RIS 2007-14, Fingerprinting Requirements for Licensees Implementing the Increased Control Order
| ML071500056 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/05/2007 |
| From: | Schlueter J NRC/FSME/DMSSA |
| To: | |
| References | |
| SRM-SECY-07-0011 RIS-07-014 | |
| Download: ML071500056 (10) | |
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF FEDERAL AND STATE MATERIALS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 June 5, 2007 NRC REGULATORY ISSUE SUMMARY 2007-14 FINGERPRINTING REQUIREMENTS FOR LICENSEES
IMPLEMENTING THE INCREASED CONTROL ORDER
ADDRESSEES
All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensees that have received the Increased Controls (IC) requirements. All Agreement St ate Radiation Control Program Directors and State Liaison Officers.
INTENT
The NRC is issuing this regulatory issue summary (RIS) to inform addressees that in Fall 2007, the NRC will issue additional Orders to licensees that have received the IC requirements. The
Orders will require fingerprinting and a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) identification and criminal history records check for individuals that have or will have unescorted access to radioactive material in quantities of concern. No specific action or written response is required at this time.
Agreement States will be taking similar actions through the issuance of Orders or other legally binding requirements to their IC licensees.
BACKGROUND
Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), several national and international efforts were underway to address the potentially significant health and safety
hazards posed by uncontrolled sources. Following 9/11, it was recognized that these efforts
should focus on efforts to deter unauthorized access to radioactive material for the purpose of
malicious acts.
In 2005, NRC and the Agreement States issued IC Orders or other legally binding requirements to licensees [70 Federal Register 72128, December 1, 2005]. The purpose of the ICs for
radioactive sources is to enhance control of certain radioactive material in quantities of concern
to reduce the risk of unauthorized use, in order to prevent unintended radiation exposure and to
prevent malicious acts that would be detrimental to public health and safety. Enclosure 1
identifies these radionuclides and their quantities of concern.
On March 12, 2007, the Commission directed staff to develop a plan to require fingerprinting for IC licensees under the NRC's authority to protect the public health and safety. Enclosure 2
contains Staff Requirements Memorandum SECY-07-0011, directing the development of
fingerprinting requirements.
IC 1 of the IC Orders requires each licensee ensure the safe handling, use, and control of material by controlling access at all times to radioactive material quantities of concern and by
limiting access to such materials to only approved individuals who require access to perform
their duties. Under the IC's, licensees approved individuals for unescorted access to
radioactive material quantities of concern using a trustworthiness and reliability review process.
As part of this process, licensees were required to document the basis for approving individuals
who required unescorted access to materials.
For individuals employed by the licensee for three y ears or less, IC 1.b. requires trustworthiness and reliability to be determined, at a minimum, by verifying employment history, education, and
personal references. For individuals employ ed by the licensee for longer than three years, trustworthiness and reliability is determined, at a minimum, by a review of the employees'
employment history with the licensee.
On August 8, 2005, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct) was enacted. Section 652 of the EPAct amended Section 149 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) to require fingerprinting and an
FBI identification and criminal history records check of any person who is permitted unescorted
access to radioactive materials subject to regulation by the Commission, and which the
Commission determines to be significant to the public health and safety as to warrant
fingerprinting and background checks.
SUMMARY OF ISSUE
In accordance with Section 149 of the AEA, as amended by the EPAct, the NRC and Agreement States will impose additional requirements for unescorted access to material in
quantities of concern, so that affected licensees can obtain and grant unescorted access to
radioactive materials. Orders or other legally binding requirements will be issued in the near future requiring that the results of an FBI criminal history records check, based on fingerprints, are used in conjunction with IC trustworthy and reliability criteria to make determinations for individuals granted unescorted access to radioactive materials in quantities of concern. All NRC
and Agreement State licensees that are requir ed to implement the IC requirements will be required to fingerprint and make a trustworthiness and reliability determination for individuals
granted unescorted access to radioactive material in quantities of concern.
A joint NRC and Agreement State working group has been formed to address issues associated with the implementation of the fingerprinting requirements of the EPAct for IC licensees. The
working group will be responsible for the development of a plan and implementing guidance for
the fingerprinting of IC licensees. It is anticipated that fingerprinting Orders or other legally
binding requirements will be issued in Fall 2007.
NRC and the Agreement States have recently issued a RIS to non-manufacturer and distributor (non-M&D) service providers. NRC and the Agreement States will offer the opportunity for non-
M&D service providers to receive an Order or other legally binding requirements imposing trustworthy and reliability and fingerprinting requirements that manufacturer and distributor (M&D) service provider licensees must current ly meet for unescorted access to radioactive material quantities of concern. IC 1.c. requires that all service providers be escorted unless
determined to be trustworthy and reliable by an NRC required background investigation as an
employee of a M&D licensee. Once a non-M&D service provider has rece ived and implemented all the trustworthy and reliability and fingerprint requirements, they may provide service without an escort at a IC
licensee's facility, if the IC licensee chooses to allow them to have unescorted access.
