowledgeofengineering,heat transferandothertechnicalissuesunderreview,permittedtotestifyandactasexpert interrogatorto"sharpentheissues"). 8Forconvenience,theStaffwilldenotecitationstoDr.Thompson'sdepositiontranscriptas"Dep.Tr.,"ratherthan"BriefExhibitA."BCOChasprovidedlittlereasontobelievethatDr.Thompsonisqualifiedtoserveasanexpertwitnessherein.Asborneoutbyhisdeposition,discussedbelow,Dr.

Thompsonadmitsthathedoesnotpossessthe"'knowledge,skill,experience,training,or education'germaneto"aresolutionoftheissueunderconsiderationinthiscase-an analysisoftheprobabilityoftheseven-stepaccidentsequence.McGuire,ALAB-669,15NRCat475.DuringhisdepositiononOctober16,2000,attachedheretoasBriefExhibitA, 8Dr.Thompsonmadethefollowingstatementsregardinghisprofferedexpertise:1)Hestatedthathewillbeproviding"anintegratedpictureofthestepsinvolvedin[the]accidentsequence, drawingfromliterature,whereavailable,andsupportedby calculationsandjudgement,wherenecessary.Thistask involvesknowledgeofreactoraccidents,thereleaseof radioactivematerialfromreactorcontainmentsduringsuch accidents,theeffectofthisradioactivematerialontheability ofoperatorstomaintainthefunctioningofspentfuelpools andtheequipmentthatsupportstheoperationofthespent fuelpools,thebehaviorofaspentfuelpoolwhenwateris lostthroughevaporation,andtheradioactivereleasethat wouldensuefromthedryingoutofapool.....[T]hisisahighlycomplexmatterinvolvingagreatdealofanalysis.

Thereisnoonepersonwhocouldclaimtobeanexperton everydetailofeverystepofthatanalysis,andIdonotclaimtobesuchaperson.Idonotbelieveanysuchpersonexists.And,therefore,myexpertise,whichIbelieveis sufficientforthisproceedingistoprovide,asaIsaidbefore, anintegratedpicture,drawinguponliteraturewhereitexists andthensupportedbycalculationandjudgement."(Dep.Tr.

7-8)(emphasissupplied).3)Heclaimsthathisexpertiseinreactoraccidentsissufficientforthepurposeofthisproceeding.Hehas participatedinanumberofstudiesrelatingtoreactor accidentsandcoredamage(asource-termreport(Dep.Tr. 12)).Thisaffordshimexpertiseinprovidinganintegratedpictureofthesequence.(Dep.Tr.9).Hehasnotrainingin analysisofreactoraccidents.Hehasnotworkedwithcodes toanalyzereactoraccidents.Hebelievesthathiseducation inscienceandengineering,whichdidnotincludeany coursesregardingreactoraccidents,"issufficienttosupport thetestimonyhehastoprovide."(Dep.Tr.10-11).4)Hehashadnotrainingoreducationrelatingtocontainmentintegrity,containmentdesign,containment bypass.(Dep.Tr.13-14).Hiscontributiontothesource-termreportmentionedabovewasbasedonasurveyofthe literatureandattendanceatconferencesandworkshops.

(Dep.Tr.15-16).5)Heworkedonanunusedreportontheprobabilityandconsequencesofthereleaseofcontaminantsrelatedtoa requestbytheownersofSeabrooktoreducetheemergency planningzone.(Dep.Tr.17-19).Hedidnooriginal calculations,otherthansomeforconsequences.(Dep.Tr.

19).Hehasparticipatedinanumberofotherstudies,but hasnotperformedanyoriginalcalculationsoraccident analysesforanyofthosereports.(Dep.Tr.20-26).6)HeisnotqualifiedtoprovideathoroughreviewofCP&L'sIPE,IPEEorPSA.(Dep.Tr.33-34).7)HedisagreeswiththeBoard'sassessmentofhisexpertiseastoreactortechnicalissuesas"policyoriented,"

(Dep.Tr.45-49).8)Heclaimsthathedoesnotneedtoperformadetailedanalysisoftheaccidentsequence,norcouldhe,but"inorder tosupportthecontention,wedonotneedtoperformthe analysis....Allthatisnecessaryistoshowthattheuseof asetofreasonableassumptionsandsupportedbysome scopingcalculationsshowsthat...theprobabilityischaracterized...insuchamannerthat...PreparationofanEISisrequired."(Dep.Tr.57-58).9)Hehasnotrainingasahealthphysicist.(Dep.Tr.72-73).10)Heclaimsthatheisqualifiedto"leadateamthatwouldprovideathoroughandcomprehensiveassessment oftheonsetofoxidationreactioninadrainingpool....[He] isqualifiedtospecifytheproblem,tointeractwiththevariousspecialistsnecessary,toidentifythespecialistsnecessary, thecalculationsandexperimentsthatarenecessaryto reviewtheirfindings,andtosummarizetheseintoacredible result."(Dep.Tr.94).11)HeconsidershimselfanexpertinPRAforthepurposesofthisproceeding.(Dep.Tr.115)Hehashadno trainingandlittleexperienceinthatdiscipline.BasedonthesworntestimonyofDr.Thompsonduringhisdeposition,assetforthabove,itisclearthathelackssufficientexpertiserelatedtotheanalysisoftheprobability ofhispostulatedaccidentsequenceinEnvironmentalContentionEC-6.Hedoesnothave sufficientexpertiseinthedisciplinesnecessarytoevaluatingtheseven-stepsequence.

Therationaleforpermittingexperttestimonyandpermittinganexperttogiveconclusions andopinionsbasedupondataandfacts,andotherexperts'analyses,istoaidthetrierof factinreachingadecision.SeeMcGuire,ALAB-669,15NRCat475.EventhoughBCOC'switness,Dr.Thompson,acknowledgesthatanalysisofhisproposedscenario requiresateameffortwithinputfromexpertsinseveraldisciplines,thatheisnotqualified torenderanexpertopinionontheentiresequence,andthat,atmost,heisqualifiedto provideanintegratedpictureoftheworkofexpertsinthenecessarydisciplines,BCOCis relyingsolelyonDr.Thompson.Histestimonyregardingtheprobabilityoftheseven-step accidentsequenceshouldbegivenverylittleweight.AnyopinionsDr.Thompsonmay renderinthismatterbaseduponhisexpertiseasexplicatedinhisdepositionwillbeoflittle aidtotheBoardinrenderingadecisiononthisenvironmentalcontention.SeeMcGuire

,ALAB-669,15NRCat475,n.48.Asdemonstratedabove,Dr.Thompson'squalificationsasanexpertwitnessfortheissuesrelevanttheanalysisoftheprobabilityoftheseven-stepaccidentsequenceare 9Asdiscussedabove,Dr.Thompsonadmittedthathewasnotqualifiedtoperformtheanalysesrequiredtoassesstheprobabilityofthesequence,asorderedbytheBoard.Dep.Tr.7-8,33-34,57-58,94.Hewouldtherefore,beperformingscopingcalculations.Dep.

