ML16285A130
| ML16285A130 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 06/02/2016 |
| From: | NRC/NRR/DIRS/IPAB |
| To: | |
| Anderson M,NRR/DIRS,301-415-8744 | |
| References | |
| Download: ML16285A130 (4) | |
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NRCFinalResponseFAQ12 04,HRARelatedOccurrences(Generic) Page1of4Revised05/13/2013Plant:PerryDateofEvent:June2,2012SubmittalDate:August16,2012Contact:JohnPelcicTel/email:440 280 5824jfpelcic@firstenergycorp.comNRCContact:MarkMarshfieldTel/email:440 280 5822mark.marshfield@nrc.govPerformanceIndicator:OR01OccupationalExposureControlEffectivenessSiteSpecificFAQ(AppendixD)?No FAQrequestedtobecomeeffectivewhenapproved.ApprovaldateisMay8 th ,2013.QuestionSectionNEI99 02Guidanceneedinginterpretation(includepageandlinecitation):Page62,Lines1622,andassociatedfootnoteTechnicalSpecificationHighRadiationArea(>1remperhour)Occurrence-Anonconformance(orconcurrentnon conformances)withtechnicalspecificationsorcomparablerequirementsin10CFR20applicabletotechnicalspecificationhighradiationareas(>1remperhour)thatresultsinthelossofradiologicalcontroloveraccessorworkactivitieswithintherespectivehigh radiationarea(>1remperhour).Forhighradiationareas(>1remperhour),thisPIdoesnotincludenonconformancewithlicenseeinitiatedcontrolsthatarebeyondwhatisrequiredbytechnicalspecificationsandthecomparableprovisionsin10CFRPart20.
Afootnotestatesthat"Concurrent"meansthatthenonconformancesoccurasaresultofthesamecauseandinacommontimeframe.Eventorcircumstancesrequiringguidanceinterpretation:OnJune2,2012,anequipmentfailureresultedinresin/waterslurryflowintothegeneralareahallwayoftheRadwasteBuildingEl.574.Indicationsofchangingradiologicalconditionswereavailable.However,theRadiationProtectionstaffdidnotrecognizetheneedtoconductanewradiologicalsurveyofthearea,whichwaspostedandcontrolledasaHighRadiationArea(HRA)atthetime.ThefailuretoperformatimelyradiologicalsurveyisaperformancedeficiencyandanNRCPerformanceIndicatoroccurrence.Overthenextfewdays,thereweretwoinstancesofindividualsenteringthisareawithoutRadiationProtectioncoverageandoneinstancewhereanindividualwasprovidedaHRAkeybutdidnotenterthearea.OnJune7,2012,aRadiationProtectiontechnicianperformedaradiologicalsurveyoftheareainpreparationfordecontaminationactivities.ThesurveyidentifiedafloorareawheredoseratesmettheTechnicalSpecificationcriteriaforclassificationasaLockedHighRadiationArea(LHRA).Afterthesurvey,theRadwasteBuildingEl.574areawaspostedandcontrolledasaLHRA.ThisPIcountsnonconformances,or"concurrentnon conformances,"withtechnicalspecifications."Concurrentnon conformances"aredefinedasthosethat"occurasaresultofthesamecauseandinacommontimeframe."Inthiscase,thethreeinstanceswereasaresult NRCFinalResponseFAQ12 04,HRARelatedOccurrences(Generic) Page2of4Revised05/13/2013ofthesamecause-thefailureofRadiationProtectionpersonneltorecognizetheneedtoperformanewradiologicalsurvey."Commontimeframe"isnotdefined;howeverFENOCbelievesthatthesethreeinstancesmeettheintentofa"commontimeframe."Theinstanceswerearesultofasingleperformancedeficiencywiththesamecommoncause.ThefailuretorecognizetheneedtoperformanewradiologicalsurveypriortoJune7,2012,wasreportedasaPIoccurrence.Additionally,thethreeinstancesofindividualsenteringthearea,orhavingaccesswithoutRadiationProtectioncoverageasaresultofthesingleperformancedeficiencyofnotperformingthetimelysurveywereconservativelyreportedpendingtheoutcomeofthisFAQ.SincethePIcountsnon conformancesthat"resultinthelossofradiologicalcontroloveraccessorworkactivities"andthenonconformancethatledtothethreeentrieswasthefailureofRadiationProtectiontorecognizetheneedtoperformanewradiologicalsurvey,arethetwosubsequententriesandonepotentialentryconsideredtobe"concurrentnonconformances"boundedbythefailuretorecognizetheneedtoperformthenewradiologicalsurvey?
