ML16344A053

Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC - Response to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Request for Additional Information Regarding the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report and Environmental Review

ML16344A053
Person / Time
Site:	Northwest Medical Isotopes
Issue date:	11/28/2016
From:	Haass C C Northwest Medical Isotopes
To:	NRC/NRR/DPR/PRLB
References
NWMl-2016-RAl-004, TAC MF6138
Download: ML16344A053 (131)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:.. NWMI .*:.**.-.* . ..... * ** *:=* * ". NDRTHWESTMEOICALISOTOPES ATTACHMENT 3 Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC Response to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Request for Additional Information Regarding the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report and Environmental Review of the Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC Construction Permit Application Docket No. 50-609 Dated: September 29, 2016 {Document No. NWMl-2016-RAl-004, November 2016) Public Version Information is being provided via hard copy

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• Response to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Request for Additional Information Regarding the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report of the Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC Construction Permit Application Docket No. 50-609 Prepared by: NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 November 2016 Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC 815 NW 9th Ave, Suite 256 Corvallis, OR 97330 This page intentionally left blank.

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UGlltm'VlSTMf[l(CAllSOTOf(S NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 Response to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Request for Additional Information Regarding the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report of the Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC Construction Permit Application Docket No. 50-609 NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 Date Published: November 28, 2016 Document Number: NWMl-2016-RAl-004 I Revision Number. O Title: Response to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Request for Additional Information Regarding the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report of the Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC Construction Permit Application Docket No. 50-609 Approved by: Carolyn Haass Signature: NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 REVISION IDSTORY Rev Date Reason for Revision Revised By 0 11/28/2016 Issued for Submittal to the NRC N/A NWMl-2016-RAl.,004, Rev. 0 CONTENTS General Information ................................................................................................................................ 1 Chapter 2.0-Site Characteristics ............................................................................................................ 4 Chapter 3. 0 -Design of Structures, Systems, and Components .............................................................. 20 Chapter 5.0 -Coolant Systems .............................................................................................................. 35 Chapter 6.0-Engineered Safety Features .............................................................................................. 37 Chapter 7.0-Instrumentation and Control Systems ............................................................................... 46 Chapter 8.0-Electrical Power Systems .................................................................................................. 53 Chapter 9 .0 -Auxiliary Systems ............................................................................................................ 54 Chapter 11.0 -Radiation Protection and Waste Management ................................................................. 66 Chapter 12.0-Conduct of Operations ................................................................................................... 78 Chapter 13.0 -Accident Analysis .............

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83 Chapter 14.0 -Technical Specifications ................................................................................................ 91 References ............................................................................................................................................. 93 ATTACHMENTS Attachment A-Section 3.5, "Systems and Components" ofNWMI-2013-021, Construction Permit Application.for Radioisotope Production Facility .......................................... A-i Attachment B-NWMI-2014-RPT-006,MCNP 6.1 Validations with Continuous Energy ENDFIB-Vll.1 Cross-Sections (Rev. 0) (Public Version) ........................................... B-i Attachment C -NWMI-2015-CSE-008, NWMI Preliminary Criticality Safety Evaluation: Hot Cell Uranium Purification (Recovery and Recycle) (Rev. A) (Public Version) ........... C-i NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 TERMS Acronyms and Abbreviations 99Mo 235u mu ADAMS ALARA ALI ANECF ANS ANSI AOA ASCE ASTM BMS C-I C-II CDE CEDE CF2 CFR CP DAAP DAC DBE EDE EOI ESF FEMA FPC FSAR H2 HEGA HEPA HEU HMI HVAC I&C IBC IEU IROFS ISA ISG ketr LEU MCER MCNP MHA MMI MoS molybdenum-99 uranium-235 uranium-238 Agencywide Documents Access and Management System as low as reasonably achievable annual limits on intake average neutron energy causing fission American Nuclear Society American National Standards Institute area of applicability American Society of Civil Engineers American Society for Testing and Materials building management system Seismic Category I Seismic Category II committed dose equivalent committed effective dose equivalent carbon fluoride Code of Federal Regulations Construction Permit diamylamylphosphonate derived air concentration design-basis event effective dose equivalent end of irradiation engineering safety feature Federal Emergency Management Agency facility process control final safety analysis report hydrogen gas high-efficiency gas adsorption high-efficiency particulate air high-enriched uranium human-machine interface heating, ventilation, and air conditioning instrument and control International Building Code intermediate-enriched uranium items relied on for safety integrated safety analysis Interim Staff Guidance k-eff ective low-enriched uranium maximum-considered earthquake Monte Carlo N-Particle maximum hypothetical accident Modified Mercalli Intensity margin of subcriticality ii

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• MU MURR NCS NESHAP NFPA NRC NS NSR NWMI OBE OSL OSTR osu PGA PHA PPE PSAR QA QAPP QL RAI RAM RCA RPF RSAC SAR SEP SNM SR SSC SSE TEDE TLD TRI GA u U.S. UC UH3 U02 U02(N03)2 UPS USGS UZrH WCDE NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 University of Missouri University of Missouri Research Reactor nuclear criticality safety National Emission Standards for f:Iazardous Air Pollutants National Fire Protection Association U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission non-seismic nonsafety-related Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC operating basis earthquake optically stimulated luminescence Oregon State University TRIGA Reactor Oregon State University peak ground acceleration process hazard analysis personal protective equipment preliminary safety analysis report quality assurance quality assurance program plan quality level request for additional information radioactive material radiologically controlled area Radioisotope Production Facility Radiological Safety Analysis Computer safety analysis report standby electrical power special nuclear material safety-related structures, systems, and components safe-shutdown earthquake total effective dose equivalent thermoluminescent dosimeter Training, Research, Isotopes, General Atomics uranium United States uranium carbide uranium trihydride uranium dioxide uranyl nitrate uninterruptable power supply United States Geological Survey uranium zirconium hydride weighted committed dose equivalent iii "'

.;., .. NWMI ............ . : ........ :. Units oc op µ cm cm 2 ft ft2 g g gal ha hp hr m. in.2 kg km km2 kPa kW L lb m MeV mg rm mi2 mm mrem mSv rem wk yr degrees Celsius degrees Fahrenheit rmcron centimeter square centimeter feet square feet gram ground acceleration gallon hectare horsepower hour inch square inch kilogram kilometer square kilometer kilopascal

kilowatt liter pound meter million electron volts milligram mile square mile minute millirem millisievert roentgen equivalent in man week year NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 iv

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Ntml'HWfSTMU!ltAL tsOlOPES NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 GENERAL INFORMATION No. Request for Additional Information 1of96 NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 \The maximum hypothetical accident (MHA) discussion was inappropriately included in Section 13.2.1 !of the preliminary safety analysis report (PSAR) (NWMI-2013-021, Construction Permit Application for )Radioisotope Production Facility). NWMI interpreted NUREG-1537, Guidelines for Preparing and jReviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors: Plan and 1Acceptance Criteria, Part 2, Chapter 13, as augmented by the Interun Staff Gui.dance (ISG) (NRC, ]2012), as requiring.an analysis consistent with both 10 CFR 70.61, "Performance Requirements," and lwith the MHA approach. Additionally, the PSAR combined the two in its approach to the MHA, jproducing an analysis inconsistent with the intended requirements of an MHA analysis. t fThe accident analyses in the final safety analysis report (FSAR); as part of the Operating License !Application, will be consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 70.61. As stated in Chapter 13b, !"Radioisotope Production Facility Accident Analyses,'.' of the ISG Augmenting NUREG-1537, Part 1: I . l NRC staff has determined that the use of Integrated Safety Analysis methodologies as described in 10 CFR Part 70 Subpart Hand NUREG-1520, application of the radiological and chemical consequence and likelihood criteria contained in the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70. 61, designation of items relied on for safety, and establishment of management measures, are acceptable ways of demonstrating adequate safety for the medical isotopes production facility. fThe accident analyses in the PSAR are based on (1) use of integrated safety analysis (ISA) !methodologies, as described in 10 CFR 70 Subpart Hand NUREG-1520, Standard Review Plan for the !Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility, (2) application of the radiological and !chemical consequence and likelihood criteria contained in the performance requirements of 10 CFR l?0.61, (3) designation of items relied on for safety (IROFS), and (4) establishment of management jmeasures to demonstrate adequate safety. \The ISA includes a systematic analysis and discussion of credible accidents for determining the limiting ievents for several accident categories. The limiting event in each category is analyzed quantitatively to !determine consequences. Radiological accident consequences, as mitigated by structures, systems, and jcomponents (SSC) and administrative safety measures, are evaluated against the performance !requirements of 10 CFR 70.61. The safety measures are designated as IROFS. 2 of96 NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 '-Request for Additional Information !Based on the response to RAI G-3, PSAR.Section 13.2, "Analysis ofAccidents with Radiological and !Criticality Safety Consequences" Will be revised and the MHA discussion in PSAR Section 13.2.1 will \be deleted. f'G . '.itiidili !SSCs will be designed to protect against both high and immediate consequences. PSAR Section 3.5.1.3.1 jdescribed both the high and the immediate consequence performance requirements from 10 CFR 70.61. jTo eliminate confusion and ensure completeness, these bullets were removed from PSAR .Section 3.5.1.3 j(see Attachment A), and the 10 CFR 70.61 performance requirements are referenced. 3 of96 NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 CHAPTER 2.0 -SITE CHARACTERISTICS No. Request for additional information if;,;; 4. '* :l'" ***','\);;analySjfi; should t{?!no.nst,rate:Biatthe!',e is. a ca,u,Id ajfe:qUhe ,.: i I ,:,, :: , :::: :;;/°'! .** ;:'f:eiictoFor:fh'f:lttheconseque'nt:dfro',,f'.dnx Ciirc' *" * '::associatedqcC/aefitare:atr,eady liiJunded bl/.,:*,.

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There are three airports and three helicopter ports located within 16 kilometers (km) (10 miles [mi]) of :the proposed RPF site. The three airports include:

• Columbia Regional Airport (public) located approximately 10.4 km (6.5 mi) south of the RPF site 1
• Cedar Creek Airport (private) located approximately 10.6 km (6.6 mi) northeast of the RPF site Sugar Branch Airport (private) located approximately 15.6 km (9.7 mi) northwest of the RPF site iTuese airports are identified in PSAR Chapter 2.0, Figure 2-30, of the Construction Permit Application.

The nearest airport to the RPF is the Columbia Regional Airport, which is used by commercial and 'privately owned aircraft.

The airport is situated on approximately 0.532 ha (1,314 acres) and is owned :and operated by the City of Columbia. This airport is the only public use airport located in Boone ;county, Missouri, for which records are kept. For the 12-month period ending October 31, 2013, the 'airport had 16,610 aircraft operations for an average of 26 flights per day, including: ' . l

• 81 percent general aviation 16 percent air taxi 2 percent military 1 percent air carrier :Cedar Creek airport is a private turf landing strip approximately 10.6 km (6.6 mi) northeast of the RPF ; '.site. The facility houses two private single engine aircraft.

The specific number of flights to and from the i ;facility is not available. The Sugar Branch airport is a private, turf landing strip approximately 15.6 km (9.7 mi) northwest of the ;RPF site. The facility houses one single engine aircraft. The specific number of flights to and from the :facility are not available. 'Three helicopter ports are located within 16 km ( 10 mi) of the RPF site and support hospital operations, ,including:

• University of Missouri Hospitals and Clinics heliport located 6 km (3. 7 mi) northwest
• University of Missouri (MU) heliport located 6 km (3.7 mi) northwest Boone Hospital Center heliport located 6.3 km (3.9 mi) northwest.

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NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 .. *:.* * ".. .. NqrtrnwuT,MflMCAl tsotOPfS !No operations data are available for these heliports. ! 1Based on NUREG-1537, sites located between 8 km (5 mi) and 16 km (10 mi) from an existing or . \projected commercial or military airport with more than approximately 200 d 2 (where dis the distance in ; !kilometers from the airport to the RPF site) commercial or military aircraft movements per year, the )probability of aircraft accidents is considered less than an order of magnitude of 10-7 per year. * !Tue number of operations at the Cedar Creek and Sugar Branch airports are not available. However, daily) 1operations were assumed based on the aircraft housed, including two operations per day from Cedar '. iCreek (730 operations/year) and one operation per day from Sugar Branch (365 operations/year). Based '. jon the results presented in Table 1, all three airports are under the 200 d 2 limits.

• i Airport Table 1. 200 D 2 Limits Distance km (mi) Flights per year i is the distance in from the airport to the .RPF site (200. x qistance, squared) ..... 200 d 2 limitsa !Based on this requirement, none of these airports needs to be further evaluated.

The guidance also jrequires that special consideration be given to facilities sited within the trajectory of a runway of any ;airport. The RPF site is not located within a trajectory of a runway of the airport. ' iBecause the three heliports are closer than 8 km (5 mi) to the RPF site, the frequency of an aircraft jcrashing into the site needs to be evaluated. NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of iSafety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, Subsection 3 .5 .1. 6, provides a methodology for , !determining the probability of an aircraft crash into a facility from airways. However, the approach requires : !knowledge of the number of flights per year along the airway. Because this information is not available 1for the flight paths near the RPF, DOE-STD-3014-2006, Accident Analysis for Aircraft Crash into !Hazardous Facilities, was used to determine the frequency of crashes. The following equation is used. !Where: : I Fh N Ph fh(x,y) Fh = Nh x Ph x fh(x,y) x Ah Crash impact frequency Flight per year Probability of a crash Probability, given a crash, that the crash occurs in a l-mi 2 area surrounding the facility = Effective plant area. \The effective area for an aircraft was determined by two components: the aircraft crashing into the !facility either by skidding or by flying directly into it. The effective area was calculated based on an laircraft skidding or flying into the facility in the direction that produces the largest area (i.e., crashing in a; jdirection perpendicular to the largest diagonal of the building). , ' iThe following formula was used to calculating the skid and fly in areas of an aircraft crashing into the !facility. , \Where: , (2 xL x W x WS) Ar = (WS + R) x H x cot</J + R + L x W 5 of 96 L .. NWMI -.-.* .. *:.* .

• NORIHWUT M£DIW lSOTCIP£S and: !Where: l, : Ar ' As ws R H cot<l> L w s Effective fly-in area Effective skid area = Aircraft wingspan As = (WS + R) x S = Length of the diagonal of the facility = ..J L2 + W 2 Facility height, facility-specific Mean of the cotangent of the aircraft impact angle Length of facility, facility-specific Width of facility, facility-specific

= Aircraft skid distance (mea.Ii value). NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 '.DOE-STD-3014-2006 notes that in calculating an effective area, the analyst needs to be cognizant of the ;"critical areas" of the facility. The critical areas are locations in a facility that contain hazardous material and/or locations that, once impacted by a crash, can lead to cascading failures (e.g., a fire, collapse, '.and/or explosion that would impact the hazardous material). The critical areas of the RPF are considered , *to be the hot cell and waste management areas. * *The critical areas dimensions are estimated at 30.5 x 24 meters (m) (100 x 80 feet [ft]), which provides a ; diagonal (R) of39 m (128 ft). The facility height (H) of22.9 m (75 ft) was used. DOE-STD-3014-2006 l . provides estimates for aircraft wingspan, mean of the cotangent of the aircraft impact angle, and skid .distance for five different aircraft types. For helicopters, the cot<l> value is 0.58 and the skid length is 'typically assumed to be 0. The effective area is calculated in Table 2. Aircraft Helicopter

Wing spana ws (ft) 50 Table 2. Affective Area for Helicopter cot<l>a 0.58 Skid distancea s (ft) 0 Effective plant area Ah (mi 2) 0.00079 a DOE-STD-3014-2006, Accident Analysis for Aircraft Crash into Hazardous Facilities, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., 1996 (R2006). For a helicopter, fh(x,y) is estimated based on half the average length of a flight with the lateral :variations in crash locations assumed to be one-quarter mile on the average from the centerline of the *flight path or 2/L. The probability Ph (2.50E-05) is taken from DOE-STD-3014-2006, Appendix B :Table B-1. The total number of flights from the three helipads are estimated at 1,825 per year. A ; !conservation estimate is that 5 percent of these helicopters overfly the facility.

In addition, a conservative i :estimate of total flight path is the distance to the closest helipad or 6 km (3.7 mi). I !Based on these assumptions, the helicopter impact frequency is calculated as follows: 2 Fh = 91 x 2.SE-05 x 3_7 x 7.9£-04 Fh = 9.7E-o7 The calculated crash impact frequency from the heliport is less than the requirement ofNUREG-0800 of f '.being within an order of magnitude of 10-7 per year. Therefore, no further analysis is required. This ; 'information will be added to PSAR Section 2.2.2. 6 of 96 NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -Request for additional information iPSAR Section 2.2.2.1 had a typographical error. 10.4 km (6.5 mi) is the correct distance from the !Columbia Regional Airport to the RPF site, based on Google Earth measurements, and 10.4 km (6.5 mi) \is the distance used in the associated calculations. The stated distance of 10.5 km will be changed to ; 10.4 km (6.5 mi) in PSAR Section 2.2.2.1. . . -' . - ' ' ' \' *.' '/1('aqility nearby or mi(i_ta,ry "cannotaJfep['.the/Rf!llJ! .:. ' *. ' l * * * : *:

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imd giy<? the fot t!Jis '.statement. '.' (:* : ', _. ': * .* * * .. * . \IFurthermore, NuREG-1537;part2, $ection 7;2, irm;sportation,,c:i,nd_Militqry., . ; -;

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'4_1$fance for at Fprnt. *:; _-, : . , ; . . O': ' ',,. . -_ ' " : ,'; .. ' *.* 11PSARSeciion 2.1.3.1.2;' "NeiJrbyFaCilfties, -*i .. .. . . . 2). NFVM in<fiCates that an analysis accinlYJtfngfor th?;to(al amount 9f gasoline . 'j!at 0 thelv/iigelldnfactlity yl¢1as.a s'tij;;Stand6]Jdistaiide;)greater* . 'i *" ',1. ** ' ' . " ' ' ' . . . , ' . ., . ' ' " " ' ,'" ... *' . * :;than its citr_rent l(Jc_qtion to the R;PF.'Such scenario niajipose q_ ri$k to tlie RPPsirice the location of* i '.:. ;_ * ; .. , '.: * *: rf!l ihi;ip, rfsli;[pr_ r , . . , *Jrje,coun_ti,ngfor the.to(al-.afri{funt of j)r.dpdne_'stqi:ed at Af[J,Soutlz)}'m:fnfaoility: Tl]e !, i .. ' J:consider the acceptable distance to ihe largest tank of gasoline;-.diesel, or propdne," at these nearby' '. J_; * . _. * !1f a._ci/ities 'wh,ich is

• TJ:erefore, a,drJitio,n,qljnjOmiation is .. >. . .*;; , .,,,. , --* 1ineededfor the NRG staff to*de(etmine tliat p,otentia(accidents at: nearbyfacilities*wouldnotpose;-

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• lisuffici to the RPF t6 Fende; t/:le site unsiiitablefor constroction and operation a11dib : . .'. : . * . ' ' I-. ' ' -' . . -. ' ' ' ' . . * ' i .. *, : '. _-. , , . i!u"'dersfandthe pole_IJfil!/

radi_ofogicq/ risks, ifJJfiy, t9,th,efacil!ty.,stajf, .fh,e,. pu.,b/ic, '(lfldfhe j '; : RA.I whether-the assumptions in PSAR Section 2.2.3.1,. "Deterntinatioh ofDesign-BasisEvents, ',

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The analysis performed does not bound an explosion of the total inventory of nearby facilities.

The ianalysis uses the largest tank for two identified facilities to determine the effect on RPF operations or !safe shutdown. It was determined to be highly unlikely for the total inventory from both facilities to be !involved in the explosion scenario due to the following. At the MU South Farm, the closest facility, the jtotal inventory of propane is in multiple disperse locations. For the Magellan Pipeline facility, an ;accidental explosion of multiple tanks at one time adding to the pressure wave is also highly unlikely . . ... .. --.. j _RAI. 2.2-2b;Wrovide the acceptablf!. 'disirince for.die§el dr1d descrtbe p(?terf t_i_al, e.ffeits in. the'RPF,; ..... .. :: .. .. __ ___ ,, .. :::-;;: -.:*'. ,. , ._ ,,** -* .,, ": --. l /As identified in PSAR Section 2.2.3 .1.2, Table 2-17, the acceptable distance or diesel at the MU South ;Farm is 0.94 km (0.58 mi). The diesel tanks are 1.6 km (1 mi) from the RPF. Based on the explosion ianalysis conducted in EDF-3124-0016, Analysis of Potential Accidents at Nearby Facilities, an ;explosion of the tanks would not affect the RFP. *rn-e:e* ..._..,.__ ,_. .. = 7 of96 .*:.** ... * . .: ... NWM I NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 . : .. * ** *:=* UOlUlf'NESTMtmCALWJTtJPES No. Request for additional information [*. .* ., .*.

• RAI *2:3-1 '.'NURE_G-1537, Part 2, Section 2. l>'Geography States;' in p;,:t, that "aspa;t ojthis .t :*review, the should cf;eck the exclusion area dfstances against distqnces used in analysis *. !ij}resented in Chapter 11 ofthe SAR [sdfety 'a11alys.(s report]. ,; .* * . . .'., . ./ .. ; ." : l * ::NWJ.;JJ PSAR 2:3.2, ,;'Site Meteorology;*,,

in part, asiumptipnswere .. '*used, tn both the SafetYAnalysis Computer code to support 10 CFR 10(£11: . , , . : of Excl11sionA.rea; .Jpw Population and.Population Center,distqn,cf!.

• • * ; (he area is nOt specifically'driscribed in 2::1 oriri *chapter 1:i*and-J3 of the PSAR. ;\Conflr'm*that the exclusion b 0 undafy is 'w!iat is described itJ. Chap{er il .of the* PSA:IJ. as. the j .i"controliedarea. "If not the same, describe th_e exclusion area.poundaryfor the RPF '.* : * . .., " *"' -*. v: "--.

-"-***-*- -.:-;:""'.-.. *,::-' -'*-... _,,_*:-* ""'" *-**-**-"'"" *-*-*.**** "*'* --.* "." -.* ,, __ , . ' .. ,. -*-'" ......... .* -; .... -**. ' ,,,, *. <-:*-*-*.:-__ ,,__... '"-' -::!* The boundary of the "controlled area" described in PSAR Chapters 11.0 and 13.0 is the same as the "exclusion area boundary." PSAR Chapters 2.0, 11.0, and 13.0 will be updated to use the same 'terminology when referring to the "exclusion area boundary." :.c* di;[

• * ';annual .freql{encies of severe weather phenomena, induding hurricanes, tornadoes, waterspouts, *
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and,hail;:should be .stated; *The ¢pplifJimt should give the known,aiid

,'.: ' :'.maximuln annual frequency ofdccurrence and time duration of freezing ;ain (ice:sforms) arid'dusi

• il;(sand) .storms Y1?here applicable

.. Tl;e applica_nt sho"rili:l_estipwte lhf! /qO-year<<returrz ll(ind spe,'ei . * .. ! . r *"' ' ' ', , . * *. , ' , ' '.,, . , ' " ' ' ', . ; ' ' */"{ '" f "( .'WWMI PSAR, Se,etion 2.3.1.7, "Extreme Weather,'"statesthaf'the.RPF loe,ationarea exhibits . . * \'

• instilbility, "heavy predpitatfon; afJdmdny and is located*( *,in a tornado prone area, but did not provide annual frequencies of severe weather phenomer,a.

This ' _ ..mformatiori; is needed to -aete.1:mine

• if a of credible .frequency or consequences at '.iihe site render it zmsuiia.ble .for operation, as designed, and likely to cause* damage to the RPF facility ;" ,;\ -,' '.ldurirti tts7ifetim?

'thaf,toillir,elease unciontr6ited tq' :the unrestriCte<J a;ea. ' 1'. * "' .. .. .. The seasonal and annual frequencies of tornadoes, thunderstorms, lighting, and hail are provided as .follows in 1:able be .. Table 3. Seasonal Frequency of Historical Tornadoes in Boone County, Missouri (1954 to 2016) Magnitude (Fujita Scale) Month l February April ' June _, -... --August 1 .. .. ---*-* . .. ___ ,_ ' ' . October 2 _* --:, :-*-.-.----' --December Source: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/ 8 of 96 ...

• .*:.** ... : . ............

NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 r.:oamwESTt.mw:ALJSOTDPES Table 4. Annual Frequency of Historical Tornadoes in Boone County, Missouri (1954 to 2016) Magnitude (Fujita Scale) Year Total l: :; .... .. *: _ **: :. .* . .. 1956 ! 1 :: .. 1959 -* ** .* -1,. -.... Source: http://www.ncdc.noaagov/stormevents/ Table 5. Boone County Seasonal Thunderstorm Wind Events (8/29/1955 to 5/11/2016) Wind Velocity (mph) Month ';* p ; -; ._.,,:. ; . ..,...-_t-2 Source: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/ 9 of96 ';"* NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 Table 6. Boone County Annual Thunderstorm Wind Events (8/29/1955 to 5/11/2016) Year M4@1 J?W-M@§.i?W-M4Q4.i?W MfJ§.i?W 1 I 1 1958 l 3 ! 1973 l 1 , 1989 I -i 2004 8 Source: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/ Table 7. Boone County Lightning Events (7/5/1998 to 6/30/2016) Location -Description Columbia i 7/5/1998 I Lightning strike was blamed for a fire at a residence in southwest . i Columbia. Firefighters arrived to find flames shooting through a hole in l lthe roof. Columbia l 8/25/2004 l Lighting strike melted power lines at Providence and Green Meadows I j roads. About 5,000 people were affected by the resulting power outage, i i including New Haven Elementary School. Columbia . I 6/6/2005 I Lightning strike started a house fire. C:olumbia ! 7/19/2007 . Lightning strike started a fire at a photography studio. . Browns l 6/17 /2009 i Lightnfug strike killed woman in an open field at Rocky Fork Lakes I l Conservation Area. Columbia I 7/23/2011 i Lightning struck cell phone being used by woman in Cosmo Park. Source: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/ 10 of 96 .:;.*.;:.NWMI

• .**.-.: . ............

NORTHWISTMllHWtSOlDPlS NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 Table 8. Boone County Seasonal Hail Events 4/23/1958 -5/11/2016 Diameter (in.) Location Source: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stonnevents/ Year Source: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stonnevents/ 11 of 96

.. NWM I *::.**.*.:* ........ :.* NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 tl!lRfHWESTMEDlCALISOTOP£S Re uest for additional information -! RAl*.2:3:-2b /ind duration of freezing tain. discuss ; f L * ; . . .

• ilfhe potential effects of thesi} meteorologicgreyents.

on t,he RfF. . . ;. >** * * . : . . .* .. :. (. * -.-"**.*** .......... ,, .,..[ ..... ,.. .. ' ... , ..... .,. .. ,.-.. _._ ,.,* ... ......... -.--<<*-* .... ;.c . .;,. .. ,.:.". "*'" .. -.. .;,*.* .. '*'*r *. **"*""' ............ ...... *.* ... iWinter weather events since 1996 in Boone County, Missouri are provided in Table 10. These events 1 !include snowstorms, ice storms, and extreme cold events. The RPF is being designed to ASCE 7, iMinimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures, to withstand expected meteorological \events. This information will be factored in the design requirements of PSAR Section 3.2.5, "Rain, Loading" for RPF. Table 10. Boone County Winter Weather Events (1/1/1996 to 6/30/2016) (2 pages) Description ---Ill 01102196 ; .. -,--."* ............ -<<-*e-i-o i/d3/9({ ..

• • ....
• . . . . .
• *. . *

..

• • -.-*--...,,,,,,,-

'::.-*<-*t"'--:--<,-._..;.:_::., .. -..... ____ , ___ .. --...... .,,. ... ____ . .:.. *. -.... ---11/25/96 Ice storm 1 i Numerous traffic accidents 01/15/97 Winter storm : 2 : Freezing rain and sleet with 'l4 to Yi in. of ice accumulation

followed by 3 to 8 in. of snow in the region 04/l 0/97 ; Winter storm \ 1 ; 2 to 6 in. of snow in the region

..... ,, ... 01/12/98 : Winter storm i 1 ! Freezing drizzle resulting in thin glaze of ice on roads .. 12/21/98 Winter storm : 2 : Light freezing drizzle, sleet, and snow left a thin coating of ice 'on roads r ... ""-* .-... -,.. ........ ...... ............

• ..

....... ....... -.. *-.. ... -.. ..... ............ --*.** .......... ...........

... .. . .. *" i 01f9Jl99 .. ;: Win.ter stcinjJ: :; <i . \6._iq 10,;n,i:*of snow acr<)ss region.With about ap. i,nch oL:,. *

• I I./ ** :(,'* * .

.. ..... 01/27 /00 ' Winter storm 3 i 4 to 5 in. across region .. .. .. 12/13/00 ; Heavy snow : 1 : 6 to 12 in. across region ,- ..... * -""-""--{;- -*----------*G ....... ... 1;....,.*.-- ... :* . .. ---*::-.;-.;.--:--....**:-**-*. '"""-. __ :*--**---';'"'<;.- ......... ___ ,_ .... f 12/16/00 ?( Emret!te ..... > :; , Z ; qlp1ls ?-om::.20.°Fto 10°F,* * : * * *

• L .*. : ..

_* __ .. . .. .... .. * ..... , .. .... .. .. ...... 01/29/02 Ice storm 2 : 1 'l4 to Yz in. of ice accumulation; power outages 03/25/02 : Winter storm 2 ; Sleet followed by snow; 3-to 4-in. accumulation of the mix .. ws:iii:* .. .......... . I. ..... .......... .. -., .. , ..... , .... , ................... -.................... , .... ., .. , _, .. .. -... , .. _ ....... _ ........ ............................ -........ -=-..... --.. ... .. ........... , ..... ........ .. 12/24/02 Winter storm : 1 : 4 to 8 in. of snow across region 02/23/03 \ Winter storm ; 2 ' 3 to 6 in. of snow across the region I .. .... .. .. ... :-'.:] 12 of 96

.. NWM I .........

• .* NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 . '. 9.r:.:!:.

NORTHWISTUBlCCALISUTDPl:S Table 10. Boone County Winter Weather Events (1/1/1996 to 6/30/2016) (2 pages) -Storm type mmmm -Description 12/13/03 : Winter storm \ 1 i 3 to 6 in. of snow across the region .. .. L 11/24/04 \ Winter storm ( 1 i 4 to 6 in. of snow across region

• . ..;. *.
• --**-*
• -'-
• .. **:-;-';'.i:::.."':'"'-,.,-*'"".-

-:- .*

• • . ..:..:..:::;::

!.12/08/05

• ::-Winter.storm

__ ;;"

• 1 -:J2m.:ofsnow
• ., * * .... * -' * *

":r.r."";-*----.

• .

.. 11/29/06 i Winter storm I 3 ! Over a foot of snow in some areas 12/8/2007

Ice storm ; 4 ! Up to a Y2 in. of ice accumulated along with up to 1 in. of sleet .*. , .. *** .*

.. ..

• • '"-'.-' " .. -... ..=,: ..

.. .,.-,. "" **<<,' *1 l l/31/2011-:*}* storm. :j'_ .... 2. : }ll,Tp:to 2_0-in-,of sn6_wfellal9ngwith

WindsguStirig over , : -1 , ... . .:. ....

... ... : ... . ... .... .. ..... .... .. , _ __ .. .. ,; ..

c. :.:J 12/21/2013 l Ice storm 1 1 \Average ice accumulation on trees and other overhead ' ; surfaces was from 0.25 to 0.30 in; about Y2 inch of sleet also : : fell in some locations 2/4/2014 ! Winter storm \ 1 ! 6 to 13 in. of snow across the region Source: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/

No. Request for additional information ,, -. '!;Applies to' * ,;i!fUR!!,G-153 7;Paft J,' $ection* 2.p;' *".!Geology, _Seisn{IJJogy and

• sta/es that 1.f?Ais 2 .. 1 ')\ifir/appl!can_t detail the seislii{c:

an'd $iie and regio[l

• through

. j;ine site.: The degref! of detail and'e.fif!nl bf corisfderdttOns should be,corhme1J8urate, with the. po'tential

' ' .. ' .. :.<<.*>> .. *.*/. .. -:"..* ,,:_* :X<': .. "* .* .\ ;j ' * * . , .. '.\N.,rJREG-15 3 7, Part .J, Secti_orz id: 2, ,'.'Si(e .Geology,/Stdtes that /he in detail : *i' * :. < *.* qt tfle sfloulfl pdy.particu!a'r attf{htfqn: to 'to_:tfu{Sife such 'antiCltiies; d_oriies,and -: .. *, :.*'. ,.

1. . . :!{*' .. ' " . *," ': . '*. * .. *:.* ' ' "_**** ...... : ....... "* .. -: .---*.,c'*<<" . ,, ' .'"-( . *

• J.In.Sec.tions 2:5,S,,* "S:f!:ismicity, :' 2.5,.f,., "-Nfaximuhf Ijarthquake Potentiql,/
  • ,i, f ., * * . * * ?J,v.Iotion, :'. 25. 6, .

Faulting, ::,gnd 2.5. 7, "J;i<jiiefqction Potenti(ll, NV!ffe:G, that,:: ".! * * * * . . * *'. j;; appliC<lnt sh(ju!d ... Mefcaiu intehsity'of'. '.i f(:" *: *: * * *

• .. ,Jh*; .. <* :.:: ;':\ 11.* :: * . , *: :* , ..

co.uzaoccur,.::.,gn-µ:tsoseisn_1q1

tflaps.

)". . * ** : : the. applicant.sh0,u/d:assess the gfoun_d motio_n:atthe site jrOi11: the fJl(!x..LIJlUf!l. , .::' , *. : . lo. . . . . . . . . '.* -' ' . . ' . . . * . * ' * . ., .. . *,:I" *potential earthquakes ... and the applicant-should e§tciblish theyibratq'r,y ground:motiori _design . .. *,i, . '...;! :. ' spectriim r ahd}'the applicant should discuss so ii s:tructure and prepare an appfopriate state of the;-J, ;:*".. : . _. _-.)(, '.

• * * ::;/,. ', ',:**_* ::: _*' . 0: *, ,;*:::. * ...

. : ....

• J!]lUREG,.

153 Section. 2:5/urther. states review tHeinformation/.'i * . di.

/peal bi u'ty , . '. . . * .

• su_ch astfiefiifal safety:analySis'report (FSARfof:a_ . . : : .. * . .<_:. /

... -.**.* **-*- .... -;*--,'!-.--.,...,;--=:----

• -

--.*-*o _.-,..,,_._:,.

• -

.......... 13 of 96 .*:.**.*.* . .... .. NWM I NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 . : ........ ; .

• 8*

N!IRMvtSTrJEDlCAllSOTOPlS -Re uest for additional information 2,.S:T3,* L . . '* .. Xof the cou_nt;I coritain weil d(!J?elqped C,ave.and sii1,kholf!form.ations. fSAR§ection 2:5:'2;"3;

• .: :. *. . '. :* l * *
• Formation," references.a report by Tep:acon . *
• i i , . ' .:'.(;onsµltants, lnc.':{Ferracon) tfiat that "no or are known to dt:. arepubUshefJ( i* _: ..

f!X,ist _aP!{t:o.x,iin,atdf ,f "rnt!J ,of;fthis '. k<irst : i.c. *. ..

RJ.\l a F<J..o.r,zfirm by or no. new aeveloked lj(theproject

.. : *if ' : '*'.Site s(nce the T¢rtqconpreliminary'reportwas issued in 2011. * -* .. . . ** * ** *t -, ,, ---

---

>>' .:*-

-..,.--___ .:__., ______ ..:,.:=',_- __ * .,. -"'-"'-'" **-_:.. ';'" :.. - .. -*-_-.-.. ""'--<::'..-=..;.- < --::. .. ...,,,,,,,.... ___ -.,,.. .. ,:._ ... ... : ..... .h-:,, ..

• ,..;: v

'.No sinkholes have occurred at the RPF site since the Terracon preliminary report was issued in 2011 i(Terracon, 201 la/b). The most recent study (Boone County, 2015) shows that the project site is northeast tofthe nearest areas considered to have the potential for sinkholes. The most recent sinkhole occurred in ; 1 May 2014 and was located on East Gans Creek Road, approximately 1.17 km (0.73 mi) to the southwest i :of the RPF site. , j * ----c*-*-* * """-"*"'** ___ *.-..

• ._, .
• *----** -*

.. -* .. .,.. *- ..... ..:. *. -*.* . . ..._._ .. ....__.:-",w-.*

RAI 2.5-1 b 'lc;I,arif.y alfd iqentifY mea'sures tQ, to prec/uefe potentially detriinentdlffffects of sinkhole * ...

; : : : .. -. . . ;l[o'r,rilati.ons on tflefq,uriqatiofls'in il:!f!Juture

......... ' : :: " . ' : ': . . . .... .,,,.: _;_ *** ... ---:.*. -..,, .....

• l'; ...

._., .. ,;,;,_Fzt,:!',.,,:., ',,._-,.,.: .**

• ._.;.+.<<?*

....

.-**. ; A site-specific geotechnical investigation of the RPF will be conducted site to ensure that the area does ,not have the potential for sinkholes.

If the investigation does identify the potential for sinkholes, the '.design would incorporate one of the following alternatives: (1) excavate site both vertically and 'horizontally to remove that potential and backfill with structural fill, or (2) install piers to bedrock to *'.support the substructure if a sinkhole was to occur. If one of these alternatives needs to be implemented, )t will be determined after the geotechnical investigation is complete, incorporated in the final RPF ;design, and presented in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application. .

-** * * * . * *. ** ;"plastic clays:that volume change 1111th variations m moisture are near * * , . . . * * :

ground stateme11,t i!i i'.epeated in this P$AR section.*

• ; .. ; ' .

of oil strncht(ai .. * . :r* , ..

.-\"'/;'.'.'f

• * ,:<':<:: * .. *:" *

*: .,:

_ * ... _ ...

• i ** ** .... nqarifY anymeasiires*tobe

, .... -** ., ..

__

• . : * . * ?-. ; ....... :* * < *. * *. *: .... * .:" ": .. ... * .. .A site-specific geotechnical investigation of the RPF site will be conducted to identify the site-specific isoil characteristics.

If highly plastic clays are identified at the site, the design will include excavation of ithe clays and then backfill with structural fill. The structural details will be developed in the final RPF :design and presented in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application. , f-. _ _... __ --r-,<-:-""'* ,,.--= .... . .._ '""-.* ""'-"""- ..... ........ *** __ .,.. .;;::.;p-:-:--- ....... ....;:,.:.... .. ,_., __ ; .... ** ....... .....

'.'°":<"""""---;;-_-"'*"-

- ..

• f ,! .f{AI 2.5+ .,NWMI PSAR Sectign 2.5.3, Types ..... . . : . *: . * . . . ".: .* . .. , :: , . **. . . :.'.:

with levels .limi.ts l!lciJ: be ruttini'and can .. : . *" * : ... ** > .develop' durin'g-ge.nir;al qonst/-µ¢tf6n'.op°'errit/ons '(!' eAa(:oii )0 J.1 X. *, .

• j . * * '* ,f :;:, :* expqn,srve:'w.r.

sorls.,

Footings, floor.;*s.labs,.

qnd pa\!el'J]ents. supported, on expansrye-: . -:*.I . f . * . .. '*' . .... . *" ".' .. *.-** . . . ' '" . . ' . . . . . . ,,;. soil often shift'itpwafd or downW,ardcausingpo:Ssible distortiofis, '*cn:1cking or Sthj.Ctural damage:. : *;: ' . . .

• is to preventpoteniial of ) .

A site-specific geotechnical investigation of the RPF site will be conducted to identify the site-specific

• :soil characteristics.

If highly plastic clays are identified at the site, the design will include excavation of :the clays and then backfill with structural fill. The structural details will be developed in the final RPF in as . ..... . 14 of96

.. NWM I *.::.**.-.: . ........ :.* . * ",

• NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -Request for additional information f

f , : ' ., : Z ': * : larger°tha'n J:O tn table ;ids,,

i/J/'{equtr4,cf6y.

1 .. *: i. * *-:: s-/- Section 2:s::3.,<'."SeismiC1 . "Tlie:laSi !Isled earth .. -1: !PSAR Chapter 2.0, Table 2-28, will be revised (as shown below) to incorporate earthquakes since 2002 ; , with a magnitude over 3. 0. : l.._. _ . ......,._.._._,_,...__,,"l"_. ,_"<"' .. _ __.,. .. __ '"" _ .... "! Table 2-28. Recorded Missouri Earthquake History (3 pages) -***--*' ' ---' *t1M:hhtl. ' .* ' ' " . ' ' ' 12/16/1811 j NewMadrid --J -* *-7.7--*-* (1811-18121 Region, Missouri i !;flooding, high river back cave-ins. Topographic changes affected series) ! j ,an area of78,000 to 130,000 km 2 (30,116 to 50,193 mi 2). Later ! !geologic evidence indicated that the epicenter was likely in , jnortheast Arkansas. The main shocks were felt over an area Recorded damage j !covering at least 5,180,000 km 2 (2,000,000 mi2). Chimneys were l !knocked down in Cincinnati, Ohio, and bricks were reported to ! * !have fallen from chimneys in Georgia and South Carolina. The , I !first shock was felt distinctively in Washington, D.C., 1,127 km I j !(700 mi) away. 2/7/1812 l New Madrid, I 7.7 !Three main shocks reaching l\1MI of XII, the maximum on scale. (1811-1812 ) Missouri l !Aftershocks continued to be felt for several years after the initial series) I ! !tremor. Historical accounts and later evidence indicate that the I ! 1epicenter was close to the town of New Madrid, Missouri. Tiris I ! !quake produced the largest liquefactions fields in the world '

• .

-: . l/4118ll-3

• *

.;j . *Not;Jisted,

a.net:'['

.. *_: *:,:, . , .. ,..,,. ,, . -*i"' *'**.* . _ * ,.,,, ,, ,,,.,.;;.:-./

• .....

.. ![ *;, , . "*":., * * .. *"* 1;md1cateo.lli8,t.two:huntersr,:were ,dfowneddunng the,formation of aj 4/24/1867 ! Eastern Kansas , Not listed . !Reports indicated that an earthquake occurred in eastern Kansas I l land was felt as far eastward as Chicago, Illinois. It may have been j l !noticeable in Columbia 15 of 96 I .... :;;;:. NWM I *::.**.*.:-

• .;,* .. *:.* '*, ..
• fJDRTIRV£STMIIllCAl ISOT\WU NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 10/31/1895 Table 2-28. Recorded Missouri Earthquake History (3 pages) Location Charleston, Missouri Recorded damage 6.6 :Largest earthquake to occur in the central Mississippi River valley :since the 1811-1812 series. Structural damage and liquefaction

'phenomena were reported along a line from Bertrand, Missouri, in ;the west to Cairo, Illinois, to the east. Sand blows were observed lin an area southwest of Charleston, Puxico, and Taylor, Missouri;

Alton, and Cario, Illinois; Princeton, Indiana; and Paducah, !Kentucky.

The earthquake caused extensive damage (including idowned chimneys, cracked walls, shattered windows, and broken ;plaster) to schools, churches, and private residences. Every !building in the commercial area of Charleston was damaged. ;Cairo, Illinois, and Memphis, Tennessee, suffered significant

damage. Near Charleston, 1.6 ha (4 acres) of ground sank and a ; lake formed. The shock was felt over all or portions of 24 states ;and in Canada. Ground shaking was recorded along the Ohio . ;River Valley.

,_. __ _ . _* _:?J 4/9/1917 St. Genevieve/ St. Mary's Area, Missouri Not listed sharp disturbance at St. Genevieve and St. Mary's, Missouri. !According to the Daily Missourian, No. 187, dated April 9, 1917, /the earthquake was not felt in Columbia. However, on the day several people reported feeling the shock and ;attributed it to an explosion. No damage was reported in !Columbia. Reportedly felt over a 518,000 km 2 (200,000 mi 2) area ! :from Kansas to Ohio and Wisconsm to Mississippi. * . * * . -. *: . ; ... , shocks were felt m Mt. Vernon, -Illmms, and three were felt m

• l *,', ** * * ' Ji."::.:'.*.
• ...

is .* J **. ' * ;, , ** i& f4oughtt,o pave oiigitlateg east of Columbil!Jn Illinois. In *1 ,, * ** * * . '>>ithe Evening Missourifil4*No. 29:7, dated May l; 1920, ! ... .

,'i; riot ft<lt

• . :, *>'However, ma later mvestigat:J,on a few p1<ople' reported feeling a .. *.! . .,.; ....

'*' .. ..

.. .

.. -:.

• ..

.. . " ....

• j Listed as !At nearby Charleston, windows were broken and chimneys strong :collapsed or were damaged. Similar effects were observed in :Cairo, Mounds, and Mounds City, Illinois, and at Wickliffe, :Kentucky.

The area of destructive intensity included more than ; '596 km 2 (230 mi 2) [" ...

• • ..

.. ;* .... '*'j-:' i"**i;c ** * ** ,*. *****:**F- ... ,,. : .... , .*. 'e**"

• -'.*o;*****'

,"., ,.*.;;,.*-..,. .. , .. ,, , . .,* .* .. *. 9 <<. ),

Redf3_ud,

'afid, a repqited * !. ' ;: .. * * * .;;MMI'.ofll was .m _Columbia, 1\1.issoun:*The

• • ... ! '*, :'approxitj:Jately distance from the epicenter*

to Columbia W<l!' > L : . .. ;.;: _: .. miJ._'.c ..

• :._:.; .* .... '. . * *
• __ 3/3/1963 ; Near Menorkanut, Not listed 1MM1 of III was recorded in Columbia.

The approximately Missouri ; /distance from the epicenter to Columbia was 317 km (197 mi).

• ___ ._* *:' .*;:. > >>* ****

163 km)(lOlffii) .. * * * .** . *. j 16 of 96

NWM I *::.**.-.: . NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 * : NORflfWIST M£DiCAl ISOlDPCS Table 2-28. Recorded Missouri Earthquake History (3 pages) mm. Location IM[.!1il@N Recorded damage 11/9/1968 i Wabash Valley Seismic Zone, southern Illinois ! 5.4 \Strongest magnitude in central U.S. since the 1895 earthquake.

Moderate damage to chimneys and walls at Hermann, St. Charles, ; St. Louis, and Sikeston, Missouri.

Shaking was felt. Areas include i all or portions of 23 states from Minnesota to Georgia and from !Pennsylvania to Kansas, and in multi-story buildings in Boston, ; ;Massachusetts and southernmost Ontario, Canada.

• .

.. ._, .. ......,,.,..,_. -""*, -: ... ... .:.*, *---*-=:

• ,,.:

...... !:'., .'. .. :if " *: .

• 1

.. *1 I . : .* :* .. * . , *il Se1snuc near. ;i . ** . < . * .*. ... * .. and stre.ets ma .. t. fo .. 11T Cities IQ: Illmo1.s;* .* . 'l , . *.: :; , Olney, Richland, ;\

• d *
• JJndiana, Shaking 'yas felt.m 17 states, from... . ***1 1. *. :,> *
• .
• *.* L .
• ____ :-..... ...

_ *-- ___ : __

• .. _: ___ ! 2002 l Wabash Valley l 4.6 1Moderate earthquake caused chimney damage and cracked \ Seismic Zone, ; !windows in and near Evansville, Indiana. Shaking was reported in : Posey County, SW 1 !seven states, including Missouri.

J Indiana l * .... .. :* ..... ,-. ______ _(_ .. ___ ...

• * ----* * *: ': *
• 5/18/2005 I Missouri l 3.3 !Minor quake, no damage reported

.. .. 6/7/2011 I 18 km NNW of \ 3.9 !Minor quake, no damage reported

• Potosi, Missouri . r '9/1i2io'i . L .. __

___

• : **:.' ___ .

___ _ 1/16/2015

15 km N of ! 3.5 ;Minor quake, no damage reported ; Doniphan, Missouri 1 . r10;i6/2:oj'5' . , . I_ .*

.. . : . ' . , , .*. : .... 7/5/2016 ; 6 km SW of i . 3.0 !Minor quake, no damage reported

• Caruthersville, Missouri Sources: USGS, 2013c, "Three Centuries of Earthquakes Poster," pubs.usgs.gov/imap/i-2812/i-2812.jpg, U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia, accessed July 23, 2013. USGS, 2002, "Earthquakes in the Central United States 1699 -2002," pubs.usgs.gov/imap/i-2812/i-2812.jpg, U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia, June 18, 2002. MU, 2006, Missouri University Research Reactor (MURR) Safety Analysis Report, MU Project# 000763, University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri, August 18, 2006. USGS, 2016, "Search Earthquake Catalog," http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/search/, U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia, accessed October 7, 2016. MMI Modified Mercalli Intensity.

17 of 96

.*:.**.-.* . . : .. * ** *!=* . : ' NOffOIWCST MfmtAl ISOTOPES NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -'

• seismtq desfgif Request for additional information
• . . * :;the proposed project are *discussed in ter.ms bf the 20I2 Inteifz,citiona!Building:Code (J.BC) and*: * * .. ( . . . ... 's associatedstandatds

.. Later.disci.t$sions in tlJif section r{!fer{o.tfie 20Q9 !BC iliJfl.Amei:ican SoCiety of .. :. *.: :. .. !i<JtvilEngin<}_ers, (:fJ.SCEf

wit!iqytqny ef!j;lanqlicJfziA(fd{tlonal to resqlve,.

,*. 2009. * .' ,**:.. . '. * ",. -.. * * * * * * ' .... , .. _ .. :}:2t:,*:** The correct reference is IBC 2012. The 2009 IBC reference callouts in PSAR Chapter 2.0 will be changed to 2012. , )."'"'""'."""'"'*""*-7,*-*,_;,*n '.*""" . .,.,.'.. -***-' ;"'°P':'c:;'*A('*""'""7 '. ___ .,..-""*

• .':-. .,. **'",...**'-'"*

i * .f!'fUREG 1537,, Part 2,

.*Geology, th,at

• J ;; * * * * .:

inff:!f"!ation ih a form sui'.qkle f?,r: d<!VelopfJJg

de1igh, ilJ !, .: . ;: :* * '!iG!Japter 3/orthe;SSCs, obtain?d]i:,om soi,trc:¢S,;0f ade;guate, f ", . ** * . : lif lliiiit,rjt'he'r le*

tJS,GS.or%

'ihe J7$(JR. j ..*. > '.'..'.'.* "\. * <\ .. >.< .... ..: . :> .. * /' > .. ) ' ' l ,*. ;: " \,,, * ,

• 7.

that 5'.J.orMf!

,j; . *

,lfds been,]eviei.( as*the req_uired bui(ding Therefore, the>seisniic*d,esign pararheter,sfor the . '.' ' ',;: . * 'proposeq,proj<!ctafe d{scussedinterf!is*ofthe 20121BCand Cissociated:standards." .: ... , . * . , *: ;*

... ,* /

• '" _

  • ,:::,< .. *

'! ..

' .. ,:*,>>,J . :* .:

• flni:v.ef'rsity (N.(CJJY9*

'and, C,allaway;N;ucleat'Plan{'Y,hiqh'(s1* . ', a(fqpted seislliic by}lkCJRf!gulatory " J * * * ;{iQu.ide f6,_0; "Desjgn for S,e'ismic-'Desf gn ?f Plcjnts/' afzif adj11,sted,to .. :! .;: 're!JJ.ohse

\'7'.:; ': :: *, 't *."'":'.:'

• ;: > * * .t;'* , * *

.. * *':;' *:2 : * . iiNWMI P$AR Sectjon 2.} 5, .. '.'Maximum Earthql(ak,e, Potenti(ll, " st,ates that Boone County )V01fld,be . t iiSeverelyimppctedby a' 7.6jnagnitude

with the epicenter.on or neatihe New Madrid" ' . . f c' ' ...

'W.i(h ar/ ed of VII at ¥e",sife,' li$, .. Tab

' : N ) . . . . . *,

for B<1,bne 1:!,¢eqed t<? ifesign Grf,d its* .. : :[ ,y ' ' .,;J"seismic.:in}Jut pitrameters*are adequate '.fdpreverit ana mitigate any 'ra8iological releases below the ;; ,; :,;, .. :* __ .. ...

RAI Z

5-:6a >Provide a.n. estim/1te4 gr.ound ac,ce!er.atimJ irt{he ,site, corresponding to this irrtehsii:y VII." . ) L.

• _. . .,,::;,, ..

".: <t\, ***. *;

. ,,._ . :* -* <:,.

__ .. ... *Tue estimated maximum ground acceleration atthe RPF site will meet Regulatory Guide 1.60, Design \Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, free-field response spectrum anchored to :a peak ground acceleration (PGA) of 0 .20 g. :

• RP.I i * . .. :releases 10 CFR 'f'qrt 20 iimits {n'the eve17'fof,an
• *. : , *:

. "',:* : .' , '--;. ' i ... -'.!.*

• _,_ ** ,.._,.'_ '< "-=:--'7* .""..

_, * *- .... --;-* ._v 0<:'. ... -.:. {_.}'.k""l'.

• • -: *

.*. ., * .,,

:.. :: . ..,.,..-,:*

':--!1 '-** .. .-,,...:;-;,'-'*r".'...;:

-,:... *:=--'-. .:.. --* .:;.,,._.,.:.

""' PSAR Sections 3.4 and 3.5 provide design criteria and the analysis methodology for seismic events, :including a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). The seismic design of the RPF and associated IROFS will ensure the functionality and/or integrity of SSCs required to prevent radiological release below the *performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61. Additional information on the seismic requirements and :evaluations of the RPF and associated IROFS will be provided in the FSAR as part of the Operating .License Application. 18 of 96

........ !.* .. NOlUlfW!STMEDICALJSOTOPfS NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 Request for additional information 1 The geotechnical investigations and analyses of the RPF site will be completed in the first quarter of I ;1 2017. !'.:... 19 of96 "

.. NWMI .*:.**.*.* . ...........

. . *.

.'

• lt'OlUffl'VEST MrotCAl IS:atO.PES NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 CHAPTER 3.0 -DESIGN OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS 20of96

NWM I ........ *.:* .........

