05000298/FIN-2010003-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Place the Essential 4160 Volt Alternating Current System Agastat Relays in (a)(1) |
| Description | The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2), requirements for monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear power plants, for failure to demonstrate that the performance of the essential 4160 volt alternating current power system was effectively controlled through appropriate preventive maintenance. As a result, the licensee did not establish goals or monitor the performance of the essential power system Agastat relays per 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) to ensure appropriate corrective actions were initiated when a revised evaluation of a Agastat time delay relay failure incorrectly changed the initial functional failure determination. Incorrectly changing this maintenance preventable functional failure resulted in the affected function, EE-PF03A, not reaching the licensees maintenance rule (a)(1) threshold. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as Condition Report CR-CNS-2008-07910
This finding is more than minor because it affected the reliability objective of the Equipment Performance attribute under the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The inspectors determined that this performance deficiency was an additional, but separate consequence of the degraded performance of the essential 4160 volt alternating current system Agastat relays. Following the guidance of Appendix B to MC0612 and Appendix D to IP 71111.12, the inspectors determined that this finding occurred as a consequence of actual problems with the Agastat relays, and that those actual problems were not attributable to this finding. This finding therefore cannot be processed through the significance determination process, and is considered to be Green by NRC staff review. The finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with decision-making because the licensee did not use conservative assumptions in the functional failure evaluation of a Agastat relay failure H.1(b) |
| Site: | Cooper  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000298/2010003 Section 1R12 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2010 (2010Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | N Taylor R Hagar V Gaddy M Chambers R Kumana |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
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Finding - Cooper - IR 05000298/2010003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Cooper) @ 2010Q2
Self-Identified List (Cooper)
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