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{{#Wiki_filter:'CommonwealthEdison1400OpusPlaceDownersGrove,Illinois60515February19,1993V.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionWashington,D.C.20555Attention;DocumentControlDeskSubject:Reference:DresdenNuclearPowerStationUnits2and3ResponsetoNoticeofViolationInspectionReport50-237/92028;50-249/92028NRCDocketNumbers50-237and50-249T.O.MartinlettertoL.O.Delseorge,datedJanuary20,1993,transmittinginspectionReport50-237/92028;50-249/92028EnclosedisCommonwealthEdisonCompany's(CECo)responsetotheNoticeofViolation{NOV)whichwastransmittedwiththereferencedletter.TheNOVcitedtwoSeverityLevelIVviolationsrequiringawrittenresponse.Theresponsetotheseviolationsisprovidedintheattachment,lfyourstaffhasanyquestionsorcommentsconcerningthisletter,pleasereferthemtoDeniseSaccomando,ComplianceEngineerat{708)663-7285.Sincerely,c3.W~D.FarrarNuclearRegulatoryServicesManagerAttachmentcc:A.B.Davis,RegionalAdministrator-RegionIIIJ.Stand,ProjectManager-NRRM.N.Leach,SeniorResidentInspector-Dresden930324006i9303i8PDRADQCK050002378PDRZNLD/2112/13F<BSg199~  
{{#Wiki_filter:'Commonwealth
Edison1400OpusPlaceDownersGrove,Illinois60515February19,1993V.S.NuclearRegulatory
Commission
Washington,
D.C.20555Attention;
DocumentControlDeskSubject:Reference:
DresdenNuclearPowerStationUnits2and3ResponsetoNoticeofViolation
Inspection
Report50-237/92028;
50-249/92028
NRCDocketNumbers50-237and50-249T.O.MartinlettertoL.O.Delseorge,
datedJanuary20,1993,transmitting
inspection
Report50-237/92028;
50-249/92028
EnclosedisCommonwealth
EdisonCompany's
(CECo)responsetotheNoticeofViolation
{NOV)whichwastransmitted
withthereferenced
letter.TheNOVcitedtwoSeverityLevelIVviolations
requiring
awrittenresponse.
Theresponsetotheseviolations
isprovidedintheattachment,
lfyourstaffhasanyquestions
orcommentsconcerning
thisletter,pleasereferthemtoDeniseSaccomando,
Compliance
Engineerat{708)663-7285.
Sincerely,
c3.W~D.FarrarNuclearRegulatory
ServicesManagerAttachment
cc:A.B.Davis,RegionalAdministrator
-RegionIIIJ.Stand,ProjectManager-NRRM.N.Leach,SeniorResidentInspector
-Dresden930324006i
9303i8PDRADQCK050002378PDRZNLD/2112/13
F<BSg199~  
   
   
ArrACHMENTRESPONSETONOTlCEOFVIOLATlONNRCINSPECTlONREPORT50-237/92028,50-249/92028~gllj~2~72'I249%2I!2JULll10CFR50,AppendixB,CriterionV,requiresthatactivitiesaffectingqualityshallbeprescribedbydocumentinstructions,procedures,ordrawings,ofatypeappropriatetothecircumstancesandshallbeaccomplishedinaccordancewiththeseinstructions,procedures,ordrawings.kProcedureDOP6900-07,Revision9,"125VdcGroundDetections",requiredthattheprocedurebeimmediatelyperformedatDCsystemgroundsabove60Vdc,andaB1WorkRequestbesubmittedoncethegroundwaslocated.Furthermore,theprocedurerequired,atgroundsabove115Vdc,initiationofa14'aytimeclock(administrativeLimitingConditionforOperation{LCO))tolocateandremovethegroundandpreparationofaJustificationforContinuedOperation(JCO)ifthegroundcouldnotbelocatedorisolatedwithin14days.ProcedureDAP07-05,Revision9,"OperatingLogsandRecords",ParagraphB.5,requiredthatwhenaLCOentryoccurs,theeventmustbeloggedintheLCOLog.Contrarytotheabove:1.OnSeotember26,1992,whena125VdcsystemgroundwaspresentinUnit3,theLicenseefailedtoinitiateactionstolocateandremovetheground.Inaddition,theLicenseefailedtoinitiateanadministrativeLCOanddocumenttheeventintheLCOLog.2.OnNovember3,1992,when125VdcgroundswerepresentinbothUnits2and3,anadministrativeLCOwasinitiatedandloggedintheLCOLogforUnit3only.TheLicenseecouldnotprovideevidencethatactionsweretakentoidentifyandremovethegroundsineitherunit.3.OnNovember12,1992,whena125VdcgroundwaspresentinUnit3,thelicenseefailedtoinitiateactionstolocateandremovetheground.ZNLD/2112/14  
ArrACHMENT
RESPONSETONOTlCEOFVIOLATlON
NRCINSPECTlON
REPORT50-237/92028,
50-249/92028
~gllj~2~72
'I249%2I!2JULll
10CFR50,AppendixB,Criterion
V,requiresthatactivities
affecting
qualityshallbeprescribed
bydocumentinstructions,
procedures,
ordrawings,
ofatypeappropriate
tothecircumstances
andshallbeaccomplished
inaccordance
withtheseinstructions,
procedures,
ordrawings.
kProcedure
DOP6900-07,Revision9,"125VdcGroundDetections",
requiredthattheprocedure
beimmediately
performed
atDCsystemgroundsabove60Vdc,andaB1WorkRequestbesubmitted
oncethegroundwaslocated.Furthermore,
theprocedure
required,
atgroundsabove115Vdc,initiation
ofa14'aytimeclock(administrative
LimitingCondition
forOperation
{LCO))tolocateandremovethegroundandpreparation
ofaJustification
forContinued
Operation
(JCO)ifthegroundcouldnotbelocatedorisolatedwithin14days.Procedure
DAP07-05,Revision9,"Operating
LogsandRecords",
Paragraph
B.5,requiredthatwhenaLCOentryoccurs,theeventmustbeloggedintheLCOLog.Contrarytotheabove:1.OnSeotember
26,1992,whena125VdcsystemgroundwaspresentinUnit3,theLicenseefailedtoinitiateactionstolocateandremovetheground.Inaddition,
theLicenseefailedtoinitiateanadministrative
LCOanddocumenttheeventintheLCOLog.2.OnNovember3,1992,when125VdcgroundswerepresentinbothUnits2and3,anadministrative
LCOwasinitiated
andloggedintheLCOLogforUnit3only.TheLicenseecouldnotprovideevidencethatactionsweretakentoidentifyandremovethegroundsineitherunit.3.OnNovember12,1992,whena125VdcgroundwaspresentinUnit3,thelicenseefailedtoinitiateactionstolocateandremovetheground.ZNLD/2112/14  
   
