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{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[05000249/LER-2013-001]]
| number = ML14037A211
| issue date = 01/27/2014
| title = LER 13-001-00 for Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3, Regarding Secondary Containment Inoperable Due to Two Interlock Doors Being Open Simultaneously
| author name = Marik S M
| author affiliation = Exelon Generation Co, LLC
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation = NRC/Document Control Desk, NRC/NRR
| docket = 05000249
| license number = DPR-025
| contact person =
| case reference number = SVPLTR 14-0006
| document report number = LER 13-001-00
| document type = Letter, Licensee Event Report (LER)
| page count = 4
}}
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:ADresden Nuclear Power StationEAelolnG nn 6500 North Dresden RoadExeon GenerationIL 0450815-942-2920 Telephone www.exeloncorp.com 10 CFR 50.73SVPLTR # 14-0006January 27, 2014U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control DeskWashington, DC 20555-0001 Dresden Nuclear Power Station Unit 3Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-25NRC Docket No 50-249
 
==Subject:==
 
Licensee Event Report 249/2013-001-00, Secondary Containment Inoperable Due to Two Interlock Doors Being Open Simultaneously Enclosed is Licensee Event Report 249/2013-001-00, "Secondary Containment Inoperable Dueto Two Interlock Doors Being Open Simultaneously."
This report describes an event which isbeing reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C),
any event or condition that couldhave prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed tocontrol the release of radioactive material.
There are no regulatory commitments contained in this submittal.
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Mr. Glen Morrowat (815) 416-2800.
Respectfully, Shane M. MarikSite Vice President Dresden Nuclear Power Station
 
