ML16285A130
| ML16285A130 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 06/02/2016 |
| From: | NRC/NRR/DIRS/IPAB |
| To: | |
| Anderson M,NRR/DIRS,301-415-8744 | |
| References | |
| Download: ML16285A130 (4) | |
Text
NRCFinalResponse FAQ1204,HRARelatedOccurrences(Generic)
Page1of4 Revised05/13/2013 Plant:Perry DateofEvent:June2,2012 SubmittalDate:August16,2012
Contact:
JohnPelcic
Tel/email:4402805824jfpelcic@firstenergycorp.com NRCContact:MarkMarshfield Tel/email:4402805822mark.marshfield@nrc.gov
PerformanceIndicator:OR01OccupationalExposureControlEffectiveness
SiteSpecificFAQ(AppendixD)?No
FAQrequestedtobecomeeffectivewhenapproved.ApprovaldateisMay8th,2013.
QuestionSection
NEI9902Guidanceneedinginterpretation(includepageandlinecitation):
Page62,Lines1622,andassociatedfootnote
TechnicalSpecificationHighRadiationArea(>1remperhour)Occurrence-Anonconformance(orconcurrentnonconformances)withtechnicalspecificationsorcomparable requirementsin10CFR20applicabletotechnicalspecificationhighradiationareas(>1remperhour) thatresultsinthelossofradiologicalcontroloveraccessorworkactivitieswithintherespectivehigh radiationarea(>1remperhour).Forhighradiationareas(>1remperhour),thisPIdoesnotinclude nonconformancewithlicenseeinitiatedcontrolsthatarebeyondwhatisrequiredbytechnical specificationsandthecomparableprovisionsin10CFRPart20.
AfootnotestatesthatConcurrentmeansthatthenonconformancesoccurasaresultofthesame causeandinacommontimeframe.
Eventorcircumstancesrequiringguidanceinterpretation:
OnJune2,2012,anequipmentfailureresultedinresin/waterslurryflowintothegeneralarea hallwayoftheRadwasteBuildingEl.574.Indicationsofchangingradiologicalconditionswere available.However,theRadiationProtectionstaffdidnotrecognizetheneedtoconductanew radiologicalsurveyofthearea,whichwaspostedandcontrolledasaHighRadiationArea(HRA) atthetime.Thefailuretoperformatimelyradiologicalsurveyisaperformancedeficiencyand anNRCPerformanceIndicatoroccurrence.
Overthenextfewdays,thereweretwoinstancesofindividualsenteringthisareawithout RadiationProtectioncoverageandoneinstancewhereanindividualwasprovidedaHRAkeybut didnotenterthearea.
OnJune7,2012,aRadiationProtectiontechnicianperformedaradiologicalsurveyoftheareain preparationfordecontaminationactivities.Thesurveyidentifiedafloorareawheredoserates mettheTechnicalSpecificationcriteriaforclassificationasaLockedHighRadiationArea(LHRA).
Afterthesurvey,theRadwasteBuildingEl.574areawaspostedandcontrolledasaLHRA.
ThisPIcountsnonconformances,orconcurrentnonconformances,withtechnical specifications.Concurrentnonconformancesaredefinedasthosethatoccurasaresultof thesamecauseandinacommontimeframe.Inthiscase,thethreeinstanceswereasaresult
NRCFinalResponse FAQ1204,HRARelatedOccurrences(Generic)
Page2of4 Revised05/13/2013 ofthesamecause-thefailureofRadiationProtectionpersonneltorecognizetheneedto performanewradiologicalsurvey.Commontimeframeisnotdefined;howeverFENOC believesthatthesethreeinstancesmeettheintentofacommontimeframe.Theinstances werearesultofasingleperformancedeficiencywiththesamecommoncause.
ThefailuretorecognizetheneedtoperformanewradiologicalsurveypriortoJune7,2012,was reportedasaPIoccurrence.Additionally,thethreeinstancesofindividualsenteringthearea,or havingaccesswithoutRadiationProtectioncoverageasaresultofthesingleperformance deficiencyofnotperformingthetimelysurveywereconservativelyreportedpendingthe outcomeofthisFAQ.