   
ATIACHMENTRESPONSETONOTICEOFVIOLATIONNRCINSPECTIONREPORT50-237/92028,50-249/92028NFTEVIO3A~QH;DresdenStationconcurswithitem1oftheviolationaswritten.DresdenStationproceduresprovideclearguidanceonrequiredactionsuponidentificationofdcgrounds.Itisclearthatpersonnelfailedtomeetmanagement'sexpectations.Investigationoftheeventsindicatedthatpersonnelfailedtofollowestablishedstationprocedures.WiththeissuanceoftheviolationDresdenStationinitiatedaninvestigationwhichrevealedthatstationdidtakeappropriateactionsonNovember3andNovember12thInregardtotheNovember3,1992,groundinvolvingUnit3(example2),actionwastakentoidentifyandremovetheground.TheUnit3Logentrystatesthatagroundcheckwasperformedat1857tloursfora-155Vgroundonthe125Ydcsystem.Thegroundwasidentifiedonbus3A-2circuitnumber16andWorkRequestD-13836waswrittenforinvestigationandrepairofthecircuit.ElectricalMaintenanceidentifiedandreplacedabrokenterminalblock.Furthertestingrevealedthattheauxiliarytransformer31fireprotectioncircuitwasgrounded.WorkRequest15077waswrittentoimplementrepairs.InregardtotheNovember3,1992,groundinvolvingUnit2(example2),actionwastakentoidentifyandremovetheground.WorkRequestD-13806waswrittenforinvestigationoftheground;however,thegroundclearedbeforeElectricalMaintenancepersonnelcouldbeginwork,TheUnit2groundwasnotdocumentedintheLCOLogsinceitneverreachedtherequired115volts,asspecifiedinDOP6900-06,125VdcGroundDetection".lnregardtotheNovember12,1992,groundinvolvinqUnit3(example3),actionwastakentolocateandremovetheground.TheUnitOperatorloggedthe-115Yground,thegroundchecking,andtheLCOintheUnitLogBook.Thegroundwaslocatedonbus3A-2.NoworkrequestwaswrittensinceWorkRequestsD-13836andD-15077werealreadyopentoinvestigatethegroundonbus3A-2.OnNovember16,1992,WorkRequestD-14129waswrittentodocumenta-90VgroundontheUnit3125Vdcsystem.ElectricalMaintenancepersonnelinvestiaatedandresolvedthegroundunderworkrequestsD-13836andD-15077.ThegroundwasmonitoreduntilJanuary2,1993,andneverreturned.DForexamole1,theidentifiedgroundhasclearedwithoutanyactionbystationpersonnel.OperationspersonnelinvolvedintheSeptember26,1992,eventwerecounseledbyOperations'sseniormanagementwithregardstotheimportanceofprocedureadherence.ZNLD/2112/15  
ATIACHMENTRESPONSETONOTICEOFVIOLATION
NRCINSPECTION
REPORT50-237/92028,
50-249/92028
NFTEVIO3A~QH;
DresdenStationconcurswithitem1oftheviolation
aswritten.DresdenStationprocedures
provideclearguidanceonrequiredactionsuponidentification
ofdcgrounds.Itisclearthatpersonnel
failedtomeetmanagement's
expectations.
Investigation
oftheeventsindicated
thatpersonnel
failedtofollowestablished
stationprocedures.
Withtheissuanceoftheviolation
DresdenStationinitiated
aninvestigation
whichrevealedthatstationdidtakeappropriate
actionsonNovember3andNovember12thInregardtotheNovember3,1992,groundinvolving
Unit3(example2),actionwastakentoidentifyandremovetheground.TheUnit3Logentrystatesthatagroundcheckwasperformed
at1857tloursfora-155Vgroundonthe125Ydcsystem.Thegroundwasidentified
onbus3A-2circuitnumber16andWorkRequestD-13836waswrittenforinvestigation
andrepairofthecircuit.Electrical
Maintenance
identified
andreplacedabrokenterminalblock.Furthertestingrevealedthattheauxiliary
transformer
31fireprotection
circuitwasgrounded.
WorkRequest15077waswrittentoimplement
repairs.InregardtotheNovember3,1992,groundinvolving
Unit2(example2),actionwastakentoidentifyandremovetheground.WorkRequestD-13806waswrittenforinvestigation
oftheground;however,thegroundclearedbeforeElectrical
Maintenance
personnel
couldbeginwork,TheUnit2groundwasnotdocumented
intheLCOLogsinceitneverreachedtherequired115volts,asspecified
inDOP6900-06,125VdcGroundDetection".
lnregardtotheNovember12,1992,groundinvolvinq
Unit3(example3),actionwastakentolocateandremovetheground.TheUnitOperatorloggedthe-115Yground,thegroundchecking,
andtheLCOintheUnitLogBook.Thegroundwaslocatedonbus3A-2.NoworkrequestwaswrittensinceWorkRequestsD-13836andD-15077werealreadyopentoinvestigate
thegroundonbus3A-2.OnNovember16,1992,WorkRequestD-14129waswrittentodocumenta-90VgroundontheUnit3125Vdcsystem.Electrical
Maintenance
personnel
investiaated
andresolvedthegroundunderworkrequestsD-13836andD-15077.Thegroundwasmonitored
untilJanuary2,1993,andneverreturned.
DForexamole1,theidentified
groundhasclearedwithoutanyactionbystationpersonnel.
Operations
personnel
involvedintheSeptember
26,1992,eventwerecounseled
byOperations's
seniormanagement
withregardstotheimportance
ofprocedure
adherence.
ZNLD/2112/15  
   
