ENS 40455
ENS Event | |
|---|---|
21:27 Jan 16, 2004 | |
| Title | 24 Hour Notification for Bulletin 91-01 Loss of Criticality Safety Controls Involving Waste Drum |
| Event Description | At 1526 on 1-16-04, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that a waste drum was not characterized and handled properly and handled as fissile waste. This is a continuation of PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2004-003, NRC Event 40447.
During the investigation of ATRC-03-4095, container RFD# 215759-20, which had been characterized as NCS [nuclear criticality safety] spacing exempt based on the drum being heterogeneous material, it was identified that this waste drum contained spent alumina material violating NCSA (nuclear criticality spacing analysis] WM0-001. The purpose of this NCSA requirement is to determine if the waste drum requires two independent characterization results. Two independent characterization methods were not utilized for characterization of this drum. PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATR 04-0166; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2004-004. NRC Event Worksheet 40455 Responsible Division: Production Support SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: The control for performing two independent analysis for determining the U235 mass was violated but one drum monitor analysis determined that the drum did contain less than the safe mass for spacing exempt waste drums. Since the process condition was maintained, the safety significance is low but double contingency was not maintained. POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIOS) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR: In order for a criticality to be possible, two or more waste drums would have to contain greater than 120 grams U235 and not have the proper spacing maintained between the waste drum. CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC The process condition relied upon for double contingency for this scenario is mass. ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): The drum has been characterized to show that Uranium mass is less than 120g U235. NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: The first leg of double contingency is based on the requirement that uranium waste material must be characterized to show that the U235 mass of the waste drum is less than 120 grams. This control was not violated and the process condition of mass was maintained. The second leg of double contingency is based on the requirement that high density uranium homogeneous waste material be characterized using an independent analysis. Since the waste drum material was mistakenly identified as heterogeneous material, only one analysis was performed. Therefore, this control was violated. One drum monitor analysis determining that the waste drum contained less than 120 grams U235. Although the control was violated, the process condition was maintained. Since this scenario relies on two controls on one parameter and this control was violated, double contingency was not maintained. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: Access to the area has been flagged off and access controlled until drums retagged and properly stored. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. |
| Where | |
|---|---|
| Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant Paducah, Kentucky (NRC Region 2) | |
| License number: | GDP-1 |
| Reporting | |
| Response | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+0.25 h0.0104 days <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Tom E. White 21:42 Jan 16, 2004 |
| NRC Officer: | Gerry Waig |
| Last Updated: | Jan 16, 2004 |
| 40455 - NRC Website | |
Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant with Response | |
WEEKMONTHYEARENS 483982012-10-10T18:05:00010 October 2012 18:05:00
[Table view]Response Double Contingency Control for Empty Cylinders Not Maintained ENS 479112012-05-08T21:16:0008 May 2012 21:16:00 10 CFR 76.120(c)(2), Response Autoclave High Pressure Isolation System Failure ENS 474832011-11-28T15:30:00028 November 2011 15:30:00 Response 24-Hour Report Concerning a Localized Loss of a Geometry Criticality Control Contingency ENS 473102011-09-30T13:54:00030 September 2011 13:54:00 Response 24-Hour Nrc Bulletin 91-01 Report Involving a Loss of One Leg of Double Contingency ENS 471762011-08-19T13:15:00019 August 2011 13:15:00 Response 24-Hr Loss of Criticality Control Report Required Under Bulletin 91-01, Supplement 1 ENS 465922011-02-03T15:30:0003 February 2011 15:30:00 Response 24 Hour Notification Under Bulletin 91-01 Concerning Leakage of Moderating Liquid ENS 463122010-10-06T16:06:0006 October 2010 16:06:00 Response 24 Hour Notification Under Bulletin 91-01 Concerning Cooldown Verification of Uf6 Cylinders ENS 461052010-07-17T19:07:00017 July 2010 19:07:00 Response 24 Hour 91-01 Bulletin Report on Loss of One of Two Criticality Control Contingencies ENS 454922009-11-12T17:15:00012 November 2009 17:15:00 Response Violation of a Nuclear Criticality Safety Control ENS 450422009-05-04T10:07:0004 May 2009 10:07:00 Response 24 Hour 91-01 Bulletin Report on Loss of One of Two Criticality Control Contingencies ENS 445582008-10-09T20:37:0009 October 2008 20:37:00 Response 24-Hours Bulletin 91-01 Report Involving Failure to Visually Inspect Storage Cylinders ENS 442232008-05-18T22:21:00018 May 2008 22:21:00 Response Violation of a Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval - 24-Hour Report ENS 441512008-04-17T21:44:00017 April 2008 21:44:00 Response 24-Hour Nrc Bulletin 91-01 Report Involving an Excessively Large Container Found in a Fissile Control Area ENS 441002008-03-26T19:57:00026 March 2008 19:57:00 Response 24 Hour Report of Degraded Criticality Control ENS 440562008-03-11T19:57:00011 March 2008 19:57:00 Response Two Cylinders Identified with Weight Change Prior to Wash ENS 432322006-09-23T03:00:00023 September 2006 03:00:00 Response Reported Under Nrc Bulletin 91-01 24 Hour Notification ENS 421652005-11-22T18:05:00022 November 2005 18:05:00 Response Improper Criticality Spacing for Waste Drum ENS 411582004-10-29T14:45:00029 October 2004 14:45:00 Response Criticality Control Report ENS 410202004-09-04T18:45:0004 September 2004 18:45:00 Response Violation of Nuclear Criticality Safety Control in the Process Building ENS 408732004-07-14T18:00:00014 July 2004 18:00:00 Response Criticality Control 24-Hour (Bulletin 91-01) Report ENS 408602004-07-08T20:50:0008 July 2004 20:50:00 Response 24 Hour Nrc Bulletin 91-01 Loss of Criticality Control ENS 407232004-05-03T21:00:0003 May 2004 21:00:00 Response Criticality Control 24-Hour (Bulletin 91-01) Report ENS 407002004-04-23T13:45:00023 April 2004 13:45:00 Response Criticality Control 24-Hour (Bulletin 91-01) Report ENS 408052004-04-23T10:53:00023 April 2004 10:53:00 Response Paducah Gaseous Diffussion Plant - Response Bulletin 91-01 24 - Hour Report ENS 406412004-04-04T19:30:0004 April 2004 19:30:00 Response 24-Hour Nrc Bulletin 91-01 Loss of Criticality Control Notification ENS 404552004-01-16T21:27:00016 January 2004 21:27:00 Response 24 Hour Notification for Bulletin 91-01 Loss of Criticality Safety Controls Involving Waste Drum ENS 404472004-01-13T19:00:00013 January 2004 19:00:00 Response 24 Hour Notification for Bulletin 91-01 Loss of Criticality Safety Controls Involving Waste Drum ENS 403562003-11-25T09:45:00025 November 2003 09:45:00 Response 24 Hour Nrc Bulletin 91-01 Notification Regarding Loss of Double Contingency Protection ENS 401512003-09-11T13:45:00011 September 2003 13:45:00 Response Double Contingency Was Not Maintained for Non-Fissile Nams. ENS 401392003-09-07T12:50:0007 September 2003 12:50:00 Response Criticality Controls Degradation at Paducah ENS 401092003-08-27T14:00:00027 August 2003 14:00:00 Response Procedural Deficiency Omission 2012-05-08T21:16:00 | |