SincethePIcountsnonconformancesthatresultinthelossofradiologicalcontroloveraccess orworkactivitiesandthenonconformancethatledtothethreeentrieswasthefailureof RadiationProtectiontorecognizetheneedtoperformanewradiologicalsurvey,arethetwo subsequententriesandonepotentialentryconsideredtobeconcurrentnonconformances boundedbythefailuretorecognizetheneedtoperformthenewradiologicalsurvey?
WhatistheNRCresidentinspectorsposition?
TheNRCresidentinspectoragreedwiththefactsandrecommendedthattheFAQprocessbe followedforresolution.
PotentiallyrelevantexistingFAQnumbers FAQ203addressesthefootnoteinquestion.However,inFAQ203,thecausesofthetwo entriesweredifferent;therefore,bothoccurrencescounted.FAQ203didnotaddress commontimeframe.
ResponseSection
ProposedResolutionofFAQ
Thefailuretorecognizetheneedtoperformanewradiologicalsurveyrepresentsalossof controloveraccessintoaLHRA.However,sincethesubsequentthreeinstanceswithout RadiationProtectioncontrolwerearesultofthefailuretoperformthenewradiologicalsurvey, andwerewithinalimitedcommontimeframe,theycanbeconsideredtobeconcurrentnon conformances.OnlyoneTechnicalSpecificationHighRadiationAreaPIoccurrenceshouldbe reported.
Ifappropriate,provideproposedrewordingofguidanceforinclusioninnextrevision.
Inthefootnotedefiningconcurrent,commontimeframeshouldbedefinedtobewithin thenormalperiodoftimebetweensurveysforthespecificarea.
NRCResponse
TheproposedFAQcorrectlyquotestheapplicableguidanceinNEI9902forthisevent.The performanceindicatoridentifiesanoccurrenceofnonconformance(orconcurrentnonconformances) withtechnicalspecificationsinvolvingalossofradiologicalcontrolsoverentriesto(orworkwithin)a TechnicalSpecificationHighRadiationArea(TSLHRA,>1remperhour).TheFAQdiscussionnotesthat therewerethreesubsequentinstanceswhereentriesweremadewithoutRadiationProtectioncontrols.
NRCFinalResponse FAQ1204,HRARelatedOccurrences(Generic)
Page3of4 Revised05/13/2013 AcommontimeframeasusedintheOccupationalRadiationSafetyguidanceinNEI9902,isnotafixed periodoftime.Itistheelapsedtimeinwhichanumberofeventsoroccurrencesthatareassociated witheachotherhappen.TheeventsdescribedinthisFAQareallwithinacommontimeframe.
However,theissuedemonstratedbythisexampleisnotwhetherthesubsequentnonconformances resultingfromanongoingfailuretoproperlycontrolaTSLHRAarewithinthesame(orcommon) timeframe.Thepertinentissueinthisexampleiswhetherallofthesubsequentnonconformances resultedfromthesamecause.
Inthosecaseswherealicensee,forwhateverreason(e.g.,failuretosurvey,failuretolockthearea, etc.),failstoprovideadequatephysicalcontrolsaroundaTSLHRAforanextendedtime,allofthe subsequentnonconformanceswouldbeconcurrentnonconformancesasdefinedinNEI9902ifthey weretheresultofthesamecause.Forexample,anoperationaloccurrencethatcreatedan unrecognizedTSLHRA,thesubsequentfailuretopostthearea,failuretopreventunauthorizedaccess (possibleseveralentries),entrynotcontrolledperanRWP,etc.,areallconcurrentnonconformancesif theyaredirectlyattributabletotheoriginalfailuretosurvey.However,ifduringthetimethatthis TSLHRAisunidentified(oruncontrolled)thereisasubsequentfailurebytheRPProgramtotaketimely actionthatreasonablywouldhaveendedtheTSHRAnonconformance(e.g.,afailuretoperforma routineordirectedsurveillancethatwouldhaveidentifiedthenonconformance,orafailuretorespond tonewinformationthatindicatesthepotentialfortheunidentifiedoruncontrolledTSLHRA),thenthe subsequentnonconformancesareconsideredaseparatePIoccurrencebasedonthefailureto reasonablyactandcorrectthecondition.Insuchacasethenonconformancesthatoccurredbeforethe subsequentfailurewouldbeconcurrentnonconformances(i.e.,onePIoccurrence)withtheinitialTS violation.Thenonconformancesfollowingthefailuretoactonthenewinformationwouldbe concurrentwiththisfailuretoact(i.e.,aseparatePIoccurrence).Oncethisnewinformationis obtained,subsequentsharingofthisnewinformationwithotherstaff,orvalidationofthisnew informationwouldbeconcurrentwiththeseparatePIoccurrence.TheNRCresponsetoFAQ203isa specificexampleofthisgeneralstaffposition.