• .* .
• ll0fffHW£STM£lllCAl ISOTOPES NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -Request for additional information

• • .... :::.:

., -,-. * .?: .. <<-** .. '..'-.:.'"':, ... ,_, 'l -*., ', fl ,: '\ .. -'*,, '. --" . ,--*. " , -*' .*! . -: . :" '" . ', .. --' ' ,' ' ! *---* i;' *' This*:Stdndard a to.ANSI/ANS 2.3.,1983; "Staitdar'd Estimating.Tof?lado and Extreme' ;. !-*. ::* * ' , . , TfitJcf t,he 9f;t, j, -. : "*, :, . .Jit/;Jn fhe scope standat:?J ll!Cl;S _expanded. f(J_'.inc_lude

• :; * * * * * -* -'1> : A change lo the Fujitfi damage §calc; as,afunc_tiori of winq:velocities, .ad,optttd:in 200? by

_ .. * * 'l-'.* ; ,,_' ... !);.\ _ 1 , _ . *,;-.

• bemgr.eplacedby the EnhancedFu11ta Scale as_shown m. Tab(e 1-:

mduded m the scop? ---l : *

• _, ;':

is1he.applicabilityofthisstan'dardtoall,nuclearfacility'sites, notjust.!ludearpower*-,' . ._:,-. .-* .. :_,-*_. __

• . >>; "< ,:*: ,'_ *\:;:-:'*--_.,:.\._

} ., : . _* ;';ANSJ/ANS'2},-201-l*applies tJ?e same criteria;to wh{!'ther_a prod-µctionfacilifjior_

a". _; >:' .i _

• /:_:;>>_*

_ ;:*.-. *:,.: ,, .. ::;.'.

• • .-: _./*_*:< _. -.:: *.:/-.,-:

.::,,,-'.:*:_:, . ::;;.;:" ', _*.-;:\:;,;_,_._* }*. :f, 1 ._ te.s:4R r2;

• '.'to'rfi4do

j ;fJressure*rJrop, and tornad()generatedmzssile tmpacteffects.

* :* * :-. .... * . -' i' * ' * ' , * ' ,:* ' , ; " ' _,, > * ! ' ' ' * , ',

• I ' *; * ,> ' ' , :: * * * --.

iqentijie_d,tha_t the i_nforniatiqnpr,ovideq'in 6": ."Torna_aq. -:., ', ..... --:: *, , ._ :,_. : ""imrJ 3,;, 1 :7.-'*:Tornado

• Wind priv_en /Vfissile CNteri a; differsfforn the ddttiprovf(/ed in f, .. ,* :: *, -::RegiJla(oryGuide

/, 76, 0 "Design B_asis:Toma,do and '[or_nado1yfissilesfor Nucle_arPq11;er'Pla_njs," _: ___ * .. \

• ': .;,velo<Jztie,s, gnd '9lti(uqe 1 ()jau(om()b1le

---,;< ;-: * ,_} _ * :.'* .>.: ,;:_: .-:, -', . , .: '. __ -* ,.,* : * . _: ) 1-" *

• f --' ' *,' -. * " * ' .. ' -: * * , *. < '. * ' , ' ' ' ; ,, ' ' , ' ;_ . J*The citedANS/IANS23'-2Qll, "Estim_atihg:

Tornado, and,Exfreme Str.afghtLine. "Wind.* . : -_, _ i 1,. . . . ..... , * ., * ,**. .' , ** . . . -. . . . . .... *_ .-r , . , _ . .-* . . .* .,, ... ,

• _ , , . * -. * . "" . . : ;;chara_ctefistics at Nucleat,Facility Sites, "has-not yet been NRG;: and'the:

-,\ .. -.-*\"*"'*- ___ .. .. ... ,. *.. -... _. __ *..* , .... ,,." ___ .**.. h-"'--

• "'t**, ....

--tWUREG'-15_20, "Standard Review Plan for Fuel Cycle Facilitie_s LiCeJJ.S¢ ApjJlications," sta(es-that_the' , 1 tornado ocCJ-11'.renc¢ prob'(J/Jifity be_ijuantifie_ef_by'tlie qppiicanf NURE(J!. J 520, Pcu{ $ .(lppe_hdix J) __ , _ J dn. of ifre facitifY'the effli:t§ of f:/toriiado-w#h an *G/1nua1 _, :*:: '*; 1\ (. (' , . , ._ ,,.,, . , *, <<: _ , o:, ., _ -, , * ,,) , ,r . , I' , * , , < , ,_f" * , , , , , . ' , . , , ' ',"* "< .. -" , :' .: . q, . ' ' ' .iWxceedani:e prob{l_bUity of10;.5 orgfeatermiay.rieed.to be considered:':. ' *. ' , '. I ; ,' " ' ;* , " ' ' " -, -: *.. ' ,. , . ' : , . ' '. .* ,, . . ,, . . . ' --_ *- f!,S'.-a i,nfilft/q:f.he * *;1(1.lfSI!ANS

2.

J-haS'IJO_f: been accepted 'the *NR;C, 1ustifjt the 'Of!ornaaC! effect parameters

.

_ \,which .are less than* those provided in Regulatory; Gui de )]6, Revision .I. * .. ,.. ___ ,_ - .... ,:._,,_.,., ;f * .!.

• • • .c*:. ,_.,....,, '!'-_,-,_,_.,--..,,

.-r-=-** * .f"-*;*.,-*.,. .. '--.. -,.-. .,...,,,..:'U-iThe PSAR, including Section 3.2.4.2 and all appropriate supporting documentation, will be modified to ; istate that Regulatory Guide 1. 76, Design Basis Tornado and Tornado Missiles for Nuclear Power Plants,' iwill be the basis for tornado wind loads and wind-generated missiles. . !1 -' ; 0 ' ::weight of all mdtenals of cons(rucfiofl ..... [arid] also-consist of the weight of fixed*equipiiient,' including { . -;1 the,weight of cranes.'! It is ngt appgrent thaithe weight and loading from ... "* **. * "':r,*:., 1.*: ** '. *, ** ,' '. ' ... ', ," .. -.. ..: ;, , ,; 1" ' ' r . --; -:'-'.:' ' , * '*

" _*' i --.. -

!This inforination is needed to *confirm 'that adequate .uniform loading is in2ludecUn the dead load to L, _,

.:; t -... :. , _ , r:_duc_t the glqbqls[ructural analyszs_ and the de,s1g11 arfd s1z1ng; : *: * .. _" ." .. ' *, ._._ ... _. --__ --_: * .. '-_ ': ..... ._.;* ) ;(_**: **-:*:*"* --deadl6aa f \ " .**,.. -: !jS1ib-s)!steins (Le., trays, coniil{its,_ Hf/A and components, weight and)oaaings.

; * ,, 1iiil the design and'sizing of th{! $lructura!elements..

... ; _ : , ,. .-,:_*, . . , * ';

• _ . * : * --__ .. * -__ ._ * -" * -* J ;:, <:.:_.,..-

..

• .* ..:-.*

-' .. : .. * .

• .. .,,* . ._ ***

!The density of all interconnections (e.g., heating, ventilation, and air conditioning [HV AC] ductwork, i conduits, cable trays, and piping) between equipment will be conservatively estimated and included in jthe final design for dead load for fixtures attached to ceilings or anchored to floors in the RPF. This !information will ?e pr?vided in the FSAR as part of the Operating License 21 of96 .: . .-.;:.NWMI ........... . : .. "!..*:=* NORO!WCSTMfOfCAllSDTOPIS NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 __ ._, ___ ._._ ._,,.:. _-*;,_, ... >*: * . . . . r* 'f . . * . :f, :: watei: d_amage of the* sf1-uctitres,'_systems /ind compon.ents function 'in {hM)AR. This * , . ,* *';rfr: ;*: and(-3,)' the.impact on.equipmen(iSIJch .qs/cjri$,'

.; " ;;-. degradatior{

of the eieciromechanical fuhciion (o ' '. ' .. ".' *< ' i_ . ' .. c . : :/-i;: j : J'. ,' ' .: . : :* ' ,, * .. _.,'. ':' ' " , ._;, -. ",,;' .. *' , .;;* ' ', -',-' .' -.,. . ' ' ',' ' . ' ' -'.:l ".* .. .. ,:s,tates;.inpqr_t,'.fhat:'

• . >'*.*" ;' .\ * :*. *, *:* .. : **, .

._ _ .,: *,:A * . * -;;-: io (lnax3/ 1n6t01:if ana* * . ), . .;:,,' yalvesresulti,ngjrom, cjegrpdcitioh of ?lectromechan,(c'alf.unction due Jo wat?r. ' : ,,;*: . "' ;' f I;'* ,. "., ,

1*,. : ,:< " ' :*,<< ',,'* *";'/': ') ,, *, ,-fi*:

' !} '. ' ' ': " . . , < ,' , 'r, ' ' ,_:

• _.' : .: , "/;* '.:*, . :* t (,*1, , .
• ,. )'.NUREff:J531:

3B;_ ;'fTf ater the,'dreas of re\Jz.ew include the:?esign 1 . i)pnd defigf!,bases for all stru.ctures; 'fY.stems;. pnd: qr>!Jlppnents that coil{<! be affec_ted by predicted. . . * *. * ( , ..

* <*i;'.*'., ; .

.. :,, ,,ff<, * <;>;i *. >:: *./ :The,i:J.<{§jgn crit(!ria and designi:sfwit/{jpro,vid,e.

r,easonaple ClifSUtdncJ_e that st(ticture.J,; 'systems' and. , ;:

• 0 * :

compq'1e1JtS.W(!.Uld funcµon unde_r WGl<tr darljagf!'Condttions:

• , * .;; ,; , For* the the applicant:sf!.ould us,e* local bllilding col/es; :as J{elp_ ensure. ifz.at,.,.

• : ;,:1; '{*' ' water: damage !9 strUi;;iures,.

Systems and tdmporjents at the facflitjJ site {vou/'a ndt cause or allow

• R .*; _

;. , .. * ..... :: ; . . . . <: :i*t* . .,. ,: . _ _ > '." . '.. ,_ i * * \. 1 1-IWMi

'.' 1;11:; i*ft'1dod.Protetti&ri:Measµres Joh:: i': *: * :' .-c.1, , ** /structure;, Syste11JS, 'and Componen(s,"" refer* to *:p SAR_* Sec'ii,on>> 2.5. 3,, . "Onsite**soit for * ; . . : "< ',-* , 1;additiona/:information onfloodprotection ineasures.'.,Section 2.5.3 of;.the. PSAik'does not contain this . i *., . . .. __ .-:: *:'\=":*: .. 't:'.f>_. _ "'.'";:: . -:'.'.e.3/ .. }_ _:t<<.:, "::::, ! .... * :t , .

• corre(;,freference i'ri, the'PSAR/pr ac/ditiom;1l.detailfoi*flo'odprotectio'n measures. . ; . * , -. * .r "** -.:-"-*.-<<-.,....,, . ..,,".,..._..,., ..
• ....

.,..._-.--:*. _,,..""i."I':-::"'-.:

......"--

.-. ... -

• '--: --<>',

... ..-.,,,, -.,;;-* ---*!:< '.PSAR Sections 3.3.1and3.3.1.l will be modified to pointto PSAR Section 2.4.3 (instead of PSAR '8ection 2.5.3) for flood information. . l *, . ' ,, . \ ' ' : ,: : (2) (he imp(J.e,(.on systems resultingftO'in)nstriiine,ntatio'h, *atidcontro/elec{tiC,dl ; . ' t ! , -" *:/-I ,, ' "*-u, \. '* >, " *' ' .-* * " ;;. ',; _.. " * .,.,,. ' *' ' f; * '1

• malfunction due to water, and (,3). the impact on e,quipment, such as fans, motors, qn_d valves,::
• .. i 1" -. ;,;:::

ofthe*elecfi:qmechanicalfunctjon due fo wdter.; '.*'. ' ' *:;: ' ' >! '1 ,.,. .. '. :::'., * * *' *

• j { , * .. * .. *;

,, *. * *: J2,, components would continue toperform r,eqwredsdfetyfunctions under.water damage conditions .; ... ; ) ' ' '* : . ;; ' ' 'jorjhi. de,sign appiicant;#oµld butiding as lb 'help '*.** ' ".* : .;;*. -, *water(d,wnage 0 fO, s(r;Uctrires, afid, components 1fou!d*noi cause unsafe. *,, l ' '*;; _,:., hmetor would reaqfbr 'shut(iowh, cause:or alloW: .**. . ;f ;>_ . , . . *, . '-. , ,

• 1. :ww.M1 RSAR Section 3.3* Sections.3.3.1:3,and 3.3.J.4.l deal withjlooding; , 's J *
• " ,,. c " ' t, '" :,<<,' 1' * ' u* ,* , '< ' " " ' '* I"' ' " ' ""'h ", *', * , , ;. ; 1 d,ue tf)Jhalf.urictiqnofthe Ftr_e Protection System; b'ut the NRG *staff could hotjind.a discussion of the * " * .-":'. . :_ ' : '8.ffects of of the'J!ii;e Proiectioi1Sy$tem.*Qn.strUCtitre,s)systems , * .. * ;,':.. . :*'\:;5{r;.>.:

[; '*

• 0 1sens1tive components_

und,e':lh.e iffects of znadv.ertentd1sqhargeof the Fmf,_ Protection . '1 .. J;System Sf!rinkters-br:rµp(1fr'e of the 'iiqn'"seisriiic fire prQtectionpiping. as a resif li of the postu_la(ed

• *<* r .

._ *:zr .. << ... __ ;: ... ,_ ,.,, ..

..: .. -J 22 of96

.: . .-.;:.NWMI

• .**.*.:*

............ ". P4'1mfWISTfJfiHCAL tS'OT09[S NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -Request for additional information /) : disfusstng'mef:t8ureit'b 'i;(/'fiticerifor. the

,, '.:* ! :,i 1'.equip111ent under the effec.ts ofina<fYertent discharge ofthe.-Fire'j>rotec_tionSxste,m:wa_ter.

• . . .. *_: * . f

.. J.

• • • _.c,,_ *:

'"** . !"': .,..._*;7"..;,,_**:;5:

,._,_,,.'.,.;;,..__

• . '
  • )Design of fire suppression systems using water (e.g., automatic sprinklers, hose stations) includes )elements such as the grading and channeling of floors, raising of equipment mounts above floors, :shelving and floor drains, and other passive means. These features will ensure sufficient capacity for 1 gravity-driven collection and drainage of the maximum water discharge rate and duration to avoid !localized flooding and resulting water damage to equipment within the area. In addition, particularly I )sensitive systems and components, whether electrical, optical, mechanical and/or chemical, are typically

!protected within enclosures designed for the anticipated adverse environmental conditions resulting from !these types of water discharges. If critical for safety, these water-sensitive systems and components will ;be installed within the appropriate severe environment-rated enclosures in accordance with the relevant \industry standard(s) (e.g., NEMA enclosure standards).

Selection of specific fire suppression systems for facility locations will be guided by the recommendations

offered in relevant industry standards (e.g., NFPA 801, Standard for Fire Protection for Facilities

'Handling Radioactive Materials) and will depend on the level of fire hazards at those locations, as !determined from the final facility and process systems designs. These final detailed designs will include \any facility design elements and sensitive equipment protection measures deemed necessary for !addressing the maximum inadvertent rate and duration of water discharges from the fire protection

systems.

The final comprehensive facility design, along with commitments to design codes, standards, iand other referenced documents (including any exceptions or exemptions to the identified requirements), ' lwill be identified and provided in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application.

....,,., .. A: .. ii Pm:t;i, appltcar;f;shou{tj :: . * * * ;(and describe stnictures,.systems and components th(Jt are requrred to mamtam .the.necessary safety: ' ,, . .... \function,* ifdseisntic event should, oct.;µr:: The seis,niic;_ i: '" . ;: thaf'th_e c.ould be'SHui dow11' iri 'a cond,ition: To \ierifY that .,_ . :]' "

met, b'C1sesfor tec/inica/.spe_cificati,01:zs', * ".** I: ' * ;!necess.ary tij en.sure operability, testing; 'and irispectii:Jn of associpted, systems, including . . *" * * \'. ' ,\ ' : ** ,*.-' :

as,

.. '

" ' ' !,, :*: *:'

.. , * *,,. J , . :*NUREG-I 53 7, Par.t 2, Sectio!1 3A, *'.:Seismic' 1Jamage, .states that.the review, should inC/ude. the , .-* ' of '*systems,; 'arid. cbmponents ,tliat :a_re .require.a to dn case of a seismic event 'at .. The finding required is that the facilifY design should , . \ * * ' , reasopable RPI( cqn'be shut. do111n and main{ained in

• , ) * '!;NUREG-J537;"Part 2, Sectton:2.

5, * ,," tfr . '. !: _, ._ ::/part, *ilidt: wii6 .;, * !!other.qilailtible, data, silch as.datafr.oir/ the USG$ orin of ci nearby nµclearpower plant:\,,, ., :, d_,:/,"***' ,"'f'.,>r.';, .. <',.'":',.__," *,, '*,_.'::*' '...

Nff'MIPSAR Section 3.4). 1; *"Desi git Response Spedra Earthquake, .

> . '"* :, , *' '. r' * >' *.' "-' ** *" '", \: ,* *** *

• ',,,,.,., "* '.'*f )i :.;*

ear,thqyake }for Rfi'Pfaci{itY risk:.:tqrge(ed m'qximt,11,n _ .. i: ii>> consi(feredearthquake (MCER); as d(fterm,iried in with.ASCE7 and;the Federal,* , ;;,, -, :. ' I'_ -_ , '{ '*, t' ., , *. . '.' r, ' '* " ,. -, *

• o' * * > *, : *. r *-., '* * *' ' ,'"" " l * , ' * " ' *. * :;.:>

) . : I,:_

• New Burldmgs and Other Structures.

Tfie MCERfor;thzs. site 1s goverIJed;b,y the..by, tf?e probabrils,tic '. :; * * :1 '. shhlhnifdw[lich:has.'O.n:anliuaifreqµency.of'ixc"eed,ance<Jfj

• :
• 4xio-4. . *;-: . * * . : . <* < ; .. . * : _' *' * " * . > ' , *
• _:.;. :. }_ / o., : ; . . : : *; '* .. \iMuJ?R CdllaW_'ay Nuc'ledrElanfi.which is in ihe'proximi/yojtlie RfF siti!,, adapted the. seislJzic'.>.'.

I,,'

• __ ',. . * . "

_spee,U-a P'lo,viqe{f by NRCf!:effUlat()ry.GuJdeJ:6Q'.

• i I ,*' '1\Pf!sigi1,of Nuclear f ow er 'p ldnts, '.' and adjusted to 'r,ejlect tlie' ground"acceleration respqnse of q, 2 g. : . h:-:-

'-*

.*,

-.--=:.,.._._ .-.,. ... . -;S.,,;.-* .. '--' *-:*.-.-::**.*,,,....,,.,_ ....... , .

• .*.* . .,.._.,. _ _,,,.. ,..,,._.,...;;

...,..,...;_J.J.*--*':; 23 Of 96 NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -Re uest for additional information

..

':'.Pr;ovideju$ti}ica,fionfornot 1/sing_RegUlatory GUide -\:.

**

, . . <" ,:;, ** *

.. __

As stated in the response to RAI 2.5-6a, the SSE design basis for the RPF will be the Regulatory

Guide 1.60 spectrum anchored to a PGA of 0.20 g. Seismic loads for the design of IROFS will be derived i ,from in-structure floor response spectra generated by the finite element model of the building structure, .'as outlined in the response to RAJ 3.4-7.

'JU!s 3. 4-:-2 . "part, that "the irifqrmation on potential seismic* effects should b? in a jqrm for (;/eve/Oping '.. . . }

. * * . , .. :.;: '""'. *. ,;>. .. i: :* -.-:->::::

.

:_-: -.-... ..:*::...

• *

• . .: -.:.":,..,-;.*.v::::::. :-:::.; .*

• 1:-: ...

.-:::,<::..':..;:

!:. RAt* NWMIPSARSection 25 6, Vibratory GroundMotion/' states that ."TheBoone County site is a soil .. ,, 1* **:*;'" ,-., ,. , If< .. " ' *.-* ... ' " * ,-. ,-:-.. **,,." :<. *. "**. .., ;;; . :,, * '-... . .,.,, *,, * ". . . '*'* \ *.*:7.'.'*,. l.' . * , :;0,34lt;mq,0.223respectiyely(Fa=:J.6.andFv72.4)a,r?o.b{ame.<k. ': '*,* . .'; . } , * .... * . .._: * .* *.) t -. , * . ,./.: *. , ' ... '. *"'.:,* . .' '; .', -> .'

• *. -,'., :..*:, *', ,"' ' ; <',; .: * , *'.' . * *

.'** , . 1,.** > ." / .. ', "l ':" ,:, *_ ,,.: *, ' ' t) ! , . _ . l!PSAR &ction 3:4:1. *

'On Tal}le 3:.22,:7sdfe Earthq11;d,ke:*, . : . j, ,;

.RA!

and UP.date Tab.te 3.-c4°2fon;site c;Jass1Jproperties,,aitd demonStrrite .thata. M ;- .. . . *. )::;,,._, ;:{;-',: . *: . , . . . .

Tue NRC has recommended using Regulatory Guide 1.60 for radioisotopes production facilities (e.g., I . 10 CFR 5 0, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities").

NWMI will use a spectrum 1 !anchored to 0.20 g PGA for the RPF design basis. Regulatory Guide 1.60 is not indexed to any specific ! soil type, with its frequency content sufficiently broad to cover all soil types. Therefore, soil type for the /RPF will not be a parameter used to determine the RPF's design response spectra. Tue composition of :soil in which the RPF is embedded will be included in the soil-structure-interaction analysis as part of the \building response analysis. This information will be provided in the FSAR as part of Operating License !Application.

Table 3-22 will be deleted from PSAR Section 2.5 .6. In addition, Regulatory Guide 1.60 will be added to l iPSAR Section 3.4.1.1 forthe determination of the RPF design response spectra. 'The seismic soil classification for the RPF site is Class C. Thus, the reference to the Boone County site as) 'being soil Class Din PSAR Section 2.5.6 will be changed to Class C. IPSAR Section 2.5.6 will be modified to reflect the above information.

' ; . .. ...... __ !._ _RAI 0 3:4-:2,b ;['f.roviilejustiftcationfor.dhe: thqt; : *Th_is spech:'wn)s:5%:;rfaff?ped.:

• *I j *.* * ... --e* .: . )jwhic}z; per_-ABCI!J;43 des_,ign ofthe'structur,_ql
• _ .. ;:* :'_:*: ...

... ,

Response spectra corresponding to the recommended damping values of Regulatory Guide 1.61, Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, will be used to derive seismic loads. 'Damping varies depending on the type of SSC. Structural damping will follow the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.61, which range from about 3 to 7 percent. Plotting response spectra at 5 percent \damping for purposes of illustration is a convention within the nuclear industry, but for analysis loads, '.damping will vary depending on the earthquake level (operating basis earthquake

[OBE] or SSE) and the ot_SS_C __ ... _ ____ __ ____________ _ 24 of 96 NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. O -Request for additional information I 4:f i, '*:'De:rig'n safe s1iutdollin

,'Pifi1Ire.fi,*

j7 * *>) It*,,,*_ .. * '.! , .;,[ r:* ' *:,;damping: " ' :. , *. ,, ' , ' ' ,., ' ' ':' --* *.*: '> , : ' ; '., ': ) ! :.. . . . *

• ai:i<:ussian{hadusdfies.itat

.(he s/Je<:'rrufn iat: "1 ;r .. * ; .. . * * , . .' [!;Site fas: diseusseif* in fil;JI 3:f 7) is fhe

• 4 :; . :. . * * */ .. ;fo,r an Intensity .HI establisheci-in, .f SAR Sf4ction :2.5.5,, Tqble 2:::29,.*

E_a,r,thqua/G! .. .... iThe RPF building structure and IROFS analysis will be based on the Regulatory Guide 1.60 ground * !motion spectrum indexed to a PGA of0.20 g. This PGA matches that of the University of Missouri !Research Reactor (MURR) and the Calloway Nuclear Generating Station, which both are within 80.5 km i i(50 mi) of the RPF, as suggested by the NRC staff during the November 10, 2016 Public Meeting. The ; lanalysis procedure develops ground motion acceleration time histories that match or exceed the jRegulatory Guide 1. 60 spectrum as input to the building finite element model. Structural damping will ifollow the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.61, which range from about 3 to 7 percent. lThe reference to a Class D site is a term used in IBC 2012, and will not be the basis for the RPF seismic !design. The composition of soil in which the RPF is embedded will be included in the soil-structure- \ interaction analysis as part of the building response analysis. !Table 3-22 will be deleted from PSAR Section 2.5.6. In addition, Regulatory Guide 1.60 will be added to; !PSAR Section 3 .4 .1.1 for the determination of the RPF design response spectra. iTue seismic soil classification for the RPF site is Class C. Thus, the reference to the Boone County site as! ;being soil Class Din PSAR Section 2.5.6 will be changed to Class C. I jPSAR Section 2.5.6 will be modified to reflect the above information. ""-.. _ :;,-'-""1::-:..+:;,*:r,.::::....;:i..' .. :-. ..

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• * '-""-;.' l .. RAI 3.4-4*. NWMTPSAR*S.ection.

3.\4J!2X' 'Equivalent:Static' Seismic Ana/ysfs/' under *Dir.ection of Seismic*:<

• : /'. .. , ' * * * * * .* !(49ad)fig, ihat <<'the fore.es qne h01:(zqniat

'." . *t / : . , : .

an.a d _using th.e 100($0 ('fie,._ .w_ill be * * * " -rby the use,*ofse1sm1c/oad*combmatiqns setforthwASCE 7;*Sections'12.4:2.3 andl2.4:3.2:'.

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• -;::::;:-.-:

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r RA1*3;4-4a

Provide

(!.'disCJ-lsston w.hy (he si111ultJ,pwous application of three 1_ ...

• *' . !Design of IROFS will consider seismic loads in all three directions using a combination of iof-the-sum-of-squared or 10/40/40 methodologies.

The 10/40/40 methodology will be used in the idevelopment of the final RPF design and in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application.

y:;-:--*U,..,.;'" ...... .;;,_, -*:

.:,.';'j*- ...

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.> .. ...... , .. .... '."!1*' :i RAI 3.4-4b: !'f'rovide a disc;ilssion tljat justifies why the effect$ are iiot.combined pefReguliltorji<;Ju.ide JJJ 2, . ': , * * ;: ,;: .... 0 , ** * .' :i Analy$is; :* '*

• square-;root-of-._sum-of-the squares; or,JQ()*4(f40 m_ethodplpgy:

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'.:; ...... ... ..* .. !Design of IROFS will consider seismic loads in all three directions using a combination of square-root-j !of-the-sum-of-squared or 10/40/40 methodologies. The 10/40/40 methodology will be used in the ; .. 25 of96 ./ NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -Re uest for additional information '( -;RAI-

• ifiiiii?SjR i/j,

• di;a

! ; '(' ' -*. ' ' ": Sfpte$ h-v,e conservative 'results in 'cornpar.ison;to ' -' , . * ; '; the effects of sot[,.-sfn}ctut(f ,i11teraction. _, . _ ;_ *-* , ; , , .. __ .. ;*,: ., _ , <. , :;*:*:: J . ,_ , :'ac(:Urately the dynafmc char,actqn,stics.and the:struqtural response; where. the rocking mode *

_ ._ ... *.

• .*-,.-:_.f

\*:* !11Provide ofjixed modelfQ.tififsrelativelyshort_. -! : 1 i[acilitywith' a relafively largefootprinfwhere the ror:king mode may bl! predominant infacility -' '

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The analysis of the RPF building structure to the SSE will include the effects of a soil-structure

!interaction rather than the assumption of a fixed base. . . __ . . .. . .

\ -Qualification.byTesting.

< . * * . * ': 'f. *, * ' * * * ' . * * , -:, . . *t J . \; , ,... . < -;' -* -... * * "--*** *:-* * ' .,.-; < -. ' ... -., . ' . . , '. .c -' ....,. ' ' ,* ' * . ' ' -'" ""'"

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• 1'/Vfany compone'ntiwhos,'e co11tiriue*a.

operability/fu'Yictionality. 'during ana after tJ:ie postulated seismic -. : *.r, ,, \ geveJJts ,_ *r . __ ,. :* . ./, / .*. *;fr*.:.:._-<;.-_, .. ;:_ ".:-:. __ * *-. * .. -.* .} ,*;*::**:.*

,_ -..

• : , > .. _ . __ .' .. *.: ') . ;!ClanfY if NWA{I j;urch'a_se will specify tlje' qua/ification method. t6 'b,e use cf or will it :be';,

.. .. -- .. , .... :: .. NWMI will define specific acceptable qualification methods in the procurement packages to demonstrate i , I :seismic qualifications. Seismic qualification of IROFS will include three options of: (1) calculations and i :verification that the main structural components of the SSC can withstand the seismic loads derived from; :the in-structure floor response spectra at the damping value derived from Regulatory Guide 1.61, ! ;(2) reference to available shake table testing that demonstrates the seismic capacity of the SSC or of . \multiple similar items, and (3) demonstration of the seismic capacity through the performance of the type 1 'of SSC in actual earthquakes. -"-". .. .... , . ._, <"' "'*:--, "-°Jf;-""* ..

• RAI 3A 7 7 :JVW]VJIPSAR Section_ 3.4. 2.1.2; "'Dyiidmi_c Alwtysis/'.

d,escribes-ytirious l1if!thods for seismic* * .' \ . <<*. ,,:*_ sfibs]lstems'aiideqzi)pmentlin<i;ciiesASqf[4,j'!'Se'ismtcAntilys(s of Safety-Related. ,. ., 1 ! -; .:*. ;::.-, fN.uclec11;,Structures

ioOO,'.':'a111*the

_Nl?.CRegu!Gtor)lpuide'.1.122; "Diyefopmenioj

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'.

• i!in-sfrw:titl:e.

r,espbi1se spedl}'a, '.fyhile. Ri!'gitlq.torY.Gittcle ,J}n.;ohfY t;bvef'.s* 1J1ethod. . f *,, -. . * .. <' ':r* < ' *** _* ' * : ...... ,*' 't 'r.-"* ..... *r"*. '*' .*-.. ,., * .-:* ";' :: :: . );Clar.ifY response. 7)me_ -.. , _ .. ,'. ** .. * * *. .. * . _ , ** *

t.,

/.

• . ,:, .

.... .. .. ,..:. ?:'llJ ... '"< Jn-structure floor response spectra will be developed through a finite element model of the RPF building using an artificial time history that matches or envelops the Regulatory Guide 1.60 spectrum at .PGA = 0.20 g. .. \.-. _, , _.-. -- 2012,-Chapter

• * } . _ j;will qual;fied_i;,z.

C,r,itefia

. :J![or Seismic Ce_rtification.by Shake+.Table Testing ofN.ol'Jstr.ue,tural*Components:

• *

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* . ' ' '* '* ' ',-, ' ' f" ;;; -; *o* '; ' " ' * ' !' ., ' \"' * *, ' ' ' ' ' *. < -, ' ' ' ' ' ' !

._'.:-.,' i'.; :-.: -1 fa_tego,!Y11 c &entsfrqin qam,dging the_sdfety_-related_

• , ,.

qonsjderdtfotis), ordetr,imer,ital . *.;irelqted SSCs.-due. 'to the ex<;essive* displ9ce11Jents caysedJjythe postulat(!dearthq1,1(Jke. . ;: ,: _ *, _ ....

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....,.,._. _,..____..,,_;.... __ "!'" --.,. -_ __:_,-:- .. -. ** .-. .....:, .* 0 26 of 96

NWMI *::.*.*.*.:* NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 .........

• .*

NOAJKWISiWOtCAllSOTOPES -Request for additional information i RAi '3,.4:.Sa fco'Yi}imi that Sei,Sµiic Illizy;tems wiiosri impact the ty' !' ,h : .. '. . . : . :\of safe_iy incf, (J_re: d,f}sijwec(to r,l!nl,airi le rJu,ring; m:z_d a.f!er/h?: . ' . '* . i: * , ' :-earthquake effects. . ' . * . ** .. . * . ' .... * .r !.--. ., ** ;-*--*-**

• • ,.._.,.. . , . .;\.*.,.,,-*::..,.

... ... ,-'-.* .... ;..:_; . . . ..... ::;..:..._,_,. .... rThe capacity of the standard support design for overhead fixtures mounted above RPF IROFS will be ! checked to ensure that the supports can withstand the seismic loads derived from the floor spectra /(e.g., remain stable during and after postulated earthquake effects) of the attachment floor slab. This jinfonnation will be provided in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application. .

..... * * .*,

*;vdamage"the safetj/:relqteqitems due t9 d .. eformati_ons quring tlie eVf!,izt { ; *.--. ... . '

.. ... -......... -, ... ,_.., ........ ,,,,._ .. , .. *-.... " .... ,_.. , ............. ,..-.... =,._ .......... --<<-.; .*. _. ... ... _.,._. ,.,. .... _.; .. , .' ....... .. -. .,, ..... .., ,. ;j. .... -. ... ..... , ....... , .. tThe RPF seismic design will include a check to ensure that pounding or sway impact will not occur I ibetween adjacent fixtures (e.g., rattle space). Estimates of the maximum displacement of any fixture can )be derived from the appropriate floor response spectrum and an estimate of the fixture's lowest response \frequency. This information will be provided in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application.

• • '--** ....

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• • • .

i RA!; 3.4.:.9 ::Nrf!Ml PSAR S?c(ion 3.4. 3, * "Seisnlic InstrU_men,iation, "provides a de!Jcription of the seismic *' 1 ' , ... *"iristrum,entaqqizpr,oviderJ.for:thf!RPF.*-.;*:-- ... >_._:: , .. * '.:'. . ._ .. *, ._;.,'.:": .. "'.::*;. ,.. , ..... : :;*; if the seismic iiz_strifmentatipfl_ . .* _' )'.Category}, and is fzi".chased,as:Seif1}1icallY,.Qualifie,,1. abfe. tiff purp9S,e'.,,.

• . , , . :! -
• .:;czardY the sei8mic be a* safety-;elated Category [installation.__ , .. "safety-related." Although the seismic recorders have no safety function, they must be designed to 1 withstand any credible level of shaking to ensure that the ground motion would be recorded in the highly
• iunlikely event of an earthquake. This capability requires verification of adequate capacity from the :manufacturer (e.g., prior shake table tests of their product line), provision of adequate anchorage (e.g., !manufacturer-provided anchor specifications to ensure accurate recordings), and a check for seismic :interaction hazards such as water spray or falling fixtures.

With these design features, the instrumentation;

would be treated as if it were safety-related QL-2. Additional information on seismic instruction will be : rprovided in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application. . -=*=

Request for additional information .. -*:" ,'(Applies to" for JROFS is 'provided in 10 CFR 70.4.'The' definition states: *.-*; ..... ' . :;: l

(

• t;quipmen{;componenis, aridadivitiesof

.-. i , and 3. 5-3). * * . personnel./hat tire r,elif!d OYJ _to prevent potential accidents at q. fac;ility_

that 9ould, e,?Cc;eedff;e, .. * . , ' . i i:. * .. * * '

• performance:

requirenients i11f7.d. 61 otio tHeir pot<rntial -This Joes not* . ..1 ' ,. fhe license'efrom}dentifj;infi'additiQnalsiructures, 'systems, *equipment,' coniponentS,* qr(!* *';.* i i activities of personnel (;.e.,:beyond those'in the minimum set riecessary for complim:ice wi.tli the ... ', : . * * ' :*. . . requirements) as itemsre!ted onfor_safet);. ' * .. , . , . '" ., " , i: '----c'-"-"-"' ____ -* . ..,. ---*--""=:_" ""S

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27 of 96 NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -Re uest for additional information J *' .. :,. . ; . E,'.: <*, . *hazard9us.

i>dl not"lealltq}JJ.in

_eyers;ble

'or:oth.er

• serwus,

'effects, f. . . , *

• .e1fe4ts

d l

• , '..: ; ;,, <!of safety-re.[afed SSGs({): {IJ,qluifeperfo,1:m(11:!.ce,:re,qu11:e:1J1e11[s f.or.$$Cs 1mp0,rtanUO, safety. in Jl:ze. Rl]F.'.: *. * , , :-f>*'..r*****'<"*..,_

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rt

'.: .* .. : , * . ;: '.!Tfhilefour bftHe fiyeji_qfts.of this qejini,tion th/f;.thir,d j§ri'bfthiSaefinition

• : t J;"'*** ..

tliepJJtentialf of'iin: fnlidverlenN:ntzcallty ?fcdi'dent*is'ni!JFcrediliM(')' <:*:;.-L* _**.-,"*.'

• "-<*-"'";

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"*',-.-."*.,, 1( h :; :*;**!;:; -*;;_<* *,/;::.!)bC1se4 /!'Je ,

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• 1p.

pef!gniidn¢e

for f:ql,ifJ!

.. :io Cf"R 10: 61(iifstates,q F:: r 'li rzuC!ia/!}crlti'C,altty

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\i be fJy.asstJ,r{rig

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ctr,e: \, .. * ,\,, : .. ,< '.'. \ , (; >* c9ntr,pls lf"tlS.f b,erth.e P.P'!lfl!Y f!U!Ons._ of protectiqn

aga11Jst<rzuc/ear:.

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• • • • :Y

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a&:ldent unltZing:t.he(criterid op :ti l' *."','". ' .... "'" ,,, ,' n ,n*" ',6.,: '.i' ....... *""'**1* .; .. t; } ' ,'h*, ' c. h""", " *.* *" "* ... ., .. ',., ......... , .. .... * *' '*' ,, . .. ' ... , .. ,,.,, f"Ril":;*\:'

• :':'- :;

J(d) on/ex'? azn,wh;x.t. <} :JJ) .J.Ffi. /ZQ. 61. ,* :*.** .;:, . .,:;,; *, ;;;*;; .... ; <. ' iNWMI is using the 10 CFR 70.61 performance requirement for subcriticality. PSAR Section 3.5.1.3 was ! )revised, the bullets removed, and 10 CFR 70.61 performance requirements/criteria are referenced. j ij *,.:,)': .' ;'.* .*:/';1.: .. **',c;.01J:.l5ll.ra .{)n\mqnx;zg(!.1np1, mam.ef!qtlqe;.; {Jzm.ng<in. l'.qU(J) .. cq z<;ms;p vce.*. s,;*,; f?:'. ** .:' . * ,Q[,:*]'.ah'?J Ql!:J .ql<f.ai;ly,,stat<r wh'at SSCs (Jri

• thes<{ leyi.Js and'the:/iv,cl' r!fqualitf
  • :* *.

28 of96 .:.;:.;* .. NWMI -::.** ... : . .........

• .* ... _

UORfHWfST MUHCAl. ISUTOPES NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -Request for additional information .. !NWMI has revised its Quality Assurance (QA) Plan to clarify the difference between QL-1 and QL-2. '. Section 3.5.1.3 was modified to reflect the changes in the quality level definitions (Attachment A).: ]The basis forthe difference in QL-1 and QL-2 is a* graded approach to quality, by which the level of * /analysis, documentation, and actions necessary to comply with a requirement is commensurate with the )safety significance. The graded approach permits the implementing organization to focus resources on /those activities that are deemed, by qualitative analysis, to reduce the associated risks and hazards. The factivities and tasks are performed in accordance with approved implementing procedures. iThe graded approach to quality is a process by which the level of analysis, documentation, and actions , inecessary to comply with a requirement is commensurate with the safety significance. A graded approach; )permits the implementing organization to focus resources on those activities that are deemed, by * \qualitative analysis, to reduce the associated risks and hazards. I :Activities and tasks are performed in accordance with the quality level definitions. l

• Quality Level 1 will be applied to IROFS (SSCs and activities).

IROFS are QL-1 items in which . failure or malfunction could directly result in a condition that adversely affects workers, the public,

• and/or environment, as described in 10 CFR 70.61. !
• Quality Level 2 will be applied to safety SSCs that are non-QL-1 SSCs. Some of the required characteristics may be examined less rigorously than for QL-1 items. Quality Level 3 items include those items that are not classified as QL-1 or QL-2. QL-3 items are controlled in accordance with standard commercial practices.

'. . _.:,*. * ,. . '.. . one SSC.is goyemed.,by QI;_-1 and the\otherhy QE.,2, desc.rzbe,'fl,ow they W!ll tMy, *:: .. *. .. J '.Tue QA Plan will be revised to clarify the difference between QL-1 and QL-2. For two SSCs with the ' !same performance requirements, NWMI would not expect the components to be materially different. !However, the level of analysis, documentation, and actions necessary to comply with a requirement is : commensurate with the safety significance; therefore, a QL-2 SSC may have different verification. \requirements. . \,..;.-.;..;......,.,-;<<.....,;,;.

• • • ,,_.* .,,-_,,,_

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• .:...-.J 1* RAI 3.5:..:3c f!PSAR Table.3-25; . '.'System Silfe'tY cind SeisniicClassificdtion aijd:Associated Quality. Leve{ Group,{'*

.. l :f .:. '.,: , ... _ .. ,

• jilists N_sR_;

pv-2, Jhat'otily ]I/SR ,; . . . . ,:JI S$Cs are QL-2. If.this is the .stateth1s,?xpbc1tly, and ifth1s 1s not thepaseprov1de examples of.. _ .. __ iPSAR Chapter 3.0, Table 3-25, has been revised and is provided in Attachment A. The table was :modified to match the changes in the NWMI QA Plan. A room continuous air monitor in the operating

gallery is an example of a QL-2 item that is not Seismic Category IT. ,

i . * . ." . * ' *,.,

• qss,f!sspie[Its,. ;:* :.* ** * *. *.:. .i considered QL-1 or QE-:2. Jfconsidered*QL-2;*provfde justification why they are:not Qontrolled.under i

!QL-1 SSCs are controlled to the full measure ofNWMI's QA Plan. The QA Plan will be revised to , I clarify the difference between QL-1 and QL-2. PSAR Section 3 .5 .1.3 was modified to reflect the changes '. iin the quality level definitions (Attachment A). * ..... ""*'<-* .,.,_ .. -,.,,,,,. --"-* "**" "'***'* * "-* 29 of 96

NWMI ........ :.* rl0.IUHWESTM£Dtl:ALISOTOP1S NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -Re uest for additional information

..

c;i(e;i;;,:adi<!s7i;;

• 1 < *:: , * .. : *, *:' *' :[that the* <Ji{stgif incl1)d_e PesponseJo

• * . * *'-:: * ::1 ;;arialyzedtn the..safety.pnalysis repqrt. * , : . * ,,* .' , * . * *. * ; * /; {,<* :" . .',.

<<> .**', .i<\<<,:,. '; ::*fL**' , . :,1 :* !,( ;"'.*" ,,-:_r,J :, *." ,' .' '., 1'.NWMlPSAR Sectiori 0 3:5:J,$>/, "$eismk:'Classi.ficationfor'.Stfuctures; Systems, arid Compoiiehts, ;istgtes that &iSn;ic. c;a(egoryJ: (C.:J/'.applt<is.to Sltistnlc:.Category j*.'* * 'i; ,\, *','* '.'.' * * ,,:"*' * .lf,'*"

• . *: 1"*) ?' r',',;,*'",1 "n> '*' '. '**<',.p.*

1 ,'""*: ", *.'"" r'."'; . *)!applies to*thqfe.NSR 'auring* q,Safe ;shutdown.'eJ;rtlfquaki! could*degrqd,e:*!i . . <thefunction.ofSR SS.Cs. or iinpaptthe main c.oirt:ro/ room, and.tliatSSCs not classi.fiedG-1 or C-11 are ' r * ; * ..

• entompdsses thesiate>>zent thiid ' * ' ' j *, ' . ' . * ' '_ ,. -'_ * . ' -' , * . ', . , _,
• I .; . , * .. *.. ..they'are'not controlfr:r/undeithe "fallmeasure of NWMI's QAPI?, "clarification is needed ' *: * . i

1 : * * : .*,. ':;i'!fe,rs thpt NSIJ C:-flS,S,Cs a,1;_,e Qb2: P.:()_v}de:fl;e, 1:atidnalefor thatQA Classijicptipn

'. .. :, :'.J ., .. .. .* .. :The QA Plan will be revised to clarify the difference between QL-1 and QL-2. PSAR Chapter 3.0, 1 Table 3-25, was updated to reflect the changes in the quality level defmitions (see response to :RAI 3.5-3c).

.The QA Plan will be revised to clarify the difference between QL-1 and QL-2. PSAR Section 3.5.1.3 wasi revised to change the definition of nonsafety-related SSCs, and PSAR Chapter 3.0, Table 3-25, was ; modified (see response to RAI 3.5-3c). However, nonsafety-related SSCs should not be QL-1 even ifthe ; 1 SSCs are Seismic Category II (C-11) (see Attachment A). i The QA Plan will be revised to clarify the difference between QL-1 and QL-2. PSAR Section 3 .5 .1.3 was 1 ;revised to change the definitions and Table 3-25 was modified (see response to RAI 3.5-3c). The " ;differences in acceptance criteria for QL-1 and QL-2 is a graded approach to quality, by which the level 'of analysis, documentation, and actions necessary to comply with a requirement is commensurate with the safety significance.

The main difference in the acceptance criteria for the Seismic Category I (C-Q . ;and C-11 classification is that C-1 has to function after an SSE, while C-11 has to maintain its integrity (see! Attachment A). , * , .. -"'.'"'. _'--*:,*:: "."" ./ .. .. '.'?' .. '7;;!,, !, . 3;5;4d .. ilSince onlymaintai11 stnictural integrity, 'explaif!. if the 'sfritptural integrity ai.:ceptarfixp*

> 'I .. ' ','

L :; :,'. '.* ' *::criteria/or ,c:,:.Ysscs, and C}JISSC .w.f II pe.the S,ame or dif.fe'rerit.

if diflfjr:ent,' provide ,the for..the  :: .-....

• -* *.,

_

... .. *c;L:_:: .*

• -_!: While the structural integrity performance requirement should be the same, the acceptance criteria for C-Ii \and C-11 SSCs will be determined by the quality level of the SSC and may have different verification requirements.

!._ . ...,.,.,., ........ __,,,_., .,,,._..., ** ---... .. - -* -,.,. ...... ., .......... -.-....... "'" ___ *. , ... ___ .. ...... t:* .. )(Applies to.:.. J;n,theJSP Augmenting NUREG-.1573, ,Parts 1*afld2,;'.(he NRC staff.stated,:* in part; that ad(fressing

• 'i; . . ' . 'I ' . ; ' ,, ; . * * -. I ' . .,, ' .' " .-; -" ' . -' ,: L >' * * * ' , 'ii( * * * ' ' iRA!s3..

'"* crtter!.a/1.pd (leff!_,n'se '.in deIJtlJprac,ti,ces. in JO Cf'/?. 70,. 64Js

way of-* -:i ian4'.3: 5.-6}' :

sdf<;iy dk'iign o/d'ra_didfsoiope'.

1 .,. . ',

____ __ ;, .. __ .. 30 of96

NWMI ........... .......... r.;. . N:OHTHWEST MrolCAl lSOlDPlS NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -Request for additional information f

• 3.5-s PSAR i9

'l,* .. . :; 'Pdiscusses SSCsthat are considered important to safeiy. The importmjtto.safeiydSthefive

1 * .

sS,cspteskniedin

'Sdfeiy-Ri4a(ed SttUctlli

es, Systej,,8, * * ! *::

.. : . . <-: .)-:;;: ,,::.::;:: ' . . . , 1{** '* P,reventdegradat1on offunc'tion andlor:performcmceofanysaJety:-rel(Jted§SC:

-.... * *

• J.:. .*. ".

sdfrti sSgs and*othef!. puld ajfeqi i,he .:* ..... * ' . * * !functionlp(!rjorm*ance pf safeiy-related S$Cs. However, NWlvfl does not provide;_a classification for

• L . . .

ju_st the and,NSK PSAR Table, .:; *;:* .... :; \ * \ . :;t "System $djety and Seismi'c, '(;zassificatfon arid Associated Qualiiy Level . . :' i:* *:* *,, *.;' 7 ,, **

• * ; i' ;: "'.'(:. ':* . r' >:Section 3.5,:f;2 that NSR C.OJJSSGsare .co11sia(?red}mportr;mt t6safetY beca.ijse ofthelf;C,.JJ"*
• :, , , * :\ ; :' *" '*: . .*

is: n_q{ .. j .*. . . . . **vCtassificatio,njorStructures, Systems, and Cqmponel}ts, C-1, C ..

.. .. ' _ Lj :\'HAI 3:5-Sa: :.9zarifY ifN$R c:.11 SSCs are important to safe.iy. ' .. , * .. .. .. , * . < _, . j. "* _:*.. : :-* *. * * .. * * ': I --,.r,',.:*;..;,. -*. :-*""

• • """'"'-.-':'
• .

.* -,, **-;:::'""'_""- __ .-.--,,..--- .-*

• • -"-"'-"-'"*"""-

_.,.,., .. "'""" --* .. ,* _,,, ___ ---I,, \The QA Plan will be revised to clarify the difference between QL-1 and QL-2. PSAR Section 3.5.1.3 has

• I been revised to change the definition of nonsafety-related SSCs, and Table 3-25 was modified (see lresponse to RAI 3.5-3c). QL-2 SSCs are safety-related items that are not QL-1 (see Attachment A). *'

.* ;.,.*.-.""":*:

.-

.. -'-;'l.>'-':.*"-*,;.;-..-_ ... _ _,-,;-.,,.,r*-*':' .. _ *. .._.,;:,:;-7.'-

• ' *.-* **

., .. ... .* :,.:-""IS'

• .-*-""u"'." ..::--r.-;-

_,. ") .. .. ...... .. .. :; .. __ *j lThe QA Plan will be revised to clarify the difference between QL-1 and QL-2. PSAR Section 3.5.1.3 has* ibeen revised to change the definition of nonsafety-related SSCs, and Table 3-25 was modified (see * \response to RAI 3.5-3c). QL-2 SSCs are safety-related items that are not QL-1 (see Attachment A). , r ?' :} .:.,._-:,:,_.1...,._ .. _.,* > ,--=",.:..,.,,-.,. ,;,__ -**,"," .* , .:-.. : . .;.M;,-\ *.* *-t* !The QA Plan will be revised to clarify the difference between QL-1 and QL-2. PSAR Section 3.5.1.3 has . ibeen revised to change the definition of nonsafety-related SS Cs, and Table 3-25 has been modified (see : !response to RAI 3.5-3c). QL-2 SSCs are safety-related items that are not QL-1 (see Attachment A). 1 .. \The QA Plan will be revised to clarify the difference between QL-1 and QL-2. PSAR Section 3.5.1.3 has* /been revised to change the definition of nonsafety-related SS Cs, and Table 3-25 has been modified (see )response to RAI 3.5-3c). QL-2 SSCs are safety-related items that are not QL-1 (see Attachment A). l:'"",_*e. .. 1 ..

.*

.*** -**. ..

• -"".'.!'., .** ..;;:.;"-H:"..,--'<"'.'

.. .-, .. .. ... ....... :,,;**<:-""'*

_

'j-/--; --**,']'. '\ *

• RA.I

j'r/'f&I{EG:-1537, Part"h Chapter 9i" :'Au+/-iliary'Systeins, "'st¢tes}:hat the app1icai1t should inelitdethe , "

• 1 .: " . ;\design bases for eaclJ auiiliary systenz. \ , _ . ' .. *. * * * ** * ' * ... * ...... +-. -,.. , :'. _:: . * ... :**, .... ;_. * ..

.. "" ..

/*,< .. ':., ... \" '*r ,,,; 1'"" J'Jn cross-referenCing the design bases if(NWMI PSAR. Chapter 9. 0, Auxiliary Sysiems,!;'with those i1:1 ** iif 848.,, Ch.t;1pter, ,¢9111:Pb!:'ef!t8,.

• .;; .: '*: :.. ,\,, ,.:*. " .. *. *. ,,,,: .. : I .:;> :'."*:: :. ':: * :,._* "*,,-_. ,'\,: ,".:
• 3:5?:2;

.. . ;;the RPf are'presente£in [P{!AR]Secfiof! 3.4.'l; whereas FSAR SectiOIJ 3.4:1;. "Se1sn1if; jnput, ." . :' 1 i" . : .. :;1di$ci(sses seismic desiin :considerdltons: S,ince*the liighertier . . * ;'.(Ind co,mponentS: this potentially incorrect.

*. , , * .' : . * , ;: . : ., / * \ *. f,

• < '. : , ... l(Providead&itiorilii.

irifotmati</n .. di;ireftaffcy 'ln 'i>SAJ!.;! 1 . , , .. : ... :,,, .. .. fThe cross-reference to PSAR Section 3.4.1 was a typographical error. The first sentence in PSAR ' !Section 3.5.2, which pointed to PSAR Section 3.4.1 will be changed to PSAR Section 3.5.1 (see :Attachment A). 31 of 96 NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -Re uest for additional information r,,. . *rt""-,***:*;--:- -*7:*;*,-**** ""'- ,. *"":l:'"1;*'

• .

-":""-.;;-"*'i-'"; ...

-*-..

.. -'""'t' ""'"'"'"""'1'*

l. RAI of{tO:C:fl:

.. .

mr;f

• 1f/;l/

f<JI!; 1 :,: : : !** . '_ ;:_:;, *. .'. p[Jhe :;; . ; ;t :), .. >+.: *_.; ;:1,:, * .. ; ;' Ofj(J{/, f L s';.;1** .... , *,:<;{*

• hctentifies 5'.ev¢rat7ROF,$

a#b,Citjted with'fhe.,ojfgas}reatm¢hi arid.b'ujlaing'.Wnfilatioit .:;:, :f )\ , , ;, ,, * , ,;*. * ' , * ,, * , .._ -, , ,, * .,_. * < * * \

• 0 ( * ** (" I ; * " "'-* ' Oc * ' _ , ' ,, ** , , ' *_, j * ._.,_,_, * ' ' . " " ,* _j-* *-.' a .,, ::1, :::,;;,; .. * , em which ptax an importdritrolein protecting both :m<h worker .andptiblic health and safe'ty,;, These ii J.

