05000333/FIN-2009005-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Emergency Lighting Performance Demonstration Not in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2). |
| Description | The inspectors identified an NCV of 10 CFR Part 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, because Entergy staff did not demonstrate that the performance of the emergency lighting system had been effectively controlled through the performance of appropriate preventive maintenance and did not monitor against licensee-established goals in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a}(1}. Specifically, the inspectors identified that a second emergency light failure had not been correctly classified as a functional failure as documented in condition report (CR}-JAF-2009-02768, initiated on August 12,2009. The issue was entered into Entergys corrective action program (CAP) as CR-JAF-2009-02999 and Entergy classified the emergency lighting system (a)(1) due to this repeat failure. Additionally, the emergency lighting battery preventive maintenance replacement period was reduced from 24 months to 18 months due to an excessive number of emergency lighting battery failures that occurred between 18 and 24 months. This finding is more than minor because it affected the external factors attribute (fire) of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, plant operators rely on emergency lighting to provide lighting to complete actions described in emergency operating procedures in case of a partial or complete loss of normal plant lighting. Additionally, Appendix R emergency lighting supports time critical post-fire safe shutdown manual actions and the aVailability of the emergency lighting battery system was affected. The emergency lighting system had not been maintained sufficiently to provide for reliable operation of the equipment. The inspectors determined the significance of the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process. This finding affected postfire safe shutdown. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the inspectors assigned a low degradation rating in phase 1 of the SOP. The inspectors assigned a low degradation rating because the issue did not have a significant impact on safe shutdown operations: operators, carry flashlights, the three emergency portable lighting units located in the control room were available, and there were not specific plant areas that had widespread emergency lighting outages at anyone time. The inspectors determined this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution within the CAP component because Entergy personnel did not address an adverse trend in the emergency lighting battery system in a timely manner. (P.1(d) |
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
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| Report | IR 05000333/2009005 Section 1R12 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2009 (2009Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | S Rutenkroger G Hunegs M Gray S Mccarver J Commiskey |
| CCA | P.3, Resolution |
| INPO aspect | PI.3 |
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Finding - FitzPatrick - IR 05000333/2009005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (FitzPatrick) @ 2009Q4
Self-Identified List (FitzPatrick)
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