Semantic search
| Discovered date | Reporting criterion | Title | Description | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 44655 | 13 November 2008 06:20:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Oil Spill from Circulating Water Pump Oil Sight Glass Line | On November 13, 2008, at 0020 CST, the State of Nebraska, Department of Environmental Quality and National Response Center were notified by Omaha Public Power District's Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station of an oil spill due to a crack in upper pump bearing sight glass line for 'C' Circulating Water Pump, CW-1C. The spill involved a small quantity of oil estimated to be less than one gallon to the intake Structure sump with trace amounts discharged to the Missouri River. Per Fort Calhoun Nuclear Stations' National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit, the notifications were made and samples were taken for offsite analysis to determine if the quantity discharged involved an actual violation of the discharge permit. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 72.75 (b) (2) (xi), 4 hour non-emergency notification due to a notification being made to a Government Agency (State of Nebraska, Department of Environmental Quality and National Response Center). The licensee notified NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee also notified the Nebraska Department of Environmental Quality and the National Response Center. | |
| ENS 44703 | 8 December 2008 02:10:00 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER | Inadvertent Edg Start | On 12/7/08 at 2010 CST, Emergency Diesel Generator 2 was started manually from its local control cabinet. The diesel started and operated as designed upon operation of the local Emergency Start Push button. This was an inadvertent start of the diesel during an alarm test on the local engine panel. The alarm test and emergency start push buttons are in close proximity and of similar design and color. The diesel has since been shutdown and returned to a standby condition. The Emergency Diesel Generator remains capable of performing its designed function and was considered operable throughout the evolution. Therefore this report is being made in reference to 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) . The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
On 12/7/2008, Fort Calhoun reported an inadvertent start of a diesel generator (event Number 44703). Based on a detailed review of NUREG-1022, this event has been determined not to be reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) . As reported, the diesel generator was not intentionally manually started by the operator. Therefore, this event was an invalid actuation of the safety system and this notification is being retracted. An appropriate report will be forthcoming as required by 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.73(a)(1). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Cain).
As allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), the following information is provided: On December 7, 2008, an equipment operator inadvertently started emergency diesel generator 1 using the local Emergency Start push button. The operator was distracted and failed to apply appropriate self checking. This report is being made under 10 CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A): a) The train that was actuated was diesel generator train 2. b) The train actuation was complete. The diesel started and operated as designed. The associated emergency bus was not deenergized so the diesel did not connect to the bus. c) As previously noted, the diesel started and functioned successfully for the plant conditions at the time. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Farnholtz). | |
| ENS 44833 | 6 February 2009 00:28:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification to Local Fire Departments for Assistance | At 1828 CST, a fire alarm in the Administration Building was reported to the Fort Calhoun Station Control Room. The Administration Building is located outside of the Protected Area on Owner Controlled Property. An Equipment Operator was dispatched to investigate the cause of the alarm. The Control Room entered AOP-06 Fire Emergency at 1830 CST. At 1832 CST, a report was received from a building occupant that smoke was emanating from a Mechanical Equipment Room located on the first floor of the building. At that time, personnel in the building attempted to extinguish the fire using a portable fire extinguisher but were unsuccessful. Local Fire Departments in the City of Blair and Fort Calhoun were dispatched. At 1840 CST, the Operator arrived at the scene, found light smoke coming from the Mechanical Equipment Room and proceeded to de-energize the ventilation equipment. At 1844 CST, the fire was then extinguished using portable fire extinguishers. It was at that time that Blair and Fort Calhoun Fire Companies arrived on site to assist. At 1911 CST, AOP-06 was exited. Preliminary investigation shows that filter media had become dislodged and contacted duct heaters in the ventilation system. The fire ignited secondary material in the area. The Protected Area of Fort Calhoun Station was not affected at any time during this incident. This event may cause heightened public or government concern related to the health and safety of on-site personnel. Therefore, this report is being made in reference to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and plans to issue a press release. | |
| ENS 44851 | 13 February 2009 21:26:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown | Unusual Event - Engineering Analysis Requires Technical Specification Shutdown | On February 13, 2009 at 1526 CST, Fort Calhoun Station declared a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) based upon EAL 4.2 - Both Diesel Generators NOT Operable. The station has entered Technical Specification 2.0.1(1) requiring the Unit to be placed in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 6 hours. The cause of the NOUE is a potential common mode failure of the diesel generators. Design Engineering has identified an unanalyzed condition in which a High Energy Line Break in Room 81, Main Steam Lines Containment Penetration Room, or an auxiliary steam leak in Room 82, Turbine Building Ventilation Room, can potentially result in water entering both diesel generator rooms through the floor of Room 82 located directly above the diesel rooms, Rooms 63 and 64. This condition presents a potential common mode failure of the diesel generators due to loss of diesel generator auxiliaries from a single failure. The possibility of water leaking into Rooms 63, 64 and the Switchgear rooms prompted this declaration. Compensatory measures to exit the NOUE will be to remove auxiliary steam from room 82 and blockading shut the door between rooms 81 and 82. These actions are expected to be completed within one to three hours. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
At 1828 CST, Fort Calhoun Station exited the Notification of Unusual Event. Both Diesel Generators were declared operable based upon establishing compensatory measures. Diesel 2 was confirmed operable by running in accordance with approved procedures. Diesel 1 was successfully run on February 11, 2009 per a monthly surveillance tests. No additional water intrusion had occurred into the diesel 1 room since completion of the surveillance test. Compensatory measures to prevent water intrusion into Room 82 include isolating auxiliary steam to room 82 to eliminate a source of water to room 82, installing a temporary barrier at the door between rooms 81 and 82 to prevent water from flowing from room 81 to room 82, should an HELB occur in room 81, and to open the door between room 81 and the turbine building to allow water to flow out of room 81 so as not to flow into room 82. Technical Specification 2.0.1 has been exited as of time 1828 CST. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Miller), IRD (McDermott, McMurtray), DHS (Doyle), and FEMA (Via).