., : /, :i

• .

nof sta,tei*if <!l!c$f gn,[31/iteri?!. ,bet[ig* ;: * : ;*, .. ":* .;_ . (he u.nflersltiizri.if << : .... ,; .. t !The same seismic design criteria for the RPF structure to withstand a design basis earthquake also applies! ;to the ventilation and offgas systems components that are accredited IROFS. These components will be ! f designed to perform their safety function following a design basis event (DBE), including an earthquake. !

• • r,;,._,..._...,,_,-.,,.._:

.. .. 11 .',.-,1*. ,-"<" , '*.'.!'),"'" *'",=r. *J,,*:****:, ';', 0 ,>*J, *.;*v<<',I<<,_-.; ,.,._*f-,,,,_ 0 ***.: *. "" ..* ,,.,_(, -"°*"', *S<\.'. *':*'*' __ ,,,, l.'!* l '*; ,,,/., -:) ... :.' ]\of bu(:nd( .j: ,:.* *\J:(r .: ! ,

• .f

, .* .. .

1fhe1saine typ,<!' ofinformation.presqribed:in Section :'3,:J(l, onJhe <fesigrr; constructiori.

and opet;atingt,' ., . l ;;,*;;'.:;:<::*.

1/ ** .: .,..,-..

. , , ** .. /-Jr-> *

• . . -.* <i,

--,. .. > _ _, J:. : . , . ; .. , , :". . ... ._, '.:.; -;.

• _*

T. c! I. * .. ::;;1:.r.:

.. *:,,, ;, ,**NWMI<PSA.RcSection:i3N.7 ./Codes andStandards;l'identifi.es.codes,'lind:standdrds.used a8gyidahce: i: )" , { *. ;<

• the 1?,?rswncana:the 1!1<;,re 2.Ql 5 verswrtJ

'7: .' t, .'. .c:J. ;*. ,; ;:: i '.' :TP:f, .**. i ... ;,. ,. ' . *' /; ,.:; . ;;ijoes:l'lo,t.

i';,,

>*

f

• *t" 1 .r:

.*. si I :*;:? ...... . * .. Has considered'mathtenance

• operalions;:"particil1arljlJin

'.t ... *or cells; dvhen ff'.,,* " .. '\ /Each of the hot cells will have manipulators that will be used to perform maintenance within the hot ! \cells. Equipment within the hot cells will also be positioned on skids for ease of removal and replacement [ !if necessary. If maintenance cannot be performed by the in-cell manipulators, the cover blocks can be I \removed and the required equipment replaced. For the tank hot cell, a portable manipulator can be moved l Ito different locations with the tank hot cell to perform maintenance. The design philosophy that will be ! iincorporated in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application will use remote handling for as Jmuch maintenance as possible within the hot cells. In additional, the ventilation and changes in building !configuration will be designed to maintain zones and barriers consistent with defense-in-depth, , iredundancy, and independence to protect workers and the public. I !. --.,. .. ,. .......... --..............

• • -**--,.,,..,, *---* ..... ...................

... **-** .**.. , ................. _._.,_. __ . __ ., ..... -*****--------*-***-*-*****

• • . _ ... _,, ___ , _______ , __ ... 32 of96

.: . .;:.**.-.: . ........ :.-. ". tlO!lTHWlSTtJmlCAl ISOTOPVJ NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -Request for additional information .;*:-.. ...... -,*:.:..*+9-.*,",;..- .. - "':,. ... .... -.'***:::'; r**RAr3;5::.9.::'J'.The1SG'AugirienljngNpRFB-153'7, .>:.;'<:*

• .. .'. *.; \ . . ' : , ..

Production* states, in part, that.the license.application must pmpose .*.: ii'. . * . *>i;equ!pJnen,t,,facilities, to enSl{re tho/the d{!sign pro.v.id?Sforc;jticality/;onf[ql,,;

• .. * . .' i . *. * .. , . .: * ,.

to oftheJSQ -. * ... "/' t .;. " ** .. :

• Part-Jstates,.in,part,.lhf:l(:
• '* * ,,

"* .* .. . , . * * *" * * * .. * ;: .;,._;*,' * ,,' ,.," ;, f *I *,*> 0 -; , '° * *' ,"' > ". *" ',*, I',,"*.' '* J'. i . ,... . . **, ;; , : "The ,applic,011{ shoulrj iJescribe a that' e,nsw:es w'itli' the, (/ouble1;ontirigen(JY, .. *t ;). : *' * *. 'll* . *: pfincijJle;" wf!ere practicable.* Process'fs' iri' whi ch"there dt'.e *no 'crellib Ii!, "acc'iaent scen'Grios that leCic{\ : *

• 1\ .. to 'cr,iiicalitynu:et

'the by This l1sgiven in*:: : , t : *;.Jt*: .. Amer,icaii NatJona( Stqndards.]fi§titute/Ame!icar.rl'fuclear. _SocieQ!.(A]i[SJ/A'l'{S);,&T-/998, ,f'JXtR;leat':i. !; ' " . .,. l >>Criti<;:ality Safety in Operati6ns fissionable }vfateri9ls Outsii/e Reactors, " staief ihatat least.. ;, . ' ' ' . ' 'i: .. < in, pro.c.ess*condttions. must:occur. criticality is_.poss,ible .. '(Jt:e no.J),rocess J i ' ' ,-,-:.,_;'.:-:> chang<{s leading io _critzcdlitj;:iheh ,..: t), :. : >.t* :": ' ' '.;,. _; ;: 1\ * : , . . ;. : i'.Tfie NvREG-,Pa;d,. 6b.3 .J ": :._;_ * * /:1.dd/tipljal

i, . /J:ontingency are. provide in NUREG-15 20, which containf current industry practices OIJ qontm1l.ed' ( 1 * " .;/;arametet:sandacceptarice:criteriiL NUIJEG-1520, Se9tion'3.4:.3.2, . . [: ' '

ilJJJJIYt, if:9 !s 1,1.?f?_fi? I . *. . *1wpeqified, to cntical mass control bydouq/e.,.batchmg;proof,dhe ma,rg1!".fro111 a smgle./;1atch to,;'; .* '.* * ***;'.the sub.criti¢a/.limit Trad,iijonalJY, baich.is4S% <<'i *

'jf

• . '::: .::,.\ * . *>\})u,bsectjon 4c, states*thatwhen overl;iatchmgof specwl material '(S_N!vfJcJs largest"'
• :;mass a single failure.is showl'J to be subcritical and OW!rbatcJiing_

beyond double-* : * " be, consiqer<!d Uf![e.ss it requir.es indeP,endentfailures._,'Qr, is. b;: * * :. 'i!eqtiipnie!licapaCity,

• • ' ,. * * *" ** " " ** ... * ' . Z . . rmf1MI ;SAR .. Chbpter; 4, *ana**9

.., .. A\andthepdssiye:.desiftn

eJ!ul

es;

'il'ctivJ '*.')( ' ' ' . ':' . _' -i* ..._ **.'-. * ',*_;_ -*. ' ,,'*. ', ' ' .* ; * .: ,,_, ' '

• ", ,,*
• " . ;'. : ---. ' {'. . * .. ;;adhefen9e*

to' the doufJle-cofltingencypririr,:iple. PSAµ Chapters ? and* 13.. identify double-batc:_hi11g_ as a; .

• i:bounding

'accid,(mt, Jn response ioR.1)1 3 .. 5.,f (ADA}y1,S Accession.No;}.?Ll 6123Al J.9)/NWMJ states ' I* t ' ' * ! ' "Jithat SSCs will Qe;'use#d:Pfevent*an iniidv.<!:r.teµ(driticaiity rfc4deiirl{11d in respOf1Se;to'fiAI

• .* .. * . *::µwMlcommits to 'iµaintaining a

nuc(ear cnticalif;tsafety program"lising

• * . :: .. ,Fconting?.12cy ptinqiple.

The PSJ!,R dpes iw{ospf!cifica.lly, tii{lrgin .fro!J(a, singleprocess .. batch. ;; .. '.*)ti\to .the if ... ( * . *;\beyond double-batching has:beefi. cdnside;:ed iii theNWMI RFF d{!Sigh. :* *: ,'.* . '. ..,:_: * . * >., . . , , 'l! .. *' " .: *_' .' ' , ' *1. * ""* ' ','. , ' ' :, , ' ' *: . ' ' _, ' :' -* . , " * ' , ', * * ' ' i ', ', ; . *; ' l ; , ' *I, ' i!JfqFnfafiofJ

• <: ::. :. ;fcritica?ity'safety evaluation*

anif confirm tha( the aci:,eptance criteria 'bf the IS(J.1fugmeftting N{Jf?EQ-:

i . '.i1537 heye'been met, Spei:ijically;the NRG.staff needs to confirm tfle*marginfrom d single ba_tc_h to the, 1 J,'. :; .. , , . .

!itiJif :an,d the 1 ?t,45 .'f.hff die.¢s.J .. *: *:.:'to: unders,tandwliethe,r overbatcf!ih'g is:crcrdib1efor:tlie NWA1l'RPF or1Sprecluijedby:equipme,nt

• ':* .* ": i '. ' ' . 'Jcapacity;.availabi?iiy o]!f/aterial; or other consideration.

!tis, not,C!eqr whether the)efoimatiolj.!*

*'; j :: * > ** * .,;

f *, *:. *.: .. * * ::i)contaffJi!dln operatioY,.s;*:-: . :,:*.> * . * ., , .'. * ._.,, * :'; .. *: .. _-;_ -:*.-:** = .. .::.:: .::!:: ;..--:,*.

• ...= *.

-:...-.

.-..... _-.:::':*

• .

  *::-;'.;

• -;**::::.

-

-::-.,* *. *. -::

• RAI 3.5;-9a iProvide additiqniil detail.on the inargin from a Single process batch: to the S11b9ritical hmitin all. ...... *c_\ i; . . .: * : . , . }pl'.odu'Ction ptoc'i.ss equipment aiid:provide ,ah ev.aluati.on of'overbatcf;ing o; i;t:Yeference to such :an ;' !

.... _ _: .*.. ... _ * .. .. __ ...... :*

• __

• _:.::_:* ....

__ J _* .... * :NWMI developed several calculations (e.g., NWMI-2015-CRITCALC-006, Hot Cell Tank Pit, and jNWMI-2015-CRITCALC-002, Irradiated Target Low-Enriched Uranium Material Dissolution), that !looked at overbatching. The hot cell pit criticality calculation, NWMI-2015-CRITCALC-006, looked at iconditions in the large hot cell that were well above double-batching conditions. __ _., .. ,._,......,,..... .. *----. *"'" . ., .... , ---..* ,. .. -. -' 33 of 96

.. NWMI NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -:-.* .. *::-* NOflJffW[Sl MEDlCAL IS.OTOPU -Re uest for additional information 'l *, *,***.*-*

• .* -*-r' _,. --* ' .. -'1 * * ** * .** *.

,-.< ,. -, '

• -.,.-' -:. ...... -

-... , ... - "',

• *""".':

--;-*-'" -. -*:- .. *--**.-;--*,i**d:

• ' < -; :: RAI (Provide.'(J listing of all are/1s ahdprocess.

'equipment contain jiss(oripble material. 1: .*-*.::: .. .,-,....,-.--'*

• ---:

-...:c*r.*- -* .. :>,.-o::.-:: .-o,--:::-;;.-,,_,. .... _ .. ___ .* *.- .*.

• • • -,,-*

.,-*:-: ,.,,.. ..,_.,_-_.,," ........ -::*

• ."*":" :< 'The list of all areas and process equipment that are expected to contain fissionable material is provided in j :psAR Chapter 4.0, Sections 4.3 and 4.4 (e.g., Table 4-51, "Uranium Recovery and Recycle In-Process 1 *Special Nuclear Material Inventory").

t.

The maximum quantities or concentrations of fissionable material for all process areas or process \equipment during normal operations are provided in PSAR Chapter 4.0, Sections 4.3 and 4.4 (e.g., °Table 4-51). ,

The bases for the above maximum quantities, including numbers and types of targets or special nuclear ;material (SNM) in storage or being processed, are provided in PSAR Chapter 4.0, Sections 4.3 and 4.4 (e.g., Table 4-51).

'.The quantities or concentrations of fissionable material used in the criticality analyses for all areas or process equipment are provided in each individual criticality calculation or criticality safety evaluation. iTue single process batch to subcritical limit will be presented in the FSAR as part of the Operating

License Application.

'The criticality safety analyses conducted for the RPF are documented in the following: Criticality Calculations -NWMI-2015-CRITCALC-001, Single Parameter SubcriticalLimitsfor 20 wt% Uranium-235-Uranium Metal, Uranium Oxide, and Homogenous Water Mixtures -NWMI-2015-CRITCALC-002, Irradiated Target Low-Enriched Uranium Material Dissolution ' -NWMI-2015-CRITCALC-003, 55-GallonDrumArrays -NWMI-2015-CRITCALC-004, Single Parameter Subcritical Limits for 20 wt% Uranium-235 -Low-Enriched Uranium Target Material -NWMI-2015-CRITCALC-005, Target Fabrication Tanks, Wet Processes, and Storage -NWMI-2015-CRITCALC-006 Hot Cell Tank Pit Criticality Safety Evaluations -NWMI-2015-CSE-OO 1, Irradiated Target Handling and Disassembly -NWMI-2015-CSE-002, Irradiated Low-Enriched Uranium Target Dissolution -NWMI-2015-CSE-003, Molybdenum-99 Recovery -NWMI-2015-CSE-008, Hot Cell Uranium Purification (Recovery and Recycle) -NWMI-2015-CSE-009, Liquid Waste Processing -NWMI-2015-CSE-010, Solid Waste Collection, Encapsulation, and Staging -NWMI-2015-CSE-011, Ojjgas and Ventilation -NWMI-2015-CSE-012, Target Transport Cask and Drum Handling -NWMl-2015-CSE-O 13, Analytical Laboratory 34 of 96 .... NWM I -::.*.*.*.:* ........ :.* . ! ;

• NORTN\'iltst fo"i.1llltAl IS(JitlPi.S NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 CHAPTER 5.0 -COOLANT SYSTEMS No. Request for additional information

!i.*' 1 ;..1, ff]uf 1$CF;AugmentingNUl/.EG-) ?37,: Part ,4;'. Section 5b/ "Radioisotope Production F'.li,cility Cdolirig ' : . ' f , * ,_ , , , , *, -, . , * *. * .. , ' * * * , " -,, , , * * * * , * * ,,. * * * '. \ , ' * .* , * * , r, , I ,i . * .. -*-.* : ' : * . stqtef; part, that "the rcvie'fe(-Jl10uldascertain m1* *-. * .... \ ; * .. , .: . : :'.adequate,_qrialysisto .. cou1-:}eyo/anypprtof'j

* * .* * *

'./he radioisotope production process .. " TIJe JS(]-A1igmentingNU,REG-1537, Part 1, Sectfori 5b, ."-_. i ;\ :('R,adioisotope

_P_r.oductif!n, Fqci,lity states,,inpari'.* that. ihe, 0/icense ppp#catipn.

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::,,: * '., ,:f : .* 1.... .;:}T!f.'MIPSAR Secfion5.J.}, "Irradiated Target Basis;" Statesamiriimym/Jecdytimefor,:receip(of' . _.,;*:t .

bg§ed:on t!Je* retafive ... * .. : :,J 1 * . '.(f;resentatip1i on March Hf, 2016 (:ADAMS Accessioh' No. ML16153A409),, stated that the e'stini'afed

• . *; i!* * "< . Ftr.aveltime and.distance from'tlie MURR-irradiation site andthe.RJ'Fis 3o:*miijutes

.. and 6 .. ! '.L >* * .. *: * * ,

• bf ihm:rthe

_'*,:. ::* '. *: ** .' :* * '. *:;specified iri Sedion -s: l. J.: These* targets form. the bds_is of the heat generation,?ate, calCl{latioiisjor

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,.;". ,j " . : 1':,Additional'iriformation is ne.e,deqforNRCsi'affto U,riderstaHd the basis*ofthe.;deC.aytifn!! assumed for' J i) , *, * ;iMuRR. targets and.that ihe-)Jecdy time is foi-e\Jaliiaiing need fo( ailxi fidrj cooling .. * . l > < ;, ' ' , ' * * > : '}. -* ' *-, C ' * ' * -O > " oJ * ' ' -' ,. C 0 * .' , 0 0 < ' O ' ' '0

• L ' ' ' *-: :.,. ' ' i, i .. _i\J?1:ovide

.. ad#io11aldetaii'on.the:minimum time e11d ofirradiation:'Of Mf:JR/.?. , ;;J. l:* ' ' 'iitargets' iifr:ti.tding 'hO:..V 'the handfirig: and trafzspor,tatiJii -tinies been rieteniilnkd 'ahd demonstrate .. 'f ; .* * .. **.,. : *:,; 1,\vhy (he.mf.nimu,m.:decay time for (brget.receipifron_iMURR ey;aluatin,g.

• )

.. .. .. jSeveral material-handling steps must occur after the end of irradiation within the reactor before a cask j containing irradiated targets can be transported to the RPF. Examples include transfer of targets into the Jcask, removal of the loaded cask from the reactor pool, assembly of the cask lid, removal of water from !the cask, drying the cask, performing the cask leak-check procedure, and cask decontamination and /verification. At-reactor handling procedures are projected to require significantly longer than eight hours jfor an individual cask. Independent of the actual cask handling time required, the clock time for end of )irradiation of a target batch becomes a datapoint recorded on transfer papers, and a cask will not be )unloaded until the minimum decay time after end of irradiation used in safety evaluations has elapsed. --;, 1 . , ' i:Sys(ems,,'.' states, in part,, thatthe .reyiewer,sf:Iould as2ertain thµi the cm ,, '.*', .i '. .*: {ctdeqtfate (:6o!ing <Jui:ing::the.course,'.6Jahy[i"ar/of, 1: ) . ' * * *,**, * ' . * -, * .. : . f, ,I: _. . ,.: ,: _.; J?qr,(:.!!Jqt,

• .

t' * : :, :*:* * . , . * '.i'Qased on)rrad,icifing eight targets per heat load from' receipt of MURR ' , * ;, 'J. : ' . , zised as atthe RPF.::;PifJ.R

• .': * -*.: 1 !. "'

RPf is rio!liinal ...

• ) ;,, * ', ;rope!ational pro1essing capa.bility,of one. IJ'<!;tcfz per week;of from i _

J?eactor.(Mo/ill/ . !2 ..

• t ,j ,.:* *: ;,:).fi'f!'t.1ldM[{1!f!,.AO:,:

f{'!ted, '115. fi .. - .1): 3ih:l,;1f ..

• '!::* .' .:: *: 1:sta,e 'in I'*o.til\.

.%c'tioh* . . or eva uating t e' nee or,.auxi iary coo iY]g.. -:,:, ' ' :.. <*;: i , '1*:,;.r * " . * ' . i . . . *

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-- ___ ... __ _.,.., _,..,_. ____ _,,._ -------.,_. ,.,. ,.,.---!.--.,..._ -- - ..,,. ___ _,.,. ..* --...,..l 35of96

........ : .. * .. NlllUffW£S:tMEmCAllSOTOPE8 NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -Re uest for additional information lf.0" '*: ." **;.+:'.! .. '-' * **--:_I* ':'}" "" *

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• , *M * ,""';' l 5;1-2 the betweef1 thf! numQ.er of MUJ?.R targets.*{i.e:;
• s per wee/t)'usedfot

... **

.... oltfie equipment W:i4 tqrgets 12 per . * *;j . i * : .. :. F fqcil{tf,deS,igr(,basi.s gf!d <J,sonie ry)J.tive

• .-j: f . . . . . .. . :

bdsisjor eyaludtio!J considering:.that, tlieJ?J! F4s designed to a t 1 .. " .. **;'.*: ....

• i:op,eration.at processing capability pfitp to 12MURR targets:per.Jveeli..
• : *." . * ..

;-:,: , 1

.. ... . _ _.;_., . .. \The target load per week described in PSAR Section 5 .1.1 will be changed to 12 MURR targets per week I !in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application. The modification will include update of ! )NWMI-2015-CALC-022, Maximum Vessel Heat Load, Temperature, and Pressure Estimates, with a l imore detailed analysis and revision of PSAR Section 5.1.1, Figure 5-2. The inconsistency identified is ! :not expected to modify the thermal analysis in subsequent sections of PSAR Chapter 5. 0. The thermal

• iload is characterized by radial heat transfer in a vessel and the uranium concentration of solutions held '.within vessels throughout the RFP. Increasing the number of targets processed during a given week 1 !increases the total liquid volume contained in geometrically favorable vessels (or liquid level height), but) not change the uranium concentration or radial thermal flux. ! 36 of96 NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 CHAPTER 6.0 -ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES

1.

6. r!ftfleJSGA'Ug,izen'ting'Af;ufiAG-:

Pd¥2/statei'ih'at the

• a'* !, *;? * **< ..

dof,u.rr1f!nJ7<.4.:1;o/iew.ed,;.ef.nd,Cfpprqve.f!.w;i{idgtio1:reparf

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*1 .. ..:.: N,<jSanq!ysis.

• Tke.sui?p:za,17

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• l *):* ..... * * * ':' i\descfip1iof!

ofa reference milntiaforvalidation 17eport should include asµ1,1lf!l(Jry oJ;. ;. 1 . * : *iitfie theory of the meth,odology that is siljjii::ien#y detaile}lcinil the *7 :: , . / selectthe ben'Ch1!1arkexperiments; (b) .deterinir(e i11 bias;_".* i: 'i * .* subcriticalliniit:

,* * * *;,

*> * :. " ""*"* .: " * :.,: * . . ":. ' 1 ;,:: " )", < > ,* *' > ' ': ' * ; ': ,** , : * ' -* '

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1:Tabie 3 aYJdSe,ctior 5.Ll ofithe Validation Report

.. * * '. . * ;M!ith. Co'!tiijuousEnergy.!iNJ?F?B-T{I1_41 Cross:.Sedions(:'.

• , .. '.*1 :> ,

tq be, .in ,the <!f 9'. to:fJ, Flvf(!:T/ whicb if. stated .. tn, fhen;naf:

• ,1 * * . )nirii!Jlum vpliie .of the ii i' ".' --: :10.00L/3Jyfel-:

'whiCh fs cqnsider'i.d signfficanilj ab9V.ejhe range. - ' : :*" < ' :;* c .i

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.. .. .* !NWMI-2014-RPT-006,MCNP 6.1 Validations with Continuous Energy ENDFIB-VII.1 Cross-Sections i(Rev. 0) (public version) is provided in Attachment B. .

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• -'*-* .*r'-." *-" .,_:-. !j_ ru\1.a:3-8b

.1;Clarifji if t}Je units.on the 4,NECFvalites givejj .in.MeV aJ7.e. corfebtinthe yaljdation report .. :, * . * . _ .: . * . ,t.,-- .,,_..:..,._J. -:...: ..... -.::_.:,.._

• .

...... ..... ;; _;_ ___ --::/ ... ... ------*-. ..:_'._ . ... .. ---<-!The units in the average neutron energy causing fission (ANECF) values given in the validation report !(NWMI-2014-RPT-006) are in million electron volts (MeV). ;.-- !'".-r----."'..,-0-.*-. .--- "';*---... . .. ;.,'.,,._;, "'7 ... .:. "":-'-* .* 6i3'-9 tSection.;6,b:3 of the JSG Auginen,/ing NUREG::J 5$;7/Part*2/-state:sthafthe.'app!iqantshouldinplud,e a, * .i I,: ; ';. *; d¢sqrfptiqn .Pf g'docu!J.zen(ed,;*rzyiewed, .anaapproyedvalid(1tion reko'rt, (6yfN,CSf ni1r;:lear *:: ;).:' ;': * .. , .... : . * * '.icr:frf<;qlity .safe,tyj /1Jn6fiofl for.each me,thqdof9gy that will bf} .tise<ffo[Jerforni, a,:i:N,<;,S+ . . . . *.. . ?f

• .. :,.:.! i . \foUowing:

{a) a sµmmary ofthe;theoiy of the nzethpdology that.is sitfficien!fy detaile<j a1J4clerir, to'b.e,. ; : . * *' !iiihderstood;'inc1uding_the ineiha,'d usedto the IJ'enchfn.arlhxP,efiments 1 bias 'i" * , .. ; __ '* *A11ncertaint)!infiie'bias, and(c}determ'in'elhe.iipper,subi:riticai:uini( .... : * ; :, ';, * ;* ,:.> .. : .-* .:' 11--*.h ,,* '* .. ,_ ',, r< *,,.'

• *,'-,',

,* !;The Validation Report. (NWMJ:..20U-RI!F006;

• Validations with'Continuous:Energy

.* . * ;,!' . * * ... <"'.]iNDF'IB:"V,IL ic'iJross.;sectiofis, ":Rc!v.

• ofstates{thai the

. , ; . *.

imly r,ange of8 -J 6Jrin H/J{; buUhe.:Areq of . ,;.. .( . ; 1 1 , . ;Applfcabili.lJl

13) states that th_e ,.ange <;:overedfro11J Q-J4.00,'. (I'he,hig#-::<mric,heduraniufn.

-* *:*. * . * .(:[HE[]} cases d9wrz fo !ff!. of 3,* not used_ irz tk<i upper.S!fbcrlfic(J1 li1?1i,t ,,, . ;1and app{fcab'ilftY 1ias'f!ot beii1i:aen1dn'sir,ated/Since the spectdtrii;'is:ve,ry,sensiifve io ch,ange,s.

I ' ' * ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '* * -'* ' ' . ' ' ., : ' "'" .,* , *, ' " ' ' ' '*,' ": "',' .. /*. :*.;;:* i(fr1HIX in the:lqiv HIXJiril'it; infotm#tiqrr is needei;lfor inC/itaJng the;r.angef:from 8 fo'r, * . . :<. *. :;enrichnients oc(.;urring.ai,thejadlitjJ;.

• .* :*!.i: ... : '., , (.,, :/ *:<: ..... ** '.*.: ':" :;. *< <;,: .*.. *. :J1Ju*tW;'irip1uau1g . . *" ) ' " . ' ;:,jljsfijicatidn, demonstratetheir t9your operation&'.'

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-,.,*=.::.!':.: °"""-:. * - -,-.. ,,-'. .. ..:. __ .. _,

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__ .... ........ _'.

• -s:; -'=":'-"

.. ::.: "=.,:;i \The validation report was generated prior to any calculations being performed for the NWMI RPF , jprocess. The intention was to provide as broad a base of coverage within each area of applicability (AoA) 1 jparameter range as possible. The HIX range was extended below a value of 8 based on a data trending ' lanalysis performed in the validation report (NWMl-2014-RPT-006). Subsequent to publishing the [validation report, analyses have been performed for all NWMI processes showed that the extrapolation is ' !he HIX will be changed to from 8 to 1,400.. * . :-37 of96 -::.**.*.:* NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 *.-.* .. *:.* *

-* NOfl.THW£ST ISOTQP£$ -Re uest for additional information f

6;b;40J:iiii:'isd d-. > j : 1 , , ... : *.* of.a dof:uf!irnted, reyfcewi:fi,: and qpproV.ed w1lidation refJ9rt {bJl/fCS fum:;fion c;rnd:; . .. : * , 1 ** ;,managellj_ent) for each ,methoqo_lf!gy used t(J analysis: ,The summary '. : . '.: :* . *. _. * .ofarefe1;encemanu1;17'ofYalidiitioilreport.shbuld indude thefolliJwing::.(a)tl'Sitmma,Y*oj.

1 '. '; * * : . *: *; _;tthe* theory/of is sufficientiydetail?it/inij cliar.tb 6,e understdod,:

including (he * ;_*)j J .: .;, (' to :select,ilie.

b,eni:hirzqrk ' . ; ... * *,_

• * .. ;::. * *.:**** :_* ... * ** * .

l * 'l*'. ,_' .:. ' , : -. '1 :" ' ,_, -* " ' ' . ', .:;,_." * ._ . o<" * ' "' , _ .. \, , * :"\lhe ,NfCNP 6,1 J(alidations.with .(!ohfinuous.Energy .* *:'" * * * *' ...... :.-. !':ElfDFIB;VJtJ 0): iflcluqes*ap,evafitatidn of oias_in. the evaluatj:of:ic

, ,. \: . . : .. < *.:}Morein/Qrmqtion ,isn.eederf:to the qqequacy of the, ev(l/uatlon

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:;* j RAI negative iflclt{dh;g .hydrogen, hm?u,.dingj1.epleJe{f1,:*:, *.

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.. iSection 5.1 of the validation report (NWMI-2014-RPT-006), including Figures 5, 6, and 7, evaluates

trends in important validation parameters.

The calculation methodology should have a method bias that :has neither dependence on a characteristic nor is a smooth function of a parameter. If a trend in a parameter exists, the bias will vary as a function of that trend over the parameter range. If no trend in the ;Parameter exists, then the bias will be constant over the parameter range . . Figure 5 groups individual experiments into sets that correspond to common moderators that include .water, graphite, carbon fluoride (CF2), hydrogen bound in uranium trihydride (UH3), and no moderator. 'When the calculation results for these experiment sets are graphed, some of the experimental results lie ;below akeffof 1.0. Figure 5 does not represent a bias calculation; it is an evaluation to determine if a ;trend exists in the moderator parameter that would suggest the method bias (calculated in Section 5.3 of -the validation report) has a dependence on moderation. In the Section 5.1.5 discussion of conclusions ,regarding the trending evaluation depicted in Figure 5, rather than stating the evaluation demonstrates no l ;significant bias with the various moderators, the statement should read, "the evaluation demonstrates no :significant trend with respect to moderation that would influence the method bias." *Similarly, for Figure 6, the intent is to determine if a trend exists in the reflector parameter that would : suggest the method bias (calculated in Section 5 .3) has a dependence on reflection. The Section 5 .1. 6 1 discussion will be modified to "the evaluation demonstrates no significant trend with respect to reflection! 'that would influence the method bias." * :For Figure 7, the intent is to determine if a trend exists with respect to chemical form that would suggest 'the method bias has a dependence on chemical form. Section 5.1.7 will be modified to "the evaluation

demonstrates no significant trend with respect to chemical form that would influence the method bias." 'The method bias is developed in Section 5.3, and all of the experiment sets included in Figures 5 through! 7 are evaluated there for the method bias calculation.

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_0b;\[ustw tf!eir. inc/us/on Jn,tbe ofpPpli¢g!Jilitf.(f' abf . , ;, , *1: .<', . ff/Oderat,qr '.: *. *. * * * * *: * ':_:_, ....... . ...::. __ __ -;_.;...,. ..... . ... 1, _The hydrogen referred to in Table 13 and Figure 5 of the validation report (NWMI-2014-RPT-006) is ; :included in a high-enriched uranium (HEU) experiment set with the chemical form UH3. The 'miscellaneous reflectors referred to in Table 13 and Figure 6 are contained in a subset of experiments

using graphite, copper, and aluminum reflectors.

The miscellaneous chemical forms referred to in , ' I ;Table 13 and Figure 7 are a collection of 12 experiments using UH3, uranium carbide (UC), and uranium : :zirconium hydride (UZrH). 1 I ;As described in the response to RAJ 6.3-11, the validation AoA will be changed to include only :[Proprietary Information] as chemical forms. 38 of 96

NWMI *:****.*.:* ............ NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 litmTHW£1TatIDtCALtSOIOPts -Request for additional information moderating materials will be changed to include no moderator and water. The reflecting materials

will be changed to include no reflector, water, concrete, polyethylene, and paraffin, and the absorber imaterials will be changed to include aluminum, steel, stainless steel, polyethylene, and paraffin.

,.,_:. ,,.;.: .t,,.,_;_;:, *: .... w.:.*. ;;:-,.-. -

-... ;-'J .

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6:!X3 oftliq. ISGA uginenting Nl/REG.,.1537, 'Part 2:*sfates "fhat the applicqnt'Should inclilde .a!.* .. '.' j'"* -.',.:,

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oj/a

. * * *;.

n,ianag?f11<:nt)f()Y; eacfl methodology that*l)llll be ..

.. \ '1: i:. . . . !:qescrijJti.iJn bf a refer;ence.manual or validation report should inch1de lhefolloWing:

(a/a summary of ' ( R* .. : .*. : .: ,/he theory of:the methodology that is sufficiently detailed and c(ear.to be .understo'od, i11r:1ua{ni tfie, * -.*; i) . ' :; ' ;

used toseiect;the benchniarkf!xperifnents, (q) determlne*thebias*a11duncertainiy in the bias:., .. \ i . . . . : ... , ;'.abcUc) detef:mine.the upper.subcriticai lirtiit * **:*

• 1 * * * *: : * ** ;. * .,... _; ... * : * ** * *
• i f.

  'YCNf' 6.f . *. ; " '/ . * * . : ' . "R&. 0) fl.

mq{<;riaff in 'th?,,qrei;l of tti i, * :. bia;fo;*

• .: t . *, * .:Some qf thesf! n!aterials.

ar!f C1 smal{ nl!mher J!-ZrH and UQ;.S04fm:ms;* .. !,* . 'graphite, U?23(andBf!O/efleqtors;.cu:qbsorbers), andmaynotbepresent*across.the .. \ ,. ' .. * . 'J'.neufrori energy, Sp?plr,um: Therefo:e. ad,c/itjona/ inff!rmation is needed to det[trmine whe_ther,,they-sho°µld

.j * '

** . ,.*:

• llbe of applicability (AOJJ * : *,:.'.. *"* .,. * . : ..... *. '** * ;.* '. '-*'.-. . _.,,, f *. '-:::. .. . .:..:-."

.. ;,;._:_.;.* . .:: .. *-*

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.:-::.-. * :;i;-_ :.;.: ... .. ::-_:;_;. .. 'y,-;-=:5r:r.::

.

of tlie various clzemical form/}. t ..

..

.::'. ... ..

.. .. : .... ,.J !The validation report (NWMI-2014-RPT-006) was generated prior to any calculations being performed !for the NWMI RPF process. The intention was to provide as broad a base of coverage within each AoA iparameter range as possible. The chemical forms and moderating, reflecting, and absorbing materials

present in the critical experiments were placed in the AoA. Subsequent to publishing the validation i report, analyses have been performed for all RPF processes and it can now be concluded that some of the ' jchemical forms and the moderating, reflecting, and absorbing materials listed in the AoA are not /necessary to support the NWMI calculations.

Therefore, the AoA will be changed to include only ;[Proprietary Information] as chemical forms. The moderating materials will be changed to include no ;moderator and water. The reflecting materials will be changed to include no reflector, water, concrete, !polyethylene, and paraffin, and the absorber materials will be changed to include aluminum, steel, !stainless steel, polyethylene, and paraffin. .. __ _,,_.,...._.

• ....; ** :..* * ...;;.....\.*, .* . ..,-._ .. ,;.;::.. ,......_ __ ._, .* -*
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"**-* --

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• ,:...,_,'." -**""** -r--'"'"*

_,.,'. ".' , -..-;,...1 b;'.f qr compounds,. elenl(!_nts,: for*whiclj_'thefe arefew

• *.:* i ;L,.,* .*

.* ....... !Each calculation document includes an evaluation of the validation AoA. For systems that have i compounds, elements, or nuclides that fall outside the validation AoA, an increased margin of lsubcriticality (MoS) may be warranted, depending on the specific problem being analyzed. The analyst ;will document any extrapolation beyond the validation AoA in the calculation and justify whether an .. ____ ... ___ . . ... . .. . _ __ .....

. * . .

;;summary description of a docuinented; reviewed, andapprovedvalii:idtian repm1,(byNCSfunctioh J, .* . ::manage.ment)for:eachmethodo/Ogythcitwiltbe*used.toperfo"r,m Thesumn.iary

• ** .. Ji .. . " ;*descrip't;on of a reference' manual or validation .repor( should JnC/ud_e (Ci) 'q sUnimarf of ' *: . '.* '.

of the suffi.Ciently deiailed'and"i:.tear tob'e u,nderiiqo(/;.Jhc!iir)ingthe -:--.. l* . .: -:Seledthe benchmark expertilients; (b) 'the bias .; '.1 . r)mid (ctdeteniiine the upper; szibchtica/'liniit. . ., . [' " . . ,.. '.;, ' -. . . :: . :: '<-\'i *. " ' ,', 0 : "'**: 1: :: . . . . i * . . .. ' . . ... ;, . " : * ** * ... .;* . * ! . . .. " . " . ' **' l' ... ' .. " 1 i : .. ' *

• Vfilldai-;on
• .*-'MCNR 6.J f!.O,lid<JtiOns,With, Cdntinu0us$nerg.Y ;1 ENDFIB*V1L 1 "Rev: 0) in(;Judes a .discussion of physidai par,ameters in theA..OA.'

i " . . . fs to. de_tern;,ii1e/f ofpgfametersJq to, the_ ,,, :'facilitydesign*arewithin.theAOA .. * * * * *: *:, .;; , , , '.:. :* , * * .. ..*. 1;;,., ... ... ..... ., ... ::.:: '. o:.,.. .. ,:,.;:,.,.,::_ ..... ;>... * ...** .. ",. .... * .. , .. .,,....,, ..... .. -.... 39 of96

........ :.* * ** l'lG8fHW£ST MmCAl.ISOTtlPES -NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 Re uest for additional information

The validation report (NWMl-2014-RPT-006) was generated prior to any criticality safety calculations i )being performed for the NWMI RPF process. The intent was to provide as broad a base of coverage l )within each AoA parameter range as possible.

The actual physical parameters associated with the facility ( /and process designs were not established at the time the validation report was originally issued (as I [Atkins-NS-NMI-14-01, 2014). Subsequent to its issue, criticality safety calculations have been ! !performed. Each calculation documentation includes an evaluation of the validation AoA. For systems I 1 that are outside the validation AoA, an increased MoS may be warranted, depending on the specific j iproblem being analyzed. The analyst will document any extrapolation beyond the validation AoA in the j ([Proprietary Information] I i I ! 40 of96 _ ... NWM I *::.**.-.:- -.-.* .. *:.* . r.llHUHWISTUUtlCAllSOTDPlS NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 Request for additional information 41 Of 96

NWMI .;:.**.*.:* ............

• ':

• HORJHWm Mt01at.ISOTUfES NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 Re uest for additional information 42 of96

NWM I ............

• *. *. *
• NGRTRWlST ISOTOPES NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 Request for additional information 43 of 96

..**.....

• .

NWMI NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -:-.* ** *:=* . ";_ f.lalUHWEST M£DtCAL ISOTOPU -Re uest for additional information

Mi ihe ;;n* sl;b

-* --* -* -' * *i: *-* *:'.o

• • ,.,._,; .*

-.* *" .-..

• )'.

,._;.":"-, *;,..,, .. .......

• • " ";*:" *.
• .:-'-.><'--< .PerNWMI-2015-CRITCALC-006, the modeled maximum volume of any of the uranium containing .vessels is [Proprietary Information].

To reach a 1 cm (0.39-in.) depth on the floor of the uranium purification hot cell floor, [Proprietary Information] would have to be spilled at the same time. This ; would be equivalent to a simultaneous spill of almost [Proprietary Information] in the hot cell. A spill of ;this magnitude should bound any spill expected to occur during operation of the facility. In addition, all '.of the vessels in the interaction calculation were assumed to be full of fluid, even though a large portion .of the actual fluid would be on the floor to achieve the 1 cm (0.39-in.) height, thus maximizing the 'possible interaction effects of the scenario. -** '"' *** "'<* '"*""*_,, __

• "

: . ,, * . should mclude*acc1dent analyses znvolvmg materrals arid an mterprefdtion of the sequence of' :J *j : * ,: *;:'.ei>erits>jt is presumea'thpt dl(cnticality:cJ.ccident'analyseslvouidassuffJe high

*:* )h<J applicdht include cr,edible a?

• j .: . ;As part ofthe <yaluation applii,atior;.

the staff NWMJ-20{5-:CSE-008, "NWMI ' *' * *: * . ::Preliminary Ctiticality.SafeiyEvaluatioi1: Hot Cell Uranfuin Purificati01i, "Rel!: A. Thisdocitment . *. : * * " , * * : * !:prov_ided iJ_n evcilu_atiofl th.e hof.cdlpur.ificapon unit; 4cJ4itiq1:1al ., ., ,;, . ;'.information is needed to deterrni'ne if thi!i analysis ensures that the processfs Szjbpritical under'normq' . ! ,f" * :;* , r: , *. ;:and abnorinat Cb.fidJti(njS and adeiju4te1y:satiS.ftei -"* ** ,.. :* * ** , , ::..: , * ..; '>

';,:. .. . ..:;::.:. .::::: "":*-. *,: <"* --:

• 7 -**= :*.,:._;:.*

":;-

':.:": ; RAI s:3.:14a ;1.JustifY' ihlli, the lneilsuresprevehiing backfiow 1o '/lie fteslf'resin in *Scenarib C7,. .1; ' *.

• i:are su]fic}ently.reliable*io ehsur.e*crilicalityis "highly unlikely;" specific;all.x double Qlock-an_d-. . " ** . :,bleedyalY,e and the paddleplank. . ' * * ** . -* . -*.. " * ,.
• an<. .......

....... a .... n ... d,._ ... .. 1 failure probability of 10*2 to 10-4* Each of the administrative actions relied on as controls are also backed iup by a control requiring that a manager or supervisor verify correct valve alignment/presence/absence of! the paddle blank in accordance with the activity that is being undertaken. With this required verification, 1 :either the primary or secondary contingency is unlikely to occur. These actions are determined to be '.sufficiently independent such that for the scenario to occur, two independent, unlikely failures would be irequired, thus satisfying the double-contingency principle and rendering the occurrence of the scenario to; :be highly unlikely. , * --.-** *** " * .!' * , ** -***"* * **; "; -... .. ... .: * ..:.-:..*:,. . -* -v----;---. <*-; *-**'*

• • • • • . __ .,......_

-*,*;-r*;.. -

.. *-.-.. >>-.'-'.f'-

• ......

.* :.--;::,,_ ..... ":-; i.RAI of these,controls,are.r:,onsidered administrative, in that they rely. ori proper valve "' :,. ;._ '* * : * * : . * 'iatignm'erit 1nitallation, dfmDre treziliiioridlpassivi

• .. . . ' ' . *. . . '..llprevefntion.(e:g.,:overjlow draiiis, siphoribrea,ks);Jn accdrdance with !f,WMipriferreddesign . ' ' .1 < ..

__ .:;'.'. ...... .--.;:..: ... .. : .. .. -.. ,; ..... ......... .. .. -____

• *
• The addition of fresh resin is not a routine occurrence, and is expected to occur on an annual or .annual schedule.

Fresh resin will typically be added to a water-filled column with no SNM present. Once : *the new resin is added, the valves will be closed and the blank inserted. The operating/design conditions l ;of this equipment (column is pressurized) does not lend itself to passive features. The analyzed controls

• iare considered to be adequate.

The current design of this equipment does not include passive backflow design features, as the analyzed controls are considered to be adequate. Consideration will be given to providing passive backflow controls for this scenario and will be provided in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application. I 44 of96

NWM I *::.**.*.:* ............ NllRtHWlSTl!i.mllCAltst>FOPIS NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -Request for additional information . :i_* .R.6.(6j .. -6. 15.3 6Jtke isa AugmeiitiJi NURj;fi15p,

Siaiei

• **r, ,j: : -.* . *;. * * ..
• licens?dYJ1..aterials a/1q.:an:

of *i \ .. : *. _. *

• It {s 1 pr,e,syl}led
• qt all_cr;i(iC;ality an9ly$es }V_Ou!d as_swJle fiig_hco71sequenc,es; tf!ere[cge,.';

., . :!the applicant should i1Jclude every credible event thdt couldresult in an uncontrolled criticality event. .: "7_*/,;', *'

• . ;'* *t,

,: .. l

"*".* ,*,::,' <, .,_.,; * ', **, .1 ." .. * .. \ff)sP,q(t st<:ffrevl_c;wed .. *-'*.'. ) . S,afdy 'j' F \iprdvidedtiri of cnticality safety:scen,aj-ios'in hot unit, AdditionaJ ,*' ,; ' *, *' ,( ;, * , * ,

• to aetern1ine if 'this analysis ensures thaf-theproce'Ss*

is suljcritical imdeFn0,rindl !: (. ..-*: ,:, ' -_;;ani,Fabnoririal conditions andaaequptely satisfies, the double coi1tingencypribdple. -: . : . ,, ;_ .,, *1 \_:.L .. ; :=:.:: . ... .::-,S-,;:.-::

.::::: ..

.. -::.:.**, ..... -:.;_-;_;.": -:..::::::,-;;..::_;i:.::-.;:;.* .. -

-... '.J

...

.. : .. ,i.RAl*6.3-1 Sa '!f;xplaif! the na_ture,fin<i operaqon of tarzkVentirigand the over loop s,eahysterij d,r,Jscribed .in Scf!ndr.io C8,' ;: .:.:: ' ' . '.,,,, :!tncluding whether.they cire:pasSiv.'e:pra9tiye,' andjustifythattheytire 8ujJU:i'ehti)h;eiiable iO ensure ., c;, '( .. .. :: .*_' __ .. jL::..: :-... ;,_ )Scenario C8 in NWMl-2015-CSE-008 evaluates the backflow of material into the incoming air or gas ;lines to a vessel holding fissile material. Both the tank venting and overloop seal systems described in I ! Scenario C8 are passive systems. An overloop seal system provides an overloop in the supply line for !each gas addition stream that is of sufficient height such that even at the maximum possible pressure in !the attached fissile-containing vessel, the fissile fluid cannot reach a sufficient height to flow through the , !loop and back into the nongeometric favorable parts of the gas system. Tanks are vented directly to the

• jprocess vessel ventilation system. The vent header in the hot cell is geometrically favorable and has drain ; \lines to favorable geometry tanks or sumps. Since both systems are passive, these controls are considered
• junlikely to fail, and failure of both simultaneously is considered to be highly unlikely. . ) .---"!* -'---""-* ...... ";--*""'-::<-

..

...

• '"\'f'*,,.:,

'?;.;, .. * . .;.;-.? :) RAf6.3,.15b*.1Clarifjf whether the overloop seal -'system is'passive, as stated in Sec,tioh -4, 1. 4A of ,I .. '.*** __ .. .. .!L ... L;:,:i,.: .. lThe overloop seal system is a passive system. An overloop seal system provides an overloop in the :supply line for each non-fissile utility that is of sufficient height such that even at the maximum possible !pressure in the attached fissile containing vessel, the fissile fluid cannot reach a sufficient height to flow i 1 through the loop and back into the non-fissile utility vessel. No operator actions or active equipment ioperations are required for this system to perform its intended function. ., .... -*1'"-.... :* -* ..,.,..,.... --*-': "-:?. --:r..:.....-- .... "-;. .. ---- -* "':***r* ... ,,-... :: ,. .. ,, ..

.i;-;

-....

• • • -.-: "1'

.. )1*.,RA!.,6.3-16,.;!Sectiom6. b:3 of the'IS(JA itgmenting"'.NUREG-15, 37, *Part 2;. states 'fhai"cn ti,cality (

• ',. * '. ' I:'

inclu_de 'acddeiit qil_q!fses

d4h, se.queiice oj ,'i :; ;* .:

It is presumedJhq_t al{ q:itic(lli,ty,,ac,ciqent, a'?alyses lfOulq assume high '<, r: i:fhe dppf!cr;int inplude every q:edib{e,' event {h(If CQ.ula'resu/t in, qn UnC0,1JlrOl/efi: critica,fity event , !, *j . ,I) . . . , *" *. , 1

• _., . . . " '1, ,. '* ' ,

'* . * * . *. ' '. , !:As part-of the ev{Ililation of NWMI app#catjon the'stajf revii,Wed:NWMI-201S-CSE-'008;, '.'NWMJ > .. --!,Preliminary 'CriticalitjSafetj/Eviiluatfon: Hof Cell Uraniun1 PurificatiOn, ".,Rev. A .. This:documenf- .. -, ..

• unit.Sedtio1;1.4.1'.4

-... " '. * * *: .. * *. *;; chenpc.41 Yeagcnt'.or systems-witfiai1: brf Sectipn .; ;. CfjE-:{)8-;PDfl c;ither a qdyt(Jnk;or tl[l lnsu]fi<iiefnt,infoiwtatid1;1 i,s < _ : (;provJded:o,n.J;o,w, day to.pr<rY.en,t .. , . *:< . ' * *:.;_ : , 1!clarlfy whether both day uscdoii these siJpply ' " ' )*systems;:'or on,lyqn,e, o[her. : . ' .* ' ' .* ' *' , ,.. '** ' ' -. . -t.-.*;---. -::.:;:.-_ .. .* . .'.,,,-, I iAs stated in Section 4.2.4 ofNWMI-2015-CSE-008, criticality in each of these systems will be prevented )by incorporation of safe-geometry intermediate day tanks in the liquid systems that are physically iisolated from any larger-geometry tanks with an air break, such that backflow of uranium to an unsafe )geometry is physically impossible. The current wording of the control CSE-08-PDF12 does not reflect \the actual design and will be revised to clarify that the control consists of a safe-geometry intermediate isolated from any !arger geometry tank 45 of 96 NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 CHAPTER 7.0 -INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS No. Request for additional information J.::::i':*/ ..

,* .R{-\1 ?.

*1 .f cn;t, {:/.(Iesti,on

-!f?;* f n

• l (. J .. *. . * * ** ,

the tech1)lcal,aspects, :safety,.phzlo:SQphy,,,and'ob;ectjves-of(he control (l&Q) * ' ' ' ""' ;;de$igil .su¢hfactbrs'as redundahc;f 'diversity,: ancUso)d_iioh*offunction,s. 'TheJSG ;; I ., * .. ' * '.W.ugmeniingN[/REG-f537, farts Tand2;'Sec't{on7br'.'Radioi$6tope ProductioriFaCility .: t' * *,, : . , .. :., ": .

• af!,d Contro{Sysfems,. J,<'Sul.nmaYt Desgripfion, .st.(lt,es; inpm;t, . that fhe,,:* t i sh,ou'.ef

,'::t ; .. {safe(Y; ,con,szdera,gqns,,a11f1 .. f!ro_d,ucti?1Jfaczfi1J!.,thr;ti'

-:, determine of liJfiit the J&<; de,sign:

I 537,,;Part 2;$ecti0n

7. ],,'. ':SuiitmpryD(!$crij)tfon;;"

! 1,l_;,.: t* :*'>*' <-*'*" .fl ... **""" \:o'*', _.,,_,:: ... - .*

• ,:,,,"'.7 ,' ;), ._*:,, *.

. ' .>>' .** * *. _**;,:,* _*,*.: ** :">' , * *,,: ,o,., ."<',*;. ,\ ,;_ 1! , . * : :m pr;rrt, ;that (hf acceptance ofthe sumJ:llary.de,scnptif;n:shoulrfbe*

base4 on its completeness, m. ** ' * , *. * ( c Pqrt*1. ::: .. :::*: :,;: ,. '::.-:*" >.* ')" * : * >.,.. .... < .**. < * * * .f. lf!WMI PSJ[R Sectioht I/ "$1.tmirJary IJeschptipn, :'. disci{sies qeiign;in terms df RPF*: . . . .. 1 :.:P,rricess'es diid8ysiemS.iri¢ludingBNAf prepai,atioh an.dhandfin8 processes, radioJsotqpe. t:11J(/Ji

f UtJ .f!{J1(4tf ,.) .

;' .fa'Wftx v,efif!{atiq'.n Rfia_[!icql 1f/f . 1; * * *

ith,at ponftol (FPC) iJ.17iJ:th¢.,build,ing*1f!ah'{:lgefrlent systein (13MS) 'provide'mohitorin'g !\,'*,;-.

": ,,.:"' **'"* .. , ,. '"'-:" .. * *. ,--., ..* "'." *"**,, .... '*"r'-."i *.: '.:{j,17d,'controlfitn,dions: J!S!fRSection kl the.proce,sses qr systems'are'::*

• .... ;-* '.'. .' ' ".:r;/orittOr(!(i and'dontrot!ed However,'

ii aoes not identifY a'n'ji'specific J&Ctecfmical ilspe"cts; philosopliy, f . ** i:or discitssion:does.not,address r,edundqncy; diversify/or.*.*

• * *
• l , ' ;l, , -, , , ,, , r , ,-. . , ,_ * , . * * /:';;is,olatiof!

engine,ering fe0tll1:(!5'. f.o b.e . *; ., *;I 1: ... .. ... * *. :;*.:{ ****:**,*.

1. :: .*.

lljf,

<;'fffeCts, . ' * .: * ;1safety, phllosophy; andob;ectives ofthe-J&C design gnd confirm J&C design meets tfie* ... -:: .. . ':* .. -.: ;:: ";: :\t*:::*. ':.* ;.,: -' .. * .. * * * .. *';'Provide .ad(iitfonal detaiLregarding the design, bases, technical

aspects,

'phil(Js6phy, and . :. .. '.3 fon fµofliior'dn(i_ cohtrol'/1PF . : . . . . ., "' .. .'..,.¥,c}f "I".:,-.;;-:,'. . ,;.* ' -..

The instrument and control (I&C) systems preliminary design was developed to ensure the sufficiency of ! ;the principal design criteria, design bases, and information relative to materials of construction, general 'arrangement, and approximate dimensions sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the final design

will conform to the design basis. In addition, preliminary design of the RPF I&C systems (e.g., details /regarding the design bases, technical aspects, safety, philosophy, and objective for all I&C components

!that monitor and control RPF processes or systems) was not developed to constitute approval of the : safety of any design feature or specification. Such approval is anticipated to be made following the '.evaluation of the final design of the RPF I&C system, and described in the final safety analysis report 1 (FSAR) as part of the Operating License Application. Note that concepts like redundancy, independence, 1 :and diversity of systems are specifically identified as necessary in PSAR Sections 7.2 through 7.6. ' :For the RPF Construction Pennit Application, the preliminary design of the RPF I&C systems is 'considered functional and at a conceptual level. Our intent at this stage was to describe the design :methodology and provide reasonable assurance that the final design will conform to the design bases safety. . .. __ *-.... . 46 of 96 .: .... ... NWMI *.*:.**.-.:. ........ :.* ': flDRTIMIESTe.!!DtCAl ISQTOPCS NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -Request for aqditional information f R.t\1 {NuiiEo-153 7; -Part f

• iI;'part, thatthe:geherdt'desc;/ptioni

\:. ' fJt;tcfl ,category of I&C subzystems should inclu<fe<the types of parameters monitored;

• the number oft: i' * * * . ;:channels designed.to monitor each parameter, qnd tfle. actuating logic: NUR,EG_:..J 537,,Part.2,,i. . * , ; f::: .*. '

7.

