ML20195G903

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Notice of Issuance of Director'S Decision,Under 10CFR2.206, Responding to Chernobyl Accident.Addl Relief Requested by Gap 870501 Petition That NRC Suspend Further Licensing of Nuclear Facilities in Us Denied
ML20195G903
Person / Time
Issue date: 12/15/1987
From: Murley T
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML19313A417 List:
References
2.206, NUDOCS 8712240105
Download: ML20195G903 (2)


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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COWi!SSION ISSUANCE OF DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 CFR 2.206 REGARDING AGENCY RESPONSE TO CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, has issued a "Decision Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206" concerning the petition dated May 1, 1987, filed by Mr. Thomas Carpenter on behalf of the Government Accountability Project (GAP) and others (Petitioners) requesting that the Commission take action on the basis of the accident that occurred at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor. Specifically, the Petitioners requested that the NRC suspend further licensing of nuclear facilities in the United States pending a study and report of the accident at the Chernobyl plant. Further, the Petitioners requested that the NRC (1) review the findings of the final reper'. for the applicability of these findings to facilities licensed by the NRC, (2) request public comments on whether the record should be reopened to consider new issues raised in the final report that are r.aterial to any pending licensing proceeding or current license, and (3) evaluate the need for the corrective actions identified in the petition.

The Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, has determined that the Petitioners' requests that (1) the NRC complete a study and prepare a final report of the Chernobyl accident and (2) review the findings of the final report for applicability to currently licensed facilities or facilities under construction have, in effect, already been granted. The additional relief, M, ff05 S]I2 g

beyond these items, sought by the Petitioners' request pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 is denied. Tne reasons for this Decision are explained in the "Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206," 00-87-21, which is available tar public inspection in the Comission's Public Document Room located at 1717 H Street, N.W.,

Washington, D.C. A copy of the Decision will be filed with the Secretary for the Comisstun's review in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c). As provided by l

this regulation, the Decision will constitute the final action of the Comission 25 days after the date of the Decision unless the Comission, on its own motion, institutes a review of the Decision within that time.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0fEISSION

,/ ? O Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 15th day of December 1987 l

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GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT 25 E Street, N.W., Suite 700 Washington, D.C. 20001 (202) 347 0460

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August 11, 1987

Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 e

,; Dear Mr. Murleys i

By letter dated June 8, 1987 (enclosed), immediate relief of

,' a petition, filed under 10 CFR $2.206 by the Government Accountability Project (GAP) and others, was denied. The June 8th letter also states that the petition was referred to the staff for further action, within a reasonable time.

In the two sionths since the June letter, GAP has received no notice f rom the NRC as to what action has been taken on the Nor has GAP received notice of denial of the petition.

petition. '

I GAP hereby requests official notification as to the status of the l' $2.2.06 petition, within 20 days of receipt of this letter.

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h Tho . s E Carpenter, Esq.

Director, Citizens Clinic

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2.206 REDUEST TO SUSPEND LICENSING OF NUCLEAR MURLEY, NRR FACILITIE5 FENDING RESPONSE TO CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT BECKstORD, RES DATEt 05/12/87 l

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UNITED 8TATES f, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS$10N t, wwatow. o. c. roau May 14, 1987

'% *...e 61EMORANDUM FOR: Thomas E. Murley, Director OfSce of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: Jack R. Goldberg, Acting Assistant General ^

Counsel for Enforcement

SUBJECT:

RENEWED REQUEST FOR A STUDY AND A SUSPENSION OF LICENSING OF NEW FACILITIES ON THE BASIS OF THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT Enclosed please Snd a copy of a petition dated 8tay 1, 1987 Sted by Thomas and Carpenter on behalf of the Government Accountability Project (OAP) others. The petitioner asserts that this petition is in neponse to a letter dated May 27, 1986, wherein an earlier petition, which requested an agency response to the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor, was denied.

The earlier petition, which was filed by GAP on May 6,1986, requested that the NRC suspend further licensing of nuclear facilities in the United States pending a study and report of the accident at the Chernobyl plant and that the NRC review the findings and request public comments on such a report for their applicability to facilities licensed by the NRC. The May 6 petition was denied because the petitioners had provided no speciSc information which

, compelled a halt to lleensing of facilities in the United States.

The present petition requests that the Commission order implementation of the relief requested in the May 6,1986, petition. The petitioner indicates that if there is no sufScient progress by the Commission within 30 days toward achieving their requested rollef, they will consider the petition as being constructively denied and will pursue appellate action.

Unlike the May 6 petition, the pusent petition la supported by an enclosure l

entitled "Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of Chernobyl Petition,' and states as a basis for the request that there is a similarity between Chernobyl and boiling water plants in the United States and that the Chernobyl accident provides important industry experience which warranta review of eristing industry standards under NRC regulations.

For this reason, it appears that it may be necessary to address the petitioner's concerns in a decision pursuant to 10 C.F.R. I 2.206.

I CONTACT: Susan Chidakel

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I have enclosed drafts of a letter of acknowledgement to the petitioner for

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your signature Federal and a Nottee of Receipt of the petition for publication in the Register.

Please inform my staff of the technical staff contact who wul be involved in preparing a response to the petition. Please ensure that I am provided copies of all correspondence related to the petition and that I am asked to concur on all staff correspondence. i I '

J k R. Goldberg, /.etin A latant General Counsel for Enforcement Office of the General Counsel

Enclosure:

As stated cc: w/ encl.