Tr.10.TheStaffsubmitsthatthisfailuretofullyrespondtotheBoard'sorder,ifborneout inBCOC'ssubmittal,willdemonstrate(1)Dr.Thompson'slimitedexpertiseinthisareaand (2)BCOC'sfailuretomeettherequiredburdentodemonstratetheexistenceofagenuine andsubstantialissueofmaterialfactastoitspostulatedseven-stepsequenceandthe needforthepreparationofanEIS.TheStaffnotesthatDr.Thompson,whoproposedthe seven-stepsequence,apparentlydoesnotdeemitnecessarytofullyanswertheBoard's questionsconcerningthesequence.meager.Therefore,anyconclusionshemakes,opinionsherenders,orothertestimonyrelatedtothiscontentionshouldbegivenverylittleweightbythisBoard.C.TheProbabilityoftheOccurrenceoftheSevenStepSequenceisLowTheStaffutilizedprobabilisticriskassessment(PRA)methodstoanalyzetheprobabilityoftheoccurrenceoftheseven-stepaccidentsequenceproposedbyBCOC.In ordertoanalyzethesequence,theStaffassembledateamofexperts,ledbyDr.Gareth W.Parry,anacknowledgedexpertinPRA,andincludingmemberswithexpertiseinsevere accidentanalysisandcontainmentbehavior,radiologicalconsequences,andreactor systems.Theexpertsanalyzedthesequenceutilizing,amongotherthings,site-specific dataandPRAanalysessubmittedbyCP&L,andthemostrecentgenericinformationand analyses.9PRAwasutilizedinperformingthisanalysisbecauseitisthebestmethodologytodeterminetheprobabilityofthesequence.TheCommissionhasacceptedtheuseofPRA methodologyand,infact,hasencouragedtheStaffandtheindustrytousePRAand"to expandthescopeofPRAapplicationsinallnuclearregulatorymatters....""UseofProbabilisticRiskAssessmentMethodsinNuclearRegulatoryActivities;FinalPolicy Statement,"60Fed.Reg.42622,42628(1995).TheNRChasadoptedarisk-informed 10TheStaff'squalitativeanalysisendsatstepfive(inabilitytorestartanypoolcoolingormakeupsystemsduetoextremeradiationdoses)becausetheprobabilityofthesequencegoingbeyondthatstepapproacheszero.But,duetothesimultaneousfiling requirementsofthesubpartKprocedure,theStaffhasaddressedseveralotherfactorsthat arenotnecessarytoitsanalysis,butwhichmayberaisedbytheIntervenor'switness.approachtoregulationthatusesPRAinformationinconjunctionwithotherinformationtoassessrisk.InitsFinalPolicyStatementregardingtheuseofPRAmethods,the Commissionsaid:PRAaddressesabroadspectrumofinitiatingeventsbyassessingtheeventfrequency.Mitigatingsystemreliabilityisthenassessed,includingthe potentialformultipleandcommoncausefailures.Thetreatmenttherefore goesbeyondthesinglefailurerequirementsinthedeterministicapproach.

Theprobabilisticapproachtoregulationis,therefore,consideredan extensionandenhancementoftraditionalregulationbyconsideringriskin amorecoherentandcompletemanner.60Fed.Reg.at42627.AsthisBoardnoted:Certainly,intheinterveningdecade[sincetheVermontYankee decision]theCommissionhascometorelyonprobabilisticanalysisevermoreheavily intheprocessofmakingdecisions.Indeed,theentiretrendinlicensing, enforcement,inspection,andthegrantingofamendmentshasswung graduallytowarddecision-makingbyprobabilisticriskassessment.We thereforethinkthattheCommission'sintentisatpresentevenmorefirmly directedtodecidingwhatis'remoteandspeculative'byexaminingthe probabilitiesinherentinaproposedaccidentscenario.Harris,LBP-00-19,52NRCat97.ItisagainstthisbackdropthattheStaffhasexaminedtheprobabilityofoccurrenceoftheproposedseven-stepaccidentsequence.

10PRAisusedtoanalyzedegradedcoreaccidents,whichoccurwhenheatcannotberemovedfromthereactorcoreanditoverheats.Ifcoolingisnotrestoredintime,thecore willmelt,potentiallyleadingtofailureofthereactorpressurevesselandpossible containmentfailureorbypass,which,inturn,mayleadtoreleaseofradionuclidesintothe environment.Affidavit¶9.PRAisananalyticalapproachusedtoanalyzesuchaccidents.Id.APRAanalysisofdegradedcoreaccidentsandcontainmentfailureswasdonefortheHarrisplantbyCP&L.Affidavit¶10.ItisfoundintheHarrisIndividualPlantExamination(IPE),whichhasbeenupdatedintheProbabilisticSafetyStudy(PSA).Id.CP&LalsoanalyzedexternaleventsintheIndividualPlantExaminationforExternalEvents (IPEEE).Id.Thesedocumentsaddressthefirsttwoeventsoftheseven-stepsequence.Id.Alevel1PRAisusedtoanalyzethecausesandlikelihoodofdegradedcoreaccidents.Affidavit¶12.Theanalysisutilizeslogicmodelscalledeventtreesthatidentify thevariousscenariosthatcanoccurafterachallengetonormaloperationandthatresult fromcombinationsofsuccessesandfailuresofthefunctionsorsystemsthatarerequired inresponsetothosechallenges.Eventtreesaresupportedbyotherlogicmodelscalled faulttreesthatidentifythecombinationsofequipmentandpersonnelfailuresthatleadto systemorfunctionfailure.Id.Thefaulttreescombinedwiththeeventtreesareusedtoidentifythecombinationsofequipmentandpersonnelfailuresthatresultineachofthedegradedcoreaccidents.Id.Level2PRAsareusedtoanalyzetheconsequencesofdegradedcoreaccidentsintermsoftheimpactoncontainmentusingacontainmentevent tree.Id.¶13.PRAanalysisinvolvestheuseofengineeringjudgmentinconstructingtheanalyticmodels,whichareusedtoextrapolatefromcommonsituationstosituationsthathavenever occurred.Affidavit¶14.ThereforethereisvariabilityintheresultsofPRAsperformedby differentanalysts.Id.TheStaffhasrecognizedthisvariabilityasasourceofuncertainty 11TheStaffnotesthatthisanalysisandCP&L'sanalyses(IPEandIPEEE)havebeensubjecttopeerreview.Affidavit¶¶30,34,35.

12Theprobabilityofanexothermicreactioninthefuelpool(stepseven)hasbeenassumed,conservatively,as1,giventhelossofthepoolwater.Affidavit¶29.andrequiresthatthesourcesofuncertaintyinPRAsbeidentifiedandevaluated.Id.¶15.ApeerreviewisonemethodofincreasingconfidenceinPRAresults.

11Id.PRAshavebeenperformedforallnuclearpowerplantsintheUnitedStates.Affidavit¶16.Althoughtherearedifferencesinthedetailedresults,thereisageneral consensusregardingthetypesofaccidentsthatcancausedegradedcoreconditionsand thenecessityforplantspecificanalyses.Id.TheStaffrequiresthatanyassessmentofriskbeaccompaniedbybothanassessmentoftheimpactoftheidentifieduncertaintiesandqualitativeargumentsthatjustifythecase.Id.¶19.Therefore,inthiscase,theissueofwhethertheseven-stepaccidentscenariois"remoteandspeculative"willnotbebasedon anumberalone,butanunderstandingofthereasoningthatwentintothatnumber.Id.Therearemanypostulateddegradedcoreaccidents,eachwithitsowncharacteristicsandfrequencyofoccurrence.Affidavit¶22.Theconditionalprobabilityof containmentfailureorbypassgivenadegradedcoreaccidentisdependentonthe characteristicsoftheaccidentsequence.Id.TherearesomedegradedcoreaccidentsforwhichSFPcoolingwouldbeinterrupted.Id.¶23.Ifpoolcoolingisinterruptedforlongenough,thewaterinthepoolswouldeventuallyheatupandevaporateorboiloff.

12Id.¶24.Ifpoolcoolingormakeupisinterrupted,itmustberestoredbeforethefuelis uncovered.Ifpoolcoolingormakeuparerestored,thenBCOC'ssequenceisterminated. Id.TheStaffconcludesthatformanyofthescenariosanalyzedforthesevenstepsequence,thepoolcoolingfunctionisrecoverable.Id.¶25.Prolongedinterruptionofcoolingwillrequireameansofmakeupofcoolant.Id.ThereareseveralmethodsofmakeupavailableatHarris.Id.Inassessingtheavailabilityofmakeupmethods,thestaffanalyzedstepsfourandfive,whichaddressextremeradiation dosespreventingaccessandrestorationofcoolingandmakeup.Id.¶26.Thelocationanddegreeofradiologicalcontaminationisafunctionofthenatureofthedegradedcoreaccidentandthecontainmentfailuremodeandlocation.Id.Thedosetopersonnelincontaminatedareasisafunctionofthetimefromreleaseandthetimespent inthecontaminatedarea.Id.TheStaffinterpretstheprobabilityofstepfiveoccurringastheprobabilityoffailuretorestartanypoolcoolingormakeupsystemsgiventheconstraints imposedbyradiologicalcontamination.Id.¶28.TheStaffconcludes,asaresultofitsanalysis,thattherearenoaccidentsequencesidentifiedwhereabilitytoeitherrestartpool coolingorinitiatemakeupafteranaccidentwasprecludedbysevereradioactivedoses.