J)'escrtp.fton, ;,_ tnp(lr(that the 4.¢.ceptaiice of tiie, sii/Jimary.-descr.tp#of!

' " f : \ ,: . _}.. \i§hould

... '" * .* ,; .. *,,.

• V * '* *' . *L*:NfWAf!P81f . '.;., ? . :*, . .' _*.

7.1.sta'.es that, the:FP_C and the BMS proy14e an-i cqnb;:q! * *-. ;,:* * . **. * , *

• _ifunctfons; but it does riot discuss I&C SitbSyslems'thiit are part of the overall FP,G syste'n1 and BMS. 1. . . ** !JPSAR 8ectiori'7.1 identifies.izoW, arid wher(J_ lMprocesses.

or systems afe monitored and coiitrollea. J _ * :: ,, {. the f)IJJ.e:S;;of pat;l!_meferS, mcmi(orecJ, ,the number-of.chii'?tiels '.

• f !).'. . . ""

.. ':. . : * ,:._ :/::* . :, . : ;,\.; *;' ., i" . . *.-*. . ' , r ,., * , . fr4dc!fti()tJqlinfonJiciti.on isneedf!(ifo1: t!ze, of pariimeters

• ; v . . , _.:., ;'.,.

a1uJ,Jhe act,ua4on,:19gic anef critel:fo of . *\ , . * "*

• pNUREG-1S37; Part 2/Section 7,1. *. .. _. . . * . -* ... , * . . . . ;*. ; :* j I ' \ ' f j ' ' ' 1 i ' ',; ' * ' * * " , ' ' ' * , ' ' 1 ' J. * \ \ . , . ;!P_rovide of I&C'subsystems that includes the types _ofparamete'rs
• *: I * *** , *
• i'ffJ..onitofed, tlie_number of channels designed to monitor eae,h parc1rneter, a1Jd.the.qct11,atirzg)ogiq

..* * . _, ;1 .... . .. :.,.:o'.-;,'-ow* ,:._"'.'! .... v:: .. ..;..:, .* .;., L.i_ __ __:i:;:.;,..,:. ".::..,: .. . !.':_:!_,.: ,_.:.,

_.,_, *-,,-_

_:i \The I&C systems preliminary design was developed to ensure the sufficiency of the principal design jcriteria, design bases, and information relative to materials of construction, general arrangement, and iapproximate dimensions sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the final design will conform to /the design basis. In addition, the preliminary design of the RPF I&C subsystems (including types of !parameters monitored, number of channels designed to monitor each parameter, and logic) was ;not developed to constitute approval of the safety of any design feature or specification.

Such approval is : !anticipated to be made following the evaluation of the final design of the RPF I&C system, and described; Jin the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application. Section 7.2 does not address specific aspects * /of the I&C system, although Tables 7-4 through 7-12 list the location and types of parameters anticipated. ito be monitored. '.For the RPF Construction Permit Application, the preliminary design of the RPF I&C systems is !considered functional and at a conceptual level. Our intent at this stage was to describe the design (methodology and provide reasonable assurance that the final design will conform to the design bases !with an adequate margin for safety. j .. . >::of eachca(egory ofl&C a*sum.mary "OJ the hunid,ncJmt;IChihe 1 irlteYJace' -* *' ... :* . ( :\.': j!prinqiples used in the loca_tion of instrumentation a17d controls. NUREG-1537,. Part 2;* Section 1.1, ,. : * /: ". 01* . J "Surlinuiry

part, summary

.. \ . '*. ;:bf;ised on itfcompletenessin 'addresstnithf!faqtors listed, in />artl. ,' ... ' . .. i: : ' '* **: *;;Nff/MI lsAR i 1; temis'.oJJ??F.-t -_.*;y . :. ** !: . <'Proc,esses lriilSyste_'!zs.' 7). that ffle t<:rge..t fa,pt:lca_tJpn,,P,rQ(;e:r4; .. a1Jd. *.) ' . ';disassembly process, targ¢t dissolution process, 'molybdenum .'and fturifi,e'ation proce,ss,: anrj ... !, ,.>,. '.!!Ow-dose liquid waste:hand/ing will be*confro/led by opefators at foca(humari-miJch(ne' inteYfafeS, '* f' * . ,\(HMI). f SAR Section Z. J:also identifies thai: operators at local HMis will controMhe'plant alr, system:*:**: . )gas fUpplysy_ste[lt, .. chilled w9ter demineralized . : . . '.;chemicaI:supply

iystem, and standby electric power8ystem.

PSAR Section* 7, l"uses several.different*

,; \ . 'i!tefnis (i:*e.'

di;pJ/;ys,' dpef IJiiI ',; , :' ' '" .. equipment PSAR Section '7,. i)Joes ndt tnc#/de a oj . ;::}used_in the ofl&C'and doesnotdefinethe d(jferent'ie'rms usedto'aescribe opeYatof;c(>)itroileq'. ' : ;,<eqt1ipment. . :* .* * ,

• , *: . * , " .. ' *. *. :*::: .. :
• f * *: * *: : : * :: * *; _< * * ... ,_ * : ***. **,., ; , '.'. :I * ; . .

is 'f!eededjor thdstaffto understana the a;;ato , ,. ; ; . * . : ficonfirm that:thef &C desi.gn ll'lee,ts the w;r;:eptance. .P,art2, Seetion 7,. J:. " .**. .i ; __ ... -'.* .* -.... .. --.;.,-=--

• .,,--,;'......';'.

... .. -*** ... .. ,.:,,._,.,.

.--

,,_., , .. ... 47 of96 1 I .: .. .............. ..........

-. :

• f!ORIW.'JEST MEotCAl ISOTOPES NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -Re uest for additional information i .. jii\1: 1.1-3 .:*:;pf:(/vtde

,;", , pripqiple.'!:tfse4liJ/h.t;,Jf!t;ai#9Jtofl/f:C:wz_rJ {nfUJJCtj?ha"fty_ µmfAesigri, * .: ._ .; *\ ' . * *. *-* *:betweenoperato_r interface disp/fJYs, operaior itzterface terminals, and HMls .. ' * * * * -,*.: * * * * *: i

JL

.. , .. :--::. ..

• .,.:* .. ..

.. .. .. .. " .. ::. ... ... *The I&C systems preliminary design was developed to ensure the sufficiency of the principal design ,criteria, design bases, and information relative to materials of construction, general arrangement, and \approximate dimensions sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the final design will conform to '.the design basis. In addition, the preliminary design of the RPF I&C subsystems, including specific ; details on human-machine interface (HMI), was not developed to constitute approval of the safety of any : ;design feature or specification. Such approval is anticipated to be made following evaluation of the final 1 ;design of the RPF I&C system, and described in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application. ITo be consistent in the PS.AR, terms like "operator interface displays" and "operator interface terminals" !will be replaced with the single term, HMI (e.g., pages 7-i, 7-iv, 7-4, 7-15, 7-17, 7-18, 7-20, and 7-21). ' I ;For the RPF Construction Permit Application, the preliminary design of the RPF I&C systems is !considered functional and at a conceptual level. Our intent at this stage was to describe the design ;methodology and provide reasonable assurance that the final design will conform to the design bases No. Request for additional information ..

• . Th¢ :'System (n tfJe .. SAR ai]dmqjor q 0 niponent.s 1

• ' ' *fJlosjc,;zogic;

<I.J14.soJmqre.:

" ; '

1iwftw;js£or P,9ppu_t;r arfd .applicant .. ' . . . '_shou*1a:desci-ilie how,the'S)lsfem operatiqnql will be met,' f1ow:"the.:

i .. t

.,._ *.* *'**,*1 .,,, .. --......... ,.. ..* *' *.*,,;'., '"' .. **; ** .. *, :'; .. *f',* *--, .. **

• ' I( ' operator interface requjrenients wm be'met, [and} should"addresstlie.'m¢thodology"and:

acceptance'*

• > ); :; " criter/Cl'Used i{J es,talilish and cqltbf*ate'l/if!

triP'or dqtui:itt6n. functions:

, : , :;, ' ' :, 0; '.flWMf ?slft?.. Section J;*i3, KPF1 &(j] srstefn. basic co!hPpnents*qs * *,. )ncludirzg

'f'P@.;'sjlste,m;' 'eng_irz,eerifli sefet;/feafureJifSF}:actuation iystems, qonl]:'(;Jl cpnsf!li;.aiid .. i 0 PSAR Z. f..},5'.fio .a:de'scription ._ .. i . !iqf ?:n* i;g. * * . "1. FP:Csystem; ,conl[olrooinlopf!rator m,terfqc;e,fix.epJ:,oteqtiqn, system,1, ,<***}},<'\'.'_"* -'"F -'. *:,"1,-<', .'i'. '*'*"*'* "/' *"':':* ;,< .,.;*:*'-"" *' * .' ,,._'* ** * : ;f"acilitycomfnunication Sj;stefns,,ancl anaJytical'labora(6ry*i)lstem .. PSAR.Section ?'2.:3 alsodoes*not *.:1 "' ':: *.. schenzalic address,:the:methodology '. ' . ')!ind acc,eptal1c'e t,hei'tripior 'lictiiati<i11 setpoinfs; or i1fterloc.k*' '. ). ._ * .. , .. , * .. *-_-.. * ::::;r ;, '. :. ,_::

• ;; ,.

'.:{:. :* ; * .. . ":* _ :;;

• '.: .'.*'.
• ' .. _* '. .*;:.;: .<*\ .. *: ,,,. \ *.l .

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• .* * ':

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• .additiim"t;i trlf ii&a

\ '/: '. i p'. . <'*:* . ,. /oste:.

• \*:J .. *' . i'.f1lisys,te111s:.

d1pgra11l§f°'?:* tfJ.<; d{[J.lf(ll;c<f_mpu,ter_ ;l. .

• _ . .. .

.. * .. ,. :,; ---* ,: . ,; .. * .... , . ... .. ... .... .. .. .. jThe I&C systems preliminary design was developed to ensure the sufficiency of the principal design !criteria, design bases, and information relative to materials of construction, general arrangement, and iapproximate dimensions sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the final design will conform to !the design basis. In addition, the preliminary design of the RPF I&C systems describing all of the jequipment and major RPF I&C components (e.g., block, logic and schematic diagrams, software flow !diagram, and description of how system operational and support requirements and operator interface !requirements are met) was not developed to constitute approval of the safety of any design feature or (specification. Such approval is anticipated to be made following evaluation of the final design of the RPF\ !I&C system, and described in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application.

• !For the RPF Construction Permit Application, the preliminary design of the RPF I&C systems is !considered functional and at a conceptual level. Our intent at this stage was to describe the design !methodology and provide reasonable assurance that the final design will conform to the design bases (with an adequate margin for safety.

.. y--* ..

... ..

7: b .. .. .. . jThe I&C systems preliminary design was developed to ensure the sufficiency of the prinpipal design ' ;criteria, design bases, and information relative to materials of construction, general arrangement, and japproximate dimensions sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the final design will conform to fthe design basis. In addition, the preliminary design of the RPF I&C systems describing the detailed :methodology and acceptance criteria used to establish trip or actuation setpoints or interlock functions !was not developed to constitute approval of the safety of any design feature or specification. Such !approval is anticipated to be made following the evaluation of the final design of the RPF I&C system, !and described in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application.

• i 1 IAs discussed briefly in PSAR Sections 7.2.4.1 and 7.2.4.2, trip or actuation setpoints for systems in I Section 7 .2 will be established to indicate a warning when a given parameter is approaching a setpoint iand alann/trip when it has reached a setpoint, both at the HMI and the control station, as appropriate.

iAlarm/trip setpoints will be established at levels that are protective of systems relied on for safety, as (described in the PSAR (and follow-on FSAR), particularly IROFS. This means that alarm/trip setpoints lwill be established to provide reasonable assurance that these systems will be consistent with the design !requirements and limitations established by the bounding analysis found in the PSAR and follow-on !FSAR 1!For the RPF Construction Permit Application, the preliminary design of the RPF I&C systems is ,considered functional and at a conceptual level. Our intent at this stage was to describe the design !methodology and provide reasonable assurance that the final design will conform to the design bases _____

• -___ "' .,,,____ __ _ __ .... _ .. _ .. __ ---------*-. _ ,. _______ . *-... _ ..... J 49 of 96 ,*.

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• .* * :
• flORJKWtsl MEDlCAllSOTOPU NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -Re uest for additional information .

fari,1 :: 4;

• thdt . . . * . *: "* .i!shpulq cl;nduc(a SystepJ N.e17syr_e the 'desigl) criteri{J an<:(des.fgn, '. . .:

met liCensing req11iremen{sfqr tije .Pe.rfolJnm:ice 6/fh(!, system afe specified. Tli'e analysis ;: . *: < :!shoulq describe the* operation sjJstein afld presentthe:analysis

• af how 'the .si>item

\ *!'. . *. ?bneeM'tHe de'iign critet:iiuthd J:'. :; .,.; ... * * *< *:*!.' .* , .. * .. , .... .:<:.. ... .: A.}' >.* ;;:fiwMJ 7{2. lt/ !: by ,, , . , *

• P§AR Section. 7._'.2.
• Wi:lbiniiiate_:aridconirobESF actiV,dtiori

i . ' :and isolation:

PSAR-Section

i:2.4.2.6 states that the FPC sy'stem will have the abilityJo'perforni a* .. , *. " * , *. iimpnual of th,e ESE: Howevr.:r, PS!JR'See;tion i 1.

th_at ES,F will operate* , : . *. ) :. *:irzdependen(ly from:. the FJ?(;system(Jr !}MS; will yse*hard.,.wjreij qnalogcpntfpls(interlocks, to proteet .. : ... * ;,:i:workers, the.public, :'Jn(J ewiMnine1]t; amlatdnn /unctiohs will/be lnteirliiedinio, j ... . /}rifid nfoiiitOf:ei:fbYihe Pre of.ihe. FfC 'sysle/nfu11ctibnality in\ . * '>.\'.aiffer.entsectionsoftheFSARapfedr.toh?'1nconsistent.'.:.*:.;. > * * .. ;*,* .:: .: * .

• l ;*; :*" ***,* -':' : -' '. '*. ,<' '.:. ..

  *

  _;_ ' ... ': -' .* .. * ' ) .. : * '.\A(Jdltioiiat inforinatioY, is nece.ssaryJor.iheWRCsiaff tojullywiderstahd'tlie.

6peraiion'Ofihe integ;:atefiJ -::* ');;;if??F-1&<;_ . . ; . ' . ' .,:** " . " ... ' .** : '* . ,.. . ); /,' " *. ' . *c; . ***. :* infor_,;,ation ih the! &c system perfar,mance 'analysi;*Of the FF<;. I. )' " ' .. ;'sj;stem as if'r.e/a..fes:.toE_8_f 1f1aljagifl$; .:J!tSO/Ve ffie. appqre._nt i .1: 1. * .* '* * * . in iJ:!a(states .'.,'.E,Sf. qrefir,ly_ monitore,i;l .: : , . ', ;: . ]:{lf!d{Jig _7.:2,flf <. '} .'. , *, * , ... Pisolation is initiated and controlled by the FPC 'and the FPCsystem; has the ability to manually.activate t .. ..... ...... ... ..... _,-m .... *.

• • , .. **

... :.-:1 '.The I&C systems preliminary design was developed to ensure the sufficiency of the principal design !criteria, design bases, and information relative to materials of construction, general arrangement, and 1 approximate dimensions sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the final design will conform to ;the design basis. In addition, the preliminary design of the RPF I&C systems describing the detailed :methodology and operation of the integrated facility process control (FPC) system as it relates to :engineered safety features (ESF) managing, monitoring, and actuation was not developed to constitute

approval of the safety of any design feature or specification.

Such approval is anticipated to be made , :following the evaluation of the final design of the RPF I&C system, and described in the FSAR as part of i 'the Operating License Application.

psAR Section 7 .1 states, "Engineered safety feature (ESF) systems will operate independently from the ;FPC system or BMS." This sentence will be amended in future versions of the PSAR to say, "Engineered

safety feature (ESF) systems will operate upon actuation of an alann setpoint reached for a specific !monitoring instrument/device.

For redundancy, this will be in addition to the FPC system or BMS ability \ actuate ESF as needed." By amending this sentence, the descriptions in PSAR Sections 7.2.4.2.2 and *7.2.4.2.6 will be consistent with Section 7.1. !

• .. --:--
• .-;*_,,-*

_... ... -*.....,,.:-,.-*---"'"tj'-*" ..

• r*Y'7

\* .; ; RPil* /Jif[Jf?EG_:.. I 53-7; Part -1; ,SeCtionJX .. should.summarize why. the .1 ,

• r . , ,, , , , . , , . , '. , _, _' " ** ,, ** , r ., ,;
• o , ,
• _ *, [ *_ . , , ' , \J * * . :r

.{s suffic:ie!J( af!.d sfdtf!blf!for:peefdt:lJl!ng in , *_,, : **1 "

• 1 : O , > *'"; ,'*_' , .> "' ,
• O * .'. ' ** : " ' .. > -' .... ' ' -' <, <, " '. * ', *i .' * * > r .' ' ' ' '** " .' L '> * -'. ', ' "/ . .;NWMI'B.SA.R See;tion].

2'4:3*:. RPF:J{k..(.: syst,eins }fill me'f!tJh.? .. . ;: *, .. istated design criteria. anddesign ba'sis*requirements outlined in NUREG-.1537. PSAR Table 7-2, . . ! * ,,:'. L' *'*/'-'_.:.)

• • • '* ' '* ***.**I>;,_

';i_"r * ""'

• "-"\
• ,:; ..
• .*, L'" *, ** .

' " i1."Insf[L!.1Jlentatf{;n.a11dc;or1f1:.ol Cri{eria,CJ:os8W.alfovith Pf!signBas[;ulpp{if(1bility and F_unc;tion . . . . .*. Meii11s, "presents a crosiwallf of the atte11jpts:to ihe differentJ&,C f : : : f*:'Sufiystems to 'the nec'essafjtd:'

i'. *> :!zhcate :t6e ojhow.fhe design,ba;;s .. ' '.;is_ sa'tisji,ed;

rflr{

eJ.'f1lu'ating thq.t the '. . *: .;, : .. :. *'!d.esigfl. is_ siifjicfent, _and*siJitqgle:for

• . * .. : . '., . , i: : ., \VtdditidnaOnferm?ttib11..is necessary.toifully understand the .operatfon*

of the integrated RPF1&,.C:, : c. * .:: ... ' . .'.,. .. ., . . . . . . . .. . *. . ..

• .. ..

.... "'* so of 96 NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -/ Request for additional information f

• 6r:Jiiiti6n

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... ' { c,orm *. *.*. '(f RSAR' .tJ:te systJ}n is' .. tfze'function$ stated each *.; L:-: .. !The I&C systems preliminary design was developed to ensure the sufficiency of the principal design jcriteria, design bases, and information relative to materials of construction, general arrangement, and iapproximate dimensions sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the final design will conform to !the design basis. In addition, the preliminary design of the RPF I&C systems describing the detailed !methodology and operation of the integrated I&C systems was not developed to constitute approval of jthe safety of any design feature or specification. Such approval is anticipated to be made following the revaluation of the final design of the RPF I&C system, and described in the FSAR as part of the Operating* !License Application. iWhen the final RPF design is complete, PSAR Chapter 7.0, Table 7-2, will be expanded to provide a icross-reference to the specific section of each I&C section and how the system is suitable for performing

!the functions stated for each design basis applicability item. , .... -b4 ""'="""ft'" .......

.. No. Request for additional information .. __ RAI :7.3-1 ;;TIJelSG AugriJen,tiYfg Pal'.t 2,, 'section* ?Process. _: . * { * *."* .

• ";t *. ;;'requiredpro_ductiofz'.and_SNX{fue.l feCibnditioningpl'.()cess.'operations:'

>J .. ':** '°; .*'.P***_*., * . *::' ... ,, 1 ** :*: * ;>Vf:VMifs#?.*:$er:qJµ; the i{Pf .

• .*.t. . ' '.!,System

willprovid<;

a permissive to."allowjor the active 'ptth1p in that Circuitto be energized on.ce*the ' .. .* Jl()Pf!fator

ha8 configuredlflf!

r,outing'.*F of tJ:ai1$pq,rt;rej1uir!ng ,FP.t;

i; 1 . :.. <.

tq l p[ovi4e}: .. *J .: .,, ',. : * .. bas<fd'OJ'! thetraµSfar J . . . , .. :J:che .()f

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qn,doperatiµgproceduresto prec,ll!tle,,

dfcntzcq!tty acqzi/e1Jts,. !;-'.: * .** *, . :*c;'*f .' * . '. 1 '.," .: .. *,;;**,.' ,f".*"* "--... '-, .'".J:;.'_ ,,. 'L

• • • _),'",.

_,f * : , is necessmyto rbe'/cegpar,ameters elistfr_e .... ; . . .

*""/ . . .* * :.::* . .: '. * . * , t\'; ....

,,., .. *, . *: ;;<<'.:.t ** : ..

.. .. i*

• i.Provide additional:iriformdtion regarding the adequacy of
• .i 1 . . * .. ,. . ,.

from*no!11inq/'cgnc;eiz[raiions., shoulq theJ'..qccur . * ;; .. iThe I&C systems preliminary design was developed to ensure the sufficiency of the principal design !criteria, design bases, and information relative to materials of construction, general arrangement, and !approximate dimensions sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the final design will conform to \the design basis. In addition, the preliminary design of the RPF I&C systems describing how the key \parameters are monitored to ensure adequate criticality control (e.g., instruments to detect deviations lfrom nominal concentrations and quantities, status of software development procedures) was not ideveloped to constitute approval of the safety of any design feature or specification. Such approval is ; \anticipated to be made following the evaluation of the final design of the RPF I&C system, and described\ '.in ,!!_le !:_SAR as part Operating License = 51 of96 *I NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 No. Request for additional information . CJ: ,f:\:';, ' ru\i'"7.4-1 !fctuatiop, . * * , , ::; ;;;' "

• th;$.JJ¢tion"

:\ ' **, ,.f ',' '. ,*

in'p&m* Chdpte/i 13. i/r;ka:j537, Pait '1, sdfi& .. '"]: :. ,.* , .. ., * : 1,S)?!ffern misufficrf!_nt,detail fhf!

• * ., . .*! : ......

.. ...

• 1iDescriptiiiri;:

!\states' that:'tlie'.PSAR '..Table** 7?; 13, "En'girieeredSaferyPeaturi:Aduation or Moriifi;il:iitg

• ';"::1; '.i*-'_.,***

.* ..

• • .'". ,..'-
• ,,*,-.4. ;;,*

'*-. "'

• r'.,_""h *. * :,,Systems, }psis thkESFs tf!.at will

'Systen('f f;Afl 'Se¢tion 74. not.* . *, 1 * : .'. sl!f*);:} . . -'* . }f \;, :: : '.*::._::,i';:

. : .: .:} :r; <.:}:%; :..; *>i:*f .: < * <. i': ' , . ! . *;/ladftion(J_l'infdrntation is'netf!ssmj(to undef'stand'ihefunctioria/fty required offhe ESF.ahd opeCJ:ation.

f , )iofihe, systein to..me.e( the acd¢ptdnce criteria:'oj;NUREG-1531/ Part 2, ::an a the']SG ' . ' ;; , *: * <* }:t:* .;'o:._ * ;sJj£*'.::\;,

* .-

-:tti:i_-t

• '.:::.

.,

.'*, >:*:

• . " 1 . * .. * * *

'ili,e i .. ... 'The I&C systems preliminary design was developed to ensure the sufficiency of the principal design :criteria, design bases, and information relative to materials of construction, general arrangement, and :approximate dimensions sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the final design will conform to !the design basis. In addition, the preliminary design of the RPF l&C systems describing the functionality l ;and operation required of the ESFs was not developed to constitute approval of the safety of any design \feature or specification. Such approval is anticipated to be made following the evaluation of the final :design of the RPF I&C system, and described in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application.

The fourth column of PSAR Chapter 7.0, Table 7-13, provides some information on the anticipated

technical means by which an ESF would be actuated; this mechanism is not described further in PSAR I Section 7.4 because the design has not been finalized.

The intent was only to provide reasonable

assurance that we recognize that specifics of the ESF actuation mechanism will need to be addressed as the 52 of96 NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 CHAPTER 8.0 -ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS No. Request for additional information f3ii*

j .;RAI ,8.2.-1 .:':8rtctiQ!J. 5,0.;9; , "Completehessalid'dt:curr,iij; ofinfqrmdtMn,,':'. of 10. CFRFdr/ 5p r.eq11ird,that. ,*:, ,, . ;ih *: j :!" .. , '. ,** :**,' i :-.* appl{canl'b.e i:o'inP/e'i'I; andaceurate'trf . -:::*:*:'

• '. , * '.: ,, ... "'

?art 1, .sectiqJJ, s'. 2; :, 'imefg?,J?CY ,, voltage power requirements for;_emergencyelectric

power,

• J 2,

., -, : c. * -* ... * " .. , characteri;tics of should .. j * ..

• ii:'" aeiign in dihe.r

'Oj!lie i :. . : Ji:: :, sflo.uldbe, r:ap@/e: oJ:supp!ying:Fbwer}jo,:.;tf!e 'iluraiionJ

.:;': * :*"

• _ _.:

.. .' ,.,'. * :" , < * *.** _ ...

• . *

"_] '"' .. frNJ11M.! 8:;1. 2;. :.'pe_sign_fof,S/ife 1t(JteMlia,t t11e SiljJP}ies\

• (UPS} wr ll be* deszgnf!d to opeJ;ate up to 90 mm?Jfes,*

(!Xcept the . 'f;]P S for the fir<; pr9tection wz ll. , *

• i!o"peratefor .up to:24 ho'iirs: However; :P'sAR Section3.5:2f::9, 'iStcindHy'EZecfriCiiz

'0:stdtes ihat . . , . dJsign J;;r "r/PSiJs io . ":._.

• (J 9fi2p min_' * " !.

_*:" .:*:,* : ...

• . -*:*'::*:/'-.::.':.*,

.< .:*;1'.****r._ .*'.';:'.:*'.:'"'.'.!

• 'i;l'tovide:

to exJ?laiJJ avgiM1 tuOi * '. f "_;..,. ,. ** *1;ti_mes. -**:* , . .:: , : .. **_,: ___ '*;;: .. *;-"i_ * ,' _ ; \PSAR we;; changed to 120 minutes to reflect . .J :section 3.5.2.7.9. ...... <;,:.,r.,..,-..._.':.'

• "'"':*"'*'..,:.;...*.**

... ---:..; *. -*"* :*..;.,_;."':i . ...,\,,;-....

7"--:-. ..

...... T_.. ....

.. ,.;.* *.

..

• ".

t .... _,: * ... "'"' ;**-J ... ( :Rf\I 5,0:f!}. 'cinq 'accufaty 'oflnforni?ttion;'t* d): 1,D'CFlfPcjr(5. 0 requlfe's thgi'./: *""r;*r **

• l 1;, '.: *
• the CO!Jtpfete'.an(/aseurafe ill;aJ!

.. ,, , , -.: ;! c ... ...

"*'* .,., ... *.:,,,_*," '5,

\ .. .. ,-. .. .. .. .. .. *. 'i . ' {NUREGC.}53 7, 'Part 1,, Section}j, 2,:;£m?i-gencyElectric Power

, siates, tliat'the dJsign

' { . '": " . -" ... * .. is,l:ipulqprovide requ/remen,ts for:.elnergency electfl.c powe.'r. systems; , , * *. -' ..

• l,r ", :* ;:_ '* ,'*:*:* '"'\.*. ,,'_*' .' ?,l* """:*. ',* ,.;:..,, *'. ,_,, .. , .,* '<< . '": ** *t ,,.,' ** > ** i .. * ;'NUREG-1537, Part 2,:Section Criteria, states, in part:.. * , * , , * " ", ' t: ' ,' ,,,', ' I.' ' , .> " r ';"<,, f' -f r' *' :, / '>-: '. '1', p ' , r '*',

> ' : . :.

• Thf! functional qfthe emergency power be:t:ommensurate with ihi:. *r .1 ,.([". design _basei, '.W,hich.

are detiVec/Jtom pr<jsentedln other 'ch(lpters 'of th_r; Sf#?.. -.:,):he s91}r,ce t : j!, '.;/_ of sHofildbe:dapable

1 -( .. J . requzred*by the SAR analysis. . '. ..'

.. , : ** :.. , 1 * * ,., :, * ,:! 'i ** " , \!Nr1ift PSAR hew).

2' , jpio_vige 82 2i;*, _: * :; "'. i "i#qtes; 'in "The SE;P ;i:equ.tr,r:.dfor fhi RP!" ifl, l ef Q;kw: '1i(l, 528hp). ::*. Purther, PSAR .. Table '8:. J, , . :* . tMkP f 'thdt 'sep* reqziifed is* .... * * * * * :WF_,,: .. o:*: .. . !Standby Emergency Diesel Generator:" cites 2 1 600 kW as the basis/or diesel generatorem1ss10ns.

:* . ! . !t

.. ' --': .. -"' .'.,; .. "."; ..... *.-* ... .,", '*, ':,;. ;*' ,*,., ..... .... ' ' ' 'i " * * * )IJ?rpvide, a.dditional infQfmatiol})o or explain thesepppa,rent in P; 1

• ',*' ' '*. ' < * * " ' '," ,,:* , :, ' jThe column headings in Table 8-1 of PSAR Chapter 8.0 were changed from " ... power requirement" to i" ... peak power load" to be consistent with the description preceding the table. PSAR Section 8.2.2 will !be modified to reflect the peak power of 1,178.6 kW (1,585 hp), as determined from Table 8-1. PSAR were bounded. 53 of 96

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• MEDKAl1$CtQP[S NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 CHAPTER 9.0 -AUXILIARY SYSTEMS No. Request for additional information .

.. .. ..

'.(Applies to**'.

(!,hapter* ?;*'

• ' ;RAJs}U'

  .l

.* !*d_esign basesfor f!il,chauxiliary system.:,, . ". * : * . .. ; .* : ** . . ': ,* ": * '. * . ,*; .>. * . . . : *: * :r

• :;wr]J?iq:1s3?.

1,

• • I: ;t 1 .:: **: *

'.'The* basesfor. t,he"1esigJJ: <;riteria for s01pe: disc;-'ssed. c:hapte}')nay 'be * . t . : ::developed ilfother chapters 'andshould be appropriately cross referenced.".*.' .'/ . .: .. " : : 1: ,> *,, r, , , r , , ? '. , \ * " . !: '* iWVRE(j}":.153{Z, .. :f 2f. J ,*;.ff lf eaui:zg;.:tf

.. .° , 1 Proc¢aures;

!s#1tes;/inpart, thqf "Tfi.e d¢iign C(/niparefdwith O,tfier'* ! .:.J:: .. .. i RAI 9.1 * : 1'fNWMJ PSARSectiQn 1, "DesigJJ::Basis,

'. ( .' . : . *. '. : . /: .. > ' . *.*. . . .**.*. , " * ; .; . " > ..* "'. *

fp;ovide

• ::;i ' . . . .. .

of/he

J '.:

.. *, ..

• • • :. " -*.:

.. * .. .. [*.;<: ,:**r ... i: ... dbd

• <**;,;*". , *: t*;*:'0>:f

... *}f:.\F*** . ( . . .. ' :* .Mqi,ntaining d.ose 11pfake_tfitough,ingestior1 to levels/).LARA]as1ow'as. re,asonably

\ l*: * .... i* ,. .* ' i: :,_ *.

• vefi.tilatiofz air/qnd c,,oi1(liti01:itng*(he wor!cersor occupa11ts*

  ' .. * .. j '" * ** '. * ' , \

  . Providing' maf{eup air.

Rf F for. process:and, elei:tr:ic.al .. i r \' ',/,ft:. .* *.:-(: .. ,:.::-*_*,r.\!;,,,._,;._'.,;.'.;,;_

• .. ,'

.. /.': .. Ji *_,1 ,/'."', 1 i .* :.tfo/zerea,s, :P,SAR 2;* (Facility Ve._ht!fatton what PSAR,\ , .:'.'fenti!dfl()n. $ysielj;_

'. str;ztes tkat t **

.. _. :.; ;F;r',:: ::::f::" < "*'*'.?t,::*

• , )' _'._.:::(r.

.:;1,'.*,*. 1* .. r *

j : ii, ,*: cf1¢mical ciir,borne .,.: : * *' :: *cohditioning:ofRPF.envir,onmentfohJacilitypersonneland'-equipment::.:

• -". ** * * ** ***

.. .. *',, ", .. '. ,' :,,* ..

.,,*,p,,-i,-*'

• "'"'*,,,._,"-,'">

'* ... e{'._ .. *(r">:.',i_"' .

• grddieri(s'(9 ensureprdperJ!Ow of air from ieast.pOteritially c01'ltamif1(1ted ateds*tomost, . *

..

• • .. * ... ! .' ." .. Jv!am,tain .cJ?S<:* uptakf! thrf!_ugh l()w (J1.'l!A/fe1J.

., . , ) . *f-Y;<;Yic1ep1_,akelf pqir. _and cqnclitfp,n

• • .. i ** *Process exhau,st jlowfroin the process yess?l ventilation system * . * :*::.: ** * .. * " . * * * *** ,:;,.* .. !

of qls by pf;ovi r.api d; :qt,t/oitwtif::

, ,

• i' :' . { -' * :closure bf for* va11ious:acc{dent:co1Jd,itions
• : . . ":: 1//'fzf.ls; FSARtSectiph9.f.:1 app'e'qr.s th' 5.2::7: 12/in thqtP/$Afi, *
• ::J: '*.,, ,,:-, '.'*:*

..... ,* * *:*-" ,.' .. ... '*"*r"*. ,..,, * . ., *._':*,* ,3.5.:27.12. r<!fe.rs/o ventilat{oil iY_stenfc Is called the '.'ve.f1tila_ti()fl system'.'

in r *

J: PSAJ?.Section J'5:. 2. 7J funi:tiolisfor

• . *
• i, '.;ventilqfion'system that dre,no{lisieJ ifz PSjfR r.fi?r the .:"verztilaqon sys{em, ""spedjicallji:

"."} * . . :J:

f ,

• 1:: f;: :." ** * .: : . .'i: 2;; / >>.+

'. * ; ;/ .*. P.r?vidf! confine1:flent pfa_itbo0e:r.adiqaciiv.e t!Je rapid, auiorifgtic '": :* . i : ,' '/i', *."closure 'Of With iii confirfemen"t.fo'nesfor fariou's

5 : : *::, ' !'A.dditionally?i'SAR Section 3.:Li. 7.:1i listsflve"design, that are a,;,oni ihe t<,. ,'°'*, * ;'.,. , * ';:<' ,,t '"' ,' :i,,", ,,.,' ..

'r .,.1 design qases,.in_ PSAR Section*9,I. J.;:specifically,:. .. ..

• 7 -::' .,, " * .. /. * *
• t .. , . J1,;: .

.. opf!r,ali°.fS,

• * ,; .. _.* ..

,*:.*J J':: , .. , __ ,: *.";; *.,,.

• .

  -;* f. * :; ,* . ;

.. ,.H .. 54 of96

.. NWM I *:*:.**.-.:- .........

• .*

tlMTHWESTWlltCALlSOJOPl! NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -Request for additional information r * .. , . -; -. :f (75*degrees7Fahrenheit/C!Fj) (simimir) and \ i: . . , .. , I\ " :* 12°C (72°!) (winter), .with .. aqtive ventilatiOIJl<fsupp?rt*workers an,(! '; . _; * , ': . l \ * , .. . .1; ***

• MaiTJtqin.qiriglfqlity.

tfla(complies with-0 10 C:FR 20.qose*Jimitsfof* norriJd1operations and' >> *. i l >' " ": .{.i,b y;lz.utdawn*

• * * *: : , , *:,:: .:: .... *. :*: .;:". '<-" . ; .*. *:

• i.: * / * ** *: *.::.: *; :( ': . :: **, *:* l, 1!. * * **
• in

.. '.. i t . ,:, * .). <'

• sank!* <JS* whqt fs cal(erft!Je system !'JiiFSAR

'Or.( afe > .. !: . * *:, .;fnot inter.chlingeabte, :*wAethe,,one of the'systeni.S;* or which parts.there-OJ; 'iinfpartf 'd}the ot,her

• *<<.

  ' * ' -:.

the u;e of .: "', , ' ; *j * ** :fiubsystefns. JnconsiStent design-make Ii diffii:uli . .to' identi]fs)!steni'bpundaries

• ' !; I; !:"-*'. -" ]iami)o'deterh1ine

'the,adequacy oftHe

') ' ' :"** . .' '; .: ' ,: ' ., '

\, \ ' "' "*.  ; "::: : *: 1. t:' ,'.-'. :;.;t,!,:'. '-, .. -.... ,; ' .. -/*,,-" '_,. ":: ._: ,:J* ""'-</,_ **,,'.."/,:,

.

.. ., ' ,J*:\ '* k . '<t*, !'f:r9yi<Je'ciddmpnal znfoi:mati_on to di:zd exj}lain /hese appCit:ent discrepancie,sin-"the

. .:

... ljiill.correet 'as p ;;'. *.i*:*, :;\f!Je*f,SAJ}..

• how NW}.:fi.,Ml{;

en:.ure"the:PSAR uses .. __ ::( __ .. ...... , ... ,, .. :J:: .. __ -'.PSAR Section 9 .1 will be modified to clarify terminology and to correct the apparent discrepancies. The !bulleted items in PSAR Section 9.1 will be deleted, and the design basis description in Section 9.1.1 will !be modified to cross-reference to PSAR Section 3.5.2.7.12 and to PSAR Chapter 6.0. References to i"ventilation system" in PSAR Section 9.1 will be amended to read "facility ventilation system." ' *, '. '* ' '.[' .. ' * , * ::The' ojfgas tl'eatment system will pr,ovide primary 8ystemfunctions to on.:site 'and off-site . --* '.:.personne/from rai:liological and otl?,er}ndustrial-related ha,zqrds by: * * <* . ', * ' * * ,. , *',* ,,;.,; f * * , '*'", .. r.*;, "',_, ':.,, i,t,' ', . :r*

• a,{[

each o_ftf!,.C.'(!U11Jer:ous* vess<ds 9nq 0 other, cpmponen/s in_: :-::: -; , * > " "-,, -.,, J \*:*'. .. / .. ..: ..... : "'. ;, * '.-:: *;;;:;,.,_<:

-..

:

..

• . * ;* <<'.:. .< '. ,, Ji .

may confgin;iodine, to, -cd;iatement:;equipifte1:z/to r,c.duce:

i,'-.;: , , any io_din,e stl'eain ,' ' ' ' :,, ' " ' . " ' . ' -: ;"' '>': ' ""*' ", .; . . . . .. ;: . -. ColleCting a special hzgh-vofyme 1Jumidve$sel ventstl'eam from t!Je waste handling system * . . , . ' ' 'ii , : ,info the 1'Ja(ri fapilitY.

8y#em ior jur_ther :,: , ::' , *, :).

t.o'teifwy,e -:; *,* . * ,,*:*:*-' _ < ., . * * , _ ... .,,

• _ .*-, . . *:' "ii :,**

emi$si.on:limits

, : , , . '* "* * *: ,, "/ * .i .. .Provfding piij}()l1!

to prf:!rjuct;ojfgas system fil>F,.i * . : ..... :*:r: .. ':,:..\ .. * ** ..... * :.,,:: "'", ;". * ... ._ ... ':" <* ,::* :;. " :> .. ": : c' ::,. "*\ .. <*.;, ;J!*: ;;A.dd{tional information on the design basis is;provided in Ch.apter 3. O; .!'Design ojStructures, Systeins, . . . :... _ * . " -*'*. *' * . *:;" : .' . '*" .-** < ' < 7Jli f:'essel:Ventililiioh f() , . ;> * * .. *iiPSAR.,Seqtiori 9,'1.1 '!oiJ};qs "'and tliatth£;

, .T; .. * *; ,:'. :;. <

,: ._;.:. , . , ** ,; . :

.**. * *::* .\' . .\, :* '. .. * *. *. : * :,*; * :!;, **. Prov(de'.primary*'sjl$fefn fi.t1?ctibns to qn'--s{(e ah_rj pet;sonnel .fr,pJJrrpdiotogical anrl:-:1 *;!; . '"'/<<.' ';' .' _ .. :: '. :_*';; * *; .. *: ,,*. :*: ' ': .. < -..

i 'Cdilect dif In-leakage ,eaeh and in

' : *; * *, i) : fil'F processef a1]q maintain hydrogen pipi,fg lo:wer... t > "' *;;

• • :: .. _.,;,::;, *::::.,.'.:-.

.. :. >:-.. , '.'.* .... *.: .. *.* .. :. <<'*: .,,._,. * .:,f * .. , . *

• ti . *.
• Minimize reliance*

on admfrilstra:five or com'plex.actwe erigineering.c<Jntl'o./s tq pro'vide.(l .: .; * ,:";,, :::, * ***

. .. " , , .. * * ..

:.J

....

• "" ..

.. "* .*.

• ....... _,,. ,, . , ..
• .uPSAR.

3,5,.2.7.11

• tfien lrsts.des1gn

a$follows.'/" '*"' . , * . . : ".,_ . ."' . : >>./f .. :l

• iruidvertenl JissiiJn prqduet iioundary'liiirini:?ifia after' , ;: ' riot:'nia,l op?rations;
• shutdown

afld PBEs

': . :* ;' ' ' , , ' :, ' ' ' ,' "*' ' i -* 1 i *

• 3()-yem: design life ; ,: . ,, , . . * * . *; ' .
• _ *'.'* :< ": .... * , . *. " * ,,,Coi;tain gases

.. 55 of 96 NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -Re uest for additional information .*:;:

• rf '.,f f

t:*": *t -* * **, -,,,01* . *1?.'eflfrs ,_;,;,, ;; '.:,:1 :. ,;;{ :,,1;::. /': '1f .:,\ : 'f MB .i* * ;;:: .. >t *;'.'? ,;*:' *'*:(,,, /*4> i;:,i :'Pf: i*-' * * * *: , .. :,'. * * . 'L,is'is .;.:;M . * :.,.'". *

• 1faiffJcutt'to iCientiJY

!System boiiridaries'arurto .tli? .* .. l : .: :.;;, .. ,;,/.:. : ':)the ojfgas system. &plairi.how NWMJ willcbrfect the ape/1r.en(discrepandies,:.as:* " jPSAR Section 9 .1 will be modified to clarify terminology and to correct the apparent discrepancies. The I \bulleted items in PSAR Section 9 .1 will be deleted. The design basis description in PSAR Section 9 .1.1 l !will be modified to cross-reference to PSAR Section 3.5.2.7.11 and to PSAR Chapter 6.0. References to ! i "off gas treatment system" in PSAR Section 9 .1 will be amended to read "process vessel ventilation I " isystem. t. \.-> .. : o;.* '.; '-.1('. .f' cdmpltes, lf:ith*1'Q;Gffl* 20"doselii!J,itsf((! nprihal :*,. .. <!: c;' I .. 56 of96 .:;.-.; ... NWMI ...........

. ........ :.* * *.

• lll:GflTKWISf flfOICAl lS1lTilP£S NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -Request for additional information if :RJ\j'!ti*-3*

iSifR 3.5

i .. 7:i3'tntroduce;

• ,-,;supply

'Whtch'has, *; ,l (C<?nt) *. * (!design basis-'<ifements (functions and values) ;tfiai appear to to /wo ojthe de,sign ', 7 *1 ; * >' . * (furjctionslva/ues):'ofthe iil,?$AR J

• ..

... '.'.':: . .,-.** .. : .. _'.) .. /., * ** ,c ..

.* , *.

• * .*.

l .'.* ' * . * .;

• thdt is;{j i'tJd (:" .. :-, *, "liventilatiori' system "*in' PSAR Section'3.5.2.

7.12, aiid:the "ventilation 'sys[em PS.{fR J. J .. ,

• fx. . *,. : ,*, .* ...
• fi:,11:11;,elJ

't,M 'sf i(em:/asf HfY .. *:* .* . > .j. :! ': : : "_,* *,** *.. r:Y:e;:itilatzo'! SJ!Sfe,11!'. f!'!d Tf:!e lJS,e; '* **:i: :: 1 ! . ' ' .. rsubs;:,stems,qrid iripons,ist'ent d<qsign_ make, 11.diffipult to jdentifY. syste1ii bow:idqfie_si

• .**

.. :. ,,: :>:*:.**; .. *:*:. ;* .

• .; .. *

.. *;j i ,:'. *<'* *' * * ** ;:,

,elatjpflsli/p a{ri cind I i, *. *. *; . ,ifr,enplai1pnsysf,<pns.

EXP:Iwn-flo1A?iN_f!'Miw1Ucop;ect;thefippar_e'!t

• ;*r

... (PSAR Section 9.1 will be modified to clarify terminology and to correct the apparent discrepancies. The !bulleted items in PSAR Section 9 .1 will be deleted, and the design basis description in PSAR !Section 9.1. l will be modified to cross-reference to PSAR Section 3.5.2.5.12 and to PSAR Chapter 6.0. !References to "ventilation system" in PSAR Section 9.1 will be amended to read "facility ventilation I system." \The supply air is a subsystem of the facility ventilation system. PSAR Section 3.5.2.7.23, "Supply Air fSystem," will be eliminated and appropriate design basis values moved to PSAR Section 3.5.2.7.12, !"Facility Ventilation." : 1\f \': * , . *

9) ); ."SY.stein l)i,sqjptid,ri, '!

in.:paJ!t;> '.'abqtement tech1Jol(Jgiqs, pr;i!ftartlyd?ighf

*; f(

., ;,

• ::-.-.. *. *

-. \ . :i *'<'.< . f o <;FR,6,J!: fr,';,.. ) , : , . : , ** State

• , *. * * ** ' ... *;*. . ., \ '" .. :. ':. * * .* * :: . . ':i! J, * : ' ' ' ' 11 ' ' -. * ', ' * *,, ' * .o * * * ' ' ' ** :.: ;*. .".
• o*_\ *,, ' .,,\. ' '.' I ' * .: ' "1 '.}I ; ' ' '1 * "' :'., ' I

' 'I.' 1:1 .. _. ' *. * *

• 111:eeting of 40 (:fR

.6f_a;:id /aw a regulatory/legal requir.ement; .. ':*.1 *. * * * :. * .. , * * .j!tflat sfl.o.uld fornjpgrtof .design basis su9h .that the*SJJSf{nr dt!csign l!'ill meeNhe, performance .. * [ * .:* . [requirements. if the (Jesign requireriz.eotfhat exha11st.aifl re'gi/lati5,.Y(tegiil

• > 7; *.' J _ ::. ,.

it '* * < .;. ' .. * '.iam6ng the' 'design :basis fuhcfions,'or 'vrilues. in PSAE '3. 5. 2}. *12, ds. arg:.cet.tritli* othit. *app/icqq le *:: *, * *:.:':/ '.:: :. :,* __ \"<<*;. , . "'.

... -

.<t.:'..:;:*_

• * *: " .*" * ;._-' ' :.": " * :*

.<*:,. .... :. '*.:'* .* ':' ;provid_e a.dditional information tdclarifjwhether this.regulatory/legatrequireinent is a design. ,

• r jufzction (Jr JJ.sO: 'fnc{ude'._{t ln

1. Sts 'tn.;PSAR: ?.

.. ,:t .. ... : .. .. jThe bulleted items in PSAR Section 9.1 will be deleted, and the design basis description in PSAR !Section 9.1.1 will be modified to cross-reference to PSAR Section 3.5.2.7.12 and Chapter 6.0. Reference , Ito 40 CFR 61, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants" (NESHAP), is already a_ and will !Je .i? 3 .5._2._7_.1_2._ .) 57 of 96 "

.. NWM I NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -:-.* .. *::*

• NOIUHW£STMEDICALISOTIJPCS

-Re uest for additional information i 53 r,* Ji

-* :::: ., : , , * : , *. * .. *:*** ... :; *" * :<: .. , , . _ * *:; f :. *::. :: ::. _, .. , * *: .* ; ._* .. ,; : *' : .* : *: . : * * '.

• 1* * *.: * ;iJv;UREQ".-15 3, 7;* Part* 1,

'9: 1 *stiites tfzat al/. in a facility may requir,e Hf(AC tQ J * *. ,._ *

• jpr'r}vi,de, : ; : * > : 1 *_7 _ :_. :. , ..
• *! t**
• i;

' .. -** :.: hqbitabilityand'.theworkif1g(!11Yir;onin{!nt ifl'ther?a.c(m:facility.for p(wso&nel and**. 1 *1 . ,. . :,, *.;'-* :: *' : .. :,.. *.**; r. i ' '* .: ;* .. ** ." . :"" .. * .* '. *,: ',;, , ... ' . , ' ... . .. :.}1 :*: .* . ., "\!fWM1 PSAJ?... Sec ti on 9,L 2. 3 . .1,,. .!'Zon? J.ExhptJs.l$y.s,tepz,/'. .s,tates, th_at. the, wi

• * * ** * *!mot be for* Zone Jc spaces unlf!SS thermal loads .are expected to.cause temperatures.to ,exceed, ,J ; . *. ' .... *j;equipm.ent operatink;.rahges without additional cooling. Bowever,)t is not what *. .1 *: ;; ! * '* * *.:
• 1 would.'result in temperatures'exceedjrig*opera'ting ranges. Therefore, *.aaditional
• ,. .' ' .. * ' Jinformatjon is needed to, W,hetherJIVAC sys.terns dari properly J?rbvide an aqceptable

.. * . *: t* .* , ,;::>\; *. .. ::_i_

• ..

,::**':.

.. _: . ** *

..... ' : .

gdditionaMiiformatibn td explain* when (i.e,,c-f/esign phase, ;c;,onstruction, . ;: " ' .*. : ,'.'.testing;: or afidhow .(e:g., 'as an opera(ional sensing,"calculatiiJn bnd confrplfunction)

; . . * . ;}IWMI, willdeter,iiine whether HvAC

{rilnperature in z6ne I ilill.need to be proVided: .... -:; --... 9 ... . , __ ,. - ... :-.. : ..

• .;4*-'

.. _ :...* ,.._:. .* " .... ... ... ..... -,.,- .... "'-.. .. ,.L : ..

,'"*"" .. ,, .. The need for HV AC space temperature control in Zone I will be evaluated and determined during the ifinal design phase by performing a heat balance on the Zone I ventilation system. The maximum heat ;1oad on the ventilation system is anticipated to be dominated by heat losses from equipment in the Zone I ventilated areas (rather than decay heat) when operating at the maximum uranium throughput.

Temperature control will also be evaluated for a loss of ventilation scenario.

Results of the evaluation

(including space temperature control systems that may be identified by the heat balance) will be !described in t?e

.. _ ., ,,. _ ,, _ ..... ____ , .. ,,. No. Request for additional information_ t _,'.,,,r:,.; J'i 's'*\ .. .. !:(Applies . ;'µ(JJWG,:1537, Rar/?,'Secttqn 9.3, f.1'.ografn,s, :' . * 'i .1RAJs 9:3-f'..,

• 1:states, .. fn par't, that <![m]e,thods to 9onfrol, ;and stale,d iri;the plalJ. : lf

.. ::,*'*' \:c,2:,:L:;,;,;l .. L j:j i'* RAI !NWMI PSAR Sei:;tion 93.3:J.'.l, /'HotCel/, W:asteHdndling: aiid'ShippingAreiis," disczisse$ the'h'dt ['"' '* ** ,_,.**.-*, **

• 0", *, *; ... *.-.,*.***,,5

__

'. *./>>,.,* -,: :',.,:'*"-,,,,.,. .. ' -, * .' *. I : ,. ,* * . * * * . : ,. ,;fcelljirl! .areq.* If owe:y,¢,r, rio;info,rifiatfon:pnfir,,e l/Je;hot cell was \ * , .. *,

• is neerjed on.thehotcellfire:protection .ta mf3fhqds to. de_tect, *. .-** 'i . ,,':,control, and fires* are adequate.
• * ., " , . , .. * .; :. * *: * .' * "" * * * '. ' ':.:; "" * .,,' * : , ' 1
• _, , " , , , '. "* ' * * , I , ;*Provide iriforpiat[on on type ,offir.e that will used in iHe hot pell enclo-r._ure, * * *! * * ' * ' 1 * * ' -* * ' ' ' * ' , , e -. ' ' ,.;<* * ' " ' * -' **[, . ,

'l , f:.* " "' ' * ,_, "* '"' ' l ,,._,, ..

Hot cell fire suppression systems have been commercially available for years and include product * ;designs compliant with the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and other relevant industry ;standards.

Selection of the specific hot cell enclosure fire suppression system will be finalized during the * :final RFP design, along with commitments to design codes, standards, and other referenced documents, 1 'including any exceptions or exemptions to the identified requirements. These final designs and )commitments will be identified and provided in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application . . :The life safety concerns that could arise from the operation of hot cell fire suppression systems relate to ithe possible mobilization and spread of radiological contamination from the hot cell containment into , *other systems and facility areas, thereby posing risks of personnel exposure. The design and construction ! :of hot cell fire suppression systems include features to handle the water and/or other types of fire , ;suppression fluids during and after the system discharge(s) in the event of a fire detected within the hot cell. j 58 of 96 .*:.** ... * . .: .. NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. O ......... !:* * * ..

• f'ORJHW£&Tl':£01CAL ISOTOPES -Request for additional information . !Selection of the specific hot cell enclosure fire suppression system and its discharged fire suppressant ihandling subsystems will be finalized in the RPF and hot cell final detailed designs, along with icommitments to relevant design codes and standards.

These final designs and commitments will be !identified and provided in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application. . f,o-!:j;';:..;,..* . .-; .. <;. * ..,...;..,.,;;r ..;;1 *'- .* *. '-.; ...

• ...

  • ::...

