ML18041A048

Forwards Response to Request for Info Per 10CFR50.54(f) Re Adequacy & Availability of Design Bases Info

ML18041A048
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	02/18/1997
From:	SYLVIA B R NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NMP1L-1184, NUDOCS 9702250240
Download: ML18041A048 (319)

Text

CATEGORYj.1,',II4REGULAT~INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION STEM(RIDE)ACCESSION NBR:9762250240 DOC.DATE:

97/02/18NOTARIZED:

YESDOCKETFACIL:50-220 NineMilePointNuclearStation,Unit1,NiagaraPowe0500022050-410NineMilePointNuclearStation,Unit2,NiagaraMoha05000410AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION SYLVIA,B.R.

NiagaraMohawkPowerCorp.5~RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION p~ppt4DocumentControlBranch(Document ControlDesk)

SUBJECT:

Forwardsresponsetorequestforinfoper10CFR50.54(f) readequeacy aavailability ofdesignbasesinfo.DISTRIBUTION CODE:A074DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR iENCLIBISE:ITITLE:Responses to50.54(f)Req.forDesignBasisInfoNOTES:RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME

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NIAGARAMOHAWKGENERATI0NBUSINESSGROUPB.RALPHSYLVIAExecutive VicePresident Generation BusinessGroupChietNuclearOfficerU.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Attn:DocumentControlDeskWashington, DC20555300ERIEBOULEVARD WEST,SYRACUSE, NEWYORK13202/TELEPHONE (315)4284983February18,1997NMP1L1184RE:NineMilePointUnit1DocketNo.50-220NineMilePointUnit2DocketNo.50-410

Subject:

RequestforInformation PursuanttoIOCFR50.$

4@Regarding AdequacyandAvailability ofDesignBasesInformation Gentlemen; OnOctober18,1996,NiagaraMohawkPowerCorporation (NMPC)receivedaletterrequesting; (a)adescription ofourengineering designandconfiguration controlprocesses, including thosethatimplement 10CFR50.59, 10CFR50.71(e) andAppendixBto10CFR50;(b)arationale forconcluding thatdesignbasesrequirements aretranslated intooperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures; (c)arationale forconcluding thatsystem,structure, andcomponent configuration andperformance areconsistent withthedesignbases;(d)adescription oftheprocesses foridentification ofproblemsandimplementation ofcorrective actions,including actionstodetermine theextentofproblems, actiontopreventrecurrence, andreporting toNRC;and(e)anassessment oftheoveralleffectiveness ofourcurrentprocesses andprogramsinconcluding thattheconfiguration ofourplantsisconsistent withthedesignbases.Attachment AandAttachment Btothisletterprovidetherequested information forNineMilePointUnit1(NMP1)andUnit2(NMP2),respectively.

InresponsetoRequested Action(a),weareproviding adescription ofourcurrentdesignandconfiguration controlprocesses, QualityAssurance (QA)program,aswellasour10CFR50.71(e) and10CFR50.59 processes.

Inproviding ourrationale forconcluding thatdesignbasesrequirements aretranslated intoprocedures, ourresponsetoRequested Action(b)focusesontheinitialdevelopment, review,andapprovalofplantoperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures, theprocedure revisionprocess,andtheassessments andinitiatives conducted toassureconsistency betweenourdesignbasesandplantprocedures.

Theassessments andinitiatives discussed includeNMP1'sSurveillance Verification Program,UpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR)Verification Program,RestartActionPlan,andQAAuditsandNMP2'sSurveillance Verification Program,UpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR)Verification Program,andQAAudits.InourresponsetoRequested Action(c),wediscussNMP1'sDesignBasisReconstitution walkdowns, RestartActionPlan9702250240 970218PDRADaCV.05000220PPDR 03 Page2activities, RestartReadiness Report,andNMP2'sdesign,construction, andstartupQAProgramcontrols, initialtestprogram,andPowerUprateeffortasameansforproviding reasonable assurance thatstructure, systemandcomponent configuration andperformance areconsistent withthedesignbases.Alsodelineated inourresponsetoRequested Action(c)andcommontobothunitsaresafetysystemfunctional inspections, routinesurveillance testingandexaminations, andresponses toindustryoperations experience items.Concerning ourprocesses foridentification ofproblems, implementation ofcorrective actions,andreporting requirements, ourresponsetoRequested Action(d)includesadescription ofourDeviation/Event Reporting (DER)process.TheDERprocessprovidesfortheidentification, documentation, notification, evaluation, correction, andreporting ofconditions, events,activities, andconcernsthathavethepotential foraffecting thesafeandreliableoperation oftheplants.InRequested Action(e),theCommission askedlicensees todescribetheoveralleffectiveness oftheircurrentprocesses andprograms.

Inresponse, NMPCsummarizes itsprogramsandprocesses andtheresultsoftheassessments andinitiatives previously described inourresponses toRequested Actions(a)through(d).Althoughtheresponses toRequested Actions(a)and(d)arenearlythesameforNMP1andNMP2,theAttachments havebeenunitizedbecauseofthedifferences inresponsetoRequested Actions(b)and(c).Specifically, differences existbetweeneachunits'rocedure development, planttestingactivities, assessments andinitiatives, andresponses toindustryoperations experience items.Notethatseveraloftheattachedresponses arebasedoncurrentversionsofNMPCprogramsandprocesses whicharesubjecttorevisions and/orenhancements.

Also,inordertoeliminate anyambiguity withregardtocommitments contained inthisresponse, Attachment Cdelineates thespecificcommitments madebyNMPCinourresponsetoRequested Actions(a),(b),(c),(d),and(e).Basedontheinformation providedintheenclosedAttachments, NMPChasreasonable assurance that:(1)designbasesrequirements arebeingtranslated intooperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures; and(2)system,structure, andcomponent configuration andperformance areconsistent withthedesignbases.Also,NMPChasaneffective administrative toolfortheidentification, documentation, notification, evaluation, correction, andreporting ofconditions, events,activities, andconcernsthathavethepotential foradversely affecting thesafeandreliableoperation oftheNineMilePointNuclearStation(i.e.,theDERsystem)~Althoughdeficiencies intheareasofdesignandconfiguration controlhavebeenidentified, thesignificance ofthesedeficiencies hasbeensmall.Asproblemsareidentified, DERsareinitiated anddispositioned, andappropriate corrective andpreventive actionsaretaken.Theseprocesses areafeedbacklooptothedesignandconfiguration controlprocessinthattheyeitherconfirmthattheprocesses areworkingeffectively oridentifyproblemareaswithsubsequent corrective actionstoenhancetheprocess.Verytrulyyours,B.RalphSylviaChiefNuclearOfficer

Page3BRS/JMT/1mc Attachments xc:Mr.H.J.Miller,NRCRegionalAdministrator Mr.S.J.Collins,Director, OfficeofNRRMr.S.S.Bajwa,ActingDirector, ProjectDirectorate I-l,NRRMr.B.S.Norris,SeniorResidentInspector Mr.D.S.Hood,SeniorProjectManagerRecordsManagement

UNITEDSTATESNUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION IntheMatterofNiagaraMohawkPowerCorporation NineMilePointUnit1andUnit2)))))DocketNo.50-220DocketNo.50-410B.RalphSylvia,beingdulysworn,statesthatheisChiefNuclearOfficerofNiagaraMohawkPowerCorporation; thatheisauthorized onthepartofsaidCorporation tosignandfilewiththeNuclearRegulatory Commission thedocumentattachedhereto;andthatthedocumentistrueandcorrecttothebestofhisknowledge, information andbelief.B.RalphlviaChiefNuclearOfficerSubscribed andswornbeforeme,inandfortheStateofNewYorkandtheCountyofthis18thdayofFebruary17.MyCommission expires:9'"~~>~"INOTARYUBLIC&En

ACAEALARAANSIASMEASSSBTPBWRCADCDSCFRCSL.DBRDCDCDDCRDDCDERDSDSEDSFIEOPEPIEQEWCFSARGAPGDCGEGIGIPGLHPCIHPCSHPESHVACIASININPOIPEISEGISIISTITSJTGAlternating CurrentArchitect-Engineer AsLowAsReasonably Achievable AmericanNationalStandards Institute AmericanSocietyofMechanical Engineers Assistant StationShiftSupervisor BranchTechnical PositionBoilingWaterReactorComputerAidedDrawingControlled DocumentSystemCodeofFederalRegulations LowPressureCoreSpraySystemDesignBasisReconstitution DirectCurrentDesignCriteriaDocumentDesignChangeRequestDesignDocumentChangesDeviation/Event ReportSystemDesignSpecification DataSheetsElectrical Distribution SystemFunctional Inspection Emergency Operating Procedure Engineering ProgramIntegration ProjectEquipment Qualification Electronic WorkControlFinalSafetyAnalysisReportGeneration Administrative Procedure GeneralDesignCriteriaGeneralElectricGenericIssueGenericImplementation Procedure GenericLetterHighPressureCoolantInjection HighPressureCoreSprayHumanPerformance Evaluation SystemHeatingVentilating AirConditioning Instrument AirSystemInformation NoticeInstitute ofNuclearPowerOperations Individual PlantExamination Independent SafetyEngineering GroupInservice Inspection Inservice TestingImprovedTechnical Speci6cations JointTestGroup

LCOLDCRLERLOCAMCMELMOVMSIVNCTSNDDNEPNFPANIPNMP1NMP2NMPCNMPNSNPRDSNRCNRRNSSSNTSDNUMARCP&IDPMPMSTPTSDPCRQ1PQAQARSEQATRQVSARAPRBCLCRFO6RGRHSSALPSAPSARSBOSDBDSERSERTSEWSSOERLimitingCondition forOperation Licensing DocumentChangeRequestLicenseeEventReportLoss-of-Coolant AccidentModification Coordinator MasterEquipment ListMotor-Operated ValveMainSteamIsolation ValveNuclearCommitment TrackingSystemNuclearDivisionDirective NuclearEngineering Procedure NationalFireProtection Association NuclearInterface Procedure NineMilePointUnit1NineMilePointUnit2NiagaraMohawkPowerCorporation NineMilePointNuclearStationNuclearPlantReliability DataSystemNuclearRegulatory Commission NuclearReactorRegulation NuclearSteamSupplySystemNon-Technically Significant Discrepancy NuclearManagement andResourceCouncilPipingandInstrument DiagramPreventive Maintenance Preventive Maintenance/Surveillance TestingPotential Technically Significant Discrepancy PlantChangeRequestQualityFirstProgramQualityAssurance Qualified Applicability ReviewerSafetyEvaluator QualityAssurance TopicalReportQualityVerification andSafetyAssessment RestartActionPlanReactorBuildingClosedLoopCoolingRefueling OutageNo.6Regulatory GuideResidualHeatRemovalSystemSystematic Assessment ofLicenseePerformance StartupAdministrative Procedure SafetyAnalysisReportStationBlackoutSystemDesignBasisDocumentSignificant EventReportsSeniorEngineering ReviewTeamScreening Evaluation Worksheet Significant Operating Experience Report I

SORCSQSQUGSRABSRVSSCSSELSSERSSFISSSSVPTRRTSDUFSARUSIUSQV&VVMCStationOperations ReviewCommittee SeismicQualification SeismicQualification UtilityGroupSafetyReviewandAuditBoardSafetyReliefValveStructures, Systems,andComponents SafeShutdownEquipment ListSupplemental SafetyEvaluation ReportSafetySystemFunctional Inspection StationShiftSupervisor Surveillance Verification ProgramTrainingReviewRequestTechnically Significant Deficiency UpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(Unit1)UpdatedSafety'nalysis Report(Unit2)Unresolved SafetyIssueUnreviewed SafetyQuestionVerification andValidation VendorManualCoordinator 0~.~h' ineieointnit...g702250240

,ATTACHMENT ANINEMILEPOINTUNIT1ToicPaeREQUESTED ACTION(a)RESPONSEExecutive SummaryIntroduction Engineering DesignandConfiguration ControlProcesses 1.Activities Affecting ChangestothePhysicalPlant1A.DesignChange1B.Configuration Change1C.Temporary Modification 1D.SetpointChange1E.Maintenance andSurveillance 2.Activities Affecting ChangestoConfiguration Documents/Data 2A.Procedure Changes2B.DesignDocumentChanges(DDCs)2C.ProgramChanges2D.ChangestoTraining2E.Evaluations/Analyses 2F.DatabaseChanges2G.VendorManualChanges2H.SupplierDocumentAcceptance 2I.ChangestoLicensing Documents/New Regulatory Commitments 2J.ExternalSourcesofChange3.Activities Associated withSpecific10CFR50Requirements 3A.10CFR50.59 SafetyEvaluation Process3B.10CFR50.71(e) 3C.QAProgram/10CFR50 AppendixB4.CommonPrograms4A.ProblemIdentification Processes 4B.Training111124410111212131314151515161617171818181919202021REQUESTED ACTION(b)RESPONSEExecutive SummaryIntroduction 23232324

ATTACHMIi2IIT ANINEMILEPOINTUNIT1ToICPaeProcedure Development, Review,Approval, andRevisionAssessments andInitiatives Surveillance Verification Program(SVP)RestartActionPlan(RAP)Administrative Procedure UpdateProgramVendorManualandVendorInterface ProgramsQualityAssurance (QA)AuditsStationBlackout(SBO)AuditFireProtection AuditServiceWaterSystemAuditOperations Experience GL88-14,Instrument AirSupplySystemProblemsAffecting Safety-RelatedEquipment Unresolved SafetyIssues(USIs)A-44,StationBlackout(SBO)UFSARVerification ProgramTrainingSummary2426,2627283232323334353535363738REQUESTED ACTION(c)RESPONSEExecutive SummaryIntroduction Surveillance TestingandExaminations DesignBasisReconstitution (DBR)ProgramDesignBasisReconstitution (DBR)Walkdowns RestartActionPlan(RAP)RestartReadiness ReportNMP11990PowerAscension ProgramSafetySystemFunctional Inspections (SSFIs)Electrical Distribution SystemFunctional Inspection CoreSpraySystemandHighPressureCoolantInjection (HPCI)/Feedwater Functional Inspection 39393940404145464748494950

ATTACHMENT ANINEMILEPOINTUNITj.TO1CPaeOperations Experience GL89-10,Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve(MOV)TestingandSurveillance GL89-13,ServiceWaterProblemsAffecting Safety-Related Equipment GL88-14,Instrument AirSupplySystemProblemsAffecting Safety-RelatedEquipment GL91-06,Resolution ofGenericIssue(Gl)A-30,AdequacyofSafety-RelatedDCPowerSuppliesGL87-02,Verification ofSeismicAdequacyofMechanical andElectrical Equipment inOperating