TheStaffconcludesthattheprobabilityoftheseven-stepsequenceisverylowandis boundedby2E-07/year.Id.¶30.Initsanalysis,theStafffirstaddressestheprobabilityofadegradedcoreaccidentatHarris.Theprobabilityofadegradedcoreaccidentisusuallypresentedasacoredamagefrequency(CDF).Affidavit¶32.TheStaffassessedtheCDF,includingcontributionsfrom allinitiatingeventsinallphasesofreactoroperationwithfuelinthereactor,including internalevents(e.g.lossofcoolantaccidents-LOCAs)andinternalfloods,externalevents (e.g.earthquakes,fires-internalorexternal,highwinds),andaccidentsatlowpoweror shutdown.Id.¶¶34-40.TheStaffreviewedCP&L'sIPE,IPEEE,PSA,andanswerstoStaffinterrogatories.Id.¶¶34-37.TheStaffalsoreviewedNUREG/CR-5750,NUREG-1448,andSECY-00-0007.Id.¶¶37-40.TheStaff'sanalysisofthedocumentsreviewedisdiscussedintheStaff'saffidavitat¶¶32-41.TheStaffestimatesthecoredamage probabilityattheHarrisplant,includingcontributionsfrombothinternalandexternal initiatingeventsfromfullpowerandlow-powerandshutdownstates,tobe1.2E-04per reactoryear.Affidavit¶235.Thisfigurewasreachedbytakingthesumoftheprobabilities forinternalevents(7E-05),fires(1.1E-05),seismicevents(1E-05)andshutdown(3E-05).Id.¶41.Whilethereissomeuncertaintywiththisestimate,thestaffbelievesthatthisisareasonablyconservativeassessment.Thecontributionfrominternalinitiatingeventsin particularislikelytobeconservative,sincethefrequencyofinitiatingeventshasbeen shown,basedonplantspecificdata,tobeconsiderablylowerthanthatassumedintheIPE.Id.¶235.TheStaffnextanalyzedthesequencesthatmayresultininterruptionsofSFPcooling,notingthatnotallsequencesthatinterruptcoolingwillleadtolossofmak eup.Affidavit¶¶42,237.Theconditionalprobabilitythatthespentfuelpoolcoolingisinterruptedwillbedominatedbycommoncausesofbothcoredamageandtheinterruption ofspentfuelpoolcooling.Id.¶236.Thejointprobabilityofbotheventsfromindependentcauseswillbeverylowbecausetheprobabilityoffailureofaredundant,normallyoperating system,suchasthespentfuelpoolcoolingsystemoverashorttimeisverylow.Id.Therefore,theStafffocusedondependentcauses.Thestaffconsideredfourcategories ofdegradedcoreaccidentsthatmayleadtointerruptionofspentfuelcooling.Id.¶49.Themajordifferencebetweenthesegroupsistiming-whenpoolheatupstarts.Id.¶50. Inanalyzingthesegroupsofevents,theStaffreviewedCP&L'sanswerstotheStaff'sinterrogatoriesandtheIPE.Affidavit¶¶51-55.TheresultsoftheStaff'sreviewand itsconclusionsarefoundat¶¶51-57oftheStaff'saffidavit.TheStaffalsoconsideredthe likelihoodthatshouldthecontainmentfail,thereleaseofsteamandradionuclidesintothe plantauxiliarybuildingsmightaffectequipmentnecessarytomaintainpoolcooling, primarilythecomponentcoolingwatersystem,andemergencypowersystems,and concludesthatthelikelihoodofsuchaconsequentiallossofcoolingislow.Affidavit¶115, 239.TheStaffconcludesthatthefrequencyofeventsthatleadtoalossofpoolcooling isestimatedtobelessthan1E-04(1x10

-4)perreactoryear,withabestestimateof6.3E-05perreactoryear(approximately6timesin100,000years).Id.¶240.Thisfigureisreachedbytakingthesumoftheprobabilitiesforinternaleventsandflooding(5.25E-05),

seismicevents(1E-05)andfires(2.6E-07).Id.¶54.Allthesequencesthatareinitiatedbyalossofoffsitepoweralsoresultintheinterruptionofseveralofthemethodsofmakeuptothepools,sincethedemineralized watersystemisnotpoweredbytheemergencybuses.Affidavit¶241.However,methods thatemploygravityfeedandtheuseofthefireprotectionsystemwiththedieseldrivenfire pumpwouldstillbeavailable.Therefore,noscenarioshavebeenidentifiedthatdirectlyleadtolossofallcoolingandmakeupsystems.Id.Forthemajorityofaccidents,eveniftheyleadtoaninitialdisruptionofSFPcooling,thefunctionisrecoverable.Affidavit¶¶58,242.Thelikelihoodofrecoveringthecooling functionbeforecontainmentfailuredependsontheprecisetimingofevents.Id.¶243.Becausethereisaverylargenumberofpossiblescenariosrepresentingdifferenttime sequencesofevents,theStaffdidnotfocusonassessingtheprobabilityofrestoration. Howeverfortheverylatecontainmentfailures,thereisaveryhighprobabilitythatmakeuporcoolingwouldberestoredbeforecontainmentfailure.Id.¶¶137,243.Recoveryisdependentonaccessibilityofthoselocationsneededtoeffectrecoveryandwhetherthenecessaryequipmenthassurvivedtheaccident.Affidavit¶¶55,244.The Staffconcludedthat,whatevertheinitiatingevent,inordertodeterminethelongterm viabilityofSFPcooling,itisnecessarytodeterminewhethertheneededequipmentwillstill beavailableaftercontainmentfailure,andwhetherthenecessarylocationsareaccessible.Id.¶57.TheStaffnextturnedtoanalysisofcontainmentfailureorbypassmodesandreleasecategorycharacteristics.Coredamageprogressionandcontainmentresponseisevaluatedinthelevel2PRA,whichaddressessevereaccidentphenomenaimportanttoaccidentprogressionand containmentbehaviorandprovidesinsightsintothemechanismsthatcouldleadto containmentfailureorbypass.Affidavit¶58.CP&Lperformedalevel2analysisintheIPE,inwhichitevaluatedandquantifiedaccidentprogressionusingacontainmenteventtreeandsupportingdeterministic calculationsandsensitivityanalyses.Affidavit¶59.TheStaffanditscontractorsevaluated thelevel2IPEandfoundittobecompleteandtheresultsreasonable.Id.¶60.Inanalyzingthecontainmentfailureandbypassmodes,theStaffconsideredCP&L'sIPE,theStaffreviewoftheIPE,thePSA,theNUREG-1150internaleventsanalysis fortheSurryandZionplantsandthecurrentstateofknowledgeregardingsevereaccidents andcontainmentperformance.Affidavit¶¶60-62.TheStaffalsoconsideredthelikelihood ofvariouscontainmentfailuremodesreportedinIPEsforothersimilarplants.Id.¶63. TheStaff'sdiscussionofthesedocumentsanditsanalysisiscontainedintheStaff'saffidavitat¶¶63-100andgraphicallypresentedinTable1oftheStaff'saffidavit.Baseduponitsanalysis,theStafffoundthatthecontainmentwouldremainintactin80%ofthecoredamagesequences,therefore,findingaconditionalcontainmentfailure probabilityof20%.Affidavit¶66.TheStaffdeterminedthatthecontainmentfailuremodes ofmostconcernaretheearlyandlatecontainmentfailures.Id.¶¶132-139.Theircombinedprobabilityoffailureislessthan.1.Id.TheStaffanalyzedtheimpactofcontainmentfailureonspentfuelcooling.Firstevaluatedwasthelikelihoodthatreleasesfromthepostulatedcontainmentfailurecould causeconcomitantfailureofspentfuelcooling,focusingontwopossiblefailures:the componentcoolingwater(CCW)systemandtheemergencyandnormalswitchgear,both locatedinthereactorauxiliarybuilding(RAB).Affidavit¶102.Inconductingitsanalysis, theStaffreviewedcontainmentfailuresaddressedinCP&L'sIPEandPSA.Id.¶¶102-114.TheStaffconcludedthatareleasefromthecontainmentwilleithernotreachtheCCWcomponentsandtheswitchgearorwillreachthemwithinsufficientenergytohave anadverseimpactontheequipment.Affidavit¶115.TheStaffconcludedthatthe probabilityofadegradedcoreaccidentthatleadstoaninterruptionofthepoolcooling functionandacontainmentfailurepriortorestorationofpoolcoolingisboundedby6.3E-