..... --T"**- t f:S/J.R§ec(ipn 9,},: Sys,tems '. :* :; r ,. ** ':, ,, ':; * ,jprijgrqmfo1:_ as qlaffn,, t J. * *.: * * * ' .* *.*** and life iiafety u lf f°'cility . !! , . . * . . '\wil! be bujlt.to. AdditionaUnformqtion ispeeded'to tjeterm{ne if iJ:lethods_.to*

detect, am{,.. " 1 , . *. [:extinguish fire.are adequate.

' ** * * " . '. : * . '. "" :. ** * . ' 1,, r_,' *'..; ** .. ' .'*,,...., 'c,. -\', >,J'-' 1',"; '",'1*'*',;

,"fJ'.', *,;:',*,'_,-.'; 1 * *; * * :; , : 1 Identify tlie.buildihg:.andfir? codes that NWMI is conmiitting .*, .: . {' !Commitments to specific building and/or fire codes (e.g., NFPA 801) will be finalized and identified in :the RPF final detailed design, both for facility construction and for fire protection program maintenance. iThis final detailed facility design and the relevant commitments to codes and standards will be identified !and provided in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application. \*--'***

• -*=;.""-. .;;...,-

........ .... .. **::-* k ......

• .

!

RAI 9:3-3 * * ;! Tf'hi/e NWMI PSAI,?.; 'Section.

!!:3, providef inforiiiatiOT!* i/h fire protectionrsyslf!nt de-Jigri, it not *. 1; *, ' ' *, >; ' 'l;describ,e rcidiatfon"areaj;mdy' afjec( (hepeffo'rlnditce:'pftohtzaitpn qetectors; .'While.}'

' .. : . J '. .,*: . , .; .,'

te.ctors: qartbe 4adtttq1al

• inf

' ( .*. .. .. . . ,

• 1ie.ecl,e.d tq th? ,c.apab.ilitieS;pfth(/faci/ilJl:" :" .::,_ . * , * *: * < , . < ". " .. *i 1 . . '* * * * * . ,;;Provtde the for how
• IJe.

as we/fas j9r thi that

.. :: *;. . -ilfie jmrin plac(! to en'sµre.t}ieir ft,ln'ctionali'ty.

• .,'..* :: * *. * . * * *' * * * * * * .. '* , :-*

.. .:.:..,, . .. ::.1 ** ; *. , ' * -.--:-* ..... -: -::-.o* .. " .::.. :-_ .:_, \Fire detection systems for severe industrial environments (e.g., high radiation, high particulate concentrations) ihave been commercially available for years and include product designs compliant with NFP A and other : (relevant industry standards. Selection of the specific fire detection technologies for a particular severe \environment will be guided by the recommendations offered in such standards (e.g., NFPA 801 ), along /with the recommendations and requirements of the test and maintenance programs to confirm the reliable ' Jfunctionality of these systems. The fire detection systems selected for the RPF's :fire-protected areas, and * \the corresponding test and maintenance programs, will be included in the final RPF detailed designs, '.along with commitments to design codes, standards, and other referenced documents, including any iexceptions or exemptions to the identified requirements. The final designs, test and maintenance

programs, and standards commitments will be identified and provided in the FSAR as part of the l Operating License Application. "* " / .. -. ](llarm

Subs;wtetfl/'

deluge iystems be u_sectto.,,::

i) . * ..*. ,

'i,* ,,, .z. , *: ** . **:) i ;:; ' . . ' ". '::,, r:1 de;'crtption.'of;the

• }; ;;*_ ,, . ., .. ,

., * '.\:: * ::: .... *.?" .,, . :,: .. } ..

include the means for nondestructive in situ testing and maintenance, and are designed and constructed in * !compliance with appropriate NFPA or other relevant standards.

The specific HEPA filter fire protection , \system(s) selected will determine the most appropriate corresponding test and maintenance program(s) to lbe implemented. HEP A filter fire protection will be included in the final RPF detailed designs, along iwith commitments to the relevant design codes, standards, and other referenced documents, including iany exceptions or exemptions to the identified requirements. The final fire protection system designs, test fand maintenance programs, and standards commitments will be identified and provided in the FSAR as "part of _ 59 of 96 *,*. NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -Re uest for additional information f '., RA'i . I* 9.:3,

• "--::! i;' ': ---_ ' -: :tqppliq1{ion shoulddfsciisspassiye rJesigYifeqtures;required by(hefacility 9haracterlsticsto, jn-\; , .* ' _: * '.fl.art, '/ifllitfire qonsequences:

the fa9ility shoulrj be .fjs(emssliould existtq ,, _ '.*;

im.co71trolled-reiease,ofradio'iictive,material,ifaflre:shouid occur. :. : .. * , , -,, .. c,i >-, " ,' f'.' ') ' I J ,>' ,' ', *' " , ,* ' ;' : ' , 1 ,-; ," , , l : , ' ' ' ' '< 'J , ' ' " "* ' ' >> ' I '1 i < ' " ' .' ' * ; /1 : '.NWJV!f fSAR Section 9:3. 3: 1.. Facility Fire 'Area; "disqissesfin/ hazards . "i , -* igttiffon W;'efg fql'. flu/ '(?PF, ;bid,ifoeS_l!Ot describi,\vJziqfijireiafetJ/8y$fems*! . ,"" ln<[cifure'i '*. ' ,;; * . ,: -Jl_Ccidents,:-4dditional inforfn,ti,tion is requirecj to determine ijthep/an for'.fh<fpre\Jentiowojjires 'is .. ' , : ; !i f 'liP:i'ia:s* . *. ;: ';":i;.- /; .,. . , " .. : -. * * ' * '" ;-:; ..... :-,..:,.. .. .. ..

• ,;_:;;'

,=,,....,_ .. ._ ... .,., ... -.

• • • • • • -*"-**w---*--*-

'.The fire protection system was not identified as an IROFS during preliminary design and Construction

Permit Application stage. Design and/or operational approaches will be used to prevent and mitigate : major RPF fires causing significant external and internal releases of energy and hazardous materials.

The : 'level of consequences is typically directly related to the quantity of energy and hazardous materials ! :released during such accidents; therefore the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the fire i *protection systems will focus on minimizing these release quantities. Inherent process and systems : design features such as compartmentalization, isolation, batch size limitations, and early/rapid/redundant ( .fire detection and suppression can serve to reduce the maximum possible magnitudes of energy and hazardous material releases resulting from fires. Once finalized, the detailed design of the facility and its :systems (including the final designs for fire protection and the final list of key safety systems and ,components to address severe accidents), along with the management programs to maintain their 'reliability, will be identified and provided in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application. .. ,.;*:*r*7*.j: I* n* " , ** "" ., "' , " .... *.. " *. -*" , . ,, ... '*. "'.. , , -. . , , : " *. *. " '" . , . :.. . .* * , ** '?i:onstructed,procitred,,,inStalled,'.aftatested'to'.ensure'.fhat:'theywill".he'avai(abte*pn¢*relialileto<.

• :.* 1' i*:*. ** ..
• :,;, '.{ '*:.,:, .. ,, ... ' * ** ._. ;: .*

.... -: .. ... !'t- _ """ .'<,z .--; : 0 .. '. The fire protection system was not identified as an IROFS during preliminary design and Construction

Permit Application stage. Design and/or operational approaches will be used to prevent and mitigate tmajor RPF fires causing significant external and internal releases of energy and hazardous materials.

The Jevel of consequences is typically directly related to the quantity of energy and hazardous materials

• released during such accidents; therefore the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the fire 'protection systems will focus on minimizing these release quantities.

Inherent process and systems :design features such as compartmentalization, isolation, batch size limitations, and early/rapid/redundant

fire detection and suppression can serve to reduce the maximum possible magnitudes of energy and ;hazardous material releases resulting from fires. Once finalized, the detailed design of the facility and its :systems (including the final designs for fire protection and the final list of key safety systems and :components to address severe accidents), along with the management programs to maintain their ',reliability, will be identified and provided in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application.

60 of96 .:.:*;;* .. NWMI .... :.**.-.: . .........

• .* * ".

rrotl.TWNESTfJ.E.DlCALIS{JlOPES NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -Request for additional information {-RA.i. ".

• f<.NuiiEa-153 7, *Part 2, *'sectiott9.

3,

Protedtio°r!*Sysie"iiis

• . * .. \ L.;, ... *
• _

s}10,lfi<l<!iscl!ssJhe prevenfio1.1

• • *} l* *:. :.". -. , , _ ..

matr,rJa{S: Jf o'!!:f!.¥:.<!r .. pr,ovf(!e iJft1<;

• ) l * . * / .

{f thef {it}rt,ff!Jtjz. tQ,Jil!J/t l -.. : _::'.

.;o; *.: : *. ).:* >*,:;./.;:.

\;,* .. ::* <C,:-;

',

1 * °'. * * -* . r

Pr?vide additional information on* the types of combustibles fourid in _eachEre *area.and.how':th<? . __ .. _

', ; ""' ' -.,., .. *.*:*;, t .. __ ,,_L . ..:; .. .. .. ... .. . )The RPF's combustible loading (i.e., detailed inventory and distribution of the types and quantities of ;combustibles throughout the facility, both fixed and transient), along with a commitment to an iadministrative program to control combustibles within the facility, requires the detailed specific jquantitative data that can only be derived from the final facility design. In particular, the combustible . )quantities of various types and their distribution within facility areas depend on the detailed specification

\of process equipment and components, materials and their quantities, operating and maintenance

/procedures, and material locations during the various operational states of the facility. Thus, the 1combustible loading analysis results and the administrative program to control combustibles within the lRPF will be finalized and provided along with the final detailed design information in the FSAR as part ..... _ ..... ., ... ***-.. _ .. --** _ . ... -*-----__ -* _ .................... _ .... _ . _ ..... No. Request for additional information ..* / .. :{ *. "::, . . ,:;1 ;*. t \-) .. * . > *:l! i .. , ;*:. ,*' ':". ' ' ** maintained by tlJ(f 'rJppli canf. q_onzjJ_lete Jina /jl{

. i '

:; :*. _. :.: .... ;,,,!; ,,*,*;,,.:,'

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,{ J. ,; 1". ' ' <-t! ',, ,*"'.' I *.4f*'-.. \" * , ' *. , 'J , , f:

. ;'design:

oases for eachauxmary system ' ' . . . . . " i .-I; *, d ,c*': *;: ,"h,* ,;'

(J .)* /**,,f"*

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• I: ';:" :' '. *: * ;'.:, " .. " . ",, : ,; 'c, ','_ , . ..-,_-. -.. , , " . . . , . . . , *°' . , , . _. . ' l' * .. _ **. *:. ," , ]he cominunfcations systein design ba$iS is lo provid<;!

comn,iun/cations'i/iiring:n.ormaland:'.. '". ..., ;*. ... ,

• r: * ...

This.: * ... ,; J ,; * ; . . _ . iapaHi1i¥y will 'd6mi/OJ operai'Qrs '.di staffJMhibers 1' * ** -:ii *.,, annqT,lnce an e"'ergeficy Iii all oftheRPF .4om_mu1:ztcations betWer/i{atr.

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.

: *. _. . *: '.i . .,

and. 'f.eleponi111i./,nicatioilsJndustryAssociaf!911,. req1;1ire,Tnents.*

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• r ' .

<?n..'. sy_s,te1:z basis is, P'.Ol'.i de din, ,Ch_apier 3;,o.,,, . c-">: :( < ., -*, f!f o: ;<<pesiglJ

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• '.*\:. ;,;J .° RAI 5*0.9, r/jFR* f f,ift5_Q

,,;.: '. . * '. ** ;1 }* ... **. * .** ,, '. *:*;lihformatioi(maintained /JyJh!?, andacci1raie)n all hJ:atef,tial n;spe9ts.:,* .. : *. -*::: ... '.'i, * * .. ; ;

• o ', C ' . 0 ' *' * ,' * * -I ' \ :. ' 0 *, ' _"t, 0 < > * , > " ' " ' > * ': L* 0 * * ' > > '* ',,. ,.. , , L >} , './VURE.G-1537,-f>art

"'stat(;s*tht;rithe appliCa!it'shoji{dinC!ude the_.** .. ... *.'.;designbasesforeqcfra,1JXili,arysystem.,*: . -::>*:: *>** <* * ** . . . " *. i ,' * .. * -r J ' ,, : * '*, * '. ',, : : *

• 0 ,'* , * .:: ":NWMJ PSAJ!. Secti.on 9.6:1, 1 IJ,eszgn I}as1s,JstatesJhat."" , , ,, , , / , ... ** . * .. ,, . + ". ,' ,'*:,:. '(,
• ,.,:> ', ,' , **:,'*A,'

r,*,..O ':'>>"' ':;-, "j .'*; *; ';; '_ ,-,-': ,;' ','> ::_,' '*_,.-.* .; . Tfie [cover;gas:controfJ Sjls,tfim desigh)asis, i,n::th.e' of tlie' lowerjldmm,ability#mit of sq f!e .£ 1; 'un¢bnlf'.ol[e'd, ,of mqterzal .. ;qn,d'that wi(hiri)h,e'SJlsfetfi dq)1pf ,t reach.hplosiv_e, l{fj_eli, in the i: l' .. pr.irtJar;f c90/ant.system Chapter). O[VeSigii ofStr.Uctilres, Systems,_ and . << .: .r: : ,, . , :,:;; r !-. ,_ **p:*<,erA:BQ_; .. '*"c:**.'h-. .. *,.,. -,,."'.*h .. 1:1'?-'h*

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r.:,*,; . * , *,; .: i.s}n .. :,. ... /

• rpcess ) e rr gter ..
• w, ic, ,ists one*oJ t e' :* ].: ', * ' * .. ; . . ,: raf!sign' .zy_st¢m aspioviqini;c<Jve/iga8 to:prb;efliflqfnmabl? .>*"'
• . r',';,:;'. , .. "'* *. *,_*::>.;
  • *:<::,, ** * *, .. _. * . .. '"', .:Provir;Jeadditional thisfipparent gap tifinformati01i

,\ . * :: it:'.;_.!. ... ",:: .... ,:. "*' .* ;. . ... -;;;:;-* .....;; ... .. . .;...-.,,....;,. .. .. 0-lTue RPF does not have a separate cover gas system, as typically found in a reactor. There is a function ;applied to the process-chilled water system in PSAR Sections 3.5 and 9.7.1.1 to ensure that the process-' .. is ... _. .. _, .... *.--.. . ... .. ____ ,. ,,., No. Request for additional information tS :_.;;_ ... *.: .,.,,'., .*.:,**"_,' .***' ,., 1' L ' ,:" O! I, I ,,, ' -., .* \";:' ':,:,, '/

• 9. 7-1

  ** !'.NuREG:;

I1i7,'.Pcft"-J.:. Chapten.?;

• HJe .. : * ., ,f l'. <'r" ,,. ,. '

sys_tem:.>

• . :),,; . ,;;-,;;:-:, * '.;;,. " -i:. . . . j: '1. '., ,,, .. . . .'-*.. '**** :l. ii.

water,,

. . 5 :: .. ' * '* ;: , *fhbti':e force; 9rz,d ()fher funqfions s_uppptt ur:anluf!l

}f/asf.e hiJ.rz,cjling, _; .. * :: f.hefollpw[ng-subsysi<{rf!s:, , . , , ,, . " ... . . '; , : ... -. * . ,'* ,' ;; . ' ' " . . . ;**: . . . (, .. ,. ,.. ,

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' ,, < .. * .... * . i . ** 'Gas-supply, hiti:ogen; heliitm; hydrogen; '*

• r

.. ,::::-_ ;">.:.', *: :::., ... *,,, ::.:::.*N:.*.* ... :: ,; * \*::***:'.\

• . _The PSARfurtheri.statesthe,:l;ltility sy$fems <i[.e designed to'_(!nsitre,*tfJaUmy po,te'r!tiaf m'alfunctipns

.. , * :do.n.ot*c;al;lse the Rf 'llJ1e arl}. ,;,;, , ,: to _tht:1t-in, l!fent rq,diO/icNye, o]?(!r{J,ti<JlJ 9fo)Ji,<;, .o pqtenti{,i/,ra<fiati_on;ejposu_res.:wquld,not*excee,cf the fimtts*ofJO:CFE 2Q .and are cpnSiste}1t i' ); *. . . ' > ; : : '" .. 'wl,th' AµIjA prr/grdif,. i6e a'uiill'dry sy'/itemi ! 1* . ,, , 'with' or prevent safe shtiido'tfn,of th'e,IfBF ' '.'. ,, , / , : "./* .. , '* .. , . , .. ' ;; * -:

• ** * * *' *** *** * * **:' *.* " *1 " , 1 1;\ . ..:'

"1* *' .,-*> '<: ,.' >:'""'<< -1 ,;: ., , *',: ":'

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• Tft.f!. .'uti_!ityS)lsteins if<:s,ign

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gt L7 inch * :*-. ** * !L. . [ih2j)*'cil:z.d'.f2Jcg(cin 2'.(60,IB{ifihJ(l'uge. process eqziip1rieht

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.. 62 of 96

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........ o*** * *. tJOIUH'NIS1' t.UIMCAL lSOTOPES NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -Request for additional information , r . . . . . 'X° *:;' .* 'fJemint:rtJ_lize,d water.!(? th{process anil cooling water . .. : . . .. * . . ' . . ' " 1 i '.. * ., : * : ;1 .;: *. *,., punzf .*

• f, .. * ;:

COllV<fYOr , : *y* . , .. , , .!* _., . -, : .,; . * ,-*1. ,:*,; *: ' ,;*. J '" * :Jnstritn1ent airfor'bubO'lers arid v'Ol\ieViiJiilaiton* . *. . . * * '* . * . . , " i; * -* , , * ' . il. \ . * .. an(lhyprogf!n to, the .. , ), ., .. '

• andoxygeJ:i to the*dts'solvers

.* .'-* ' ... ** * * * ._ .

• _ .*-**. * .*. .. * * * . ( 1 " .. ;,_ *:

provide 'adeq1fateflow'such 'tha .. fahe accumulatiOf1

of C()mbus{iblegases

{ ' ' -below haiardous concentrations and reduces radiological hazards-due; to 'accumulation of } :_ *. ,.* !;.- _!'. .: :-.--*: *r:: , .. **;:'.*, ; .. *;** r: *. /'*... **:*: .. :*;_ .-r. '* _:; ' '. '. . *:* .,;-: -( . ;!P,.s'(ffi;

• 3>. 2.::t.

.. 41r

• . .:

6/ :: !. !itheplantand1instninierifairsj;stefiicireasf0Uows(': .. *.*".. _* ** * * '." .. ' * *; ... * *_*.,; . Provide small, )o; (e:;., * 't * ... p(Jwet; purge go/, ii'J tanks,. yalve arid leve(me_asurerfz_entF: .-*,: *"} *' .. ;: .

• i P'r,ovide plmzt air receiver buffer ecrpadty :t0;mril[f!

llP. aiffeteriq_e_ be&eeri:p?(ik d*flrf0n<! and_.. . , .! :s .qomprefsso'!;_capac?ty1.*:* .... *; *. **:c* : .. * *. *:*.:** ** ... :; .* ;:;: *. ."!,':" 1' '"': ; , . * ! '" ,, *, ,Prqvi<fe pl<jht aiffo in_slrl:f_m,en,t air;lu,bsys(ef!l.fo[; actu.qt_ton,: . :..

• _ : -. . '* '.;: .;

insfrllment'i:iir re,celver buffer c;apa9ity to* make up difference be'tween peak demand and .. )." cOnzpressQr..capGcitj;.;_ . ' * ,: *"*'.-*; r. * '.." f<,, -.,.: . " -* * ./: * -'* ' -. *' 'l ;:PS4R_ Section }§2.:Z,.14 lists.thefqllowing desigJ1, basip :values of the plant and tns(rument a__ir* systemf ; .. *. .:.*. . * ...... _*,.-'.: -'.: __ .. * :'.*,_ . '..: * .... _:, .. *-. .:,* _ *. * *. * . " ** .. :; :o _.3 'df!sigii life' with .tlie f?artS.f t, . *: ; -, . , . ',: ii; r. frovide ft:lre.g,)nl'.f

fble, point: oflljo

.,: ; ; '(: . ,:i . 40°[; (-40°F) andfiltered-.to a maximum 4Q micron (µ)particle size> * ,: * * !. ' <-'v , ,,, ** , _ .; . . . irrhu;,

7: 1:'i appeari* .. 3.°/2. 7. ) ::

• air. ; *:r \lsystems thattire not'listed.among the two basis. . .. 1: : * .,* . : . *.'" * *.' :';; .* ,.::. _: : '<. , )_ * * 'i ,* ;*i" ,. .* .. -' *. : * -;!_

small, severa{ (e,g:,* (ool

• * :: power,,purge gas in
• c;icflf:atiqri,tind . , '. .J .. " **' .. ..-'Pr.avid<;

plant dir receiv,er'.f?iiffer capqcitji '-. compressor.capacity...

• . . * *' * *, ....... ** . *, .* " : >* " *,. * . ..;*-. *. * * -:. * * ,* * *. i ._ . ,
• hovide.

beffer cdpactty to :Zake u/dWereiice be;.;een pdak

• . : . __ -*:"* .-, ... **:.,: ,**' *; '. .. **.: _'." . ,. ;t;Igditi.f!ril1lly;J!,$!1I?.

7,;lf,, in,,qlt,td..e: tji,c{ ifl.*_PS!flJ.:

-.;,

.' ,_ ... : :;secti,on

'9. 7.1.1 for th'¢ plant and fnstrument ql'r Also, PSAR section '3.5:2. 7.14 llsts desigt1 ; ;;b,asis a'f,e among the bcisis:elemenis given

section 9: 7.1.1. " . . ;TV}lile, PSAJ!,. Section'9.

7.l:Jd6es indicate tha.t PSAR.C:hapte,r 3 .. 0provides(ldditiipi'atinforniatioh on '*i , ... 1iiiie utiiify systems it is"'riot each basisfunf:_tioris'.andy(,liltes in, : -\ ' i:PSAR Section-3. 5. 2:.7:.14 suppor(s or correlates .with tlie ddsign .basis.den1ent$ in PSAR 'S,ection

9. 7_: L l; I' ' p '* 0 '. ' ' ,c '* * ' I ' ;: '_ ' *" .-., ' ' ' ' ' I ,* " ' * * " ' " .: ( *. , ; : (s.beedeq ,tr/r,cts6lve i{e,silfa*ba.#i ele111ents., . :,: ; .. *_, 1* * * 'i)'unetioiis, af!d inconsist'e17t level'ofdetdil;:

unclear of'desigrf ba',#s fiinctions <;1nd *: j:,'f 0:"" '"'. :, _ jf#h 'de_s,ign

• bll;is,:elemdnts.'

ciaritjhn idehtifoing'whtch fo';; i: ) *., .. * ... * '. );wl}ich sys,'te#, (o deferinine;' 0 J .. .. :,.* __

• ______ , .. ::: .. :i. __
• ___

.. .... .: . *_ .... ,::_; ..... : .. -.: .. 63 of 96 .,.:;;;* .. NWMI ... :.**.-.* . .........

• =* * ";.

...

• NORntWtsT M£D1CAL ISOTOPES NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -Re uest for additional information . .

1

• d_;;ig;i

.. .... .. .. .. :.* ... .. .. L .. ..

PSAR Sections 3.5.2.7 and 9.7 will be aligned with each other to enhance clarity and resolve 'discrepancies.

The design basis bullets in PSAR Section 9.7.1.1 will be deleted, and the design basis 1description in PSAR Section 9. 7 .1 will be modified to cross-reference to the appropriate subsection of :PsAR Section 3.5.2.7. Subsequent information in PSAR Section 9.7 will focus on the description of systems and components that satisfy the design basis functions . . ,, iThe design basis description in PSAR Section 9. 7 .1 will be modified to cross-reference to the appropriate;

• subsection of PSAR Section 3.5. Subsequent information in PSAR Section 9.7 will focus on the * :description of systems and components that satisfy the design basis functions. . . . . 1; *
  • • • "" 0'**'""r

..... .: **

.. r.o;:.'"":"" ... .....

i RArn.7-2:

.. Part1, f:hapter.9, states th(lt the applfi;aiitshoi.tld i'nc/iide the* fqr each **.* * '.; ':' .::* < * .. : ':> : _ , > '\ .** ::*:: :* . ,>v;, *. .... :. *' * * ;;NJ'f'Ml.PSAR Section 9; 7.1,*:"Vtility'Systems,:'. cqll!pris,e th_efollmying .. . . . . l *:*. . /

• sieam*.* .... '.i * .:: ..
• . .-_
• .i:hii1Jd *: . . .

S :; :* . 'i>fant 'iilr. , . '* ' .(;as SuppfY, }1e'lium;. 'Oxygen' . .' .. * .* ... , ;_ . : .. /,. ::** .. * ... :: . . . *. . . '." ..... , : rPSARSection

• f}.la,1 states, inparUhatqnepfth:

zitilityS}'.sMms.designbqsesis toprovidecflilkd.

Maieil 'to' "dufinil rio'r/r/af<>pelf ati'olis ..

.. r.;* *.:'.psXJi'se?:ti01{3.5:2'i f:!, *

• • .'!idesigri'basisfun.ctiqns'as fdllows: * * ,::,:,,. :*<" * , .* ;::;*.. * * . :;:. * . ,_ . , >:\I*

three. '* \.:. .. , .. * .. , ... * .. *t ... ' :Oii.e .. :::'. "" :"* ,:.:.; . .. * * * *01i:e

• * ... *: .*

.",, '*:;:' .. .** <!.\:.' '\.". :;:\*' ?; .. ...

• Provide inonitoriiig*of chil/edwater loops for .loss ofpfiinarjlccnitaininent;
• e'roytd,e * ,:* * ** >> .... ** .. '.;f$AR.

z.J;7 {iestgn , , . . . ;;, .

• jo-year.designlife with parts. (e.g.; /;umps}, : : .* .... . . 1; .* ;'." :*chilled watef to.

ho thifn. 1 bc:c (5 0° iJ nofinal ' . *it,,* .opehation'S ';,, , , :.;.;; '"'* :* .*' '*';*"" * ::, ... <; ! ';:.

• .. .:,,: ..... ;, ... * ;'basisfunctioris'.asfollows:

y .,. .. *; '*., .'. "': .;" " '..*t; .. * ** * * .. *' " .,, * * ** **** , *. ; " *f \**

'lfledia to' heiitihg;; tehHtatibri; 'and conditioniiig (HV AC)

• .1 < k;:* .. :;;upply'JIYAC.sy8f¢m'w.ith.r,:qo)ing.wqte,r,.

tf;qt throrigh lhf! ch_il/ecJ,\yaterc()ils tn air* * -"*:

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• • ., * * ** * *l [:,, :* '. 3,Q-yew,iiesign Ii.fa. with the, eiceptipn of cqlllmon parts (e,.g:? pitmps)

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r:,, . : * .Y Se&tioh 7.'19/;stsflicility, heated w(iier ,sy,stein/deSig1f basjs vdlµes}asfqllql!!,s:

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l",*;; )*>'.* -:-1-, '.0*"/',,l* .. *<<";*,. ',')' .. 1>'.. . , '. ;PSAP.. Section, 3.5'.2.7;

"Rqdioisotope

'fro<fuctionFaciUty D<f_Sign iu}id} J " " *,' ,*., .... : . ,. .... , : .. .,, ... ':'".:;:I_'.':*>" ...... *. "*' *.<\,,. ". )"*** ,'J.'.' . ./i*.*J,-,._.,, ,*; ,.4, ';"*_:::. ,**jjV'a/u1s; 'diS,<;JJSS,es z,} 8} S)lsterii;: ', l\: . * *>:*

• ,

l *' ': . : 1.,Sectipn 9, 7.J;:orfo'r Wh?c/i (/eszgJJ. $ZV,e]1.l'l f:S/if?. fjec;tio'f, 7,). [; SJ1sf.e1}?S Gff! : ;* * *. i . .;, 1r:'\* *. : * .

• ffiesCl:ibeq brieflyin:PSAR

&ction'9:.7;J.:22/:'."Chilled is-nee'dMN/ . , *' t t.. . ..

• the.relationship:ainongthesesy_stems.' . : . * *. , ' *: . ;., .* * *
• _.: ., . <*

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• 1Provide (Jdditionql inf9Jwatiqnto c9n:e,ct, or. darifyJhis.ppp(J/:ent;discrepqn9)j

.. ln discussionS;*ofi, .. :: ..... .. lPSAR Sections 3.5.2.7 and 9.7 will be revised to enhance clarity and resolve discrepancies. The RPF 1 )system and subsystem designations will be used to align the utility systems. The design basis bullets in 65 of96 .... NWM I *::.**.*.:- ........ :.* .. '; 110.RTifi\'EST MlDfCAl. ISOIOPES NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 CHAPTER 11.0 -RADIATION PROTECTION AND WASTE MANAGEMENT No. Request additional information

.µ -::ii.: :.:J'

)(Af tf}; ,>, , l;fpl;(dJ,, ?f ! 0: en,, ,0.( i:.;, :!";:, t: !11: 1-J. throµgh 1 1 1Jlaler.zal shall' be.establzshed /Jy lu::,ensees sych thatmd1x1dual members of the,publJc bkelytto recrtzve t 1 1 JU -2) >. '. . * /the higheSt dos(wi eip'ecre(! ta .recelvla to,ial fi.ffectivefaose equivglen/ (fEDEJ il{excess of<< )1 '1* , '/"': .* .. .... . .. . * .. RAl(1.1. _ !;lfUIJ.F:G _ 153 7,, f qrt .J.l.{. 1, .:'.'IJa,rHati,Qn the appJir,;41?.t.§ho,u{d .*, .. , :, , '._-_ * '. , .. ;)nodels lin,dJiisitmptions that are .lfsedfof t;:Jfid accitiiftilatfve!'

• * ""

N1:lr..o$e?J.- PQ, *an_4 /:*;.( FPIJ.fr(){led,; Cf,IJ:,1 .. ,'J)jff cqn,te!f!J

• <: .*. .'.!esti111dtes

_ofthe predictedanhua(to,tal tq at least the followingJn' the unf;estricted'm;eas: '(l) the\ "*:*maXimum exposed indiViaual, (2) tlie nearest permanent resi(?ence, dnd' f3) any locatirjn of special: . . . . ,: *'.ltnterest.': , :: . . * .: , :, 1 *.: .* * * ".<*.* .. : i, . *. ,; :.<<. :<:'. '.'. . " : .. ."*' ,, , :'.*.. , *. .' '" WWMI PSAR Sectidn.ll. l! 1.1.:2, '.'Release of Airborne RadionuclideS, "provides Table JI';2, ., . : . *

. *

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• '..

';;:fof . r* .. : '. '. <. *;:*!' '*, ... ' " , :,, . .C?_n,seqziencesfrpm fJperation andpse of!he f;,acilfty, '.'.statf!s the . * "* :, * ;'anqcipated radionuClide inventory in the RPF is based on a weekly (hr&ughput of f!ight MURR. . . . * \ . :ntargr:;ts professea a sped]led *time, aft¢fena ofirradiation (EOJ) .. :.Srfction:'4. J.iJ. '$fates* the RPF.is , *: . " : ,;!designed.to have.a fiopiih,p/pjJera,(iprza/ prqcessingcap,gpiifty ojone:Jif;zfc;h pe[;.;Wl!?k of uftJo . ; * ' " ,') 2 t(u:gets fr.om up /o 52 targ¢tsfrojn' thf! Oregon . ' 1, ), :"*' * . li i.. *

1. .f>.,bas¢g on. 8 or,,.* !:

..

• . ( ' RAI *t1.1'.,.1a

  fClarifj;jhe basiS,ofthe calculation ofairbome'release/Jfradionu.clides;.i

  e.

whiChtargetp'rocessin,g. 1* . ** ** :};:' >** * ;. Hthfoughpuhs tlie baiis of the:'computatidn]or maiimum-:dose

to thepuf?lic the:sectiqn>*

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-

• The calculations of airborne release in PSAR Section 11.1.1.1.2, "Release of Airborne Radionuclides," :are based on the processing of eight targets at MURR. This section will be updated and described in the , ,FSAR as part of the Operating License Application.

The basis will be consistent with nominal operating conditions. The primary dose contributor is the xenon noble gas, and the offgas system is designed to *retain the xenon to below release limits and bound the range of target processing.

L:.;', ,. : . ... .. .. .... ;..'.,"""" .. : ... ,:.... ' ' . . * . *, :PSAR Section 11.1.1.1.2 conditions were slightly more conservative than those described in PSAR :section 4.1.2.1. PSAR Sections 4.1.2.1and11.1.1.1.2 operating conditions will be aligned in the FSAR i_as part of the Operating License Application. . .... *-*--., .. ... ... ...

.

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• ___

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• 1.\RAV11.1:-2 JWUREG-:-153 7, Part2, SectjQil) 1), l,; '.'Radiation Sourcei*".states (he *applicant should presel}t the* ,1 :: ,_ ' . ' " '

of th<; maXinniffi doses/or ma} Or radiolog;dql '. \ ;> ; " ' ':' : c"(rgi/ting thefii/l.range ofnorrhpl operations]orj'dcility staff ahd members'9fth.e pug/id. Th_e doses ",,. I oe .. ,: * *

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• . "' -;,,NTf1¥!:I18Afi S,eptio!J 1.l:f.l, Pr°flkt:f!,;"1!

'.'. is.,( . , *:;,,:,* * \'committeq'to protecting RRf workers, 'the,:public, an.d u,naccen,taole' exnosure to* * *d : * ' _.,. * . *" ** -' -* * * *c . ,, '. . .,. *. * , , ' ' , * . ' * ' ' "i . ' 'Fjie NWMIRI:f /imvs ha\Je:*p een the;limi,ts ,;' ' I ! * ; *. . , ;;spe,cificed ill::{ f) :<;FBfcu:t10£o thq,t .lilJ!-itS (lre. no_t ex,ceeded °:nd 1; ,, .'to pri.nciples.Table. lf:'5,, "Estjmated Radioisotdpe Facility * : *** * \ :; ; , ,, .. * , > '::'. >"'** r.a.tes for, a areas to . ;* : : ): , * * . * * * ** * *, * .. )iricljide tM:gc(ministrati\w space$>

• fqr dp§s, r4tes,;(l_e$iliiati9n-qf

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tlOHTIIWESTMWfCAtl:SOIOPU NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 Request for additional information .* ITue dose rates in PSAR Chapter 11.0, Table 11-5, were either based on actual shielding calculations or * !were the goals/ endpoints of the shielding analysis. This table will be updated in the FSAR as part of the ioperating License Application when the final shielding design and calculations are completed. Areas /identified as controlled access areas, restricted areas, radiation areas, and high radiation areas will be i designated based definitions provided in 10 CFR 20, "Standards for Protection Against Radiation," and {the predicted doses rates presented by the shielding analysis. Although the Radiation Protection Plan has inot yet been developed (i.e., this plan will be supplied with the Operating License Application), idosimetry is anticipated to be required in any restricted area. .... ...... --:-.. ... >';,:'-.... .. -.... ..,,... _ ..... ._ .

.

.. 11.:1'-2b. i11:e areas the RfF. that would.be desigriatc(d, radiatiob*areas.'or high .. ';z

• __ /2;::;:;

!Radiation or high radiation areas are shown in PSAR Section 11.1.3.2, Figures 11-2 through 11-4, and ldiscussedfurther in PSAR Section 11.1.5.5. 1 ,-.. . .... .* .;,:'.f"'.>

• -:'--.--...

J:!'-'"--7-'."J l RAI 11.1,72c for assigiiingpefsonnel dosinietrJ)Jo staff '_'. < ' ' !':' . ,:, c. ' r . / '.' S, . . L""'"'*****: ... ..... ..

... .. :. .. _J,,.., . .. ... . .:..,,;, .. .. -\. !Personnel dosimetry will provide a means to measure, assess, and record personnel exposures to ionizing : \radiation from external sources. Exposure to external sources of radiation will be performed by !individual monitory devices such as thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLD), optically stimulated !luminescence (OSL), CR-39, activation foils, or direct reading pocket dosimeters. Use of personnel \dosimetry will be required for all personnel entering the "restricted areas." Use of direct reading

• 1personnel dosimetry and criticality monitoring will be required for all personnel entering "high radiation

\areas" and "very high radiation areas." .. ! !dose equivalent (TEDE) above which would trigger an investigation by the Radiation Protection staff to ' \determine why an individual received such a dose equivalent. The routine TEDE to workers is not 1anticipated to approach this level. An investigation might entail interviews with the individual and the !immediate supervisor, review ofradiation work permits (or equivalent), review of procedures, review of jALARA (as low as reasonably achievable) approaches, and providing feedback to management with irecommendations on how to proceed. .. .:... .. .*.:;>*;_; .* ,_. *F; : .:.-;:., .) j 1. f:;3 .. .. 2,00J(a)(?) ofl Q C.F(?.:-'PJ1rt 20 stq.tes that one of .' f f: ,*** ':.,** ,"

• • • .. : :
• . , .. :;::".*<*:::

.. : . .y .....*. *.* , .( ,*.. *. . .. . J!NUJ?J/X! fart 7, $,ecfion and Dqsbn¢try; t!,statelfke,desigfl,, *i1 : , . :: .. : ,.* * ** 1:bas.es'Of f ) , . . " . " . 1!1f!fpt'!m<f:.f 1zr1ts,i ., . ; *,1, ( *. .. , " 4!2.1, 1,, r,'.:. **\ id .. :.* *. . *,:biologt6d!sliieid do$e' pateS:pnq +thJ limit's;oj JO (}FR: elf

.}:/; iiadministhitive suppbrtiirea.'

ThiSinfortnati'on is need fo ensure* 'that radiation doses' arli . } <<*{ ' -' -. . ' * : ... . . ' .., ' ., .. ' ', * . .. ' ' ;-. J .' ** ,'_:.:. '! , ... . * \:ALA.RA and.within applicqblef:limi(s of 10 CFR:Part 2Q;* ... ,** r ;; .. . **; .. " *:, . ' >.* :' * :v\ ...

-.-:d--.... . ..;.,: .

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• UORJHWCSTMEmCAllSOTQPfS NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 Re uest for additional information

11.1 ii>escribe'the jf; .. ___ _ __ )As shown in PSAR Section 11.1.5.5.2, Figure 11-5, the entire RFP is considered a "controlled area." :PSAR Chapter 11.0, Figure 11-2, shows five doors from the outside of the RFP to entrances into the !"restricted area." Each door will have two-credential access control (e.g., fob/PIN, fob/bio, or bio/PIN). iThe RPF Radiation Protection Program will require personnel to access assigned dosimetry and portable :survey instrumentation (as needed based on the work authorized) from an as-yet unspecified location ;within the RPF administrative area before entering the restricted area. Portal survey monitoring will be in-place at the exit from the restricted area into the administrative area. The specifics on the type and ;instrument used will be described in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application and will I either be a control that allows standing passive detection or hand and foot monitors. , ;This corridor, which is not continuously manned, will normally have a dose rate less than 0.5 mrem. ,However, this corridor provides access to the solid waste drums in the manipulator hot cells and , :therefore, at times, may have a higher dose rate and require radiation controls consistent with the planned 1 :activity. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . '.7RJ\i ; *' .. ':_ ' 'ffmqdi','surveys*of afebs,' that'are reasonab/il,underthe circumstances/to evaiuate the potential. > , . ,;: ; ' . . * . , /;zazbrds of the' raaiiition:Jev<f/S gndteSidu_af'radfOactivity.deteCted;* .' . '. .: .... _ , /, . :_,: * .. * ... :

• Jfjufilid 153 7, J>a;1,:2!.

Section,] j_J. i,, ()n >* .* i. r **-, . : * * -. * ., . , * * 'i\best o m'efxim,um_.pn1Ju{l{ <josf! µiJtJ. for ipq)or, _ I , *. : l.dur,ing the fit!! rqnge-for facilitj; staff and;memb'ers ofthf!,P?Lblic .. The doses : ,* . i ' .r.

• r?; ' "-i ' ' t , J .. , u " *, ' " ' " ' , ' >'" " ' "" ; ,, " , I ' 'l .

.: * * . *. '.*." * "" .. *. ': '"..""' '*.* .. - ,>,. f"','o'; '/:*,**. :**O _r )':". *:*.* .' 1 2,.2)( ': :: * *_1 :'.'.invjmtory.to 'irradiated target receipt, which exd'!Jdes fr.ace c , , \1 '1pro_{fitc{scof th,e irradiatiohproces's:. The basis' ofthls inVentcny ;; weel{fY-thrOµgljput of'B*NfuRR. ' -

• . **. \._ * ,* * ,* * '.* **.t ,'o IA{" {* !.,".**'.b

(, ,*:;.'; .\, 1.i.:."I ', .. ... ':,": ,_{-.,,,, ' .. ><i.J/:" "* ', ..{*:. **> r **;,., .':"". : .. , ,-. '. :., ,', .: , , ; *',' "".'; * ;'.

• 7;PSAR<Se¢tion*4:3.2:2S;,

de,scribespro¢essing qpotentia/3 -r *. :: i:3 6-i;r.'a<l; ateq p'kr Jroiiz '.tiie targiis *1 * *:frnipactthe'radidtiondosei*iothepubiic;*

• i..* * *.*. _ .<<, ,,,,_ __ " .: ,";' _

-_ dose-i; _ _ _ . , !ipu,bUq cjescr,ibetf ii? $ectio'[i:<Jl. l:J:: !:l ofthef'$tJR:;;. , :, :* .. _ '/ _, *' -;< ,\-..;:: *;."° .... ,..-. -:; -:-o<; *

-

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.. *.--:-* . ..! * .:;; ..

At discharge from the Oregon State University TRIGA Reactor (OS1R) (or third) reactor, the 30 targets

will have essentially the same amount of radioactivity as eight targets being discharged from MURR 'Since the OSTR targets are not going to be received for 48 hours, the total radioactivity is significantly

'less than the eight MURR targets received in 8 hours. Therefore, other than grams of uranium, the ;radiation source for the 30 OS1R targets is lower. *-* **----,_. ** -___ .... --* ----*"-<.. ..... -_ ,_ , ---68 of96

NWMI *::.**.*.:* .... e ** *!.* NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 NMTH\"IUTPAfWCAllSOTOPIS Request for additional information to :. "Jo.1-1 "!iiatea;h. siiJ/1 -**:. -i :\Mi ! 1.1-5 ., . ::#nplef!Zerit a:radiatioiz_protection program commensitratewith .the scope and ex,tent of licensed . -.*-. -'.; 1: _ 'RAI 11.1,.5 :)NUREG)537,Pdr(4; Radilition'S.om;c.e,:;; "$fates;ff!e app#'i;:anl:s/ioitM'idepti.fY

• * * *.* ! *I ; ,.*_. ' '.'*'
• i;fiio.ile ls' ils'Sllnjptio';zs thai best estimaies

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• * * *:* ,_ r s . ' .. ' *' . *i ., * * , :* . r . , . * , -. . , )' . . -1 , ---" .. * ! , 1. "' i:NWMIPSl[R

&ption.13.2. !* '.'Jv!axintum Accident, shows_ in TablesJ3': 18, .'Cable i J _ , U9, .and Zable T3-20,_ expoSllre, dnd doses, * * . ;* f ., ", . versus distance fr.om th_,eRPf itackjor an assumed bo.unding 2;,;hr*exjiosure.,NWllifI . 'l i-* ... *: .*:,, ' jpro.yi des: the ;!EDE d,1.f e .to ¥!:fA for the' if1div,i dua( b.u/ notpro.vidMhe

_ '.: :*: 1 ( :,, .* <!/;onpjii{ted!Jose Equiy,dlerit (Cf?E).'to the thyroid; . ., . . *' '.:; '\ *". *<' '. ':' * ; * .: 'l ,,,* ".':\ . -'. .', l"**. '.-_:,

i -:"1 .' * *. . '"*, ,-* '*.' .:<;,. '"* .:' .,;,,-, - ': .... ;' :: ,_.' '* *J.,*: ,

j. ,

• t CDEto the thyroid from the presented 0 scenario and th(f il!lp(!_ctto the public. . * . , , , . '

__ ,, iMHA. The MHA is being deleted from the PSAR, consistent with the response to RAJ G-3. ;"" *: *** ;;.:u.;.. .**

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.... .. __ ..... '°':""'*'-- .... *-*'-*'"':-:'* .. * .,. ....... _._,_ . .. .... .... :.,,.::---.:.

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• .:wuRE,G'" 1:537, ,.Part 1, Sec'il(J,n 11 :t3, fa,eilit;l/s:AtARA program.'.
• .. **; *, . :: '* / ' . .

theft ljY (li_e !fLAR#.,

• 1 * * ** -. ' ,, ** 'econom1cfactors liavmg* been taken.into account * * << * . . . * " ** .,. . . :

it*' , '< ;;.. r>

• ""'.., ',' r *' r, ,: *-;' *,.' ,.

,,\> *>;**:* '< .-*.';* ";: s.:.'*,',L'*':--*' ,;.** -,,.l,'. ):* *. , . ]iWMIPSAR Se9tidn 1-t 1.2! .'!Raqi(ltion states.th,eNWM! administratiye . , i .* : "-" :< '.':(exposu're 1imits'h"ave been set below ib,e specifierJ iJJ 10 CFR, Parf 20 to ensz/ie that regulatory* .:: f'. ' Yad(atipn exposure linJils,are'rioieiseid_eqjindto

• .. *i,: :: ; * ,. * ** . j'.

C¢.ntT;olled f1estri Rates, sti:tte(f the': *\* *'. ... . . . *::dose'rdte in the adfni1iistfation. and support area.and utilityarea:willbe O:mrenl/hr, .. It is not clear. . ; .. ; t:: / . . .. '* .:* *: ... ' ._.* .: < j : .* . . . *-. *.' " , . \\;;Jescribe how.' Nwlvif)viil demon;trate,. [hat'the administr_atiqn_ imd are 'nc/ different thart**;:

,,*

.. \,:u __

• • . .' . * ,,* -. ,.; *. ;* ,/ ; *:*_._/ * .**. .; *. *: .:. **! :'.' * * *" * -;c .* _>.. * * .. , * .. * ------_ --*----**-*"'" . .

.*

• • . ._,.;;,.**-*r.-*

\PSAR Section 11.1.2, Table 11-5, provides estimated dose rates based on the RPF design. Although a !dose rate of zero may not be achievable in the controlled areas, this is the goal. As stated in PSAR : Section 11.1.5 .5 .2, an area monitoring program will be established in the controlled area to demonstrate !compliance with public exposure limits in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application.* L *: . ,. .:: -: .... ;1 range of radiation moriuorlng ana*samptini* apftropriate'to the Jai:ility, "shoum be , * * .... *Ji * . , , , '!employed ihn;mghouithefacility, in'cludingequipmentemployedby experimental afidoperat1oris 0 * * ;; ' . ,* * -" -"' l *. . ,>support personnel, *including remote area '!jionitors:.

• *, i *. * ., * , * . . : , ; * :. *** *' *
• i1.5.5:2,.

. ;f1{iis

• '.:.
• with

Arf i:l

!s i1! *** .Section.Jl.1.4ofthePSAR.

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• l:.'

,,.,J, '..'" ,.1';1* </, *:,,: ,'. ' ::} .. ,,,:-,'

1. ' *"

• ff the.

fo td:dem()!!strate ': : .. ' .. [!Compliance wzth public; exposure . * * .

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• ..

__ ;*,:....,,_ .* '." .** ::; _:_ : Details on the area monitoring program will be provided in the FSAR as part of the Operating License iApplication. Area monitoring is anticipated to comprise a combination of passive (e.g., TLD or OSL !monitors changed out monthly or quarterly) and active (e.g., energy-compensated G-M detector systems iwith local and remote monitoring capability) monitoring systems located at points in the controlled area jthat would provide reasonable assurance that radiation areas are not present in the controlled area. The jselection of specific instrumentation, range of detection, and alert/alarm setpoints will be consistent with !the intent to detect radiation areas where they should not be and alert personnel to this changing !condition. 69 of 96 .... .. NWM I -::.**.*.:* .........

• .*

N09.fffW£STMrotCAltSOTOPES NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 Re uest for additional information .f: -. RAI 11j-a: 7, I, sittio;1 jj. j.: :z -'::r - .** --' >." to sample arza/yt_elhe Y,adio/ogicaf:effect Ojja9i/(ty Qpe'J:afion should b,e

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• 1rapplicpble( and of sufficien(.validity tharth_e envirpnmental impac.:t cqn,be 1111ambiguo1Jsly,-'as$eSserJ.

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ro i/r to 110.rc;ell as_;---:: -

• ':'. * .. tpfocessed-wafer.-*water.:lhat

'is_noTrecyded wiltbe adjitsted,and th_erimixed witlJ an' adsorbent;:* . *,. :"\ --_ *. :;: ';,imeitiftai'in s5:;ga1i6n F'urthefi* us*appr6ptiQ.te,_ l ' ---.:'{{aha Licj_iliq Waste Dtspqsition -. (. -. ' "qndF'igitr</4-25,--_"Low J?oseLiquid WasteEvaporationFacility Lbcdtion; an.*_ '1: J'.evapordfiQ_n_syste:;m andfaci?ityi ft 'is"not-Clear.how the?1J_dporiltidri effluent.is controlledfroin the' ' ' 1110-W-ilosewastew2itef'tanliS:O "*: _ .' }"::: ,*:. ?_, ".*.:r < *::. * .. .-.":>'"?.

*: *, .. * ---::. : i: .

the* /adiliti?

' '1' -?_; , J/c,' !** ' ' , ' ,. *,; ,.-.<: >' '),,'

• , , / , < _t , < , < -;;:** .: * "' ',

,, ' ' ) "'!*'-. , , .>,' , ';;,'.,* : * *. , '. ' ., " ;,.. % ,f ';, , ,r.. ,, 7 /, i , ; , L . *-,t:, j n , _,' '.<I.': -'"' ; _ *1 1 wil/ .be ei:Haustedto the .environment'. Expl(Jin,: if NWMI's intends lo exhaust to 'the environment, whdt*,' *:L":ij ___

.* ..* -* -* 1 The final facility design strategy is to route the air stream from the evaporation tanks into the Zone I 'exhaust system. The Zone I exhaust stack will have continuous monitoring.

1 .. J _ ,* :* . _ = * * * *; -*

• th'e'QSTP.

wW*<;onsiSt'ofllVolr,ansp,oJ:t casks;*notfo'kxceid _ * .. i)

• _,,. .-:_;
• . d r:.: ,;** -_ *," ',

Secii:On:'4.2.3'.-J

, "Jh'iiidl'Source Terln

*

staies photo,:; source;sirengthfor-the NWMI' --' *\ '.*:. - analysis .;,as determined on the activity.associal<ffl with.eightMuRR irradiated.-* --; *: ' :. :_ *;i:tar'gets. understand, the pJ:ocess of re,ceipt.and processing!: ' ' ' ' fo'f;d the impact to the sf?ielding anl.rlysiS. " ,:., --* -< ', *. " . "' .; ' -,* ;_ --. ' :<< ,, -;

• • :,. ' '.-' 1;i::".

'0 *.;._,,,,,,\, .;: '... ..:., .. ),*.I' _,,, ,,,, *** < .. , '7*-:, *\. ,. **,,*" :,. _;: -.': ,':::* .** -"-' r* *._ .. * ;, * > /' e?Cpzaff!:"faol?_ihe ,-.--. - ..... '< .. j .: '. : ---* < -: .,, ,, *:" -iAt discharge from OSTR (or third) reactor, the 30 targets will have essentially the same amount of *radioactivity as eight targets being discharged from MURR. Since the OSTR targets are not going to be :received for 48 hours due to transportation time, their total radioactivity is significantly less than the :eight MURR targets received in 8 hours. The OSTR targets at receipt are estimated to have only iapproximately 40 percent of the MURR targets at receipt. Therefore, other than grams of uranium, the :radiation source for the 30 OSTR targets is lower and is not used in the shielding analysis. ;;_;_

• _ . .:_

.::;,'. .*

_

_,. _,....:_;

_,,...;*

-:...:;:_:: ... :;:;:; ..

.

.. .:,_* ..

.*.

..* _ _;_;: ;: . of lQ-iGfR P<;rt'f a i',fldi<(4C{ji;_?_J,;. ,\-_ '" 'i .; -., -i: : \;rilate,rial'shall be by to re,ceiV_e t1 ;, * . ;, ,,-}the higlJe,'s(dosewiJl-rjot)e,.'</ipected-to T/l[!Et,ri of 10 (TtWf!m}per year, :: .-feomthese:efnissions*.

• _--,,.'..

' '., _., ,. :. ***.:: * : --,'.----_ * ' --., -*, , ---1, '*- j;1-:*1,

• saJrces/'

ifi,pari, i *:;,i 1 ap discussron s1Jou1d include the :'. --,_, i j_lphySical curifr.sh:ength orexpQsUfe.fates; energy . l planned.:',* r '1'Ipfogrd.iri'fol*_aisposaPpfaU'radioaqtive mqtet:iql subjeet to the;reactor.1icens_e. ," : . '_: * . . , _ '[ {'-: .-' :,, '1' * .. :,-,_'*,'.f ,,,<' .,*:, *W _:",'" °.,'**'.:, ,',>,>>. ;', .. _' '0 ,; ,.J .* <

• 1: . * * . '-: . qvWMIP,SflR, &ctiorL4_:4.