WhatistheNRCresidentinspector'sposition?TheNRCresidentinspectoragreedwiththefactsandrecommendedthattheFAQprocessbefollowedforresolution.
PotentiallyrelevantexistingFAQnumbersFAQ203addressesthefootnoteinquestion.However,inFAQ203,thecausesofthetwoentriesweredifferent;therefore,bothoccurrencescounted.FAQ203didnotaddress"commontimeframe."ResponseSectionProposedResolutionofFAQThefailuretorecognizetheneedtoperformanewradiologicalsurveyrepresentsalossofcontroloveraccessintoaLHRA.However,sincethesubsequentthreeinstanceswithoutRadiationProtectioncontrolwerearesultofthefailuretoperformthenewradiologicalsurvey,andwerewithinalimitedcommontimeframe,theycanbeconsideredtobe"concurrentnonconformances."OnlyoneTechnicalSpecificationHighRadiationAreaPIoccurrenceshouldbereported.
Ifappropriate,provideproposedrewordingofguidanceforinclusioninnextrevision.Inthefootnotedefining"concurrent,""commontimeframe"shouldbedefinedtobe"withinthenormalperiodoftimebetweensurveysforthespecificarea."
NRCResponseTheproposedFAQcorrectlyquotestheapplicableguidanceinNEI99 02forthisevent.Theperformanceindicatoridentifiesanoccurrenceofnonconformance(orconcurrentnonconformances)withtechnicalspecificationsinvolvingalossofradiologicalcontrolsoverentriesto(orworkwithin)aTechnicalSpecificationHighRadiationArea(TSLHRA,>1remperhour).TheFAQdiscussionnotesthattherewerethreesubsequentinstanceswhereentriesweremadewithoutRadiationProtectioncontrols.
NRCFinalResponseFAQ12 04,HRARelatedOccurrences(Generic) Page3of4Revised05/13/2013AcommontimeframeasusedintheOccupationalRadiationSafetyguidanceinNEI99 02,isnotafixedperiodoftime.Itistheelapsedtimeinwhichanumberofeventsoroccurrencesthatareassociatedwitheachotherhappen.TheeventsdescribedinthisFAQareallwithinacommontimeframe.However,theissuedemonstratedbythisexampleisnotwhetherthesubsequentnonconformancesresultingfromanongoingfailuretoproperlycontrolaTSLHRAarewithinthesame(orcommon)timeframe.Thepertinentissueinthisexampleiswhetherallofthesubsequentnonconformancesresultedfromthesamecause.Inthosecaseswherealicensee,forwhateverreason(e.g.,failuretosurvey,failuretolockthearea,etc.),failstoprovideadequatephysicalcontrolsaroundaTSLHRAforanextendedtime,allofthesubsequentnon conformanceswouldbe"concurrentnon conformances"asdefinedinNEI99 02iftheyweretheresultofthesamecause.Forexample,anoperationaloccurrencethatcreatedanunrecognizedTSLHRA,thesubsequentfailuretopostthearea,failuretopreventunauthorizedaccess(possibleseveralentries),entrynotcontrolledperanRWP,etc.,areallconcurrentnonconformancesiftheyaredirectlyattributabletotheoriginalfailuretosurvey.However,ifduringthetimethatthisTSLHRAisunidentified(oruncontrolled)thereisasubsequentfailurebytheRPProgramtotaketimelyactionthatreasonablywouldhaveendedtheTSHRAnonconformance(e.g.,afailuretoperformaroutineordirectedsurveillancethatwouldhaveidentifiedthenon conformance,orafailuretorespondtonewinformationthatindicatesthepotentialfortheunidentifiedoruncontrolledTSLHRA),thenthesubsequentnon conformancesareconsideredaseparatePIoccurrencebasedonthefailuretoreasonablyactandcorrectthecondition.Insuchacasethenon