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Entered date | Event description | |
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ENS 44218 | 16 May 2008 09:17:00 | Below are the responses to questions BWXT received from (deleted) the News & Advance of Lynchburg, VA, regarding NRC Inspection Report No. 70-27/2008-001 and Notice of Violation: Q: Is Babcock & Wilcox contesting the notice of violation? A: B&W has 30 days from the notice of the violation, which was issued on April 21, to contest it. A decision has not been made. Q: Other than losing 'personal effects' and undergoing first aid, has the splashed employee experienced any other consequences from the splashing? A: We do not comment on the health status of employees. Q: What happens next in this citation procedure with the NRC? A: B&W will make the decision to contest the notice or accept the violation. No fine has been charged to the facility. Corrective actions were implemented immediately following this event. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 44270 | 5 June 2008 11:53:00 | Below are the responses to questions BWXT received from (a reporter) at the News & Advance of Lynchburg, VA, regarding the closure of the Barnwell Facility in South Carolina. Q: I understand that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has announced new guidelines for the storage of low-level radioactive material since the disposal site in Barnwell, S.C. plans to close. Does B&W ever use the Barnwell Facility for any disposal needs, or will that facility's closure affect B&W operations here in any way? If so, I'd like to discuss those potential effects and perhaps write an article about the issue. A: Annually, the B&W Lynchburg facility generates approximately 15 to 20 cubic feet of Class B and C waste, which was disposed of at the Barnwell site in South Carolina. However, the Lynchburg facility has not been significantly impacted by Barnwell's closure. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 45805 | 1 April 2010 15:12:00 | On March 29, 2010, Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) was notified that a UT Smart Crane had failed its functional test. The Smart Crane is an active engineered control that prevents simultaneous immersion in water of two fuel bearing components of concern in an Ultrasonic Testing (UT) tank. Earlier in the morning the crane tripped into fault mode while being moved to a storage position; there was no fuel bearing component attached to the crane at the time. Plant Maintenance personnel reset the crane's PLC (Programmable Logic Controller) and the required functional tests were performed per procedure prior to returning the crane to service. When the functional test was performed on Tank #3, the crane failed the test. Tank #3 was loaded with a component of concern (> 500 lbs) and the crane failed to prevent movement of a test weight into the tank's exclusion zone. The Smart Crane should have recognized Tank #3 as loaded and should have stopped the test weights at the edge of the tank's exclusion zone. The crane's PLC was subsequently checked and it was determined that it did not indicate Tank# 3 as loaded with a component of concern. The PLC was manually set to identify Tank #3 as loaded with a component of concern and testing resumed. The crane then failed a test on Tank #1. The UT tank did not contain a component of concern (i.e., it weighed < 500 lbs). As such, the operator using the crane should have been able to transfer the test weights into tank's exclusion zone, but the crane's safety interlock stopped the weights at the zone boundary. Initially, these failures were thought to be caused by errors in conducting earlier tests. If the weights are inadvertently released from the crane within the exclusion zone at the conclusion of a test, the tank status (loaded/unloaded) can be affected. As a result of an earlier corrective action, forklift barriers had been erected to limit the free space around the tanks. It was anticipated that these barriers were possibly interfering with the movement of the weights in/out of the exclusion zone during test. Tank #1 was reset and all tanks successfully passed the required functional test. Since a definite cause could not be determined but the crane passed the functional test and operations continued. The operators were requested to log the status of the Smart Crane indicating lights as the crane moved from tank to tank. On the night of March 30, 2010, the indicating lights did not provide the correct indication of tank loaded/unloaded status. The operation was immediately shutdown and NCS was notified. On March 31, 2010, Plant Maintenance determined the crane's linear encoder was damaged and not accurately tracking the crane's position. This failure mode allowed the crane to move, but gave a false indication of crane position to the PLC. This type of failure did not provide the PLC with accurate data to determine the crane's position. In this state, the Smart Crane would not prevent an operator from loading two items of concern in a single tank. This is a failure of the Smart Crane as an IROFS. This determination was reached at 1530 EDT on March 31, 2010. There was no immediate risk of a criticality or threat to the safety of workers or the public as a result of this event. An operator never attempted to load two components of concern into a UT tank. However, with inaccurate position information, the Smart Crane could not be credited as an IROFS and double contingency could no longer be assured. A criticality was no longer highly unlikely. Babcock & Wilcox Nuclear Operations Group, Inc. is making this 24 hour report in accordance with 10CFR70, Appendix A(b)(2) - Loss or degradation of items relied on for safety that result in failure to meet the performance requirement of 70.61. An investigation of this event is ongoing. Corrective actions will be determined as a result of the investigation. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 47712 | 1 March 2012 12:12:00 | Evaluation of LTC (Lynchburg Technology Center) AmBe Shipment issues for 03/01/12 receipt. The conditions for reporting under the requirements of 10 CFR 20 1906(d) have been met. QWI 14.1.10 Classification & Notification Criteria for Unusual Incidents Radiation Protection section - for shipments, bases reporting requirements on receipt of a shipment with radiation or contamination levels in excess of 10 CFR 20.1906(d). This requirement was exceeded and an NRC report is required. The truck cab sleeping area (normally occupied space) dose rate of 3.4 mRem/hr is greater than the allowable limit of 2.0 mRem/hr. The private carrier personnel state that they do not have dosimetry. Immediate Actions Taken: Digital photographs have been taken, confirmatory surveys (with other instruments) were taken, additional spot surveys were taken, the shipper has been notified, and an evaluation of the regulations has been made. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 49231 | 1 August 2013 12:00:00 | The conditions for reporting under the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1906(d) have been met. QWI 14.1.10, Classification & Notification Criteria for Unusual Incidents Radiation Protection section - for shipments, bases reporting requirements on receipt of a shipment with radiation or contamination levels in excess of 10 CFR 20.1906(d). This requirement was exceeded and an NRC report is required. The truck cab sleeping area (normally occupied space) dose rate of 5.4 mrem/hr is greater than the allowable limit of 2.0 mrem/hr. The carrier drivers (2) state that they do not have dosimetry. Immediate actions that have been taken: - The area was secured. - Confirmatory measurements were taken. - Digital photographs have been taken. - The shipper has been notified. - A review of the associated regulations was performed. - The carrier has been notified. - The truck has been unloaded and released. The shipment contained Am241/Be sources sent from QSA Global in Burlington, MA for use in refurbishing sources, typically well-logging. The estimated departure time/date was 0800 EDT on 07/31/13 with estimated arrival time/date of 0800 EDT on 08/01/13. The driver team consisted of two (2) individuals during the 24-hour transit time. The shipment was off-loaded and secured following the receipt rad survey. The licensee notified the shipper, the carrier, the Commonwealth of Virginia and informed the NRC Resident Inspector. * * * RETRACTION FROM TONY ENGLAND TO PETE SNYDER AT 1702 EDT ON 8/5/13 * * * This event has been reported to the Commonwealth of Virginia under Event Number VA-13-04. The material involved in this event is regulated under Commonwealth of Virginia License. Notified R2DO (King), R1DO (Trapp), FSME Event Resource (email), and FUELS OUO (email). |
ENS 49258 | 9 August 2013 16:20:00 | EVENT DESCRIPTION: At B&W's NOG-L (Nuclear Operations Group - Lynchburg) facilities, scrap and waste material is generated during fuel bearing operations. Certain streams are collected in favorable volume less than or equal to 2.5 liter containers and eventually transferred to the Drum Count Area for U-235 assay. Because the U-235 content of such containers is not known until they have been assayed, they are referred to as 'unknowns' and are subject to a bulk weight limit. These containers are limited to a maximum of 7,000 grams net weight (approximately 15 pounds). The unknowns are stored on designated less than or equal to 2.5 liter container storage racks. The construction of the storage racks controls the spacing between storage locations and the distance from the floor. The racks' materials of construction are credited as a fixed neutron poison. Some of the unknown racks are fitted with an additional poison plate which allows the rack-to-rack spacing to be reduced. On August 9, 2013, at approximately 1:00 p.m., a contract Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) engineer working with B&W's NCS staff identified a safety concern. While working to consolidate information in several Safety Analysis Reports, it was determined that the poisoned less than or equal to 2.5 liter storage racks fitted with a horizontal poison plate were improperly analyzed. EVALUATION OF THE EVENT: The NCS evaluation of the poisoned less than or equal to 2.5 liter storage