Reactors, Unresolved SafetyIssue(USI)A-46NRCBulletin88-04,Potential Safety-Related PumpLossUnresolved SafetyIssue(USI)A-44,StationBlackoutDERTrendingResultsREQUESTED ACTION(d)RESPONSEExecutive SummaryDeviation/Event Report(DER)TrendingLessonsLearnedProblemIdentification/Evaluation StationOperations ReviewCommittee (SORC)SafetyReviewandAuditBoard(SRAB)QAAuditsandSurveillances andThirdPartyReviewsSelf-Assessment Surveillance TestingQualityFirstProgram(Q1P)(Employee Concerns)

NRCInterface ProcessTrainingREQUESTED ACTION(e)RESPONSE5051515252535354555757575761616161616263636464656666111

ATTACHMENT ANINEMILEPOINTUNIT1ToicPaeENCLOSURE 1DesignConfiguration Documents ListENCLOSURE 2DesignInputConsiderations ENCLOSURE 3DesignChangeOperability Acceptance ENCLOSURE 4DesignChangeCloseoutENCLOSURE 5FieldVarianceRiskDDCCriteria6970717273

ATTACEIMENT BNINEMILEPOINTUNIT2ToicPaeREQUESTED ACTION(a)RESPONSEExecutive SummaryIntroduction Engineering DesignandConfiguration ControlProcesses 1~Activities Affecting ChangestothePhysicalPlant1A.DesignChange1B.Configuration Change1C.Temporary Modification 1D.SetpointChange1E.Maintenance andSurveillance 2.Activities Affecting ChangestoConfiguration Documents/Data 2A.Procedure Changes2B.DesignDocumentChanges(DDCs)2C.ProgramChanges2D.ChangestoTraining2E.Evaluations/Analyses 2F.DatabaseChanges2G.VendorManualChanges2H.SupplierDocumentAcceptance 2I.ChangestoLicensing Documents/New Regulatory Commitments 2J.ExternalSourcesofChange3.Activities Associated withSpecific10CFR50Requirements 3A.10CFR50.59 SafetyEvaluation Process3B.10CFR50.71(e) 3C.QAProgram/10CFR50 AppendixB4.CommonPrograms4A.ProblemIdentification Processes 4B.Training111124410111212131314151515161617171818181919202021REQUESTED ACTION(b)RESPONSEExecutive SummaryIntroduction 23232324 0

ATTACHlVEÃT BNINEMLEPOINTUNIT2ToicPaeProcedure Development, Review,ApprovalandRevisionAssessments andInitiatives Administrative Procedure UpdateProgramSurveillance Verification Program(SVP)ISTISIAppendixJRemainder ofTSSurveillances UFSARVerification ProgramNMP2PowerUprateQualityAssurance (QA)AuditsFireProtection AuditServiceWaterSystemAuditVendorManualandVendorInterface ProgramImprovedTechnical Specification (ITS)Conversion Independent SafetyEngineering Group(ISEG)Operations Experience GL88-14,Instrument AirSupplySystemProblemsAffecting Safety-RelatedEquipment Unresolved SafetyIssues(USIs)A-44,StationBlackout(SBO)TrainingSummaryREQUESTED ACTION(c)RESPONSEExecutive SummaryIntroduction FSARVerification EffortNMP2InitialTestProgramSurveillance TestingandExaminations PowerUprateSafetySystemFunctional Inspections (SSFIs)Electrical Distribution SystemFunctional Inspection (EDSFI)ServiceWaterSystem2427273131313131333434343536383839393940414242424343434445464646

ATTACHMENT BNINEMILEPOINTUNIT2ToicPaeOperations Experience GL89-10,Safety-Related Motor-Operated (MOV)TestingandSurveillance GL89-13,ServiceWaterProblemsAffecting Safety-Related Equipment GL88-14,Instrument AirSupplySystemProblemsAffecting Safety-RelatedEquipment NRCBulletin88-04,Safety-Related PumpLossUnresolved SafetyIssue(USI)A-44,StationBlackout(SBO)DERTrendingResultsREQUESTED ACTION(d)RESPONSEExecutive SummaryDeviation/Event Report(DER)TrendingLessonsLearnedProblemIdentification/Evaluation Independent SafetyEngineering Group(ISEG)StationOperations ReviewCommittee (SORC)SafetyReviewandAuditBoard(SRAB)QAAuditsandSurveillances andThirdPartyReviewsSelf-Assessment Surveillance TestingQualityFirstProgram(Q1P)(Employee Concerns)

NRCInterface ProcessTrainingREQUESTED ACTION(e)RESPONSE46474848484949515151515555555555565657585858596060ENCLOSURE 1DesignConfiguration Documents ListENCLOSURE 2DesignInputConsiderations ENCLOSURE 3DesignChangeOperability Acceptance ENCLOSURE 4DesignChangeCloseoutENCLOSURE 5FieldVarianceRiskDDCCriteria6364656667

• ATTACHM1<PIT CNINEMILEPOINTUNIT1ANDU5KT2ToicPaeNRCCommitments Made:

e Provideadescription ofengineering designandconfiguration controlprocesses, including thosethatimplement 10CFR50.59, 10CFR50.71(e),

andAppendixBto10CFRPart50.ThetextthatfollowsinresponsetoRequested Action(a)ofthe50.54(fjletterprovidesadescription ofhowthedesignandconfiguration controlprocessismanaged,controlled, andimplemented atNineMilePointNuclearStation(NMPNS).Inaddition, detailsareprovidedtoshowthatprocedures existforensuringthatengineering designandconfiguration changesaQectingtheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR)areevaluated inaccordance withthecriteriaof10CFR50.59 andincorporated intotheUFSARinaccordance withtherequirements of10CFR50.71(e).

Alsodetailedarethequalityprogramelementsthatassurethatanyworkinvolving safety-related structures, systems,orcomponents meetsthedesignandconfiguration controlrequirements ofAppendixBoftheMVPNSUFSARinaccordance withourcommitment toAppendixBto10CFR50.NMPNSpersonnel performworkinaccordance withprocedures thathavebeendeveloped and,inrecentyears,significantly

improved, tomeettheregulatory requirements established tooperateandmaintaintheplantinaccordance withourlicense.Theseprocedures areperiodically reviewedandundergorevision, asappropriate.

Themanagement andthestafFofNMPNShavesignificantly improvedtheirawareness ofthelicensing anddesignbasisdocuments inrecentyears.Back-to-Basics trainingprogramshavebeenestablished whichhaveemphasized theimportance oflicense-based thinking.

Ourcorrective actionprogramfocusesattention onthecorrection andprevention ofmistakesresulting fromafailuretofullyunderstand oradheretotherequirements ofourprocedures.

Theapproachforassuringthatprocedures existtocontrolengineering worksuchthattheplantdesignandconfiguration controlconformswiththeNineMilePointUnit1(NMP1)licensing basisfollows.TheNiagaraMohawkPowerCorporation (NMPC)NuclearDivisionPolicyandDirectives Manualsetsforththeoverallprogramforcontrolling theoperation, maintenance, andmodification oftheNMPNStoassurecompliance withapplicable regulatory requirements, licenseconditions, andNMPCcommitments.

ThetotalprogramconsistsoftheNuclearDivisionPolicy,theNuclearDivisionDirectives (NDDs),andlowertierdocuments (administrative andimplementing procedures) developed toimplement theapplicable requirements.

Thehierarchy ofPolicy,Directives, andadministrative andimplementing procedures isshownonFigure1inourresponsetoRequested Action(b).

TheNDDsarethevehiclebywhichmanagement communicates requirements forperforming andcontrolling activities tothoseresponsible forpreparing NuclearDivision, departmental, andbranchprocedures.

TheNDDsidentifyapplicable regulatory requirements andassociated QualityAssurance (QA)programcommitments thatmustbeincorporated intoimplementing procedures.

Eachactivityaddressed inanNDDidentifies thespecificrequirements andorganizational responsibilities concerning thatactivity.

NuclearInterface Procedures (NIPs)arepreparedtoimplement NDDs.NIPsgovernactivities involving interfaces betweenorganizational departments andforthoseactivities performed bymorethanoneNuclearDivisiondepartment whereacommonmethodology isdesired.Department andbranchleveladministrative procedures arepreparedtodefinetheorganization, assignresponsibilities withintheorganization, andprescribe methodsforaccomplishing thoseactivities orportionsofactivities addressed inNDDsorNIPs.Engineering designandconfiguration controlactivities areprimarily implemented inconformance withNuclearEngineering Procedures (NEPs)andapplicable Generation Administrative Procedures (GAPs).Technical implementing procedures arestep-by-step procedures preparedtoprescribe methodsforaccomplishing thoseactivities orportionsofactivities asoutlinedintherespective NDD,NIP,ordepartment administrative procedure tobeconducted withintheindividual branch.Thehierarchy described aboveismaintained fortheengineering designandconfiguration controlprogram.TheNDDonDesignControlestablishes therequirements fortheNMPNSdesigncontrolprogramandassignstheresponsibility forimplementing thoserequirements.

TheDesignControlDirective appliestodesignactivities associated withsafety-related orquality-related structures, systems,andcomponents (SSCs).Thedesigncontrolrequirements includedinthisdirective arespecified intheNMPCQATopicalReport(NMPC-QATR-1),

theTechnical Specifications administrative controlsectionandtheNDDsgoverning nuclearcomputersystems.Activities subjecttodesigncontrolarecategorized asoneormoreofthefollowing:

engineering evaluation oranalysis, designchange,configuration change,temporary modification, orplantcondition monitoring program.AseparateNDDestablishes therequirements andresponsibilities forconfiguration management, including requirements toidentifyandupdateselectedcontrolled documents anddatabases toassurethattheNMPNSisoperated,

modified, andmaintained inconformance withtheapproveddesignandcurrentlicensing basis.Thisfunctionisaccomplished bycontrolling changestoessential plantSSCsandassociated procedures,

programs, anddatabases sothattheyaremaintained consistent withapproveddesignoutputdocuments.

Information ordataaboutplantconfiguration thatisnecessary forefficient andcorrectdesign,operation, andmaintenance ofessential plantsystemsissubjected toconfiguration controls.

Thefollowing discussion describes currentmethodsforcontrolling engineering designandplantconfiguration, including designchanges,configuration changes,designdocument

changes(DDC),procedure changes,temporary modifications, programchanges,plantmaintenance, andtheevaluation ofvarioussourcesofinformation forpossibleimpacttothedesignbasis.Typicalofnuclearplantsthroughout theindustry, theNMPNSiscommitted toasystemofdesignandconfiguration controlsbasedontherequirements ofAppendixBto10CFRPart50,aswellasotherregulations andindustrystandards, Thissystemincludesnotonlycontrols, butalsofeedbackloops(testing, evaluation) thatresultinanongoingcomparison ofactualconfiguration withthedesignbasis.Successful implementation ofthedesignandconfiguration controlsystemassuresthattheNMPNSisoperated, tested,andmaintained withinitsdesignbasisthroughout itslife.Thediscussion thatfollowsisorganized intofourbroadareasofactivities.

Thefirstareaincludesthoseactivities affecting thephysicalplant.Thesecondareaincludesthoseactivities affecting configuration documents/data.

Thethirdareaincludesactivities associated withspecific10CFR50requirements.

Thefourthareaincludescommonprogramsapplicable totheotheractivities.

Eachoftheseareasisfurtherorganized intodetailedactivities asfollows.1.Activities Affecting ChangestothePhysicalPlant:1A.DesignChange1B.Configuration Change1C.Temporary Modification 1D.SetpointChange1E.Maintenance andSurveillance 2.Activities Affecting ChangestoConfiguration Documents/Data:

2A.Procedure Changes2B.DesignDocumentChanges(DDCs)2C.ProgramChanges2D.ChangestoTraining2E.Evaluations/Analyses 2F.DatabaseChanges2G.VendorManualChanges K

2H.SupplierDocumentAcceptance 2I.ChangestoLicensing Documents/New Regulatory Commitments 2J.ExternalSourcesofChange3.Activities Associated withSpecific10CFR50Requirements:

3A.10CFR50.59 SafetyEvaluation Process3B.10CFR50.71(e) 3C.QAProgram/10CFR50 AppendixB4.CommonPrograms:

4A.ProblemIdentification Processes 4B.TrainingWhenphysicalplantchangesarerequested, theyareevaluated inaccordance withaNIPtodetermine whetherdesigncontrolsshouldbeappliedtothechange.Increasing levelsofcontrolareappliedtoplantchangescommensurate withthesafetysignificance ofthechangeasperAppendixBto10CFR50.Changestothephysicalplantareaccomplished usingoneofthefollowing processes:

designchange,configuration change,ortemporary modification.

Eachoftheseprocesses isdescribed below.Setpointchanges,maintenance, andsurveillance activities arealsodiscussed becausetheyrepresent processes thatassure,orconfirmcontinuing, reliablesystemoperation and,assuch,mustbecontrolled toremainconsistent withdesignbasisparameters.

1A.DesignChangeThedesignchangeprocessisacontrolled processthatisappliedwhendesignconfiguration documents and/ordatabases (aslistedinEnclosure 1tothisAttachment) areaffected, andtheproposedchangeaffectsthefunctionofsafety-related orquality-related SSCsortheirreliability, expectedlife,localenvironment, orfailuremodes.Additionally, thedesignchangeprocessisappliedtochangesinvolving interfaces withsafety-related orquality-related SSCs.Theprocessmayalsobeusedforothersituations atthediscretion ofEngineering orplantmanagement whenstringent controlsaredesirable.

Whenaplantchangehasbeenevaluated andapprovedforimplementation, itisenteredintothePlantChangeRequest(PCR)database.

Ifitistobetreatedasadesignchange,itisgiven V

adesignchangenumber.Intheinitialstagesofadesignchange,theresponsible engineerordesignerusesadesignimpactchecklist todetermine thepotential impactofthechange,possibleissuestobeconsidered, andthekindsofdesigninputrequired.

Basedonthechecklist review,inputisrequested fromdiscipline experts,programadministrators, andaffectedgroups.Thedesigninputprocedure requiresthatthoseproviding inputconsideracomprehensive listoftopics.Theseprimarily emphasize thedesignbasisrequirements, functionality andperformance requirements, andotherrequirements relatedtomaintaining theintegrity ofthedesign(Enclosure 2tothisAttachment).

Specifically, thedesigninputprocedure requiresthatdesigninputsuchasdesignbases,performance requirements, regulatory requirements, andcodesandstandards, areidentified, documented, andtheselection reviewedandapprovedbythedesignorganization.

Also,references mustbesufficiently specifictoallowtraceability.

Thisprovidestheinitiallinkbetweentheproposedchange,thedesignbases,andthelicensing basis.Thedesignchangeissubsequently developed onthebasisoftheseinputs.Aslaterdescribed, theseinputsareverifiedinaccordance withprocedures andthedesignissubjected tofurthercomparison withthelicensing basisatotherstagesofthedesignprocess.Concurrently, theconfiguration management processes arealsoinitiated.