conformancesthatoccurredbeforethesubsequentfailurewouldbeconcurrentnon conformances(i.e.,onePIoccurrence)withtheinitialTSviolation.Thenon conformancesfollowingthefailuretoactonthenewinformationwouldbeconcurrentwiththisfailuretoact(i.e.,aseparatePIoccurrence).Oncethisnewinformationisobtained,subsequentsharingofthisnewinformationwithotherstaff,orvalidationofthisnewinformationwouldbeconcurrentwiththeseparatePIoccurrence.TheNRCresponsetoFAQ203isaspecificexampleofthisgeneralstaffposition.ThespecificexampleoftheresinspilleventatPerryreferencedinthisFAQwasinspectedundertheNRCBaselineInspectionProgram.AcompletedescriptionoftheeventisprovidedinPERRYINSPECTIONREPORT05000440/2012005AND07200069/2012002(ML13038A702).ThespilleventstartedonthemorningofJune3,2012 ,whentheRadwaste(RW)OperatornotifiedtheRadiationProtection(RP)staffofapotentialresinspill.Theinspectorsidentifiedoneself revealinggreenfindingwiththreeexamplesofthelicensee'sfailuretoperformtimelyradiologicalsurveysandevaluatethepotentialradiologicalhazards.Thesethreefailurestosurveywererelatedtothefollowing;FailuretoadequatelyrespondtotheinitialnotificationofapossibleresinspillintheRadwaste(RW)building,574'level:Atapproximately0400hoursJune3,theRWoperationssupervisorobservedalargerthanexpectedleveldecreaseinCondensateBackwashSettlingTank(CBST)tankinventory.TheRWoperationssupervisorcalledtheRPcontrolpointandinformedtheRPtechniciansthathebelievedtherewasafailedsealontheCBSTtransferpumpwhichcouldindicateaspillofcontaminatedresin.RPdidnotfollowuptosurveythearea.Failuretotaketimelyactiononceitwasrecognized(orshouldhavebeenrecognized)thattheradiologicalconditionsinRW574'werepotentiallymuchworsethaninitiallyassumed:Atapproximately1442hoursJune3,anRPtechnician,coveringanotherjobontheRW574'lookeddowntheeast westcorridorhallwayandobservedresinoutsidetheCBSTroom.Duetoanincompleteshiftturnover,thedayshiftRPtechnicians,andRPsupervisors,wereunawareofthe NRCFinalResponseFAQ12 04,HRARelatedOccurrences(Generic) Page4of4Revised05/13/2013reportedlossofresininventory,andpossibleradiologicalconditionsofRW574'.Afterleavingthearea,theRPtechnicianreportedtheunexpectedmaterialconditionofthecorridortotheon dutyRPsupervisor.Nosubsequentsurveyswereperformed.Failuretotakeatimelysurveyoncethedecisiontoperformasurveywasmade:OnTuesday,June5,2012,atabout0630hours,inresponsetocontinuedconcernsexpressedtheRPtechniciansabouttheuncharacterizedradiologicalconditionsonRW574',theRPmanagerdirectedthatafullsurveyofRW574'beperformed,includingairsamples.However,theTSLHRAremainedunidentifiedandinadequatelycontrolleduntilThursday,June7,whenthesurveyswereperformedat1514hours.Eachexamplerepresentsnewinformationoridentifiesorganizationalfailurestorespondinatimelymannerthatwouldhaveendedtheon goingnonconformancetostationtechnicalspecifications.Therefore,eachofthesethreefailurestotaketimelyactionandendthenonconformancewiththeTechnicalSpecificationsrepresentsaseparatecauseofthesubsequentnonconformanceandthereforerepresentsaseparatereportablePIoccurrence.