J. Lieberman, OE W. Olmstead, OGC W. Briggs, OGC J

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l bir. Thomas Carpenter i' Citissno Clinic Director Government Accountability Project 1555 Connecdcut Avenue, N.W. -

Suite 202 Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Carpenter:

This letter is to acknowledge receipt of your petition dated May 1,1987, t

on behalf of the Government AccountabiHty Project (GAP) and others, which  !

you state is in response to a letter dated May 27, 1988, wherein your petition filed May 8,1988, which requested an agency response to the accident at the i Chernobyl nuclear reactor, was denieo. Your petition requests that the l Commission order implementation of the reHet requested in your May 8,1988,  !

petition, that the NRC suspend further licensing of nuclear facilities in the

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United States pending a study and report of the accident at the Chernobyl plant, and that the NRC review the findings and request public comments on such a report for their applicabiHty to faciuties licensed by the NRC.

Your earlier petition was denied because you failed to provide spectSc information which compelled a halt to Mcensing of faciHties in the United States. Your present petition is supported by an enclosure entitled

'Memorandurr. of Points and Authorities in support of Chernobyl Petition," and asserts as a basis for your request that there is similarity between Chernobyl i j and boiling water plants in the United States and that the Chernobyl accident provides important industry experience which warranta review of existing

! Andustry standards under NRC regulations. Your petition has been referred l l )

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to the staff for action pursuant to 10 C.F.R. I 2.204 of the Commission's i regulations. As provided by section 2.204, action will be taken on your request within a reasonable time. I have enclosed for your information a copy of the notice that is being filed with the Office of the Federal Register for publication.

Sincerely.

Thomas E. Murley. Director ,

OfSce of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:

As stated ,

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REQUEST FOR ACTION ON THE BASIS OF THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT RECEIPT OF PETITION FOR DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 C.F.R. 2.206 Notice is hereby given that by petition dated May 1,1987, the Government Accountability Project (GAP) and other named petitioners requested that the Commission take action on the basis of the accident which occurred at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor. Specifically, the petition requests that the NRC suspend further licensing of nuclear facilities in the United States pending a study and report of the accident at the Chernobyl plant, and that the NRC review the findings and request public comment on such a report for their applicetility to facilities licensed by the NRC. The petition asserts as grounds for this request that there is a similarity between

(.bernobyl and bolling water y o .ts 'a the United States and that the Chernobyl accident provides important industry experience which warrants review of existing industry standards under NRC regulations. The request is being treated pursuant to 10 C.F.R. I 2.203 of the Commission's regulations.

As provided by section 2.206, appropriate action will be taken on this request within a reasonable time.

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A copy of the petition is avaDable for inspection in the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 11 Street, N.W. , Washington, D.C. 20555.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this _ day of , 1987.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation i

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G'OVERNMENT AdCOUNTABluTY PROJECT 1555 Connecticut Amse. N.W., Suite 202 Woshington. D.C. 20036 -(202)2324 550 May 1, 1987 1

l Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut Acting Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation -

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

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Dear Mr. Eisenhut:

This is in response to your May 27, 1986 denied our petition under 10 C.P.R. 2.206 requesting an agencyletter, where response in the Sovietto the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor located Ukraine.

that the NRC -- In our petition we specifically requested 1.

initiate all currently available legal options to learn as theexpeditiously Soviet accident; as possible all material facts concerning 2.

prepare ongoing, publicly available analyses of this -

information's relevance for NRC-licensed facilitiest 3.

prepare a final, published report of findings on the same issue at the completion of the research project;

4. suspend the granting of operating licenses for U.S.

facilities under construction until completion of the final report 5.

review the findings of the final report to determine the safety consequences with respect to all currently-licensed facilities still operating or under construction at the time the report is finished; 6.

request public comments on whether the record should be opened to consider new issues raised in the final report that are material to any pending licensing proceeding or current license, including but not limited to the need for the following illustrative corrective actions:

(A) A comprehensive review of conta'insent structures, both dry containment and the surge suppression containment, to provide a uniform, complete standard, of adequacy for all plants currently in operation and that will be in operation in the future. This standard should review the structural capacity of containment to withstand emergency situations of the type seen at Chernobyl but not necessarily of the magnitude.

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Mr. Darrell Eisenhut May 1, 1987 Page Two '

(B) A public forum to allow public participation for review and comment on the containment standard proposed by the NRC for assessing the adequacy of containment.

(C) A complete review of existing containments at completed plants, detailing methods to be used to correct inadequate containments at these plants and a time table for implementation of these changes.

(D) A complete review of containment structures at plants currently under construction detailing methods to be used under construction. to correct inadequate structure currently A deferment of final licensing for these facilities should be made, until corrections have been standard.

made to bring them into line with the established (E) A comprehensive plan for review of emerge'ncy procedures currently in place at existing facilities and a detailed procedure and time-table to implement periodic reviews and evaluations of these procedures.

This plan when implemented should include provisions for documentation of owner traircing, its schedule of implementation and qualifications of personnel conducting the training.

(F) Provide a detailed plan for coordination between owners, the NRC, and state officials during emergency situations and the sharing of critical data on plant operation during the emergency.

(G) Provide a public forum to obtain public input and review of a detailed plan to be submitted by the NRC on Evacuation, proposed on a state by state basis. the i plan will provide an overall strategy for evacuation based on individual plant design parameters, i.e.

containment in place.

used, and emergency procedure safety system We petition the Commission to order implementation of the six requests listed above within thirty days from today.

year since the accident it is abundantly clear that lessonsIn the learned f rom the Chernobyl accident must be applied to the U.S.

nuclear industry. All that is necessary is the Commission's policy decision to make and implement that commitment. If within thirty days there is significant progress toward achieving the requested relief petitioners will consider extending the 9

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, .. 1 Mr. Darrell Eisenhut May 1, 1987 Page Three timeframe. Otherwise, we will consider the petition as constructively denied and we will pursue appropriate appellate action.  :

The enclosed memorandum summarizes data on several illustrative lessons that are being learned already from Chernobyl, with respect to containment structures, operating procedures and emergency planning. Part of petitioner's request is thatindustry U.S. the corrective actions include but not be limited to the weaknesses identified by these examples.

