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| Entered date | Site | Region | Reactor type | Event description | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 44942 | 28 March 2009 03:45:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | At 0146 EDT 3/28/09, the reactor mode switch was taken to shutdown in response to high vibration levels on the Main Turbine #1 bearing. Reactor power was at its reduced level in preparation for entry into Refueling Outage #13 which was scheduled to begin at 0300 EDT. All control rods fully inserted into the core. The lowest reactor vessel water level reached was 162 inches. HPCI & RCIC did not initiate. No safety relief valves (SRV) actuated. Reactor water level is being controlled in the normal band using the Control Rod Drive (CRD) system. All isolations and actuations for reactor vessel water level 3 occurred. The cause of the high main turbine vibrations is currently under investigation. There was no maintenance or testing in progress that would explain the high turbine vibration levels. At the time of the scram all ECCS systems and Emergency Diesel Generators were operable. This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), any event that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical. The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 44968 | 3 April 2009 17:07:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | At 1630 hours on 04/03/2009, the SPDS and ERDS system was removed from service to support activities for a planned maintenance outage on the UPS vital bus power supply. The duration of work is expected to be approximately 24 hours. During this time, Control Room indications and alternate methods will be available. Since the SPDS computer system will be unavailable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Update to event #44968 regarding SPDS and ERDS system removed from service to support planned outage on the UPS vital power supply. Planned work which resulted in the removal from service of the SPDS and ERDS has been completed. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Daley). |
| ENS 44984 | 11 April 2009 14:27:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | Notified by Engineering that Technical Support Center (TSC) emergency charcoal sample failed acceptance criteria. Declared TSC ventilation unavailable at 12:10 PM EDT, 4/11/09. TSC ventilation supports RERP radiological habitability function and as such represents a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Notified all Shift Managers if an emergency event is declared (Alert or higher), Shift Managers will need to modify emergency call out service so that TSC staffing report to Emergency Operating Facility (EOF). The use of the EOF as a backup facility for the TSC is included in Fermi's RERP Plan. Fermi will notify the NRC upon completion of corrective maintenance. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Regarding Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation unavailability: Corrective maintenance to restore HVAC system has been completed satisfactorily. TSC has been restored as an Emergency Response facility. The TSC was declared operable at 1457 EDT. Corrective maintenance included replacing the out-of-spec charcoal filters and satisfactory follow-up tests. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Hills). |
| ENS 44999 | 19 April 2009 23:38:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | On 4/19/09 at 2315 EDT, Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) were removed from service to support activities for a planned maintenance outage on the UPS vital bus power supply. The duration of work is expected to be approximately 24 hours. During this time, the majority of the Control Room indications remain available to the plant staff, and will be used for emergency response, if needed. Information will be communicated to the NRC using other available communication systems, if needed. The plant is currently in Mode 5, and will remain in Mode 5, for the duration of the SPDS and ERDS unavailability. Since the unavailability will last greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability, and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Update to Event #44999 regarding SPDS and ERDS being removed from service to support planned maintenance on the UPS vital bus power supply. Maintenance is complete, and SPDS and ERDS were returned to service on 4/20/09 at 2230 EDT. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Cameron). |
| ENS 45035 | 30 April 2009 17:39:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | During plant startup on 4/29/09 at 2239 (EDT), the startup had progressed to the point where plant conditions were adequate to allow performance of SR 3.5.1.9, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System flow testing against system head corresponding to reactor pressure. A Note to SR 3.5.1.9 allows 12 hours to perform this test after adequate reactor steam dome pressure and flow have been established for test performance. During the test performance, the test line pressure control valve did not properly operate to establish the required system head. The HPCI system was shutdown and returned to Standby. Earlier, on 4/29/09, SR 3.5.1.10, low pressure HPCI flow testing was successfully completed. Troubleshooting of the test line pressure control valve was begun. At 1039 (EDT) on 4/30/09, the 12 hour allowance of the Note to SR 4.5.1.9 expired and the HPCI system was declared inoperable for failure to complete the required surveillance. The HPCI system remains in Standby and is configured to perform its safety function. However, this event represents a potential loss of a single train safety system pending repair of the test line pressure control valve and completion of flow testing. With HPCI inoperable, the Unit is in the 14-day Tech. Spec. Action Statement 3.5.1. The licensee is revising their surveillance procedure to allow for manual operation of the failed control valve and estimates that the required testing will be completed within 4 hours. The Unit will remain in Mode 2 pending completion of this test. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Surveillance Requirement 3.5.1.9, HPCI system flow testing against system head corresponding to reactor pressure, was satisfactorily completed and HPCI declared OPERABLE May 1, 2009 at 0221 hours. There was no loss of HPCl safety function. Therefore this event is retracted. Notified R3DO (Hills). |
| ENS 45230 | 27 July 2009 10:39:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | On July 27, 2009, Fermi 2 is removing the Technical Support Center (TSC) from operation to facilitate maintenance activities for furniture and facility upgrade. During this work the facility will not be available for use. Fermi 2 is making this notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). In the event TSC activation is necessary the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) will be utilized. Activation and use of the EOF as a back up for the TSC is included in Fermi 2's Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan. The Emergency Call Out System (ECOS) is designed to facilitate contacting TSC personnel to respond directly to the EOF in the event of an emergency. Fermi 2 will notify the NRC upon completion of this work which is expected to be July 31, 2009. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Update to Event #45230 regarding unavailability of the Technical Support Center (TSC) for planned furniture and facility upgrade. The work to upgrade the facility has been completed satisfactorily. The TSC has been restored as an Emergency Response facility. The facility had been removed from operation on July 27, 2009 at 0935 EDT. The TSC was restored to operation at 1330 EDT on July 31, 2009. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO(Daley). |