==Enclosure:==
 
Licensee Event Report 249/2013-001-00 cc: Regional Administrator
-NRC Region 1itNRC Senior Resident Inspector
-Dresden Nuclear Power Station NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES:
01/31/2017 (01-2014)
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request:
80 hours.S .Reported lessons leamed are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.
A , Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by.'.. LIC"ENSEE EVENMT REPORT (LER)~ intemet e-mail to and to the Desk Officer, Office of Inforration andLICENS~EE.
EVENTI REPORT (E ) Regulatory
: Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104).
Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC(See Page 2 for required number of 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMBfor each block) control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to,digits/characters fthe information collection
: 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGEDresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3 05000249 1 OF 34. TITLESecondary Containment Inoperable Due to Two Interlock Doors Being Open Simultaneously
: 5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVEDMONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH DAY YEAR N/A 05000O T MT E IFACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER11 28 2013 2013 -001 -00 01 27 2014 N/A 050009. OPERATING MODE 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)Ql 20.2201(b) 0 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
[0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
[] 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
E 20.2201(d) 0 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 20.2203(a)(1)
[3 20.2203(a)(4)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 0 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) o 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
[0 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 03 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
: 10. POWER LEVEL El 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
[3 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 0l 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(x)
Ql 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 0 50.36(c)(2) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
[1 73.71(a)(4) 100 El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 0 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
[1 73.71 (a)(5)El 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
[ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
E0 OTHERQl 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) j[ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 0[ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or inI NRC Form 366A12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LERFACILITY NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)Glen Morrow -Regulatory Assurance Manager 1815-416-2800
: 13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORTCAS SSEM CM 1NN MANU- REPORTABLE CAS 1YTM COPNN MANU- REPORTABLE E COMPONENT JFACTURER TO EPIX FACTURER TO EPIX14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED
: 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEARSUBMISSION El YES (If yes, complete
: 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) O NO DATEABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)On 11/28/13, at 0258 hours, the Control room received a Unit 2 interlock door alarm. Operations sent an equipment operator to investigate; and found a Radiation Protection Technician (RPT) and laborers in the area of the alarminginterlock removing lead blankets.
With the Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.2 not met, Secondary Containment was declared inoperable, and Unit 3entered into Technical Specifications 3.6.4.1 Condition A. The doors were closed and the Technical Specifications Condition was exited.The cause of this event was determined to be a failure to recognize a hazard while proceeding in the face of uncertainty.
Specifically, the RPT did not recognize that there was a change in plant conditions (i.e., the restoration of the X-Area aspart of the Secondary Containment boundary) and decided that it was permissible to override the door interlocks byusing an emergency manual push-button.
As a result of this event, Radiation Protection will be reviewing the proper useof human performance tools and will be revising procedures to enhance the notifications made to the Radiation Protection Department.
This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C),
any event or condition that could haveprevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release ofradioactive material.
N1 or nofft R.- f-In-rrrA NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES:
01/31/2((01-2014)
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request:
80 hours.Reported lessons learned are incorporated Into the licensing process and fed back to industry.
Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections 4 .(T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
or byinternet e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of lnformation o LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) and Regulatory
: Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104),
Office of Management and Budget,Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display aCONTINUATION SHEET curretly valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is notreruired to respond to, the information collection
: 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGESEQUENTIAL I REVYEAR NUMBER NO.Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3 05000249 2 OF2013 -001 -00NARRATIVE PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS) Unit 3 is a General Electric Company Boiling Water Reactorwith a licensed maximum power level of 2957 megawatts thermal.
The Energy Industry Identification System codes used in the text are identified as [XX].A. Plant Conditions Prior to Event:Unit: 03 Event Date: 11-28-2013 Event Time: 0258 hours CSTReactor Mode: 1 Mode Name: Power Operation Power Level: 100 percentB. Description of Event:On 11/28/13 a Radiation Protection Technician (RPT) and laborers went to the Unit 2 Secondary Containment
[NG] X-Area (i.e., Main Steam Tunnel Area) to remove and demobilize the remaining lead blankets in the area. The RPT and laborers entered the Unit 2 X-Area by opening the outer doorof the interlock that required an RP "R-Key' to open. The door was held open by the laborers whilethe RPT used his Dresden Station (DS) key to open the inner interlock door at the same time. Theinner door seemed stuck closed to the RPT. He looked around and saw a manual button that defeatsthe interlock mechanism.
The RPT pushed the button, and the inner door opened. The RPT andlaborers entered the room and proceeded to remove and demobilize the lead.Concurrent with the events taking place at the Unit 2 X-Area, the Unit 2 Control Room received alarm902-4 F-19 on the X-Area interlock door. Operations sent an equipment operator into the field toinvestigate and found the RPT and laborers in the area removing lead blankets from the room. Henotified the RPT that the control room had received an alarm for secondary containment.
The RPTclosed the doors and the alarm was reset.This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C),
any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that areneeded to control the release of radioactive material.
At the time of the event, the requirements ofTechnical Specification 3.6.4.1 were not applicable to Unit 2 because Unit 2 was in Mode 4.Therefore, this event is only reportable for Dresden Unit 3.C. Cause of Event:The cause of this event was determined to be a failure to recognize a hazard while proceeding in theface of uncertainty.
Specifically, an RPT did not recognize that there was a change in plant conditions (i.e., the X-Area was restored to part of the Secondary Containment boundary) and decided that itwas permissible to override the X-Area interlock doors by using an emergency manual push-button without first stopping to question when conditions were not as expected.
NRC FORM 366A (01-2014)
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (01-2014)
: 4. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)CONTINUATION SHEET1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGEYE I SEQUENTIAL I REVYEAR NUMBER NO.Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3 05000249 3 OF 32013 001 -00NARRATIVE A contributing cause of this event was a lack of procedural guidance that would communicate to RPthe restoration of the X-Area to service.
The procedure required communications (i.e., Signoffs) toOperations and to Engineering.
: However, the procedure did not require RP to be notified of therestoration.
D. Safety Analysis:
The Secondary Containment interlock doors were open for approximately fifteen minutes.
Basedupon the number of individuals present at the interlock that were capable of closing the interlock, andthat the Secondary Containment differential pressure remained negative during the course of thisevent, this event is of low safety significance.
E. Corrective Actions:As a result of this event, the station has completed or is planning to complete the following:
: 1. Performance management of the RPT involved in this event has been completed.
: 2. A Stand-Down with the RP Department, discussing this event, was completed.
: 3. An action was created for each RP employee to review human performance procedures.
: 4. Conducted a discussion with RPTs on how the U2 X-Area interlock doors work in order toverify understanding of the door operations.
: 5. Established requirement for additional briefs for X-Area entries.6. Add additional communications to the station procedure for removal and restoration of the X-Area from service.F. Previous Occurrences:
The station did not find previous occurrences over the past two years that specifically related to anevent where an individual manually defeated interlocks.
G. Comoonent Failure Data:N/ANRC FORM 366A (01-2014)}}

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