Respec fully s mitted,

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h pe Citizens Clinic Director, GAP Atthur ackson Staff Assoc ate, GAP 4WM Thomas Devine

/ Leg Director, GAP 8

en Bossong Lanny k

inkin Public Citizen 215 Pennsylvania SE Christic Institute Washington D.C. 20003 1324 N. Capitol N.W.

Washington D.C. 20002 l

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Kathleen Tucker RuEh Caplan Health 4, Energy Institute Environmental Action 236 Massachusetts Ave. N.W. 1525 New Hampshire Ave. NW washington D.C. 20002 Washington D.C. 20036 l

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF CHERNOBYL PETITION Arthur Jackson Thomas Devine Thomas Carpenter

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Government Accountability Project

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1555 Connecticut Avenue N.W. f 200 Washington, D.C. 20036 l

(202) 232-8550 stay 1,1987 l

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Table of Contents A u t h o r i t i e s c i t e d . . . . . . . . . . . . .11. . . . .

Jurisdiction............................................... iii R e g u l a t i on s In vol v ed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 A r e a s of Conce r n Di s cu s s ed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii ........

e B4Chground................................................. 1 S u mm a r y o f A r g u m e n t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. . . . . . .

(I)

A comprehensive review of containment structure is necessary for consistency wi post-Three Mile Island program.th the NRC's

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The Chernoby.1 incident confirms that the Commission mi st establish and implement an adequate program to monitor and document i

operator training programs on an ongoing basis... . 7 (III)

Reevaluation of NRC standards for individual emergency plans is necessary to incorporate lessons learned from Chernoby1...................

8 l Conclusion................................................. 10 Fo o t n o t e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12. . . . . . . . .

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Authorities Cited l

Cases i (1) Burinskor v. NLRB, 1 357 F.2d 822, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1966)

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Herbert Harvey, Inc. v. NLRB, 282, 292, 424 F.2d 770, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1969)

(3) Leroy Garrett v. Federal Communications Commission, 38 F.C.C. 2d 117, 124-125 (1972), 513 F.2d 1056 ~~

(D.C. Cir. 1975)

(4) Oystershell Alliance v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 800 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cfr.1986)

Regulations:

10 C.F.R. $50.34 (F) 10 C.F.R. $50.34(F)(e)(1) 10 C.F.R. $50.47( A)(1) 10 C.F.R. $50.57( 3) 10 C.F.R. $50.109 10 C.F.R. App. A Criterion 16 10 C . F. R . App. E Miscellaneous:

Af fidavit of Arthur Jackson, Staf f Associate. Gove rnment Accountability Project (April 1987) i Congressional Chernobyl Research Nuclear Service, Issuo Brief, IB86077, The Accident: Causes, initial effects and~

Congressional response (updated August 4, 1986)

DUilB Technical Consultants, Accident for Nuclear Emergency PlanningImplementation of the Chernobyl-4 York (May 1986) for the State of New Peterson, page A-1, Cass, April "Reactor 1, 1987 Ordered Shut Down," Washington Post, Report of the State Committee for Using Atomic Energy of U.S.S.R. , The Accident at Chernobyl AES and Its Consequences, Report prepared for I. A.E.C. Expert Conference (August, 25-29, 1986, Vienna)

U.S. NuclearAccident"

[Chernobyl) Regulatory Commiscion, "Chronology of the l

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Jurisdiction )

i Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 2.206, the Government Accountability Project (GAP) petitions the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or commission) under this regulation to modify or revoke licenses for plants currently under construction and production.

Regulations Involved The text of the following regulations are relevant for this petition:

10 C.F.R. 50, A ppendix A, Criterion 50 10 C.F.R. 50 50.109 10 C.F.R. 50, Appendix E 10 C.F.R. 50, Appendix F.

Areas of Concern Discussed I. Containments Whether a comprehensive review of containment structures, tuoth dry containment and the surge suppression containment, should be made to provide a comprehensive standard of adequacy for all plants currently in operation and that will be in 1

cNperation in the future; and whether the standard should include 1

tJue structural capacity of containments to withstand emergency situations as seen at Chernoby1; and whether a public forum should be provided, for public participation in the review and development of the containment standard; and whether the c>ompleted review shall detail methods to correct inadequate cxantainment at existing faellities and at facilities currently under construction.

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II. Operating Procedures Whether the Commission must institute revised operating procedures to insure personnel action will be adequate if a Chernobyl type emergency should one occur in the 'U.S..

III.

Emergency Planning and Evacuation Procedures Whether the Commission should provide a comprehensive review of the adequacy of emergency planning and evacuation procedures currently in place at existing facilities, including but not limited to publication of a detailed procedure and time table to implement periodic reviews, as well as provision for documentation of proposed changes.

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BACKGROUND

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On April 25, 1986 at the Chernobyl power station in the Ukraine, routine testing was begun at Unit f4. The Chernobyl station consists of four (4) RBMK 1000 reactors, each with a l capacity of 950 M.W.

The testing to occur at Unit #4 was to 1

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repeat an earlier experiment performed successfully at this unit.

The testing was similar to that conducted at other plants inside the USSR, Europe and the U.S.