   
ATIACHMENTRESPONSETONOTICEOFVIOLATIONNRGINSPECTIONREPORT50-237/92028,50-249/92028ETIVEEKTDEVITheOperationsManagerhasdiscussedfailuretofollowestablishedprocedureswiththeShiftEngineers.BeginningonFebruary10,1993,theShiftEngineerstailgatedwiththeirrespectivecrewstheimportanceoffollowingprocedures.Theywereremindedthatadherencetoproceduresisabasicexpectationandisrequiredtoensuresafe,reliableoperations.DATEFLLMPANEFullcompliancewasachievedwhentheindividualwascounseled.ZNLD/2112/16  
ATIACHMENTRESPONSETONOTICEOFVIOLATION
NRGINSPECTION
REPORT50-237/92028,
50-249/92028
ETIVEEKTDEVITheOperations
Managerhasdiscussed
failuretofollowestablished
procedures
withtheShiftEngineers.
Beginning
onFebruary10,1993,theShiftEngineers
tailgated
withtheirrespective
crewstheimportance
offollowing
procedures.
Theywereremindedthatadherence
toprocedures
isabasicexpectation
andisrequiredtoensuresafe,reliableoperations.
DATEFLLMPANEFullcompliance
wasachievedwhentheindividual
wascounseled.
ZNLD/2112/16  
'  
'  
ATlACHMENTRESPONSETONOTICEOFYIOLAllONNRCINSPECTIONREPORT50-237/92028,50-249/92028RE10CFR50,AppendixB,CriterionXVI,requiresthatmeasuresshallbeestablishedtoassurethatconditionsadversetoquality,suchasfailures,malfunctions,deficiencies,deviations,defectivematerialandequipment;andnonconformancearepromptlyidentifiedandcorrected.Contrarytotheabove,inFebruaryandApril1992,thelicenseeidentifiedoversizedfusesinvarioussafetyrelatedcircuitsincludingtheEmergencyDieselGeneratorexcitersandLowPressureCoolantcircuitry.AsofDecember,1992,thisconditionadversetoqualityhadnotbeencorrected.FRTEVIThefuseverificationprogramidentifiedfusesthatwereinadequatelysized.ThesediscrepancieswerenotedonTechnicalProblemReports(TPRs)andforwardedtoCorporateEngineeringforresolution.TheEngineeringevaluationofthefuseintheUnit2LowPressureCoolantinjection(LPCI)circuitrystatesthat,"thecurrentlyinstalled20Afuse,BussmannTypeMIN,inPanel902-32,providesadequateprotectionforthecircuit,"andthatthe"existinginstalled20Afuseprotectsthecircuit."Theevaluationalsoindicatedthatthefusemaynotcoordinatewiththeupstream30Acircuitbreaker.Nosafetysignificanceoroperabilityconcernswereattributedtothispotentiallackoffusecoordination.Engineeringdid,however,recommendreplacementofthefuse.WhentheevaluationarrivedatDresden,thefusecoordinatorprioritizedreplacementoftheLPCIfusecommensuratewithitslackofsafetysignificanceandoperabilityconcerns.Nospecificduedatewasassignedforthefusereplacement.Engineering'soperabilityassessmentofthefusesintheUnit2dieselgeneratorexcitationcabinetsrecommendednocompensatoryactionstoensureoperability(i.e.thesystemisoperablewiththecurrentlyinstalledfuses).Two30Afusesandone40AfusewereinstalledintheUnit2excitationcabinet,insteadofthe25Afusespresentedinthesystemdrawing.Theevaluationagainincludedarecommendationtoreplacethesubjectfuses.Itstatedthatduringanabnormalfaultcondition,thefusesmaynotprotecttheprimarywindingsofcontroltransformers.TherecommendationwasbasedonguidancefromGEBulletinGET-3039G,"HowtoSelectanApplyPowerFuses,TypesEJ-1andEJ0-1."AnActionDueDateforfusereplacementofFebruary28,1993,wasassignedbyEngineering.Thereasoningbehindtheassignedduedatewasbasedupontheengineeringjudgmentthatanyexpectedfaultconditionthata26Afusecouldprotectagainstwouldalsobeprotectedbya30Aor40Afuse.ZNLD/2112/17  
ATlACHMENTRESPONSETONOTICEOFYIOLAllON
NRCINSPECTION
REPORT50-237/92028,
50-249/92028
RE10CFR50,AppendixB,Criterion
XVI,requiresthatmeasuresshallbeestablished
toassurethatconditions
adversetoquality,suchasfailures,
malfunctions,
deficiencies,
deviations,
defective
materialandequipment;
andnonconformance