BACKFIT DISCUSSION
This RIS requires no action or written response. Any action on the part of addressees in accordance with the guidance contained in this RIS is strictly voluntary and, therefore, is not a
backfit under any regulatory requirement in 10 CFR. Consequently, the staff did not perform a
backfit analysis.
FEDERAL REGISTER
NOTIFICATION
A notice of opportunity for public comment on this RIS was not published in the Federal Register because this RIS is informational, and does not represent a departure from current regulatory
requirements.
PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT
This RIS contains information collection requirements that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These information collections were approved
by the Office of Management and B
udget (OMB), approval numbers 3150-0001;
3150-0007; 3150-0009; 3150-0010; 3150-0015; 3150-0016; 3150-0020; 3150-0029;
3150-0130; and 3150-0158.
PUBLIC PROTECTION NOTIFICATION
The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a
currently valid OMB control number.
CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT
This RIS is not a rule as designated by the Congressional Review Act (5 U.S.C. et seq.) and, therefore, is not subject to the Act.
RELATED GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS
RIS 2007-15, "Unescorted Access to Materials for Non-Manufacturer and Distributor Service Providers."
RIS 2007-07, "Clarification of Increased Controls for Licensees That Possess Collocated Radioactive Material During Transportation Activities."
CONTACT
This RIS requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questions, please contact the technical contact listed below or the appropriate regional office.
/RA/Janet R. Schlueter, Director Division of Materials Safety
and State Agreements
Office of Federal and State Materials
and Environmental Management Programs
Technical Contact:
Nima Ashkeboussi, FSME
(301) 415-7637
Email: naa@nrc.gov Enclosures:
1. Radionuclides of Concern
2. SRM-SECY-07-0011
3. List of Recently Issued Generic Communications
RELATED GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS
RIS 2007-15, "Unescorted Access to Materials for Non-Manufacturer and Distributor Service Providers."
RIS 2007-07, "Clarification of Increased Controls for Licensees That Possess Collocated Radioactive Material During Transportation Activities."
CONTACT
This RIS requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questions, please contact the technical contact listed below or the appropriate regional office.
/RA/
Janet R. Schlueter, Director Division of Materials Safety
and State Agreements
Office of Federal and State Materials
and Environmental Management Programs
Technical Contact:
Nima Ashkeboussi, FSME
(301) 415-7637
Email: naa@nrc.gov Enclosures:
1. Radionuclides of Concern
2. SRM-SECY-07-0011
3. List of Recently Issued Generic Communications OFCFSME:SSSBFSME:SSSBFSME:MSEA FSME:MSSA
NAMENAshkeboussiTHarrisAMcIntoshSMooreDATE 5 / 14
/07 5 / 15
/07 5 /15
/07 5/ 16 /07 OFC OGC-CRAOGC - NLOOISNSIR:DSP
NAMEDReddickTcampbell for JGoldbergMJanneyMShafferDATE 05 / 25
/07 05 / 17
/07 05 / 23
/07 05 / 23 /07 OFC FSME:MSSA NAME JSchlueterDATE 06 / 05
/07 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Enclosure 1 RADIONUCLIDES OF CONCERN
Radionuclide Quantity of Concern 1 (TBq) Quantity of Concern 2 (Ci ) Am-241 0.6 16 Am-241/Be 0.6 16 Cf-252 0.2 5.4 Cm-244 0.5 14 Co-60 0.3 8.1 Cs-137 1 27 Gd-153 10 270 Ir-192 0.8 22 Pm-147 400 11,000 Pu-238 0.6 16 Pu-239/Be 0.6 16 Se-75 2 54 Sr-90 (Y-90) 10 270 Tm-170 200 5,400 Yb-169 3 81 Combinations of radioactive materials listed above
3 See Footnote Below 4 1 The aggregate activity of multiple, collocated sources of the same radionuclide should be included whenthe total activity equals or exceeds the quantity of concern.
2 The primary values used for compliance with this Order are TBq. The curie (Ci) values are rounded totwo significant figures for informational purposes only.
3 Radioactive materials are to be considered aggregated or collocated if breaching a common physicalsecurity barrier (e.g., a locked door at the entrance to a storage room) would allow access to theradioactive material or devices containing the radioactive material.
4 If several radionuclides are aggregated, the sum of the ratios of the activity of each source, i of radionuclide, n , A (i,n), to the quantity of concern for radionuclide n , Q (n), listed for that radionuclide equals or exceeds one. [(aggregated source activity for radionuclide A) ÷ (quantity
of concern for radionuclide A)] + [(aggregated source activity for radionuclide B) ÷ (quantity of
concern for radionuclide B)] + etc........ >
1 Enclosure 2 March 12, 2007MEMORANDUM TO:Luis A. Reyes Executive Director for Operations FROM:Annette L. Vietti-Cook, Secretary
/RA/SUBJECT:STAFF REQUIREMENTS - SECY-07-0011 - INTERIM
IMPLEMENTATION OF FINGERPRINTING REQUIREMENTS IN
SECTION 652 OF THE ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005 The Commission has approved the staff's plan to issue orders imposing fingerprinting requirements for individuals with unescorted access to radioactive material possessed by
Security Order Licensees which includes licensees who (1) are licensed for a spent fuel storage
facility, fuel cycle facility, or decommissioning reactor; or (2) possess and ship spent nuclear
fuel. (Recommendation 1) These orders should serve as an interim step while the rule to
require fingerprinting is developed and finalized.