06.Id.¶¶116,246.TheStaffnextaddressedthepossibilityofrestartofSFPcoolingormakeupsystems.Indoingso,theyconsideredthetimeavailabletoperformrecoveryactions,the timingofcontainmentfailure,themethodsofmakeupavailableandthedosesexpectedin 13AsnotedintheStaff'saffidavit,CP&LhasplanstoseekanamendmenttoraisetheheatloadinpoolsCandD.Forpurposesofthisproceeding,theStaffcalculatedtheeffectsofincreasedheatloadonpoolsCandDandconcludedthatitwouldtake approximately254hoursor10daysforthewatertoheatupandboildowntothetopofthe spentfuelstorageracks,assumingnostepstorestorecoolingorsupplymakeup.Affidavit at¶121.theareasrequiredtobeaccessible.Affidavit¶118-131.

13Inanalyzingthetimeavailable,theStaffusedcalculationsrelatingtopoolsAandB.AlthoughAandBarenotunder considerationhere,astheyhavealreadybeenlicensed,duetothehigherheatloadsand, therefore,fasterevaporation,theStaffconservativelyuseddatafrompoolsAandBto calculatethetimeavailabletotakeactiontorestorecoolingorinitiatemakeuptothepools.Id.¶¶127-131.TheStaffconcludedthatforamajorityoftheaccidentsthatresultincoolinginterruptions,thefunctionisrecoverable.Seee.g.Affidavit¶¶130-131,133,209-217.TheStaffalsoanalyzedthevariousmethodsavailableformakeup.Id.¶¶146-154,Table2.TheStaffhasidentifiednoscenariosthat,inthetimeavailabletoprovidemakeup,wouldpreventaccesstoalltheareaswhereoperatoractionisneededtoestablishmakeup, althoughthetimeforaccessmightberestrictedbecauseofdoseconsiderations.Affidavit

¶¶217,247.Formostscenarios,accesstotheplanttoinitiateseveralofthemethodsis possible.Thus,theStaffstatesthatitcanbearguedthatelement(5)ofthesevenstep scenariohasaprobabilityofessentiallyzero.Id.¶¶195,217.However,theStafffurtheranalyzedthesequencegiventhetimeavailable,takingintoaccountthat,formostofthe scenariosthereareseveraleasilyimplementedmethodsaccessibleforprovidingmakeup, andeventakingintoaccounthumanreliabilityconsiderations.Basedonthisanalysis,the Stafffoundthattheprobabilityofamorebroadlydefinedsequence,namelyoneinwhich thedegradedcoreaccidentleadingtoacontainmentfailureandalossofspentfuelpoolcoolingforalongenoughtimethatthewaterisevaporatedsothatthefuelisuncovered isverylow.Id.TheStaffassessedthelikelihoodoftheoperatingstaffrestoringcoolingorinitiatingmakeuptoapoolfollowingaseverecoredamageaccidentwithcontainmentfailureor bypassutilizingHumanReliabilityAnalysis(HRA).Affidavit¶¶218-234.Basedonthe analysis,theStaffconcludedthatoncethedecisionhasbeenmadeonamethodfor makeup,thelikelihoodofsuccessishigh.Id.¶233.Themostlikelycauseoffailuretorestorepoolcoolingorstartmakeupsystemsisconsideredtobeafailureinrecognizing theneedtotakeaction.Id.However,inthoseaccidentsinwhichthecontainmentislikelytohavefailedbeforetheneedtoprovidemakeupisclear,thestaffatthesitewouldalready beintheprocessofdamagecontrol,andnolongerconcernedwithprotectingthereactor, butoflimitingradiologicalcontamination,andthespentfuelpoolwouldlikelybeanobvious targetofconcern.Id.WhilenoHRAmethodhasbeenconstructedandcalibratedtoprovidehumanerrorprobabilitiesforsuchsituations,forthepurposeofthisanalysis,the Staffassignedaprobabilityof.1totheeventthattherestorationofpoolcoolingorprovision ofmakeupisnotsuccessful,forthosecaseswheretheonlyaccessistotheoperatingfloor oftheFHB.Id.¶234.Thecontributionofequipmentunavailabilityorunreliabilityisnegligible,butactionsmaybehamperedbysteam.Id.Forthosecaseswherethereareseveralmethodsavailable,andnoaccessorenvironmentalproblems,thelikelihoodof failureismuchlower,butassumedforthispurposetobe.01.Id.Therefore,theStaffconcludes,basedonitsanalysisoftheseven-stepsequence,utilizingsitespecificdataandgenericanalyses,thatthetotalfrequencyofasufficiently prolongedlossofcoolingtopoolsAandB(themostlimitingtimeperiod)resultingintheuncoveringofthefuelisestimatedtobe2E-07.Affidavit¶251.Thisistheupperbound ofprobabilityfortheseven-stepsequence,sincethesequence,aswritten,ismorerestrictive.Id.Finally,theStaffdetailedthesourcesofuncertaintyandhascharacterizedandprovidedthebasisfortheconclusions.Id.¶¶251-256.Aftermuchdetailedanalysis,theStaffdeterminedthattheycouldidentifynoscenariosthatwouldpreventaccesstothe areasrequiredtorestorecoolingorinitiatemakeup.Formostscenarios,severalmethods ofestablishingmakeupwouldbeavailable.Sincemethodsofmakeupwouldbeavailable forallscenarios,theprobabilitythattheseven-stepsequencecouldoccurisessentially zero.Ifhumanreliabilityconsiderationsarefactoredintotheanalysis,itisestimatedthat theupperboundofprobabilityis2E-07/reactoryear.Inreachingthisconclusion,theStaff usedinformationfromCP&L'sPRAmodelsfoundintheIPE,IPEEEandPSA,toestimate thejointprobabilityofthefirstthreestepsofthesequence.Affidavit¶252.Thethree documentswerepeerreviewedandtheIPEandIPEEEwerereviewedbytheNRCstaff.

