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 Entered dateEvent description
ENS 5276723 May 2017 11:34:00On March 24, 2017, at 1425 EDT, while performing Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS) quarterly High Pressure Injection/Low Pressure Injection Logic and Component testing, an unintended test signal was generated when a test switch was moved to the OFF position but went slightly past this position and engaged contacts for the Test no. 1 position. When examined, the test switch was found to be degraded which allowed the switch to move past the center position and engage the test no. 1 contacts. This resulted In a partial actuation of 'B'- train ESAS components. It also resulted in an injection to the reactor coolant system (RCS). The test signal was immediately removed by operators and the inadvertently started equipment secured. The plant was operating at 100% power when the event occurred. There were no valid signals or plant conditions present to warrant the safety system actuation. The 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator rolled on air start but did not get up to full speed. Decay Heat Removal Pump 'B' started and the Decay Heat Removal Injection valve 4B opened, Make-Up Pump 'C' started, Make-Up Pump suction valve 14B opened, Make-Up pump discharge valves 16C and 16D opened, Spent Fuel Pump 1B tripped off, Air Handling Fan 18 tripped off and Air Handling Fan 1C trip tripped off. These components properly functioned from the inadvertent test signal and were secured prior to any adverse impact to plant operation. There was a small injection of borated water into the RCS. The plant remained stable at 100% power operation. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) the following information is provided as a sixty (60) day telephone notification to the NRC. This notification, reported under 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), is being provided in lieu of the submittal of a written LER to report a condition that resulted in an invalid partial actuation of the 'B' train of the Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS) as it was not part of a pre-planned sequence. The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.