TheMasterEquipment List(MEL)andtheControlled DocumentSystem(CDS)aresearchedforpotentially affecteddocuments, forotherpendingworkorwork-in-progress thatcouldaffectthedesign,andforconfirmation ofequipmentldocument currentstatus.TheMELmayalsobeusedasaconfirmatory sourceofinformation formanyoftheitemsinthedesignimpactchecklist becauseitlistsvariousequipment requirements andcharacteristics, including safetyclass.Avarietyofotherinformation mayalsobeavailable, including whetherEquipment Qualification (EQ),SeismicQualification (SQ),Inservice Inspection (ISI)andNuclearPlantReliability DataSystem(NPRDS)considerations applytothecomponents.

Thenextphaseofthedesignchangeprocessisthedevelopmental phase.Intermediate

products, suchasevaluations andanalyses, stressreports,andcalculations, areprepared.

Theseactivities areperformed usingcontrolled procedures andresultincontrolled productsthatcannotbechangedwithoutre-invoking theoriginallevelofreviewandapproval.

Newdesignoutputdocuments orchangestodesignoutputs,suchasrevisions todrawings, vendortechnical manuals,acceptance

criteria, setpointdatasheets,designbasisdocuments/design

criteria, andspecifications, aredeveloped.

ChangesmayeitherbeintheformofDDCsthatarepostedagainsttheaffecteddocumentorbyfullrevisionofthedocument.

Pendingchangestoconfiguration databases arealsoidentified andprocessed.

Changestolicensing documents, including theUFSARandTechnical Specifications, aredeveloped inaccordance withcontrolled procedures.

SystemEngineers intheTechnical SupportDepartment arerequested bytheresponsible engineertonotifyprocedure ownersofrequiredchangestoprocedures, andtocoordinate requiredtraining.

Finally,anyguidancenecessary tosupportinstallation andtestingisdeveloped incoordination withtheinstalling organization.

Uponcompletion ofthesesteps,thedesignpackageissufficiently completefromatechnical pointofviewtoallowfinalreviewpriortoissuance.

Designoutputsareapproved, butnotreleasedforimplementation untilthereviewsrequiredinthefinaldesignphasearecomplete.

IIIllIlI Duringthefinaldesignphase,theresponsible engineer/designer reviewsthepackagetoassurethatthedesignobjective ismet,thatnoopentechnical issuesexist,andthatappropriate designimpactshavebeensatisfactorily addressed.

Anyindividual whoprovideddesigninputmayrequestfinaldesignreviewtoconfirmthat'thedesigninputwascorrectly implemented inthefinaldesignchangepackage.Thenextstepisindependent designverification byaqualified individual pertheengineering designverification procedure.

Thisactivityprovidesanindependent reviewtoassurethatappropriate designcriteria, qualitycriteria, anddesignbaseshavebeencorrectly identified, andtoassurethatthedesignoutputmeetsthespecified designinputsandtheoveralldesignobjective.

Ifnotdonepreviously, anapplicability reviewandsafetyevaluation arecompleted asdescribed laterunderthe10CFR50.59 safetyevaluation process.Afterverification (andresolution ofanyconcerns),

thedesignchangeisreadyforfinalreviewandapproval.

Thesereviewsinclude:~Reviewandapprovalbyaqualified engineering approver; IReviewby,aQualified Technical Reviewerper,Technical Specification 6.5.2.3;~Cross-disciplinary reviews,ifrequiredbytheQualified Technical ReviewerperTechnical Specification 6.5.2.4;and~ReviewandapprovalbythePlantManageror'Manager Technical SupportperTechnical Specification 6.5.2.3.Completion ofthedesign,review,andapprovalactivities isdocumented onaDesignChangeControlform.Thisformservesasaflagtoeitherpreventorallowissuanceofdesignoutputdocuments tothefieldforinstallation, asdescribed below.Designoutputdocuments areissuedandreleasedperthedocumentcontrolinterface procedure.

TheyareenteredintotheCDSasdocuments thatareapprovedbutnotyetOperations Accepted(i.e.,theydonotyetrepresent installed configuration).

Theyarethendistributed toastandarddistribution thatincludestheModification Coordinator intheTechnical Supportdepartment, TheModification Coordinator servesasthecoordination pointforplantdesignchangesanditisthroughtheModification Coordinator thatdesignoutputdocuments aretransmitted tothefieldforinstallation.

WhentheModification Coordinator receivesdesignoutputdocuments (e.g.,reviseddrawings, DDCs,etc.),thedocument(s) isretaineduntilacopyoftheassociated DesignChangeControlformisreceived.

Thispreventspremature orinadvertent issuanceofdesignoutputdocuments thathavenotbeenfullyreviewedandapprovedforinstallation; i.e.,approvedatboththedocumentlevelandatthedesignchangelevel.

~~I'4 WorkOrdersarewrittenbytheresponsible

engineer, Modification Coordinator, ormaintenance plannerusingtheelectronic workcontrol(EWC)system.TheseWorkOrdersandtheirassociated designoutputdocuments arecross-referenced inthePCRdatabaseundertheassociated designchangenumber,sothatwhentheWorkOrdersassociated withthedesignchangearecompleted, theModification Coordinator cannotifyinvolvedpartiesthatOperations Acceptance (turnover toOperations) ispossible.

Uponcompletion oftheWorkOrdersassociated withadesignchange,theModification Coordinator confirmsthattheapplicability reviewnumberandsafetyevaluation number(ifapplicable) arelistedinthedesignpackage(asachecktoverifycompletion oftheapplicability reviewandsafetyevaluation ifapplicable),

andnotifiestheSystemEngineertoverifycompletion ofanyprocedure changes,testing,andtrainingrequiredtoplacethesysteminservice.PlantSupportEngineering isnotifiedto"redline" criticaldrawingssothatplantoperators willhavecurrentandaccuratedrawingsintheControlRoomwhenthenewdesignchangeisOperations Accepted.

TheModification Coordinator alsoverifiesthatallrequiredrisk-released documents havebeenresolvedpriortoOperations Acceptance (seebelowforanexplanation oftherisk-release process).

Nonconformances identified duringtheprocessaredocumented onDeviation/Event Reports(DER),evaluated, andresolved.

Whentheseactionsarecomplete, theyaredocumented onaDesignChangeOperability Acceptance form.Thesignature oftheManager/General Supervisor Operations (ordesignee) conveysOperations acceptance ofthedesignchange(Enclosure 3tothisAttachment).

Operations acceptance isrequiredpriortorelyingontheSSCtoperformitsfunction.

ADesignChangeCloseoutForm(Enclosure 4tothisAttachment) isinitiated toassurethatactivities associated withthedesignchangeareverifiedanddocumented ascomplete.

TheModification Coordinator thenenterstheOperations Acceptance dateintothePCRdatabasetoindicatethatthedesignchangehasbeenacceptedandisnowcurrentplantconfiguration.

Thisinformation issharedwiththeCDSdatabasetostatustheassociated designdocuments asOperations Accepted.

TheMELdatabaseisautomatically updatedtomovethependingMELchangesfromthe"pending" filetothe"active"filewithastatusof"C"whichdesignates thatitreflectscurrentconfiguration.

Atcloseout, theresponsible engineerforwardstheDesignChangeControlform,andanyotherrequiredrecordsthatwerenotpreviously releasedthroughtheCDS,tothepermanent plantfile.Thedocuments usedtotrackthedesignchangethroughinstallation toOperations Acceptance; e.g.,logs,Operations Acceptance form,DesignChangeCloseoutform,andPCRsareforwarded tothepermanent plantfilebytheModification Coordinator.

Theseactionsensurethatpermanent recordsofthedesignchange,frominitiation tocloseout, areavailable forthebalanceofplantlifeforfurtherrevieworaudit,ifneeded.Therearetwovariantsofthedesignchangeprocess;1)risk-release ofdesignchanges;and2)partialoperations acceptance ofdesignchanges.Risk-release isdefinedinourengineering procedures asaprocessbywhichanorganization formallyrecognizes andapprovesthefinancial riskofbeginning animplementation orinstallation priortofullapprovalofthefinaldesign.Risk-release doesnotinvolvearisktopersonnel safetyornuclearsafety.Usually, 011 designoutputdocuments areissuedonlyafterappropriate aspectsofthedesigndevelopment, review,andapprovalarecomplete.

Undercertaincircumstances, itisnecessary toreleasecertaindesignoutputsona"riskbasis"toallowpre-staging, pre-fabrication, pre-installation, partialinstallation, andtoallowforfieldvariances toworkin'progress.

However,becausethesecircumstances involvefinancial risk,therisk-release processisusedsparingly.

Activities suchaspre-staging, pre-fabrication, andpre-installation/partial installation maybeinitiated andprocessed usingtherisk-release process.First,theresponsible engineermustprepareadocumented justification ofwhythedesignorpartialdesignmustbereleasedpriortobeingfullyapproved.

Theactivitymustbereversible withinatimeframeconsistent withtheactivitytosupportoperating requirements.

Iftheresponsible Engineering supervisor approvestherisk-release, itissubmitted tothePlantManagerforapproval.

Inaccordance withthesafetyevaluation procedure, whichprohibits anychangetotheplant(temporary orpermanent) withoutanappropriate review,anyrisk-released workmusthavebeenproperlyevaluated forplantsafetyimpactandcomparedwiththedesignandlicensing basespriortoimplementation.

AfterPlantManagerapproval, theresponsible engineermakeslimiteddistribution oftherequireddesigndocuments, whicharestatusedas"risk"intheconfiguration databases.

Untilthis"risk"statusisresolved, thedesignchangecannotbe'Operations

Accepted, (i.e.,turnedovertoOperations) orreliedupontoprovideitsfunction.

Whentheriskisresolved, thedesignchangeprocesscontinues normallythroughOperations Acceptance andcloseout.

Risk-release offieldvariances maybeauthorized byaresponsible engineertoallowminorchangestoworkinprogress(e.g.,correcting interferences).

Inthesecases,theinstaller requestsEngineering toreviewthesituation andtherequested fieldvarianceforinitialfeasibility.

Ifthefieldvariancesatisfies theprocedural criteria(listedinEnclosure 5tothisAttachment),

theengineermayinitiatearisk-release DDCtoallowtheworktocontinuewithoutinterruption.

TheriskDDCisgivenlimiteddistribution bytheresponsible engineer.

Onecopygoestotheinstaller tocontinuework;onecopytotheModification Coordinator toentertheriskDDCintothedesignchangedocumentlogforsubsequent trackingandresolution priortoOperations Acceptance; onecopytoDocumentControlforentryintoCDSwitha"Risk"status;andtheoriginaltoEngineering forcompletion ofallreviewsandapprovals inaccordance withtherequirements ofthenormaldesignchangeprocess.IftheEngineering reviewandapprovalprocessuncoversproblemswiththeriskDDC,theworkisstoppedandreversed, orotherwise corrected.

WhentheriskDDCisfullyapprovedperEngineering procedures, itisissuedthroughDocumentControltoitsstandarddistribution.

Thedocumentstatusischangedfrom"risk"to"approved".

OncetheModification Coordinator receivesanddistributes thefullyapprovedDDC,theworkiscompleted orconfirmed completeinaccordance withthefullyapprovedDDC.ThedesignchangecanthenbeOperations Acceptedandclosedoutfollowing thenormaldesignchangeprocess.TheothervarianttothenormaldesignchangeprocessistheoptionofpartialOperations Acceptance.

Thisoptionmaybeusedwhenthedesignchangeaffectsmultiplecomponents ortrainsthatmaybesafelyputbackintoservicebeforeeverycomponent or"train"hasbeenmodified.

AnexampleofhowpartialOperations Acceptance couldbeusedistheprocessofimplementing achangethataffectsmanyidentical components acrossavarietyofapplications

,'l<.',>><)f$)l<'riV5 orsystems.Inthiscase,thedesigndocuments andassociated safetyevaluation wouldbewrittentocovermanyspecificapplications ofasingletypeofcomponent (e.g.,pipesnubbers).

TheModification Coordinator wouldthenbeabletotrackandobtainOperations Acceptance ofthedesignchangeatthecomponent levelratherthanhavingtowaituntilallaffectedcomponents inthedesignchangewereOperations Accepted.

Asinthenormaldesignchangeprocess,thedatabases areupdatedatthetimeofpartialOperations Acceptance toshowthatthedesignchangehasbeencompleted forcomponent Xforexample(butnotYandZ),andthecomponent isreadytogobackintoservice.Therequirements forpartialOperations Acceptance aresimilartofullOperations Acceptance, thatis,thesafetyreviewprocessmustbecomplete; associated WorkOrders,including thosefortesting,mustbecomplete; applicable procedures mustberevised;requiredtrainingcompleted orinprogress; risk-releaseddocuments mustbefullyapprovedandtheriskresolved; andtheControlRoomcriticaldrawingsaccurately updatedtoshowtheportionofthechangethatisbeingpartially Operations Accepted.

Fuelreplacement, becauseofitsuniquerequirements, iscontrolled byasetofprocedures thatincludesNEPsandFuelsGroupEngineering DesignStandards (OT-EDS)thatmeet10CFR50AppendixBrequirements.

Keydesigninputsaresolicited,

reviewed, andapprovedaspartofthedesignprocess.Thepreliminary fuelbundledesignisprovidedbyanNMPC-qualified vendor.Designiterations occurbetweenthefuelvendorandNMPC.Analysesandcalculations supporting thecoredesignareperformed andverifiedbyNMPCusingcontrolled procedures.

Thefinalcoredesignisverifiedindependently bythevendorundertheirNMPC-qualified QAprogram.Calculations andanalysessupporting licensing requirements fortransients andloss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs)areperformed todetermine fueloperating limitsforthenewcoredesign.ThevendorsubmitsafinalreporttoNMPCdocumenting theverification ofthedesign,compliance todesignrequirements, analysisresults,andnewoperational limits.NMPCacceptsthedesignbytechnical reviewandperformsa10CFR50.59 safetyevaluation asdescribed laterinthissection.Licensing documentchangesareperformed inaccordance withcontrolled procedures.

Thefinalreviewandapproval,

issuance, installation, andacceptance followaprocesssimilartothedesignchangeprocess.Insummary,thedesignchangeprocess(including risk-release andpartialOperations Acceptance, andfuelreplacement) isacontrolled processwhichrequiresreviewandcomparison oftheproposedchangetothedesignbasisoftheplant.Theprimarybarrierofdefenseagainstdeviations fromthelicensing basisisthe10CFR50.59 processthatisrequiredforeachplantchange,Thedesignimpactassessment anddesigninputprocessrequiretheresponsible engineerand,asnecessary, otherdiscipline experts,programadministrators, andotheraffectedgroupstodescribeorreference appropriate designrequirements andconstraints toassurecompliance withtheplantdesignbasis.Additionally, configuration databases provideconfirmatory sourcesofdesignbasisinformation.

Anindependent verifierreviewsthedesignforconsistency withdesigninputs,including designbasisrequirements.