TheyarealsoconsistentwithPRAsforsimilarplants.Id.Estimatesusedforseismicandshutdowncontributionstocoredamagefrequencieswerebasedoninformationfromother similarplantsandarebelievedtoberepresentative.Id.¶253.TheStafffocusedonthemajorfactorsimpactingtheoutcomeofthesequence.Id.¶254.Theconclusionoftheanalysisisnotverysensitivetotheuncertaintiesforthereasonsthatfollow.TheStafftook aconservativeapproachtoestimatingtheconditionalprobabilityofinterruptionofcooling thatrequiresrestartfollowingcontainmentfailure.Id.¶255.Nocreditwastakenforrecoveryofcoolingbeforecontainmentfailureforearlyandlatecontainmentfailuremodes.Id.Nocreditwastakenforassumingthat,for60%oftheaccidents,thecontrolroomwould remainhabitable.Id.Finally,becausetheStaffhasdemonstratedthattherearenoscenariosthatwouldpreventaccesstoatleastonemethodofpoolmakeup,theprobability isessentiallyzero.Therefore,apreciseestimateoftheprobabilityisnotneeded.Id.¶256.However,successfulterminationofthesequencedependsonoperatoraction.Therefore,thefinalestimatetakesintoaccountthelikelihoodoffailureoftheoperatorsto successfullyimplementmakeuptothepools.Id.TheStaff'saffidavitdemonstratesthatmanyconservatismshavebeenfactoredintotheanalysis.Seee.g.Affidavit¶¶66,101,124,127-131,139,206,207,234,235,245.Inaddition,theStaff,inassessingthetimeavailabletotaketheactionsrequired,usedthe mostlimitingtimesforheatupofthefuelpools(useddatafrompoolsAandB,didnottake creditforheatsink,andassumedthattheeventsoccurredearlyinthefuelcycle).Seee.g.Affidavit¶226.ThelevelofdetailoftheStaff'sanalysis,asevidencedbytheStaff'sAffidavitandsupportingdocumentation,demonstratesthattheStaffhasproducedadetailedand thoroughanalysisoftheseven-stepsequence,utilizingsitespecificdataandgenericdata andanalyses.TheStaff'sanalysishasbeeninternallypeerreviewed,makesconservative assumptions,identifiestheuncertainties,andcharacterizestheconclusions.Theanalysis isbasedlargelyonpeerreviewed,sitespecificandgenericanalyses.Finally,theanalysis isbasedontheknowledgeandjudgmentofateamofexpertsfromavarietyofdisciplines.

Therefore,theconclusionsdrawnfromtheanalysisregardingtheverylowprobabilityofthe seven-stepsequencearereliable,wellsupportedbydataandanalysesandrepresentthe experts'bestestimateoftheprobabilityoftheoccurrenceofthesequence. C.TheSevenStepSequenceisRemoteandSpeculativeOncetheprobabilityoftheoccurrenceoftheproposedaccidentsequenceisestablished,itmustbedeterminedwhetherNEPArequiresconsiderationofsucha sequence.AnanalysisofrelevantNEPAlawdemonstratesthattheprobabilityofthe seven-stepaccidentsequenceinquestionissolowastoberemoteandspeculative.Since NEPAdoesnotrequireconsiderationofremoteandspeculativeimpacts,theNRC's environmentalanalysisoftheproposedlicenseamendmentisadequateandfurther analysisisunnecessary.Theburdenofproofforestablishingthatthisaccidentsequencewillresultinasignificantimpacttotheenvironment,andisnotremoteandspeculative,restsonthe Intervenor.SeeCitizenAdvocatesforResponsibleExpansionv.Dole,770F.2d423(5 thCir.1985),reh'gdeniedenbanc,777F2d701(5 thCir.1985);StateofLouisianav.Lee

,758F.2d1081(5 thCir.1985),cert.denied,475U.S.1044(1986).Inaddition,asdiscussedabove,theburdenofgoingforwardandofdemonstratingtheexistenceofagenuineand substantialissueofmaterialfactthatcanonlyberesolvedbytheintroductionofevidence atanadjudicatoryhearingisontheIntervenor,BCOC.SeeHarris,LBP-00-12,51NRCat 255.NEPAdoesnotrequirethatanEISbepreparedforimpactsthatareconsideredbytheagencytobe"remoteandspeculative."SanLuisObispo,751F.2dat1300;VermontYankeeNuclearPowerCorp.(VermontYankeeNuclearPowerStation),ALAB-919,30NRC29,32(1989)(statingthatagenciesneednotconsider"remoteandspeculativerisks" or"eventswhoseprobabilitiestheybelievetobeinconsequentiallysmall");YankeeAtomicElectricCo.(YankeeNuclearPowerStation),LBP-96-2,43NRC61,90(1996)(stating "onlyaccidentscenariosthatarenot'remoteandspeculative'needbethesubjectofaNEPAanalysis").SeealsoPublicServiceElectricandGasCo.(SalemNuclearGeneratingStation,Unit1),ALAB-605,14NRC43(1981);HoustonLightingandPowerCo.(AllensCreekNuclearGeneratingStation,Unit1),ALAB-629,13NRC75(1981).Neitherthe courts,theCounselonEnvironmentalQuality("CEQ")implementingregulationsforNEPA, 40C.F.R.§1500etseq.,northeNRCimplementingregulationsforNEPA,10C.F.R.§ 51.1,etseq.,haveclearlydefinedthephrase"remoteandspeculative."Thephrasehas beenusedtodescribeavarietyofdifferentcircumstancesandaccidenttypesthatarenot subjecttoaNEPAanalysis.Thephrase"remoteandspeculative"hasbeenusedtodraw parallelstoeventswhoseprobabilitiesareinconsequentiallysmall.SanLuisObispo,751F.2dat1300;VermontYankee,ALAB-919,30NRCat32.Ithasalsobeenusedsynonymouslywith"insignificantmatters,suchasthosewithoutimport,orremoteeffects, suchasmerepossibilitiesunlikelytooccurasaresultoftheproposedactivity."EnvironmentalDefenseFund,Inc.v.CorpsofEngineersoftheUnitedStatesArmy,348F.Supp.916,933(N.D.Miss.1972).Severalsignificantcategoriesofaccidentstowhichthephrase"remoteandspeculative"hasbeenappliedare"Class9,""severe,"and"beyonddesign-basis"accidents.

"Class9"referstoacategoryofaccidentsusedbytheCommission,inthepast,to designatethemostsevereaccidentsforpurposesofNEPAanalysis.LongIslandLighting Co.(ShorehamNuclearPowerStation),ALAB-156,6AEC831,834(1973)(hereinafter "Shoreham")."Accidentsthatcontemplate'sequencesofpostulatedsuccessivefailuremoreseverethanthosepostulatedforthedesignbasisofprotectivesystemsand engineeredsafetyfeatures'arevariouslytermed'beyonddesign-basis,'Class9,'orsevere 14Insomecases,intervenorshaveassertedthattheCommission'sresearchandanalysisofbeyonddesign-basisaccidentsdemonstratesthattheCommissiondoesnotconsidertheseaccidentstoberemoteandspeculative.Thisargumenthasbeenrejected bytheNRCandtheFederalcourts."Theexistenceofongoingresearchintobeyond (continued...)accidents.'"PacificGasandElectricCo.(DiabloCanyonNuclearPowerPlant,Units1and2),ALAB-880,26NRC449,458(1987)(citationsomitted)(hereinafter"DiabloCanyon

").Thisclassofaccidentrepresentsan"indefinablenumberofconceivabletypesofaccidents" thataremoreseverethan"designbasisaccidents."Shorehamat834-35.TheoccurrenceofClass9accidentsistheoreticallypossible,buttheprobabilityoftheiroccurrenceisso smallthattheirenvironmentalriskisextremelylow.Id.Ithasbeenheld,therefore,thatNEPAdoesnotrequireadiscussionofClass9accidentsunlessthereisareasonable probabilityofoccurrence.Id.;SanLuisObispo,751F.2dat1301;DiabloCanyon,26NRCat460-61,VermontYankeeNuclearPowerCorp.(VermontYankeeNuclearPowerStation),ALAB-869,26NRC13,37(1987).TheNRCnolongerusesClass9todescribeaccidentsandtodeterminewhichaccidentsmustbeconsideredinthedesignofnuclearpowerplants.Theterm"beyond design-basis"hasreplacedClass9todescribesevereaccidents.FloridaPowerandLight Co.(St.LuciePlant,UnitNo.1),LBP-88-10A,27NRC452,458(1988).Seealso FinalEnvironmentalStatementrelatedtotheOperationofShearonHarrisNuclearPowerPlant, Units1and2(FES),NUREG-0972,p.5-59to5-60.(BriefExhibitC).Beyonddesign-basisaccidentsare"bydefinition,highlyimprobable--i.e.,remoteandspeculative--events."VermontYankee,26NRCat30-31.Forthisreason,beyonddesign-basisaccidentswhichdonothaveareasonableprobabilityofoccurrencearenotrequiredtobeconsideredinan EIS.14 14 (...continued)design-basisaccidents...doesnotundercutthereasonablenessoftheCommission'sviewthatsuchaccidentsnonethelessremainhighlyimprobableandthereforebeyondNEPA's mandate."PacificGas&ElectricCo.(DiabloCanyonNuclearPowerPlant,Units1and2),ALAB-880,26NRC449,459(1987),citingSanLuisObispo,751F.2dat1301."TotheextentthattheCommissioneverconsiderstheenvironmentalimpactandrisksofabeyond design-basisaccident,itdoessoasanexerciseofdiscretionunderits1980NEPAPolicy Statement."VermontYankee,ALAB-869,26NRCat31,citingSanLuisObispo,751F.2dat1301.If,asstatedelsewhereinthisbrief,theprobabilityoftheseaccidentsissosmall astoberemoteandspeculative,thentheNRC'sdecisiontoexcludethemfromits considerationoftheenvironmentalimpactsofthisproposedlicenseamendmentis reasonable.TheStaffhasnever,ineitheranenvironmentalanalysisorinresearch, consideredtheaccidentsequencepostulatedbytheIntervenors.Thisexclusionofthe accidentsequencefromreviewisreasonableinlightofthesmallprobabilityofitsoccurrence.TheNRChasalsoattemptedtodefinewhichaccidentsareremoteandspeculativebyattachingtotheaccidentanumberrepresentingitsprobability.Forexample,in PublicServiceElectricandGasCo.(HopeCreekGeneratingStation,Units1and2),LBP-78-15,7NRC642,699(1978),theLicensingBoardheldthataccidentswhichareexpectedto occurwith"probabilitieslessthan1x10