| ENS 45287 | 24 August 2009 13:01:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | On August 24, 2009 at 0900 EDT the Fermi 2 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) was declared unavailable due to failure of the EOF backup diesel generator to start during weekly testing. Fermi 2 is making this notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). In the event that EOF activation is necessary, the alternate EOF will be utilized. Activation and use of the alternate EOF is included in Fermi's Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan. The alternate EOF has been verified available. Investigation into the failure of the EOF backup diesel generator start failure is in progress. Fermi will notify the NRC when EOF availability is restored. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Repairs have been made to the EOF backup diesel generator and it was successfully tested. The EOF is now available for use. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Orth). |
| ENS 45394 | 30 September 2009 14:11:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | At 11:09 EDT 09/30/09, the reactor mode switch was taken to shutdown and the main turbine generator was manually tripped in response to hydrogen gas in-leakage into the stator water cooling system from the main turbine generator. The scram was uncomplicated, and all control rods fully inserted into the core. The lowest reactor vessel water level reached was 122 inches, and as expected, HPCI & RCIC did not actuate. No safety relief valves (SRV) actuated. Reactor water level is being controlled in the normal band using the control rod drive and reactor feedwater systems. All isolations and actuations for reactor water level 3 occurred as expected. The cause of the increased hydrogen gas in-leakage into the stator water cooling is under investigation. At the time of the manual scram all Emergency Core Cooling Systems and Emergency Diesel Generators were operable, and no significant safety related equipment was out of service. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), as an event that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 45512 | 21 November 2009 05:58:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | On November 21, 2009, Fermi 2 (removed) the Technical Support Center (TSC) from operation to facilitate maintenance on the facilities' 480-volt AC power supply. This work affects TSC lighting, computers, and ventilation. During this work, which is expected to last over 8 hours, the TSC will be unavailable. In the event TSC activation is necessary, the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) will be used for the TSC function. Activation and use of the EOF as a backup for the TSC is included in Fermi 2's Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan. The Emergency Call Out System (ECOS) is designed to facilitate contacting TSC personnel to respond directly to the EOF in the event of an emergency. Fermi 2 is making this notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Fermi 2 will notify the NRC upon completion of this work. Fermi 2 will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
The planned maintenance has been completed and the TSC has been restored as an Emergency Response Facility. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 45530 | 1 December 2009 11:08:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | Beginning December 1,2009, at approximately 1200, the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) will be removed from service to support installation of a Cyber Security Modification. The Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) reside on the PCS platform and will be out of service when the PCS is removed from service. These systems will be unavailable to the Control Room and all other Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) for approximately six hours. By 1800, it is planned to restore IPCS, including SPDS and ERDS, to the Control Room, Operational Support Center, and the Technical Support Center. The IPCS will remain unavailable to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) as well as alternate EOF. On December 2, at approximately 1600, IPCS will be restored to the EOF but will remain unavailable to the alternate facilities. On December 3, 2009, at approximately 1600, IPCS will be restored, including alternate facilities. During this entire duration dose assessment capability will only be available in the manual data input mode. A follow-up notification will be submitted when the PCS is completely restored. For the first six hours of the PCS outage, the emergency assessment capability of all Fermi 2 ERFs will be degraded by the loss of IPCS and SPDS. During this period the ERDS function will also be lost. For the following 24 hrs., the EOF will have no IPCSs capability, which includes the SPDS function. Based on the aggregate effect of these losses, this notification is being made per the requirements of 8 Hour Non-Emergency Notification 10CFR,50.72(b)(3)(xiii), any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
On December 3, 2009, at 1530, emergency assessment capability has been restored to all on site emergency response facilities. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. R3DO (Riemer) notified. |
| ENS 45789 | 25 March 2010 18:18:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | At 1627 EDT on 3/25/10, the reactor mode switch was taken to shutdown following an automatic scram due to a main turbine trip. The scram was uncomplicated, and all control rods fully inserted into the core. The lowest reactor vessel water level reached was 136 inches, and as expected, HPCI & RCIC did not actuate. No safety relief valves (SRV) actuated. Reactor water level is being controlled in the normal band using the control rod drive and reactor feedwater systems. All isolations and actuations for reactor water level 3 occurred as expected. The cause of the Main Turbine Trip is under investigation. At the time of the scram all Emergency Core Cooling Systems and (Emergency Diesel Generators) EDGs were operable, and no safety related equipment was out of service. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 45900 | 5 May 2010 05:07:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | On May 5, 2010, at 0500 hours EDT, Fermi 2 removed the Technical Support Center (TSC) from operation to facilitate routine preventive maintenance on the facilities' heating ventilation and air-conditioning system. During this work, which is expected to last approximately 12 hours, the TSC will be unavailable. In the event TSC activation is necessary, the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) will be used for the TSC function. Activation and use of the EOF as a backup for the TSC is included in Fermi 2's Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan. The Emergency Call Out System (ECOS) is designed to facilitate contacting TSC personnel to respond directly to the EOF in the event of an emergency. Fermi 2 is making this notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Fermi 2 will notify the NRC upon completion of this work. Fermi 2 has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. * * * UPDATE FROM JIM KONRAD TO PETE SNYDER ON 5/5/10 AT 1725 EDT * * * Maintenance to restore ventilation has been completed. The TSC has been restored as an Emergency Response Facility. Notified R3DO (Passehl). |
| ENS 45979 | 6 June 2010 03:10:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | Reactor shutdown. All control rods inserted. Maintaining reactor vessel level with reactor core isolation cooling. Maintaining reactor vessel pressure with reactor core isolation cooling. (Automatic) Reactor scram due to loss of division 2 offsite power. Classification code: Unusual Event (HU1) Natural Destruction Phenomena Affecting the Protected Area. The licensee declared a Notification of Unusual Event at 0253 EDT. All rods fully inserted and decay heat is being removed by the main condensers. Division 1 buses are being powered by 1 of 3 offsite feeds and division 2 buses are being powered by the Emergency Diesel Generators. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Division 2 power provided by Emergency Diesel Generators number 13 and 14. Classification Alert Code: (HA1) Natural Destruction Phenomena Affecting the Plant Vital Area. Main condenser is the heat sink. The licensee declared an Alert at 0417 EDT. The reactor remains stable in Mode 3. Physical damage to the auxiliary and the turbine buildings were noticed after an initial inspection. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3RA (Satorius), NRR (Grobe), IRD (Morris), R3DO (Pelke), NRR EO (Galloway), DHS (Doyle), FEMA (Guy), DOE(Morrone), USDA (Ussery), HHS (Standifer), and CNSC (Gdesnryxrs).