This is a retraction (of the report made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - Unanalyzed Condition) Fort Calhoun has performed a detailed evaluation of water intrusion through cracks in the floor of room 82 above the emergency diesel generators, as identified in part in the notification of 2/13/2009. This evaluation determined that no common mode failure mechanism existed and that the diesel generators were capable of performing their design safety functions. The licensee informed the Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Rick Deese). | |
| ENS 44903 | 12 March 2009 21:45:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification for Low Intake Water Level Due to an Ice Jam | On March 12, 2009 at 1249 CDT, Fort Calhoun Station entered AOP-01, 'Acts of Nature' Section IV, 'Low River Water Level' due to lowering river level resulting from an ice jam upstream from the station. At that time, Missouri River level had lowered to 983 feet and posed a potential challenge to continued operation of the circulating water pumps. AOP-01 requires offsite notification of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to determine current river conditions, expected river levels for Fort Calhoun Station, and planned actions to alleviate the lowering levels. Current river level at 1900 CDT was 982' 6" with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers predicting the minimum river level to be 981' 6" feet. At this time, there has been no degradation in the circulating water pump or plant performance and compensatory measures are in place to monitor river level hourly. Barring degradation in circulator performance, additional actions will not be required if river level stays above the predicted minimum levels. The minimum level for operating the circulating water pumps is 978'. A break in the ice jam is not expected to adversely affect the plant. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 45251 | 9 August 2009 09:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | State of Nebraska Notified Due to Minor Sewage Spill to the Missouri River | (The licensee) notified the Nebraska Department of Environmental Quality that a site sewage lift station had overflowed due to blown fuses and released an estimated 20 gallons of raw sewage the Missouri River. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 45315 | 31 August 2009 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Emergency Sirens Inoperable | At 1546 CDT the control room at the Fort Calhoun Power Station was notified that a siren test conducted at 1440 CDT had failed. At this time none of the station's emergency sirens are capable of being sounded. Utility personnel are troubleshooting the problem and expect to restore siren capability. Compensatory measures have been implemented. The NRC will be notified when siren capability has been restored. Harrison and Pattawattamie counties in Iowa, and Washington county in Nebraska have been notified. The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
The licensee has reset a communications device that activates the sirens and restored operability to 38 out of the 103 total sirens around the site. To re-establish operability of the remaining sirens, the licensee will need to dispatch personnel to each siren to relink with the communications system. The time frame to complete this effort is estimated to be approximately 5 hours. The compensatory notification measures will remain in place until the sirens have been restored. The licensee will notify the Resident Inspector of this updated information.
The licensee has restored 101 of 103 total sirens to service. Two sirens that are not in service are currently not accessible. They will be automatically restored to service at approximately 0330 CDT and verified in the morning. The licensee has notified the Resident Inspector of this updated information. Notified R4DO (Farnholtz).
The licensee has restored all 103 of 103 total sirens to service. Harrison and Pattawattamie counties in Iowa, and Washington county in Nebraska have been notified. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector of this updated information. Notified R4DO (Farnholtz). | |
| ENS 45389 | 29 September 2009 20:09:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Unavailable for Emergency Planning Responses | At 15:09 CDT, today the Technical Support Center ventilation system stopped running. The cause for the failure of the Technical Support Center ventilation system is suspected to be an interlock between the fire detection system and the ventilation unit. The cause of the this condition renders the Technical Support Center unavailable for Emergency Planning Responses. Alternate facilities are available. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities." The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Technical Support Center ventilation system is now functional and is available for Emergency Planning Responses. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Mike Shannon) | |
| ENS 45467 | 26 October 2009 15:50:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | Pressurizer and Feedwater Storage Tank Level Indications Do Not Meet Appendix R Requirements | During a review in preparation for converting from 10 CFR 50 Appendix R to NFPA 805, it was discovered that all of the cables for pressurizer and emergency feedwater storage tank level indications did not meet Appendix R cable requirements. A fire in Corridor 4, Corridor 26, or in Room 6 could result in a failure of level indication for these critical components. Corridors 4 and 26 were adequately addressed by existing fire watches. A fire watch was established for Room 6 upon discovery of this condition. Pressurizer level and emergency feedwater storage tank level indicators currently meet their requirements, with the established fire watches. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
On October 26, 2009, Fort Calhoun reported the (above event). During the course of the subsequent evaluation it was determined that the pressurizer level indications do meet the 10 CFR 50 Appendix R separation requirements. There is sufficient redundancy of emergency feedwater storage tank level indications to allow proper operator response to potential plant fires. Therefore, this event is not reportable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Proulx). | |
| ENS 45468 | 26 October 2009 15:50:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Station Paging System Out of Service | At about 1050 CDT on 10/26/2009, it was discovered that the station paging system was not operating. Repair efforts were initiated. The Control Room was notified of the pager outage. The automated callout system was available during the pager outage. Investigation determined that the paging system was nonfunctional as early as 0900 the same day. Repair efforts were successful and the pager system was returned to operation about 1230 CDT. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 45533 | 1 December 2009 21:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xii), Transport of a Contaminated Person Offsite | Contaminated Person Reports to Offsite Hospital | On November 26, 2009, at 2330, it was determined that a machinist who was working on reactor coolant pump (RCP 3A) seal was contaminated on his left hand index finger. The contamination level was 1500 net counts per minute (CPM). Upon exit, the individual alarmed monitors and decontamination was attempted. Decontamination for the next two shifts included wrapping of the hand, waiting 2 hours, rechecking and repeating 2 hours later. However, decontamination was unsuccessful. The individual was conditionally released and allowed to leave the site with his hand wrapped. On December 1, 2009, at approximately 1500, the Fort Calhoun Station Health Physics and Radiological Protection Personnel met the machinist at the University of Nebraska Medical Center (UNMC) for further treatment. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 45614 | 7 January 2010 19:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Due to the Discovery of Contaminated Dollar Bills | An individual entered the plant access and alarmed (the) portal radiation monitor. Upon investigation the individual's wallet contained three contaminated one dollar bills. The individual had processed out of similar monitors the previous day without indication of contamination. The three one dollar bills were surveyed and it was determined that they contained only I-131. The individual was interviewed and it was determined that the contaminated money was likely obtained at a local merchant. The individual is not aware of anyone undergoing iodine therapy. I-131 is used for therapy and diagnostic medical practices. The Corporate Health Physicist called the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services, Radiological Health Division about the incident and location. The bills are contaminated above levels acceptable for the plant. The conclusion is that someone not associated with the power plant had iodine treatment, contaminated the bills, used them at the store and the individual received those bills as change. There is no reason to believe that contamination has any connection to the operation of power plant. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 45615 | 8 January 2010 19:29:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Emergency Sirens May Be Impacted by Extreme Weather Conditions | The current NOAA weather forecast for the station is predicted to be about -25 degrees Fahrenheit (on the morning of January 9, 2010). Based on this forecast, the station reviewed the impact of these temperatures on the 101 sirens in the Fort Calhoun Station 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). The siren manufacturer's and the FEMA approved siren design report information states that the sirens (Federal Signal model 2001) are designed for operation between the temperature readings of -22 degrees Fahrenheit and +140 degrees Fahrenheit. Event Numbers 44782 and 44783, on a similar condition at another utility having the same sirens, were reviewed. It was noted that the reports documented discussion with the manufacturer's technical representative confirming that the sirens are operational and no special testing is required when the temperature goes below and then returns within the operating temperature limits. The current temperature at the station is within the operational limits. Therefore, the 101 sirens are considered functional at this time. The following agencies were notified that if the temperature falls below a negative twenty-two degrees Fahrenheit, the established process of back-up route alerting is to be used notifying the public in the event of a nuclear emergency where the sirens are activated but fail to respond: -Washington County, NE Emergency Management -Pottawatomie County, IA Emergency Management -Harrison County, IA Emergency Management This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). No media press release is being made. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
A review of area temperature indicates that the siren design was not exceeded. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Hagar). | |
| ENS 45724 | 24 February 2010 17:40:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps May Experience Runout at Low Steam Pressures | At 1140 CST, both of the stations safety related auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps were declared inoperable. The AFW pumps were declared inoperable due to an evaluation that determined that the pumps may experience runout at low steam generator pressures during some design basis events. The stations Technical Specifications require that: 'With both AFW trains inoperable, then initiate actions to restore one AFW train to OPERABLE status immediately.' Technical Specification (TS) 2.0.1 and all TS actions requiring MODE change are suspended until one AFW train is restored to OPERABLE status. The station is aggressively working to develop a solution to return at least one train of the AFW system to operability. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. * * * UPDATE FROM DAVID SPARGO TO PETE SNYDER AT 2323 ON 2/24/10 * * * At 2133 CST, Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, FW-10, was declared operable based on an engineering evaluation that determined FW-10 will perform as required under all design basis conditions. Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, FW-6, remains inoperable. (The licensee) exited Technical Specification 2.0.1 and 2.5(1)D, and entered TS 2.5(1)B, 24 hour LCO, effective as of 1140 CST. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Lantz).
At 0238 CST, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, FW-6, was declared operable per an Engineering Operability Evaluation. (The licensee) exited Technical Specification 2.5(1)B. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Lantz).
Further review has determined that the auxiliary feedwater pumps are and have been fully capable of performing their required safety function. Therefore, this notification is being retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO(Lantz) | |
| ENS 45731 | 26 February 2010 14:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | In-Plant Paging System Out of Service | At about 0830 CST on 2/26/2010 , it was discovered that the station paging system was not operating. Repair efforts were initiated. The Control Room and station personnel were notified of the pager outage. The automated callout system is available to notify the emergency response organization during the pager outage if needed.
The station paging system was restored to operable status at 1400 CST. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO(Lantz). | |
| ENS 45790 | 25 March 2010 15:28:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat | High Pressure Safety Injection Inoperable Due to Voids Identified in Suction Piping | At 1028 CDT today 3/25/2010, a rejectable void was found in one of the suction lines (cooled suction line) to the B HPSI (High Pressure Safety Injection) pump. The main suction line is water filled. The piping was declared inoperable and the appropriate technical specification was entered. At 1357 CDT the void was cleared from the cooled suction line and the piping was declared operable. Subsequently, at 1409 CDT a similar rejectable void was discovered in the other cooled suction line for HPSI pumps A and C. The piping was declared inoperable. The appropriate technical specification was entered. At 1447 CDT the void was cleared and the piping was declared operable. Due to the close proximity of these occurrences the station is conservatively reporting this as a safety system functional failure as it appears that both trains of HPSI cooled suction were inoperable at the same time. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Subsequent to making this event notification a detailed analysis of the event was performed by FAUSKE / Westinghouse Engineering. This evaluation determined the quantity of gas voiding in the piping, the duration of time the pump(s) would be subjected to gas voiding and potential effects on the piping support design loading. The hydraulic data was then reviewed by the HPSI pump manufacturer (Sulzer) to determine the effect on pump performance. Based on these evaluations, it has been determined that the HPSI pumps were not degraded, and that they were capable of performing their design basis function at all times and were operable. Therefore, this event does not meet the 10 CFR 50.72 reporting criteria and the notification is being retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Shannon). | |
| ENS 45822 | 8 April 2010 13:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Paging System Outage | At about 0830 CDT on 4/8/2010, it was discovered that the station paging system was not operating. Repair efforts were initiated. The Control Room and station personnel were notified of the pager outage. The automated callout system is available to notify the emergency response organization during the pager outage if needed. That pager system was returned to service at about 1005 CDT 4/8/10. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. | |
| ENS 45828 | 8 April 2010 21:22:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown | Technical Specification Required Shutdown Due to Inoperable Steam Generator Inlet Isolation Valve | At 1622 hours CDT, an electrical ground on 480 Volt Bus 1B3A was determined to be from a supply cable to Motor Control Center (MCC)-3A1. Isolating loads on this MCC required securing power to HCV-1385, Steam Generator RC-2B Inlet Isolation Valve. This condition results in the valve being unable to close on a Steam Generator Isolation Signal (SGIS), which requires entry into Technical Specification 2.0.1(1). This Technical Specification requires the plant to be placed in a Hot Shutdown condition within 6 hours. A plant shutdown to Mode 3 was commenced at 1740 hours CDT. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