-6,basedonaconservativecalculation,maybedisregardedinthedesignbasisofafacility,"andthattheenvironmentalimpactsofsuch lowprobabilityaccidentsaresoremoteandspeculativethatconsiderationoftheminasupplementalEISisnotrequired.Id.at698-699.Inanothercase,theAppealBoard,indenyingastaypendingappealinaspentfuelpoolexpansioncase,impliedthatanestimate ofprobabilityoflossofspentfuelpoolwaterbetween3x10

-5and1x10-10madeinaBrookhavendraftreportrenderedsuchanaccidentremoteforNEPApurposes.

PacificGas&ElectricCo.(DiabloCanyonNuclearPowerPlant,Units1and2),ALAB-877,26NRC287,293(1987).Asdiscussedelsewhereinthisbrief,inVermontYankee,theAppeal Boardfoundthataprobabilityof1x10

-4forapostulatedaccidentwasremoteand 15Manyofthenumericalprobabilityfindingshavebeenusedinthesafetyarena,butareinstructivefortheenvironmentalissuesraisedbyBCOC'scontention.Forexample,theAppealBoardhasstatedthatanaccidentwithaconservativelycalculatedprobability of10(-6)peryearorarealisticallycalculatedprobabilityof10(-7)peryeardidnothaveto beconsideredindesigningaplant.FloridaPowerandLightCo.(St.LucieNuclearPowerPlant,UnitNo.2),ALAB-603,12NRC30,45(1980).Inotherwords,accidentswithaprobabilitylowerthan10(-6)perreactoryearare"beyonddesign-basis"accidents,or"Class 9"accidentsunderNRC'spreviousaccidentcategorization,becausetheydonothaveto beconsideredinthedesignofnuclearpowerplants.AlthoughtherearenoNRCcases directlydiscussingsimilarnumericalvaluesforremoteandspeculativeaccidentsunder NEPA,andtheconsiderationsforNEPAarenotnecessarilyco-extensivewiththeAtomic EnergyAct,theStaffsubmitsthattheabovenumericalprobabilitiesareappropriatewhen consideringthescopeofaNEPAanalysis.speculative.VermontYankee,ALAB-919,30NRC29.Onappeal,theCommissionremandedforfurtherproceedingsduetothefailureoftheAppealBoardtodevelop informationregardingthelikelihoodoftheaccidentsequencepostulatedbytheintervenors.

TheCommissionspecificallyvacatedthatportionoftheAppealBoard'sholdingthat"an accidentwithaprobabilityontheorderof10

-4perreactoryearisremoteandspeculative."VermontYankee,CLI-90-4,31NRCat335.YettheCommissiondidnotcompletelyrejecttheAppealBoard'sdetermination,saying:"Wearereluctanteithertoendorseorrejecta holdingthataccidentsofthisprobabilityshouldbeconsideredremoteandspeculative..

..."Id.TheCommissioninstructedtheAppealBoardtoreturnthemattertotheCommissionifitfoundanaccidentprobabilityontheorderof1x10

-4,butotherwiseto"modifyorconfirmitsjudgmentastotheremoteandspeculativenatureoftheaccidenton thebasisoftheaccidentprobabilityderivedonremand."Id.at336.Therefore,althoughtheCommissionrejectedtheAppealBoard'sholding,itdidnotrejecttheideathataccidents withaprobabilityof1x10

-4couldberemoteandspeculativeforpurposesofNEPA.

15 TheFESfortheHarrisplantdidconsideranumberofsevere,beyonddesign-basisaccidents.(BriefExhibitC).Theestimatedprobabilitiesoftheaccidentsanalyzedinthe FESrangedfrom3x10

-6/reactoryearto4x10

-5/reactoryear.TheFESdidnotincludeanyaccidentscenarioswhichhadamoreremoteprobabilityofoccurrence,indicatingthatan approximatethresholdforinclusionintoanEISwouldbeintherangeof1E-06occurrences perreactoryear.TheStaff'sbestnumericalestimateoftheprobabilityofthisaccidentsequenceisanupperboundof2x10

-7,whichisconsiderablylowerthanfortheaccidentstermed"remoteandspeculative"intheabovecasesandtheaccidentsevaluatedintheHarrisFES.

BasedonthisinformationandthequalitativefactorsdiscussedintheStaff'sAffidavit,the StaffhasconcludedthattheaccidentsequencepostulatedbytheIntervenorsisremoteand speculative.Theseven-stepaccidentsequenceproposedforconsiderationbyBCOCfallsintothedefinitionof"beyonddesign-basis"accidents.Itisasequenceofpostulated successivefailuresmoreseverethanthosepostulatedforthedesignbasisofprotective systemsandengineeredsafetyfeatures.Thistypeofaccidentdoesnotneedtobe consideredinanEISunlessthereisareasonableprobabilityofoccurrence.Similar accidentstotheonedescribedbytheBoardinthiscasehavebeenfoundtobeoutsidethe scopeofanEIS.In1988,inacasesimilartothiscase,alicensingboardrefusedtoadmitacontentionsubmittedbytheIntervenorbasedontheremoteandspeculativenatureofthe contention.TheIntervenorallegedthatexpansionofthespentfuelpoolattheSt.Lucie facilitywouldincreasetheprobabilityofaradioactivereleasetotheenvironmentasaresult ofnormalplantoperation.FloridaPowerandLightCo.(St.LuciePlant,UnitNo.1),LBP-88-10A,27NRC452,457(1988).TheIntervenorpostulatedthefollowingsevereaccident scenario:1)acaskdrop;2)structuralfailureofthespentfuelpool;3)lossofcoolant;4) fuelrodzircaloycladdingfire;and5)largeradiationreleasestotheenvironment.St.Lucie ,LBP-88-10A,27NRCat458.Thelicensingboardfoundthatthisaccidentwasa"Class9" or"beyonddesign-basis"accident,andthattherewasnothingtosuggestthat"thelossof poolcoolantandzircaloycladdingfirescenario...isanythingbutaremoteandspeculative,beyonddesign-basisaccident...NEPAdoesnotrequiretheconsiderationofsuchaneventandanEISneednotbeprepared."Id.at459,citingSanLuisObispo,751F.2dat1300-1301(D.C.Cir.1984).SeealsoVermontYankee,ALAB-869,26NRCat30(It"wouldbeanomaloustorequireforalicenseamendmentanEISaddressingremoteand highlyspeculativeconsequences,whentherewasnosuchrequirementfortheoperating licenseitself."NEPAdoesnotrequireconsiderationofbeyonddesign-basisaccidents "becausetheyare,bydefinition,highlyimprobable-i.e.,remoteandspeculative-events.");NortheastNuclearEnergyCo.(MillstoneNuclearPowerStation,UnitNo.3),LBP-00-02,51NRC25(2000)(rejectingaccidentsequencesimilartotheseven-stepsequence postulatedherein).Asdiscussedpreviously.Inadditiontothelownumericalprobabilityoftheaccidentsequence,anumberofotherreasonsexistastowhytheaccidentsequencepostulatedby theIntervenorsisremoteandspeculativefortheHarrisplant.First,theStaffhasconcluded thatnotalldegradedcoreaccidentswouldleaddirectlytoaninterruptionofspentfuelpool coolingatHarris.TheStaffhasnotidentifiedanyscenariosthatdirectlyleadtotheloss ofallcoolingandmakeupsystems.Additionally,theStaffhasnotidentifiedanyscenarios whichwouldpreventaccesstoallareaswhereoperatoractionisnecessarytoprovidemakeupwater.Formostofthescenariosevaluated,theStaffdeterminedthatseveral methodsofprovidingmakeupwatertothespentfuelpoolswouldbeavailable.Giventhat anumberofmethodswillbeavailable,evenconsideringtheeffectsofhumanreliability,the probabilityofthepostulatedaccidentsequenceislow.TheStaffhasdeterminedthat,for theHarrisplant,ahighlikelihoodofsuccessofoneofthesemethodsisexpected.Finally, theStaffnotedanumberofsourcesofconservatismwherecreditwasnottakenin developingtheprobabilityoftheaccidentsequence.Basedontheabovecaselaw,theStaff'sdeterminationoftheprobabilityoftheoccurrenceoftheseven-stepaccidentsequence,andotherfactorsthatmakethisaccident sequenceveryunlikelytooccur,thesequencecanbeappropriatelycategorizedas"remote andspeculative."SinceNEPAdoesnotrequireagenciestoconsiderremoteand speculativeaccidentsintheirenvironmentalanalyses,theNRC'sEAandFONSIforthe proposedlicenseamendmentareadequateandfurtherenvironmentalanalysisis unnecessary.

