At approximately 3:55 p.m. on November 18, 2003, the storage of miscellaneous items was noted in a hood in the chemical area. The items included valves, small diameter pipes, and other objects wrapped in plastic.
The criticality safety basis for the hood is based upon not exceeding the UO-2 limit and the geometry of the objects in the hood. Since the geometry control is based upon only a single type of process component in the hood (e.g.: a limited number of 1" valves, or a maximum length of 1" pipe), the as found condition was not consistent with the documented analysis (only one type of component can be processed at a time).
An assay confirmed less than 4 killograms uranium was contained in the components. Therefore, the mass limit was not exceeded. The mass control was not violated and no unsafe condition existed. The situation was corrected in less than four hours.
This condition is reported within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> pursuant to NRC bulletin 91-01 due to a degradation of criticality controls.
Activities in the affected area have been suspended and the equipment tagged out until an investigation to determine the root cause and necessary corrective actions has been completed.