05000373/FIN-2010002-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Improper Procedure Implementation During Testing of Excess Flow Check Valve |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance was self-revealed with the unit in the refueling mode of operation. Specifically, operations and maintenance personnel did not establish proper field communications while testing excess flow check valves (EFCV) as required by procedure and consequently operated the wrong component. As a result, a Division 2 emergency core cooling system (ECCS) signal was received and control room operators were subjected to an unnecessary operational distraction. A NCV of Section 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was also identified for failure to appropriately implement procedure LIS-NB-115B, Unit 1 High Pressure Excess Flow Check Valve Operability Test. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because it affected the Initiating Events Cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety function during shutdown as well as power operations. It also affected the Human Performance Cornerstone attribute due to the multiple errors associated with field communications and procedure use and affected the Configuration Control attribute for shutdown lineup. Specifically, by not following the procedure as written, personnel in the field created an unnecessary operational distraction in the control room while other significant activities, such as refueling operations, were in progress. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance using the SDP Phase 1. This finding is also related to the cross-cutting area of Human Performance (work practices) because the procedure in question was not followed. Corrective actions planned and completed by the licensee included halting all EFCV testing until an initial investigation into the event was performed and conducting an apparent cause evaluation for the event. |
| Site: | LaSalle  |
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| Report | IR 05000373/2010002 Section 1R20 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2010 (2010Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Holmberg F Ramirez K Riemer M Mitchell B Metrow J Yesinowski C Scott A Scarbeary P Smagacz J Corujo -Sandi |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
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Finding - LaSalle - IR 05000373/2010002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (LaSalle) @ 2010Q1
Self-Identified List (LaSalle)
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