D.ConclusionastoEC-6BasedupontheanalysiscontainedintheStaff'sAffidavit,theStaffconcludesthattheprobabilityofoccurrenceofthesevenstepsequenceunderconsiderationisverylow, withanupperboundof2x10

-7/reactoryear,butisprobablylowerduetotheconservatismsintheanalysis,andconcludesthattherearenopostulatedscenariosthatwouldpreclude accesstothefuelhandlingbuildingforthelicenseetorestorecoolingorinitiatemakeupby atleastonemethod. TheStaffsubmitsthat,basedupontheanalysisandconclusionscontainedintheStaffAffidavitanddiscussedabove,thesevenstepsequenceisremoteandspeculative.

Therefore,anEISneednotbeprepared.TheStaffsubmitsthattherearenofurtherfactsthatneedtobedevelopedorthatrequiretheintroductionofevidenceinanadjudicatoryproceedingforresolution.Thereare nogenuineandsubstantialdisputesofmaterialfactsastoanyaspectofEnvironmental ContentionEC-6.Therefore,BCOC'srequestforhearingshouldbedeniedandthematter shouldberesolvedinfavorofthelicensee.VII.THELICENSINGBOARD'SQUESTIONSInitsOrderadmittingthelatefiledenvironmentalcontention,theBoardaskedthepartiestorespondtoseveralquestions.TheStaff'sresponsestothespecificquestionsare containedinthissection.1.Whatisthesubmittingparty'sbestestimateoftheoverallprobabilityofthesequencesetforthinthechainofseveneventsintheCP&L andBCOC'sfilings,setforthonpage13supra?Theestimatesshouldutilizeplant-specificdatawhereavailableandshouldutilize thebestavailablegenericdatawheregenericdataisreliedupon.AsdiscussedaboveandintheStaff'sAffidavit,theStaff'sbestestimateoftheoverallprobabilityofthesevenstepsequenceisthatitisverylow,withanupperboundof 2x10-7/reactoryear(2occurrencesin10,000,000years).Thisestimateisbasedupontheplantspecificdataandgenericdatadiscussed supraandintheStaff'sAffidavit.2.Thepartiesshouldtakecarefulnoteofanyrecentdevelopmentsintheestimationoftheprobabilitiesoftheindividualeventsinthe sequenceatissue.Inparticular,havenewdataormodels suggestedanymodificationoftheestimateof2x10

-6peryearsetforthintheexecutivesummaryofNUREG-1353,Regulatory AnalysisfortheResolutionofGenericIssue82,BeyondDesign BasisAccidentsinSpentFuelPools(1989)?Further,doanyofthe concernsexpressedintheACRS'sApril13,2000lettersuggestthat theprobabilitiesofindividualelementsofthesequencearegreaterthanthosepreviouslyanalyzed(e.g.,isthechanceofoccurrenceof sequenceelementseven,anexothermicreaction,greaterthanwas assumedinthedecade-oldNUREG-1353)?ThemostrecentpublishedstudyofbeyonddesignbasisaccidentsinspentfuelpoolsistheDraftFinalTechnicalStudyofSpentFuelPoolAccidentRiskat DecommissioningNuclearPowerPlants(TWG),February2000 (http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/REACTOR/DECOMMISSIONING/SF/index.html).NeitherthisreportnorNUREG-1353hasadirectrelevancetotheprobabilitiesoftheindividualevents intheseven-stepaccidentsequence,sincetheydonotaddressseverecoredamage accidentsasaninitiatingeventforthelossofspentfuelpoolcooling.However,itshould benotedthattheTWGreportisinsubstantialagreementwithNUREG-1353inrecognizing theveryrare,highgroundaccelerationearthquakesasbeingthemajorconcern.Such majorearthquakesarenotanissuehere.TheconcernsexpressedintheAdvisoryCommitteeonReactorSafeguards(ACRS)April13,2000letterdonotimpacttheestimationoftheprobabilityoftheseven-step accidentsequence.Inparticular,theStaffhastakenthepositioninthisaffidavit,thateven iftheprobabilityofstepseven,thechanceofanoccurrenceofanexothermicreaction, giventhefirstsixstepsofthesequence,isassumedtobe1,theprobabilityofthe sequenceislowenoughthatitsoccurrenceisconsideredremoteandspeculative.

Furthermore,theissueraisedbytheACRSinrelationtotheignitiontemperaturedoesnot directlyimpacttheprobabilityofthesequence.IntheTWGreport,theignitiontemperature isusedtodeterminetheageoffuelforwhichanexothermicreactionisnolongera concern.Inreality,arefinementoftheignitiontemperaturecouldimpactthetimetoignition oncethefuelisuncovered.However,sincetheprobabilityofanexothermicreactionisassumedtobe1,thishasplayednoroleintheStaff'sanalysis.3.AssumingtheBoardshoulddecidethattheprobabilityinvolvedisofsufficientmomentsoasnottopermitthepostulatedaccident sequencetobeclassifiedas"remoteandspeculative,"whatwould betheoverallscopeoftheenvironmentalimpactanalysisthestaff wouldberequiredtoprepare(i.e.,limitedtotheimpactsofthat accidentsequenceorafullblownEISregardingtheamendment request)?ThisquestionrequeststhatthepartiesdefinethescopeoftheNRC'senvironmentalanalysisshouldtheBoarddeterminethattheaccidentsequencepostulatedbytheIntervenorsisnotremoteandspeculative.TheIntervenorshaveassertedthattheEApreparedbytheNRCwasinadequatebecauseitfailedtoconsidertheiraccidentsequence.