The testing was ".. .to verify the possibility of using inertial energy of the generator disconnected from the steam supply to generate electricity for auxiliary motors. . . ."l/ as stated in the Soviet Final Report on the accident.

Due to unforeseen interruptions the test procedure extended into the day of April 26. It was during the co'ntinued testing on the 26th that the emergency occurred which resulted in a massive breach of the partial containr.ent at Unit f 4 and the release of large quantities of radioactive material.

Although preliminary reports described graphite in the core of the reactor as a major contributor, later reports have made clear that the accident was due primarily to a steam explosion, l resulting from a loss of coolant during testing.2/ A major factor contributing to the accident was the breaching of established procedures for safe operation.2/ Another factor was the partial containment inadequacy. As stated by many reports, a more substantial containment may have reduced the 1

overall release of material during the accident.1/ Further, even though established evacuation procedures existed within the I

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soviet Union, the actual coordination between the Soviet government and its civilian populace ' retarded the evacuation efforts.

The resulting delay may have added significantly to damage from the release.

Immediately after the accident, the NRC was petitioned in accordance with 10 C.P.R. 2.206 by ten (10) civic organizations.

At that time the NRC responded to the petition indicating that there were no areas of common concern relevant between U.S.

nuclear industries and Chernobyl. In light of later reports that provide a more complete picture of the events at Chernobyl, it is obvious that several common areas exist. These areas are of major significance and should be given serious consideration because of the scope and nature of the potential threats to public health.and safety.

SUMMARY

OF ARGUMENT The Commission has established a precedent for review of existing industry standards with the post-Three Mile Island revision of its regulations. That change was based upon the "important industry experience"l/ that the Coemission realized was made available by Three Mile Island.

This set a standard for review of existing rules whenever an event within the industry provides important industry experience. Clearly Chernobyl and the problems created by the largest single release of radioactive material f rom a commercial power plant in history meets the requirement of important industry experience necessary for revision of Commission and industry standards.

The Commission has the authority to provide such a review and to require backfitting if necessary for safe operation. This was made clear after Three Mile Island. The Commission must now take that same initiative in response to the Chernobyl incident.

In the absence of a full explanation, the Commission cannot now treat similar situations dissimilarly, without engaging in

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arbitrary and capricious behavior prohibited by the Administrative Procedure Act.

ARGUMENTS 1.

A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF CONTAINMENT STRDCTURES IS NECESSARY MILE FOR CONSISTENCY ISLAND PROGRAM. _.

WITH THE COMMISSION'S POS The requirement to provide 3 containment structure'is stated in 10 C.F.R. 50, Appendix A, Criterion 16, Containment Design:

Reactor containment and associated systems shall be provided to establish an essentially leak tight barrier against the uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the environment....

This requirement and need have long been established in the U.S.

These structures have served as an integral part of the overall safety system for plants. As pointed out by industry representatives af ter the incident at Three Mile Island, the presence of the full containment structure was instrumental in sainimizing and largely restricting the release of radioactive smaterial into the atmosphere. Even at Chernobyl where there was a massive release of energy, Issue Brief IB 86077, prepared for Congress by the Congressional Research Service, stated, "these types of containments might have reduced the release of

I radioactivity from the Chernobyl accident."i/

Unfortunately, the containment used at Chernobyl was the l type commonly employed at many U.S. boiling water reactors.1/

i This similarity creates new industry experience that must be considered by the Commission for consistency with the precedent set after TMI. In 10 C.F.R. 50.34, the Commission added TMI-related requirements that represented stringent new safety rules.

These changes reversed designs for plants under construction to accommodate design changes consistent with experience gained 0t TMI. In 10 C.F.R. 50.34(F)(3)(i), the Commission mandate Aany plants under construction to --

provide administrative procedures for evaluating operating design and construction experience and for ensuring that applicable important industry experience andbe will provided inthe constructing a timely plant. manner to those designing (emphasis added)

These provisions were imposed in 10 C.F.R. 50.34(f) by the commission on the following plants in the wake of Three Mile Island:  :

(1) Duke Power Co., Perkins Units 1, 2 and 3.

(2) Houston Lighting and Power, Allens Creek Unit fl.

(3) Portland General Electric Co., Pebble Springs Plants Units 1 and 2.

l l (4) Public Service Company of Oklahoma, Black For Units 1 and 2.

(5) Puget Sound Power & Light Co., Skagit/Hanford Units 1 and 2.

(6) Offshore power systems.

Because of the lessons learned at TMI, these plants were required

1 to implement additional design changes in the emergency core caoling system, contal'nment isolation system, and many other systems.8/

By taking that action the Commission established a precedent for handling other important industry experiences and related occurrences. Certainly Chernobyl, with a very similar operating system and containmen.t structure to many boiling water plants in the U.S.,

fits in the criterion of important industry experience. '

When an agency sets down a policy, then without explanation refuses to follow that same policy for siallar situations, its action is arbitrary. In the case of Garrett v. Federal Communication Commission, 513 F.2d 1056 (D.C. Cir.1975), the '

federal agency refused to waive coverage rules for one applicant when it had done so for other stations in the past. The' court >

heldt  !

Hitherto we have had occasion to deal with claims of disparate decisional treatment accorded parties by  !

administrative bodies. Speaking of one agency we have twice said that it "cannot act arbitrarily nor can it treat similar situations in dissitallar ways," and we remanded litigation to.the agency when it did not take pains to reconcile an apparent dif ference in the treatment accorded litigants circumstanced alike. We have pursued the same course with respect to the Agency now before us where, "the differences were not so

' obvious' as to remcVe the need for explanation."

i These rulings vividly reflect that underlying principle l that agency cannot stand when it is "so inconsistent with its precedents as to constitute arbitrary treatment amounting to an abuse of discretion.