At 0238 (EDT), severe weather caused a loss of 345KV (switchyard power). Reactor scrammed from a turbine trip. Plant is stabilized with RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel) water level in normal band and RPV pressure at 820 psig. RPV Pressure is being controlled on turbine BPV (By Pass Valve). Division 2 EDG's (Emergency Diesel Generator) are supplying power to division 2 buses. Plant is currently in Alert due to physical damage to plant due to severe weather. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector is on-site. Notified IRD (Morris), R3DO (Pelke), NRR EO (Galloway).
There is no release of radiological materials. No further potential exists for uncontrolled release of radioactive materials to the environment. The Reactor is shut down. Reactor pressure and temperature are within normal bands. Offsite electrical feeds to the site have been restored. An overall damage assessment has been prepared and reviewed to ensure no conditions exist that would create an entry condition to the Emergency Plan. Plant repairs will be accomplished through site processes. At 0220 EDT on 6/7/10, the licensee has terminated from the Alert classification. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3RA (Satorius), NRR (Grobe), IRD (Grant), R3DO (Pelke), NRR EO (Galloway), DHS (Doyle), FEMA (Blankenship), DOE(Bailey), USDA (Ussery), HHS (Peagler), and CNSC (Gdesnryxrs). |
| ENS 46044 | 24 June 2010 12:35:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random drug/alcohol test. Unescorted access has been suspended. Contact the HOO for further details. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 46359 | 24 October 2010 18:09:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | At 1641 EDT 10/24/10, the reactor mode switch was taken to shutdown following an automatic scram due to a main turbine trip, caused by a loss of (condenser) vacuum. The scram was uncomplicated, Control Rod 10-35 did not fully insert on scram and was manually inserted from position 38. The lowest reactor vessel water level reached was 137 inches, and as expected, HPCI, RCIC. & SRVs did not actuate. Reactor water level is being controlled in the normal band using the CRD (Control Rod Drive) and reactor feedwater systems. All isolations and actuations for reactor water level 3 occurred as expected. The loss of condenser vacuum is under investigation. All Emergency Core Cooling Systems and EDG's (Emergency Diesel Generators) were operable, and no safety related equipment was out of service. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), as an event that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical. Decay heat is being removed through the main turbine bypass valves to the main condenser. Electrical offsite power lineups are normal. Reactor pressure is 882 psig and reactor temperature is 515 degrees F (NOP and NOT). The reactor is stable in mode 3. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 46388 | 3 November 2010 13:15:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | On 11/3/10 at 1235 EDT Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) were removed from service to support activities for a planned maintenance outage on the UPS vital bus power supply. The duration of work is expected to be approximately 48 hours. During this time, the majority of the Control Room indications remain available to the plant staff, and will be used for emergency response, if needed. Information will be communicated to the NRC using other available communication systems, if needed. The plant is currently in Mode 5, and will remain in Mode 5, for the duration of the SPDS and ERDS unavailability. Since the unavailability will last greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability, and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Follow-up notification will be made when SPDS and ERDS have been restored. * * * UPDATE TO PETE SNYDER FROM MARK EGHIGIAN AT 1414 EDT ON 11/6/2010 * * * Update to event # 46388: on 11/6/2010 at 1000 EDT, regarding SPDS and ERDS system removed from service to support planned outage on the UPS vital power supply. Planned work which resulted in the removal from service of the SPDS and ERDS has been completed. All emergency assessment capabilities have been restored. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Giessner). |
| ENS 46433 | 23 November 2010 14:53:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | On 11/23/10 at 1145 EST, a verbal report to the Michigan Department of Natural Resources & Environment (MDNRE) was made relating to a sewage leak to the ground from the Training Building restrooms. The onsite Facilities Maintenance Journeyman discovered mud and stones while clearing a drain to relieve a blockage. An immediate repair of the broken drain is being implemented. The plant is currently in Mode 4, in Refueling Outage 14 (RF14). Since a verbal report was made to the MDNRE, this is considered a News Release / Notification of Other Government Agency, and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee also notified the Monroe County Health Department. |
| ENS 46436 | 24 November 2010 16:00:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | On 11/24/10 at 1515 EST, the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) were removed from service to support activities for a planned maintenance outage on the UPS vital bus power supply. The duration of work is expected to be approximately 48 hours. During this time, the majority of the Control Room indications remain available to the plant staff, and will be used for emergency response, if needed. Information will be communicated to the NRC using other available communication systems, if needed. The plant is currently in Mode 4, and will remain in Mode 4, for the duration of the SPDS and ERDS unavailability. Since the unavailability will last greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability, and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Followup notification will be made when SPDS and ERDS have been restored. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Update to Event #46436: On 11/26/10 at 1733 EST, regarding Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) systems removed from service to support planned maintenance on the UPS vital bus power supply. Planned work which resulted in the loss of SPDS and ERDS is complete. All Emergency Assessment Capabilities have been restored. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Dickson). |
| ENS 46438 | 25 November 2010 09:01:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | No reactor systems were impacted, no initiations of any safety systems or any plant events occurred. Report is for transportation of contaminated fingers with an injured non-contaminated person to a hospital for potential reattachment. Fermi 2 is currently in a refueling outage. At 0300, the control room was informed that an individual, who was assisting in rigging of a Reactor Shield Block ((approximately) 100 tons), received an injury when his fingers were pinched between the Reactor Cavity wall and the Reactor Shield Block severing portions of two fingers. The portions of the fingers remained in PC Clothing (gloves) and decontamination was unsuccessful. The fingers were treated as contaminated material and transported to the hospital by radiation protection personnel. This material (contaminated fingers) was deemed unusable and at 0540 all bio-hazard/contaminated material was returned to the Fermi site. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 46513 | 27 December 2010 16:18:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | On December 27, 2010, at 1537, a report was made to the Michigan Department of Natural Resources and Environment for exceeding the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit limits to outfall 011A. The limits were exceeded due to the General Service Water (GSW) traveling screens being in continuous operation and the back wash being aligned to outfall 011A which resulted in exceeding the maximum discharge limit of 1.8 million gallons per calendar day as a result of a fish intrusion event occurring at the GSW intake. The GSW traveling screens have been in continuous operation since 2100 on December 25 and the daily discharge limit was reached at 1700 on December 26. The condition was necessary to maintain safe and reliable operations of the plant in response to the fish intrusion. The GSW traveling screens are being continuously monitored in order to limit unnecessary discharge into outfall 011A and restore full compliance with the NPDES permit as conditions improve. This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) 'Any event or situation. Related to the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made.' The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 46515 | 28 December 2010 16:27:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | On December 28, 2010 at approximately 1220 hours, during surveillance testing of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system, abnormal control room position indication was observed on the HPCI Minimum Flow Valve, E4150F012 as the valve was stroking closed. HPCI had been removed from service for quarterly surveillance testing at 0950 hours. The unplanned inoperability condition began at 1220 hours when position indication was lost on the minimum flow valve. The valve was manually closed to comply with the action of LCO 3.6.1.3 to isolate the penetration. A 14 day LCO was entered and back dated to the time that HPCI was removed from service per LCO 3.5.1. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, based on loss of a single train safety system. RCIC was and has remained operable. The failure is currently under investigation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 46825 | 6 May 2011 10:11:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | A licensed operator had a confirmed positive for an illegal drug during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 46874 | 23 May 2011 17:03:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | On May 22, 2011, at 1444 hours, the Fermi 2 Control Room was notified by the Central System Supervisor that the switchyard voltage for both the 345kV (Division II) and 120kV (Division I) offsite power circuits following a generator trip would not be sufficient to sustain operability of the safety-related loads. Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1 'AC-Sources Operating,' Condition E was entered at 1444 hours. At 1535, both offsite power circuit voltages were at acceptable levels and the offsite circuits were declared operable. Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1, Condition E was exited at 1535 hours. Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) 20.300 GRID was entered. The Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) remained operable during the degraded voltage condition. The ability of the EDGs to fulfill their design function was not affected by this condition. The event is being reported per 50.72(b)(3)(V)(A), as any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
This event is retracted. The original report was based on calculated unit trip voltage drop results reported to Detroit Edison by ITC Transmission Company that exceeded acceptance criteria. ITC has subsequently informed Fermi 2 that this notification was in error due to a software feature of their real time contingency analyzer that resulted in inappropriately high results. Based on the results of other similar real time contingency analyzers employed at that time, without the problematic software feature, none of the acceptance criteria were exceeded and both divisions of offsite power were capable of supporting operability of safety-related loads. Additionally, Fermi 2 has determined that even at the inappropriately high voltage drop originally reported, the Division II system could have performed its safety related functions. Therefore, there was no loss of safety function. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Lara). |
| ENS 46960 | 15 June 2011 11:10:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | A deceased individual was discovered this morning along the shoreline of the Fermi-2 property, outside of the Protected Area. Specifically, at 0835 (EDT), the Main Control Room was notified by Security that a body had been found on the shoreline, north of the cooling towers. The Monroe County Sheriff and the US Coast Guard were notified and were on-site. The identity of the body has not yet been determined. The body has been removed from site by the US Coast Guard helicopter, and all local law enforcement officials have left site. A press release is not planned at this time. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 47242 | 6 September 2011 05:54:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | On September 6, 2011 at approximately 0104 EDT during surveillance testing of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system, control room position indication was lost on the HPCI Minimum Flow Valve, E4150F012 as the valve was stroking closed following shutdown of HPCI. The Minimum Flow Valve main power fuses were checked (found blown) and replaced in accordance with plant procedures. During stroke time testing of E4150F012, control room position indication was again lost when the operator depressed the open pushbutton. HPCI had been removed from service for quarterly surveillance testing at 2219 EDT September 5, 2011. The unplanned inoperability condition began at 0104 EDT when position indication was lost on the Minimum Flow Valve during system shutdown. The valve was locally verified closed to comply with the action of LCO 3.6.1.3 to isolate the penetration. A 14-day LCO was entered and back dated to the time that HPCI was removed from service for surveillance testing. This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, based on loss of a single train safety system. RCIC was and has remained operable. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The failure is currently under investigation. |
| ENS 47383 | 27 October 2011 19:08:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | At approximately 1715 EDT on 10/27/11, a Security Officer accidentally discharged his weapon and wounded himself in the foot. An ambulance and Monroe County Sheriff reported to the site. The officer was transported offsite to a local hospital. This is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). The officer was clearing his weapon following his shift when the accident occurred. No other individuals were hurt. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 47530 | 16 December 2011 16:37:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | At 1017 EST on December 16, 2011, a loss of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) occurred due to a process computer malfunction. This loss in capability is being reported as a loss of assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Indications of related plant variable are available in the Main Control Center. The Visual Annunciator System (VAS) remains functional. Meteorological and process effluent radiological monitor indications are available and dose assessment capability is available and tested functional. In the event of a plant emergency, the Emergency Plan can be implemented as assessment capabilities are available under alternate means. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
At 2235 EST on December 16, 2011, the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) were restored following the correction of the process computer malfunction. This loss in capability was reported under a loss of assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R3DO (Dickson) notified. |