J,:- Material, "provides an , *; *l _ --. .. . -,,V,;overyier/pftlzf!. 1frf;iniu,,j.1:r!.boy?1Y ari{;l it is 22

• i * ' ';.* ** " .: * :, -< * *,, ' * *' * ,.* " ", ' * ' ' * '. >>-.: l;. ' ' . ",. ! #.* * . *. "'* ,, -"", i * * ' ,,.';" t-< ' *,' . '\* \ " '* ,.
• . . ' ;' .,, t. ) ';, ' ' .* l\ * -. : -:rirecY,cleJq)he target Section. 4.';l. J .also sta(es the, 22 kgl'rflef!k.

is based on * *

• _-t -*
• * {' * ':.:'_,:*:

<<:'. *,-t"-'.} .::

• _ .. : '1 \.

thl .. . . :) ." the;l?Y"f!isHaseqAn a

• *. * * -_ fi _ ;:targetsproce_ssed at a*spficified tfme ,after,.th_e, end of irrqdiatioYJ

.. PSAR;S,ectiqn'4. h2.,J. states the:RPF; r ",, ,; ,* ", li1is;designe,}i t9 have' capability of o.ne bdtc_hfier_ week :of up ' ,; ,:*. ;e' .*-. * -,/ :jtargetsfrom_MUR]?,-for.ifp't9 5,2 }ye?_kSper,yearand dppro'xim{lte.-ly}Otcir-g<JfsJroiµ the {!STR.9r a __ * - __ _ 70 of96

.... :.**.-.: . ............ .. NOilmwt:iTWUl_ICAllSOlOPlS NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 Request for additional information

• ___ )The SNM being recycled to target fabrication is included in PSAR Chapter 1.0, Table 1-1. The recyclable:

\material is held in the U decay tanks until needed for processing into targets.

• i The response to RAI 11.1-4 explains why the OSTR targets are not used for the radioactive source term (calculations.

The basis for the maximum dose to the public is derived from NWMI-2013-CALC-011, )Source Term Calculations. As discussed in PSAR Chapter 13.0, the MHA uses 12 MURR targets to !estimate the gaseous source term. Due to batch size and receipt timing at the RPF, eight MURR targets ) .. No. Request for additional information r;= .. ** .-::*:s* ,.-*:*(;.:* .. **o,:r -,)-( . RA.I

• :;JyUKffG-1 S37,.Par.tJ,_

Se.cfio,n D,2, "Radioacpye ': fn_tr_oqiii:es I( ' ' , .  : 1 lfor the content oftfle PSAR: It includes the statement:' "The magnitude*atid ndtµre of the effort .. ' ' .. '* ... ) .. : ,,. * *, kpfJP the r:ear:torf < i j . <.*.,: ,_ ,, ; . * .. : ;

':atu.re and* def ll!?ste" . :, ( 1 ;* : .. ,. _:\1 a(so,be:commen'Surate .wzththosejactors:;.'.Bpsedonthe (Jnnua,l,genw:at!OJJ r,a,tepjh1gh-;dos_e ... <;lass G\ :r* '* ? *.*.-: inPSAR Table 11 :b',. ,:; . . . . ;:: : _ , . (dndtl:ze }Vdste presentedin p'Sim* Table f-)7/ j\Contqiner__ Ge(JtnetriC pafa, .. 1?!i.Z q_e*/i.ne gr'fn,o;e. ¢. Joi-. itve7 liJqek. *{* :'.'(The complexity ofwa,s,te pr°"cessitzgisindicated.by both t/:ze nuntber of chemical opera_tions ahd "* _ -_ :, ,, .. '.".' :_ ::" </1°djus'6nen,ts:requi17/d, asdisGµssed:inP$AR 'Secti,ons.4. J.3:6, - lfmu;lling; ,;

• * ,_. *. :;;*ctn4 Waste, '.'/ind by

-:*. .*: ;:; "-: * .... *

• ,"*:;: '. . ,

Given tM . '., -. . -.;:opera_tions; the .. :. ndtu;e details rµdioactive'.waste' 1',ihour!ibe .. ' .<<' , ' *; ll * ,I *'. * ' [ ' ' ' ' ' ' * * *; .. * ;we f!Xplamed , * , * , , . . .. , * . . *>:" : . *: : i;i;-vRi;p:? 1/2,. L , * . * ., .. -,;:expec,tatiof!sfor. the, descriptiqn o.fthe/ddioacqve wast(f management p'rog1;a1J1. NUREG-153 'l;.: . * , <'. * * *, : * *: J(J?art2,.Secti611'. I{ 2. J/::'Rad(oa,cti've a1:zageme.nt Progrqin, ::.:Siates'th,atfactbrl dddr.esf!ea by. * *. \:. . . _:, . fic/escriptiOIJ..S,,, a11d'pr.ogram personne[, fit1es *and q71a/ifl cations *as 4zscussed m theformat

• .,: *; * : * ;

'. * :,.<-*:: ."._';:.:'.""':'..:.:

• • ,<, .* -._ '->! ... * *:**::: ,:'.>;:_ .. * ... \: *. . . . . ;'.PSAR Section ll.2.:J.3.2,
• Managenzeni Leaa:" identi}ies.the individualresponstble' to the** ,,. ,,;: , . " waste mdnpgeiiient activitieS,, inplu'd11ig f Sjflf

j t '--, * *

o!Op,eriftiops/'.

{; :i. * ::. .. \;J y :* ... :, : -. ;* .. , :;tfle Radiatio_n b[e qnd, di,sposd{oj:: .. '.;,,,., }i '; *. ' *, "* * '* _* *_ ;'.radioa¢tive wastes. This-PS!fR indonsistehey hisults'i12 uncertainty regarding the hiahdgement.j

• :yq ::.. ,*." :* .* *.' ._*

staffing andpqSitioh descrtptions, :and prbgrdm personnel responsib[liti,eS. ) . :*: *'; ....... -_,,._. .... -..,:,. ...,,.,..;

• ...,,, ..

_ ... .. -.-, .. ;. ... :l..---.'.!., ** :,_ .::*.::::' __ ,, ;... ___ ;,:;_ ,.;_:;. ;,.: * ......,...'.: 71 of 96 .. '

NWMI \ .*..*... :-............

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  ...

1 '.:** _._ -' .. * *.: .:.:* .. : .. *. : * .:;,

... .,,.,,.i_"'"'"

• ..-:-... ..., ....
• . "

""7'"-5 .

• .

....... .The Waste Management Lead (not the Radiation Protection Manager) has responsibility for oversight, : :handling, and disposal of radioactive wastes. PSAR Section 11.1.2.1.3 will be modified to delete :"overseeing handling and disposal of radioactive wastes;" this information will be added to PSAR '.Section 11.2.1.3.2. \Radioactive waste management responsibilities within the NWMI management structure include:

• Implements waste management policy , Develops waste management procedures for the processing, packaging, and shipment of radioactive!

waste from the facility Processes, packages, and ships radioactive waste from the facility Provides technical input to the design of equipment and processes Provides technical input to the waste management training program Establishes and maintains contractual relationships with waste disposal sites and radioactive waste earners

• Maintains working knowledge of the waste acceptance criteria, standards, guides, and codes with respect to waste disposal
• Conducts self-assessments of waste management practices and compliance with procedures in accordance with the waste management self-assessment program '.These responsibilities will be added to PSAR Section 11.2.1.3.2. . "r * --
• . ,.,. ..

.... ...... -,"' ..,..;, * .. ::;;. ... -...

• '

'-*** ,,,,,.,_,,,._, -

• -

-*: .. --;:-*-n,,f'..r..;,. '"""' <'.7 -*'""---e>..--*-""--,! '. RAI. 11.2'--1 b

• • " * ).,;*-.. : . *;. ; * ** __ * *,, * ** *.** *.* *' vi"'""::..:;\.!.""'-

"*"' ,,._ ... ,,...;.,, ... __ . ..;_ .. _ . .. :;:...;t.-:-

• ..i., . .:-

..... 'The waste management program will be coordinated with the radiation protection program, and program [ Imanagement will report to the Plant Manager. PSAR Section 11.1, "Radiation Protection," describes the

• iprogram and procedures for controlling and assessing radioactive exposures associated with radioactive

:sources, including radioactive waste streams. The goal of the waste management program is to minimize j ;waste generation, minimize exposure of personnel, and to protect the public and environment.

An official ' ;charter describing the authority, duties, and responsibilities of personnel in the waste management ! '.organization will be described in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application. !

** ,-. *' * ,';',

by:the W} __ a t;espeptf., .*,:,,. , --, < 1 ' : *,: . ]_53!/,, "part) rsectioniJ.-2. 2: Jfqste '6011'/rolS,:" &t,atebh)it,.the*app/icani should:! : ' l)identifY and discµ,ss the ,p!dns Ji! fohns:ojrddioactiv'¢ ': ' ' : ' : :-"_; . !: t:'".,, :-; J, ?, '" _':< l. < ** ,::**;.,. , , :,'i!; **'..:: ;,:*,; ',;., I' .fNWM{P$ARSection I L2,3) "Re(if7,!f.e of .. of '.,* 1 '\\arinl.lar.generati¢h rate's of speQific waste meams/but }vithput. a4f!quate,spe¢ifiCity-to ascertr,:1in whqf .*I' -'.,: bee'fz considered;;*

• . *
• c l. '. * .. * ;. l:?&B*

,;he !;quid :; ** " --! " .* ,,. .c.;. i __ --.. *+/- -.. -'. , -.;. RAl:1!1.2-2'a. !\Clarify if tfie ifif 81f.'T9bl£f.}J-:9 rnc:Z,u!Je this addeq of caustic'solutfon: . : 'j .. "I,*.--;- .* ** . ....,. .* .

• . ..,,.-* *

--.o ....

• .,. .
• . ,,. **
  • . ..
• ** -..

,,-. l.-...1 ,Caustic soda (NaOH) is included in the waste volume estimates in PSAR Chapter 11.0, Table 11-6. : r* :*., ... .,., ""'l'.\' "'-'r\' .. ,..,, ... ,,._, :f*:---<-7: .. ..... , ...... ¥ :-* ..... ---*""-"" .. -.;,;,,.* .... __ , __ .,,,.,.,.,. ......

j'.: Rft:t; 1)

'inclu;ded:{'!j),$A[?:** ',::? * * :< 1 :\; _,,_:' :, ,_,,,.:,,;,'; 1* f ..

The solidification agent content is included in the waste volume estimates in PSAR Chapter 11.0, iTable 11-6. 72 of 96

• -.. ---..

.; . . . NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 Request for additional information

j RAi 11;2:26 4.4.i4,

• • . * '1 i ** : . , ... rgeometr.ically safe loca(ions.

There streams are

• .* ' . . *":. : i;after collection and whethert/:iejrn!ill"be treated as waste:: . . ,\ . . . * .. '. . . 'r ' * , . .'. ,, , -, *,* . ,,, *<< **; .,,,.. "'. .. , ' ' *'"-.,,,,

'.'; . *I i' .i* *'. . ,, .... ';

l .:'; .. liwaste,':tindifso;wh'efherthatvolume'is'incl'uded in PSAR Table 1 J:::-6.::" .:. >* * '.'..: * .; * "' . ; 1:._,:-.;.. ....

"°'; .... :..;,,,, :. .*

... -.* . .....

• . ,,...,_:._ . .{::J.*a_._S"

._.: ... .. .,. ,, : ,...__ .. !Material discussed in PSAR Section 4.4.1.4 will not be considered waste. The material will be returned !to the U recovery and recycle system, purified, and reused. This material is not included in PSAR )Chapter 11.0, Table 11-6. ..... -

• .::<;".:.*.;-

... .** ..... .*

• • .

-*---: . ....-."":* -*;,.-,--.'-...... ... i RAI 1

,:?SAR* Section 4.1 :.2. {, '.'.Process f3asis, ":states tljat tlie Fjs desiipie'E:Zro.

a .. *

• l * *., ,, . "):ope..1(aµoiiql pr'ocessing*cap(Jbi@1

.. ofonebiitchper:w'f}ek of tip {o ,12 tdrgetsfaoni)MJ!IPJJor ,tf:P ti}:. : *:: if , ' ' , * " ; * ' ' , * " ' ". "' * ! f " ' ,_.,; * .. ' "* * ' ' * ,,. ' * ** I ' *,* " *.-. *, ,I , ' O ' * ' ! i* * . ": * * <

• h5 2 lveeksperyearaiid apptoximdtely3,0 tqrgetsftofiz OSTR or a third re:qctorifor v . ' i '*.::: .....

per year prb'c;e;sing capabififY::o/ih'e:RPF. f ' ; . '. . . : tar.gets yea:r_, 'rhiS, staiesthat the process furictioi:uil

i C _-_ . . . ,* * *

;;the

• li!aste fanctionis, the,capab{lity to jtom processirig,upr

,*, ::to 120 per.month.

PS(IR 1 T-6,: Rq<f/bfscjtqpe . * ..

• t * , . , :: ..
• is Qn phq_ce,ssing 8 M_Uf!:R per m:

of(he RRt [ .: .. * *; . :" : <: .. y :.:,, _, , ,., .. _. * *. .-...... , .. I.,: .. ;, . *n . :, . *\!Given: these statements,justijjlthat, the, dqta presented iri PS(lR Table J 1-:6.. wli.ii:h

.:'* *'" .:: f" * *. :* .. * ....

bqii$ ior'ivas{e ..... * \ f'"'T"' *!**-* ,Cc_'fl**

• . .,""'="*

--0*-..-""r:':"-.' ... .** .*

• -:-..

... -.**-* -."':. """"'-"' **:-; *-;: *' - <r-. jThere was no basis identified for the values listed in PSAR Chapter 11.0, Table 11-6. Waste volume :projections are based on the composite values from the MURR and OSTR mass balance calculations that , !assume an eight-target/week MURR processing rate plus a 30-target/week OSTR processing rate and will* ibound the planned operations.

• "i*"*
• ,*.* <*"*"\'*--.**

...,:;,,., ... '., **

... .. .;...,....

• -},*-1 :1:. RAI , . '.1Partigrafih 20:1101 (d) *oflO'CFR Part20.siates.that .ai:onstrairiton*

eiliissiO'ns of radioactive >.,: .. '\' i* . "* . , . .,, ";(. ... :. *"*"**' '..' "" "* ': ... ' *' *." . : ' ......... ','.. ,*, ..*. ""*"' ' : '"' . . " ,, . '. : f * ... , . , .. , ):material§liaq be esta,blishet1:'.by in(iividual memb(!rs 'public /ikelyto,'.'receive*i. ) , *' . highest dose 'will riot be expected to *receive a TED Kin excess of 10 mlllirem (mrem) per year ' i .. 'from these . * * . '" " ., ' * * . * * * : ,' ,* -* * * " * -,, .. :-' -' :.\ J,' tl ' * *'." ,* r '*: *;* r .::,

_" ',,.Ji' ,, ',**,* ,'_ '<.. c. ,** O .:j :, .. , .. :!NVRE<;i-)5}7,:Part2,:Sectidn 11.2.],""'.'Radioactive WasteManagement.Program, . , * *,*1; .: ' '* all techriical anddaininistrativejunctioni r{ecessary:to (inilt /. :( .... , , " * ,**

• <

<;: * : * ;' .* * . : .. ::,. ';,:" .<, . * '. ,. "\,': '.:'"" .\ . .'_.l 1;:. * * * : 1 PSAI;?. Section 454.1/: .Process J)escriptton/' states that the bverall process*cf.nicept for.+ll,di<iactive.'. t ';( ' -,. * , . . : ' ' . ** *, ' * . '. * . ' -' . . ' . '* * ' c. ' (,\, \i, gases ,is.to delay gas-release* so .thatdecay will reduce the corifeht sufficiently to' j :;c :!allow the*decayed nob/egases to be safelydischarged to' stack The',:pSAk states*tli'at a

• . i: '. (period will effect tha((i1If.tY, if riven pyXehoh'-!§3. fhft, P...sAR cloes, 7Jofqd_dri,stf h.Ow ./onger.:fived

..... !* " ' '* * .. !radioactive isotopes are limit(!i:ljo to rqdi<J,'(1ctive waste. . . ' '..; j " ',*,,. ( 'i*'"*' .. '.'"* ...

• .
• .,'*,_.,*,,, .* * -;; . .:c),,' '::., i": '(, *" ,_ .. : . *. * -'i\DesetipeJ10W oy,: *: ... * <r * : ... ithousdndsof CµfieS.ofacpvity in, tf1'isprpcess, Ih-<< ... ,,, : .'. (;' , '* , . !.:* iiProcess Raqio'µuqlidef riVlnt(Jry, '.':'if!ch:

as: Proq1et,hiuil.1'-l'43.*an<!145,. Cesium'-i37;: Ceriuni:-144, *etc. * :i __ ':,-;.,:.- .. .,-.;

• __ ; __ ..;.," .. -_..,.:::,-.

.. .,,..; ... .. ...,.;.-..,,,_.,.._.;\,..,,__,.,._:.. .. -.'....:::._ -.--*.*; * -

• -f 0':*';,".":.:.
  • !The nongaseous long-lived radioisotopes are contained in the high-dose liquid waste stream that is jsolidified and eventually sent o:ffsite for disposal.

'f" ... .. .;.; *.

• • ----:*1--. "i-
• : . ..-,--..

..

.. 'r'-*-;-..;,,*:....,:*,,_,_, ....

"

RAU1.24."

• rSe(:tion 5 0,9_;"'.'Completeness*and i:Jcciiracyof inforn/atiori, " of 10 CFR. Rar.f.60.ore.qutres tfuit , : t I ( ' * *1* . , . * .. , , _, *:. , * , .* * ' , ", ., '"" ,., " * . , *.-r ,, t ' i ',J *>'-'1 r " " , . ' ; , ' <, ' ".' *
• c , _. l * *, * : :* * .*: ';mformapon,8ub,mitted, or infotiru;i/Jo1 to

,: r:. .. ' :. *.*, ... , ..... : ,: , <, >,**;'.. *;' ;,', '::'.:.**' , :, : c' . *; ':-.,;j: l * * ** " !WTVMI PSAR Section ]'].2.2:1, "Waste Desighatiqn, '.'*:State.J. thatthe [U>ffwi/lg¢1Jerate:Glass:A., B,, :, '* i * . Tab'!e 11-6, "WidstiProdue,ed iri .... ::.** ,, . '.. as c14ssC:waste. High-doseand'.other types of.waste, are,identifiedl

• ', . : :'.as:Class (Jnd <;1,nnual generatiolJ volumes are provide4 ," *" , , ' * .* _ * ' :-::_' ":! -t_* '..._.,.,.,..

__ _, '""" -..*- -"'-:

• _._"' i/ .... _...,.,_,.. .f:

,,,_.,\

• _,,.. M ;f ,;,i _,. ___ ,_. __

_,.;-1: *- ___ 73 of 96 "I I ! .... NWMI ..........

• . . : ........ ; .
• NDRrn'NESTMIDICAltSOTOPB NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 Re uest for additional information

""Jn its Novefflber2: joj

• 1: . * ..

{) NTflV!f stated that waste are projectedfo be*. * * * * *. '. .. } . :

• B waste,. an.d provided botmding'annitalgeneration rates '(in kilograms per year). * *. " , J * *0*;
• in/he. *.*. * **
• the d1spo,sed waste;r:lqssificq.hJJ.n J!:om clgss c;. ps.,,areSf!,lt:qfoptim,1:zption
• .' ** ** ** *i ... * /* .:. *., *.

and. results be de_sdribed;in:the Ope;apµg di<f n&tlde11tifjwnx. \ ' ;* , . : ,,sl!,ecijiq 6fC/af's C waste./'J.dditiohal is ner:ded*to-re.solve this apparent.(, ! : ., . ., . , :1disc;:.epaflcyb,etween'Table.J1-6andNfj'NJJ'srespon.setoRA1WM.:.R-:.1:

• :: * ,: .. ** . . *,, .1 * ' ' -',-*-": ' ' . . ' ' . ' ' , ;; * -.-" , *: " ' ' ' . * *. '. > -1' '_,,., ' , " _;1 * '*. ,. ' ' -' *. :
• itP1:ovide apparent df :Whethq will. be, j , .. . < 'produced, or f!uijr'pdtentially;be produqed;'f1J"TapleH;,6:0f'ldNWlvP:s
  • .
• l; <</! r *" *) "'. .. ;:.. ',

,'.; * 'j *. '.'."/ ...

• 't-,-_;,:,_:.

_,,_,_,,.,....;_.,:!'..:-,- .'.,,.;, ... *$-**; J

..*' i,..

Z:-

• • ,*;...:=

-'i :Tue solidified high-dose liquid waste from the RPF will be either Class B or Class C waste. As a result of; :reducing the waste volume and minimizing disposal costs, the liquid waste concentration endpoint may :result in a change in the final waste classification from Class B to Class C. 1 *... -

• .:* ___

....

• .
• i ,RAI j!Ji!UJJEG:o.

J f3 7/Part i; Sectio,h *11:22;: Radioactjve Waste-Controls, " states (haithe appM:ant shduld; .;,:, . : .;: .* \ *. thef Jar manpgfiig so1id r.adioactiYe. dilring ' " . < . ;: " ... ; . . : ,. \;oper,(l(ions, .re,seip;ch/and.71rllization;.of the reqc;tor:' This de,sc;rjptiO": so#d. , . :. *.: *b *: '. ,. ' , ' ; materials

• "* *. :f'(ldqitiom;zlly, :NURE,G-.153 lf .2: 3; *:'.'Rejea:;:e..

W,aste,, ..!Ji(lt<f# 'th(l,t th,p ., i "" ' ": * .* .* ..... *<applicant id,ehtifY,allradiodi:tive mqterialsfor.whiqh tran;>fer:tO, o.ther paitie,sfqr,disppsa!is .. ,; .: .. '..:.:.' .. .'.*:.:.*x

• ... "., *. * ...... '.'. :..***: .. / ... ;.;; .. :*: ." .:: ... J: ."* * * > .\-AfWMJPSAR.Table 19:.13; "So.lid: Wast<! Pr;oduced at the.

Faci/{ty," * . ':: . * . ' 1lincludes an estimate of4d,OOO L of potentially contaminated waste (e.g., *aecontamination:materials, .". * .\ ... *.,. *1!PPE), does not identiJY personal protective clothing and dry wastejrom* , ! * " . ' * *

• q anil

,:;*' *t ... * , , . , .. *:1r.,egr:if.ding tl!e.estifll;atedamo.untqrhqhd!,iflf{ofqfy aptive wdstesgenerated atthe, RPF.!Jtis notclear.i

• * * . :

in,rl iA Tqb

• sot?pe :. .'.J : . ,, .. * *:lRroductionFaf:ilily.

P$AR 4 arid 9,, do f!Ot e,onfqin inf(!,rmafioi;. thepi:,oposed " ; , :, :., . 'collection, volume reduction; packaging or' storage of this waste steam. P.SAR.Section

9. 7.2.2.8, .. , ; * * '.'. "Waste*'staging and Storage Building, "provides Waste

'and Shipping . ';;: ' ,' . . . but provides no* details regarding the.processes oceurring within that building. . . . ' .{ , **::iJi;f will ,bi/, , "' '* . " :i . "' illi tirnes fn d marI,ner *that pro,te'cts . .t/1.e'enV,ironpent and .aJJ<i.tfafet;wf fhf! . * .,. 'f

• _.

.. .. .. .. : .. '.:"**"*T: RAI the*b,aslsfm:-the e'stimate ofthe'generatjoh, rateanddiscitss the tO. f!linimi:z(

• i * * * * * * * :'th<Pvolume*storedpriof to disposal, andinClude th,e waste*sireqm in PSAR Table 11-6. * , . * *' : ' '-* .L . ....,.:

.. :.!.:-.. ... _;,._

• .

_ _.,,.1;,, '.-; '"':""

• .._._-;:,*::..-.-

........ ;.. *. -

Tue estimates for the laboratory facilities or facility support waste volume projections in PSAR

chapter 19.0, Table 19-13, have no definitive basis and will be further defined in the NWMI Operating 1 License Application.

The estimated facility support waste values in Table 19-13 will be added to PSAR . :chapter 11.0, Table 11-6. Shipment will be made in a timely manner to minimize the inventory of stored ! *waste at the RPF. The Class A waste will typically be shipped monthly or when a trailer of drums has ' 'accumulated. The high-dose waste will be decayed to meet shipping cask limits and then transported to 1the disposal site. Solid waste encapsulated in cement (55-gal drums) will typically be shipped when 10 1 drums are available to fill the shipping cask. The other (low volume) waste streams will be disposed of : shortly after. : :*--* .h* *--.. .,, -*"" ""'.---1 t *'.,-.. - .. -'*1> .. :.:- .... .. t:r.' -*:*:*;s:; .... :.-*-"-"' ... u-.. ... ,. .. -it :*"-.. .. -;7*-- .* '(RAI ,1{2-.5b .was/<f in.

• J '. * ** .. *' :. if the Waste'Stagiiig and,ShippidgBullding.'., . ' * * "' . . '* * *. , . . ' ... , . * . :. . . , . : .::
• ,. r;,. __

. . ...;.._.._

.. ... -........ ' ' .. _;..,*-*.<.<

!The Waste Staging and Shipping Building does not contain any waste processing steps. The building will! :be used to store incoming drums (consumables) and to store and stage filled drums (Class A waste) prior j .to an apprc:>:red facilit)'.. . . ,, 0 *'* ... 74 of 96

NWM I ........... . : ........ :. .... tlOBTIMUTmtltCALISOtOffS NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 No. Request for additional information .. ..... _. .... J RAI' H.J-1 l$ubpgragraph 2.0.2001 {<i)(J) ofJO*CFJ1Part20 statesthata licensee'.*shall dispost/oftfC<Jnsetjmaterfql! 'l, * .. . . ,; _¢Fµ .. .,: .:.::>: * ,.;. *. *: ...... * .\ } -.' _ _,.,. ,, *:"*,° .','.' '* .. .. *.' .. >,J',,.* il *. 1*-.1,.,,.

• • . p ;: -*. " -": ': ,_ *.. ,,,, " Y 1 < , ., * .jTli¢'/SGJfiigrfae,rit;izg NUIJEG-15,3 7, }'art '2; JI; 3;'

1J.rogram/' §ia(es ,, i 1 *: :: '._ .. ;, '. the app!(carif illari(£requ}tem(mts,. , ' ; ' ; ! I . ,, : an,(! peYfo/mpnc<{testinfI, tq '.v'eiitilatl?n:'

,,f .I . , ;, !;when-required and are within (he_irdesign'spei::ijications.::

• *, " *, :.:* ' ,\, :* 1 ,;* ., ,_ *; *.*. j, 1 , , i' -, . . , , . , , . . , -'* , . " , -* , , + ', "' " * * * . ' , , , ._ .. . '* , **
• I " * *"

4: JA.5, R<{ceip(:A.r.(fa,*." tha( the ir.r,qdiated!arge/ receiptj l .*-. ::. :* as a?one {I procedures aYld * , *f } * * " . *, ;" . , the}Jorcell cover, bloqk* is removetifdr maJntenance,' Tab.le pna:Respeetive '._., , *. :*. , 'v*i 1confinemeni.Zones;'i! in:Sif

4.

$ta,ies th/!.baJ)Wi/l: bftef ate efS aZpiie [V l; '* *, tl' .' .. .. ' * "'.'* ") ;, *,".'.* ,', ., i ;"* ,,,J J . .,,.; !;. *"''l*>'o'{>,,1 ,;, "*'<!'d' b;,1* '. ,,*-1* 1;: :*. * : :, : .. . \ . 40:*.:*', .;;; ..

RAI 11.3-1 a i

Pefc'i'ibe how. these .iondi ar<j managed, how the changes will be evaluated;

'anapdste4

' ' ' ; ft..-* =*-_

...,...:.....,...

____ .;... ____ __ .*. . .. .... .. .. ... jTue preliminary design and analysis of the RPF ventilation system ensures that no uncontrolled release ofi /airborne radioactive material to the unrestricted environment could occur during normal operational ! !states and to mitigate the consequences of design basis accidents (e.g., maintaining a series of cascading !pressure zones to draw air from cleanest area to the most contaminated area of the RFP). In addition, the )preliminary design indicates that the distribution and concentrations of any airborne radionuclides are !limited by operation of the ventilation system so that during the full range of facility operations, no !potential occupation exposures would exceed the design bases (e.g., 10 CFR 20) derived .in PSAR j Chapter 11. 0. The pressure relationship between the four ventilation zones and ambient atmospheric [pressure is presented below. izone IV will be the cleanest zone and is slightly positively pressurized with respect to atmosphere. iZone IV is independent of the other three ventilation zones. Zones I, II, and III will potentially be !contaminated areas, with Zone III being the cleanest of the potentially contaminated areas, and each !subsequent zone being more contaminated and having lower pressures, as shown below: i Pzone I <Pzone II< Pzone III \The Irradiated Target Receipt Area and the Irradiated Target Truck Bay are two different areas in the 1 (RPF. The truck bay is where trailers will be rinsed before entering the receipt area, where the cask will bei !removed from the trailer. The Irradiated Target Truck Bay is Zone IV, while the Irradiated Target * !Receipt Area is normally Zone III. Details of how the Irradiated Target Receipt Area will transition (between Zone II and III during operating/maintenance activities will be provided in the FSAR as part of ithe Operating License Application. !Tue Irradiated Target Receipt Area will be occupied by at least two workers during cask sampling and i jmovement of the cask to the cask transfer tunnel. ! ... "' ......... .. , ... ";"=:::!_:;.": .. .., 75 of 96

...**... .........

• .

• NllRtllWEStt.!tDl:CAl ISG10P£S NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -' Re uest for additional information fRAI

'j'Sectiop

• 2r;h9p2 o/IQ CFR
• .;-* o_,;. " . ' :'.r,adipactiviiy ai-_eai.arid r;ireas'or rqoms'in which ufed or stored ,, ' ' ' t . -[:TIJ.e JSG Augmenting NUREG'-'-153 7,,: Part-2, state; thatthe applicant will insta1l .. !.* , .iappr9priately'sized.ven'tilati'on and containment>>systems in'ar:.eqs of thepl,ant identified as having' ' ' , . ', :*" "fj}otefltiatairbprne that. c'ou(d deriv.e4

' '

• specified jn). O_

."St!zriiiards for Profection" agaihst Radiation/" i . '-. (, <'.* ' B,. "AJnua! 611'1rfrake}ALv (DA C) of Radiohucliaiis" l' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' *' . ' '"" ' ' ' " " ' ' "* '< '" ' , " """ " '" ' ' , "" " "" , * .;ifqr Occupational Expoiure,' Effluent Concentrations; C9ncentratimis for fleteasf! tQ Se:tt:erage." , *,._, P. * '* . * * *,, c. ** c ', , . .. . '.iNJ!1W PSAft Secti.on!J).2, system will .. ', ;;, ' , i'.f!i,aif}fain a Of c_ascading pre{JSJ,IJ'.<f .. arr Jjom/he of {ifJ:fO :t/ie. :i *r. c01;itaminatedareas. 1Vi!:ilf.bc; a,pfea'! zpf}g tha( oftfae*other

• . A ;I' * * .. /:zo_nes:

Zomdll will.be' the of the:poteiltially c;ontaminatefi,ai;eas, With each.

... 1; !" :*" * ' : .J.;beifig more'coniaminaie'f;lanq Havtng tower j;resSllres. Mo're information;is.neededdo.determim;the, : :; i* .,* *. * ** :fadequaCjiofthico/:ifineinen(i:indradiOactiV.,empteriqltontaminatiofi*contr,61.: .", * .. _ *. * ' r .* -*':: .:. .. ::::--: -::-:' . ..-_.-..;.-:::.

_

;,:: :;'..: ;.::-:;,..::

7;'

.:

.. ;:;: //'::.,, .. ::;

• -.,d-;:*::

.,;:;; . -:.:;;; .*. /.:.:..,.*;;_-,:-;:;::: :-;.' ::"':: 1 RAI the process-whereby NWMI will maintain these ven'tilation ZQnes.in regards to contamination.

'.:',,,..

,., .. _ * : .* " -. t.,,.:...;, . ..:,. ::-,._..,_ . .,. ... ,_ .. _,. __ .. ;h*;*'.::*.,,.,;,...,_."-:, ..

• • .

.*

• .,,._ -

.. ,*,-. *. : .. ---;==----,:* .. -, .. '-.-.. ,...,.,_ *, The preliminary design and analysis of the RPF ventilation system ensures that no uncontrolled release of'. ;airborne radioactive material to the unrestricted environment could occur during normal operational \states and to mitigate the consequences of design basis accidents (e.g., maintaining a series of cascading

pressure zones to draw air from cleanest area to the most contaminated area of the RFP). In addition, the !preliminary design indicates that the distribution and concentrations of any airborne radionuclides are :limited by operation of the ventilation system so that during the full range of facility operations, no :potential occupation exposures would exceed the design bases (e.g., 10 CFR 20) derived in PSAR ; Chapter 11. 0. The pressure relationship between the four ventilation zones and ambient atmospheric

'pressure is presented below. !zone IV will be the cleanest zone and is slightly positively pressurized with respect to atmosphere.

zone IV is independent of the other three ventilation zones. Zones I, II, and III will potentially be ;contaminated areas, with Zone III being the cleanest of the potentially contaminated areas, and each :subsequent zone being more contaminated and having lower pressures, as shown below: Pzone I <Pzone II< Pzone III 'The RFP will maintain ventilation zones in regard to contamination and radioactive material ;contamination control. In the context of describing ventilation zones, it is common to separate zones _commensurate with the work being performed, radioactive materials present, and the potential for 1 radioactive contamination within each zone. Details of the facility ventilation system provided in PSAR Section 9 .1.2 were intended to meet this philosophy.

PSAR Section 3 .1 provides the codes and standards

that the ventilation system will be designed to. 'The RPF preliminary design of ventilation and containment systems was developed to ensure the ;sufficiency of the principal design criteria, design bases, general arrangement, and approximate ,dimensions sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the final design will conform to the design !basis. The final facility design of the ventilation and confinement system will be described in the FSAR ',as the_

__ . ____ ,, __ ... _ _ ____ .... -,, ........ _. _ .. -_ --** ,, _ __ _ 76 of 96

• .**.*.:*

.:;:.;:. NWMI NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 ........ !.* NQftllMUTlmltWISOTOPES -Request for additional information

! RAi' the potenliatconta,Jzlhatioh

! .>: ... ' ' ,:" ' .: *. '.' :: ' ' \ ' , .. t . .---,_'..._,,._. .! n.-.;"'.':"**.,,.,;-.

• • -'-":"<:,:-._*

_,_,, .... _ .. ,*, .. .,-.. "-r;/>\" ... ... ,,,;l)r'."' -n',,,+ ,;,.,,

** .*

• "'..-!Y* ::

_:.'.;'.: iThe preliminary design and analysis of the RPF ventilation system ensures that no uncontrolled release of' iairbome radioactive material to the unrestricted environment could occur during normal operational '.states and to mitigate the consequences of design basis accidents (e.g., maintaining a series of cascading

• pressure zones to draw air from cleanest area to the most contaminated area of the RFP). In addition, the \preliminary design indicates that the distribution and concentrations of any airborne radionuclides are ;limited by operation of the ventilation system so that during the full range of facility operations, no :potential occupation exposures would exceed the design bases (e.g., 10 CFR 20) derived in PSAR !Chapter 1 LO. The pressure relationship between the four ventilation zones and ambient atmospheric

pressure is presented below. iZone IV will be the cleanest zone and is slightly positively pressurized with respect to atmosphere.

!Zone IV is independent of the other three ventilation zones. Zones I, Il, and ID will potentially be ; contaminated areas, with Zone Ill being the cleanest of the potentially contaminated areas, and each isubsequent zone being more contaminated and having lower pressures, as shown below: Pzone I <PZone II< Pzone III i Details of the facility ventilation system provided in PSAR Section 9 .1.2 were intended to meet this (philosophy. PSAR Section 3.1 provides the codes and standards that the ventilation system will be !designed to. I !The RPF preliminary design of ventilation and containment systems was developed to ensure the !sufficiency of the principal design criteria, design bases, general arrangement, and approximate !dimensions sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the final design will conform to the design ;basis. The final facility design of the ventilation and confinement system will be described in the FSAR ias part of the Operating License Application.

• --*:-"**-*-, :..--., *. -

.:.*

• .
• -

<*/.._._, *-* ',-<.: __ :.,.:;; .-C';'.""'"""-:- 4 )'.* RAI 11.'.3-J;*i*S'.ecqon 20.1701' ojl'O C:F'RPart 20 states thai the shall'itse, to. the extent pfaci:ical, prqcess" .; \ , , * , * " _ * * * * * , .' ** *, ",*. * > ' ' ' ' '" , r '.

• 1 ,-1' ; " '< ** l1 1 * **: * ** :;or.other engineering controls td*pontrolr{l.dioacµve nfat7rialin qir::: . * : *. , * .: . :* :, ._: : * *. .'*.*. :; :: ' " ;J .* '-. ". -, . ' <"',* ___ , ** *, ', *'" :*"'.*'

• ',,\' -',,,,?, '*;/, ..... , __

• ," '.;. ,' **,**:-
• , *, '\, '/ ;,, *'.* /,: * * .. liT/ieJ!;G Augineniitig lf[[JWG-1537; Part,;2, :Sec;tioid J .3,. statei qes¢ribe:fhe'. , *1 : .. J. . . ... ;!criteriafor the ll,'nd J!o,w 'vt?,.locitY ,a( openings in:. * , /, . ' ' . ::these systems, maximum differential pressure.

across filters, and types of filters to .... ! ...... ', *, ; ' * * (NWAfi.PSAR .9.1, and Air; Conditiontng Systems,:" states that the Iµ>; : *,1 , . ,,, that,qjiflow anq.rela_tive pr.e,ssure.willpreyent inadvertent diffzisfon. or:other,. . .! ;. , , ().( airbolJ:}e, rad_ioactiye;>>zatf!rial:jrorirthe RfF;:7;7ie facility.is, also desigf!ed'alid

{ r "; '. '. ':. * .. *;:operated to e,nsure* that no µncontrolled release of airb01;n.e radioactive.material to tf!.e unrestricted . '. ;, . , * * * ,

to de,tetminf!, adequacy, ofihe

,

matenal con_tro/.

• *' *. : '. . :. , * * . . *. . * '." ...... -. : '.: :1 . ' ' . . . ' . . . 'J'.Descfike the,criteriafor,the ventilation.

and.containmenf.systen1s;' including 17ltniniilmflbw velocity al ::1 ,; . ., these systems, n1axinium differen(ialpressurk across'jilfers; andtypes'ofjiltersio*be . f _ __;_ :., .. ;t.J ---*":.',.-

,*-: * .-**---. *.-:-. ...... . ..,,.,,,_)

"'."t:"" .. .,._,.;,...,l.,_ .... '...:.:.- ..... :.+. ...... .. ;.:; I PSAR Section 3 .1 provides the codes and standards that the ventilation system will be designed to. The 1 detailed ventilation system criteria, including minimum flow velocity at openings in each zone, ,maximum differential pressure across filters, and types of filters to be used (e.g. HEPA, high-efficiency

gas adsorption

[HEGA]), will be provided in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application. ' __ -"-<" ,.--_.,,--:.. _ ---, --.-":::" "_._,,..,_, --....<. '-**- .:<:.".*.:.. -._.

.... -....._ ** ... ---='* __ _<;-.... "'::'*::c. .* v . --- _._.,,,.._. 77 of 96 . NWM I *::.**.-.:- ....... Nttlltu\YESTJJmtCAl ISGTDPES NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 CHAPTER 12.0 -CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS No. Request for additional information

1 *. , ,, ' * * ;JJro,g;cz,"J ppplr ed/o /he/lr;srlfn, J.a_Qf'.l{}atro,n, ,<;()nstruction; a11d,tespng ptm'!

. :* \.:*. _ .. *\'.d1cf

), .. -> , .. *;. ;. . ::* -.;_ ;,;::;*\ : _ *"): :'" ... :,:.*. "*_ .. .*::'.:'.

, :: :. * ::*:: ::: -. . '" -: Q*CJiR.l/qrt

70.

S)lftelflsi <h h* ,, , * .. ;'!((Jqtiyities of

o?J: ) :* ;' .. * : I': :. :

pe:f9r,mm:zp7 §Z Q. 6[9r..lP. ,f(J,ezr R.011,fegpep,ces_. T!te,.[SG . , *:'. . .;. . *, . \:, * . . ' !itiug11_lehtingNQREp .. ,!, in) OX;FR (.{ , :*... ., ... '.: qf

• . ,, .;.*;'be found acceptable.by the>NRC stcif.f ; _ :--.,: .. 1.: . * * * * . * -, ' *: , * . * " ** " * *' '<<(\ ,;*',

.'.,: .. .':::* ,-'" .*".'**: ';":*.h:j '* "*:**. -;.:_r_"":-"*:*" -;*: * ... l'.NWMJ.!s'(2Aprbgram dejin_es Q4 hiteijis as inc;,luding those items in which failwe 'of mf;zlfunct,ion *. result ifi:*a c'ofzaitionthatadVerselj affects workers, .thi p'uli.lic, and/or envirorirll,e.n(as: ! '. ' .: O.CF_f?- of: a Q4,:I;evel_2.jtefr1, .in cpiijurkn'()ri ihf! '.'.. ,,; '*:*;< Cf Jzigh, or-b_uil{lingcqnd.structur.e*Il!.O.F,S

• . , *; " ;,. * ., *associated withcredible e:iterhat*events are* (2A1Level Jo: '(2A *Bevel J items.also include those :attributes 1, 1 *' * '.

that' could iiiteract'.with.'IROFS due' to a

dsu.Jiin high gr inte,",;,e<fiate,'. , *

*i, . ",. * \ ' . './ >>* :: * ."" * * * :*.:i ::.._.,, *rr. '"ll*'-+.

-

• ..

_*"*-*-i* ,_"_** .. .. .. .. . ,c ... -, _ .' . ."* .' ' -. ... ',. ' i?1WN£1 P,;SAR, deschptibn_ of (2A. Level/ JROf.S'.dpp?arS'.to_'C;nZ-j: ',/ *. j , . * , * . df1forination is nee'ded, to *uhd?rstandth'e applicability ojthe.(2A pldn to othirlROF.S besides stru.ctures.

.

!\-..* , **

_.;* *_ .. _

• ":

-.r * .,1,.;: : :: .. "' '" .. ,.;* '*:_t-' * .* ".-:"-.: .. _;: **; *. , -:) ** _.:. _2.s ,: _. -_

• _ -.... ,:_, :--,-:-.. : 1 !*" : . .:"., .;: \,C,lm;ify_:_the scope 6fl_RQf!£aqqt?Sf¢ddjY.fhepppl,ic/1fl.t:s, (lie,appljqpqility;of;)

Tue QA Plan will be revised to clarify the difference between QL-1 and QL-2. Section 3.5.1.3 was imodified to reflect the changes in the quality level definitions (Attachment A). The basis for the :difference in QL-1 and QL-2 is a graded approach to quality, by which the level of analysis, :documentation, and actions necessary to comply with a requirement is commensurate with the safety :significance.

The graded approach permits the implementing organization to focus resources on those that are deemed, by qualitative analysis, to reduce the associated risks and hazards. The (activities and tasks are performed in accordance with approved implementing procedures.

The graded approach to quality is a process by which the level of analysis, documentation, and actions :necessary to comply with a requirement is commensurate with the safety significance.

A graded approach! !permits the implementing organization to focus resources on those activities that are deemed, by ! 1qualitative analysis, to reduce the associated risks and hazards. Activities and tasks are performed in accordance with the quality level definitions.

• Quality Level 1 will be applied to IROFS (SSCs and activities).

IROFS are QL-1 items in which ; failure or malfunction could directly result in a condition that adversely affects workers, the public, l and/or environment, as described in 10 CFR 70.61. Quality Level 2 will be applied to safety SSCs that are non-QL-1 SSCs. Some of the required characteristics may be examined less rigorously than for QL-1 items. Quality Level 3 items include those items that are not classified as QL-1 or QL-2. QL-3 items are controlled in accordance with standard commercial practices. 78 of96 -::.**.-.:. NWMI NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. O .. *:.* . NORTHWESTUintCAlmJTOPil No. Request for additional information .. :" ... **.:.,,"'f',,>_*<::J !l RAI c.2.3*-1 S (hat the. 'of qJ:ilijicaiion tests sl:iallbe in

t J h'. . ,,, * * * :/ha.t cri,fer{a sha{l pe,tfoY;man¢e . ; :i_* * .*

that sz_mu_late _the most, adverse 4<:szgn .. Te.st refUlts shqJI be

• . , !I r . *. *::.: ..

ew;ilu._iftea_*!Jyth,e design organii,gtio,n to te,§t requ_ir.eme1tts .. \ f ,:, : .. * "* : . l . . .

• f:jlarify whether NWMJ int<}nds'lo perform qualijicatipn testing or /he ,11eed<to the .:.:-. * :: . : . i \ * .. , . ;;adequacy_

of p_'erfqrmance of systep1s,

• struc_titres_

or u'rJder condjtiops th gt si'!zu{ate tl:ze .mos}:.: r > . ,. ... */;adverse rJrts!gn For if it is required for a.ny type of qualification testingfor an . ,:: ., ' ' " );ii}enpfied IROFS atfrJQg t!Je ho"": wil! be s,tdtirJ in fhe. QA Pr?gfam.' ' . ' I ** ; ':.-'""" __ .._ __ -\,.,,-,:--"'°'

• .,.......,,._)._.

d.;:p,.,_,._, !......,,_,..,....,.. .,!-,,,,_,_ 0...-...-::-'......!.1._-. ___ _,.,..1,, *_, i. Qualification testing will be performed to demonstrate the adequacy of performance of SS Cs under . !conditions that simulate the most adverse design conditions. Formal testing or analysis will be required to: !verify conformance of designated SSCs to specified requirements and demonstrate satisfactory

• iperformance for service or to collect data in support of design or fabrication.

Test results will be and evaluated by a responsible authority to ensure that test requirements have been satisfied. i Computer programs used for operational control will be tested in accordance with an approved iverification and validation plan and will demonstrate required performance over the range of operation of /the controlled function or process. . .- .. lf.* t r..,-r,.;,.,1;-.r.-.-*;;:,

• .;.*...:,_o

."'-'**".l."l-;>:"."***, ,;;_;._,._p;.:,;(,.*. _;**'M"**.;::_* i*?"-';:..>"**::p" - ,,-*. -:.,_ _,;.*<<-.

• f';..' --**l \

\ '.: ' * . ::design pr<Jcessanqverificatzon procedurtt should.be reviewed.and modified asnec:essary.

• . , * . ; \ '., . . . )d.vJflMJ's details orihd'W'desfgfz aof:umented;

'.1 *. . con.stru.c,tion,per:iod and ,:w,i/l 'ira,11sition to."tlie

,

:'* ' f *:.

Nff'A16nt'endstoprovide, th'at Is ,_* 9 -!'* :* ) 'i\ofari ihd)frect"des(gn;':th(i and v(/fijicatioh propedu're should b(revtewed and rnqdiji'e'd: !(.: .;. . . '* . . . :*j)9s .. cha'Jge doc;tnie,1Jted,'ilr '. , '*: * .:-: . \ *: ** .<constry.tcqonpenod, _and_ho.w. will this ,b<J (hru tf!e,,Q4 program,. .. .. ; : .. \,,.,,

• • ;"" *

... .. ..._ .* _ *. ..* . ... ';,.,-7*'- .-."'=*- .. !Engineering change control procedures (NWMI-ENG-PR0-002, Engineering Change Control) have :been developed for the RPF design and construction to ensure that modifications to safety-related SSCs, lor computer codes, will be based on a defined "as-exists" design. Changes to verified designs will be idocumented, justified, and subject to design control measures commensurate with those applied to the (original design. The control measures will include assurance that the design analyses for the SSC, or I computer code, are still valid. Where a significant design change is necessary because of an insufficient No. Request for additional information .. .. *>*i'*';;, ... ..

• RJl

  I 11-1()1.JfSJ5.,8!ffates, :fl'I pµr.t, t!J(,i_t incli!ile pro,totype' qualificatjon iesis;;prooftists prfor(o . ' : .f, r. ' . *.* *' '..-*<< litnstallatib'ii; and functional ieiis. ' ' . . ' . ' . : . .

' " , . , ' ' ' ' ; "

' . ., ' : , i: .

or Q4 'to c* ; . *:. . 1** ::testing pre*and postmstal/ation. . ": . ., .. *: .. ,::** * * . * "* * *. ' * * '*: .  ;, ' I\ r ' '* ** ' ".. * * .,;, ' '. *.

• c. * *,'";. 1 ,,, ;* ;(i!qlj.fy, tq)i ... *. . ... ;;installation,functional tf!sfs} tf;.e applir;ant to'conduqtpnder th_e QA;pt;ogra!n., .* *.,, _,_: '/-_ * .
• ..\ '.. :.-
• . ;....

-:.>+ .,...,.:..;,,.-:},.:.;.,:,,.

• ..,._,,..,,:.

,,)""' * ,,,.,_;.,.,.,-:£* ,.

• ;

,,., .;.,,, ..,,,.. """*"" '* ""'""'"°:'* jTesting activities (e.g., prototype qualification tests, proof and :functional tests) will be completed under !the QA program of the organization that is completing the work. For example, the LEU prototypic target !fabrication will be completed under the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, High Flux Isotope Reactor QA iprogram, and the fabrication of LEU targets for irradiation and processing at MURR will be completed ........ 79 of96 .J .*:.**.*.*. .:; .. ;;:.NWMI NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -:9a* ** *.*=*

• NfilUM'h'ESTMEDtCALLSOTtlP£S

-Re uest for additional information . f r{AT

,

• *:,-T ,(.:. : ..... '.'shallinCll!de'yerificq(i(Jn tests;hardWdte tesfs, iri_1use.tests;_orpther_

tests as 8pecifi¢d by. ;. r il . . . ;/he citsfomr/r;

as approprttite.

' : . . . . .. . ) .. *.'.' { *;-' * . : 1'WwM1 '.:>,:QA ar:.qppltca,bi!ity1,0f.the

• *, . t 1,:-. * *'.;appZ(ca.bi1tty an* these.tests,orthe sucii V.!!rifi6atton.
• , *. :**
• _:. **._ >> '; .. _.* * ! 1 *

iComputer software testing will be required by all suppliers to verify and provide evidence of the quality :of their software products. In addition, methods to control and approve supplier-generated documents

will be established.

Based on the complexity of the product and importance to safety, NWMI will :independently verify the quality of supplier's product using source surveillances, inspections, audits, and . !review of supplier's nonconformances, dispositions, waivers, and corrective actions. NWMI-QA-PR0-029,; ,Testing, identifies the process by which computer software testing will be completed. 1 The software requirements review will be performed at the completion of the software requirements

documentation and will ensure that the requirements are complete, verifiable, consistent, and technically . feasible.

The review will also ensure that the requirements will result in feasible and usable code. ;During software testing, the design as implemented in code will be exercised by executing the test cases. :Failure to successfully execute the test cases will be reviewed to determine if modifications of the -requirements, design, implementation, and/or test plans and cases are required. The code will be . validated and verified to ensure adherence to the requirements and that the software produces correct :results for the test cases. To evaluate technical adequacy, the software test case results can be compared lto results from alternative methods, including analysis without computer assistance, experiments and 'tests, standard problems with known solutions, or confirmed published data and correlations. ,.,,,. ,.,,, " ,> .. "',. ,* .. ** ... ""'"'"'""'".,O.,,'>**v. ,..,,,, .. ',_..,,,,'" ,.,,, .... ,, '>>'"***'"""'*'*' ,,,.,,, .. ,.,-"""' No. Request for additional information __ -!:' *. ' . .. . provrde,c1 ot?rr m:'f'arts,3 I; 34'.'35;:*39, yo, 60, 6$/ 70'.'. or;P,ar,t_72 of th!s f') . :*:. l'.bY. coritraqt'or, .. b,e; tr,alJsmi_tted,to: the, customer for . ) '*.. . . . : .. i!evi1lu_ation as,d potentially tep01;taple co_iz{jitton under. IOC:FR 21. '1 .. _*_ . . ,: '..* .. " .. .. .. : .. $"'". * .. .:,'.._*' ... ; f ___ .* *-':;-* ,, -.'" !."'", .:.-: *. *;*

• RAI the apjJ_licability of.IO CPR fart'21 tq)he app{icant.

In* the sta,tement abov(from the*PSifR, r . . "' . *. : : ,.*.;*

• ti'pppcqbi!itJ:':of l{JCf'i{'f rnttty/-*

'. > :,.< . :: *if ......... ,, *. " *, ,,., ....... .. ,., '* , _ _,..:: .:.. .* .. _;:,:,-;--::-.;.._::.:- .. ._,_ .,_-£ .* -_ .. <;:'. _ _.:.,_", ii-.;. .. i_'-,-.** . ....... ;,,.:. .-.. ;Tue requirements in 10 CFR 21, Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance," apply to NWMI as the ' responsible party for the RPF Construction Permit Application. This will also be true for the Operating 1 Permit Application. PSAR Chapter 12.0, Section C2.15.2.4, while correctly stating that NWMI will ;notify a specific vendor (as applicable), did not intend to imply that reportability requirements to the :NRC under 10 CFR 21 would be passed to the vendor. Those reportability requirements fall under the :responsibility ofNMWI. NWMI-QA-PR0-035, Identification and Control of Nonconforming Items, \identifies the process by which nonconforming conditions will be identified and controlled.

... >.RA.I G2.15-1b' iiC]ari.fY*tM c:trcµmstance,s_if! whfch /O'<ZFR: farf21 wilfbe.applicabl'e to qnoth'er :7': * ::; !... ... *:L .. ::_ ... ... __ .t: 'f. __ :; :;3: *, :-.. : . j ;NWMI, as the license holder of the RFP, has responsibility for reporting defects and noncompliance 'under 10 CFR 21. NWMI-QA-PR0-035 identifies the process by which nonconforming conditions will ; be identified and controlled. 80 of96 .: .. NWM I ...........

. ........ :.*

• NMJH'MSl M£n!CAl.1SOTUPES NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 No. Request for additional information

,:*,.* . .. ,, . . . . . . . ': ... , .. ...

• C2.17 .:1:1ANS,15.

8 stateS, that the [qua.lily] reciJrdS.sha/linclude. as a minifm,1m: inspection and. test results; : * .. :t : . * ... * .. *:;nesulis ofquaMiassitrance reviews, qUflliiy *qss(.q;a/iceiJrdcedt{re);,: : : '. *;* :* : ... *.*:t 1, . :.*:::

,

• t .f.'. , .. \ *. 1:

• BSJJR..Secti!Jf1) 2._

the, ... ' .. t!**" :. '.: ; ' . ,. :*' will will be cq,n,sistefJt;with thin' \'-" . ' * -::. ... of appficclOle' ofJS.)t,a/so ihat.fhe:id(!n'tijiqa(iqn; gefieraifofi..and . , , f. .. "'* * \ I, j : .*. * . '. * *: ;1authenticat(on, *

• ana recpft:ls 11.Jilt ,be provide trr dting.License.