arepromptlyidentified
andcorrected.
Contrarytotheabove,inFebruaryandApril1992,thelicenseeidentified
oversized
fusesinvarioussafetyrelatedcircuitsincluding
theEmergency
DieselGenerator
excitersandLowPressureCoolantcircuitry.
AsofDecember,
1992,thiscondition
adversetoqualityhadnotbeencorrected.
FRTEVIThefuseverification
programidentified
fusesthatwereinadequately
sized.Thesediscrepancies
werenotedonTechnical
ProblemReports(TPRs)andforwarded
toCorporate
Engineering
forresolution.
TheEngineering
evaluation
ofthefuseintheUnit2LowPressureCoolantinjection
(LPCI)circuitry
statesthat,"thecurrently
installed
20Afuse,BussmannTypeMIN,inPanel902-32,providesadequateprotection
forthecircuit,"
andthatthe"existing
installed
20Afuseprotectsthecircuit."
Theevaluation
alsoindicated
thatthefusemaynotcoordinate
withtheupstream30Acircuitbreaker.Nosafetysignificance
oroperability
concernswereattributed
tothispotential
lackoffusecoordination.
Engineering
did,however,recommend
replacement
ofthefuse.Whentheevaluation
arrivedatDresden,thefusecoordinator
prioritized
replacement
oftheLPCIfusecommensurate
withitslackofsafetysignificance
andoperability
concerns.
Nospecificduedatewasassignedforthefusereplacement.
Engineering's
operability
assessment
ofthefusesintheUnit2dieselgenerator
excitation
cabinetsrecommended
nocompensatory
actionstoensureoperability
(i.e.thesystemisoperablewiththecurrently
installed
fuses).Two30Afusesandone40Afusewereinstalled
intheUnit2excitation
cabinet,insteadofthe25Afusespresented
inthesystemdrawing.Theevaluation
againincludedarecommendation
toreplacethesubjectfuses.Itstatedthatduringanabnormalfaultcondition,
thefusesmaynotprotecttheprimarywindingsofcontroltransformers.
Therecommendation
wasbasedonguidancefromGEBulletinGET-3039G,
"HowtoSelectanApplyPowerFuses,TypesEJ-1andEJ0-1."AnActionDueDateforfusereplacement
ofFebruary28,1993,wasassignedbyEngineering.
Thereasoning
behindtheassignedduedatewasbasedupontheengineering
judgmentthatanyexpectedfaultcondition
thata26Afusecouldprotectagainstwouldalsobeprotected
bya30Aor40Afuse.ZNLD/2112/17  
'  
'  
ATIACHMENTRESPONSETONOTICEOFVIOLATIONNRCINSPECTIONREPORT50-237/92028,50-249/92028SinceidentificationofthedieselfusediscrepancyinApril,1992,DresdenStationhastakennumerousactionstoaddressEngineering'sfusereplacementrecommendation.Mostsignificantoftheseactionswasamoredetailedengineeringcalculationthatsupportedcontinuedoperationwiththecurrentlyinstalleddieselgeneratorfuses.Thiscalculationstatesthat"GE25A,30A,and40Afuses,TypeEJ0-1,willclearthefaultbeforeanydamageisdonetotheprimarywindingsofthetransformerorthecircuit."ThisevaluationconfirmedEngineering'spreviousoperabilityassessmentandtheengineeringjudgmentofthefusecoordnator.DresdenStationbelievesthattheLPCIfuseswerenotreplacedpriortotheinspectionperiodbecausenosafetyoroperabilityconcernexistswiththecurrentlyinstalledfuse.Forthedieselgeneratorfuses,numerousactionsweretakentoreplaceandprocurethefusesandfuseclipspriortotheassignedActionDueDateofFebruary28,1993.Dresdendoesacknowledge,however,thatEngineering'srecommendationsshouldhavebeendispositionedinamoretimelymanner.Dresdenidentifiedtheneedforadditionaladministrativecontrolsforfusesidentifiedforreplacementunderthefuseupgradeprogram.ExaminationofthecurrentDresdenAdministrativeProcedure(DAP)11-27,"ControlandMaintenanceofFusesandtheFuseList,"indicatedthatitdidnotprovidedirectionfordispositioningofTPRsissuedpriortoOctober,1992.RRTIVEPTEDEV0TheUnit2LPClfusewaschangedoutonFebruary19,1993.TheUnit3LPCIsystemhasalsobeeninspecte8.TheUnit3LPGIfusehasthecorrectamperage,butisaMIN-typefuseratherthantherecommendedKTN-typefuse.Whilenooperabilityconcernshavebeenraised,DresdenwillstillreplacetheUnit3LPCIfusethenexttimeLPCIisout-of-service.Forgoodengineeringpractice,theone40AdieselgeneratorfuseonUnit2willbereplacedwitha30AfusebyApril30,1993.ADocumentChangeRequestwassubmittedonFebruary19,1993toupdatetheamperageonallrelateddrawingsto30amps.ToaugmentadministrativecontrolsuntilDAP11-27isrevised,theModificationImplementationSupervisorhasissuedamemorandumtothefusecoordinatorincorporatingdirectionforfusereplacementsidentifiedinTechnicalProblemReportsissuedpriortoOctober,1992.ZNLD/2112/18
ATIACHMENTRESPONSETONOTICEOFVIOLATION
NRCINSPECTION
REPORT50-237/92028,
50-249/92028
Sinceidentification
ofthedieselfusediscrepancy
inApril,1992,DresdenStationhastakennumerousactionstoaddressEngineering's
fusereplacement
recommendation.
Mostsignificant
oftheseactionswasamoredetailedengineering
calculation
thatsupported
continued
operation
withthecurrently
installed
dieselgenerator
fuses.Thiscalculation
statesthat"GE25A,30A,and40Afuses,TypeEJ0-1,willclearthefaultbeforeanydamageisdonetotheprimarywindingsofthetransformer
orthecircuit."
Thisevaluation
confirmed
Engineering's
previousoperability
assessment
andtheengineering
judgmentofthefusecoordnator.DresdenStationbelievesthattheLPCIfuseswerenotreplacedpriortotheinspection
periodbecausenosafetyoroperability
concernexistswiththecurrently
installed
fuse.Forthedieselgenerator
fuses,numerousactionsweretakentoreplaceandprocurethefusesandfuseclipspriortotheassignedActionDueDateofFebruary28,1993.Dresdendoesacknowledge,
however,thatEngineering's
recommendations
shouldhavebeendispositioned
inamoretimelymanner.Dresdenidentified
theneedforadditional
administrative
controlsforfusesidentified
forreplacement
underthefuseupgradeprogram.Examination
ofthecurrentDresdenAdministrative
Procedure
(DAP)11-27,"ControlandMaintenance
ofFusesandtheFuseList,"indicated
thatitdidnotprovidedirection
fordispositioning
ofTPRsissuedpriortoOctober,1992.RRTIVEPTEDEV0TheUnit2LPClfusewaschangedoutonFebruary19,1993.TheUnit3LPCIsystemhasalsobeeninspecte8.
TheUnit3LPGIfusehasthecorrectamperage,
butisaMIN-typefuseratherthantherecommended
KTN-typefuse.Whilenooperability
concernshavebeenraised,DresdenwillstillreplacetheUnit3LPCIfusethenexttimeLPCIisout-of-service.
Forgoodengineering
practice,
theone40Adieselgenerator
fuseonUnit2willbereplacedwitha30AfusebyApril30,1993.ADocumentChangeRequestwassubmitted
onFebruary19,1993toupdatetheamperageonallrelateddrawingsto30amps.Toaugmentadministrative
controlsuntilDAP11-27isrevised,theModification
Implementation
Supervisor
hasissuedamemorandum
tothefusecoordinator
incorporating
direction
forfusereplacements
identified
inTechnical
ProblemReportsissuedpriortoOctober,1992.ZNLD/2112/1
8
'  
'  
ATTACHMENTRESPONSETONOTICEOFVIOLATIONNRGINSPECTIONREPORT50-237/92028,50-249/92028RECTIYETEPKETVIDERDAP11-27,willberevisedbyMarch31,1993,toincorporatetheinterimdirectionsdescribedintheabovememorandum.DTEFLLPLINEFullcompliancewasachievedwiththeissuanceamemorandumtothefusecoordinatorincorporatingdirectionforfusereplacementsidentifiedinTechnicalProblemReportsissuedpriortoOctober,1992.ZNLD/2112/39
ATTACHMENT
RESPONSETONOTICEOFVIOLATION
NRGINSPECTION
REPORT50-237/92028,
50-249/92028
RECTIYETEPKETVIDERDAP11-27,willberevisedbyMarch31,1993,toincorporate
theinterimdirections
described
intheabovememorandum.
DTEFLLPLINEFullcompliance
wasachievedwiththeissuanceamemorandum
tothefusecoordinator
incorporating
direction
forfusereplacements
identified
inTechnical
ProblemReportsissuedpriortoOctober,1992.ZNLD/2112/3
9
}}
}}