| ENS 47594 | 14 January 2012 10:18:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | At 0700 EST on January 14, 2012, Fermi 2 removed the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) from service to facilitate planned maintenance on the associated power bus. The Technical Support Center (TSC) will also be unavailable during the planned power outage. The duration of the outage is expected to be 11 hours. This loss in capability is being reported as a loss of assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Indications of related plant variables are available in the Main Control Center. The Visual Annunciator System (VAS) remains functional. Meteorological and process effluent radiological monitor indications are available and dose assessment capability is available. In the event TSC activation is required, the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) will be used for the TSC function. Use of the EOF as the backup TSC is part of Fermi 2's Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan. The Emergency Callout System (ECOS) is designed to, facilitate contacting TSC personnel to respond directly to the EOF. Information normally provided by ERDS can be transmitted via the notification system as described in the Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan. In the event of a plant emergency, the Emergency Plan can be implemented as assessment capabilities are available under alternate means. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
At 1835 EST, during restoration from planned maintenance, a failure of an electrical auto throwover device occurred, preventing restoration of power to ERDS and the TSC. Investigation of the failure and necessary repairs are in progress. At this time, it is unknown when availability of ERDS and the TSC will be restored. An update will be made to the NRC Operations Center when ERDS and the TSC are restored. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R3DO (Orth).
At 0127 EST on January 16, 2012 the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) was restored and the Technical Support Center (TSC) is available as an emergency response facility, following restoration of the associated power bus. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Orth). |
| ENS 47800 | 3 April 2012 05:57:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | On 4/03/12 at 0524 EDT, the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) were removed from service to support activities for a planned maintenance outage on the UPS vital bus power supply. The duration of work is expected to be approximately 80 hours. During this time, the majority of the control room indications remain available to the plant staff, and will be used for emergency response, if needed. Information will be communicated to the NRC using other available communication systems, if needed. The plant is currently in Mode 5, and will remain in Mode 5, for the duration of the SPDS and ERDS unavailability. Since the unavailability will last greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability, and reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Follow up notification will be made when SPDS and ERDS have been restored. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
At 0702 EDT on April 6, 2012, Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) were restored, following restoration of the associated power bus. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Bloomer) |
| ENS 47826 | 11 April 2012 22:38:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | On 4/11/12 at 1807 EDT, with the plant shutdown in Mode 5 during Refueling Outage 15, the 'A' Residual Heat Removal pump tripped while operating in the Shutdown Cooling Mode. The pump trip was due to an isolation of the E1150F009 'Division 1 RHR Shutdown Cooling Inboard Isolation Valve.' This resulted in an interruption of primary decay heat removal for approximately 11 minutes. Approximate calculated time to boil was 23.1 hours. This is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to remove residual heat.' At the time of the pump trip, the station was attempting to restore power to Division 2 Bus 65E from the 64T cross tie bus. A voltage transient occurred due to a fault and caused a Group 4 (Shutdown Cooling/Head Spray) isolation signal. Abnormal Operating Procedure 20.205.01 'Loss of Shutdown Cooling,' was entered, the Group 4 isolation was reset and Shutdown Cooling was restored at 1818 EDT. An investigation is in progress to determine the cause of the bus fault. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 47868 | 26 April 2012 14:55:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | At 1012 EDT on April 26, 2012, during the Reactor Pressure Vessel Hydrostatic Test, a valid high pressure reactor scram occurred due to issues related to controlling pressure near rated values. This actuation of the Reactor Protection System was not part of the pre-planned testing sequence. All control rods were fully inserted at the time of the scram. This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' The reactor scram was reset after reactor pressure was lowered. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 48047 | 25 June 2012 16:38:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | At 1330 EDT on June 25, 2012, while restoring the Main Turbine Generator (MTG) to service after repairs to Main Unit Transformer 2B (MUT2B), Main Control Room (MCR) staff manually initiated a reactor scram in response to trip of both Reactor Feed Pumps (RFP). All control rods fully inserted. The lowest Reactor Water Level (RWL) reached was 154 inches and, as expected, HPCI and RCIC did not actuate. RWL was restored to normal using the Standby Feedwater (SBFW) system. RWL is currently being maintained in the normal level band with SBFW and Control Rod Drive (CRD) systems. No Safety Relief Valves (SRV) actuated. All isolations and actuations for RWL 3 occurred as expected. Investigation into the trip of RFPs continues. At the time of the scram, all Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) and Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) were operable and no safety related equipment was out of service. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as an event that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical. The plant is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup with decay heat being removed via steam to the main condenser using the bypass valves. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 48061 | 2 July 2012 08:25:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | Beginning July 2, 2012, at approximately 0800, the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) will be removed from service to support installation of a Cyber Security Modification. The Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) reside on the IPCS platform and will be out of service when the IPCS is removed from service. These systems will be unavailable to the Control Room and all other Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) for approximately 20 hours. By 0300 on July 3, 2012, it is planned to restore IPCS, including SPDS and ERDS, to the Control Room, Operational Support Center, the Technical Support Center, and alternate facilities. During this time dose assessment capability will only be available in the manual data input mode. The majority of the Control Room indications remain available to the plant staff, and will be used for emergency response, if needed. Information will be communicated to the NRC using other available communication systems as needed. A follow-up notification will be submitted when the IPCS is completely restored. This notification is being made per the requirements of 8 Hour Non-Emergency Notification 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
On July 3, 2012, at 01:00, the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) has been returned to service. Emergency assessment capabilities have been restored to all onsite emergency response facilities. Due to equipment problems, the Cyber Security Modification was not installed and the original IPCS configuration was restored. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R3DO (Daley) notified.
