ML15016A042

1/14/2015, Meeting Slide for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Regarding Wrag

ML15016A042
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	01/14/2015
From:	Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	Watts Bar Special Projects Branch
Dion J A
References
Download: ML15016A042 (34)

Text

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant WRAG January 14, 2015 2 Agenda*Introductions*Watts Bar Unit 2 Completion Status

• Project Risks

• Licensing

• Special Topics-Fire Protection-General Design Criterion -5

-Cyber Security

-Degraded Voltage

-Buried Piping Integrity Program

-Substantially Complete Process*Closing Remarks Simmons 3Watts Bar 2 Guiding Principles*Safe and High Quality

• Design Basis Fidelity with Watts Bar 1

• Systems, Structures, and Components -

Made Like NewWatts Bar Unit 2 Completion Status Simmons 4 Overview*Progress and milestone accomplishments continue

• Safety better than target, quality targets being met

• Discovery and closeout key risks to completion

• Completion challenges exist around hot functional testing (HFT) milestone

• Actions being taken to address challenges and reduce project risk

• Licensing issues remain stable and within plan -critical near-term activities

• Accelerating involvement and integration with operating unit SimmonsWatts Bar Unit 2 Completion Status 5 Simmons Project Update*Progress since October 2014 Completed primary cold hydrostatic test Completed secondary steam generator (SG) hydrostatic test Completed secondary hydrostatic testSuccessfully completed5pre-operational or acceptance test instructions and 600 component

testsCompleted major secondary side evolutionsWatts Bar Unit 2 Completion Status 6 Simmons Project Update*Progress since October 2014 (continued)Completed Unit 2 portion of ice condenser glycol system flushesCompleted pressurizer relief tank coating American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) stamped/certified reactor vessel, pressurizer, and reactor coolant pumpsASME stamped multiple major systems Reactor Coolant SystemChemical Volume & Control (CVCS) System Residual Heat RemovalContainment SprayControl Rod DriveInflux DetectorsStation DrainageUnit 2 license review status briefing wi th Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)Watts Bar Unit 2 Completion Status 7 Simmons*Major Milestone StatusStart Open Vessel Component & Logic Testing -CompleteStart Reactor Vessel Flush -CompleteStart Open Vessel Testing -CompleteCold Hydrostatic test-CompleteSteam Generator Hydrostatic test -CompleteSecondary Hydrostatic test -CompleteStart Ice Condenser Cool Down -January 2015Energize Plant Systems through Unit 2 Switchyard -February 2015Establish Main Condenser Vacuum -February 2015Start Ice Load -February 2015Start Hot Functional Testing -March 2015

• System Turnover Status 87systems involved in turnover process

• 17 systems turned over to Operations

• 38 systems turned over to startup testing

• 32 systems to be turned over to startup testing

• Surveillance Status895 total surveillances associated with WBN Unit 2659 required to be performed prior to fuel load895 currently scheduledMilestone, System, and Surveillance StatusWatts Bar Unit 2 Completion Status 8 SimmonsCritical Path with Forecast datesWatts Bar Unit 2 Completion Status 9 Project Risks*Fire Protection*Degraded Voltage*Schedule challenges in Construction and Startup*Equipment Failures During Testing Simmons 10*Final Environmental Statement-Complete

• Safety Evaluation -Nearing Completion

• Closure of Regulatory Commitments Accelerating

• No WattsBar2 Specific Contentions Remain

OpenSupplemental Safety Evaluation Report Open ItemStatusInspection Planning and Scheduling ItemStatus Licensing Status Simmons 83%16%1%NRCClosed TVAOpenNRCReview 79%14%7%NRCClosed TVAActionNRCAction 11*Transition and Operational Readiness Overview-Operating organization driving transition

-Unit 1 sharing ownership of critical Unit 2 milestones

-Staffing at appropriate level

-Training complete for dual-unit operation

-Corporate organization providing oversight and support

-Preparing for Operational Readiness Assessment Team Inspection WalshOverview of Watts Bar Unit 2 Project Special Topics 13 CrouchFire Protection WBN Dual Unit Fire Protection Report (FPR) Status*As-Designed FPR Submitted (March 2013)