(citations omitted) l 513 F.2d at 1058.

i The Commission set precedent with another significant accident involving a commercial nuclear reactor, Three Mile .

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Island.

The addition to 10 C.F.R. 50 of stronger post-TMI requirements set a precedent for agency corrective action when there are new "important industry experience (s)."

As the court in Garrett, supra, made clear,

...not only [is) more than enumeration of factual differences between cases required, [but] "the commission must explain their relevance to the purposes of the legislation it administers.

(citation omitted)

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The Commission must do more than simply argue that differences Lxist between Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. Its decision must be grounded and supported by the "legislation it administers." The Commission cannot now turn its back on a full and public review of containments, of the type used at Chernobyl and at many U.S. light boiling water plants, without its action being arbitrary.

The Commission has the power to implement a review of the type requested, as evidenced by the post-Three Mile Island '

changes and by the requirement of 10 C.F.R. 50.109, Back fi t t ing:

The Commission shall require the backfitting of a facility when it determines...that there is a substantial increase in the overall protection of the public health and safety....

The Commission has made this request of several plants currently operating with containment designs that "...could fail in the most severe type of accidents."9/

Clearly the possibility of an accident of the type to occur at Chernobyl represents a severe public danger. A review of i

existing containment structures in light of Chernobyl is necessary and will provide substantial additional protection that l

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may well be needed to prevent releases of significant amount of radioactive material.

II.

THE CHERNOBYL INCIDENT CONFIRMS THAT THE COMMISSION MUST ESTABLISH AND IMPLEMENT AN ADEQUATE PROGRAM TO MONITOR AND DOCUMENT OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAMS ON AN ONGOE^7 ASIS.

In 10 C.F.R. 50, Appendices E and F, Training, requires:

... Program to provide for (1) the training of Deployees and exercising by periodic drills of radiation emergency plans to ensure that employees of the Licensee are familiar with their specific emergency response duties....This shall include a description of specialized initial training and periodic retraining programs....

Yet this regulation does not provide for a reporting on or monitoring of the primary line of defense in an emergency, the operators. A major contributing factor at Chernobyl was the breach of operating procedures 10/ Admittedly there is a dif ference between training procedures used in the U.S. and those in the U.S.S.R. However, the practice of overconfident operators breaching operating or emergency procedures does not recognize national boundaries. This fact was dramatically proven at the Peach Bottom plant operated by Philadelphia Electric when control room operators routinely slept on the 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. shif t; while supervisors spent their working time playing computer games and reading magazines in the control room.10/ There is a need to provide continuing reinforcement of established policy and procedures. Since careful application of procedures is the most effective first line of defense in any emergency, it is of paramount importance to maintain the integrity of the procedures as established and to prevent breaches caused by overconfidence.

As discussed above, after Three Mile Island, the Commission added significant changes to accommodate experience for that accident.

10 C.F.R. 50.34 (F)(3)(1). Clearly, Chernobyl

(

provides important industry experience that must now be )

j considered for operating procedures in nuclear facilities.

Current regulations do not provide for monitoring or review of  !

existing procedures.

The precedent of Three Mile Island must now be followed for Chernobyl.

In the case of Oystershell Alliance

v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 800 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir.1986) where an environmental group petitioned the Commission for review of a full power operating license, the
  • court recognized the Commission's modification of its rules for plant safety after Three Mile Island.

800 F.2d at 1206.

Failure to' continue the post-TMI policy would be "arbitrary" as the court in Leroy Ganett v. Federal Communications Commission, supra, has made cleart

.. .that agency (action) cannot stand when it is "so inconsistent with its precedents"... 513 F.2d at 1060.

The Commission must now move forward as it did af ter Three Mile Island to recognize Chernobyl and the important industry experience it provides.

Current regulations must be revised to provide for monitoring of operating training and monitoring of the personnel who provide such training.

III. REEVALUATION OF NRC ST1.NDARDS FOR INDIVID0AL E IS NECESSARY TO INCORPORATE LESSONS LEARNED PROM

.g.

1 The provision for emergency planning at nuclear facilities is found in 10 C.F.R. 50.47(a)(1), Emergency Plans, which statest

...No operating license for a nucle r power reactor will be issued unless a finding is made by the NRC that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective I measures radiologicalcan and will be taken in the event of a emergency.

Further in 10 C.F.R. Appendix E, Emergency Planning and i Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities, it is required in Criterion F, Training, that -- ,

[t]he program to provide for (1) the training of Employees and exercising, b radiation Emergency Plans. y periodic drills, of Additionally, it is required in 10 C.F.R. App. E, Section 6, Maintaining Emergency Preparedness that "[p]rovisions to be employed to ensure that the Emergency Plan...are maintained up to date...."

At Chernobyl, even with well established energency and evacuation procedures, coordination with local of ficials substantially hindered the effectiveness of emergency efforts.I

$Chernobyl clearly provides important industry experience that '

must now be considered. It provides the greatest amount of dat yet available against which existing emergency and evacuation l plans can be compared for adequacy.

s The realistic limits of emergency plans may be the most dramatic "important industry experience" of Chernobyl. In the i

303B Technical Associates' Implication of the Chernobyl-4 accident for Nuclear Planning for the State of New York (May 1986), it is clear that "[e}mergency plans should be in place at all times for an operable reactor regardless of whether the plant is undergoing l

y--- - - - , - - - - - - - - - . ,.. - --

~ , .

I testing temporarily out of service or operating at full power."

As discussed above, to maintain consistency with its post-TMI reforms, here too the Commission must reassess and where necessary revise emergency procedures.