ThespecificexampleoftheresinspilleventatPerryreferencedinthisFAQwasinspectedunderthe NRCBaselineInspectionProgram.AcompletedescriptionoftheeventisprovidedinPERRYINSPECTION REPORT05000440/2012005AND07200069/2012002(ML13038A702).Thespilleventstartedonthe morningofJune3,2012,whentheRadwaste(RW)OperatornotifiedtheRadiationProtection(RP)staff ofapotentialresinspill.Theinspectorsidentifiedoneselfrevealinggreenfindingwiththreeexamples ofthelicenseesfailuretoperformtimelyradiologicalsurveysandevaluatethepotentialradiological hazards.Thesethreefailurestosurveywererelatedtothefollowing;
FailuretoadequatelyrespondtotheinitialnotificationofapossibleresinspillintheRadwaste (RW)building,574'level:Atapproximately0400hoursJune3,theRWoperationssupervisor observedalargerthanexpectedleveldecreaseinCondensateBackwashSettlingTank(CBST) tankinventory.TheRWoperationssupervisorcalledtheRPcontrolpointandinformedtheRP techniciansthathebelievedtherewasafailedsealontheCBSTtransferpumpwhichcould indicateaspillofcontaminatedresin.RPdidnotfollowuptosurveythearea.
Failuretotaketimelyactiononceitwasrecognized(orshouldhavebeenrecognized)thatthe radiologicalconditionsinRW574'werepotentiallymuchworsethaninitiallyassumed:At approximately1442hoursJune3,anRPtechnician,coveringanotherjobontheRW574looked downtheeastwestcorridorhallwayandobservedresinoutsidetheCBSTroom.Duetoan incompleteshiftturnover,thedayshiftRPtechnicians,andRPsupervisors,wereunawareofthe
NRCFinalResponse FAQ1204,HRARelatedOccurrences(Generic)
Page4of4 Revised05/13/2013 reportedlossofresininventory,andpossibleradiologicalconditionsofRW574'.Afterleaving thearea,theRPtechnicianreportedtheunexpectedmaterialconditionofthecorridortothe ondutyRPsupervisor.Nosubsequentsurveyswereperformed.
Failuretotakeatimelysurveyoncethedecisiontoperformasurveywasmade:OnTuesday, June5,2012,atabout0630hours,inresponsetocontinuedconcernsexpressedtheRP techniciansabouttheuncharacterizedradiologicalconditionsonRW574',theRPmanager directedthatafullsurveyofRW574'beperformed,includingairsamples.However,the TSLHRAremainedunidentifiedandinadequatelycontrolleduntilThursday,June7,whenthe surveyswereperformedat1514hours.
Eachexamplerepresentsnewinformationoridentifiesorganizationalfailurestorespondinatimely mannerthatwouldhaveendedtheongoingnonconformancetostationtechnicalspecifications.
Therefore,eachofthesethreefailurestotaketimelyactionandendthenonconformancewiththe TechnicalSpecificationsrepresentsaseparatecauseofthesubsequentnonconformanceandtherefore representsaseparatereportablePIoccurrence.