Finally,avarietyofconfiguration

controls, including administrative procedures anddatabases, areinplacetoassurethatinformation necessary tosupportthechangeisaccurateandisputinplaceconcurrent withthechange(e.g.,revisions toprocedures,

drawings, training, anddatabases).

Thisassuresthatdesignbasisandlicensing basisrequirements cascadedownthroughtheNMP1

~I4P systemandresultinproperoperation, maintenance, andtestingoftheplantaslicensedbythe.NuclearRegulatory Commission (NRC).1B.Configuration ChangeTheconfiguration changeprocessisusedforactivities including plantchangesthataffectdesigndocuments ordatabases (Enclosure 1tothisAttachment),

and:1)donotaffectthefunctions ofsafety-related orquality-related SSCs;2)donotadversely affectthereliability, expectedlife,localenvironment, orfailuremodesofsafety-related orquality-related SSCs;3)donotinvolveinterfaces withsafety-related orquality-related SSCsand;4)donotchangetheintentoreffectiveness ofprogramsrequiredbyregulation.

Thisprocessisprimarily intendedfornonsafety-related changeshavingnosafetyimpactandnointerfaces withsafety-related systems.However,itmayalsobeusedforsafety-related equivalent, replacements suchaslike-for-likecomponent replacements.

Thefirststepintheconfiguration changeprocessistoconfirmthattheproposedchangeeithersatisfies ordoesnotaffectthecurrentdesignandlicensing basis.Thisstepisinadditiontothe10CFR50.59 reviewthatwilleventually alsobeperformed; however,itassuresthattheresponsible engineerwillcomparetheproposedchangewiththeUFSAR,Technical Specifications, andotherlicensing documents andregulations asearlyintheprocessaspossible.

Theprocedure alsorequiresthatiftheengineerdetermines thatsafety-related orquality-related functions described inthecurrentdesignandlicensing basisareaffected, thedesignchangeprocessmustbeusedinsteadoftheconfiguration changeprocess.Likethedesignchangeprocess,aconfiguration changerequiresassessment ofpotential impactsusingthedesignimpactchecklist andtheidentification ofpotentially affecteddocuments anddatabases.

Atthispoint,outputdocuments suchasdrawings, drawingrevisions, DDCs,specifications, andvendormanualrevisions areprocessed andpendingchangestodatabases aredeveloped.

Changestolicensedocuments areprocessed pertheinterface procedure governing controloflicenses, UFSARs,andNRCapprovedplansandprograms.

Ifthechangeinvolvessafety-related orqualityrelatedSSCs,anequivalency evaluation isdocumented forthepermanent plantfileshowingwhythechangehasnoeffectonthedesignbases.Ifequivalencycannotbejustified, thechangeisprocessed asadesignchange.

Likeanyotherplantchange,configuration changesareevaluated per10CFR50.59.

Atthispoint,theconfiguration changeisreadyforfinalreviewbytheEngineering approver.

Unlikeadesignchange,independent verification andPlantManagerapprovalarenotnecessary.

However,similartoadesignchange,thecompletion andapprovalofaconfiguration changeisdocumented onaConfiguration ChangeControlform.Processing fromthispointforwardissimilartotheprocessing ofadesignchange.Outputsaredistributed throughDocumentControltotheModification Coordinator who,uponreceiptofanapprovedConfiguration ChangeControlform,issuesthechangetothefieldand,uponcompletion, presentsittoOperations forreviewandacceptance, Thesameconfiguration controlsthatNMP110

$hI appliedtothedesignchangeprocessareinvokedbytheconfiguration changeprocessatOperations Acceptance, including automatic databaseupdates,verification ofprocedures andtraining,,and "redlining" ofcriticaldrawings.

Insummary,althoughtheconfiguration changeprocessisaimedprimarily atchangesthatdonotaffectthedesignbasisoftheplant,therearenumerouscontrolsinplacetopreventthesechangesfromcompromising theplantoperating, maintenance, andtestrequirements, andthedesigndocuments uponwhichtheyarebased.1C.Temporary Modification Temporary modifications arecontrolled peraGAP.ThisGAPappliestotemporary modifications tositeinstallations, facilities, structures, andinservice systemsandcomponents therein,asdescribed intheUFSAR.Likeconfiguration anddesignchanges,temporary modifications mustbescreenedtodetermine whetherdesigncontrolsapplyandif10CFR50,59 applies.Becauseofthehierarchical structure oftheprocedures, theinterfacing procedures governing designcontroland10CFR50.59 reviewsarealwaysinvokedforplantchangesthatcouldimpactthelicensing basis,including temporary modifications.

Asaresult;temporary modifications receivethesamereviewaspermanent changesregarding conformance withdesignandlicensing:basis requirements.

Temporary modifications arecoordinated bytheSystemEngineers intheTechnical SupportBranch.Designchangesareprocessed perengineering procedures described previously.

Atemporary modification controlformisusedtocontroltheinstallation andremovalofthetemporary modification.

Associated 10CFR50.59 safetyevaluations aredeveloped andreviewedasdescribed laterintheresponse.

Temporary modifications thataffectnuclearsafetyarereviewedbyaQualified Technical ReviewerandapprovedbythePlantManagerorManagerTechnical Support.Priortoauthorizing implementation ofatemporary modification, theStationShiftSupervisor (SSS)reviewstheassociated applicability review/safety evaluation andWorkOrdertoassurecompliance withtheTechnical Specifications.

At,thispointintheprocess,thetemporary modification maybeinstalled perapplicable work/design documents withthepermission oftheoperating shiftleadership (SSSandChiefShiftOperator).

Temporary modifications aretaggedandtestedasrequiredbyprocedure.

Theyare,verifiedashavingbeeninstalled inaccordance withapplicable work/design documents andControlRoomcriticaldrawingsareredlinedaspartofimplementation.

TheSSSreviewsthecompleted temporary modification packagetodetermine theoperability statusoftheaffectedsystem(s).

JClearance oftemporary modifications isthereverseoftheaboveexceptthat10CFR50.59 reviewsarenotnecessary unlesstheequipment isbeingreturnedtoastateotherthantheoriginaldesign.Inthatcase,theactivitywouldgothroughthescreening processes againandbere-evaluated perprocedure.

Clearance involvesindependent verification, confirmation ofcompletion ofprocedure revisions, testing,andasnecessary traininganddetermination ofsimulator impact.Ifdesigndocuments ordatabases wereaffected, Engineering isnotifiedso11 V

thattheoriginalconfiguration'an berestored.

ControlRoomcriticaldrawingsareupdatedtotheoriginalconfiguration, ifpreviously affected.

TheSSSreviewsclearedtemporary modification packagestodetermine theoperability oftheaffectedsystem(s).

llInsummary,thetemporary modification processisacontrolled processthatassurestheintegrity ofthelicenseanddesignbasesbyinvokingthereviewsofthelicensebasisrequiredby10CFR50.59, andbyapplyingconfiguration controlsthatassurethattheplant,associated procedures,

training, andtestingconformtothedesignbasisoftheplant.Thesechecksareappliedbothduringinstallation andclearance oftemporary modifications, assuringthatthechangesfrom,andtherestoration to,theoriginalcondition areverifiedascompleteandcorrect.1D.SetpointChangeNMPNSmaintains setpointcontrolthroughthehierarchy ofdesigncontrolandconfiguration management procedures.

Changestosetpoints areperformed andcontrolled inaccordance withNEPsincluding thoseassociated with"DesignChange,""Configuration Change,""DesignDocumentChange,""DesignInput,"and"Calculations."

Adesigninputstatement isrequiredforsetpointchangesthataredefinedasadesignchangeandprovidestheinputandbasisforthechange.Inaddition, eachsetpointchangerequiresanapplicability reviewtobeperformed inaccordance withtheNIPforApplicability ReviewsandSafetyEvaluations.

NMP1Instrument andControlsafety-related andnonsafety-related designsetpoints arecontrolled inaccordance withanEngineering SetpointSpecification.

Whensetpoints arechanged,designoutputdocuments intheformofDDCsareissuedandpostedagainstthisdocumentandlaterincorporated intosubsequent revisions tothespecification.

Therevisionprocessiscontrolled inaccordance withtheEngineering procedure forengineering specifications.

Setpointrequirements forplantinstruments, bothsafety-related andnonsafety-related, aredefinedincontrolled documents andaremaintained viathedocumentcontrolprocess.Changestosetpoints areconsidered plantchangesandaremanagedbytheengineering changeprocessviatheappropriate NIPsandNEPs.Asetpointchangemaybeaconfiguration change,adesignchange,oratemporary modification.

'E.Maintenance andSurveillance Maintenance andsurveillance activities, whethercorrective maintenance, preventive maintenance ortesting,arebasedon,orareconsistent with;approveddesigndocumentation, Technical Specifications, orregulatory sourcedocuments.

Recurring activities suchaspreventive maintenance orsurveillance testingareaddressed bycontrolled procedures.

Corrective maintenance, maybeperformed utilizing procedural

guidance, ormaybeperformed usingdesigndocuments directlyaspartofaWorkOrder.Drawings, vendormanuals,specifications, setpointdatasheets,DDCs,andotherapprovedEngineering 12 4

documents areoftenreferenced intheMaintenance WorkOrderssothattheycanbeusedtoaccurately returntheSSCtoitsas-designed state.2.Thepreceding textcoveredhowchangestothephysicalplantaremade,including theprocesses usedtocomparethechangetothedesignbasestoassurecontinued compliance, andtherevisionofaffecteddocuments/databases toreflectthechange.Inthissection,thediscussion willcoversituations whereachangetodocuments ordatabases, ratherthanachangetothephysicalplant,istheinitiator, andhowthatchangeiscomparedtothelicensing basisanddesignbasesforcompliance and,ifnecessary, isincorporated intotheplantconfiguration.

Thesechangeprocesses include:1)Procedure Changes;2)DDCs;3)ProgramChanges;4)ChangestoTraining; 5)Evaluations/Analyses; 6)DatabaseChanges;7)VendorManualChanges;8)SupplierDocumentAcceptance; 9)ChangestoLicensing Documents/New Commitments; and10)OtherExternalSourcesofChange.Theseprocesses mayimpactthewaytheNMPNSisoperated, tested,maintained andmodified; therefore, theyarediscussed indetailasfollows.2A.Procedure ChangesTheprocedure changeprocessusedatNMPNSincludescontrolled requirements fordevelopment, requiredreviews,approvals, andconfiguration control.Theprocessgenerally conformswiththerequirements

'andrecommendations ofAmericanNationalStandards Institute (ANSI)/ANS-3.2-1976 asendorsedbyRegulatory Guide(RG)1.33,Revision2,andSection5.3ofANSI/ANS-3,2-1982, andhasbeenexpandedandrefinedbeyondthebasicrequirements toincorporate operating experience andlessonslearned.Keysupportprogramsandguidancedocuments havebeenestablished toenhanceprogramefficiency andfacilitate timelyincorporation ofchanges.Theprocessconsistsoffourdistinctelements:

1)development; 2)developmental reviews;3)finalreview;and4)approval.

Thedetailsoftheprocessdifferslightlyforadministrative procedures andtechnical procedures (e.g.,changestoadministrative procedures donotrequireatechnical verification unlesstheprocedures arerequiredbyTechnical Specification'6.8 orotherwise affectnuclearsafety),however,thebasicelementsareemployedforbothtypesofprocedures.

Thedevelopment phaserequiresassignment ofanindividual knowledgeable intheareacoveredbytheprocedure.

Toassistinthedevelopment process,NMPChasdeveloped aProcedure WritersManualwhichprovidesextensive g'uidance onthestructure, content,andhumanfactorsprinciples tobeusedinpreparing procedures, TheProcedures WritersManualisusedtoensureconsistency throughout theroughly3,500procedures maintained atNMPNS.Fortechnical procedures, therevisionprocessrequiresthatprocedure preparers researchandusecontrolled reference documents including, butnotlimitedto,engineering specifications,

drawings, vendormanuals,andTechnical Specifications.

Theuseofcontrolled documents ensuresthatinformation usedtoprepareprocedures reflectscurrentdesignconfiguration.

13

'i Developmental reviewsareconducted totheextentrequiredbytheprocedure.

Cross-disciplinary reviewsmaybeconducted whenaprocedure involvesareasofspecificexpertise thatareoutsidethegroupthatpreparedtheprocedure, orwhenanothergroupisrequiredtoperformactivities withintheprocedure.

Fortechnical procedures, avalidation reviewisnormallyperformed'contingent uponcomplexity, potential consequences, andexpectedenvironment including reducingradiation toaslowasreasonably achievable (ALARA))bytheenduserstoensuretheprocedure isworkableandcontainsasufficient levelofdetailfortheintendedusers.Thefinalreviewphaseisknownastechnical verification.

Aspreviously discussed, changestoadministrative procedures donotrequireatechnical verification unlesstheprocedure isrequiredbyTechnical Specification 6.8orotherwise affectsnuclearsafety.Technical review,asrequiredbyTechnical Specification 6.5.2.1,isperformed byanindividual otherthantheindividual whopreparedtheprocedure.

Thefinalreviewispermitted onlyafterdevelopmental reviewshavebeencompleted.

Theverification involvesareviewoftheprocedure andreference documents usedtodeveloptheprocedure toindependently verifytheaccuracy.

Thisreviewmayonlybeperformed byqualified individuals previously designated bythePlantManager.Thesequalified reviewers, asdefinedbyTechnical Specification 6.5.2.4,aremembersofthestationsupervisory staffandtheyarequalified inareasspecifictotheirexpertise (suchasOperations, Maintenance, orRadiation Protection).

Following finalrevieweachtechnical procedure andTechnical Specification relatedadministrative procedure isreviewedforapplicability under10CFR50.59 asdescribed laterunderthe10CFR50.59 safetyevaluation process.Intheapprovalphase,theresponsible procedure ownerandtheresponsible approver(e.g.,BranchManager,etc.)provideapprovalandensurethatrequiredreviewsbyqualified personnel havebeenaccomplished.

Theapprovalprocessalsoincludesrequirements toassurethatpendingchangeshavebeenappropriately addressed, thattheTechnical Specification classification (adetermination astowhetherornotaprocedure isrequiredbyTechnical Specification 6.8orotherwise affectsnuclearsafety)isappropriate, thatanychangesmadeduringreviewhavenotinvalidated previousreviews,andthatanyrequiredimplementation traininghasbeenarranged.

Insummary,theprocedure revisionprocessprovidescontrolstoensurethatprocedures arepreparedtoreflectcurrentconfiguration, thatadequatereviewisperformed byappropriately qualified personnel toindependently verifyaccuracy, andthatappropriate approvals areobtained.

2B.DesignDocumentChanges(DDCs)DDCs,evenwhennotassociated withaphysicalchangetotheplant,areprocessed undereitherthedesignchangeortheconfiguration changeprocessaspreviously discussed.