• Initial As-Constructed FPR Submitted (September 2014)Final equipment configurations Additional equipment incorporated (Fukushima related) Optimized and Refined Supporting Analyses*Triennial Fire Protection Inspection (October through December 2014)Summary of Issues Identified Technical Consistency of Information from Design Inputs to Final ProceduresProcedural EnhancementsResolution In Process*Re-Submittal of As-Constructed FPR (March 2015) 14General Design Criterion (GDC) 5Item 91 -GDC-5*TVA should update the FSAR with information describing how WBN Unit 2 meets GDC 5, assuming the worst case single failure and a Loss of Offsite

Power *GDC 5 -Sharing of structures, systems, and components.Structures, systems, and components important to safety shall not be shared among nuclear power units unless it can be shown that such sharing will not significantly impair their ability to perform their safety functions, including, in the event of an accident in one unit, an orderly

shutdown and cooldown of the remaining units.

Koontz 15 General Design Criterion 5 Koontz*Design BasisWatts Bar designed as a hot standby plantOne unit in accidentSecond unit can remain safely in hot standby (350ºF)Watts Bar has capability to safely handle one unit in an accident and bring second unit to cold shutdown (200ºF) within approximately 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> 16 General Design Criterion 5 Koontz 17*Final Safety Analysis Report has been revised*Staff request for additional information (RAIs) have been answered

• Open item closed by NRC in SSER 27

• Remaining actionTechnical Specification revision General Design Criterion 5 Koontz 18*Met with Nuclear Security and Incident Response (NSIR), Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and Regional Staff -December 18, 2014Proposed modifications to Milestones 6, 7 and 8 implementation schedules for Watts Bar Unit 2 to align with NEI Cyber Security Implementation Plan

Template and TVA Fleet ApproachProposed modifications to License ConditionsUnit 1Unit 2Provided Status of Cyber Security Implementation for Watts Bar Unit 2Actions taken Inspection InsightsMilestone Implementation Anticipated Status at Fuel Load Arent Cyber Security 19 Bright Line*Alignment with Nuclear Security and Incident Response (NSIR) on scope of issueLimited to communications equipment from the hydro yard which impacts in-plant electrical equipment*Cyber Security Assessment Team (CSAT) meeting to be held on 1/15/15 to evaluate equipment*Response to Staff on resolution -February 2015 Hilmes 20Degraded Voltage Issue:*WBN does not use the Degraded Voltage Relay (DVR) Analytical Limit (AL) as an Operability Limit for Off Site Power*WBN has not demonstrated that Safety Related loads will start assuming a Grid Voltage pre-accident which results in a Safety Related Bus Voltage at the

DVR AL Hilmes 21Degraded Voltage WBN dual unit grid operability is based upon the ability of the grid to accept accident loads while maintaining grid voltage >153kV and <9kV

drop.*Operability determined by the use of a Grid State Estimator (Real Time Program which continuously determines Grid Capability)*Use of the Grid State Estimator is consistent with RG 1.93.

Hilmes 22 The WBN Scheme:*Ensures that safety related equipment will have adequate voltage to start and run at the time required to perform their safety functions while

connected to offsite power or*Ensures that the Safety Related loads are transferred to the on-site power system once the Diesel Generator becomes available and subsequently start and run.

WBN has performed sensitivity studies to demonstrate that the scheme works for any grid capability condition.Degraded Voltage Hilmes 23Degraded VoltageWBN methodology maximizes the margin between the grid operability criteria and the Degrade Voltage Relay set point which provides the best

scheme to:*Maintain offsite power as the preferred power supply when it is capable

• Maximizes nuclear safety Maximizing this margin is consistent with Generic Safety Issue (GSI) -171 and Branch Technical Position PSB-1 Resolution of Issue

• Independent Third Party Review of TVA Approach

• Insights from NRC/Industry Meeting -January 13 th and 14th*TVA resolution to RAI questions will be provided to NRR in January 2015 Hilmes 24Buried Piping Integrity Program*WBN buried safety related piping included in the WBN Buried Piping Integrity Program (BPIP)*The objective of the BPIP is to provide a comprehensive program to reduce the probability and consequences of buried piping failure.*Program based upon EPRI Guidelines.

• The program applies to safety-related and non-safety-related piping systems.

• No additional safety-related buried piping is placed in service by Unit 2 completion.*Program addresses external (OD) corrosion and/or degradation of buried piping,*Program ensures piping is repaired or replaced prior to loss of function Crouch 25 Installation*Buried pipe is bedded to provide a continuous and uniform earth bearing from trench bottom to bottom quadrant of pipe.*Trenches are backfilled with rock-free earth or sand compacted to a minimum depth of 12" over top of pipe.*Steel pipe is either coal tar epoxy coated or spiral wrapped using coal-tar protective coating in tape form. Spiral wrap is overlapped more than half-width of the tape to provide a minimum of double thickness of tape.*Pipe is heated to remove moisture prior to wrapping.