racks fitted with a horizontal poison plate was completed in October of 2000. The analysis was based on an evaluation of a poisoned transport cart completed earlier the same year. However, a review by the B&W NCS staff indicated the conclusions of this earlier analysis were not properly applied to the analysis of the poisoned less than or equal to 2.5 liter storage racks fitted with a horizontal poison plate. The racks were improperly analyzed. The requirement of 10 CFR 70.61 (d) states in part: '...the risk of nuclear criticality accidents must be limited by assuring that under normal and credible abnormal conditions, all nuclear processes are subcritical, including use of an approved margin of subcriticality for safety.' Further evaluation of the poisoned less than or equal to 2.5 liter storage racks fitted with a horizontal poison plate indicated that under optimal moderation the keff exceeds the safety limit of 0.95 in NRC License SNM-42. Therefore the performance requirement of 10 CFR 70.61 (d) was not maintained. NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: B&W is making this 24 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 70, Appendix A, (b)(1) - 'Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of 70.61.' There was no immediate risk of a criticality or threat to the safety of workers or the public as a result of this event. A portion of the storage locations in the poisoned less than or equal to 2.5 liter storage racks fitted with a horizontal poison plate were removed from service. This action was taken to restore compliance with the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61. STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: An investigation of the root causes of this event is ongoing. Corrective actions will be determined as a result of the investigation. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 50776 | 28 January 2015 16:22:00 | I. EVENT DESCRIPTION Scrap material resulting from various operations at B&W NOG-L's facilities is processed in the Low Level Dissolver (LLD) to reclaim as much of the uranium as possible. Since the material is scrap (e.g., filters, vacuum cleaner bags, etc.), it contains only small amounts of uranium bearing materials. On occasion during processing a slight amount of material will spill over the edge of the dissolver trays, filter bowls, or when hand-transferring material between the trays and filter bowls. These small spills collect on a large catch tray in the bottom of the enclosure. Periodically the catch tray is cleaned to limit the amount of material buildup. By procedure the solid material is to be scraped up and collected in a (less than or equal to) 2.5 liter container. During the cleanout the LLD process is shutdown. On January 9, 2015, the LLD process was shutdown and the enclosure was undergoing a routine cleanout. However on this occasion the operators scraped the material on the tray into several piles for subsequent collection into containers. The volume of most of the piles exceeded the 2.5 liter limit. However, the spacing between the piles was greater than the 15 inch limit, and the net weight of any single pile was less than the 7 kg limit for a 2.5 liter volume containing an unknown amount of U-235 . NDA (Non-Destructive Assay) measurements later determined the U-235 content of the piles ranged from 6.5 to 20.8 grams. There was no risk of a criticality accident. The accident scenarios for (less than or equal to) 2.5 liter containers of an unknown amount of U-235 were reviewed to analyze the event. At that point in time it was concluded the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 were maintained. At 0900 EST on January 28, 2015, during discussion with the NRC as part of a regularly scheduled NCS inspection the applicability of these scenarios to the event came into question. The scenarios assume the material is containerized rather than in piles. Some of the IROFS (item relied on for safety) were therefore considered not available in this particular situation. II. EVALUATION OF THE EVENT The cleanup process as analyzed assumed the material was scraped up and collected in (less than or equal to) 2.5 liter containers. The scraping of the material into piles for subsequent collection into containers is a different process than what had been analyzed. The scenarios for the handling of materials containing an unknown amount of U-235 assume the material is containerized rather than in piles. Some of the IROFS credited in these scenarios were therefore not available for the collection of the material in piles. Although the as-found condition presented no safety concern, the scenarios as documented in the ISA (Integrated Safety Analysis) did not demonstrate the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 were maintained. There was no immediate risk of a criticality or threat to the safety of workers or the public as a result of this event. Ill. NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS B&W is making this 24 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 70, Appendix A, (b)(1) - Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of 70.61. IV. STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS An investigation of the root causes of this event is ongoing. Corrective actions will be determined as a result of the investigation. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