CONCLUSION The common ground between Chernobyl and similar light boiling water plants in the U.S. seriously affects nuclear safety. With respect to these specific examples, as af ter TMI tha -

Commission must take the following actions based on the important industry experience of Chernobyl, the same as the Commission took ,

af ter Three Mile Island (I) Provide a comprehensive review of containment '

structures, both dry and pressure compression, to establish a comprehensive standard of adequacy for all plants currently operating or under construction in the U.S.

A public forum should be provided to allow public participation in the process of review. The completed i

review should provide detailed methods to correct inadequate containment at existing facilities and facilities presently

under construction. ,

{

(II) operating instructions and training at U.S. plants should be revised in light of Chernobyl to provide ongoing monitoring and evaluation of the qualifications for those providing that training.

(III) The Commission should provide a comprehensive review l

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of emergency plans and evacuation procedures currently in place at existing plants, and provide a detailed procedure and time-table to revise where necessary these plans at existing plants and for implementing such plans at facilities under construction.

The examples above only illustrate the issues where the NRC must act on lessons learned from Chernobyl. It is not comprehensive.

But even these examples confirm that the Chernobyl lessons will be just as significant for public safety as the TMI lessons, if not more so.

The NRC cannot avoid its regulatory duties merely because the accident occurred on foreign soil.

Respectfully submitted, Arthur ackson Staff Associ ge

> \

Thomas Devine Legal Directo homas Carp nter Citizens Clinic Director Dated: May 1, 1987

__ __ . . . _ . _ - . _ _ _ - ._ --_.-._~

.. l Footnotes 1/

USSR, The Accident at Chernobyl A.E.S. and Its Consequen ReportVienna) 1986, prepared. for I.A.E.C. Expert Conference (August 25-29, 2/ Affidavit of Arthur Jackson, page 8 (Oct. 1986).

3/ Report of the State Committee, supra, note 1.

4/

See MBB Technical Associates, ibid. note 10, also Issue Brief, 1886077, The Chernobyl Accident: Cause, Initial Effects and Congressional Arthur Response, Jackson, October 1986. update Aug. 8,1986, and Af fidavit of 5/ 10 C.F.R. 50.34 (F)(3)(1) 6/ MHB Technical Consultants, ' Issue Brief, IB 86077, ibid.,

update, Aug. 8,1986.

7/ MHB Technical Consultants, Implementation of the Chernobyl-4 Accident for Nuclear Emergency Planning for the State of New York (May 1986). '

8/ These changes were outlined in 10 C.F.R. 50.34 throughout. (F)(1) & (2) 9/

page Cass Peterson, A-1 (April "Reactor 1, 1987).

Ordered Shut Down," Washington Post, 10/ Id.; UPI, "A-Plant Computers Said Used for Games,"

Washington Post, page A-4 (April 11, 1987).

I l 055a02 t

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', 'g, UNITED STATES 8 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 30505

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EDO PRINCIPAL CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL FROM: DUE: 06/09/86 EDO CONTROL: 001720 DOC DT 05/06/05 TOM CARPENTER FINAL REPLY OAP. ET. AL.

TO:

DENTON ,

FOR SIONATURE oft um OREEN wm SECY NO:

DESC: , ROUTINO:

2.206 REQUEST TO SUSPEND OPERATINO LICENSES FOR DENTON FACILITIES UNDER CONSTRUCTION PENDINO REVIEW OF TAYLOR SOVIET INCIDENT, ETC.

DATE: 05/09/S6 ASSIGNED TO: E -

CONTACT: GidNru nunan-f C'N 90 0W CPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS:

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May 6, 1986

. Mr. Harold Denton, Director Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission -

1717 H Street N.W.

Washington D.C. 20555 Dear Director Denton i

The recent news of the catastrophe at a nuclear power plant in the Soviet Union has significant implications for licensed facilities in the United States. News accounts indicate that the Chernobyl plant near Kiev has killed an unknown number of people already, and may claim thousands of lives in the near and distant future. ,

The Chernobyl accident raises serious immediate questions  ;

regarding the adequacy of safety goals, the degree of confidence I

we can have that containment integrity will be maintained in an t accident and the adequacy of current emergency planning requirements in the event that containment is breached. There are likely to be other significant areas of concern as we learn more about the Chernobyl accident, '

i The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has a duty to l

reassure the public that it will take all possible steps to learn and act on the safety consequences.

After the Three Mile Island accident, the NRC rightfully placed licensing activities on hold until the relevant lessons from the accident were learned. That principle is no less valid, merely because the disaster occurred outside of U.S. borders. In order to prevent a possible l

- recurrence of this tragedy on American soil, pursuant to 10 CFR

, t?

h W {h V nhE D $O '

i PDR EDO - 001720  !

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Mr. Harold Denton ,

Page 2 2.206 we petition the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to initiate all currently available or potential legal options to learn as expeditiously as possible all material facts concerning the accident at the chernobyl nuclear facility in the soviet Ukraine; prepara ongoing, publicly-available analyses of this

~

information's relevance for facilities licensed by the Commission; and prepara a final, published report of findings on the same issue at the completion of the research project.

Additionally, pursuant to 10 CTR 2.206, we ask that the NRC take the following immediate steps:

1) suspend the granting of operating licenses for U.S.

facilities under construction, at Isast until the completion of the final report on the Soviet accident and the report's relevance for licenses under NRC jurisdiction is understood.

~

2) review the findings of the final report to determine the l safety consequences with respect to all currently-licensed facilities still operating or under construction at the time the report is finished.
3) request public comments on whether the record should be ,

reopened to consider new issues raised in the final report that are material to any pending licensing proceeding or current license.