The Commission has approved the staff's recommendation to issue a generic communication to NRC and Agreement State Increase Control requirement recipients and known non-
manufacturer and distributor service prov iders. (Recommendation 4) The generic communication should be prepared in close coordination with the Agreement States, to ensure
there is a full and common understanding of the path forward among the affected programs and
that potentially affected licensees in the Stat es promptly receive the generic communication.
Subsequently, the staff should issue impose on non-manufacturer and distributor service
provider licensees that prefer unescorted access the same trustworthiness and reliability
requirements and fingerprinting requirements that manufacturer and distributor service provider licensees must currently meet for unescorted access. The staff should develop a more formal
method to identify non-manufacturer and distributer service providers that have the same
intimate knowledge of risk-significant sources as manufacturer and distributer providers.
The Commission has disapproved the staff's proposal to not impose fingerprinting requirements by order on licensees required to implement increased controls while the staff develops the
rulemaking. (Recommendation 2) The staff should expeditiously engage the Agreement States
to develop a plan to require fingerprinting for this group of licensees under public health and
safety, with a goal of issuing the requirements as enhancements to the Increased Controls
within six months. The staff should keep the Commission fully informed of the progress and any
significant difficulties.
The Commission has disapproved the staff's proposal to issue an immediately effective rule to exempt research, and test reactor (RTR) licens ees from fingerprinting requirements while the staff develops a second rulemaking to define "unescorted access" as it would apply to RTR
licensees. (Recommendation 3) Instead, the staff should expeditiously develop a definition of
"unescorted access" that would apply to RTR licensees and issue orders to RTR licensees to
require fingerprinting for individuals that fall within this definition. To ensure compliance with
Section 104c. of the Atomic Energy Act to impose only the minimum amount of regulation
needed for RTR licensees, the orders should require fingerprinting only for individuals with
unescorted access to risk-significant areas or materials within the facilities. The staff should
then proceed with the rulemaking to determine if additional personnel should be fingerprinted.
Enclosure 2 For future Commission papers involving State issues, the staff should address States' views in the coordination section of the paper either by noting the Organization of Agreement States
and/or Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors views or describing the interactions, if any, that have taken place. In a small number of cases information cannot be shared with the states before it is provided to the Commission for deliberation. In these cases a brief statement
as to why it was not coordinated with the states would be appropriate.
The Commission has no objection to sharing this SRM with Agreement States and affected licensees with appropriate controls.cc:Chairman Klein Commissioner McGaffigan
Commissioner Merrifield
Commissioner Jaczko
Commissioner Lyons
Enclosure 3 Recently Issued FSME/NMSS Generic Communications DateGC No.Subject
Addressees
02/02/07IN-07-03Reportable Medical EventsInvolving Patients Receiving Dosages of Sodium Iodide Iodine-131 less than the Prescribed Dosage Because of Capsules Remaining in Vials
after AdministrationAll U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission medical use licensees
and NRC Master Materials Licensees.
All Agreement State Radiation Control Program Directors and State Liaison Officers.02/28/07IN-07-08Potential Vulnerabilities of Time-reliant Computer-based Systems Due to Change in Daylight Saving Time DatesAll U. S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission licensees and all Agreement State Radiation Control Program Directors and State Liaison
Officers.03/15/07IN-07-10Yttrium-90 Theraspheres and Sirspheres ImpuritiesAll U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Medical Licensees
and NRC Master Materials Licensees.
All Agreement State Radiation Control Program Directors and State Liaison
Officers.04/04/07IN-07-13Use of As-Found Conditions toEvaluate Criticality-related Process Upsets at Fuel Cycle
FacilitiesAll licensees authorized to possess acritical mass of special nuclear
material.03/01/07RIS-07-03Ionizing Radiation WarningSymbolAll U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission licensees and certificate holders. All Radiation Control Program Directors and State Liaison
Officers03/09/07RIS-07-04Personally Identifiable Information Submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
CommissionAll holders of operating licenses fornuclear power reactors and holders of and applicants for certificates for reactor designs. All licensees, certificate holders, applicants, and other entities subject to regulation by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) of the use of source, byproduct, and special nuclear
material03/20/07RIS-07-05Status and Plans forImplementation of NRC
Regulatory Authority for Certain Naturally-occurring and Accelerator-produced Radioactive MaterialAll NRC materials li censees, RadiationControl Program Directors, State Liaison Officers, and NRC's Advisory Committee on the Medical Uses of Isotopes Enclosure 3 DateGC No.Subject
Addressees
04/05/07RIS-07-07Clarification of IncreasedControls for Licensees That Possess Collocated Radioactive Material During Transportation Activities All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
licensees issued NRC's Order Imposing Increased Controls and all Radiation Control Program Directors and State Liaison
OfficersNote: A full listing of generic communications may be viewed at the NRC public website at the followingaddress: http://www.nrc.gov/Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections/Generic Communications
.