Therearetwoothermeansofdocumentchangesthatinvolveengineering enhancements andeditorial changes.NMP114 Ip Thefirstmeans,engineering enhancement, isatermused'forthecorrection ofaverifiederror.Theengineering enhancement processhastraditionally beenusedtocorrectdrawingerrors.Ineffect,itisarevisiontoadrawingperform'ed inaccordance withtheapplicable procedure, butseparatefromtheconfiguration changeprocess..Per theEngineering procedure governing

'drawingcontrol,anApplicability Reviewisperformed toassurethattheapplicability of10CFR50.59 isconsidered; i.e.,whetherthechangecouldaffectthelicensing basis.Thedrawingrevisionischeckedandapprovedjustlikeanyotherrevision, andthenissuedtoitsstandarddistribution sothatallholderswillbeprovidedwiththe"enhanced" drawing.Thesecondmeans,editorial changes,areminorchangesthatdonotaffectthetechnical contentorintendedpurpose',of thedocument.

Examplesarespelling, typographical, andgrammatical errors.Becausetheyareinconsequential, theyareusuallynotinitiated independently.

Mostcommonly, theseerrorsareidentified whenthedocumentisbeingrevisedforsomeotherpurposesuchasadesignchange.Theyareusuallyprocessed andcontrolled aspartoftheassociated designorconfiguration change.Ifaneditorial changewasmadeindependently ofanyotherprocess,itwouldbedoneasarevisioninaccordance withthecontrolled procedure forthattypeofdesigndocument.

Ifthechangepotentially affectedtheUFSAR,Technical Specifications, orNRCapprovedprograms, suchasnomenclature changes,itwouldbeprocessed pertheprocedure forinitiating hcensingdocumentchanges.2C.ProgramChangesProgramchangestoNRC-approved programsmustbeprocessed pertheprocedures thatgovernApplicability Reviews,safetyevaluations,

licenses, UFSARs,andNRC-approved plansandprograms.

Additional administrative controlsmayalsobeapplied.Forexample,thereisanengineering procedure forplantcondition monitoring programswhichinvokesprogramresponsibilities, andrequiresreviewsforcontinuing compliance andeffectiveness.

Adescription ofhowregulatory requirements arereflected intheNMPCprocedure hierarchy isdescribed inourresponsetoRequested Action(b)under"Administrative Procedure UpdateProgram."

ChangestoprogramsthatarenotNRCapprovedbutarerequiredbyregulation, suchastheMaintenance RuleProgramrequiredby10CFR50;65, arealsocontrolled byadministrative procedures.

2D.ChangestoTrainingChangestotrainingassociated withdesignorconfiguration changesareaddressed byrequiring theModification Coordinator tonotifytheTrainingDepartment.

Requestsforchangestotrainingortrainingprogramsthatarepartofthelicensebasisareprocessed asdescribed laterinresponsetoRequested Action(a)under"Training."

2E.Evaluations/Analyses Specificrecurring evaluations likesafetyevaluations, breachpermitevaluations, evaluations oftemporary shielding, andseismicevaluations areaddressed bycontrolled administrative procedures.

Otherevaluations thatpotentially affectdesignfunctions aredirectedtothe115 AE WEngineering Department andprocessed peracontrolled Engineering procedure.

Thisprocedure requiresthatanyevaluation oranalysisperformed todefinethedesignbasisforadesignchangeortoestablish adesignbasisbeprocessed inamannerthatassuresthatpropertechnical input,impactassessments, designreviews,andverifications areobtained.

Independent verification isrequiredwhentheevaluation oranalysiswillresultinachangetothedesignorlicensing basis.Examplesofwhenverification mayberequiredinclude:Evaluations doneinresponsetoregulatory requirements; Analysisdoneinsupportofadesignchangeorthatislikelytoresultinadesignchange;Evaluations oranalysissupporting changestoNRCapprovedprograms; and~Analysis/Evaluation ofsafety-related orquality-related activities.

Aspreviously discussed, thecontrolled Engineering procedure forindependent verification requiresthatappropriate designcriteria, qualitycriteria, anddesignbasesbereviewedtoassurethattheyhavebeencorrectly identified andincorporated.

2F.DatabaseChangestConfiguration databasechangesareaccomplished percontrolled procedures.

Primarily, thesechangesresultfromdesignorconfiguration changes,however,someareinitiated independently asEngineering enhancements oreditorial changes.Regardless ofthereasonforinitiation, eachproposedchangetoconfiguration dataisreviewedforcompleteness andaccuracybeforeentry,aswellasbeingcheckedfortheaccuracyofthedataentryitself.Changestocomputerhardwareandsoftwarearealsocontrolled byadministrative procedures.

Verification andvalidation (V&V)processes areappliedtoassurethatsoftwareprogramsoperateasintendedanddonotresultinerroneous displaysofinformation.

2G.VendorManualChangesNMPCmaintains avendorinterface programthatprovidesforannualcontactwithourNuclearSteamSupplySystem(NSSS)supplierandbi-annual contactswithvendorsforotherselectedkeysafety-related equipment.

Thesevendorsarecontacted torequestthelatesttechnical manuals,servicebulletins, notices,advisories, letters,andoperation, maintenance, andrepairprocedures fortheselectedequipment.

Additionally, thevendorinterface programprovidesforthemaintenance ofanindexofapplicable technical documents andalogofvendorcontactsandcorrespondence.

Periodically, thelistofvendorstobecontacted isupdatedbasedonresponses receivedandEngineering reviewsofthelistsofkeysafety-related equipment.