At 2123 hours CDT, the Reactor was manually tripped from 22% Reactor Power in order to meet the requirements of Technical Specification 2.0.1(1) and have the reactor in a hot shutdown condition. All systems functioned properly. At 2124 CDT, the plant entered Mode 3 Shutdown Condition. AT 2235 CDT, HCV-1385, Steam Generator RC-2B Inlet Isolation Valve has been manually closed. Technical Specification 2.0.1(1) has been exited. The licensee is reporting the manual scram under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 45849 | 17 April 2010 01:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Inoperable Due to Hvac Failure | At 2030 CDT (on 4/16/10), the Technical Support Center ventilation system was found not running. The cause for the failure of the Technical Support Center ventilation system is not known at this time. This condition renders the Technical Support Center unavailable for emergency planning responses. Alternate facilities are available. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
As of April 17, 2010 at 12:00 CDT, the Technical Support Center is once again available for Emergency Planning Responses. The cause of the failure was a broken belt on the TSC Air Handling Unit. This belt has been replaced. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Spitzberg). | |
| ENS 45898 | 4 May 2010 20:12:00 | Other Unspec Reqmnt | Discovery of After-The- Fact Emergency Condition - Unusual Event Due to Rcs Lineup | On 5/4/2010 at 15:12 CDT when attempting to flush CH-1A charging pump, a loss of charging flow occurred. CH-193 discharge valve for CH-1A charging pump was found to be open. This resulted in a flow path to the auxiliary building sump tank when CH-356 charging pump CH-1A discharge drain valve to waste disposal system was opened. This resulted in an approximately 38 gpm leak from the reactor coolant system via letdown to waste. This leak was isolated within 1 minute. The site entered and exited the conditions for NOUE before the shift manager was able to make an E-plan call. There are currently no emergency conditions on site and an NOUE was never declared. The reactor continued to operate at 100% power throughout the event. The cause of this event is believed to be a valve line-up error. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The site plans to notify the State of Nebraska. No other notifications are planned.
The declaration of Unusual Event SU 5 EAL 2, RCS leakage, on 5/4/10 is being retracted, because the declaration was inaccurate. The leak was an intersystem leak of the CVCS, not RCS leakage, and the leak was isolated as previously noted. Therefore, the leakage did not meet the initiating condition for the EAL. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and plans to notify the State of Nebraska. Notified R4DO (Farnholtz), NRR EO (Quay), and IRD (McDermott). | |
| ENS 45924 | 13 May 2010 18:32:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification | At 1332 CDT, FCS (Fort Calhoun Station) control room received notification that a person inside the Protected Area appeared to be having a heart attack. EMTs were immediately paged/dispatched and the victim was transported offsite for emergency medical treatment via helicopter. At 1415 CDT, FCS control room received notification that another person suffered a severe hand laceration due to the closing of a security gate. Again, EMTs were immediately paged/dispatched and the victim was transported offsite for emergency medical treatment via ambulance. Neither of these individuals were radioactively contaminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector | |
| ENS 46254 | 15 September 2010 22:40:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Both Containment Hydrogen Analyzers Out of Service Due to Failed Surveillances | At 1740 CDT, VA-81A, Hydrogen Analyzer Panel, was declared not functional due to failing surveillance test OP-ST-VA-0006, Containment Hydrogen Monitor Monthly Check. VA-81B, Hydrogen Analyzer Panel, was previously not functional due to performance of surveillance test IC-ST-VA-0033, 18 Month Channel Calibration of Containment Hydrogen Analyzer, VA-81B. This results in no Hydrogen Analyzers being available to monitor containment, which prevents being able to assess for potential loss of containment barrier for Emergency Action Level purposes via the containment hydrogen greater than 3% method. USAR (Updated Safety Analysis Report) section 9.10.2.5 allows for both Hydrogen Analyzers to be out of service for up to 72 hours. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Fort Calhoun Station had previously reported that the loss of both hydrogen monitors on September 15, 2010, constituted a major loss of emergency response assessment capability. Additional investigation has determined that other methods of assessment were available that would have provided sufficient indication to make the proper emergency classification. Therefore, this event is being retracted. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notification was sent to R4DO (Thomas Farnholtz). | |
| ENS 46297 | 30 September 2010 21:16:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | Unanalyzed Condition Due to Potential Flooding Via Condensate Drain Lines | USAR Section 2.7.1.2, River Stage and Flow, states flooding protection against the 1,014 foot flood in the auxiliary building is provided by removable flood barriers and sandbagging. When required, these flood barriers are installed in openings leading to safety related equipment on the 1,007 foot and 1,011 foot floor elevations. It has been identified that the condensation drains from the switchgear room's air handling units VA-87 and VA-88 (located in the auxiliary building), and the upper electrical penetration room's air handling units VA-85 and VA-86 (located in the auxiliary building), have no isolation valves or check valves to prevent backflow from the drain line's discharge in the turbine building basement. This means that flooding of the turbine building above approximately the 1011 foot elevation (floor level of the switchgear rooms) would result in water back-flowing via the drain lines into the switchgear rooms. River level is currently at the 999' 6" elevation and stable. Procedure changes are currently being developed to block the affected drain lines. River level has never reached the 1011 foot elevation at the facility. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
A further evaluation of the reported flooding issue determined that the flow into the switchgear rooms would be insufficient to affect the operability of safety related equipment in the auxiliary building; therefore, the incident could not have prevented fulfillment of a safety function nor could it have caused the inoperability of independent trains of safety related equipment. The situation does not constitute an unanalyzed condition. Therefore, this event is being retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (Powers). | |
| ENS 46324 | 11 October 2010 16:10:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Oos for Maintenance | This is an eight-hour report as required per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to maintenance which will result in the Fort Calhoun Station Technical Support Center (TSC) being degraded. On Monday, October 11th scheduled maintenance will commence on the TSC Air Handling unit that will render the unit non-functional. This maintenance is scheduled to be completed on Thursday, October 14th. Station procedures contain compensatory measures to ensure appropriate habitability monitoring and, if necessary, relocation of TSC personnel should the need exist to activate the emergency response organization. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
At 1519 CDT, the TSC Air Handling Unit was returned to service and is functional. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Haire). | |
| ENS 46368 | 27 October 2010 17:22:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown | Unit Commenced Shutdown After Declaring Containment Spray Inoperable | During pressure drop testing of the backup nitrogen supply for HCV-345 (Containment Spray Header isolation valve) the accumulator failed its test. This renders HCV-345 inoperable. HCV-344 the opposite header isolation valve also has an air leak that appears to be of similar magnitude to the leak on HCV-345. Fort Calhoun Station is conservatively considering both valves inoperable and has entered technical specification 2.0.1 which requires shutting the plant down to hot standby within 6 hours. The plant shutdown began at 1513 CDT. Repair efforts are underway on HCV-345 and HCV-344. The leakage on both valves was identified by systems engineering during testing. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
At 1647 CDT, the licensee exited technical specification 2.0.1 after declaring HCV-344 operable. The Unit is currently at 74% power. The licensee will stabilize power at 70% and then commence power escalation. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Proulx).