At approximately 02:04 on July 3, the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) failed. The Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) reside on the IPCS platform. IPCS had previously been removed from service on 7/2/12 for a Cyber Security Modification and restored at 0100 on 7/3/12. At 0354, plant personnel were able to reboot IPCS and restore the system to normal with a Prime and Backup CPUs. Emergency assessment capabilities have been restored to all onsite emergency response facilities. This notification is being made per the requirements of 8 Hour Non-Emergency Notification 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R3DO (Daley) notified. |
| ENS 48066 | 3 July 2012 13:21:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | At 0940 hours on July 3, 2012, Detroit Edison notified the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Administration (MIOSHA) that an employee had suffered a fatality. On July 2, 2012, at 1504 hours, a Detroit Edison employee reported to the nurse's office with symptoms of shortness of breath and chest pain. The individual was transported offsite via ambulance to a local hospital for care. At approximately 1700 hours on July 2, 2012, notification was received that the individual had passed away. There was no radioactive contamination involved in this event. The licensee has not notified any other government agencies besides MIOSHA. This ENS report is being made in accordance with 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
| ENS 48106 | 14 July 2012 08:59:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | At approximately 0206 EDT on July 14, 2012, the Femi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) failed. The Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) reside on the IPCS platform. At 0525 EDT, plant personnel were able to reboot IPCS and restore the system to normal with prime and backup CPUs. Emergency assessment capabilities have been restored to all onsite emergency response facilitates. This notification is being made per the requirements of 8 hour non-emergency notification 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 48123 | 20 July 2012 22:27:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | Beginning July 20, 2012, at approximately 2230, troubleshooting of MUX A components and fiber optic cables on the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) will be performed. A loss of IPCS during the troubleshooting is possible. The Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) reside on the IPCS platform and will be out of service if IPCS is lost. These systems would be unavailable to the Control Room and all other Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs). During this time dose assessment capability would only be available in the manual data input mode. The majority of the Control Room indications will remain available to the plant staff, and would be used for emergency response, if needed. Information would be communicated to the NRC using other available communication systems as needed. A follow-up notification will be submitted when the IPCS troubleshooting is complete. This notification is being made per the requirements of 8 Hour Non-Emergency Notification 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Troubleshooting and repairs have been completed to the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) as of July 24, 2012 at 1855 (EDT). No loss of communication ability occurred from initial notification while repairs and restoration were in progress. Event 48123 is retracted. (The initial anticipatory) notification was made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Bloomer). |
| ENS 48158 | 3 August 2012 15:27:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's unescorted access has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 48197 | 16 August 2012 21:02:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | At approximately 1458 EDT on 8/16/12, a portion of the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) failed. This resulted in a loss of approximately 60 percent of data on the Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS). While IPCS and SPDS are not fully functional, the Emergency Plan can still be implemented if a plant emergency does occur, as assessment capabilities are available under alternate means. Repairs are in progress. A follow up message will be made when IPCS and SPDS are restored to fully functional status. This notification is being made pursuant to the requirements 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
At approximately 1458 EDT on 8/16/12, a portion of the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) failed. This resulted in a loss of approximately 60 percent of data on the Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS). At 2340 (EDT), plant personnel were able to restore full functionality of IPCS and SPDS, restoring full Emergency assessment capabilities to all onsite emergency response facilities. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Giessner). |
| ENS 48309 | 14 September 2012 19:27:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | At 1603 EDT, Fermi 2 automatically scrammed due to onsite loss of 120 kV switchyard. All control rods fully inserted. The lowest Reactor Water Level (RWL) reached was 98 inches. Division I diesels, EDG-11 and EDG-12, automatically started and loaded. HPCI and RCIC automatically started and restored RWL. RWL is currently being maintained in the normal level band with Condensate/Feed and Control Rod Drive (CRD) systems. No Safety Relief Valves (SRV) actuated. All isolations and actuations for RWL 3 and 2 occurred as expected. Investigation into loss of 120 kV switchyard continues. At the time of the scram, all Emergency Core Cooling (ECCS) and Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) were operable with the exception of EDG-11 which was available vice operable due to ventilation work, and no other safety related equipment was out of service. This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), any event that results in ECCS discharge into the reactor coolant system as a result of a valid signal and 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), any event that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical. EDG-11 and EDG-12 are performing all of their functions and providing power to the Division I AC buses. Temperatures are being monitored in the room containing EDG-11 and the room is not approaching any temperature limits. The MSIVs are open with decay heat being removed via steam to the main condenser using the bypass valves. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 48338 | 24 September 2012 11:23:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | At 04:07 EDT on September 24, 2012, Fermi 2 experienced a failure of a data server within the Process Computer system. The failure of the data server does affect data input to the server providing information to the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). ERDS is currently not receiving updated information from Fermi data systems. This loss in capability is being reported as a loss of assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Indications of related plant variables are available in the Main Control Room. The Visual Annunciator System (VAS) and other portions of the Process Computer system remain functional. Meteorological and process effluent radiological monitor indications are available and dose assessment capability is available. Fermi 2 personnel will use normal phone communications to update NRC Operations Center in the case of an event declaration. Information normally provided by ERDS can be transmitted via the notification system as described in the Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