Revision as of 03:07, 29 June 2018

Responds to Notice of Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-237/92-28 & 50-249/92-28.Corective Actions:Identified Ground Has Cleared W/O Any Action by Station Personnel & Operations Personnel Were Counseled on Procedure Adherence
ML18037A087
Person / Time
Site: Dresden  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 02/19/1993
From: FARRAR D
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
NRC
Shared Package
ML18037A086 List:
References
NUDOCS 9303240061
Download: ML18037A087 (14)


See also: IR 05000237/1992028

Text

'Commonwealth

Edison1400OpusPlaceDownersGrove,Illinois60515February19,1993V.S.NuclearRegulatory

Commission

Washington,

D.C.20555Attention;

DocumentControlDeskSubject:Reference:

DresdenNuclearPowerStationUnits2and3ResponsetoNoticeofViolation

Inspection

Report50-237/92028;

50-249/92028

NRCDocketNumbers50-237and50-249T.O.MartinlettertoL.O.Delseorge,

datedJanuary20,1993,transmitting

inspection

Report50-237/92028;

50-249/92028

EnclosedisCommonwealth

EdisonCompany's

(CECo)responsetotheNoticeofViolation

{NOV)whichwastransmitted

withthereferenced

letter.TheNOVcitedtwoSeverityLevelIVviolations

requiring

awrittenresponse.

Theresponsetotheseviolations

isprovidedintheattachment,

lfyourstaffhasanyquestions

orcommentsconcerning

thisletter,pleasereferthemtoDeniseSaccomando,

Compliance

Engineerat{708)663-7285.

Sincerely,

c3.W~D.FarrarNuclearRegulatory

ServicesManagerAttachment

cc:A.B.Davis,RegionalAdministrator

-RegionIIIJ.Stand,ProjectManager-NRRM.N.Leach,SeniorResidentInspector

-Dresden930324006i

9303i8PDRADQCK050002378PDRZNLD/2112/13

F<BSg199~

ArrACHMENT

RESPONSETONOTlCEOFVIOLATlON

NRCINSPECTlON

REPORT50-237/92028,

50-249/92028

~gllj~2~72

'I249%2I!2JULll

10CFR50,AppendixB,Criterion

V,requiresthatactivities

affecting

qualityshallbeprescribed

bydocumentinstructions,

procedures,

ordrawings,

ofatypeappropriate

tothecircumstances

andshallbeaccomplished

inaccordance

withtheseinstructions,

procedures,

ordrawings.

kProcedure

DOP6900-07,Revision9,"125VdcGroundDetections",

requiredthattheprocedure

beimmediately

performed

atDCsystemgroundsabove60Vdc,andaB1WorkRequestbesubmitted

oncethegroundwaslocated.Furthermore,

theprocedure

required,

atgroundsabove115Vdc,initiation

ofa14'aytimeclock(administrative

LimitingCondition

forOperation

{LCO))tolocateandremovethegroundandpreparation

ofaJustification

forContinued

Operation

(JCO)ifthegroundcouldnotbelocatedorisolatedwithin14days.Procedure

DAP07-05,Revision9,"Operating

LogsandRecords",

Paragraph

B.5,requiredthatwhenaLCOentryoccurs,theeventmustbeloggedintheLCOLog.Contrarytotheabove:1.OnSeotember

26,1992,whena125VdcsystemgroundwaspresentinUnit3,theLicenseefailedtoinitiateactionstolocateandremovetheground.Inaddition,

theLicenseefailedtoinitiateanadministrative

LCOanddocumenttheeventintheLCOLog.2.OnNovember3,1992,when125VdcgroundswerepresentinbothUnits2and3,anadministrative

LCOwasinitiated

andloggedintheLCOLogforUnit3only.TheLicenseecouldnotprovideevidencethatactionsweretakentoidentifyandremovethegroundsineitherunit.3.OnNovember12,1992,whena125VdcgroundwaspresentinUnit3,thelicenseefailedtoinitiateactionstolocateandremovetheground.ZNLD/2112/14

ATIACHMENTRESPONSETONOTICEOFVIOLATION

NRCINSPECTION

REPORT50-237/92028,

50-249/92028

NFTEVIO3A~QH;

DresdenStationconcurswithitem1oftheviolation

aswritten.DresdenStationprocedures

provideclearguidanceonrequiredactionsuponidentification

ofdcgrounds.Itisclearthatpersonnel

failedtomeetmanagement's

expectations.