Following the original notification, the Fort Calhoun Station reviewed and reanalyzed the acceptance criteria for the subject valve air accumulators. The analysis determined that the valves had been and were operable during the event. Therefore, the report under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) is being retracted. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4D0 (Howell). | |
| ENS 46490 | 19 December 2010 06:08:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Quickly Concluded Notice of Unusual Event Due to a Loss of Communications | At 2355 CST, on 12/18/2010, the Control Room was notified by security of the inability of offsite personnel to call into the plant. (At) 0008 CST, on 12/19/2010, the control room verified that the ENS Phone, Conference Operation Network (COP), Security Building, Training Center, and Blair Phone Lines were not functional. At 0011 CST, a Notice of Unusual Event (NOUE) was declared per IC SU6 EAL 2. This also meets the criteria for a Major Loss of Communications Capability under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 0028 CST, the control room was notified by security that Huntel Communications was attempting to correct the communications issue. At 0030 CST, the COP phone was restored. At 0046 CST, the ENS phone was verified to be functional. At 0050 (CST), the criteria to exit the NOUE (was met) and the event was terminated. At 0059 (CST), the NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified. The state and local agencies were notified. The NRC Operations Center conducted a satisfactory test of the ENS line. | |
| ENS 46506 | 23 December 2010 16:50:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Uncomplicated Reactor Trip from 100% Power | At 1050 CST on 12/23/2010, Fort Calhoun Station experienced a reactor trip due to an unknown cause. No abnormal indications were present at the time of the trip. (Procedure) "EOP-00, Standard Post Trip Actions, was performed. At 1054 CST, transitioned to (procedure) EOP-01, Reactor Trip Recovery. All Safety Functions of EOP-01 are being satisfied. At 1207 CST, 345KV Backfeed was established to all 4160V buses. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3, and the station continues efforts to determine the cause of the reactor trip. All tripable control rods fully inserted during the reactor trip. No PORVs or safety valves lifted. The steam generators are being fed from the Main Feed Pumps and decay heat is being removed to the main condenser. No Emergency Safety Features actuated during the trip except for the reactor trip. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 46518 | 3 January 2011 15:59:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Supervisor Fails Random Fitness for Duty Check | A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol on a random fitness-for-duty test. The individual did not and does not have access to the protected area. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. | |
| ENS 46590 | 27 January 2011 22:23:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | Unsealed Penetrations Discovered in the Intake Structure | During a walkdown of the Intake Structure conducted on January 27, 2011, to identify any penetrations in the exterior envelope of the building, four unsealed conduit penetrations (each penetration was four inches in diameter) were identified. These penetrations are concealed within a junction box on the northwest corner of the building. The penetrations are at an elevation of approximately 1006 ft. - 1007 ft. mean sea level (MSL). Flooding through the penetrations could have impacted the ability of all the station raw water pumps to perform their design accident mitigation functions. This eight-hour notification is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v). This report should have been made on January 27, 2011, and is late. Subsequent review of the issue determined this reportability. The river level has been less than 990 ft MSL since January 27, 2011. There have not been any indications of conditions that might result in a flood. The penetrations have been temporarily plugged. A permanent modification is in progress. The penetrations were plugged on February 2, 2011. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 46594 | 9 September 2009 14:02:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | Unsealed Penetrations Discovered in the Intake Structure | On September 9, 2009, the NRC Component Design Basis Inspection (CDBI) Team identified Fire Protection penetrations on the west side of the Intake Structure were not sealed and it has been determined that the penetrations were below the USAR (Updated Safety Analysis Report) credited flood level. Flooding through the penetrations could have impacted the ability of all the station Raw Water Pumps to perform their design accident mitigation functions. Reference Fort Calhoun Station Condition Report 2009-4166. This eight-hour notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v). This report should have been made on September 9, 2009, and is late. Subsequent review of the issue determined this reportability. The penetrations have since been sealed. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. See EN #46590 dated 2/3/2011 for a similar event at Fort Calhoun. | |
| ENS 46595 | 6 February 2011 04:17:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat | Both Trains of Auxiliary Feed Water Disabled | On February 5, 2011, both trains of the Auxiliary Feed Water system were disabled while transitioning from Auxiliary Feed Water to Main Feed Water during plant start up. While performing OI-AFW-4 attachment 3, FW-6 Electric Driven AFW Pump Operations, both Steam Generator Auxiliary Feed Water inlet valves (HCV-1107A and HCV-1108A) control switches were placed in 'CLOSE'. This action defeated the Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal (AFAS) ability to open the valves, rendering both trains of Auxiliary Feed Water to the Steam Generators inoperable. The condition was subsequently recognized and the control switches were placed in 'AUTO' restoring both trains to operable. The duration of the condition was 3 minutes from start to finish. Reference Fort Calhoun Station Condition Report 2011-0839. This eight-hour notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 46642 | 19 February 2011 17:35:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Emergency Operations Facility (Eof) Without Power | Recently obtained information determined that on Saturday February 19, 2011, there was a power loss to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) at North Omaha. The power loss lasted from 1135 to 1220 CST. The EOF Building was without power for that time period. The backup generator did not start. There was an electrical line down in the area. While performing preventive maintenance on the EOF Generator on Wednesday February 23, 2011, the technician determined that the EOF generator would not function. Maintenance personnel were contacted to troubleshoot the generator problem. The battery was determined to be defective and was replaced. The EOF generator was tested satisfactory. The EOF is required to be activated within one hour when required. The emergency plan does have provisions for an alternate to the EOF if required. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 46674 | 15 March 2011 20:56:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | Flood Barrier Penetration Not Sealed | During investigations of flood barrier penetrations, a 4 inch conduit has been identified that is not sealed. This conduit penetrates the South wall of the auxiliary building near the transformers into room 19. Flooding through the penetrations could have impacted the ability of the station's auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps to perform their design accident mitigation functions. This eight-hour notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v). The penetration is at an elevation of 1007'-8". The river level has been less than 995 feet Mean Sea Level (MSL) since prior to December 1, 2010. The AFW pumps are operable. There are not any indications of conditions that might result in a flood. Actions are in progress to plug the penetration. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Further investigation has determined that the penetration is adequately sealed inside of the affected structure. Therefore this notification is being retracted. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Walker). | |