I. EVENT DESCRIPTION On January 28, 2015 B&W NOG-L notified the NRC of an unanalyzed condition that occurred during the cleanup of residual solids from the Uranium Recovery Low Level Dissolver that failed to meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61. As part of the subsequent investigation of the event an Extent of Condition Review was performed. During the Extent of Condition Review of cleanup of residual solids from the High Level Dissolver, a similar potential condition was identified at 10:00 a.m. EST on February 10, 2015. A cleanup activity was not in process at the time of discovery. II. EVALUATION OF THE EVENT The Uranium Recovery High Level Dissolvers process scrap fuel materials. Undissolved residual solids collect in the Dissolvers' recirculation columns over time. These solids contain some amounts of U-235 that did not go into solution. The Dissolvers periodically undergo cleanup operations during inventory or contract changes. During this cleanout a small amount of solids are emptied from the horizontal recirculation columns onto drip pans and then transferred to a favorable volume less than or equal to 2.5 liter container. Although a cleanup was not in process at the time of the Extent of Condition Review, it could not be readily determined that the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 would be met if a cleanup operation were to be performed. There was no immediate risk of a criticality or threat to the safety of workers or the public. No actual event occurred. Ill. NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS B&W is revising Event Report #50776 dated January 28, 2015. A potentially unanalyzed condition was identified that could not be demonstrated as meeting the performance requirements. B&W is making this 24 hr. report in accordance with 10 CFR 70, Appendix A, (b)(1) - Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of 70.61. IV. STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS An investigation of the root causes of this event is ongoing. Corrective actions will be determined as a result of the investigation. No cleanouts of the High Level Dissolvers' recirculation columns will occur until it can be demonstrated the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 are met for this maintenance task. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Nease), NMSS EO (Rahimi), Fuels Group, and NMSS Events Notification via email.
On February 11, 2015 Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) revised Event Report #50776 dated January 28, 2015. An Extent of Condition Review identified an unanalyzed condition associated with the cleanout of a High Level Dissolver (HLD) recirculation column. Although a cleanup was not in process at the time, it could not be readily determined that the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 would be met if a cleanup operation were to be performed. There was no immediate risk of a criticality or threat to the safety of workers or the public. B&W amended the initial Event Report in accordance with 10 CFR 70, Appendix A, (b)(1) - Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of 70.61. The HLDs process scrap fuel materials. Undissolved residual solids collect in the Dissolvers' recirculation columns over time. These solids contain some amount of U-235 that does not go into solution. The Dissolvers periodically undergo cleanup operations during inventory or contract changes. During this cleanout a small amount of solids are emptied from the horizontal recirculation columns onto drip pans and then transferred to a favorable volume less than or equal to a 2.5 liter container. Further evaluation has determined that a criticality resulting from the cleanout of a recirculation column is not credible. This determination was made utilizing the guidance found in NUREG 15-20 which defines 'not credible' in part as: 'A process deviation that consists of a sequence of many unlikely human actions or errors in which there is no reason or motive... ' or 'Process deviations for which there is a convincing argument, given physical laws, that they are not possible, or any unquestionably extremely unlikely... ' The inherent design and process intent of the trough dissolvers, the nature of the chemical reactions involved, and the number of unlikely human errors that would have to occur to accumulate a sufficient amount of fuel and have it collect with a low enough packing fraction and entrained water, combine to make a criticality on the drip pans not credible. Although the facility was in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, a criticality was not credible. Therefore, B&W is correcting Event Notification #50776 in accordance with 10 CFR 70.74(a)(4) and withdrawing the 10 CFR 70, Appendix A, (b)(1) notification of February 11, 2015. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Shaeffer), NMSS EO (Araguas) and FUELS OUO Group (email). |