Investigation

oftheeventsindicated

thatpersonnel

failedtofollowestablished

stationprocedures.

Withtheissuanceoftheviolation

DresdenStationinitiated

aninvestigation

whichrevealedthatstationdidtakeappropriate

actionsonNovember3andNovember12thInregardtotheNovember3,1992,groundinvolving

Unit3(example2),actionwastakentoidentifyandremovetheground.TheUnit3Logentrystatesthatagroundcheckwasperformed

at1857tloursfora-155Vgroundonthe125Ydcsystem.Thegroundwasidentified

onbus3A-2circuitnumber16andWorkRequestD-13836waswrittenforinvestigation

andrepairofthecircuit.Electrical

Maintenance

identified

andreplacedabrokenterminalblock.Furthertestingrevealedthattheauxiliary

transformer

31fireprotection

circuitwasgrounded.

WorkRequest15077waswrittentoimplement

repairs.InregardtotheNovember3,1992,groundinvolving

Unit2(example2),actionwastakentoidentifyandremovetheground.WorkRequestD-13806waswrittenforinvestigation

oftheground;however,thegroundclearedbeforeElectrical

Maintenance

personnel

couldbeginwork,TheUnit2groundwasnotdocumented

intheLCOLogsinceitneverreachedtherequired115volts,asspecified

inDOP6900-06,125VdcGroundDetection".

lnregardtotheNovember12,1992,groundinvolvinq

Unit3(example3),actionwastakentolocateandremovetheground.TheUnitOperatorloggedthe-115Yground,thegroundchecking,

andtheLCOintheUnitLogBook.Thegroundwaslocatedonbus3A-2.NoworkrequestwaswrittensinceWorkRequestsD-13836andD-15077werealreadyopentoinvestigate

thegroundonbus3A-2.OnNovember16,1992,WorkRequestD-14129waswrittentodocumenta-90VgroundontheUnit3125Vdcsystem.Electrical

Maintenance

personnel

investiaated

andresolvedthegroundunderworkrequestsD-13836andD-15077.Thegroundwasmonitored

untilJanuary2,1993,andneverreturned.

DForexamole1,theidentified

groundhasclearedwithoutanyactionbystationpersonnel.

Operations

personnel

involvedintheSeptember

26,1992,eventwerecounseled

byOperations's

seniormanagement

withregardstotheimportance

ofprocedure

adherence.

ZNLD/2112/15

ATIACHMENTRESPONSETONOTICEOFVIOLATION

NRGINSPECTION

REPORT50-237/92028,

50-249/92028

ETIVEEKTDEVITheOperations

Managerhasdiscussed

failuretofollowestablished

procedures

withtheShiftEngineers.

Beginning

onFebruary10,1993,theShiftEngineers

tailgated

withtheirrespective

crewstheimportance

offollowing

procedures.

Theywereremindedthatadherence

toprocedures

isabasicexpectation

andisrequiredtoensuresafe,reliableoperations.

DATEFLLMPANEFullcompliance

wasachievedwhentheindividual

wascounseled.

ZNLD/2112/16

'

ATlACHMENTRESPONSETONOTICEOFYIOLAllON

NRCINSPECTION

REPORT50-237/92028,

50-249/92028

RE10CFR50,AppendixB,Criterion

XVI,requiresthatmeasuresshallbeestablished

toassurethatconditions

adversetoquality,suchasfailures,

malfunctions,

deficiencies,

deviations,

defective

materialandequipment;

andnonconformance

arepromptlyidentified

andcorrected.

Contrarytotheabove,inFebruaryandApril1992,thelicenseeidentified

oversized

fusesinvarioussafetyrelatedcircuitsincluding

theEmergency

DieselGenerator

excitersandLowPressureCoolantcircuitry.

AsofDecember,

1992,thiscondition

adversetoqualityhadnotbeencorrected.

FRTEVIThefuseverification

programidentified

fusesthatwereinadequately

sized.Thesediscrepancies

werenotedonTechnical

ProblemReports(TPRs)andforwarded

toCorporate

Engineering

forresolution.

TheEngineering

evaluation

ofthefuseintheUnit2LowPressureCoolantinjection

(LPCI)circuitry

statesthat,"thecurrently

installed

20Afuse,BussmannTypeMIN,inPanel902-32,providesadequateprotection

forthecircuit,"

andthatthe"existing

installed

20Afuseprotectsthecircuit."