, .. , .. . . .

TIJere were no ,additional de_tails on how .the records the* cons1n1;ction, insta[latio_n

l ** * , ;;other documentation are going to bi}, maintaine.d._

f'.urthermore; there is nQ c/arfjicati?n on the retention/' i <<: .. :} s ,: ..

• ! '*'

.. > <<*: ;,

' .. < >'.'1 t:* * .. ::* ;* : *.. .. .. ;;C;tqrify lftMtnlplemeniirig

/ii '.aadr'cis; the. . :: .:* ;' i* .. *'*'.* '*: ... fi., 'h. * .... *d** ... ;* ...... , ***"* .*>.:*<.,'1i**c"'" .. -,>.,_** .. ;*., .. .',';::**1,_: .... '.'.' .* '.*: .. :* ... ;,.. /, .. __ ... .. .. jNWMI-QA-PR0-017 (Rev 1), Quality Records, identifies the process by which quality records are * (identified and maintained. Items identified in Section 6.1 of the procedure as quality documents are !relevant to the fmal design and construction phase. These include:

• Contracts and specifications (including any modifications)

Drawings

• Procurement records
• Test procedures
• Test reports
• Engineering reports (including calculations, and software verification and validation reports)
• Inspection reports Assessment reports
• Supplier evaluation reports
• Training records
• Project-specific Quality Assurance Plan Corporate Environmental, Safety, and Health Program Plan ;
• Corporate Quality Assurance Program Plan l
• Implementing procedures i
• Material test reports !
• Certifications of conformance I
• I ' . ' i
• I !
• i I
• I Personnel qualification/certification records Design review reports Project-specific procedures Calibration records Nonconformance reports Corrective Action reports I
• i I
• Stop work requests \All quality records will be retained for the life of the RPF. 81 of96

NWMI -::.**.*.:* ........ :.* * :

• l{ORIHWEST MEDlCA1. IS.OTOP£5

-NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 Re uest for additional information jRAI C2.17-2l'ANS J 5,8.stat(!s th;_t some records shall maintained,by;or for the plant owrier]or thelife*of the** ( : . * .** ** '.'particplar item_tyhile it is ii]stqf.lec( iri the ci'assi.fiedJ

.. * ;

in a,ccor.dance with the following driteri(j: (aJthose whichw_ould be of value in demonstrating*

• . :. * \ l ' ' ... i!r:qpabilityfopafe operation;.

(/J) those. whJcb value Jn ... : ']: ::,: '*, ;, **. .'re placing,:. or ffjOdifj;irig those, which wo}1l4,og of,vali.{e iri the reiults*' f i * * * .. r.; '.qf ah acCi dent 'qr malfli'!ctloh 'of(i

• • ( d) *
• '*1 :,, .. I,> .lfor.in-service'inspeciions; or ofyalu,ejn <<, : , < ." ,;, r .

., ". ", ' *, . . ., . ' : . *,. . . :*. *,' *,' . '. ' *' *.. . . ' .. : Sectibn.C2.L7.2.2, ":;t{i.tes'tnflah, {vhai rs t *. . *. . ;tliJetime records willbe delineqted:withift Jf oweV_ei:, {t does no/s(ale if NWMJ)1 ,: :;: . '.',.

. ,. :.. ,_. .' ... : : . .,.-.. :: 0 , : '"\ *.* ,. ' " ,;cta,rfJY whetlier the at a ,minimum,.

will Classifieiin ANs:10.8 , .' L ... ... '. . .' ... :, .. '. .,. . .. , , ' . . !Lifetime records will be classified consistent with the recommendations found in ANS 15.8, Quality !Assurance Program Requirements for Research Reactors. J--" .,;.,. ,--::'.;._*

• *-*-** -"*'*
• _-;;: *
• **
• ""

I:..: ;;.<':. -=>O .-. ** <; * .,;, .. ;;-.:_..'o:'.,"*-' -">-r > ' ** -.z* .,_ ** "-"-" '°" ** ;: *. o--,..'," *. **'* *' No. Request for additional information (i/*'.;-.. ,: )RAI Ji8 stqte:S that the. QA-prdgram*sh'all over. the destgn;fabrtcatiori, ihitaliation,* '.'.1 ! -* .:and modification 'ofeiperirrleflta{eqiilpment to extent that.these impact

I: : I ,,, ' * :1 I **; *_ -.--' * .. * , -; -' ' -* . . . ' " " ,. , -,.,__, -.-;* i . '.The NWlvil PSAR dqes not qppear (o staf(r

'lyi1/pY,ovfde co!ltrols ove,r the *. , ; \ ' ;-, ' : . ; : , )r]esign,faprication, 'instdllation, qnd modification of exp?rimenial equipmerii io4he eitentihat these , d *,: * .:. ,.',,:. ,; .. :.,,,". ,.'*, *": '. :./*: -'" *

*:,J.:*<*

1 , '*' F:*,: ..

• i * .. ;,: . ..
• l, ,* ; .. ". :'modiflcdtio'n of expe'rimen,tal equipme_nt to the extent*thaf impqct, safetj-related_items

_or Wh?re. . ,: . * :;this information.is stated in the PSAR .. " * , * , * *. -' * * .' . * :* . ' * * * *; * * ' .. therefore, there will be no impacts i :to safety-related items from such equipment. Item 19, Experimental Equipment, in Table C-1 1 .. ... ............ . ., .... .. *--mM ** .... ,, .** 82 of96

NWMI ...........

. ........ :4* *

."

• l'roRJ1rNEST fJ.[OftAl ISOTOf{S NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 CHAPTER 13.0 -ACCIDENT ANALYSIS No. Request for additional information J3' 1:.,2' i;Su6parqgrapN5.035. ( 0}{2};.o/10

.. >>( j _,, ) -; : . ; . , l/, , '"), . ,"l ' * " . ' . * * , * * >' . . ' , * , *'* , * ! *, . , , * , *l '.**' < * ,-, , ** f * , , *,, 1 , f ,, ' .' . .' -

• * * .' < *'"' i I *f o,. i . :.) *. , ) \. '::nuJybe.;required (o*comp/ete the

'arid which cm:isiderat(on, will be , . L*. . .. ilsuppliedtn* tfie'}inal safefY:Cinaiysis . ::*. . .. '<, : *.* . . > * * *: * .</ *. ,*: * , * . * .

• 1 ,1, ' " .. f} 0 J \ 1, 0 , ' , ' J' ! 1 \ ;J< " I L"' ' '
• j ;; "; *: *" * * . '.\ . : : . ;'.accid_ent sequencesfor the 'uf{fnitim reqover,y and.'*", ;.' .. * *. . .. * ** )14_.'3.4_.8 (tenti;itive d¢nt sequence &RJ 4) ihat

a.

.* : \ 1 . , **; * /nitric'aCid:solu,fiorz pnci tlJe ]?lirificptiqn iQn applicafif)n.stal<f.slhat

.. '., . ! :; . ,, . .. . .:

to b.tH'¥.rthJ1: l! __ .. ...

• .

ppteritiql

• . ; *t .1 * -: * .*
• of such an accident sequence. . * * * .. * .. . . , . . . . . , , , :. , , . . , :

resin as a function of temperature.

The results from these tests will help define the hazard and accident (controls if needed. The testing is planned for the first quarter of2017. . ft'*'_;,.,:J:'.;* . .. -.:;,.,__,,..;;. ,.:;;.* .:_. *:**....-f--*::; .. .... ,;,;-'*:"";-=;.:.-r;-:-

• • i,;:-*

"""1*-*"'*'.

1*

"' .. ,.: . .>;,,.*_,. -i***

... ,v ... .* /J an<{d,eyeloprnen.t reiylts.i!zight{njluence '.theflri'al; <jes!gn.*cof thejRPFlf/!1<! .. \A uranium ion exchange column represents a closed system (for the purposes of safety evaluation) ]operating at approximately 45 pounds (lb)/square inch (in.2) gauge to address pressure drop through the imedia bed at proposed operating flow rates. A rupture disk vent path has been included in current !equipment descriptions as the feature that mitigates a potential accident resulting in exothermic reactions 1 \within the ion exchange column. The research and development results will either:

• I 1. Confirm that a pressure relief system is feasible to design for an ion exchange column operating at approximately 45 lb/in 2 gauge and the uranium separation process approach will continue, or 2. Require a design change to the system or implementation of additional controls/process parameters to reduce the likelihood of a reaction or change of separation technology.

jl ,.* . .; *

• "7-,.,;..

-::;" =

• /-*.:t* '"<

.. .

• • • ";-:

.... M'; .*

• r:"'* .* "..

..... ,,,--, -/ f i 13 .. ,staff nefldS to. 1.fn4er.eftan{i 's)1ssessme,11t of(/Je potential for exotlJer,mic

reactio.ns

• • t I;.,';""*

  * . '.* .**

• in 10ii

',:'] .r" .: . * *. \Wan{ll<f th<; ) i . .

• operating temper_ature_rgnge of th'!_ !'rqmupi zn,Table
• . Uramlffl!:*

, , . -.. :*. * * .JiRecO,very (UR-Z:}2Qan4 UR-Z-520/and.the.nitricacid:

• , .' .,: ,. ]' J , ' ..
• Section*4.'4.i.p . , ?': :: : *> :,
• ,**:.: :*/ .

1(.' . ;._. .:*.: ' :;:,.< .. *.. *:!radiolyttcde/f.ompo'sition of the chemfcatexii:actaril:Which iicttve ofthe:resifi:'.": ' ' :': .. ** :i 1/ ; . . ,. * ..

• l!lifor1tiat/6/i in.

gt .. 1 1:, * *.: . **. ' ' :;conclude tflllt the cheiJlictil <;xtractanthas, 1!.esistance* to* radiation.and nitric, acidthan tributylphosphate.* .. --,,,...;;..;.., .... ,.,., ....... '*.,.::... !Release of diamylamylphosphonate (DAAP) from the ion exchange column media during operation must . /be evaluated as part of the research and development program. Limited data described in Appendix E of lNWMl-2013-034, Uranium Recovery and Recycle Process Descriptions, PFD and P&ID, indicates that !the media beads have the potential to swell when the adsorbed dose exceeded IOx 10 6 rad. Swollen beads lhave the potential to release DAAP from the media skeleton to other process vessels. Release ofDAAP !is considered an issue from both a thermal/radiolytic decomposition perspective (e.g., in concentrators)

,and represents a potential criticality issue ifDAAP were to collect as a separate phase in a \geometrically favorable vessel. ." "** ,;,; : ..

• .* .* .,. -

83 of 96 .:.;:..;;:. NWMI *::.**.e.:- ........ :.-, * *. . r;tlllTffW£ST UfmCAl ISOTU?CS NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 No. Request for additional information *. ... .'

• ** *. ' *. .. o ... ". '.* *.'**.>, 0 3;';',.,<>.1 .t---->>*.* , .*..
• --. __ :'.'RA1. 1 sc;qtiofi, 1}b; 2,
• *;.* . . . ; ";* :.*

4,ose t: ; ' .. ,

the.£Nef!t: .. (liir.lng reco.\fery, for *e expqse,d iljdivf dual . i; \ * " iithe unc-Ontr.qlied"d'reasJ.11id qttfle':ne(lfest perma!Je'nt resiqence: . ' " ' : . ' >': ' .. : . : : .'. ' .. ,, ' ' ' .,:. 1 ' -.-,:, "" '."' ' '

• j ** -O '< *:,* * **< *, '": *I> *"o ;*, <** C '0 *: ' ., "'"r",*'\

0 0 ,-0 , : * ., *,;C"* ,-'. *_,'*A" * *, ** .-_--, ,. ,j: ,. . . * ,. * /f!WMI PSifR' Secti,on

}.,f A.'c;.cidf!nt/'*

the accldent:sc,enario. and, *. i i1J. Table 1,3:2P, Tota{ :. . '. 'Effe.ctive Dose Equivalent,,'.' and PSAR Eigi11;e '13-2,,' '.'Total }Jose Equivqlerit, (Inhalation p,lu$ * '[ 1 l , I , >-' , , c /, ' " , f -' J., * -" ,, , ' , , <> '< , , 1 . ., ;iExternal)for 2.,-1/ou'r, Gr,ourid,EeJ:el Eip,O$ztrefrom Maximum Hypothetiea!Accident/!jor. a range of'. '\ J 0 'l

• t " 0 f , : c <' , ,'J o '" , ' <;i ;" 0 ' , > I "' J >

J ' I ' ,,)e , >, . . * :;

• fro!ll.th§!

acczdeY!,t rf!lease *szte:.P$AR Table J3-2.0 identifies the maxi'!Jlum dps,e.as.

22. 6 rem.at ,; ; : ** : * , , j*' <<: ,ta-'distance of'l; IOOmfrom*

site,'No,;re$.ults isprovidedpertaining to

• 3; ,_ . , . . .. . /;operatfng.'staffdi;se o*_dose,to

{h¢

• Th.e ofthe '.. *. *: 1 . . .: ...

.* . '. ,'. * *: .. , :* * *.* " : ., * * '., ;: ... -.: *.* .. l :. ' '*'" ... *' 'iii eluding

.: * . . . * :* ':: :iithe"l?cati_O,H:of tlf,e _and proyi dtfcuS,S!O,h

• to.

• "* l

__ "" ;* -'., '* . , .. ',

The MHA discussion was inappropriately included in PSAR Section 13.2.1. NWMI interpreted the ISG !augmenting NUREG-1537 as requiring an analysis consistent with both 10 CFR 70.61 and with the 'MHA approach.

Additionally, NWMI combined the two in its .approach to the MHA, producing an :analysis inconsistent with the intended requirements of an MHA analysis. As only one analysis is 1 required, the MHA discussion in PSAR Section 13.2.1 will be removed from the PSAR. 1 See response to RAI G-3 for further discussion.

* < _: " * ;;_conse,quences;

':states that ihe [Je !n termsoffEDE. ' ** * .... * ... ' ',,. __ ._, \1**-. ,' '*.',> ,_

• "-'" ",' *,,* . : ". ,, ' . ' -: ,.*)< ,,'* .'.'.'.'*

,,, '/",' *._ ,. .*'.' -"**: *1. ,<*. l*.:f . . ** . , .'.;NFV1v!IPSAR;Eigure

• 13-{is titled. "Tqtal [Effec/iV¢ plus F;xterndl) for* , , '.: >" '.".

Jl!q:t!lfJdlit on

,j *

• GE/?1!.l iJose equ,iValei?.tJPQ8:e ft:

t, 3; , --. , -. ' : '. ' ... : .. ; '-!.-*J '. "-',-., ' ,.,, .. ;1 , * '-' * .* **?, '.. ,; * '.*. ,; ' .,, ,N -** ,+.,,.-*-, <';,-.. ' ** , '* :, ',' u.-,, J.. ,*. .. ". I ** _ ,,.< * ': .. ?'.;-'/;> * ::, .; .-.*'.1' * :1 :-2" ** .:,.:.. .. :;_'; __ . -.\ .. !.:::.;.__ ..'/,.'...._;_.:::* ... ... ..

... .. -'.7*"*:,;, ': !The data in Figure 13-2 of PSAR Section 13.2.1 is in units of TEDE. The labels on the figure will be !corrected. ..** . . . . . . . . .* . .*. .** '* .. .* .. .*. . ... ** . . .. , ... , .... , , ': .* i, ;-_,:mfd iils.g j6r[he in *the:uficontrolledareas:.aiid:dt (he izedi;est pe'ii!Janeiit. J ..

• '"'*'. . .,"

.;.; '.::-i, ** :*: ":NWJWPS,AR

$ec;.tion_J3:*1:2,, Liqu'id.Spifls and f praY..syvith ]l&,<Jiok/gicdl andJJr!f;calit)/Safety , ,":* **: . i .. '.; de$crtbes iM ac(;tdent ca}ci;.lated:TEDE-do:se: results* in' * * -* .. *

• _"::P/vlR

'fSprdJ!R,.eleq.se,; Tablf/.13'-24 /dentijies th_e* * .. "* , * : '\ * . . ' ' ' * * ' ' " ' '

• J ' ' ' ' .. ' ' ' '. ' .. ' '. ' " ' ,f , . :* . ::.;lhaximl!#J:

umn.itJ.gatedTJj;DE:dose,asJ-2.rem'tdthe.publie .. f@R ...

• • ;.( .. : * ;:.* *:. * ::µ.elease 0:97, rem.to" . t l ... * *'. *.-,*;;'. **sith.e t?:.thrif)i:qfic;J 84 of96

t* NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -Request for additional information 1;':RP.1 ji?-4

'dh(fdi;bi;Sloii pettiiiniriltd ildy)ihte)

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': 'of lh.f! rieqrest

• <i .!:

.. Jin the Construction Permit Application, NWMI originally used both RASCAL and RSAC to model ]off-site accident consequences. Since the submission of the application, NWMI has selected RSAC for !off-site accident consequence modeling. For the liquid spills and spray accident in PSAR Section 13 .2.2, !NWMI has rerun the off-site dose calculations using RSAC. The nearest permanent resident (432 m j[0.27 mi]) unmitigated dose estimate is 300 mrem, while the maximum receptor location (1,100 m j[0.68 mi]) has a TEDE of 1.8 rem (Figure 1). Figure 1. Offsite Dose Calculation of Spray Leak Accident as a Function of Distance !1 ii ll :1 l! '.l ' I I i I ii II 'I 11 !! ii !1 j I II !I 11 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.4 s 1.2 Q) '""' Q)-1.0 {/) 0 Cl 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500 1600 Distance, meters -Inhalation CEDE -External EDE _._Thyroid Inhalation WCDE L ---------------------. jTue RPF operating staff should not receive an occupational exposure from a spray leak or spill in the hot 1 [cells due to the shielding walls and ventilation flow rate. i [The third accident scenario in PSAR Section 13 .2.2 is a spill of molybdenum-99 (99Mo) product during ;container loading operations. This scenario will be reevaluated in the Operating Licensing Application. !The current scenario assumes three to four times the curie content of a shipping cask and does not take in f to account the inner container that would also reduce or eliminate the spill. Operating staff dose estimates \and worker stay time (if needed) for accident scenarios will be provided in the FSAR as part of the jOperating Licensing Application. --*--** ---.... _______ .... _ ----- - __ ...,, ___ ........ ,_ . ----* *-* _,,_ ............... -- ............. ""'" , ........ ,_ ,. ____ .... 85 of 96 NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -Re uest for additional information 537;,,Pbrtl; i3vT2

• -:.'. : . ' : . :;!accident scenarios .within' the opf!i'ating ca{egqries .I3. b. J,:f,and,.

as a minfmulJl, i*: ' .. * ; caused° by those inifi.qting .J 3'1:a.fwithin each opera'tjng .: ";/cbtefiory/' The .JSQAugmentihg NUREG:1537,*:P,art I,. Se{;tiq1J 43;b. L2, :."Api:idefit _:Jnf tiating *; . . po,wer .. '.'*;,; .*: . , .. * ,

,,"._ ',_ ,, *. *, ... *: ',.,\' ..

__ :,_*,,,;, ... :*._.'.*,: ".<'-r,-, *-**:. ,' ,, :.<. ,', _',,,,,_"' " ': ,,__r '_:-" . ' .. '*: ,'. :'< . ., }NWMJ-P,S;ll?.; Sf!cfiori)3.2.5/

• ..

P()wer, theqcr;idi{nt;scetzariq.*P;SAR

"" *.. , ..

7,

• 1?'0diologihia1
• not ,Pre.sent . * .. loss *of

'ilcCidentsc"iindrio afldstdte_s/ in pdrt; th4t detdtiled

• , -. *** *::e;\:aluaiion ojp()tential develbpf!dfor the Operating License** " .. :.," . y; -_.*: ::: .\*,_* . r

,(_ ; **., :.** .:.> .. .. : : *. _*.:-*. ,,.* .. :.'* . _*\ .. **. :.:J } * * .,; pu_rpi{se bf { .-..,;j:esults_in_idr{11/ifYing:µecessarys9fety SS[)s qncfl!j_Qfls,t<j[Jr.09,eecl, W,itft,dgsif!,ri gl1d.cp1J${fu'ctign.§if1ce

• ' ! *t ... ; ,;a,Loss;9f f!ow.er affec4ng;opdrqtiqnrif
• .. * .'!, , ': , .:iprocesses in,vo/ving r:_adioactiV(!, a,ndjissi/e, f!/ j>OW,f!r;.eVffnt

anqfyS,iS,!

tl,'?d '", ' J . :'.iefentificatjof! 'of deriYf!ti.sajetySSCs and are important topre_liminaYJ.:

. . : !, { **

• ... : . ;*_,,;-, * ***. * '. * *. '. *

.. .. *. ;. *.*.**.*, '* . *:: ' ' i1>ro'V_ide an aru'1,lysi£r,eSµlis, {,:: .. .. ,.:;,:L:L .... L * .. * * .. * :. -. . . .:... .. ..

Loss of power was identified as an initiating event in numerous RPF accident sequences.

NWMI .concluded that no additional radiological accidents were present beyond what was identified in the /hazard analysis and the quantitative risk analysis. No additional IROFS were identified from loss of ipower. The summary of radiological consequences from the analysis of other accidents where loss of :power was an initiator will be provided in the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application.

f

• , * * , *: * *se1sm1_r;:

'events that damage* the confinement or are. wzthm the *bounds dzsqussedfor other ., f,, .:*, .. *.,-... :. ; :.

• 1 :. : '. *.:;.:':*

_:_: .:::_ :: **'.:.;**

• . :* ;:* .. *.'. * .. *. :** * : *. ._,_:. ** :* *. <*j 13.2:6, "Naturaz Phenomena Events,." states that: * , c-" r' . ,,:_;[>:*

.*Th; RP Fis effect;

*. , ** **

• ..

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13.

c: ;* *: *,, . . -';" :i> f \: ' :event:4<fscr/ptip11sppf:lidentiJY lirJY qi;d:safaty, of .. 1 \* : *

• .

.> i: .:;'"' *V", : * <:;;. '" :_ ' , :<; . * ., : * *,; . ... - PSAR 1Septiqns 13.2:0.'1through.J3.2.'6.6 each*provide a Brief discussion of the qualitative* j , . ,:'aose consequence resultingjFom eqch specific h'i:itw:arphenofnena event,* but do not provide "* * '.' :; ' ' ;, ' ::coffiparfs'on'ofdose td'the Close conseijueiz.cesfrom'.the boimdingaccidentspreviously . j; ; .. ; -:.:/ . . f' ,*. ,'f:. :. *. :* , * : .

* .*.. '.** *: ... . \. *)_;* ( . .

... )'f}:ov{t!e.

• ,; 1 *' ,.. : , * .; " :1.eac;lj i;J,ahfrpl.p_,heY!'?lJ!ena as.s.ogza(eci f?f?,t111,,d{ng;tfV.f!c1J,/dps,e.

a1al)!!ecj lfl * ,_: .* .;, f. :: :. : '. .* ;.,. . .13.2.,-4 tf:zpouglz:l'S,7:§, .Siq)pqr'ting:;}Vhy the..

dQ.S(!. *. . .. ... . , .' . ;, \ ; .. . *,

qre j 3., . _. * -: .. ,.._, __ ...,,. __ -._.,::_,,,-.- ...... *..-:*,*,?----.-,. ..

• --.

,_.._, . - .... --.-k<:"-.'".,.,-*. .......

-o*-*"--.,,,.._-

• "';'-* -,.,.., ;Dose consequences were not determined for the RPF natural phenomena events. Using ISA methodology; .and since the IROFS and RPF processing areas are designed to withstand DBEs (highly unlikely events), \ !off-site dose calculation were not completed for the Construction Permit Application.

The worker dose i ;estimates for a seismic event during target cask unloading will be developed and provided in the FSAR <?f .. __ . __ ... 86 of96

---

, NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. O -r

i:,.::*f , . , ,. : ,, i'.radiological using;repliStic*methods/'.: , :: ,. ,.*; . ,. ' : ., ,** *, .*. > " ..

Request for additional information t: : ... :. r2; , .;:;

1.,*:::*

I ... ' t 'fqble_ th.at{/;{<!, :; . , 1: ..* : *. * ** i'.untizitigated dose 'l:ohsequence'joi ihe'hdimUing everit f s*1*2*rem to ifze pllbli'c, iin'dthe 'initigmed*&oie

,[, ,; . **

isio.'97 ;em t;i j}kolic. Jrtthif same 'seclidn, *J>sAitfab'I; ]:3.:'j3:.; Conseq' , fj 'o ' ' ' T _, f ; *t

• 1 :f ' * ' ' "' < \ " * ', " ' tj ;* * . , * * * ';Evaluation

"'documents thl,'a,nalysiS'lnpf;tls dntl f!isumptioris useq to .. :: , i. l* , .. * *:: , , ; ;' lf tfle qqse 1?-23 thij{ qist{iT,J,i:e o/ .. (. I '. ".* _;:jiJ:.00 m se/ectf!d/n,

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• of it o,( lpQ, m

,'.:' ..... *: * ** .:. ,.

!n

.. '::,{ b '""" *"' , " * <.*mat r 'ti' t'l'JOO' '""PSAR'T(bl'13 20 dT(bl 13 26 .. / , . ,,* . , .. ' .. ,,,

.. . .. .. </!! .. z'! , _q,;,,.? , ... :. :. > ,,1:" .. :! 1, *, :: ,. * ": *. : yfr;oyi{{_<t, disf:?U§,si'on,_pf,y.ifry a OOpi would in *the.

': .: \, ,': .... : . ;:dos<;..foi:

qtker in.'J!SAR. Tab1<;,J3-20,anll Tablfl3J2,6;'.; f . _;. _ * . : , " ;,: Jf "Ta,rget Ojfgf,1_! J!.cqf T°"ta! Eif<:,.ctiye_.p.<J,se de'f.!01J§{rftlf!* (he

• • . f ;,, .,

• j 1 do!efo,ih<J,pub/zcoccursat,9d1st0f!ce._ofl,j.00*11,1.

i *

• . ,/

., .. " . , ***.:* ....... }.-;...,,..,,_*

.. g,, ... ! IRSAC .as the model platform for all accident release and for the RPF. 1 1 The acc1dents*descnbed m PSAR Section 13.2.2.2 have been reevaluated usmg RSAC (mstead of l lRASCAL). The maximum dose to the public occurs at a distance of 1,100 m (0.68 mi). The response to ! jRAI 13.2-4 provides additional dose information. j .. .... .. ..

!\<A/Jp!ie:i,t<;, :.1:§u.f?pqrag1:aph: (a)(JJ of/O <;:FR Pg_rl .. '\ {}.:4c:8 b,ut

• fflJ_d.:,haf tij.f!. ,', ::y.--,,j j13.3-1)), * ., *: 1lprotection*of,the health and,safetj; o.tthe pµblic, : "" ."<<. **,*: ;./ ".1 -..;.,; ** i,; !" ,,,, *' -.*.-*
• ;, f'.>)7 *:/: 1,,.:;" :\:>.' :'-f.

... -:.-::,-.. r RAI' JSG ait1fmenting 'Part:2, Section' 13/i.2,, 'States'that'the app_iication* 'shoitld*describe.:

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• j\ijwi1J s), .

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q.s.an tolJ,.,ftXC,harJge ni6;iq,,1 "";: :* * \

• 1-14_

_iz.?tliif!l tempqa_!ure: pf'o.Cf!SS °;n .. '.;'. J ," * ,,,

• 1 l(Chzller MR-Z-230) to mamtam:a SI!f!Cifiid.temperature., ,, ""r . ., ." . .-.*.-:* .. ,, , .. ,,.., ""' , ,,,;*., "" ,_, Ji f .* . , 1 '. ".*:

of , ' '. '.: , > .' ts f<?r. nwic c :1 ;i. * *:*_ ,\j 1 noteq:th_at resm r:fegrad.afionr,atesvqry 1 wzth:res,m,type__; temperattfr.,e, There*;.\,'} i/ * '. *.:: for_ ani?n _:*: , _ :C,1: . *>

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a,c;cident'irn7o?v_ihg .;: * :'.(: ,, ,>. * * ':;** .:Hrnater.ialand there is nq discu:tsion 'of wli)rthis no,t (lered :g_iv}n t'.';:*, * :" *' * * *

.. .. 87 of96

NWMI .*:.**.*.-. -:;,* .. *::* NOIUlf\'l[Slr.!£DU:AllSOTDPE5 NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 -Re uest for additional information l l:'U:w

• • --*-*. -:* .. :. _; :. ; :

...... :,_,_ ___ _ :. : * * :_ *.;. .... , .... _* __ ; :The anion exchange columns in the RPF molybdenum system are very small and are single use. There is 1 .a chiller to maintain process conditions. After elution and rinsing, the column and resin are discarded as , solid waste. No additional hazards have been identified for the anion exchange columns/media.

.

!, * : * ** .' *. '.fevaluated qnd any design featftrei_ re,asdnqblli_for, manai._ingJhis*ht1Zara h_iive beerz * . . '/' *. t .L .. * *

• __

.. :: ... .* __ : ___ .. :::. .. .:_; .* ___ ,;_ .. -.:"**:=_: .. ;: .. "<. :.: ** 'The process hazard analysis (PHA) tables for the RPF molybdenum system and waste handling will be :updated for hazards associated with the molybdenum resin as part of the ongoing ISA process and will be 'reflected in the operating licenses. Hazards/accidents will include changing temperature, flow and acid ..... _________ ..... . .......... _________ ..... ____ ................. . 'i * * : : ......* -. :radioisotope.prodt,jctiorifaciliiy}The section'states tliai: NC/ReG::.) 510; 3:4, provides additfonal ,. . . I, ,. , , .,. Ji , ,,,, * * . , . , .. * ,:

• i'.criteriafor adherence to-the: safety program and-integrated*safery analysis (ISA) performance. . ' .'.; L < * *:*. "< . :'.sectjon "3:43_.' 1 }5/(!J) qf states that process 'Hazard analysls'meth_od8"(i.e

.. ,-ISA Metho'ds)

! i. ' ; . ' ' * ..

... -*'.are_.acq_ep(able if the ffli,thod

1. dr,essef,;aihniii:le"s lfbpera(ton}jndit_dirig startup,'

normal'qperatioii,' ' . **** .*. .. .* .. 1::: ,._c*-:*:

• • _

.. ._:*::* .*., , ..

. *.** :;. ;,_} * * ..

*_.* f-_::: : * . ... . . . . ,,;. ;:Tl(e NWlvfJ PSAR, has analyzed p(Jtentia(, aC.ci.dentMhat,mightocr:ur.

d11rtng normal process ope1:atidris' . '* . ' ... ideniifYini'm(ljorff!a(ur;sor the the ; .. *. ,protecJjofiofth,e health _an?l safety ofthepublic:**-Thesc;. areiricluded in PsAj?.

• ,: *u:-12, o/thec ISASwnma,.Y:.'.'{fzese.

anrjlysesare disclissedin Qhapter Jj anithe :: . ,\. :-. : /,:(SA/}14mitylry pf cir.e./hi

• , *** oc.*

i.mq tl,-es/!pote,ntfr;z/qccidentcondJflons, (e:g:; to protectffz.e plant * ,,_ . *.:; * .: . *;

• .j ? '. ": ,,; 'iTfi{PSAR Chaftter_

13 accident analjlsis does notaddress qther:oper_ating §lartitp,, *._ f ; * '* ***

• i111}ainteizancc;, .. ex_tended shutdown) that can ibtroduce different types ofhazardS.

F:o.r. exqmple, . \ j; ' ' *.. : . ;mainteiu:ince operations can -involve n{duced protective

bcirrlers between the hazardous materiais and *: .; : : -'.workers.

Extentjed shutdown _might create a*$itu_ation ll!he1:e radiolytic hydr9gen

._; ( .,* ;;°:ver ifxtended

{' -. . . . . ;:iii*i>rgtinic ion exchtinger,i}sitls,degradation.J!Z'aking t;eact <fX,9th(!r,micaf/y ' .. .. .. .. .. .. i e1'alu.aied 'to determ!rie*ifthere are * ; -'* * . :* .. !: t * .. : .. ... ;, .. . ______ ,_ . .:: .... .,.. ..

Tue technical specification will define modes and limiting conditions for operation (and maintenance).

!As suggested in the RAI, maintenance activities (e.g., removing a cover block to replace a piece of failed : ;equipment) could change the configuration of the facility. For these situations, limits on operations ! iactivities or acceptable inventories will be defined and implemented. Procedures will be developed to : !place equipment/plant conditions in a proper configuration for outages, including surveillance and 'monitoring activities. The radioactive inventory after a one-month shutdown is only 5 percent of the 'incoming inventory of eight MURR targets 8 hours after end of irradiation. After a long outage, a water irun/test would typically be performed to check the equipment and processes. '* """ . --* *---* . ... . -. "'" _ ............

• --** . -.,, .. . *-

--*--*-*" *--** "" -..... *-*-<* *-*-*--*-----... ..,. ----*--,._. -88 of 96 .:.-.. .;;.**.-.:- NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 .........

• .*

NOIUHWiSTMmfCALISOTOPES -Request for additional information NWJv.tiwW "address .ci',i RPF to.ensure the P,.oteetiori and:;: __ 1: b; *-*=': *. __ .. .. !The technical specification will define modes and limiting conditions for operation (and maintenance). , iAs suggested in the RAJ, maintenance activities (e.g., removing a cover block to replace a piece of failed * !equipment) could change the configuration of the facility. For these situations, limits on operations

• \activities or acceptable inventories will be defmed and implemented.

Procedures will be developed to \place equipment/plant conditions in a proper configuration for outages, including surveillance and imonitoring activities. The radioactive inventory after a one-month shutdown is only 5 percent of the lincoming inventory of eight MURR targets 8 hours after end of irradiation. After a long outage, a water !run/test would typically be performed to check the equipment and processes. pvt; *.. .,..,,_ .... ... ... ..... ,,;., ;,,,,. "*:""'i"'"

• • -:-***:

- ......

.*.;*:*

-0*,** .,_..._...,. .. , * -*1 /AAI 13.2-10\iThe1SGAtigmentingNUREG.:.H537, .Part,2,: Se,ction 13b.'2,,states thattherapplicilticJh shoulddescribe,.'*.f .* :.':,._,,_., ,*:;,.-. '*. ;;c', *'"'.';-' .. *" _,'. ,-. ' '-' * ',,_,* _ , '* ,_1 1 i;: * **:.: . *.* .. "* potentirjl r:a.ttse¢byprocefs'deviatiqi1S._or, other \ :: ' " . . .* it external events: " . ,' . : . . .. -. -* : * .. _ i3:.{ th.e NWMJ 1'he;: . ::_;* ;!)vkG 'staff p}rformeddn indepindehi 'ojthe of Hcfiai:dousA)mdspheres . 1* .. ;: . . ; ..... ' confirm's: thtJ,l *scefl,ario 'i:he Pf/1igh . .. * * : or *a:worke,r,,* an,d for the pub'lic.--.'fhe-NJ?:.C. staftneeds _to.uriderstand:any designfeatures}hat 'NJf1Jvfl. , * . *,. , :: .. to."rery on:t<j protect w9rke_rs 'and.the.publir:from h{gh conseq'uence-'e.ven(:

• *' .. .. . . }efentiJy ana describe any NWMI to on t0.prevent
• a aCid' .. , , . ... .: :fume. re_lepse.

-.,, . ;* ,.:" * * * -" * ' .... . .. , . *' ,., ; -*. * -** ..... _r,,,_,,-.. ----cO..!:.-,,-*:..:;._..,,,.,_._., __ .,, --..-..1.-.--*-.*-=-=-"- ,_ . ._...,..... ...... .. ;_. . .__ --o--.,...,-***

,; !General RPF design features intended to prevent/mitigate a nitric acid fume release include RPF building icontainment and nitric acid storage tank construction and venting. Specific features will be addressed in \the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application.

I *. ,, .. ,.,., ...

• .. ""*'" ,,,,.,,,, ... * *. ******* -. ..
• No. Request for additional informat!on .

.. .. 'i ! ** . * .: , * * * ::that the appbca71t, sfa9bty, de§ign,. operati.ons, qn(l safety safety pr,_oyrqe_* , *. '. [ ::***,. i ., *: :i-/easpnClbl</assura'ilc(/_that they willflmctiori as: intended and en:SUre;the: safe ,handling of license{/ .... ' ... :!: .. ;_.. *"rrmatir}ql .. ,z, * * .:" 'd* , *** :*. **: .: <: .'?' *. ' . **:;; * .*** . * *v.-... *.; *.** * <>*f: :: *i'.NWMJ.PSAR, Chapter4; Section 4.3A,6, "Chemiqa!Hazards,.:'.describerthe chemiCal protection. .* .. ;; :* .. * .* process. Forprocdsei1iaving th& potentjato]a the PSAR sfdtes; i ,. *,. * . *: .. :;itha,t l:e.iease of radi_oactive mdferiO.Uind1iniitif!g.rt:t4iati<_m

1 _

" , , 1 ,: : * ,; (/;le pl.fbfic Jr.9111

.1; J. ., * , .. :: : i'.qqy 4esign 1!Jf 7 lvf/I?Jf:!lif tq .. r,e.ty_ c/;1,em1ca( *,.: * ;* '.L.::-.:;."' 0, .. .,-! :"'.c:::. o /:::_ .. ,'..,,: *" . .. .*. -

'.'.'.

.. ;,;:*::* . .,,.,.(,}; i and {/escrf the speqific 'design feqtur?s thatNWMi,plansfo rely.oh io protect worke'rs;i:md

.. * '. * * .,. *: **:;p_ublicJrome;p&surestohazardous*chemicals

.. .. *.**** .-' .. * :. * * * .. * ; * . .,.. *.*.* * .. . .... .. , .. __ .. .. ' ' p .. "' "' , .. , t-* *" j Specific RPF design features relied on to protect workers and the public from hazardous chemical !exposure are the RPF building structure (walls, roof) that provide physical barriers to chemical releases, )and the building ventilation system that uses zone-based negative differential pressures with respect to :the RPF surroundings to prevent release of hazardous chemical vapors. Note that these design features tha! .. 89 of 96 NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 Re uest for additional informati.on -

Detailed RPF accident scenarios for chemical hazards will be developed, analyzed, and documented in :the FSAR as part of the Operating License Application.

Note that the building structure and general : containment features, including the ventilation system, serve as barriers to protect workers and the public l :against both chemical and radioactive material hazards. . :.--,M-. *:.. ... , ....... 1 .-... __ .. ....

• • -i .-.....

,.* .. *r-;-:-.... .. .... .* ,\*'RAI'. f!1/r .JO *FR;SD.:35 ( g)(2);* 'f!.consU-Uc:tJonpennitwtll fl!rth,,er2.

• . ;:::* f ; * . * .; **, .i(teqflnicql or-desf gn:inforrnatiim maY: be .pequire_f!

tr cq1np_lf!te;fhe-sa!f ty:pnq{YffJ. _q&ff cqiz bff ; . \ *, *.* : wil(be"Sllpplied in {hefin'hl safety.analysisrepqr(, , ".: , ., *,.,. *: **;,,. _,) \.. . . . ' . ' '.' . " . ' ',*" . *' . .* . ' . .,* ' *. . ., .. ,. ' **... . *" . . . ' ' ,* ... .,. i)1fhe .. f axt: *; pb,p1){(lt:s if!rt . f f, :' ,: * :_ :1that the;applzcant

s fc.tczlity design, operatwns,:

and safety.'controlsjor chemical safety provide*.

• . * , . .; * *: ::

.., * *'f *11 .. ;:,,* /(t*:.:". ":** '*?.::

. * ,;:**:*;{, '.1 * ... " 1 i . :: * ::JVWX]ff Section 9:'. 7. 4; $(, "Qperatipnc/,l Analysis dridSdfetJ?'F.unction;<<!'

c/iscusses opel'dtional

• . , * : * " * ' ..

'.'.'Backflow: / .. *. t. l!Preveniive l)evice ariq 15liy._ '[ariks :' ef!iure critjcality a'nd 'chem!<fql

• * , .. *: :V;

_..:; iSpecific chemical safety accidents will be developed, analyzed, and documented in the FSAR as part of i ' ithe Operating License Application, along with identification of relevant technical specifications. IROFS ;CS-18, Backflow Prevention Device, and IROFS CS-19, Safe Geometry Day Tanks, protect against ;general classes of chemical accidents in which hazardous chemicals (and radioactive materials) could ,enter systems not designed for them, or could be released via tank overflow events or other chemical 'losses/spills. IROFS C-19 further protects against accidental nuclear criticality events that could initiate ;or exacerbate hazardous chemical releases. "-- ..... .*-*' ,.,.., .. ,,, .* __ """-*'""-* .. ". -90 of 96

NWM I .;;.** ... :* ............ . ."

• NOHTHW(Sf w.rntAt. ISOlDPES.

NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 CHAPTER 14.0 -TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS No. _ Request for additional information [ZI .. .. of J(J ..

• • • .:;*_.J * -: ** * * * * . : f

.:. *:, . *., *. J (* * --" .. h5/J.34(a)(5)'states that thewmzmum 1nfom1ation-to be* mcluded shall consist of the identification qnd **:* !1 * '.-, _;; _:justiflcationfor the selection o/those'v'ariables, conditiOn.i.or ltems*whiCh'are-determihed as ihe *;, ;l ' o ' * ' ' , ' ' 0 ' <' .,,, '<, " < ' I ' ' I'\ l._ 1 * .! I ' f ** * *. ,; . a,nd ev'qluation' to be-probable_ itib]f!cl{pfte'chnica[ ... f. .. * ; * *. * *r!for att¢iition given to* those items l\ihzcli)i!GY: '. ***"/ * . * .: *. _..: .. *_ * .}:*. < .. .. .L:, .. *. ,,;.: .*::" ,/ :; "\* * , ,.';:*" ._ .. *"*".;

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1 !!;'"* .* -, . nor other 1te11.1s*wh1ch are determ1f?ed as_*the:.r.eSfJ/t ofprelim(nctrysafety analxs1s and t,o be: . *: i' . ' . 'l .... ', ' , ' "* . ' ... *" ... ' , . ' ' *. , . " ' ' , , .. ' -' ' ' . . ' ' '" ;: * * . , * "'.;prqbable of tecf!nlCaf, spe(;ijicatf9ps for, the fa,cilityi with sjJ(fcial attention gtvenwrthose

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* '.-*: j!whiqh . ,*: ,-*" ,-, * * * *.: ," . :c", -::. :.;' . \ ! :" -" ' '. . ' "-. " . ' ' ' . . > f * : , ' * " \: !The variables or conditions in Table 11 are probable subjects of technical specifications based on their I involvement with preventing release ofradioactive materials routinely or in the event of an accident.

\Table 11 will be added to the PSAR Chapter 14.0. Technical specifications on these items are planned for! [inclusion in sections that address limiting conditions of operation and surveillance/maintenance in the ; ... ,, .. _ *-__ _ .. __ __ _ . ___ ., ___ i 91 of 96 NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 Table 11. Potential Technical Specifications Item or variable Reason Uranium mass limits on batches, samples, and approved j Criticality control containersa Floor and sump designsa l Criticality control Process tank size and spacinga l Criticality control Criticality monitoring system ! Criticality control Air pressure differential between zonesa l Control of airborne RAM Hot cell shield thickness and integritya l Occupation and general public dose reduction Double-wall piping ! Control of liquid RAM/criticality control .. .. .. System backflow prevention devices i Control of liquid RAM/criticality control Area radiation monitoring system ; Occupation and general public dose reduction a Items that will significantly influence the final design. RAM = radioactive material. i SNM special nuclear material. 92 of 96 NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 REFERENCES 10 CFR 20, "Standards for Protection Against Radiation," Code of Federal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended. 10 CFR 21, "Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance," Code of Federal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended. 10 CFR 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," Code of Federal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended. 10 CFR 70, "Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material," Code of Federal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended. 10 CFR 70.61, "Performance Requirements," Code of Federal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended. 10 CFR 70.64, "Requirements for New Facilities or New Processes at Existing Facilities," Code of Federal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended. 40 CFR 61, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants," Code of Federal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended. ANS 15 .8, Quality Assurance Program Requirements for Research Reactors, American Nuclear Society, La Grange Park, Illinois, 1995, R2005, R2013. ANSI/ANS-2.3, Estimating Tornado, Hurricane, and Extreme Straight Line Wind Characteristics at Nuclear Facility Sites, American Nuclear Society, La Grange Park, lliinois, 2011. ASCE 4, Seismic Analysis of Safety-Related Nuclear Structures and Commentary, Rev. 2, American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston, Virginia, 2011. ASCE 7, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures, American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston, Virginia, 2006. ASCE 43, Seismic Design Criteria for Structures, Systems, and Componentfj in Nuclear Facilities, American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston, Virginia, 2005. ASTM Cl533, Standard Guide for General Design Considerations for Hot Cell Equipment, ASTM International, West Conshohocken, Pennsylvania, 2008. Boone County 2015, "Boone County Hazards Mitigation Plan 2015, Mid-Missouri Regional Planning Commission, July, 20, 2015. DOE-STD-3014-2006, Accident Analysis for Aircraft Crash into Hazardous Facilities, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., 1996 (R2006). EDF-3124-0016,Analysis of Potential Accidents at Nearby Facilities, Rev. 1, Portage, Inc., Idaho Falls, Idaho, November 2014. FEMA P-753, NEHRP Recommended Seismic Provisions for New Buildings and Other Structures, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, D.C., 2009. IBC, 2009, "International Building Code," as amended, International Code Council, Inc., Washington, D.C., February 2009. IBC, 2012, "International Building Code," as amended, International Code Council, Inc., Washington, D.C., 2012. ICC-ES-AC156, Acceptance Criteria for Seismic Certification by Shake-Table Testing of Nonstructural Components, International Code Council, Washington, D.C., 2010. 93 of 96

NWMI -::.**.-.: . NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 ........ :.* . -: mmmwm MfDreAl ISOTOPES MU, 2006, Missouri University Research Reactor (MURR.) Safety Analysis Report, MU Project# 000763, University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri, August 18, 2006. NFPA 801, Standard for Fire Protection for Facilities Handling Radioactive Materials, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2014. NRC, 2012, Final Interim Staff Guidance Augmenting NUREG-15 3 7, "Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors," Parts 1 and 2, for Licensing Radioisotope Production Facilities and Aqueous Homogeneous Reactors, Docket Number: NRC-2011-0135, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., October 30, 2012. NUR.EG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Washington, D.C., 2016. NUREG-1520, Standard Review Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility, Rev. I, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Washington, D.C., May 2010. NUREG-1537, Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors -Format and Content, Part 1, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Washington, D.C., February 1996. NUREG-1537, Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors: Standard Review Plan and Acceptance Criteria, Part 2, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Washington, D.C., February 1996. NWMI-2013-021, Construction Permit Application for Radioisotope Production Facility, Rev. 0, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, June 29, 2015. NWMI-2013-034, Uranium Recovery and Recycle Process Descriptions, PFD and P&ID, Rev. B, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, January 2015. NWMI-2013-CALC-Ol l, Source Term Calculations, Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, February 2015. NWMI-2014-RPT-006,MCNP 6.1 Validations with Continuous Energy ENDFIB-VIJ.1 Cross-Sections, Rev. 0, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, December 2014. NWMI-2015-CALC-022,Maximum Vessel Heat Load, Temperature, and Pressure Estimates, Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, April 2015. NWMI-2015-CRITCALC-001, Single Parameter SubcriticalLimitsfor 20 wt% Uranium 235 -Uranium Metal, Uranium Oxide, andHomogenous Water Mixtures, Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2015. NWMI-2015-CRITCALC-002, Irradiated Target Low-Enriched Uranium Material Dissolution, Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2015. NWMI-2015-CRITCALC-003, 55-Gallon Drum Arrays, Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2015. NWMI-2015-CRITCALC-004, Single Parameter Subcritical Limits for 20 wt% Uranium 235 Enriched Uranium Target Material, Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2015. NWMI-2015-CRITCALC-005, Target Fabrication Tanks, Wet Processes, and Storage, Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2015. 94 of96

NWMI *::.**.*.:* ........ :.* NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 *: N"ORTHW£STMU11CALISOIOPI$ NWMI-2015-CRITCALC-006, Hot Cell Tank Pit, Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2015. NWMI-2015-CSE-001, NWM1 Preliminary Criticality Safety Evaluation: Irradiated Target Handling and Disassembly, Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2015. NWMI-2015-CSE-002, NWM1 Preliminary Criticality Safety Evaluation: Irradiated Low-Enriched Uranium Target Dissolution, Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2015. NWMI-2015-CSE-003, NWM1 Preliminary Criticality Safety Evaluation: Molybdenum-99 Recovery, Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2015. NWMI-2015-CSE-008, NWM1 Preliminary Criticality Safety Evaluation: Hot Cell Uranium Purification (Recovery and Recycle), Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2015. NWMI-2015-CSE-009, NWM1 Preliminary Criticality Safety Evaluation: Liquid Waste Processing, Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2015. NWMI-2015-CSE-010, NWM1 Preliminary Criticality Safety Evaluation: Solid Waste Collection, Encapsulation, and Staging, Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2015. NWMI-2015-CSE-011, NWM1 Preliminary Criticality Safety Evaluation: Offgas and Ventilation, Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2015. NWMI-2015-CSE-012, NWM1 Preliminary Criticality Safety Evaluation: Target Transport Cask and Drum Handling, Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon,*2015. NWMI-2015-CSE-013, NWM1 Preliminary Criticality Safety Evaluation: Analytical Laboratory, Rev. A, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2015. NWMI-DRD-2013-030, NWM1 Radioisotope Production Facility Design Requirements Document, Rev. B, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2015. NWMI-ENG-PR0-002, Engineering Change Control, Rev. 1, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2014. NWMI-QA-PR0-017, Quality Records, Rev. 1, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2014. NWMI-QA-PR0-029, Testing, Rev. 1, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2014. NWMI-QA-PR0-035, Identification and Control of Nonconforming Items, Rev. 1, Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, Corvallis, Oregon, 2014. Regulatory Guide 1.60, Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, Rev. 2, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., July 2014. Regulatory Guide 1.61, Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, Rev. 1, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., March 2007 (R2015). Regulatory Guide 1. 76, Design-Basis Tornado and Tornado Missiles for Nuclear Power Plants, Rev. 1, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., March 2007. Regulatory Guide 1.92, Combining Modal Responses and Spatial Components in Seismic Response Analysis, Rev. 2, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., July 2006. Regulatory Guide 1.122, Development of Floor Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Floor Supported Equipment or Components, Rev. 1, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Standards Development, Washington, D.C., February 1978. 95 of 96 *\ NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 Terracon, 20 l la, Phase I Environmental Site Assessment Discovery Ridge Lots 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18, Terracon Consultants, Inc., prepared for University of Missouri and Trabue, Hansen & Hinshaw, Inc., Terracon Project No. 09117701, March 23, 2011. Terracon, 20llb, Preliminary Geotechnical Engineering Report Discovery Ridge-Certified Site Program Lots 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18, *Terracon Consultants, Inc., prepared for University of Missouri and Trabue, Hansen & Hinshaw, Inc., Terracon Project No. 09105094.1, February 11, 2011. USGS, 2002, "Earthquakes in the Central United States 1699 -2002," pubs.usgs.gov/imap/i-2812/i-2812.jpg, U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia, June 18, 2002. USGS, 2013c, Three Centuries of Earthquakes Poster," pubs.usgs.gov/imap/i-2812/i-2812.jpg, U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia, accessed July 23, 2013. USGS, 2016, "Search Earthquake Catalog," http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/search/, U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia, accessed October 7, 2016. 96 of 96 NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 Attachment A Section 3.5, "Systems and Components" of NWMI-2013-021, Construction Permit Application for Radioisotope Production Facility A-i NWMl-2016-RAl-004, Rev. 0 This page intentionally left blank A-ii .;;.**.-.:. ... .. NWMI .........

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• NORTHWESTMEDlCAl.ISOTOPES NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA Chapter 3.0 -Design of Structures, Systems and Components 3.5 SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS Certain systems and components of the RPF are considered important to safety because they perform safety functions during normal operations or are required to prevent or mitigate the consequences of abnormal operational transients or accidents.

This section summarizes the design basis for design, construction, and operating characteristics of safety-related SSCs of the RPF. 3.5.1 General Design Basis Information 3.5.1.1 Classification of Systems and Components Important to Safety The RPF systems and components will be classified according to their importance to safety, quality levels, and seismic class. The guidance used in developing these classifications during preliminary design with the support of regulatory guidance reviews, hazards and operability analysis, accident analysis, integrated safety analysis, and national consensus code requirements is presented below. The RPF systems identified in Table 3-1 and their associated subsystems and components are discussed in the subsections that follow. 3.5.1.2 Classification Definitions The definitions used in the classification of SSCs include the following. In accordance with 10 CFR 50 .2, "Definitions," design basis refers to information that identifies the specific functions to be performed by an SSC of a facility and the specific values or ranges of values chosen for controlling parameters as reference bounds for design. These values may be: *

• Restraints derived from generally accepted state-of-the-art practices for achieving functional goals Requirements derived from analysis (e.g., calculation, experiments) of the effects of a postulated accident for which a SSC must meet its functional goals These reference bounds are to include the bounding conditions under which SSCs must perform design basis functions and may be derived from normal operation or any accident or events for which SS Cs are required to function, including anticipated operational occurrences, design basis accidents, external events, natural phenomena, and other events specifically addressed in the regulations.

Safety-related is a classification applied to items relied on to remain functional during or following a design basis event (DBE) to ensure the: * *

• Integrity of the facility infrastructure Capability to shut down the facility and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition Capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potential site exposures comparable to the applicable guideline exposures set forth in 10 CFR 70.61, "Performance Requirements," as applicable Design basis accident is a postulated accident that a nuclear facility must be designed and built to withstand, without loss to the SSCs necessary to ensure public health and safety. Design basis event (DBE) is an event that is a condition of normal operation (including anticipated operational occurrences), a design basis accident, an external event, or natural phenomena for which the facility must be designed so that the safety-related functions are achievable.

3-43 .: .... NWM I -::.**.*.*.* .........