On September 24, 2012, Fermi experienced a failure of a data server within the process computer system which feeds data to Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), and report #48338 was made to the NRC. On October 6, 2012, corrective maintenance is complete, which repaired the data server and ERDS functionality is restored. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Valos). |
| ENS 48451 | 29 October 2012 18:15:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | At 1700 EDT on October 29, 2012, Fermi 2 discovered a failure occurred with a data server within the Process Computer system at 0115 EDT on October 28, 2012. The failure of the data server affects data input to the server providing information to the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). ERDS is currently not receiving updated information from Fermi data systems. This loss in capability is being reported as a loss of assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Indications of related plant variables are available in the Main Control Room. The Visual Annunciator System (VAS) and other portions of the Process Computer system remain functional. Meteorological and process effluent radiological monitor indications are available and dose assessment capability is available. Fermi 2 personnel will use normal phone communications to update NRC Operations Center in the case of an event declaration. Information normally provided by ERDS can be transmitted via the notification system as described in the Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan. Fermi 2 will notify the NRC when ERDS is returned to service. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
This is a follow up to EN #48468 & EN #48451. On October 29, 2012, Fermi experienced a failure of a data server within the process computer system which feeds data to Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), and EN #48451 was made to the NRC. On November 1, 2012, planned maintenance for Cyber Security Modification began which removed ERDS, SPDS, and IPCS from service, and EN #48468 was made to the NRC. On November 9, 2012, planned maintenance on ERDS, SPDS, and IPCS is complete, restoring full emergency assessment capabilities to all onsite emergency response facilities (EN #48468). The maintenance also repaired the data server within the process computer system which feeds data to ERDS (EN #48451). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Lipa). |
| ENS 48468 | 1 November 2012 08:20:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | Beginning November 01, 2012, at approximately 1000 (EDT), the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) will be removed from service outside of the Control Room to support installation of a Cyber Security Modification. The Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) reside on the IPCS platform and will be out of service when the IPCS is removed from Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs). These systems will be unavailable to all Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) for approximately 196 hours. By 1600 (EDT) on November 9, 2012 it is planned to restore IPCS, including SPDS and ERDS, to the Operational Support Center, the Technical Support Center, and alternate facilities. During this time dose assessment (Raddose) capability will only be available in the manual data input mode. The SPDS indications and Raddose remain available to the plant staff in the Control Room, and will be used for emergency response, if needed. Information will be communicated to the NRC using other available communication systems as needed. A follow-up notification will be submitted when the IPCS is completely restored. This 8-hour non-emergency notification is being made per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. ERDS previously reported out of service under event number EN 48451 . The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
This is a follow up to EN #48468 & EN #48451. On October 29, 2012, Fermi experienced a failure of a data server within the process computer system which feeds data to Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), and EN #48451 was made to the NRC. On November 1, 2012, planned maintenance for Cyber Security Modification began which removed ERDS, SPDS, and IPCS from service, and EN #48468 was made to the NRC. On November 9, 2012, planned maintenance on ERDS, SPDS, and IPCS is complete, restoring full emergency assessment capabilities to all onsite emergency response facilities (EN #48468). The maintenance also repaired the data server within the process computer system which feeds data to ERDS (EN #48451). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Lipa). |
| ENS 48471 | 1 November 2012 15:35:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | At approximately, 1215 EDT, November 1, 2012, Fermi 2 experienced an oil spill to navigable waters, requiring notification of National Response Center, Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) Pollution Emergency Alert System (PEAS), and Primary Public Safety Answering Point (911). The spill has not left site. A fuel oil and water mixture overflowed from a tank onto the ground during the performance of station fire header flushing. It is estimated that the volume of the overflow was less than ten gallons. A portion of the overflow entered the site storm drains. The source of the spill has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 48487 | 7 November 2012 12:39:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | At 09:21 EST 11/7/12, the reactor mode switch was taken to shutdown and the main turbine generator was manually tripped in response to hydrogen gas in-leakage into the stator water cooling system from the main turbine generator. The scram was uncomplicated, and all control rods, except one, fully inserted into the core. One control rod stopped at position 02 and was manually inserted. The lowest reactor vessel water level reached was 125 inches, and as expected, HPCI & RCIC did not actuate. No safety relief valves (SRV) actuated. Reactor water level is being controlled in the normal band using the control rod drive and reactor feedwater systems. All isolations and actuations for reactor water level 3 occurred as expected. The cause of the increased hydrogen gas in-leakage into stator water cooling is under investigation. At the time of the manual scram, all Emergency Diesel Generators were operable. All Emergency Core Cooling Systems were available and no significant safety related equipment was out of service. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), as an event that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical. The MSIVs are open with decay heat being removed via steam to the main condenser using the bypass valves. The plant is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 48689 | 22 January 2013 08:38:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | On 01/22/2013 at 00:30 Reactor building HVAC tripped due to low outside air temperature and Standby Gas Treatment system was manually started and maintained Reactor Building differential pressure negative. At 01:13 secondary containment pressure went positive during restart of the Center Reactor Building HVAC Train. This is a loss of secondary containment function. In a 12 second time span secondary containment pressure went above 0 inches WC (Water Column) to +0.17 inches WC and then decreased to < 0 inches WC remaining stable during the Reactor Building HVAC restart. The Center Reactor Building HVAC Exhaust Fan Discharge Damper opened after the Supply Fan discharge damper; this condition would produce the indications noted. The System was returned to normal with two Reactor Building HVAC trains running and the Standby Gas Treatment System shutdown and in standby. Reactor building pressure is stable with differential pressure negative < - 0.30 inches WC. The loss of Secondary Containment function is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 48886 | 3 April 2013 16:51:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | At 1053 (EDT) on April 3, 2013, during the performance of a surveillance test on the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system the EECW system was declared inoperable due to the Division 2 EECW makeup pump failing to start during the surveillance. The EECW system cools various safety related components, including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) room cooler. A 14 day Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) was entered for HPCI via (Technical Specification) LCO 3.5.1. Investigation into why the makeup pump did not start is currently in progress. This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, based on a loss of a single train safety system. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
An evaluation of Event 48886 has determined that the Division 2 Emergency Cooling Water (EECW) system was capable of supporting HPCI Room Cooler and HPCI operation for a period of time in excess of that required to perform the required safety functions as assumed in the accident analysis. Therefore, this event is retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Orth). |
| ENS 48887 | 4 April 2013 08:35:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | At 0406 (EDT) on April 4, 2013, the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) failed. This resulted in a loss of approximately 60 percent of data on the Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS). While IPCS and SPDS are not fully functional, the Emergency Plan can still be implemented if a plant emergency does occur, as assessment capabilities are available under alternate means. Investigation is in progress. A follow up message will be made when IPCS and SPDS are restored to fully functional status. This notification is being made per the requirements of 8 Hour Non-Emergency Notification 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
At 1627 (EDT) on April 4, 2013, plant personnel were able to restore full functionality of IPCS and SPDS. This restored full assessment capabilities to all onsite emergency response faculties. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Daley). |
| ENS 49451 | 18 October 2013 15:52:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | At 1505 EDT on October 18, 2013, Fermi 2 experienced an oil spill to navigable waters, requiring notification of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Pollution Emergency Alert System, Detroit Edison Corporate Environmental Management and Resources, and the Primary Public Safety Answering Point. The spill has not left site. Oil leaked from a fitting on a pump during the performance of fire truck testing. It is estimated that the volume of the overflow was less than four gallons. The overflow entered the on-site quarry. The source of the spill has been terminated. Media interest is anticipated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. * * * UPDATE FROM DEREK ETUE TO PETE SNYDER ON 10/21/13 AT 1445 EDT * * * In the first sentence of the second paragraph in the original report above the words 'fire truck' were replaced with 'FLEX pump.' Additionally, "as of 10/18/2013 at 1820 EDT the oil cleanup was completed with no waste generated due to oil dissipation." The licensee also notified the Michigan State Police, Monroe County Sheriff, and the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Orlikowski). |
| ENS 49575 | 24 November 2013 02:54:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | On 11/24/2013 at 00:00:54 seconds (EST), Reactor Building ventilation tripped due to low outside air temperature. At 00:01:42 seconds, Secondary Containment Differential pressure went positive, with a maximum of +0.08 inches WC (water column). This is a loss of Secondary Containment function. At 00:02:30 seconds, Standby Gas Treatment System was started and Secondary Containment pressure then decreased to <0 inches WC at 00:03:18 seconds. All the above data parameters were taken from the Division 2 Reactor Building Differential pressure recorder. Secondary Containment pressure is stable with differential pressure negative <-0.30 inches WC. The loss of Secondary Containment function is reportable under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. Technical Specification requirement are to maintain secondary containment pressure <-0.125 WC. No actual radiation release occurred during the event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 49801 | 6 February 2014 19:17:00 | Fermi | NRC Region 3 | GE-4 | At 1254 (EST) on February 6, 2014, while shutting down Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW), a human performance error occurred resulting in the Division 2 EECW isolation override switch being placed in manual override. Division 2 EECW remained running and continued to operate normally. The Division 2 EECW system cools various safety related components including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler. With the Division 2 EECW isolation override switch in manual override, Division 2 EECW may have been prevented from performing its safety function during a loss of power event. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred due to the Division 2 EECW inoperability which may have prevented HPCI from performing its safety function. A 14 day Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) was entered for HPCI via T.S. LCO 3.5.1 and subsequently exited 36 seconds later upon returning the Division 2 EECW isolation override switch to normal. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, based on a loss of a single train safety system. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee reported that the individuals involved have been removed from licensee duties pending further investigation.
The Fermi 2 Engineering staff has completed a comprehensive evaluation of the momentary mispositioning of the Division 2 EECW system overide switch initially reported on February 6, 2014. The evaluation determined that HPCI room temperature would remain below the HPCI room steam leak detection isolation logic setpoint in the unlikely event that the momentary mispositioning resulted in the temporary interruption of the cooling water flow to the HPCI system room cooler. Over the brief period of time for which EECW would have been unavailable to support the effective operation of the room cooler, its function was not necessary for HPCI to perform its required safety functions. Therefore, event notification 49801 is retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Passehl). |