| ENS 46688 | 18 March 2011 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21 | Defective Kpr-14Dg-125 Relays Discovered During Bench Testing | The following event description is based on information currently available. The condition is reported under 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i). Part 21 Report - Potter Brumfield KRP-14DG-125 Relays, supplied by Southern Testing Services (STS) division of Argo Turboserve Corporation (ATC). On March 17, 2011, during bench testing of the KRP-14DG-125 Relays, Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) discovered that some of these relays were defective in that one of the contacts would not close properly after energizing and de-energizing the relay coils. If installed in the plant, the improper closure of this contact could defeat the safety function of the relays that provide a signal to the component supported by that contact. This deviation from the design specifications is reportable per 10 CFR 21. FCS does not have any of the affected relays installed in the plant. FCS returned the batch of relays to the vendor for further failure modes and effects evaluation and reporting. FCS has not provided any of these relays from our stock to any other licensee. The vendor and the (NRC) Resident Inspector have been notified. | |
| ENS 46689 | 22 March 2011 15:58:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | Containment Coolers Declared Inoperable | At 10:58 CDT, today during the performance of IC-ST-IA-3010B, I&C found NG-HCV-400A-A3, CCW INLET VALVE HCV-400A NITROGEN SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE, closed which is required to remain open for VA-3A to remain operable. This valve supplies backup nitrogen to VA-3A CCW cooler isolation valve HCV-400A on loss of instrument air to maintain cooling flow to the ventilation during an accident condition. While the nitrogen valve NG-HCV-400A-A3 was closed, performance of IC-ST-IA-3010B on VA-3B, CONTAINMENT AIR RECIR FAN, placed the containment cooler in an inoperable status. This led to Technical Specification 2.0.1 entry due to both trains of cooling being inoperable. The cause for the mispositioning of NG-HCV-400A-A3 is unknown at this time. The inoperability of VA-3A along with VA-3B rendered the containment cooling trains unavailable to perform their safety function during an accident condition. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(V)(D) for mitigating the consequences of an accident. FCS entered into Technical Specification at 10:58 CDT and exited Technical Specification at 11:14 CDT. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 46690 | 22 March 2011 18:08:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | Potential Flooding of Raw Water Pump | During ongoing investigations of flood barrier penetrations at the station, a weakness in the flood protection strategy that would prevent protection of the raw water pumps for floods above 1007'-6" Mean Sea Level (MSL) was discovered. Cell in-leakage through penetrations at 997' 10" MSL would be beyond the capacity of the raw water pumps. During the preparation of a calculation to demonstrate the validity of this method it was determined that the grid backwash pipe for each grid and the surface sluice penetrate the east wall of the intake structure through an unsealed penetration (a total of 7 penetrations). The grid backwash line is an 18" pipe passing through a 24" sleeve. Flooding through the penetrations could have impacted the ability of the station's raw water pumps to perform their design accident mitigation functions. This eight-hour notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v). The penetration is at an elevation of 997'10" MSL. The design flood for the station is at 1014' MSL. The raw water pumps would not be affected until a river level of 1007'6" MSL was reached. The river level is currently approximately 993.5' MSL and has been less than 995'MSL since prior to December 1, 2010. The raw water pumps are currently operable. The National Weather Service Weather Forecast Office is predicting a rise in river level of 2 feet over the next 5 days. Actions are in progress to seal the penetration. The licensee has instituted a temporary plug contingency plan dependant on river level. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 46714 | 30 March 2011 19:05:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Contraband Found Inside the Protected Area | While cleaning out portable toilets being used at the site, the waste disposal vendor employee discovered a two ounce (shot sized) liquor bottle in one of the units. The unit had been on-site since 2/25/11 and was staged in the Protected Area. The waste disposal vendor indicated that it is unlikely the bottle was in the portable toilet prior to delivery to the site. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 46716 | 1 April 2011 02:26:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | Identified Unsealed Flood Barrier Penetrations | During investigations of flood barrier penetrations, two approximately 4 inch conduits have been identified that are not sealed. These conduits penetrate the south wall of the auxiliary building near the transformers into room 19. Flooding through the penetrations could have impacted the ability of the station's auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps to perform their design accident mitigation functions. This eight-hour notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v). The penetrations are at an approximate elevation of 1007 (feet). The river level has been less than 997 feet Mean Sea Level (MSL) since prior to December 1, 2010. The AFW pumps are operable. There are not any indications of conditions that might result in a flood. Actions are in progress to plug the penetrations. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 46723 | 4 April 2011 20:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material | Scaffolding Affecting Safety Related Equipment | At 1500 (CDT), a concern was raised with regard to scaffolding that had been constructed around safety related equipment in the Auxiliary Building which contains both trains of safety injection and containment spray. As a result T.S. 2.0.1 was entered (which is the Fort Calhoun equivalent to standard T.S. 3.0.3). The scaffolding in question was removed and the equipment was returned to operable status and T.S. 2.0.1 was exited at 1726 (CDT). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Following the initial report, Fort Calhoun performed a seismic analysis of the impact of the scaffolding previously reported to determine if the equipment in the room would be capable of performing its required safety functions. The evaluation determined that the safety related function of the affected equipment would be able to be accomplished. Therefore, this event is being retracted. Notified R4DO (Haire). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector of this retraction. | |
