ENS 43897
ENS Event | |
|---|---|
05:00 Jan 12, 2008 | |
| Title | Bulletin 91-01 Loss of Double Contingency Criticality Safety Controls |
| Event Description | During a project review for the recovery of uranium generated by the chemical laboratory in the Fuel Manufacturing/Operations (FMO) complex, it was discovered that ten (10) laboratory generated cans of material had been improperly stored on a conveyor system. The cans of material came from the FMO chemical laboratory that generated them from its process. The material consisted of both dry uranium powder/pellets and wet ammonium diurinate (ADU). Each can contained approximately 16kg of uranium.
After the material was placed in the cans, it was given an incorrect material type indicating it contained only dry material. When the material was moved from the chemical lab to a storage area in preparation for processing, it was improperly stored on a conveyor which was only authorized for dry material. The second controlled parameter (mass of uranium in each can) was maintained at all times. Upon discovery of this condition, the ten (10) cans were immediately placed on skids on the conveyor to provide the necessary spacing between each can. While this did not result in an unsafe condition, this event is being reported pursuant to NRC Bulletin 91-01 within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of discovery. NUMBER AND TYPES OF CONTROLS NECESSARY UNDER NORMAL OPERAIING CONDITIONS: The basis of criticality safety relies on spacing of cans (geometry) and mass as independent criticality safety controls. NUMBER AND TYPES OF CONTROLS WHICH FUNCTIONED PROPERLY UNDER UPSET CONDITIONS: 1 - Mass control remained intact, thus no unsafe condition existed. NUMBER AND TYPES OF CONTROLS NECESSARY TO RESTORE A SAFE SITUATION: 1 - Control on can spacing was lost since skids were not used to separate moderated cans on the conveyor. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: Low Safety Significance - independent control on mass remained intact - additional failure modes required before a criticality accident could occur. The as-found condition was analyzed and demonstrated to be safe. SAFETY EOUIPMENT STATUS: All ten (10) cans were placed on skids on the conveyor system and will await further processing. STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Corrective and preventative actions will be identified as part of the incident investigation. The cans were improperly stored for several weeks. The licensee will be making notifications to NRC Region 2, the State of North Carolina and the New Hanover County Emergency Management Agency. |
| Where | |
|---|---|
| Global Nuclear Fuel Wilmington, North Carolina (NRC Region 2) | |
| License number: | SNM-1097 |
| Reporting | |
| Response | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+6.17 h0.257 days <br />0.0367 weeks <br />0.00845 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Scott Murray 11:10 Jan 12, 2008 |
| NRC Officer: | Howie Crouch |
| Last Updated: | Jan 12, 2008 |
| 43897 - NRC Website
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Global Nuclear Fuel with Response | |
WEEKMONTHYEARENS 438972008-01-12T05:00:00012 January 2008 05:00:00
[Table view]Response Bulletin 91-01 Loss of Double Contingency Criticality Safety Controls ENS 433592007-05-11T20:00:00011 May 2007 20:00:00 Response Bulletin 91-01 Loss of Double Contingency ENS 422922006-01-27T20:00:00027 January 2006 20:00:00 Response 24 Hr Nrc Bulletin 91-01 Due to Criticality Controls Degradation ENS 403362003-11-18T20:55:00018 November 2003 20:55:00 Response 24 Hr Nrc Bulletin 91-01 Due to Criticality Controls Degradation 2008-01-12T05:00:00 | |