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• NOflTHVJESTMEDICALISOTOPES NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA Chapter 3.0 -Design of Structures, Systems and Components Design basis accidents and transients are those DBEs that are accidents and transients and are postulated in the safety analyses.

The design basis accidents and transients are used in the design of the facility to establish acceptable performance requirements for SSCs. Single failure is considered a random failure and can include an initiating event (e.g., component failure, natural phenomenon, external man-made hazard) or consequential failures. Mechanical, instrumentation, and electrical systems and components required to perform their intended safety function in the event of a single failure are designed to include sufficient redundancy and independence. This type of design verifies that a single failure of any active component does not result in a loss of the capability of the system to perform its safety functions. Mechanical, instrumentation, and electrical systems and components are designed to ensure that a single failure, in conjunction with an initiating event, does not result in the loss of the RPF's ability to perform its intended safety function. Design techniques such as physical separation, functional diversity, diversity in component design, and principles of operation, will be used to the extent necessary to protect against a single failure. An initiating event is a single occurrence, including its consequential effects, that places the RPF (or some portion) in an abnormal condition. An initiating event and its resulting consequences are not considered a single failure. Active components are devices characterized by an expected significant change of state or discernible mechanical motion in response to an imposed demand on the system or operation requirements (e.g., switches, circuit breakers, relays, valves, pressure switches, motors, dampers, pumps, and analog meters). An active component failure is a failure of the component to complete its intended safety function(s) on demand. Passive components are devices characterized by an expected negligible change of state or negligible mechanical motion in response to an imposed design basis load demand on the system. Defense-in-depth is an approach to designing and operating nuclear facilities that prevents and mitigates accidents that release radiation or hazardous material through the creation of multiple independent and redundant layers of defense to compensate for potential human and mechanical failures so that no single layer, no matter how robust, is exclusively relied on. Defense-in-depth includes the use of access controls, physical barriers, redundant and diverse key safety functions, and emergency response measures. The RPF structure and system designs are based on defense-in-depth practices. The RPF design incorporates:

• *
• Preference for engineered controls over administrative controls Independence to avoid common mode failures Other features that enhance safety by reducing challenges to safety-related components and systems Safety-related systems and components identified in this section are described in Chapters 4.0; 5.0, "Coolant Systems;" 6.0; 7.0; 8.0, Electrical Power Systems;" and 9.0, "Auxiliary Systems," as appropriate.

3.5.1.3 Nuclear Safety Classifications for Structures, Systems, and Components SSCs in the RPF are classified as safety-related and non-safety-related. The safety-related SSCs include IROFS to meet the performance requirement of 10 CFR 70.61 and other safety related SSCs to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 20. The purpose of this section is to classify SSCs according to the safety function being performed. 3-44

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• NDRnIWEST MEDICAL ISOTOPES NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA Chapter 3.0 -Design of Structures, Systems and Components In addition, design requirements will be placed on SS Cs to ensure the proper performance of their safety function, when required.
• *
• Safety-related IROFS -SSCs identified through accident analyses as required to meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 (see Table 3-2) Safety-related

-SSCs that provide reasonable assurance that the facility can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of workers, the public, and environment, includes SSCs to meet 10 CFR 20 normal release or exposure limits Non-safety-related -SSCs related to the production and delivery of products or services that are not in the above safety classifications 3.5.1.3.1 Quality Group Classifications for Structures, Systems, and Components The assignment of safety-related classification and use of codes and standards conforms to the requirements NWMI's Quality Assurance Program Plan (QAPP) for the development of a Quality Group classification and the use of codes and standards. The classification system provides a recognizable means of identifying the extent to which SS Cs are related to safety-related and seismic requirements, including ANS nuclear safety classifications, NRC quality groups, ASME Code Section III classifications, seismic categories, and other applicable industry standards, as shown in Table 3-T. Quality assurance (QA) requirements are defined in the NWMI QAPP (Chapter 12.0, "Conduct of Operations," Appendix C). The definitions of QA Levels 1, 2, and 3 are provided below. QA Level 1 will implement the full measure of the QAPP and will be applied to IROFS. IROFS are QA Level 1 items in which failure or malfunction could directly result in a condition that adversely affects workers, the public, and/or environment, as described in 10 CFR 70.61. Examples include:

• Items to prevent nuclear criticality accidents (e.g., preventive controls and measures to ensure that under normal and credible abnormal conditions, all nuclear processes are subcritical)
• Items credited to withstand credible design-bases external events (e.g., seismic, wind)
• Items to prevent degradation of structural integrity (e.g., failure or malfunction of facility)

QA Level 2 will be applied to non-QA Level 1 safety SSCs. The QA program is important to the acceptability and suitability of the item or service to perform as specified. Acceptance methods shall be specified (including acceptance and other applicable performance criteria), documented, and verified before use of the item or service. Some of the required characteristics may be examined less rigorously than for QA Level 1. Examples of QA Level 2 items include: * * * *

• SSCs to meet 10 CFR 20 normal release or exposure limits Fire protection systems Seismic detection systems Safeguards and security systems Material control and accountability systems QA Level 3 will include non-safety-related quality activities performed by NWMI that are deemed necessary to ensure the manufacture and delivery of highly reliable products and services to meet or exceed customer expectations and requirements.

QA Level 3 items include those items that are not classified as QA Level 1 or QA Level 2. QA Level 3 items are controlled in accordance with standard commercial practices. 3-45 . '1 .:; ... NWM. I .*:.**.*.** .............. . *. NDRTHWESTMEDICAlJSOTOP£S NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA Chapter 3.0 -Design of Structures, Systems and Components These quality activities are embodied in NWMI's QAPP and will be further specified in the Operating License Application, and when necessary. 3.5.1.3.2 Seismic Classification for Structures, Systems, and Components SSCs identified as IROFs will be designed to satisfy the general seismic criteria to withstand the effects of natural phenomena (e.g., earthquakes, tomados, hurricanes, floods) without loss of to perform their safety functions. ASCE 7, Chapter 11, sets forth the criteria to which the plant design bases demonstrate the capability to function during and after vibratory ground-motion associated with the shutdown earthquake conditions. The seismic classification methodology used for the RPF complies with the preceding criteria, and with the recommendations stated in Regulatory Guide 1.29, Seismic Design Classification. The methodology classifies SSCs into three categories: seismic Category I (C-1), seismic Category II (C-11), and seismic (NS). Seismic C-1 applies to both functionality and integrity, while C-11 applies only to integrity. SSCs located in the proximity ofIROFs, the failure of which during a safe-shutdown earthquake could result in loss of function of IROFs, are designated as C-11. Specifically:

• C-1 applies to IROFs. C-1 also applies to those SSCs required to support to shut down the RPF and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.
• C-11 applies to SSCs designed to prevent collapse under the safe-shutdown earthquake.

SSCs are classified as C-11 to preclude structural failure during a safe-shutdown earthquake, or where interaction with C-1 items could degrade the functioning of a safety-related SSC to an unacceptable level or could result in an incapacitating injury to occupants of the main control room.

• NS SSCs are those that are not classified seismic C-1 or C-11. 3.5.2 Radioisotope Production Facility Systems and components within the RPF are presented in Section 3 .5 .1. The RPF design basis evaluated the general design criteria from 10 CFR 70.64, "Requirements for New Facilities or New Processes at Existing Facilities." This evaluation is presented in Table 3-23. These general design criteria provide a rational basis from which to initiate design but are not mandatory.

There are some cases where conformance to a particular criterion is not directly measurable. For each of the criteria, a specific assessment of the RPF design is made, and a complete list of references is included to identify where detailed design information pertinent to each criterion is treated. The Chapter 13. 0 accident sequences for credible events define the DBE. The safety-related parameter limits ensure that the associated design basis is met for the events presented in Chapter 13.0. 3-46

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• NORTHWEST MEDICAllSOllJPES Table 3-23. Design Criteria Requirements (4 pages) Design criteria and description Application and compliance j 10 CFR 70.64, "Requirements for New Facilities or New Processes at Existing Facilities" a , (

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• ., .*,* ' 1:
• SSGs. unpprtant to safety .. 'W1ll be <f.es1gned; fl!,bnpated, erected; te$.d,. operated;

'. ;;. 1;". * :Develbp"and in* .. * *. f * .. : ;a,nd mamtamed to <i.¥1-if.y;standafds commensw::ate"*mtn tlie imp.ortance* o:rt:he:::., i .: mill lnrulliierrient .::* .. : '. : : ;C t.o be _. .. , * .. :.; I mefiliuresto enSiire'tba:tIROFSfile'

• 'rl

';Vlll and.7val:uatedto

detenrune

• *** ): j r and reliable:to perronn'fueirW.

IJr J. function.when needed.. . " : ' " " ' ;: to,

a. quality product lll w1.fh.11).e requ1red . , ': *

.; . ,: .. ". * * .. ' . " ' , . . * . ";, * *: * ": . , *": . F .. items'py or under the CO'ntrol , . :::*:, Will to \ .... licensee'tbroughout the-life of the*. :J. aSS1!1fnce, that'S.SCS pcrfqIDl*therr,Sflfe1Y fipcµonS: , . '<,"-' .... ,J :i**: _"_"*; :**** .:* '.: * ."-.

• ' ::--:., *.J * .' '" ... , . , * ' . * !i

} , .. ,_. . . . .. *.: * *;: . , . . . . iJ*** i '* .. *. ,;;i : , qocurnentatibn manufacfiiring.and <;lelivery o('. :i. , . 0" *: ' ' .. ' ' , k: 'highly :reliable i>r9ducis and equipment, . '* * '" . :. ' > ' ' ' ' ' " : . ' , . ", '. 'ii .. ,': ;:j ! Natural phenomena hazards i

• SSCs important to safety will be designed, fabricated, erected, tested, operated, Provide for adequate protection against j and maintained to quality standards commensurate with the importance of the natural phenomena, with consideration I safety functions to be performed.

Where generally recognized codes and of the most severe documented I standards are used, they will be identified and evaluated to detennine their , historical events for the site. i applicability, adequacy, and s:ufiiciency and will be supplemented or modified as ; necessary to ensure a quality product in keeping with the required safety function. ' ;

• The design basis for these SSCs will include: : Appropriate consideration of the most severe natural phenomena that have been\ historically reported for the RPF site and surrounding area, including sufficient margin for limited accuracy, quantity, and period of time for which historical data has been accumulated Appropriate combinations of natural phenomena effects during normal and accident operating conditions i : Importance of the safety functions to be performed J :
• Specific RPF design criteria and NRC general design criteria are discussed in l , Sections 3.1 and 3.5, respectively.

1 .. __ , __ ..,._.,,....,..,..._ ---* -** 3-47

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• NORTJfW"t.STMEDICAl.ISOTOPES NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA Chapter 3.0 -Design of Structures, Systems and Components Table 3-23. Design Criteria Requirements (4 pages) Design criteria and description Application and compliance i\

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,_ *." .: . . *. '" -. , * , " ..* * ... * '.* ".' ... "\. :*; * :.l ;::".-,. .*;,* .*. * * ;-* .. ,, '" :.'.;, .* """

• 0 Noncombustible
• .. : .J I ' 1 ' I * ' " ' ' -* " ' '}}'::. *j ' ' , ...... , * ,. ,, ",;' --'* ' ' .. " '"

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,. '* * * "> ,,.'. ,; *. ,, 1 *.

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particularly ip. locations and "-) ::*:, ,' ,: , *:.::

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• • :.: <<;: ,'f,:_' ,:._" ,;-.-.:: *: * '. ..

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Ti*::::* .,-r iJ:e 9lria,qµitY J -.-. , ** :, -*J "it ... ' : , . . .*, {1 ., ,be.prQvided anddes1gtJ.ea to.numnnze the adverse effects ot'.frres:on*SSCs> ,;-.,-"*, 1:*h ("' '.*,:. /" *; {::. :-t\: ;:*::

• )\ .,

)':

• • *-,r(

... .. ,>;:"**-'.: <. :.<"t, *,.* "".'" :: .-... :.: .. *. * "" ,:* ::,->:" : '.,.Firefig'\itirtg sySienls' will-J:if:'.*ciesignea to-en.Suie'thattheit rupture'or inadvenerif'

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• .": ::*;* :, *.::'.:>:*'.:

.. * ,_*:: .: t 1 ° j'{-1""._:*r, "; ;'.,? ;: *. .. : * ,: :*.:?*t ,"": 1 ,. .,'\ : 1 , \:':, /

• > ,: / :, ,. {';\: :r:

f,:* :_.* ; .. :.::!; "'. :_:* *1r* . \ * .. ',;, *:; *:. : : ,' . / .. ,;'..ii* _;:RBF; systei;it be tpat af<#lure>>of any conipoperi(, ;oi t (:: *:-. : .: ;< *.: .,: *. ;; . ,, 1:: .. +'** >lf:".'{>Yp.i!ot f: <.:: *::. *

• . "_,_* ;: . > .L* ** ;," ':; ** t;-_*. tp:e.RPF:orl1:JJ1lttlic:;.rel!!ase of

i *. "° ':* . ., "". " * * ** ** * ,*'. .. ":., :'

• the publi9 \Yil).,be from ra4i.ologichl RPf opef!!ti9ns., ! J .. : * ... ;< .* " =:. "., : .. .,' , .. " *.
• *RPF fire system'will.be desigileqJp provide reasonable a8Sw-arice thilt '.i' F .. ; " . , c ... ,-; ' : .. " ' :'.. *:, ,. AL ';the public ,will, be proted:ea from* radiological risks resmtirtg*

from RPF operations I ** / :, '* .,::-* ** : ; .. : ,, "" * : ;*; :" :c;' '(e.g,; failure, of kiy oomponent*Wiifnot impfilr,tlie;abillfy ofsafety':.related SSCsto*I! 1 ,a"'-," .* ,'-'.,,,.,,.,, '** ;, *;;,'*' "4*,.,* < r;_' "f ?'

_;

*;:,',

'_

• .'.,>-:*" :;:

t:" i. ,,, -:*,.,., ..... ., ... "' *; .. ,:, .. *::, *

.... r*: .. "->* , .. :' .*._ .. ":J, *,:;;_ .. , .. ....... .. ! Environmental and dynamic effects f

• SSCs to safety_ are designed to of, and to be . l f Provide for adequate protection from 1 compatible with, the envrronmental conditions associated with nonnal operation, ! j environmental conditions and dynamic i maintenance, testing, and postulated accidents.

Due to low temperature and I l effects_ associated with 1 RPF dynamic effects due to pipe rupture and discharging 1 j operations, maintenance, testing, and I flmds are not applicable to the RPF. I 1 postulated accidents that could lead to ! I 1 loss of safety functions l I l Emergency capability 1

• Emergency procedures will be developed and maintained for the RPF to control j ! Provide for emergency capability to , SNM and hazardous chemicals produced from the SNM. ' j maintain control of: I" A preliminary Emergency Preparedness Plan is provided in Chapter 12.0, l 1 AppendixB.

l

• Licensed material and hazardous

! 1 chemicals produced from licensed l l l material I i.

• Evacuation of on-site personnel j /
• On-site emergency facilities and i ! t .. _

____ J ___ _,, _________ ., ____ , .. ,._. __ .. --------* .. 3-48 ... ... .*:.**.*.* . ......... !:* . *.

• NORTHWEST MEDI CA\. ISOTOPES NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA Chapter 3.0 -Design of Structures, Systems and Components Table 3-23. Design Criteria Requirements (4 pages) Design criteria and description Application and compliance

' . . :; ' '.'.; ".: .. : ': '*':.

RPf deiiigµt:d f of. Pakive; ' ;; i :ProVide (or contillued operation of . *:.' ii* : : telease'of iiidioactive.niirteriatlfriormiil electric power is.iiiterrupted'o1;Jos6'. . .

• ti f essentiat tlfility.

se{yices:

* : .: ; : .: *:. . . * .. , * :r*; .

proy!de<l .for ii scileGtea

RP:F *

• r* ; . -* ***** : * .** . * * .. *.: .'. .: .*: .. >;!'

'*:. : ;:*** : : : * > . *. "* ,: :L* .... 1.:** .. :.:: :* *. * ,:: '.. .. .f ;!:' -' ., . j; *. t:JnPiterrtiptable power .sypplies Will prqvick power tO tha1 .* ;;

• _ ' ., -* ; * .. , *> i' *
• support the safety fun,ctions protecting workers and the public': . .. ; -* : _ * --0*"' :; -'.. . " . ' .) .* '.A combinati.on

<?fUnit\tenuptable pO\\'.t)r SJfppliesanA stfilidby ' J i . . . 0* ,.:* .'. .**. * ;. * .

• Y(:.

provide emergency electiicalpo:werto theRPFA l;OO.O;.icw .c .. * .. -;i j"; * * , . * *:* H '"*:*.;'***.' "*'.: * .. :.:;.;,, __ \ Inspection, testing, and maintenance \

• The RPF is designed to provide access and controls for testing, maintenance, and ! Provide for adequate inspection, testing, I inspection of safety-related SSCs, as needed, throughout the RPF. land maintenance ofIROFS to ensure (
• Chapters 4.0, 6.0, 7.0, and 9.0 provide additional information.

availability and reliability to perform '

their function when needed i "

• (Prov1(je forcr,itjcahfy

.. ,, ' t()

/ \ i,tdherence

• • . *' '. :: * **: :--. )ndudµig<eqµipirient,;fi:tcilities; arid pfocedpres* protect \\'.ork:er*ario public:* : .*,{; j prfu.ciple
• . ; . . Y< , :: . '.' *: *.
• to lniillil)jze*

to life

• *.*' * * :* : : * :. ;; '.' .... : '* '\ ;i.. . . . . . *' il_ . Ensinillg that the for ¢ticWity.

control;' to .f !, ; . ... * , i1 .. ,, * . . . '._,. .. * * '*:.' * . ** I . " .* *. h

• iµartn t L * ; * * * . .. . .. ;. " ..

.. :* l*' . : :<. ':' ' ,-: : . . . ': /: . . '..;:,*: ;, the.: µi <;k:f!iµin (?eyptei 65);; ': ' . ' L:::.:,. .. .. .. . :*:*" . . .,y, > . . * .. . . "*' ! Instrumentation and control l

• RPF SNM processes will be enclosed predominately by hot cells and glovebox I The design must provide for inclusion of i designs except for the target fabrication area. ! l I&C systems to monitor and control the !
• The FPC system will provide monitoring and control of safety-related components i behavior of items relied on for safety. I and process systems within the RPF.
• The BMS (a subset of the FPC system) will monitor the RPF ventilation system and mechanical utility systems. :
• ESF systems will operate independently from the FPC system or BMS. Each ESF 1 safety function will use hard-wired analog controls/interlocks to protect workers,
• the public, and environment The ESF parameters and alarm functions will be integrated into and monitored by the FPC system or BMS.
• RPF designs are based on defense-in-depth practices and incorporate a preference for engineered controls over administrative controls, independence to avoid common mode failures, and incorporate other features that erihance safety by reducing challenges to safety-related components and systems.
• The FPC system will provide the capability to monitor and control the behavior of i safety-related SSCs. These systems ensure adequate safety of process and utility ' service operations in connection with their safety function.

Controls are provided to maintain these variables and systems within the prescribed operating ranges under all normal conditions. I

• The FPC system is designed to fail to a safe-state or to assume a state demonstrated to be acceptable if conditions such as loss of signal, loss of energy or motive power, or adverse environments are experienced. (
• Chapter 7.0 provides additional I&C system information.

Safety-related SSCs are described in Section 3.5 and Chapters 4.0, 5.0, 6.0, 7.0, and 8.0. 3-49 ... ; ... NWM. I .*:e**.-.* . ......... !:* NORTif'lJESTMEDlCA.LISOTOPES NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA Chapter 3.0 -Design of Structures, Systems and Components Table 3-23. Design Criteria Requirements (4 pages) Design criteria and description Application and compliance .*.:. :: .* **, :.*. "" ;;* a .. 4esign .* ... :. i facility arid system.design and* . << _ 9egini:rin"rof ajld will completion bf a . :i *; on ' . 'f Protection that health safety are *;, :; practices::, The design must* mcorporate, :i ,, not.:whqlJ.y dependCI).t on any. srngle .of tf\e design,. construction, , ;to'theextentpractic!il?le:: ... : .. *, ..

:*;. :. :*;_.**. * .. * '***,. .* : ". -.,, * -' " ' " .,. ** ., ., ** ' ' * -* ' : ' _* . ' ' * ' ' ' * * , ' *' * + * * ' ? ! *,, Preference for the-selection of * * . , .," .. JJ .*

• NWMI'::i ri.Skinsights,oqfaine9' through

'oftne accident analysis will ,i :: *:.

• 9ver. , , :'. ; . *." ,. . f ;' :; .friiitl *e

'

• ad.in.iniSt:rative:

controls .to increase *,_, .1; . ffiltigation, of the higher nsk: potential accidents:*.

• , . " . . ,, * , *:
• I .. , ...... , , .. , . ' . ' . . ., ' , , ' . , ',., '* * . ' .. ' I,*.:

';.:'>. * *

• Qhapfur 6.0 iind .. 13_0 provide aCiditioii!ll ilifonnation.-:.

>. < -*' ' ;'_; ,

• Features that enhartee*.i>afetfby
• , . . ,, * ' * * * ' '

challenges.t9-lRQFS, , . *** , * * * * *. . :;. '" '

• 1
• 10 CFR 70.64, Requirements for New Facilities or New Processes at Existing Facilities," Code of Federal Regulations, Office of the Federal Register, as amended. b As used in 10 CFR 70.64, requirements for new facilities or new processes at existing facilities, defense-in-depth practices means a design philosophy, applied from the outset and through completion of the design, that is based on providing successive levels of protection such that health and safety will not be wholly dependent on any single element of the design, construction, maintenance, or operation of the facility.

The net effect of incorporating defense-in-depth practices is a conservatively designed facility and system that will exhibit greater tolerance to failures and external challenges. BMS CFR ESF FPC I&C lROFS building management system. Code of Federal Regulations. engineered safety feature. facility process control. instrumentation and control. items relied on for safety. NRC NWMI QAPP RPF SNM SSC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC. quality assurance program plan. Radioisotope Production Facility. special nuclear material. structures, systems, and components. The criteria are generic in nature and subject to a variety ofinterpretations; however, they also establish a proven basis from which to provide for and assess the safety of the RPF and develop principal design criteria. The general design criteria establish the necessary design, fabrication, construction, testing, and performance requirements for SSCs important to safety (i.e., SSCs that provide reasonable assurance that the facility can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of workers, the public, and environment). Safety-related SSCs for the RPF will be designed, fabricated, erected, and tested as required by the NWMI QAPP, described in Chapter 12.0, Appendix C. In addition, appropriate records of the design, fabrication, erection, procurement, testing, and operations of SSCs will be maintained throughout the life of the plant. The RPF design addresses the following:

• * * * * * * * *
• Radiological and chemical protection Natural phenomena hazards Fire protection Environmental and dynamic effects Emergency capability (e.g., licensed material, hazardous chemicals, evacuation of on-site personnel, on-site emergency facilities/off-site emergency facilities)

Utility services Inspection, testing, and maintenance Criticality safety Instrumentation and controls J)efense-in-depth 3-50 .: . NWM I *::.**.-.*.* .........

• .* . :

." ,. NDRTHWESTIAEDICAltSOTDPES NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA Chapter 3.0 -Design of Structures, Systems and Components Safety-related systems and components will be qualified using the applicable guidance in the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard IEEE 323, IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. The qualification of each safety-related system or component needs to demonstrate the ability perform the associated safety function:

• Under environmental and dynamic service conditions in which they are required to function For the length of time the function is required Additionally, non-safety-related components and systems will be qualified to withstand environmental stress caused by environmental and dynamic service conditions under which their failure could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of the safety-related functions.
• The RPF instrumentation and control (I&C) system (also known as the facility process control [FPC] system) will provide monitoring and control of the process systems within the RPF that are significant to safety over anticipated ranges for normal operations and abnormal operations.

The FPC system will perform as the overall production process controller. This system will monitor and control the process instrumented functions within the RPF, including monitoring of process fluid transfers and controlled inter-equipment pump transfers of process fluids. The FPC system will also ensure that process and utility systems operate in accordance with their safety function. Controls will be provided to maintain variables and systems within the prescribed operating ranges under all normal conditions. In addition, the FPC system is designed to fail into a safe state or to assume a state demonstrated to be acceptable if conditions such as loss of signal, loss of energy or motive power, or adverse environments are experienced. The building management system (BMS) (a subset of the FPC system) will monitor the RPF ventilation system and mechanical utility systems. The BMS primary functions will be to monitor the facility ventilation system and monitor and control (tum on and off) the mechanical utility systems. ESF systems will operate independently from the FPC system or BMS. Each ESF safety function will use hard-wired analog controls/interlocks to protect workers, the public, and environment. The ESF parameters and alarm functions will be integrated into and monitored by the FPC system or BMS. ' The fire protection system will have its own central alarm panel. The fire protection system will report the status of the fire protection equipment to the central alarm station and the RPF control room. This integrated control system will be isolated from safety-related components consistent with IEEE 2 79, Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. In addition, the RPF is designed to meet IEEE 603, Standard Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, for separation and isolation of safety-related systems and components. Chapter 7.0 provides additional details on the integrated control system. 3-51 .: .... .. NWMI ............ .. NDRTHlNmMEOICAl.ISOTOPES 3.5.2.1 System Classification The RPF is classified as a non-reactor nuclear production facility per 10 CFR 50. In addition, a portion of the RPF will fabricate LEU targets, similar to fuel fabrication per 10 CFR 70. Due to the nature of the work performed within facility, a hazardous occupancy applies: Table 3-24 provides the RPF classification for hazards occupancy, construction, risk, and seismic design categories. 3.5.2.2 Classification of Systems and Components Important to Safety RPF SSCs, including their foundations and NWMl-2015-021, Rev. DA Chapter 3.0 -Design of Structures, Systems and Components Table 3-24. System Classifications Classification description Classification Source Hazard category I Intermediate rumrrd I NRC Construction type l 11-B l IBC 2012a Seismic design category j C ! ASCE 7h a IBC 2012, Building Code," as amended, International Code Council, Inc., Washington, D.C., February 2012. h ASCE 7, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures, American Society-of Civil Engineers, Virginia, 2013. NRC = U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. supports, designed to remain functional in the event of a DBE are designated as C-1. SSCs designated IROFS are also classified as C-1. SSCs co-located with C-I systems are reviewed and supported in accordance with II over I criteria. This avoids any unacceptable interactions between SSCs. C-1 structures should be designed using dynamic analysis procedures, or when justified, equivalent static procedures using both horizontal and vertical input ground motions. For dynamic analyses, either response spectra or time history analyses approaches may be used. Dynamic analysis should be performed in accordance with the procedures of ASCE 4, with the exception of the damping limitations presented in Section 3 .4 .1. Table 3-25 lists the RPF SSCs and associated safety and seismic classifications and quality level group for the top-level systems. Subsystems within these systems may be identified with lower safety classifications. For example, the standby power supply (UPS) is an IROFS, while the standby diesel generator is classified as safety-related. Table 3-25. System Safety and Seismic Classification and Associated Quality Level Group (2 pages) System name (code) Highest safety classification 8 3-52 Seismic classificationb Quality level group .:;.-.;* .. NWMI *.*:.**.-.*.* ........ !.* . *, NORTJIWtSTMEDICALISOTOPES NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA Chapter 3.0 -Design of Structures, Systems and Components Table 3-25. System Safety and Seismic Classification and Associated Quality Level Group (2 pages) System name (code) Highest safety classificationa Seismic classificationb Quality level group Facility ventilation (FV) ] IROFS ; C-I i QL-1 f""' ., ___ --;'**:-..... '"'*** ---***** *::* *. -*****--:-c.- ..... .......... .... ,., .. ,

---

.

.. .o .. .;***:**1r ....... ,.. .... ....... 'f"*'r-* .. ,,_ ... -.. .,.. ........... tFireprotectioii (FP) * . ;* * * " .. * ' ". * *'! .

• SR---. ._** 1: * .-* C-II-.. f < "'QL-2"._

.. l --1._ --:,,-. ,.--,...._,.._-, ........ _ ..... *--::.;.:- -___ - .,,--..,,.,. _ _,._, *-"ti. .. =,_..._ ...... .... .. *=- .... ".Jr"'-::- ., ... :;..,.._,,,,,_,._,".;_,, .... -....,_ .... e> ,. _ _,,,,....' ... ,.. *. _ Plantandinstrumentair(PA) 1 NSR i C-II ! QL-2 __ Gas supply (GS) ! NSR i C-II j QL-2 .. Facility chilled water (FCW) i NSR l C-II QL-2

---

*--.

.. .... -.. .,... .......... +"-** *--*-. .. * , .. .. .. - ....

• .. , . *.*.* * * .... ) -. --;NSR .* . .{ -*: -G-IT_. * **.*)c.,.;_.

QL-2 .. _ *.* .,...., .. ..,,.,. ....... " -:-,*

• r-*

.* . .,..,.. .. .. _, ... _,,. .... . ...,.. ' Process steam (boiler) ! IROFS 1 C-II l QL-2 Chemical supply (CS) j NSR i C-II ! QL-2 [,..

• • ..r.1---.

_ _. . -:. ... '""";-!""';"' -:;..c-** ..... ... *-,.;; .. .,,_ .. .... ,_"' ... -* .....

• • -1 Biological shield (BS) " , ,. * .: " i: IROFS * :r , .
• C-I. , *:* :* , QV*l. " * -1

.* ** ,,-,,:.,,,. _ --,. .. ..

• .

-.*. *;;.,_ ,,...,..,_;._.;, ... .. .. ,-"' . .. .,;1 * ...,,;_.,_:_./,£-!,.- .. .:,, . .,.. __ .".,,.. *.. Facility process control (FPC) l SR C-II \ QL-2

• Safety classification accounts for highest classification in the system. Systems that are classified as safety-related may include both safety-related and non-safety-related components.

Only safety-related components will be used to satisfy the safety functions of the system, whereas non-safety-related components can be used to perform non-safety functions. For example, there are non-safety-related components, such as fans, within the safety-related ventilation systems that perform safety-related functions. b Seismic category may be locally revised to account for II over I design criteria and to eliminate potential system degradation due to seismic interactions. c Ventilation zone classifications vary -Ventilation Zone I and II are considered safety-related, C-I and QL-1; Ventilation Zone III and N are considered non-safety-related, C-II and QL-2. IROFS = items relied on for safety. RPF NSR = non-safety related. SR = Radioisotope Production Facility. = safety-related (not IROFS). SSCs that must maintain structural integrity post-DBE, but are not required to remain functional are C-11. All other SSCs that have no specific NRC-regulated requirements are designed to local jurisdictional requirements for structural integrity and are C-III. All C-1 SSCs are analyzed under the loading conditions of the DBE and consider margins of safety appropriate for that earthquake. The margin of safety provided for safety-class SSCs for the DBE are sufficient to ensure that their design functions are not put at risk. Table 3-26 presents the likelihood index limit guidelines and associated event frequency and risk index limits. 3-53 ,f. .: .... .......... . . * ..........

• . * *.

NORTHWEST MEDICAL ISOTOPES NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA Chapter 3.0 -Design of Structures, Systems and Components Table 3-26. Likelihood Index Limit Guidelines Event frequency limits ... Likely normal facility process condition ! 4 , Multiple events per year i > or= 0 Unlikely (infrequent facility process condition) 2 i Between 10-" and 10-5 per event, f -4 to 5 . , per year 1 r--_ --* ,,._., ..... "'----,-,._ ..

....__:,,,.*-

• "--':'*-::*

.... --'-**-'--.;;:..*/': ... .. ...... :-"""""-f* ... ---"',-;,-*,.:..;. I Ffighly .Unlikely (limiajlg:facillfy coridifii?n) '.;;. : ; ') l , "'. , .> [! -1:_,ess 0: 5 per year -;1; * : < . I 3.5.2.3 Design Basis Functions, Values, and Criteria The design basis for systems and components required for safe operation and shutdown of the RPF are established in three categories, which are described below. The preliminary design basis functions and values for each major system are provided in the following subsections. Design Basis Functions

• License conditions, orders, or technical specifications Functions credited in the safety analysis to ensure safe shutdown of the facility is achieved and maintained, prevent potential accidents, or mitigate the potential consequences of accidents that could result in consequences greater than applicable NRC exposure guidelines Design Basis Values *
• Values or ranges of values of controlling parameters established as reference bounds for RPF design to meet design basis function requirements Values may be established by an NRC requirement, derived from or confirmed by the safety analysis, or selected by the designer from an applicable code, standard, or guidance document Design Basis Criteria
• Code-driven requirements established for the RPF fall into seven categories, including fabrication, construction, operations, testing, inspection, performance, and quality * *
• Codes include national consensus codes, national standards, and national guidance documents Design of safety-related systems (including protection systems) is consistent with IEEE 379, Standard Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems, and Regulatory Guide 1.53, Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Plant Protection Systems Protection system is designed to provide two or three channels for each protective systems and functions and two logic train circuits:

Redundant channels and trains will be electrically isolated and physically separated in areas outside of the RPF control room Redundant design will not prevent protective action at the system level 3-54

• .**.-.:.

NWMI ............ . ":. NORTHV'JEST MEDltAl.ISOTOP!S NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA Chapter 3.0 -Design of Structures, Systems and Components 3.5.2.4 System Functions/Safety Functions The NWMI RPF will provide protection against natural phenomena hazards for the personnel, SNM, and systems within the facility. The facility will also provide protection against operational and accident hazards to personnel and the public. Table 3-2 lists the IROFS defined by the preliminary hazards analysis. 3.5.2.5 Systems and Components 3.5.2.5.1 Mechanical RPF C-1 mechanical equipment and components (identified in Table 3-25) will be qualified for operation under the DBEQ seismic conditions by prototype testing, operating experience, or appropriate analysis. The C-1 mechanical equipment is also designed to withstand loadings due to the DBEQ, vibrational loadings transmitted through piping, and operational vibratory loading, such as floor vibration due to other operating equipment, without loss of function or fluid boundary. This analysis considers the natural frequency of the operating equipment, the floor response spectra at the equipment location, and loadings transmitted to the equipment and the equipment anchorage. The qualification documents and all supporting analysis and test reports will be maintained as part of the permanent plant record in accordance with the requirements of the NWMI QAPP. The safety-related equipment and components within the RPF will be required to function during normal operations and during and following DBEs. This equipment will be capable of functioning in the RPF environmental conditions associated with normal operations and design basis accidents. Certain systems and components used in the ESF systems will be located in a controlled environment. This controlled environment is considered an integral part of the ESF systems. 3.5.2.5.2 Instrumentation and Electrical C-1 instrumentation and electrical equipment (identified in Table 3-25) is designed to resist and withstand the effects of the postulated DBEQ without functional impairment. The equipment will remain operable during and after a DBEQ. The magnitude and frequency of the DBEQ loadings that each component experiences will be determined by its location within the RPF. In-structure response curves at various building elevations have been developed to support design. The equipment (e.g., batteries and instrument racks, control consoles) has test data, operating experience, and/or calculations to substantiate the ability of the components and systems to not suffer loss of function during or after seismic loadings due to the DBEQ. This certification of compliance with the specified seismic requirements, including compliance with the requirements of IEEE 344, is maintained as part of the permanent plant record in accordance with the NWMIQAPP. 3.5.2.6 Qualification Methods Environmental qualification of safety-related mechanical, instrumentation, and electrical systems and components is demonstrated by tests, analysis, or reliance on operating experience. Testing will be the preferred method of qualification. Qualification testing will be accomplished either by tests on the particular equipment or by type tests performed on similar equipment under environmental conditions at least as severe as the specified conditions. The equipment will be qualified for normal and accident environments. Qualification data will be maintained as part of the permanent plant record in accordance with the NWMI QAPP. 3-55

NWM I ..........

• . ' .........

!:* * *. ! . NORTHWEST fmJICAL JS{IJQPES NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA Chapter 3.0 -Design of Structures, Systems and Components 3.5.2.7 Radioisotope Production Facility Specific System Design Basis Functions and Values The design basis functions and values for each system identified in Table 3-1 are discussed in the following subsections. Additional details for each system described below will be updated during the development of the Operating License Application. 3.5.2.7.1 Target Fabrication System An overview and detailed description of the target fabrication system are provided in Chapter 4.0, Sections 4.1.3.I and 4.4, respectively. Design Basis Functions

• * * * *
• Store fresh LEU, LEU target material, and new LEU targets Produce LEU target material from fresh and recycled LEU material Assemble, load, and fabricate LEU targets Reduce or eliminate the buildup of static electricity Minimize uranium losses through target fabrication Safety-related functions:

-Maintain subcriticality conditions within target fabrication system -Prevent flammable gas composition within target fabrication system -Limit personnel exposure to hazardous chemicals and offgases Design Basis Values *

• 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) Maintain primary fission product boundary during and after normal operations, shutdown conditions, and DBEs 3.5.2.7.2 Target Receipt and Disassembly System An overview and detailed description of the target receipt and disassembly system are provided in Chapter 4.0, Section 4.1.3.2, and Sections 4.3.2/4.3.3, respectively.

Design Basis Functions

• * * *
• Handle irradiated target shipping cask, including all opening, closing, and lifting operations Retrieve irradiated targets from a shipping cask Disassemble targets and retrieving irradiated target material from targets Reduce or eliminate the buildup of static electricity Safety-related functions:

Provide radiological shielding during receipt and disassembly activities Maintain subcriticality conditions within target receipt and disassembly system Prevent radiological materials from being released during target receipt and disassembly operations to limit the exposure of workers, the public, and environment to radioactive material Maintain positive control of radiological materials (LEU target material and radiological waste) Protect personnel and equipment from industrial hazards associated with system equipment (e.g., moving parts) 3-56

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• NORTIM'EST MEDICAL ISOTOPES NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA Chapter 3.0 -Design of Structures, Systems and Components Design Basis Values
• 30-year design life *
• Maintain primary fission product boundary during and after normal operations, shutdown conditions, and DBEs Crane designed for anticipated load (e.g., hot cell cover block) of approximately 68 metric tons (MT) (75 ton) 3.5.2.7.3 Target Dissolution (DS) An overview and detailed description of the target dissolution system are provided in Chapter 4.0, Sections 4.1.3.3 and 4.3.4, respectively.

Design Basis Functions

• * * *
• Fill the dissolver basket with the LEU target material Dissolve the LEU target material within dissolver basket Treat the offgas from the target dissolution system Handle and package solid waste created by normal operational activities Safety-related functions:

-Provide radiological shielding during target dissolution activities -Control and prevent flammable gas from reaching lower flammability limit conditions -Maintain subcriticality conditions through inherently safe design of target dissolution equipment -Maintain positive control of radiological materials (LEU target material and radiological waste) Design Basis Values

• 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) *
• Maintain primary fission product boundary during and after normal operations, shutdown conditions, and DBEs Prevent radiological materials from being released during target dissolution operations to limit the exposure of workers, the public, and environment to radioactive material per 10 CFR 20 3.5.2.7.4 Molybdenum Recovery and Purification (MR) An overview and detailed description of the Mo recovery and purification system are provided in Chapter 4.0, Sections 4.1.3.4 and 4.3.5, respectively.

Design Basis Functions

• Recovery of Mo product from a nitric acid solution created from dissolved irradiated uranium targets *
• Purification of the recovered Mo product to reach specified purity requirements, followed by shipment of the Mo product Safety-related functions:

Maintain subcriticality conditions through inherently safe design of components that could handle high-uranium content fluid Prevent radiological materials from being released by containing fluids in appropriate tubing, valves, and other components

• 3-57

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• .* . *. . NORTHWEST MEDtCAl lSOTUPES NWMl-2015-021, Rev. DA Chapter 3.0 -Design of Structures, Systems and Components Control and prevent flammable gas from reaching lower flammability limit conditions Maintain positive control of radiological materials (9 9 Mo product, intermediate streams, and radiological waste) Provide appropriate containers and handling systems to protect personnel from industrial hazards such as chemical exposure (e.g., nitric acid, caustic, etc.) Design Basis Values
• Maintain primary fission product boundary during and after normal operations, shutdown conditions, and DBEs
• 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps)
• Replace consumables after each batch 3.5.2.7.5 Uranium Recovery and Recycle (UR) An overview and detailed description of the uranium recovery and recycle system are provided in Chapter 4.0, Sections 4.1.3.5 and 4.3.6, respectively.

Design Basis Functions

• Receive and decay impure LEU solution
• Recover and purify impure LEU solution
• Decay and recycle LEU solution
• Transfer process waste
• Safety-related functions:

Provide radiological shielding during uranium recovery and recycle system activities Prevent radiological release during uranium recovery and recycle system activities Maintain subcriticality conditions through inherently safe design of the uranium recovery and recycle equipment Control and preventing flammable gas from reaching lower flammability limit conditions Maintain positive control of radiological materials Protect personnel and equipment from industrial hazards associated with the system equipment, such as moving parts, high temperatures, and electric shock Design Basis Values *

• 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) Maintain primary fission product boundary during and after normal operations, shutdown conditions, and DBEs 3.5.2.7.6 Waste Handling An overview and detailed description of the waste handling system are provided in Chapter 4.0, Section 4.1.3.6 and Chapter 9.0, Section 9.7.2, respectively.

Design Basis Functions

• Receive liquid waste that is divided into high-dose source terms and low-dose source terms to lag storage
• Transfer remotely loaded drums with high-activity solid waste via a solid waste drum transit system to a waste encapsulation cell 3-58

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• * * *
• Encapsulate solid waste drums Load drums with solidification agent and low-dose liquid waste Load high-integrity containers with solidification agent and high-dose liquid waste Handle and load a waste shipping cask with radiological waste drums/containers Safety-related functions:

Maintain subcriticality conditions by maintaining mass limits Prevent spread of contamination to manned areas of the facility that could result in personnel exposure to radioactive materials or toxic chemicals Provide shielding, distance, or other means to minimize personnel exposure to penetrating radiation Design Basis Values

• Maintain primary fission product boundary during and after normal operations, shutdown conditions, and DBEs
• 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) 3.5.2.7.7 Criticality Accident Alarm System Chapter 6.0, Section 6.3.3.1, and Chapter 7.0, Section 7.3.7, provide descriptions of the criticality accident alarm system. Design Basis Functions
• Provide for continuous monitoring, indication, and recording of neutron or gamma radiation levels in areas where personnel may be present and wherever an accidental criticality event could result from operational processes.
• Provide both local and remote annunciation of a criticality excursion Remain operational during DBEs Design Basis Values
• 30-year design life
• Capable of detecting a criticality accident that produces an absorbed dose in soft tissue of 20 absorbed radiation dose (rad) of combined neutron or gamma radiation at an unshielded distance of 2 m from reacting material within one minute (except for events occurring in areas not normally accessed by personnel and where shielding provides protection against a criticality) 3.5.2.7.8 Continuous Air Monitoring System Chapter 7.0, Section 7.6, and Chapter 11.0, Section 11.1.4, provide detailed descriptions of the RPF continuous air monitoring system. Design Basis Functions
• * * *
• Provide real-time local and remote annunciation of airborne contamination in excess of preset limits Provide real-time local and remote annunciation ofradiological dose of excess of preset limits Provide environmental monitoring of nuclear radioactive stack releases Provide the capability to collect continuous samples Remain operational during DBEs 3-59

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NORTHWESTMIDICALISOTOPES NWMl-2015-021, Rev. DA Chapter 3.0 -Design of Structures, Systems and Components Design Basis Values * *

• Activate when airborne radioactivity levels exceed predetermined limits Activate when radiological dose levels exceed predetermined limits Adjust volume of air sampled to ensure adequate sensitivity with minimum sampling time 3.5.2.7.9 Standby Electrical Power Chapter 8.0, Section 8.2 provides a detailed description of the RPF standby electrical power (SEP) system. Design Basis Functions SEP includes two types of components:

uninterruptible power supplies (UPS) and a standby diesel generator:

• UPS -Provides power when normal power supplies are absent Standby diesel generator

-Provides power when normal power supplies are absent to allow continued RPF processing Design Basis Values * *

• 30-year design life Maintain power availability for a minimum of 120 min post-accident (UPS) Maintain power availability for 12 hr (diesel generator) 3.5.2.7.10 Normal Electrical Power Chapter 8.0, Section 8.1 provides a detailed description of the RPF normal electrical power (NEP) system. Design Basis Functions
• Provide facility power during normal operations Design Basis Values
• 30-year design life 3.5.2. 7.11 Process Vessel Ventilation System Chapter 9. 0, Section 9 .1 provides a detailed description of the process vessel ventilation system. Design Basis Functions
• Provide primary system functions to protect on-site and off-site personnel from radiological and other industrial related hazards *
• Collect air in-leakage sweep from each of the numerous vessels and other components in main RPF processes and maintain hydrogen concentration process tanks and piping below lower flammability limit Minimize reliance on administrative or complex active engineering controls to provide a confinement system as simple and fail-safe as reasonably possible 3-60

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• NDRTWNESTMEDICALISOTOPES NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA Chapter 3.0 -Design of Structures, Systems and Components Design Basis Values
• Maintain primary fission product boundary during and after normal operations, shutdown conditions, and DBEs
• 30-year design life
• Contain and store noble gases generated in the RPF to meet I 0 CFR 20 requirements 3.5.2.7.12 Facility Ventilation System Chapter 9.0, Section 9. I provides a detailed description of the facility ventilation system. Design Basis Functions
• Provide confinement of hazardous chemical fumes and airborne radiological materials and conditioning of RPF environment for facility personnel and equipment
• * * * *
• Prevent release and dispersal of airborne radioactive materials (e.g., maintain pressure gradients to ensure proper flow of air from least potentially contaminated areas to most potentially contaminated areas) to protect health and minimize danger to life or property Maintain dose uptake through ingestion to levels as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) Provide makeup air and condition the RPF environment for process and electrical equipment Process exhaust flow from the process vessel ventilation system Provide confinement of airborne radioactive materials by providing for the rapid, automatic closure of isolation dampers within confinement zones for various accident conditions Provide conditioned air to ensure suitable environmental conditions for personnel and equipment inRPF Design Basis Values
• Maintain primary fission product boundary during and after normal operations, shutdown conditions, and DBEs * * * *
• Provide an integrated leak rate for confinement boundaries that meets the requirements of accident analyses that complies with I 0 CFR 20 dose limits Ensure that air exhausted to the atmosphere meets 40 CFR 61 (NESHAP) and applicable State law 30-year design life Maintain occupied space at 24 degrees Celsius (0 C) (75 degrees Fahrenheit

[°F]) (summer) and 22°C (72°F) (winter), with active ventilation to support workers and equipment Maintain air quality that complies with 10 CFR 20 dose limits for normal operations and shutdown 3.5.2.7.13 Fire Protection System Chapter 9. 0, Section 9. 7. I provides a detailed description of the RPF fire protection system. Design Basis Functions

• Provide detection and suppression of fires
• Generate alarm signals indicating presence and location of fire 3-61

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• NORIB!/JESTPJIEDtCAL ISOTOPES NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA Chapter 3.0 -Design of Structures, Systems and Components
• *
• Execute commands appropriate for the particular location of the fire (e.g., provide varying levels of notification of a fire event and transmitting notification to RPF central alarm station and RPF control room) Provide fire detection in RPF and initiate fire-rated damper closures Remain :functional during DBEs Design Basis Values * *
• 30-year design life Provide a constant flow of water to an area experiencing a fire for a minimum of 120 min based on the size of the area per International Fire Code (IFC, 2012) Provide sprinkler systems, when necessary, per National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 13, Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems 3.5.2.7.14 Plant and Instrument Air System Chapter 9. 0, Section 9. 7 .1 provides a detailed description of the RPF plant and instrument air system. Design Basis Functions
• Provide small, advective flows of plant air for several RPF activities (e.g., tool operation, pump power, purge gas in tanks, valve actuation, and bubbler tank level measurement)
• Provide plant air receiver buffer capacity to make up difference between peak demand and compressor capacity
• Provide plant air to instrument air subsystem for bubblers and valve actuation
• Provide instrument air receiver buffer capacity to make up difference between peak demand and compressor capacity Design Basis Values
• 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps)
• Provide instrument air dried in regenerable desiccant beds to a dew point of no greater than -40°C (-40°F) and filtered to a maximum 40 micron (µ) particle size 3.5.2.7.15 Emergency Purge Gas System Chapter 6.0, Section 6.2.1.7.5 provides a detailed description of the emergency purge gas system. Design Basis Functions
• Provide nitrogen to emergency purge gas system to the required process tanks Remain :functional during DBEs Design Basis Values *
• 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts Maintain hydrogen gas (H2) concentrations less than flammability limit 3.5.2.7.16 Gas Supply System Chapter 9.0, Section 9.7.1 provides a detailed description of the gas supply system. 3-62

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NORTHWtSTMEDlCAllSOTOPES NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA Chapter 3.0 -Design of Structures, Systems and Components Design Basis Functions

• Provide helium, hydrogen, and oxygen in standard gas bottles *
• Provide nitrogen from a tube truck to the chemical supply room where manifold piping will be used to distribute the gas Provide adequate flow to ensure that the accumulation of combustible gases is below hazardous concentrations and reduces radiological hazards due to accumulation of gaseous fission products Design Basis Values
• 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps)
• Provide standard gas bottles, with capacity of approximately 8,495 L (300 cubic feet [ft 3]) 3.5.2.7.17 Process Chilled Water System Chapter 9.0, Section 9.7.1 provides a detailed description of the RPF chilled water system. Design Basis Functions
• *
• Provide process chilled water loop for three secondary loops through plate-and-frame heat exchangers

-One large geometry secondary loop in hot cell -One criticality-safe geometry secondary loop in hot cell One criticality-safe geometry secondary loop in target fabrication area Provide monitoring of chilled water loops for loss of primary containment Provide cover gas to prevent flammable conditions Design Basis Values * *

• 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) Chilled water to various process equipment at no greater than 10°C (50°F) during normal operations The hydrogen concentration in the coolant system is maintained at less than 25 percent of the lower flammability limit of 5 percent H2 3.5.2.7.18 Facility Chilled Water System Chapter 9. 0, Section 9. 7 .1 provides a detailed description of the RPF facility chilled water system. Design Basis Functions
• Provide cooling media to heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HV AC) system Supply HV AC system with cooling water that is circulated through the chilled water coils in handling units Design Basis Values *
• Provide cooling water at a temperature of 9°C ( 48°F) to the HV AC air-handling unit cooling coils 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) 3-63

........ *.:* ........ .. NWM-I ........ l.* '*. NORTHWEST MED1CAL rsOTOPES NWMl-2015-021, Rev. OA Chapter 3.0 -Design of Structures, Systems and Components 3.5.2.7.19 Facility Heated Water System Chapter 9. 0, Section 9. 7 .1 provides a detailed description of the RPF heated water system. Design Basis Functions

• Provide heated media to HV AC system Supply the HV AC system with heated water that is circulated through the heated water coils in the air-handling units Design Basis Values
• Provide heated water at a temperature of 82°C (l 80°F) to HV AC air-handling unit heating coils and reheat coil
• 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) 3.5.2. 7.20 Process Steam System -Boiler Chapter 9. 0, Section 9. 7 .1 provides a detailed description of the RPF process steam system for the boiler. Design Basis Functions
• * *
• Generate low-and medium-pressure steam using a natural gas-fired package boiler Provide a closed loop steam system for the hot cell secondary loops that meets criticality control requirements Provide monitoring of steam condensate for loss of primary containment Limit sludge or dissolved solids content with automatic and makeup water streams in the boiler Design Basis Values
• 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps)
• Provide saturated steam at 1. 7 kg/square centimeters ( cm 2) (25 lb/square inch [in.2]) and 4.2 kg/cm 2 (60 lb/in.2) gauge to various process equipment 3.5.2.7.21 Demineralized Water System Chapter 9. 0, Section 9. 7 .1 provides a detailed description of the RPF demineralized water system. Design Basis Functions
• Provide demineralized water to RPF except for administration and truck bay areas * *
• Remove mineral ions from municipal water through an ion exchange (IX) process and accumulate in a storage tank Provide regenerable IX media using a strong acid and a strong base Feed acids and bases from local chemical drums by toe pumps
• Design Basis Values
• 3 0-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps)
• Provide the water at 4.2 kg/cm 2 (60 lb/in.2) gauge 3-64

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• NORTHWIST MEDICA[ISOTDP.ES NWMl-2015-021, Rev. DA Chapter 3.0 -Design of Structures, Systems and Components 3.5.2.7.22 Chemical Supply System Chapter 9.0, Section 9.7.4 provides a detailed description of the chemical supply system. Design Basis Functions
• Provide storage capability for nitric acid, sodium hydroxide, reductant, and nitrogen oxide absorber solutions, hydrogen peroxide, and fresh uranium IX resin
• Segregate incompatible chemicals (e.g., acids from bases)
• Provide transfer capability for chemical solutions mixed to required concentrations and used in target fabrication, target dissolution, Mo recovery and purification, and waste management systems Design Basis Values
• 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., pumps) 3.5.2.7.23 Biological Shielding System Chapter 4.0, Section 4.2, provides a detailed description of the RPF biological shielding.

Design Basis Functions

• Provide biological shielding from radiation sources in the hot cells for workers in occupied areas of theRPF '*
• Limit physical access to hot cells
• Remain functional through DBEs without loss of structural integrity Design Basis Values
• 30-year design life
• Provide dose rates consistent with ALARA goals for normally occupied areas 3.5.2.7.24 Facility Process Control System Chapter 7.0, Section 7.2.3 provides a description of the FPC system. Design Basis Functions
• Perform as overall production process controller
• * * * *
• Monitor and control process instrumented functions within the RPF (e.g., process fluid transfers, controlled inter-equipment pump transfers of process fluids) Provide monitoring of safety-related components while BMS (a subset of the FPC system) monitors ventilation system and mechanical utility systems Ensure ESF systems operate independently from FPC system or BMS Use hard-wired analog controls/interlocks for each ESF safety function to protect workers, public, and environment Integrate into and monitor ESF parameters and alarm functions by FPC system or BMS Initiate actuation of isolation dampers for hot cell area or analytical area on receipt of signals from fire protection system Design Basis Values
• 30-year design life with the exception of common replaceable parts (e.g., controllers) 3-65

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