| ENS 46741 | 8 April 2011 15:24:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | Unsealed Flood Barrier Penetration | During investigations of flood barrier penetrations, one approximately 4 inch conduit has been identified that is not sealed. Reducers are installed in the conduit on the exterior side. This conduit penetrates the auxiliary building into room 56. Flooding through the penetrations could have impacted the ability of the station's safety related equipment in the auxiliary building to perform their design accident mitigation functions. During investigations of flood barrier penetrations, a drain flow path from the CARP building into Room 23 of the Auxiliary Building (was identified). There is no specific procedural guidance to isolate this flow path in the event of a flood above 1007 feet. Flooding through this flow path could have impacted the ability of the station's safety related equipment to perform their design accident mitigation functions. This eight-hour notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D). The penetrations and CARP building drains are at an approximate elevation of 1007 feet. The river level has been less than 997 feet Mean Sea Level (MSL) since prior to December 1, 2010. The safety related equipment is currently operable. There are not any indications of conditions that might result in a flood. Compensatory actions have been identified. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 46742 | 8 April 2011 11:27:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Inoperable | Technical Support Center (TSC) was non-functional due to inability to maintain pressure boundary for function of the TSC HVAC system. This morning the latch to one of the doors to the TSC was discovered broken. The door would not latch shut. The station has repaired the door. Compensatory measures were in place for the nonfunctional facility. The TSC is now functional. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 46747 | 12 April 2011 14:15:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | Unsealed Flood Barrier Penetration | During investigations of flood barrier penetrations, a flood barrier sealing a diesel driven fire pump exhaust was found to be cracked. This exhaust pipe penetrates the west wall of the intake structure. Flooding through the penetration could have impacted the ability of the station's raw water pumps to perform their design accident mitigation functions. This eight-hour notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v). The penetration is at an approximate elevation of 1012 feet mean sea level (MSL). The river level has been less than 997 feet MSL since prior to December 1, 2010. The raw pumps are operable. There are not any indications of conditions that might result in a flood. Actions are in progress to plug the penetration. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
This event is being retracted. Additional review and evaluation determined that the seal flaw is above the station design flood level of 1014 feet mean sea level, and is therefore, not reportable. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (Hay). | |
| ENS 46795 | 27 April 2011 23:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Emergency Sirens Intermittently Inoperable Due to Upgrading | Fort Calhoun Station is improving (upgrading) the emergency siren system. This evening during the upgrade the sirens will be inoperable for a short period between 1830 and 2400 today. Fort Calhoun will inform the HOO when the sirens are returned to operation following this evenings maintenance. The licensee notified the states of Nebraska and Iowa and local authorities in both states of the siren outage.
The emergency siren system maintenance was complete and all sirens were restored to service at 0010 CDT on 4/28/11. The licensee notified the states and local authorities. Notified R4DO (Powers).
Fort Calhoun Station is improving (upgrading) the emergency siren system. Today during the upgrade, the sirens will be inoperable for a short period between 1130 CDT and 1210 CDT today. Fort Calhoun will inform the HOO when the sirens are returned to operation following this maintenance. Notified R4DO (Powers), State and local government.
The emergency siren system maintenance was complete and all sirens were restored to service at 1150 CDT on 4/28/11. The licensee notified the states and local authorities.
Continuing maintenance on the sirens determined that they are not responding correctly. Troubleshooting is in progress. There is not an estimated time to return the sirens to service at this time. Emergency planning personnel have been contacted and contingency actions are in place. The station will contact the HOO when the issue is resolved. Notified R4DO (Powers).
The emergency siren system maintenance was complete and all sirens were restored to service at 1529 CDT on 4/28/11. The licensee notified the states and local authorities. Notified R4DO (Powers).
Fort Calhoun Station is improving (upgrading) the emergency siren system. Today during the upgrade, the sirens are anticipated to be inoperable for an hour or two during the period between 0755 (CDT) and 1000 (CDT) today. The emergency planning staff has been informed and compensatory measures are in place. Fort Calhoun will inform the HOO when the sirens are returned to operation following this maintenance. The licensee notified the states and local authorities, as well as the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Powers).
The emergency siren system maintenance was complete and all sirens were restored to service at 1030 CDT on 4/29/11. The licensee notified the states and local authorities. Notified R4DO (Powers). | |
| ENS 46845 | 12 May 2011 13:15:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Contract Employee Admitted to Using Illegal Substance | A contract employee was questioned and admitted to using an illegal substance. The employee's access to the plant been suspended. Local law enforcement has custody of the individual. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. | |
| ENS 46875 | 24 May 2011 03:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Due to an Oil Spill | On May 23, 2011, at 2200 CDT, the station needed to notify the State of Nebraska, Department of Environmental Quality and the National Response Center due to an oil leak from the stations lube oil system. A quantity of oil spilled into the turbine building basement and an undetermined amount drained to the turbine building sump which discharges to the Missouri River. Some amount of oil was discharged to the river, which resulted in discoloration and a visible sheen noted on river sampling. Per Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit, the notifications will be made and samples will be taken for off site analysis to determine the quantity discharged involved. Also, the oil quantity in the turbine building sump (out fall L02) is expected to have exceeded 20 ppm oil and grease which does violate the State NPDES permit NE00000418. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), 4 hour non-emergency notification due to a notifications being made to Government (Agencies) (State of Nebraska, Department of Environmental Quality and the National Response Center). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 46893 | 26 May 2011 05:15:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | Potential Flooding Path Discovered | Operations identified a potential flooding issue in the Intake Structure 1007' 6" level. The areas of concern are the holes in the floor at the 1007' 6" level where the screen wash header penetrates the ceiling of the Raw Water Vault. There are five of these penetrations of concern. Flooding through the penetrations could have impacted the ability of the station's Raw Water (RW) pumps to perform their design accident mitigation functions. This eight-hour notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v). A one foot sandbag berm has been placed around each penetration of concern. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Following additional review of the reported condition, it has been determined that the Raw Water pumps are adequately protected during flooding conditions and that the open penetrations would not impact the ability of the Raw Water pumps to perform their design accident mitigation functions. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Haire). | |
| ENS 46929 | 6 June 2011 13:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Unusual Event Declared Due to River Level | At 0800 CDT a Notification of Unusual Event (HU 1, EAL 5) for operating mode less than 210 degrees F is being declared for a river level expected to exceed a 1004' MSL (Mean Sea Level), but less than or equal to 1009' MSL elevation. Currently Abnormal Operating Procedure AOP-1 is being implemented for high river level, as well as, PE-RR-AE-1001 for Flood Barrier and Sandbag Staging and Installation. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i) for declaration of an emergency class specified in the licensee's approved emergency plan. Applicable governmental agencies have been notified per plant procedures. No press release is expected at this time. * * * UPDATE FROM ERICK MATZKE TO PETE SNYDER AT 1121 EDT ON 6/6/2011 * * * During the emergency notification the automated paging function did not cause the pagers to actuate. The issue is being investigated." A notification for 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) be added to the header. Notified R4DO (Whitten).