Follow-up contactsaremadewithnon-NMP116 gIIII responsive vendorstoensurethatagoodfaitheffortwasmadetoobtainthenecessary

~~~equipment information.

Vendormanualchangesmaythenbeinitiated byreceiptofnewinformation fromthevendor,orbyNMPCtoaccommodate preferred practices, materials, orotherconsiderations.

Revisions ofbothkindsareaddressed inanengineering procedure governing vendortechnical manuals.Vendorinitiated changesareforwarded totheVendorDocumentCoordinator forloggingandtracking.

Thechangeisthenforwarded toanassignedresponsible engineerwhoreviewsitforapplicability totheNMPNS.Ifappropriate, theresponsible engineerobtainsmulti-disciplinary reviews.Ifthemanualisassociated withequipment oractivities thataresafety-related,quality-related, EQ-related, orTechnical Specification related,atleastoneotherknowledgeable reviewermustreviewthechange.Nonconformances betweentheNMPC-acceptedvendorproductandtheproposedchangearedocumented inaDER.Whenreviewcommentsandnonconformances havebeenresolvedwiththereviewers andthevendor,therevisedmanualisapprovedanddistributed.

NMPC-initiated changestovendormanualsareprocessed inthesameway,exceptasfollows:~ADDCmaybepostedagainstthemanualinsteadofrevisingandredistributing theentiremanual.InvokingtheDDCprocessinvolvesdesignimpactassessment,

checking, andapproval.

~TosupportthePMOptimization Program,vendorrecommended PMmethodsandfrequencies maybechangedwithoutrevisingthevendormanualbasedonMaintenance, Operations, Technical Support,andEngineeiing reviewandconcurrence.

Additionally, thereviewmustbedocumented andfiledintheMaintenance Department andrevisedPMmethodorfrequency identified onacomponent levelinthePreventive Maintenance Surveillance Testing(PMST)database.

2H.SupplierDocumentAcceptance Supplierdocuments, otherthanVendorTechnical Manuals,areprocessed inaccordance withthecontrolled procedure forthespecificdocumenttype.Theprocessofsupplierdocumentacceptance issimilartoothertypesofdesigndocuments andincludes:

1)preparation,

checking, verification, review,andapproval, controlled eitherbythevendor's(NMPCapproved)

QAprogramorbyNMPCprocedures and2)formalacceptance byNMPCbasedonadetailedreviewoftechnical content,certificate ofcompliance, orsurveillance ofworkinprogress.

I2I.ChangestoLicensing Documents/New Regulatory Commitments Changestolicensing documents/new regulatory commitments areprocessed pertheinterface procedure governing controloflicenses, UFSARs,andNRC-approved plansandprograms.

17

Newcommitments areprocessed pertheinterface procedure thatgovernsNRCinterfaces andtrackedviatheNuclearCommitment TrackingSystem(NCTS).Inbothcases,proposedchangesmustbereviewedforimpactonthedesignconfiguration andprocessed appropriately asadesignchange,configuration change,aprogramchangeoracontrolled evaluation/analysis.

Aspreviously discussed, anychangetothedesignbasesinvokestherequirement forreviewsinaccordance with10CFR50.59, including areviewofpotential impactonTechnical Specification requiredprocedures.

Theabovecontrolsassurethatwhennewregulatory orlicensechangesareimplemented, theyareproperlyreflected intheplant,thedesignbasis,theaffectedprograms, andprocedures.

2J.ExternalSourcesofChangeExternalsourcesofchangederivedfromdeficiencies,

concerns, orissuesidentified byregulatory

agencies, industryoperating experience, vendorinformation notices(INs),orexternalpublications areprocessed pertheDERprocess.Asdiscussed inourresponsetoRequested Action(d),DERsoftenresultinreferraltootherprocesses suchasdesignchange,procedure change,andevaluation/analysis forcorrective andpreventive action.UseoftheDERprocessensuresthatevaluation, disposition, resolution andtrendingoftheissuewilloccur.3.3A.10CFR50.59 SafetyEvaluation ProcessAnNDDregarding safetyevaluations establishes therequirements forassessing proposedchanges,tests,orexperiments todetermine ifadditional

analysis, evaluation, orNRCapprovalisrequiredbeforeimplementation.

Thisdirective appliestoproposedchangestoNMPNSfacilities (permanent ortemporary),

proposedrevisions orchangestoprocedures, andproposedtestsorexperiments.

Aqualified evaluator determines whether10CFR50.59 appliestotheproposedchange,testorexperiment bydetermining ifitinvolvesachangetothefacilityorprocedures asdescribed intheUFSAR,atestorexperiment notdescribed intheUFSAR,andwhethertheactivityaffectsnuclearsafetyinawaynotpreviously evaluated intheUFSARorrequiresachangetoaTechnical Specification..

Thisdetermination isdocumented aspartoftheApplicability Review.WhentheApplicability Reviewdetermination identifies thattherequirements of10CFR50.59 areapplicable,'a 10CFR50.59 safetyevaluation isthenperformed todetermine ifanunreviewed safetyquestion(USQ)exists.Thepreparermustalsoobtainthereviewofhis/herBranchManager,signifying asufficient cross-disciplinary reviewhasbeenperformed.

TheManagerTechnical Supportmayspecifyadditional technical reviewandmaywaiveStationOperations ReviewCommittee (SORC)reviewifitisdetermined thataproposedchangedoesnotaffectnuclearsafety.Priortoimplementation, safetyevaluations forchangesthataffectnuclearsafetyarereviewedbytheSORC.SORCrendersadetermination, inwriting,astowhetherornotthesafetyevaluation constitutes aUSQ.Iftheproposedchange,testorexperiment involvesaUSQ,itwillnotbeimplemented withoutpriorNRCapproval.

TheSafetyReviewandAuditBoard(SRAB)reviewssafetyevaluations toverifythatactionscompleted undertheprovisions of10CFR50.59 didnotconstitute aUSQ.18

!t.

ANIPgoverning Applicability Reviewsandsafetyevaluations providesadministrative controlsforthereviewofchanges,testsand experiments.

ThesereviewsassessimpacttoOperating

Licenses, UFSARs,NRC-approved plansandprograms, andNRCcommitments; determine whetherthechangeinvolvesaUSQ;anddetermine whetherNRCreviewandapprovalisrequired.

Consistent withthegoverning NDD,theprocedure appliestoallproposedchangestoNMPNSstructures, systems,orcomponents (permanent andtemporary),

proposedrevisions orchangestoprocedures, andproposedtestsorexperiments.

WhenanApplicability Reviewindicates achangetoalicensing documentisrequired, theproposedchangeisprocessed perasecondnuclearinterface procedure.

1Thissecondinterface procedure, whichcontrolslicenses, UFSARs,andNRC-approved plansandprograms, providesadministrative controlsforamendments andrevisions toOperating

Licenses, UFSARs,andNRC-approved plansandprograms.:

Theeffectsofproposedfacilitychanges,procedure changes,testsandexperiments areidentified onaLicensing DocumentChangeRequest(LDCR).EachLDCRisreviewed,

approved, andincorporated intolicensedocuments inaccordance withspecificrequirements identified withintheprocedure.

InSeptember 1996,NMPCbeganusingAdobeAcrobatsoftwaretosearchandviewelectronic versionsoftheNMPNSUFSARandplantTechnical Sp'ecifiications.

TheAdobesoftwareprovidesfull-text searchcommandsthatcanfindallthewordsonapage,nomatterwhereorhowtheyareused.AdobeAcrobatsoftwareisanewtoolforApplicability Reviewers andSafetyEvaluators toidentifyandassesstheimpactofproposedchangesoninformation presented intheUFSARandTechnical Specifications.

3B.10CFR50.71(e)

AnNDDregarding changestoOperating

Licenses, UFSARs,andNRCapprovedplansandprogramsreflectstherequirements of10CFR50.71(e).

ANIPgoverning changestoLicenses, UFSARs,andNRC-approved plansandprogramsprovidesadministrative controlsfortheinitiation, review,andapprovalofproposedchangestotheUFSAR.ANIPgoverning interface withtheNRCprovidesadministrative controlsforfilingtheUFSARrevision.

Theseprocedures provideadministrative controlsforrevisingtheUFSARtoincludetheeffectsof:allchangesmadeinthefacilityorprocedures asdescribed intheUFSAR;allsafetyevaluations performed bythelicenseeeitherinsupportofrequested licenseamendments orinsupportofconclusions thatchangesdidnotinvolveanUSQ;andallanalysesofnewsafetyissuesperformed byoronbehalfofthelicenseeattheNRC'srequest.Theupdatedinformation isappropriately locatedwithintheUFSAR.3C.QAProgram/10CFR50 AppendixBTheNMPNSQATR(UFSARAppendixB)addresses therequirements foradescription oftheQAProgramfortheoperations phaseoftheNMPNS.TheQATRappliestoorganizations performing workthataffectstheoperation, maintenance, ormodification ofsafety-related structures, systemsorcomponents andindicates thattheaccountability forthequalityofNMP119

safety-related workrestswiththeperformer, whereasaccountability forverifying thequalityofworkrestswiththeverifying organizations.

TheQATRprovidesfortheoperation, maintenance, andmodification ofNMPNSconsistent withANSUAmerican SocietyofMechanical Engineers (ASME)NQA-l,ANSI/ANS-3.2 andBranchTechnical Position(BTP)APCSB9.5-1,AppendixA.TheQATRisorganized topresenttheNMPCQAprogramintheorderofthe18criteriasetforthin10CFR50AppendixB.TheQATRstatesNMPC'spolicyforeach.ofthesecriteriaanddescribes howthecontrolspertinent toeacharecamedout.Amatrixshowingthe18criteriaof10CFR50AppendixBandthepolicyanddirectives andorganization procedures implementing thesecriteriaispresented intheQATR.ChangesmadetotheQATRthatdonotreducecommitments previously acceptedbytheNRCaresubmitted totheNRCinaccordance withtherequirements of10CFR50.71(e).

ChangesmadetotheQATRthatdonotsatisfythecriteriaofAppendixBto10CFR50,orreducecommitments previously acceptedbytheNRC,aresubmitted totheNRCandmustreceiveNRCapprovalpriortoimplementation.

Thechangesdescribed abovearesubmitted inaccordance withtherequirements of10CFR50.54.

Aspreviously stated,NMPNSiscommitted toasystemofdesignandconfiguration controlsthatsatisfytherequirements ofAppendixBof10CFR50.Concerning AppendixB,CriteriaIII,theNMPNSQATRstatesthatstationmodifications areaccomplished inaccordance withapproveddesignsandprocedures.

Thecontrolsapplytopreparation, review,andrevisionofdesigndocuments, including thecorrecttranslation ofapplicable regulatory requirements anddesignbasesintodesign,procurement, andprocedural documents.

Thecontrolsapplytodesignworkperformed bycontractors aswellasbyNMPCengineering andtechnical organizations.

Administrative procedures atNMPNSweredeveloped toassurethatlicenserequirements, including AppendixBrequirements, areaccurately implemented andthatresponsibilities forimplementation areproperlyassigned.

4.4A.ProblemIdentification Processes ANIPprescribes themethodforprocessing DERs.Guidanceisprovidedregarding identification, documentation, notification, evaluation, correction, andreporting ofconditions, events,activities, andconcernsthathavethepotential foraffecting thesafeandreliableoperation oftheNMPNS.TheDERprocessisdescribed indetailinourresponsetoRequested Action(d)under"Deviation/Event Report."DERsareinitiated upondiscovery ofadeficiency, including deficiencies inourengineering designandconfiguration controlprocess,orinconsistencies betweenourlicensedocuments, physicalplant,andprocedures.

Anumberofotherprocesses existatNMPNSthathavethepotential toidentifyproblems.

Theseprocesses includeself-identification, reviewsperformed bytheSORCandtheSRAB,requiredtechnical reviews,QAauditsandsurveillances, selfassessments, surveillance andexamination activities, Institute ofNuclearPowerOperations (INPO)evaluations, NRCinspections, andtheevaluation of.industryoperational experiences.

20 Nl~lt Asproblemsareidentified, DERsareinitiated, dispositioned, andappropriate corrective andpreventive actionstaken.Theseprocesses areafeedbacklooptothedesignandconfiguration controlprocessinthattheyeitherconfirmthattheprocesses areworkingeffectively oridentifyproblemareaswithsubsequent corrective actionstoenhancetheprocess..

Resultsfromsomeoftheseprocesses arepresented inourresponses toRequested Actions(b)and(c),providing partofourbasesforconcluding thatdesignbasesrequirements arebeingtranslated intooperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures, andthatSSCconfiguration andperformance isconsistent withthedesignbases.4B.TrainingITrainingconcerning engineering designandconfigur'ation controlprocedures isprovidedtostationoperating andtechnical/engineering personnel aspartoftheircontinuing training/position specifictrainingprogramsasrequired.

Operators areroutinely trainedontheprocesses usedfortemporary/permanent changestoplantdesignorprocedures.

Additionally, reviewsofactualchangestoprocedures andsignificant plantdesignchangesaftermajormaintenance outagesarecovered,asappropriate, beforestartup.Simulators maybeusedtotrainoperators andothersonnewsystems/components beforeactualsystemstartupandtodevelopnewprocedures forsystemoperation beforethesystem/component isturnedoverfortesting.Plantsystemconfiguration changes,specialtestsandsignificant evolutions maybetestedonthesimulator beforetheyareactuallyaccom'plished intheplant.ThePCRdatabaseissearchedbythesimulator supportstaffquarterly asareviewofplantchangesforsimulator impact.Administrative controlsareinplacethatensurethatanyplantchangeshavingpotential impactonthesimulator areevaluated andchangesimplemented asrequired.

Maintenance, chemistry, radiation protection, andengineering personnel receivetraininginplantdesign/procedure changesaspartofthecontinued trainingprogram,eitheronanasneededbasisorcyclically.

Procedure changesandplantdesignchangescanalsoreachthetrainingprogramviatheTrainingReviewRequest(TRR)/Training ChangeOrderprocess.Thisprocessrequiresthateachchangethatpotentially hastrainingprogramimpactbeevaluated andrevisions madeasappropriate.'lant personnel caninitiateaTRRonanyissuewhichcouldhavetrainingprogramimpact.TRRs/Training ChangeOrdersareroutinely usedforissuesthatrequiretrainingprogrammodification.

Concerning trainingonthe10CFR50.59 process,operations shiftmanagement, designated engineering andmaintenance supportpersonnel, andothersin'management andtechnical positions aretrainedandqualified asApplicability Reviewers/Safety Evaluators andhavetocompletearequalification everytwoyears.Trainingincludesanoverviewoflicensedocuments including Technical Specifications, UFSAR,andNRC-approved plansandprogramstogetherwithanoverviewofthehierarchy ofprocedures.

Currently, thereareapproximately 400fullytrainedandqualified personnel onsitewhohave.theknowledge andabilitytodoApplicability Reviewsandsafetyevaluations.

Thistraining/knowledge basecontributes totheawareness andsensitivity thatexiststhroughout theworkforcewithregardtooperating theplantwithinthelicensing basis.21 I~8~Arg1~

IBranchManagersandSeniorManagersalsoperformobservations ofsimulator andotherclassroom trainingaspartoftheirnormalduties.Theirfeedbacktothetrainingorganization isfactoredintotheoverallprogramtoensurethecurriculum andconductoftrainingmeetsmanagement's expectations.

NMP122 I"'Ky,S Providetherationale forconcluding thatdesignbasesrequirements aretranslated intooperating, maintenance andtestingprocedures.

Asdiscussed below,NiagaraMohawkhasreasonable assurance thatdesignbasesrequirements aretranslated intooperating, maintenance andtestingprocedures atNMP1.Therationale supporting thisconclusion isbasedonnumerousactions,programsandoversight activities.

Asdescribed inNDDs,administrative procedures establish requirements forthepreparation, review,andapprovaloftechnical procedures, Technical procedures definerequirements fortheoperation, maintenance, andtestingdescribed intheOperating License,Technical Specifications, andUFSAR.Asdiscussed intheresponsetoRequested Action(a),extensive programsandcontrolsareutilizedatNMPNStoensurethatdesignbasisinformation isaccurately maintained andupdatedasconditions warrant.Procedures areupdatedtoreflectchangesindesign,corrective actions(identifiied bythecorrective actionprogram),

industryoperating experience, andchangestosource'requirements.

Duringthedevelopment, review,andapprovalofoperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures, areviewofdesigndocuments wasconducted.

Thisreviewincludedreviewsofdesigndrawings, DesignSpecifications, Technical Specifications, andtheFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR).IFollowing thedevelopment ofoperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures, thetechnical accuracyoftheprocedures hasbeenmaintained throughprogrammatic controlsforprocedure revisionandperiodicreview.Theseprogramshavebeenstrengthened overtheyearstotheircurrentstatus.NMPChasutilizedknowledgeable andappropriately qualified individuals todevelop,review,approve,andreviseprocedures.

Programrequirements havebeenin'placeformanyyearsandhavebeenenhancedovertimetoimprovetheeffectiveness ofthedevelopment, review,andapprovalprocess.Thetrainingprogramandotheradministrative requirements assurethatpersonnel assignedtoperformthesefunctions arecompetent toperformtheirassignedtasks.ThisassuresthatNMPCcaneffectively implement programrequirements associated withthedevelopment, review,approval, andrevisionofadministrative andtechnical procedures.

Finally,NMPChasbeeninvolvedinnumerousassessments thatdemonstrate howeffectively designrequirements aretranslated intooperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures.

Theseassessments include,inpart,functional inspections, compliance verification

projects, audits,andprocedure (bothadministrative andtechnical) andrelatedprogramupgradeprojects.

23 IPa NMPC'sresponsetoRequested Action(a)providesadescription oftheengineering designandconfiguration controlprocesses currently inplaceatNMP1,including thosethatimplement 10CFR50.59, 10CFR50,71(e),

andAppendixBto10CFRPart50.OurresponsetoRequested Action(d)providesadetaileddescription oftheprocesses'for theidentification ofproblemsandimplementation ofcorrective actionstopreventrecurrence (i.e.,theDER).OurresponsetoRequested Action(b)discusses theprocesswhichwasusedtodevelop,review,andapprovetheoperations, maintenance, andtestingprocedures consistent withthedesignbases.Anoverviewofthehistoricprocedure revisionprocessispresented, aswellasthecurrentrevisionprocess.Thetrainingprogramisdiscussed toshowthatindividuals arecapableofeffectively implementing theprocedure development, review,approval, andrevisionprocess.Finally,areviewofassessments andinitiatives conducted isprovidedtofurtherdemonstrate thattheimplementation ofprogramrequirements hasbeeneffective inassuringthatdesignbasisrequirements arebeingtranslated intooperating, maintenance andtestingprocedures.