AccordingtotheIntervenors,theproperremedyforthisinadequacyisfortheLicensing BoardtoorderafullblownEISoftheHarrisplant.TheStaffsubmitsthatpreparationof anEISwouldbeaninappropriateremedyatthisstageoftheprocess.IftheLicensing Boarddeterminesthattheaccidentsequenceisnotremoteandspeculativeandthatthe NRCshouldconsidertheimpactsofthesequence,theBoardshouldrequiretheStaffto reevaluateitsEAandtheresultingFONSI.TheFESfortheHarrisplant,issuedin1983,consideredtheenvironmentalconsequencesofoperationoftheplantonwater,land,air,endangeredspecies,anda numberofotherareas.BriefExhibitC.TheFESdidnotaddressthespecificaccident scenarioposedbytheIntervenors,nordiditaddresstheimpactscausedbytheuseof spentfuelpoolsCandD.TheFESdid,however,considerbothdesign-basisaccidentsand severeaccidents.Thesevereaccidentsequencesevaluatedhadprobabilitiesrangingfrom 3.0x10-6occurrencesperreactoryearto4.0x10

-5occurrencesperreactoryear.Brief ExhibitC,5-61.Adetailedevaluationofthepotentialenvironmentalandradiologicalimpactsfromtheseaccidentsfollowed,includingadiscussionofthedoseandhealth impactsofreleases,economicandsocietalimpacts,andreleasestogroundwater.Brief ExhibitC,5-64to5-84.Afterconsiderationofalltheseimpacts,theFESconcludedthat

"[t]heseimpactscouldbesevere,butthelikelihoodoftheiroccurrenceisjudgedtobe small."(BriefEx.C,5-84).TheEApreparedfortheproposedlicenseamendmentconsideredwhethertheuseofspentfuelpoolsCandDwouldresultinimpactsgreaterthanthoseconsideredinthe FESfortheHarrisplant.(BriefEx.B).TheEAconsideredcertainaccidentscenarios,and concludedthattheadditionalspentfuelpoolswouldnotresultingreaterimpactsthanthose previouslyconsidered.TheEAdidnotconsiderthescenarioatissueinthiscase.The appropriateremedyatthispointinthecase,shouldtheLicensingBoarddeterminethatthe accidentsequenceisnotremoteandspeculative,wouldbefortheStafftoconsiderthe impactsofthescenarioasnewinformation,prepareanewEAandreconsiderwhetherthe FONSIremainsvalid.TheStaffwouldconsiderthesignificanceoftheaccidentscenario, anddeterminewhetheritpresentsa"seriouslydifferentpictureoftheenvironmentalimpact" analyzedintheFES.HydroResources,Inc.(2929CoorsRoad,Suite1010,Albuquerque,NM),CLI-99-22,50NRC3,14,citingSierraClubv.Froelke,816F.2d205,210(5 thCir.1987).Inordertomakethisdetermination,theStaffwouldassesstheenvironmental impactsoftheaccidentsequence.Oncethisassessmentiscomplete,theimpactsofthis sequencewouldbecomparedtotheimpactsofthesevereaccidentscenariosexamined intheFES.Iftheimpactsfromthisaccidentsequencearenotgreaterthantheimpacts discussedintheFES,thentheStaffmayreissuetheFONSI.If,uponfurtherexamination oftheenvironmentalriskoftheaccidentsequence,theStaffconcludesthattheimpactsaregreaterthanthoseofthesevereaccidentsanalyzedintheFES,theStaffwouldthen prepareanEISforthelicenseamendment.Totheextentanyimpactsofthelicense amendmentarethesameastheimpactsanalyzedintheFESandthereisnonew informationregardingthoseimpacts,theEISmayreferencetheFES.IftheStaffdeterminesthatanEISisnecessary,or,alternatively,iftheLicensingBoardrequirestheStafftoperformanEIS,thescopeoftheEISwouldbelimitedtoany newimpactsfromthelicenseamendmentnotpreviouslyevaluated.ThescopeofanEIS inalicenseamendmentproceedingisnotasbroadasthatconductedinpriorNRC licensingproceedings.AnEISfortheproposedlicenseamendmentshouldconsiderthe extenttowhichtheactionundertheproposedamendmentwillleadtoenvironmental impactsnotpreviouslyevaluated.Inthisregard,theAppealBoardhasstated:NothinginNEPAorinthosejudicialdecisionstowhichourattentionhasbeendirecteddictatesthatthesamegroundbewhollyreplowedin connectionwithaproposedamendment....Rather,itsseemsmanifesttousthatallthatneedbeundertakeninaconsiderationofwhetherthe amendmentitselfwouldbringaboutsignificantenvironmentalconseq uencesbeyondthosepreviouslyassessedand,ifso,whetherthoseconsequences (totheextentunavoidable)wouldbesufficientonbalancetorequireadenial oftheamendmentapplication.NorthernStatesPowerCo.(PrairieIslandNuclearGeneratingPlant,Units1and2),ALAB-455,7NRC41,46n.4(1978).SeealsoFloridaPower&LightCo.(TurkeyPointNuclearGeneratingStation,Units3and4),LBP-81-14,13NRC677,684-85(1981).AnEISaddressingtheimpactsfromtheaccidentscenariowouldbelimitedtotheproposedlicenseamendmentandwouldnotconsidertheimpactsofoperationoftheHarris plant.BurbankAnti-NoiseGroupv.Goldschmidt,623F.2d115,116(9 thCir.1980).

See alsoConsumersPowerCo.(BigRockPointNuclearPlant),ALAB-636,13NRC312,329(1981);FloridaPowerandLightCo.,13NRCat685.Asnotedabove,theFESfortheHarrisplantconsideredindetailtheimpactsfromanumberofsevereaccidents.Therefore,anynewEISwouldbelimitedintwoways.First, theEISwouldbelimitedtotheimpactsfromtheopeningofspentfuelpoolsCandD,and nottotheoperationoftheHarrisplant.Second,theEISwouldbelimitedtoconsideration oftheimpactscausedbytheaccidentscenariowhichareeithergreaterthantheimpacts previouslyanalyzedorwhichwerenotaddressedatallintheFES.Inadditiontotherequirementthatagenciesconsidertheenvironmentalimpactsoftheproposedaction,NEPAalsorequiresagenciestoconsideralternativestotheproposed action,butsuchconsiderationislimitedbytheruleofreason.SeeVermontYankeeNuclearPowerCorp.v.NaturalResourcesDefenseCouncil,Inc.,435U.S.519,551(1978).

Underthesecircumstances,shouldanEISfortheproposedlicenseamendmentbe required,itwouldlikelyincludeadiscussionofthealternativestotheproposedlicensing action,aswouldtheEA.Therefore,iftheBoarddeterminesthatfurtherenvironmentalanalysisofthepostulatedaccidentsequenceisnecessary,theStaffwouldconsidertheimpactsfromthe sequenceinanEA.TheEAwouldbelimitedtoadeterminationofwhethertheimpactsof theaccidentsequencearegreaterthan,ordifferentfrom,theimpactsanalyzedintheFES fortheHarrisplant.IftheEAconcludesthattheaccidentsequencewouldnotresultinany newsignificantimpacts,orinanysignificantimpactswhichhavenotalreadybeenanalyzed intheFES,theStaffwillreissueaFONSIfortheproposedlicenseamendment.IftheEA concludesthattheaccidentsequencewouldresultinsignificantimpactsnotanalyzedintheFES,theStaffwouldprepareanEIS.TheEISwillbelimitedinscopetothenewimpacts fromtheproposedlicenseamendment.AnEISforthislicenseamendmentshouldaddress onlytheimpactsfromtheaccidentsequenceandthealternativestotheproposedaction.VIII.CONCLUSIONBasedupontheforegoing,theStaffsubmitsthattherearenogenuineandsubstantialdisputesofmaterialfactastoanyaspectofEnvironmentalContentionEC-6, includingtheprobabilityoftheseven-stepscenarioortheneedforthepreparationofan EIS,andthereisnoissueraisedbythecontentionthatrequiredtheintroductionof evidenceinanadjudicatoryproceedingforresolution.Respectfullysubmitted,SusanL.UttalJenniferEuchner CounselforNRCstaffDatedatRockville,Marylandthis20 thdayofNovember2000