~v'- ' -' ~~ - ' ' ' ' '

Mr. Harold Denton Page 3 .

Thank you for your prompt consideration of this petition.

While the Sov.let accident is a catastrophe of unprecedented magnitude, it also may be an opportunity to avoid a similar event in the U'nited States. We will supplement this petition with further supporting information and possibly modified requests for relief, as additional facts become available, ,

Sincer

/

T 'Ca r Citis nse'N Clinic Director Government Accountability Project 1555 Connecticut Avenue N.W.

Washington D.C. 20036 Kathleen M . Tucker Nealth and Energy Institute 236 Massachusetts Avenue N.W.

Washington D.C. 20002 Ken Bossong Public Citizen 215 Pennsylvania Avenue S.E.

Washington D.C. 20003 Philip Tyson Nuclear Information & Resources service 1616 P Street N.W.

Washington D.C. 20036 Lanny sinkin Christic Institute 1324 North Capitol M.W.

Washington D.C. 20002 Tina Mobson Solar Lobby 1001 Connecticut Avenue N.W.

Washington D.C. '

s.

I Mr. Harold Denton -

Page 4 Chris Bedford organising Media Project 605 14th Street N.W.

Washington D.C. 20005 Edith Villastrigo Women's Strike for Peace 105 2nd Street N.E.

Washington D.. 20002 Greenpmace 1611 Connecticut Avenue N.W.

Washington D.C. 20009 Reverend Jesse Jackson 2100 M Street N.W.

Washington D.C.

Ruth Caplan Invironmental Action 1525 New Hampshire Ave. N.W.

Washington D.C. 20036 G

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Central File '

N0enton MAY 2 7190 OEisenhut Mr. Tom Carpenter PPAS DSR0 Chron Citizens Clinic Director DMossburg(GT001720).

Government Accountability Prcject TSpeis SBurns 1555 Connecticut Avenue BSheron JLieberman Washington, D.C. 20036 . RSilver , 100 Rdg

, TRehm JTaylor

Dear Mr. Carpenter:

JFoucharc Mialsch ,

This letter responds to your May 6th letter on behalf of the Government Accountability Project and others in which you requested, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 2.206, that the NRC

  • suspend further licensing of nuclear facilities in the United States pending a study of the accident at the Chernobyl plant in the Soviet Union and that the NRC review the findings and request public comments on such a report for their applicability to facilities licensed by '

wthe NRC.

  • The Comission, as 'well as other agencies of the United States Government, is interested in learning as much as it can about the accident at Chernobyl and determining whether the accident has implications for nuclear power facilities in this country. However, as you may be aware from press coverage of the  :

accident, the Chernobyl facility is significantly different from reactors  ;

licensed by the NRC. I am not aware of any information concerning the  !

accident which suggests that public health and safety mandates an imediate moratorium on further licensing or operation of facilities in the United  ;

States. To the extent that our review of information about the accident, as i it is made available to us, indicates the need to take measures to adequately ,

protect the public, you may be assured that the Comission will take those  ;

necessary actions. These actions will be a matter of public record. i Because your letter provides no specific information which compels a halt to licensing of facilities in the United States, I do not intend to take further action on your request under 10 C.F.R. 2.206. You are, of course, free to make future requests for action under section 2.206 should you become aware of specific infonnation, as opposed to general concerns about nuclear safety, i that you believe warrant particular action at facilities licensed by the

! Commission. l

. Sincerely.

l Ng!nal Egned By  !

Darrell G. Eisenhut, Acting Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation qy / /-/ _ / 9 fjM '/Y N -%

hy mp pt*T" i Office TA:DSR0.p...:.00: ....:.0:  :.DD:NRR...  :.D:NRR......:............:

Surname RS11ver/ba. . . . . : .85hg n. . . . : .TPS s....:.0Eisenhut..:.HDenton....:............:

Date 5 /A486. . . . . . . . : .5/p/86. . . . : . 5/p6. . . . : . 5/ /86....:.5/ /86....:............:

UFFIGIAL RLCUMU WPT

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. ...%g UNITED STATES 8 o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l y , j - wAsmoTon. o, c. 2 ossa j OCT 1 1987 Mr. Thomas Carpenter Citizens Clinic Director Government Accountability Project 1555 Connecticut Avenue, NW Suite 202 Washington, DC 20036

Dear Mr. Carpenter:

This is in response to your letter dated August 11, 1987, requesting notification as to the status of your Petition filed on behalf of Government Accountability Project (GAP) and others. Your Petition is currently under consideration for action by the staff, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 of-the Comission's regulations.

By letter dMad June 8,1987, I acknowledged receipt of your Petition and denied the 'unediate relief that you requested. At that time I indicated that, as provided by Section 2.206, action would be taken on ycur request within a reasonable time. -

In your Petition, you requested, among other matters, that the NRC suspend further licensing of nuclear facilities in the United States pending a study and report of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor. Additionally, you requested that the NRC review the findings and request public coments on such a report for their applicability to facilities Itcensed by the NRC. As 1 explained in my June 8 letter, following the Chernobyl accident, the NRC (1) coordinated an interagency fact-finding effort to detemine what had happen'ed at Chernobyl, and (2) initiated an evaluation of the implications of the accident on light water reactors in the United States. The results of these afforts are documented in NUREG-1250 and draft NUREG-1251, which I am enclosing with this letter. These documents form a large portion of the information base upon which the staff is drawing in evaluating the requests in your Petition.