NMPCisconfident thatadherence toourdesignandconfiguration controlprocesses andDERprocessprovidereasonable assurance thatdesignbasesrequirements areproperlytranslated intooperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures andthat,wheninconsistencies arefound,theyareevaluated andpropercorrective actionsaretaken.NMP1soperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures wereinitially developed inthelate1960s.Subsequent totheinitialdevelopment ofprocedures, theadministrative processforprocedure development, review,approval, andrevisionhaschangedandimproved.

Thetechnical contentofoperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures hasalsocontinued toimprove.Wehavechosentodescribetheprocesssincethecompletion ofconstruction ofNineMilePointUnit2(NMP2)inthemid-1980s.

Althoughpreviousdirection andcontrolofprocedures existed,theyhavebeensignificantly enhancedsincetheconstruction ofNMP2.Theseprogramcontrolsdefinedtherequirements necessary inordertoassuredesignbasisrequirements wereadequately translated intooperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures.

Someoftheprogramdocuments inplaceatthetimeincludedthefollowing:

~ANSIN18.7 providedtherequirements forthepreparation, reviewandapprovalprocessforprocedures, aswellasanappendixofactivities whichrequireprocedures.

~Administrative procedures prescribed theprocessforthegeneration,

approval, publication, distribution, andcontrolofprocedures.

~Administrative procedures prescribed theSORCrequirements associated withthecommittee's responsibilities.

Amongthosewererequirements forformalprocedure reviewandthedocumentation ofthosereviews.24

/N' NMPChasutilizedknowledgeable andappropriately qualified individuals todevelop,review,approve,andreviseprocedures.

Programrequirements fordevelopment ofprocedures havebeeninplaceformanyyears.Personnel involvedinthewritingoftechnical procedures wereeitherNMPCemployees orcontractors cognizant intheareaforwhichtheprocedure wasbeingwritten.Ineithercase,individuals assignedtothosetaskswerecompetent toperformtheirrespective tasks.Individuals assignedtosupportthereview,approval, andrevisionfunctions ofprocedure development andmaintenance werealsoappropr'iately qualified.

Throughthetrainingprogram,andotheradministrative requirements, reasonable assurance isprovidedthatpersonnel assignedtoperformthesefunctions arecompetent toperformtheirassignedtasks.This,inturn,reasonably assuresthatNMPCcaneffectively implement theprogramrequirements associated withthedevelopment, review,approval, andrevisionofadministrative andtechnical procedures.

Following procedure development, reviewandapproval, procedures weremaintained up-to-dateutilizing administrative controlsfortherevisionprocess.Procedure revisioncontrolswereinplacetoestablish requirements necessary toensurethatprocedures weremaintained appropriately.

Theserequirements, coupledwithconfiguration anddesigncontrolprocesses, ensuredthatdesignbasisrequirements weretranslated intooperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures inatimelymanner.Overtime,theprocedure development, review,approval, andcontrolprocesshasbeenstrengthened.

Abriefsummaryof.majorprogramenhancements follows:~1984-Anadministrative.

procedure changeincorporated theNMP1andNMP2organizations underacommonsiteadministration program..

j1985-Administrative procedures providedsignificantly moredetailregarding thedevelopment, review,andrevisionprocessforprocedures.

1989-ASiteProcedure Writer'sGuidewasdeveloped andapprovedinordertoprovideconsistent guidanceonformatandhumanfactors.Thiswascompleted inanticipation ofamajorprocedure rewriteeffort.I1990-1992-'-A newprocedure hierarchy development wasinitiated.

Thiswasdonetoprovideamoreorganized, tieredprocedure structure andhierarchy.

Administrative Procedures forprocedure generation,

approval, distribution,

revision, andusewouldbetransformed intotheNDDandNIP-PROseries.Amajortechnical procedure rewriteprogramwasalsounderway, utilizing theSiteProcedure Writer'sGuide.Thebulkofthiseffortwascompleted in1992.Concurrent withthetechnical procedure upgrade,APsgoverning procedural controlswerethemselves enhancedtobetterdescribecertainrequirements forprocedure reviewandcontrolactivities.

Akeyattribute tothischangewasbetterdefiningtheexpectations forprocedure authorsandreviewers, aswellasimproving the10CFR50.59 screening process.25

'

Trainingeffortswerecompleted toensureprocedure writers,reviewers, approvers andthoseinvolvedintherevisionprocesscouldeffectively implement theprogramrequirements.

~1992-1997

-Thequalityofprocedures andrelatedprocesses continuetoimproveduetoenhancements intheareasoftechnical review,validation, verification andthe10CFR50.59 screening processandsafetyevaluation quality.Initialqualification andrequalification programsintheseareashavebeenstrengthened considerably.

Theseprogramchangeshaveledtoourcurrentprogramrequirements described inourresponsetoRequested Action(a).NMPChasconducted severalinitiatives inordertoimprovetheprocessbywhichdesignrequirements aretransferred intooperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures.

Additionally, severalassessments havebeenconducted whichreviewedplantprocedures, demonstrated thatNMPC'sprogramscontainsufficient requirements, andthatNMPCpersonnel arequalified toimplement theprogramrequirements.

Thisreasonably assuresthatNMPCcanconcludethatdesignbasisrequirements aretranslated intooperating, maintenance andtestingprocedures.

Asummaryofthesignificant initiatives andassessments inthisareaisprovidedonthefollowing pages.NMPCinitiated (1989)andcompleted (1990)theNMP1SVPwiththepurposeofensuringthatTechnical Specification logicsystemswerebeingadequately tested.AspartoftheSVP,surveillance testswerereviewedtoensurethatwholelogicchannelsandsubchannels weretestedinaccordance withTechnical Specifications.

Inaddition, thereviewverifiedthatcontactsinlogiccircuitswerebeingprocedurally testedinawaythatuniquelydetermines thateachcontactperformed itssafetyfunction.

Forparallelpaths,thismeantassuringthateachpathwasfunctionally testedseparately.

TheSVPwasdocumented asaone-timereviewusingatemporary procedure.

Thereviewdocumentation consisted ofcomparing systemdesignbasesdrawings, surveillance procedures andtheapplicable Technical Specifications, Reviewformswerecompleted foreachsystemverified.

ThereviewformscomparedeachTechnical Specification linewithrequiredfunctions tobetested.Manysurveillance procedures wereupdated,asappropriate, basedontheresultsfromthereview.AsaresultofIN95-15,aguideline wasissuedtoprovideguidancetosystemengineers regarding testrequirements.

Asaresultofthenotice,NMPCrecentlyverifiedthatmodifications tosafety-related circuitssince1990werebeingtestedproperlytomeetTechnical Specifications, Thesemodifications metthescopeofreviewandthetestingprogramwasfoundtobesatisfactory.

Further,NMPCstrengthened specificadministrative controlsforNMP126 gII establishing requirements forpreparation andreviewoftechnical procedures, fordetermining andperforming post-maintenance testing,andfortestingdesigncha'ngestoplantsystemsandequipment.

Basedonrecentindustryeventsinvolving impropertestingoflogiccircuitsandinformation providedinGenericLetter(GL)96-01,NMPCdetermined itwouldbeprudenttoreaffirmourSVPforcompleteness andscope.Thesystemstobereviewedwillbethereactorprotection system,emergency dieselgenerator loadsheddingandsequencing, andactuation logicforengineered safetyfeatures.

Basedonthisreassessment, anotherreviewofsurveillance testprocedures andassociated printswillbeimplemented toverifyTechnical Specification logicsystemtestingrequirements arebeingmet.Thisreassessment isbeingcompleted peroursubmittal forGL96-01andisscheduled forcompletion priortostartupfromRFO15.Insummary,theSVPwasanextensive efforttoensureoperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures complywithdesignbasestestingrequirements asreflected intheplantTechnical Specifications, InDecember1987,NMP1wasshutdownduetoequipment problems.

Duringtheoutage,technical andprogrammatic deficiencies wereidentified byNMPCandtheNRC.Thesedeficiencies ledtotheissuanceofaConfirmatory ActionLetterbytheNRCconcerning NMPClinemanagement's ineffectiveness inrecognizing andremedying problems.

NMPCwasrequiredtoprepareandsubmitaRAPforNRCapproval.

Includedamongthecorrective actionsintheRAPwereanumberofactionswhichdetermined theadequacyofprocedures anddesign.Actionsrelatedtoprocedures included:

1.Thesurveillance testingrequirements contained intheplantTechnical Specifications werereviewed'to ensurethattheyhadbeenadequately translated intoimplementing procedures.

Thiseffortisdescribed inmoredetailunder"Surveillance Verification Program(SVP)."2.Arequirement forthedevelopment ofastreamlined deficiency reporting systemledtotheestablishment oftheDERprocess,thedetailsofwhicharedescribed inourresponsetoRequested Action(d)ofthisletter.Thisformalprocessisused,inpart,toidentifyandresolvediscrepancies betweentheas-builtconfiguration oftheplant,(including operating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures, andtheUFSAR),andtheplantdesignbases.3.Areviewwascompleted toinsurethatEmergency Operating Procedures (EOP)inputvalueswereconsistent withdesignbasisinformation.

Inaddition, controlswereaddedtoensuretheEOPsweremodified, asnecessary, toreflectchangestothe"as-built" condition oftheplant.27 ll]i4 a.Administrative controlswereestablished torequireadequatereviewandcontroloftheInservice Testing/ST)Program.ThesecondintervalISTprogramwasfinalized toincludeallrequiredpumpsandvalvesinaccordance withthedesignbasesrequirements.

Theprocedures wereupdatedtoreflecttheprogramandhencedesignbasesrequirements.

Operating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures aredeveloped andmaintained inaccordance withtherequirements ofvariousadministrative procedures a'ndprograms.

Theadministrative controlsapplicable tooperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures aredescribed indetailinourresponsetoRequested Action(a).Thissectiondescribes theAdministrative Procedure UpdateProgramwhichwascompleted in1992torestructure andvalidateadministrative procedures andprogramsatNMPNS.Theprimaryobjectives oftheprogramwereto:I~Reviewlicensing documentation toidentifylicensing requirements andcommitments applicable toNMPNS.Verifythatlicenserequirements andcommitments werecompletely andaccurately implemented throughadministrative procedures andprograms.

IVerifythatresponsibilities forimplementing licenserequirements andcommitments wereappropriately assignedwithintheorganization.

TheAdministrative Procedure UpdateProgramwasinitiated bydeveloping aNuclearDivision"Policy"document.

ThePolicyprovidedasummaryofthemajororganizational responsibilities, generalprogramrequirements, andotherelementsforensuringthesafe,reliable, andefficient operation ofNMPNS.ThePolicyalsodefinedahierarchy ofprocedures tofacilitate organized implementation oflicenserequirements.

28 rill4 Thecurrenthierarchy isdepictedinFigure1:EKKIRFDNuclear'ivisionPolicyNuclearDivisionDirectives NuclearInterface Procedures Department SpeciTicAdministrative Procedures BranchLevelAdministrative Procedures Technical Implementing Procedures Initialeffortsalsoinvolveddevelopment ofacomprehensive listoffunctional areastoencompass allaspectsofoperation, maintenance, modification, andtestingoftheNMPNS.NMP129 0)limni<"I Thelistoffunctional areasisasfollows:~~~ALARAProgramAuditsandSurveillances Budget/Expenditure ControlChemistry Configuration Management DesignControlDocumentControlEvaluation andCorrective ActionEnvironmental Protection Emergency Preparedness FitnessforDutyFireProtection ProgramHumanResourceManagement Housekeeping andSystemCleanness

~ISIandTestingInspections Interfacing withRegulatory and~IndustryGroupsInventory, Identification andPhysical~ControlofMaterials, Equipment,

~PartsandSupplies~Licenses, PlansandProgramsMaintenance Measuring andTestEquipment NuclearComputerSystemsNuclearFuelManagement Occupational SafetyandHealthOperations OutageManagement NuclearDivisionPolicyandDirectives ManualControlProcurement ofMaterials, Equipment, Parts,SuppliesandServicesProcedures andOrdersPlanningandScheduling ProjectandTaskManagement Radiological Effluents StationReliability RecordsManagement Radioactive MaterialProcessing, Transport andDisposalRadiation Protection ProgramRegulatory PostingRequirements Safeguards Information ControlSurveillance andTestingSecuritySafetyEvaluations SpecialNuclearMaterialAccountability SpecialProcesses ControlSafetyReviewsTraining, Qualification andSimulators Following development ofthePolicy,NDDsweredeveloped foreachfunctional areaidentified above.NDDsareusedtoestablish requirements thatmustbeaccomplished tocomplywithregulatory requirements andguidelines, industrystandards andpractices, andcommitments toregulatory agenciesoutlinedintheOperating License,UFSAR,andTechnical Specifications.

Theyserveasavehiclebywhichmanagement communicates requirements forperforming andcontrolling activities tothoseresponsible forpreparing theassociated administrative andimplementing procedures.

ISubjectmatterexpertswereassignedtocompileeachNDDbyperforming acomprehensive assessment oflicensing requirements andcommitments toidentifyapplicable requirements foreachfunctional area.EachNDDwasreviewedbyresponsible individuals inthefunctional areaandthenbytheSeniorgfanagement Team.TheNDDswereissuedasasetinthe-NuclearDivisionPolicyandDirectives Manual.Administrative controlsareappliedtoensuretheNDDsremainaccurate.

NMP130 4~f~I Following issuanceoftheNuclearDivisionPolicyandDirectives Manual,theAdministrative Procedure UpdateProgramwascompleted byincorporating requirements contained intheNDDsthroughout variouslowertieradministrative procedures.

Itisimportant tonotethat,inparallelwithimplementation oftheNDDs,NMPNSconducted acomprehensive "BacktoBasics"programtoeducatestationpersonnel onthestructure andcontentofthelicensing basis,including itsrelationtotheNuclearDivisionPolicyandDirectives Manual.Thisprogramisdescribed laterinourresponsetoRequested Action(b)under"Training."

IncontrasttotheNDDswhichestablish "what"therequirements areforaparticular functional area,theimplementing procedures providethedetailsofmethodstobeusedtoimplement therequirements contained intheNDDs.Thiswasaccomplished usingtheprocedure hierarchy developed earlierintheprogram.Twotiersofadministrative procedures areemployedintheprocedure hierarchy toensureappropriate levelsofreviewandapprovalareobtained:

Department leveladministrative procedures whichinclude:1)NIPswhichimplement commonoruniversal programsforNMPNSdepartments (suchasprocedure reviewandcontrol,corrective action,andsecurity).

NIPsarereviewedbyresponsible individuals fromappropriate areasandapprovedbytheVicePresident andGeneralManager-Nuclear;and2)Department-specific administrative procedures whichimplement commonprogramsassignedtoaspecificdepartment (suchasGeneration orEngineering).

Department-specific administrative procedures arereviewedwithintheappropriate department andapprovedbythedepartment head.Lowertier(branchlevel)administrative procedures whicharespecifictofunctional areaswithindepartments (suchasOperations orRadiation Protection) andinvolveimplementation ofrequirements byanindividual group.Branchleveladministrative procedures arereviewedandapprovedwithinthefunctional areaandallowflexibility inimplementing detailedrequirements providedcompliance withtheNDDsandhighertierprocedures ismaintained.

Adherence totheprocedure hierarchy wasmaintained toensur'eimplementing procedures weredeveloped totheextentnecessary toexecutetherequirements contained intheNDDs.Theeffortwascoordinated byacentralgrouptoensurecompleten'ess andtominimizeoverlapandduplication.

Aprocedure numbering schemewasemployedthatassociated implementing procedures totheirparentNDD.Thisphaseoftheprogramresultedinrevisionofnearlyallofthemorethan800administrative procedures thatwereinplaceatthattime.Insummary,thiseffortverifiedthatlicensebasisrequirements werebeingimplemented throughadministrative proc'edures including thoseapplicable todeveloping andmaintaining operations, maintenance, andtestingprocedures.

Theprogramalsoservedtoconsolidate requirements formoreeffective implementation andtoeliminate outdatedorundesirable practices.

Uponcompletion, thetotalnumberofadministrative procedures wasreducedfrommorethan800toapproximately 350.Thedescribed procedure programandhierarchy remainsinplacetodayasanintegralpartoftheNMPNSprocedure program.31

,)lgVIr TheNMP1DesignBasisReconstitution (DBR)ProgramincludedaVendorTechnical ManualReviewandUpgradeProject.Theintegrated programincludedprocessing over10,000vendordocuments whichresultedinreviewandapprovalofover7,000vendortechnical manuals.Partofthiseffortwastodeveloptheequipment toVendorTechnical Manualcross-reference aspartofDBR.InNovemberof1995,theprocessforvendormanualuseandcontrolwasenhancedusingINPO'sGoodPracticeDE102,INPO87-009,ControlofVendorManuals,asaguide.Therevisedprocessensuresplantpersonnel areprovidedwithcurrentandtechnically accuratevendormanualstosupportoperation andmaintenance andincludesthefollowing:

1.Identification oftheprimaryresponsibilities ofvariousindividuals responsible forcontrolofvendormanualsincluding theVendorDocumentCoordinator.