OPPD will be making a press release for this event at about 1220 CDT. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Whitten) and HQPAO (Brenner).
At 1342 CDT on 08/29/11, FCS (Fort Calhoun Station) terminated the Notification of Unusual Event for flooding. Missouri river level receded to less than entry criteria and is currently 1003.56 ft MSL. The licensee has notified the State of Nebraska, Harrison County, Washington County, and Pottawattamie County of the termination. Notified R4DO (Proulx), IRD (Marshall), NRR (Thorp), DHS (Rickerson), and FEMA (Dennis). | |
| ENS 46932 | 7 June 2011 14:40:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration | Fire in the West Switchgear Room | At 0940 CDT an alert (HA 2, EAL 1) for operating Mode less than 210 degrees F (was) declared for a fire affecting the operability of plant safety systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown. Time of fire was 0930 CDT. Control room received multiple alarms (and) 480 V bus 1B4A amps were observed to be oscillating. Bus 1B4A was secured (and) buses 1B3A and 1B3A-4A were lost. Halon activated properly. (At) 0956 CDT all notifications to applicable personnel were completed. At 1000 CDT 4160v buses 1A2 / 1A4 were secured to facilitate fire fighting. Spent fuel pool cooling was lost (as a result of the de-energized busses and the licensee) entered AOP-36 for loss of SFP cooling. Heat up rate (was) determined by STA. Current time to boil for SFP is 88.3 hrs. Spent fuel pool cooling is currently back in service. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i) for declaration of an emergency class specified in the licensee's approved emergency plan. Plant was in AOP-1 for flood mitigation. The fire is not believed to be flood related. Plant remains in AOP-1. At about 0930 CDT the licensee noted fire in the west switchgear room. The fire brigade responded and found a room filled with smoke but no active fire. Halon did discharge in the room. At 0956 CDT, offsite assistance was called and Blair Fire Department responded to the site. Blair Fire Department confirmed no active fire in the switchgear room. All offsite power remained available as well as the emergency diesel generators if needed. The licensee is currently attempting to ventilate the room. A thorough inspection of the affected area and determine the caused of the electrical fault will be facilitated once the room has been fully ventilated. The licensee has notified appropriate State and local government. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. A media or press release is also anticipated.
Entered Alert for HA 3, EAL 1 access to a vital area (Switchgear and Turbine Building basement) due to toxic gases present from the fire in the West Switchgear room. The licensee entered HA 3 at 1144 CDT. Their exit criteria is that the switchgear room is cleared for unimpeded access. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4IRC (Kennedy)
At 1315 CDT, Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station has exited Alert HA 2, EAL. It has been confirmed that no fire remained in the vital area. Plant shutdown cooling remained in-service and spent fuel pool cooling was restored and temperature verified to be lowering. The licensee has also exited Alert HA 3, EAL 1 after it was confirmed that the environmental conditions from the event and associated Halon discharge does not affect the ability to safely operate or safely shutdown the reactor due to being in Mode 5 and shutdown cooling remaining in-service. Fort Calhoun remains in Unusual Event HU 1, EAL 5 for River Level greater than 1004' elevation as reported under EN #46929. The licensee has notified appropriate State and local government. The licensee has also notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The NRC made notifications of the event termination to DHS, FEMA, DOE HHS and USDA. | |
| ENS 46953 | 13 June 2011 17:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Due to Sewage System Release | At 0500 CDT, the lift station #4 sewage system, South of the Fort Calhoun Station Administration building, was released to the Missouri River. The release was a mixture of ground water and sewage; samples were taken by chemistry but dilution concentration is unknown. Approximately 105 gpm release started around 0500 on 6/13/2011. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for an event related to the protection of the environment for which a notification of governmental agencies is required. Applicable governmental agencies have been notified per plant procedures. The licensee notified the State of Nebraska at 1200 CDT. The licensee also notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 46965 | 16 June 2011 17:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | Additional Penetration Identified for Mitigation During Walkdown | Operations identified a potential flooding issue in the Intake Structure 1007 ft. 6 in. level. The area of concern is a the hole in the floor at the 1007 ft. 6 in. level where the relief valve from FP-1A discharge pipe goes through the raw pump bay and discharges into the intake cell. There is one penetration of concern. Flooding through this penetration could have impacted the ability of the station's Raw Water (RW) pumps to perform their design accident mitigation functions. Efforts are in progress to seal the penetration. This eight-hour notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The penetration in question is not an external penetration and is not within the scope of the CLB (Current Licensing Basis) and therefore the condition is not reportable. The penetration is internal to the intake structure and does not affect internal flooding. The failure to retract this notification in a timely fashion was identified while reviewing flood related station notifications from 2011 and has been entered into the corrective action system. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Werner). |