Theevaluation

alsoindicated

thatthefusemaynotcoordinate

withtheupstream30Acircuitbreaker.Nosafetysignificance

oroperability

concernswereattributed

tothispotential

lackoffusecoordination.

Engineering

did,however,recommend

replacement

ofthefuse.Whentheevaluation

arrivedatDresden,thefusecoordinator

prioritized

replacement

oftheLPCIfusecommensurate

withitslackofsafetysignificance

andoperability

concerns.

Nospecificduedatewasassignedforthefusereplacement.

Engineering's

operability

assessment

ofthefusesintheUnit2dieselgenerator

excitation

cabinetsrecommended

nocompensatory

actionstoensureoperability

(i.e.thesystemisoperablewiththecurrently

installed

fuses).Two30Afusesandone40Afusewereinstalled

intheUnit2excitation

cabinet,insteadofthe25Afusespresented

inthesystemdrawing.Theevaluation

againincludedarecommendation

toreplacethesubjectfuses.Itstatedthatduringanabnormalfaultcondition,

thefusesmaynotprotecttheprimarywindingsofcontroltransformers.

Therecommendation

wasbasedonguidancefromGEBulletinGET-3039G,

"HowtoSelectanApplyPowerFuses,TypesEJ-1andEJ0-1."AnActionDueDateforfusereplacement

ofFebruary28,1993,wasassignedbyEngineering.

Thereasoning

behindtheassignedduedatewasbasedupontheengineering

judgmentthatanyexpectedfaultcondition

thata26Afusecouldprotectagainstwouldalsobeprotected

bya30Aor40Afuse.ZNLD/2112/17

'

ATIACHMENTRESPONSETONOTICEOFVIOLATION

NRCINSPECTION

REPORT50-237/92028,

50-249/92028

Sinceidentification

ofthedieselfusediscrepancy

inApril,1992,DresdenStationhastakennumerousactionstoaddressEngineering's

fusereplacement

recommendation.

Mostsignificant

oftheseactionswasamoredetailedengineering

calculation

thatsupported

continued

operation

withthecurrently

installed

dieselgenerator

fuses.Thiscalculation

statesthat"GE25A,30A,and40Afuses,TypeEJ0-1,willclearthefaultbeforeanydamageisdonetotheprimarywindingsofthetransformer

orthecircuit."

Thisevaluation

confirmed

Engineering's

previousoperability

assessment

andtheengineering

judgmentofthefusecoordnator.DresdenStationbelievesthattheLPCIfuseswerenotreplacedpriortotheinspection

periodbecausenosafetyoroperability

concernexistswiththecurrently

installed

fuse.Forthedieselgenerator

fuses,numerousactionsweretakentoreplaceandprocurethefusesandfuseclipspriortotheassignedActionDueDateofFebruary28,1993.Dresdendoesacknowledge,

however,thatEngineering's

recommendations

shouldhavebeendispositioned

inamoretimelymanner.Dresdenidentified

theneedforadditional

administrative

controlsforfusesidentified

forreplacement

underthefuseupgradeprogram.Examination

ofthecurrentDresdenAdministrative

Procedure

(DAP)11-27,"ControlandMaintenance

ofFusesandtheFuseList,"indicated

thatitdidnotprovidedirection

fordispositioning

ofTPRsissuedpriortoOctober,1992.RRTIVEPTEDEV0TheUnit2LPClfusewaschangedoutonFebruary19,1993.TheUnit3LPCIsystemhasalsobeeninspecte8.

TheUnit3LPGIfusehasthecorrectamperage,

butisaMIN-typefuseratherthantherecommended

KTN-typefuse.Whilenooperability

concernshavebeenraised,DresdenwillstillreplacetheUnit3LPCIfusethenexttimeLPCIisout-of-service.

Forgoodengineering

practice,

theone40Adieselgenerator

fuseonUnit2willbereplacedwitha30AfusebyApril30,1993.ADocumentChangeRequestwassubmitted

onFebruary19,1993toupdatetheamperageonallrelateddrawingsto30amps.Toaugmentadministrative

controlsuntilDAP11-27isrevised,theModification

Implementation

Supervisor

hasissuedamemorandum

tothefusecoordinator

incorporating

direction

forfusereplacements

identified

inTechnical

ProblemReportsissuedpriortoOctober,1992.ZNLD/2112/1

8

'

ATTACHMENT

RESPONSETONOTICEOFVIOLATION

NRGINSPECTION

REPORT50-237/92028,

50-249/92028

RECTIYETEPKETVIDERDAP11-27,willberevisedbyMarch31,1993,toincorporate

theinterimdirections

described

intheabovememorandum.

DTEFLLPLINEFullcompliance

wasachievedwiththeissuanceamemorandum

tothefusecoordinator

incorporating

direction

forfusereplacements

identified

inTechnical

ProblemReportsissuedpriortoOctober,1992.ZNLD/2112/3

9