• Prior to backfilling, externally-coated pipe is inspected for holidays.

CrouchBuried Piping Integrity Program 26 The Buried Pipe Integrity Program (BPIP) is implemented in six steps:*Steps 1 and 2 establish the program.1.Establishing site documents/databases.2.Risk ranking of in-scope pipe segments.*Steps 3 thru 6 ensure adequacy of the piping.3.Inspections of in-scope piping systems.4.Fitness-for-service evaluations of inspection results.

5.Identification of repair options for degraded piping.

6.Prevention and mitigation measures for reducing risk of failure.*Steps 3 thru 6 are ongoing throughout the life of the plant.

CrouchBuried Piping Integrity Program 27 Buried Pipe Conclusions*The piping systems will maintain reliable operation.

• No new safety related buried piping being added to program to support Unit 2 operation.*WBN is currently following the industry initiatives for buried piping, which is assessing the conditions, performing risk ranking models and replacing pipe as

required.*The type failures that could occur will not challenge the operability of the systems and/or their functions.*To date there has not been any occurrence of major failure (loss of safety related system function).*WBN has processes and procedures to monitor all safety related piping.

CrouchBuried Piping Integrity Program 28 Substantially Complete Letter*Definition of Substantially Complete-When the Owner takes responsibility

-Based on plant completion, not time to startup*Substantially Complete Letter timed to support notation paper-Allows Commission 60 days for review of notation paper

-Approximately 90 days prior to fuel load*Letter will include a Readiness Assessment Report-Readiness Assessment Report will provide inventory of TVA Quality Activities to construct, test, and transition to dual unit operations-Readiness Assessment Report will include high level list of remaining construction and testing activities to complete before fuel load*Letter will be available for discussion Calle 29 Substantially Complete Letter Substantially complete letter alignment to the sub-parts of 10 CFR 50.5710CFR 50.57 Sub-partSubstantially CompleteLetter Section(1) Construction of the facility has been substantially completed, in conformity with the construction permit and the application as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; andAttachment A1-Current Schedule for Completion of Remaining Work Attachment A2 -Design Basis Verification Attachment A3 -Refurbishment Program Description Attachment A4 -CAPs and SPs Attachment A5 -Status of Generic Communications Attachment A6 -Quality Assurance Activities(2) The facility will operate in conformity with the application as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; andAttachment B1 -Current Schedule for Completion of the Test Program(3) There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by the operating license can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the regulations in this chapterAttachment C1 -Department Transition and Change Management Plans Attachment C2 -Unit Differences -Design Attachment C3 -Unit Differences -Training Attachment C4 -Safety Culture Calle 30Ready For Fuel Load Letter*Letter to be submitted just prior to fuel load-Will include:Schedule for testing -Startup and Power ascensionList of activities that need completion prior to fuel loadUnanticipated exemptions or reliefs-Will request timely turnaround

-Will request full power license Calle 31 2015Unit 2 -Key Milestone Linkages NRRIssuesLicenseTVA LetterReady for Fuel LoadWRAG confirms all licensing issues are resolvedRegion 2 finding -(94300) Inspection Program CompleteIntegrated Safeguards Testing Complete (final Mandatory MC 2513 inspection)Federal Register Notice -Issue license NRR submits Notation Vote Paper Commission Decision to Issue LicenseTVA Letter -

Construction is Substantially Complete Construction is Substantially CompleteAll Systems and Areas turned over from Bechtel to TVA ACRS Final LetterTVA NRC Fukushima Orders Closed Calle Internal WRAG NRC Sr. Mgmt. Mtg.

Closing Remarks 33*Work to complete Watts Bar 2 is being done safely, in a quality manner, and in accordance with stringent standards.*The combination of construction, refurbishment, improvements, and ongoing pre-startup testing will demonstrate systems, structures, and components have achieved "like new" condition.*Startup testing and system turnovers support a June 2015 fuel load date.

• Project challenges are being identified and addressed. Fire Protection -Open issues being addressedDegraded Voltage -interaction with the Staff continues*Substantially Complete letter under development Simmons Conclusion Questions