Draft N:' REG-1251 was issued for public coment on September 2,1987. At the end of the 60-day public connent period, the NRC staff will review the coments

- received and prepare a final report. We believe that NUREG-1251, and the public coments on it, are germane to the issues raised in your Petition. As noted above, we are continuing to consider your Petition, and a decision on it will be issued as expeditiously as possible.

I hope this gives you the status information you were seeking. Please contact me if you have further questions.

Sincerely, l

Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l

Enclosures:

As stated

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((gae kn UNITED $ TATE S NUCLE AR REGUL ATORY COMMISSION 5  ! WAsailNCTON. D. C. 2olst k..... JUN O 81987 Mr. Thomas Carpenter Citizens Clinic Director Government Accountability Project 1555 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.

Suite 202 Washington, D. C. 20555 ,

Dear Mr. Carpenter:

This letter acknowledges receipt of /our petition dated May 1,1987, on behalf of the Government Accountability Project (GAP) and others, which you state is in response to our letter da'ed May 27, 1986, wherein your petition filed May 6, 1986, which requested at agency response to the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor, was denied. '. our petition requests that the Commission order implementation of the relief requested in your May 6,1986, petition, that the NRC suspend further licensing of nuclear facilities in the United States pending a study and report of the accident at the Ch tooby1 plant, and that the NRC review the findings and request public comments on such a report for their applicability to facilities licensed by the NRC.

Your earlier petition was denied because you failed to provide specific information which would compel a halt to licensing of facilities in the United States. Your present petition is supported by an enclosure entitled "Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Chernobyl Petition." This petition asserts, as a basis for your request, that there is sf ailarity between Chernobyl and features of boiling water plants in the United States. Furthermore, the petition maintains that the Chernobyl accident provides important industry experier.ce which warrants review of existing industry standards under NRC regulations. Since the petition seeks relief within 30 days of its receipt, the NRC staff has reviewed the petition to determine whether or not it contains

, issues that require immediate regulatory action.

After the accident at Chernobyl, numerous analyses were undertaken and meetings were held internally at NRC, as well as at the international level.

These activities focused on implications for innediate actions, es well as identification of new safety issues and information that affected any ongoing assessments of previously identified generic safety concerns. An effort was undertaken proeptly to integrate evolving information about the accident at Chernobyl in a reevaluation and prioritization of safety issues for U.S. light water reactors, such as was done following the accident at Three Mile Island.

In addition, NRC coordinated an interagency fact-finding effort. The results are contained in NUREG-1250, "Report of the Accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Station, Unit 4," published in January 1987. A draft report on the implications of the Chernobyl accident for regulation of U.S. reactors has been in prepara-tion and is expected to be issued for public comment shortly.

T~TD ' I y

~

Mr. Themas Carpenter . Thus rar, the above activities have not uncovered any information which we would onsider tc mandate immediate regulatory action or suspension of licensing acti.

.ities in the United States. Hence, I do not believe that issnediate implementa.

ion of your requests is warranted. Your petition has been referred to the

<taff for action pursuant to 10 CTR 82.206 of the Commission's regulations.

.ns provided by Section 2.206, action will be taken on your request within a reasonable time. I have enclosed for your information a copy of the notice that is being filed with the Office of the Federal Register for publication.

Sincerely,

, Or!-i 21 tiU.ed by j .::ts H. Sr.intk Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation '

Enclosure:

As stated DISTRIBUTION RAB R/F W. Schwink DCS Central File R. Cleveland EDO 2860' PDR L. Shao EDO R/T S. Davis J. Richardson D. Hagan K. Campe A. Thadani V. Stello, EDO R. J. Barrett C. Rossi B. Clements (SEC)

F. J. Congel J. Partlow OGC R. Starostecki H. Miller ASLAB

'J. Sniezek M. Taylor, EDO ASLBP T. Murley S. Newberry, EDO ACRS (10)

T. Miraglia J. Blaha J. Resner (2)

G. Sese J. Funches GPA/PA l T. Hebdon D. Mossburg (EDO 2860)

, S. Chidskel, OGC

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RSanders ek y j

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DRPEP:RAB  :  : "OGC

...... . .."D RPE P: RAB. . . . .. .. .. ....................". ."

D .R. .P. E . . P. .: .RA EP:D NAME : SMDavis:ye  : KCampe  : RJBarrett  : FJCongel  : R5tarostecki : Schidakel l ......................................:..............:..............:..............:.........--

DATE : 5/28/87  : 5/28/87  : 5/28/87  : 5/28/87  : 6/2/87  : 5/28/87 l

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REQUEST FOR ACTION ON THE BASIS OF THE CHERNOBYL ACf1 DENT RECEIPT OF PETITION FOR DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 CFR 2.206 o

Notice is hereby given that by petition, dated May 1, 1987, the Government Accountability Project (GAP) and other named petitioners requested that the Commission take action on the basis of the accident that occurred at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor. Specifically, the petition requests that the NRC suspend further licensing of nuclear facilities in the United States pending a study and report of the accident at the Chernobyl plant, and that the NRC review the findings and request public comment on the report and on the applicability of the findings to facilities licensed by the NRC. The petition asserts, as grounds for this ree.uest, that thera is a similarity between Chernobyl and features of boiling water plants in the j United States and that the Chernobyl accident provides important industry l

experience which warrants review of existing industry standards under NRC e> regulations. The request is being treated pursuant to 10 CTR $2.206 of 1

the Commission's regulations. As provided by Section 2.206, appropriate l action will be taken on this request within a reasonable time.

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A copy of the petition is available for inspection in the Cosusission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20555.

DatedatBethesda,Marylandthis,7 day of h at , 1987.

FOR THE NUCIIAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 0 f} -

4A w-Ja es H. Sniezek, Deputy rector l fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulatien p

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