2.Expectations forturnaround timeforthereviewandapprovalofvendormanuals.3.Requirements forthereceipt,review,approval, issue,andrevisionofvendormanuals,andnotification todepartments andresponsible personnel fornewand/orrevisedvendormanuals.Thisnotification servesasthetriggertostationpersonnel toreview'ndreviseappropriate programsandprocedures iftheyareaffectedbyaparticular vendormanual.4.Aprocessforplantpersonnel totakeexception torequirements specified byavendor.Basedontheabove,NMPCisconfident thatplantpersonnel areprovidedwithcurrentandtechnically accuratevendormanualstosupportplantoperation andmaintenance.

TheVendorInterface Programandtheinternalreviewandapprovalprocessassuresthatvendormanualinformation isreviewedagainstthedesignbasis.Thisprocessconfirmstheacceptability oftechnical information thathasnotchanged,andidentifies otherinformation thatrequiresrevision.

Significant QAaudits(vertical slices)havebeenperformed intheareasofStationBlackout(SBO),ServiceWaterandFireProtection inwhichareviewofprocedures againstdesignbasisdocuments wasincluded.

AQAauditwasperformed in1993todetermine NMP1'sabilitytocopewithaSBOevent.TheauditteamfoundthatNMP1hadanestablished SBOProgramwithafourhourcopingdurationandthatOperations hadreceivedadequatetraininganddeveloped procedures thatwouldenablethemtocopewithaSBO.Theauditconcluded thatadieselgenerator reliability 32 tj~h programhadbeenestablished andmettherequirements ofRG1.155.Procedures andguidelines usedtocopewithaSBOwerereviewed.

Thisincludedacomparison ofNuclearManagement andResourceCouncil(NUMARC)87-00toourspecialoperating procedures forSBO,observing useoftheprocedures inthesimulator, andperforming awalkdownofportionsoftheprocedures intheplant.Theauditconcluded thattheSBOprocedures includedtheoperatoractionsnecessary tocopewithaSBOandthattheprocedures hadbeenwrittentoincorporate NVMARC87-00andRG1.155requirements.

Thisauditdididentifysomeinconsistencies.

Theseitemsweredocumented throughtheDERprocess.AQAauditwasperformed in1995underthecognizance" ofSRABtomeettherequirements oftheannual,biennialandtriennial fireprotection auditsdescribed intheTechnical Specifications.

Theauditobjectives weretoevaluatethefireprotection programandimplementing procedures toassuretherequirements fordesign,procurement, fabrication, installation, testing,maintenance andadministrative controlsfortherespective programsareincludedintheQATRandme'etprogramrequirements established bythelicensedocuments andBTPAPCSB9.5-1,AppendixA-1976,SectionC.'dditional objectives weretoassesstheplantfireprotection equipment andprogramimplementation toverifycompliance withtheNRCrequirements addressed inlicensedocuments andimplementing procedures.

Theauditteamconcluded thattheNMPNSFireProtection Programwasincompliance withapplicable Coderequirements andtheNationalFireProtection Association (NFPA)fireprotection guidelines.

Thefireprotection designanddesignchangeprocesses wereconsidered aprogramstrength.

Opportunities forprogramimprovements wereidentified whichincludedattention todetailconcerning theidentification ofrelateddocumentchangesneededwhenFireProtection programchangeswereimplemented.

DERswere,writtenagainsttheprogramwhichincludedinconsistencies withtheFSAR,butnoneindicated anymajorprogramflawsorviolations.

Theauditevaluated thedesigncontrolandprocurement documentcontrolprocesses forfireprotection byreviewing DDCsforplantchangemodifications, reviewing procurement documents forfireprotection systemreplacement items,andconducting interviews withdesignengineering andprocurement personnel.

Theauditteamfoundthedesignchangecontrolprocessforfireprotection tobeastrength, particularly thethoroughness ofengineering evaluations forAppendixRrequirements.

Qualitystandards, suchasfireprotection codes,werespecified indesigndocuments anddeviations fromthesecodesorstandards wereappropriately controlled.

Also,newdesignsandplantmodifications werereviewedbyqualified personnel toensureinclusion ofapplicable fireprotection requirements.

Theauditteamalsoreviewedprocedures, instructions anddrawingstoensurethatfireprotection programelementshadbeenappropriately incorporated intotheimplementing documents.

Theteamalsoobservedpersonnel performance offireprotection procedures andinterviewed personnel toassesstheimplementation oftheseprocedures andprogramelements.

Theteamfoundthatthetrainingprogramsforfirefightingandfireprevention werebeingimplemented inaccordance'with documented procedures andthatthetrainingprogramsforfirebrigademembersmetthe'minimum requirements of10CFR50AppendixR.TheteamalsoNMP133 I4 foundthat,theinstructions, procedures, anddrawingsfordesign,installation, inspection, test,maintenance, modification, andadministration offireprotection activities andsystemswerebeingproperlyreviewed, andcontained appropriate requirements forcontrolofignitionsources,combustibles, precautions andcompensatory actionswhenfiresystemswereplacedoutofservice.TheauditteamreviewedtheNMPNSUFSARAppendixB(NMPC-QATR-l),

fireprotection surveillance testprocedures, NFPAstandards, andfireprotection relatedworkdocuments toensurethataprogramofindependent inspection hadbeenestablished.

Theauditteamalsoreviewedtestandsurveillance procedures andrelatedworkdocuments, witnessed testingactivities andinterviewed personnel toverifythatatestprogramhadbeenestablished.

Theteamfoundthatthetestprocedures incorporated therequirements andlimitscontained inapplicable designdocuments andthattheschedules andmethodsforperiodictestinghadbeenappropriately developed andimplemented.

Theteamalsofoundthatfireprotection equipment andcommunications equipment weretestedperiodically toassurethattheequipment wouldproperlyfunctionandcontinuetomeetdesigncriteria.

AnauditoftheNMP1ServiceWaterSystemwasconducted in1993toreviewsystemdesignandoperation, including maintenance, testingandvariousregulatory commitments suchasheatexchanger performance (GL89-13)andcheckvalvemonitoring (INPOSignificant Operating Experience Report(SOER)86-03).Thepurposeoftheauditwastodetermine iftheNMP1servicewatersystemwasdesigned,

operated, tested,andmaintained toassureperformance ofdesignsafetyfunctions inresponsetopostulated accidentconditions, postulated naturalphenomena, andhazardous systeminteractions.

Theauditteamemployeddeep,vertical-slice techniques originally developed bytheNRCSafetySystemFunctional Inspection (SSFI)program.Specifically, theServiceWaterSystemwasreviewedintechnical depthinordertoevaluatesystemdesignandmodification processes, andtoevaluatetheimplementation ofthedesigninoperations, maintenance, testing,trainingandadministrative controlsprograms.

Writtenquestions wereissuedwhereconcernsorneedsforadditional information wereidentified.

Uponevaluation ofquestionresponses fromresponsible organizations, itemswereclosed,continued forfurtherevaluation orcorrective action,orwhereappropriate, aDERwasissued.TheteamfoundthattheNMP1ServiceWaterSystemDesignBasisDocument(SDBD)waswellorganized, informative andcomprehensive, andthatstatingthefunctional requirement anditsbasiswasasoundpracticeandconsistent withthedesignbasisdefinition in10CFR50.2.

TheauditalsostatedtheSDBDscontained agoodbalancebetweenfunctional requirements anddesigndetailsmakingthemusefulforareassuchasplantmodifications, safetyevaluations, maintenance, operations andtraining.

Theteamalsocommented ontheinherentdesignreliability oftheServiceWaterSystem,thecommitments todofrequentheatexchanger cleaningandtheapproachbeingtakentocontrolmicrobiologically inducedcorrosion (i.e.,ourresponsetoGL89-13).Theoverallconclusion wasthattheNMP1ServiceWaterSystemwassufficiently

designed, operated tested,andmaintained toassureperformance ofdesignsafetyfunctions underpostulated designbasisaccidentconditions.

NMP134 0"[IIs Inconclusion, theseauditsweredesigned, inpart,toverifythatthedesignbasiswasproperlyreflected intheapplicable operating, maintenan'ce, andtestingprocedures forthosefunctional areas.Theresultsindicatethatwhilenotperfect,thereisareasonable basisforconcluding thatgoalhasbeenaccomplished.

Continual verification throughauditandsurveillance activities isamanagement expectation.

Industryoperations, experience itemsprovideNMPNSopportunities toconfirmthatdesignbasesrequirements aretranslated intooperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures.

Asaminimum,NRCBulletins, Notices,GLs,andINPOissuances suchasSOERSandSignificant EventReports(SERs),aswellasvendorissuances arereviewedtodetermine applicability totheNMPNS.NuclearDivisionpersonnel aredirectedtoinitiateaDERupondiscovery ofadeviation/event orcondition adversetoqualityorwhenitisdetermined thatanindustryexperience isapplicable totheNMPNS.TheDERprocess,'s described inourresponsetoRequested Action(d),requiresadisposition andcorrective actions,asnecessary.

Someexamplesofoperations experience itemsthathaverequiredNMPNSto'confirmand/ortakeactiontoassurethatdesignbasisre'quirements arebeingtranslated intooperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures areasfollows:ThepurposeofGL88-14wastorequestthateachlicensee/applicant reviewNUREG-1275,Volume'2, andperformadesignandoperations verification oftheinstrument airsystem(IAS).AsstatedintheGL,theverification shouldinclude"verification thatmaintenance practices, emergency procedures, andtrainingareadequatetoensurethatsafety-related equipment willfunctionasintendedonlossofinstrument air."Inresponsetotherequest,NMPCreviewedthespecified procedures andfoundthemtobeadequatetoensurethatthesubjectsafety-related equipment wouldfunctionasintendedonlossofinstrument airorduringdesignbasisaccidents.

Operational procedures werealsorevisedtoimproveprocedural controlduringtheloadsheddingprocess.Thereviewsandenhancements conducted aspartofthisGLeffortprovideassurance thatfortheinstrument airsystem,designbasishasbeenproperlytranslated intoprocedures.

NRCUSIA-44,SBOwasconcerned withtheabilityofanuclearpowerplanttocopewithatotallossofbothoffsiteandonsitealternating current(AC)electrical power.TheNRCresolvedtheissuebyincorporating requirements forcopingwithaSBOin10CFR50.63.

AspartofNMPC'seffortstoaddressensuringcompliance withtheserequirements, existingprocedures werereviewedand,inconjunction withthecreationofanewoperating procedure detailing thespecificactionsforresponding toanSBO,werefoundflNMP135 a~>

tomeettherequirements of10CFR50.63 andguidelines inNUMARC87-00.Aspartofthisreview,NMPCconfirmed thatexistingprocedures providedguidancewhichwouldpermittherestoration ofACpowereitherfromoffsiteorfromtheemergency dieselgenerators.

Additionally, corporate operating instructions wereidentified thataddresstherestoration ofoffsitepowertoNMP1andtheScribaSubstation fromvarioussources.Confirmation oftheseexistingprocedural andoperating controlsalongwiththoseaddedtomeetNUMARC87-00providesarationale thatoperating procedures adequately addressthedesignbasisforlossofACpowerevents.Promptedbyrelevantindustryevents,NMPCinitiated andhassincecompleted areviewofselectedUFSARchapterstodetermine theiraccuracy.

Thereviewcoveredtenhighrisksystems(basedonPRA)including safety-related andnonsafety-related systems.Thisreviewidentified attributes thatshouldbeimplemented byplantprocedures, approvedprocesses orcontained inanEngineering document.

Inthisway,designbasisandlicensing information couldbeverified.

Eachattribute wasthenprovidedtotheappropriate linedepartment toprovidetechnical justification astowhetherornottheattribute wasfullyimplemented.

Thisreviewidentified approximately 634individual statements tobeverifiedbyplantandengineering personnel.

AsoftheendofJanuary1997,approximately 600statements (or95%)havebeendispositioned.

Ofthe600statements, lessthan9%resultedindiscrepancies contained intheUFSARthatmetthecriteriaforDERinitiation.

Thesediscrepancies rangedfromtypographical mistakestominorinconsistencies ininformation contained inplantprocedures andprocesses.

Oftheidentified inconsistencies, themajorityofthesewereduetofailuretoaccurately updatetheapplicable UFSARsectionasdescribed inexistingsafetyevaluations.

Baseduponourreviewtodate,nodiscrepancy hasresultedinanoperability concern,aplantperformance problem,orareportable condition outsidethedesignbasesoftheplant.Aself-assessment oftheUFSARreviewwastheninitiated todetermine theneedforandscopeofanUFSARverification program.Additionally, thisself-assessment alsoevaluated selectedNRCinspection reportsandNMPCLicenseeEventReports(LERs)forthepurposeofdetermining theaccuracyoftheUFSARinformation.

Theself-assessment concluded thattheNMP1UFSARisgenerally accurateindescribing theoperation oftheplant.Althoughdeficiencies andminorinconsistencies havebeenidentified, theyhavebeendetermined nottoimpactplantoperation orperformance.

However,theassessment indicates thatNMPCshouldpursueimproving theaccuracyoftheUFSAR.Thisprocesswouldalsoconfirmthevalidityofthedesignbasisfortheremaining systems,andimprovetheabilitytoefficiently maintaintheNMP1UFSAR.Accordingly, wearecurrently finalizing ourplansforaUFSARverification effort.Weintendtoperformacomprehensive reviewwhichwillbecompleted bytheendof1998.Thisreviewwillincludeprovision forpromptevaluation ofidentified deviations foroperability andreportability.

Itwillalsoassessonanongoingbasiswhethertherearebroadunderlying NMP136 It concernsofdesignbasisrelatedinadequacies.

TheUFSARVerification ProgramconfirmsNMPC'scommitment toensurethedesignbasisisreflected intheday-to-day operation oftheunit,andthatplantpersonnel areknowledgeable andawareofthesignificance ofoperating withinthelicensing basis.In1992,NMPCdeveloped anewtrainingcourseentitled"Back-to-Basics."

Thiscourseprovidedtrainingonlicensing basisdocuments andoperation withinourlicensing

envelope, andwasdesignedtoresultinenhancements toourmanagement andleadership skills.Alsodiscussed wastheexpectation thatifworkcouldnotbeperformed withinthecontrolsofaprocedure, theworkshouldstopandaresolution obtainedbeforeworkcontinues.

ThistrainingwasprovidedtoBranchManagersandselectedSupervisors whowerethenresponsible toteachthe"Back-to-Basics" coursetotheindividual workgroups."Back-to-Basics H"trainingwasconducted in1995-1996 toassistorganizations inunderstanding howBack-to-Basics relatestotheirspecificjobs.Thistrainingincludedadiagramofourlicensebasisanddiscussions of10CFR50.59 and50.92,commitments madetoOperational Experience items,RGs,andindustrystandards andhowwechangethesecommitments, adefinition ofoperability withanemphasisonpostaccidentfunction, discretionary enforcement, reportability requirements of10CFR50Parts72,73and21,andhowspecificworkactivities interactwiththedesignbasis.Concerning 50.59training, thebiennialrequaliflication trainingforpersonnel authorized topreparesafetyevaluations nowincludesaspecificdiscussion oftheconsequences offailingtoprepareasafetyevaluation.

MembersoftheSeniorManagement Teamrecentlyattendedtherequalification trainingtoensuretheirexpectations areincorporated, andtoheightenawareness of10CFR50.59 requirements andissues.MembersoftheSORCandtheSRABarealsorequiredtoattendrequalification training.

Trainingfornucleardivisionpersonnel developed duringtheRestartActionPlanperiodemphasized increased Standards ofPerformance expectations.

Topicsincludedaheightened focusondesigncontrol,DBR,andabetterunderstanding oftheNMPldesignandhowplantpersonnel shouldusedesigndocuments whenwritingprocedures andperforming modifications.

Lessonslearnedwerepresented intrainingwhichdiscussed configuration controlandprogrammanagement.

Changesintrainingprogramprocesses includedconfiguration controlofindividual trainingandqualification recordsforlicensedoperators.

AnewTrainingRecordsSystem,TRAIN,wasputinplacetohelpwiththemanagement oftrainingrecords.Additionally, programprocedures wererevisedtospecifycontinuing coverageoftopicsannually.

Operational Experience, including industryevents,aretypically analyzedfortrainingvalueinconjunction withDERdispositions and,ifappropriate, areincludedinthecontinuing trainingprogramforoperations, maintenance, engineering, chemistry, radiation protection, andsupportorganizations.

37

Routineandspecialtrainingperiodically resultsinenhancements toprocedures.

Operators canprocessprocedure changeswhentrainingactivities showthatthereisabetterwaytoaccomplish thespecifictask.Procedures arereviewedperiodically withintenttopreventpersonnel errors,ensurebetterunderstanding, andtrainpersonnel onthedesignorlicensing basisof.theplant.Anexampleofwhereanengineering supportcontinued trainingclassidentified aconcernwasthediscussion ofcontrolroddriveflowandhowitisusedtocalculate corethermalpower.Asaresultofthisdiscovery, configuration changestotheplantprocesscomputerweremadetocorrectthedeficiency.

Thishassincebeenidentified asanindustryproblemthatinitiated actionatotherplants.Administrative procedures andcontrolshavebeeninplacesinceconstruction ofNMPl,althoughsubstantially enhancedovertime,tomandaterequirements associated withthepreparation, review,approvalandrevisionofoperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures.

Theseprocedures andprocesses containappropriate requirements whichreasonably ensuredesignbasisrequirements areincorporated intoadministrative andtechnical procedures.

Personnel qualification requirements assurethatNMPCiscapableofimplementing theprogramrequirements.

Continuous improvement ofprogramrequirements andimplementation hasbeenaregularpracticeatNMPNS.Additionally, multipleassessments havebeenconducted which'demonstrate theoveralleffectiveness ofvariousprogramsinthedesign/configuration controlandprocedure area.Coupledtogether, theseactivities andprocesses providereasonable assurance thatdesignbasisrequirements aretranslated intooperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures atNMPl.38 0

tProvidetherationale forconcluding thatsystem,structure andcomponent configuration andperformance areconsistent withthedesignbases.NMP1wasbuiltpriortoestablishment ofQACriteriaof10CFR50AppendixBandothermoreformaldesignandconfiguration controlsappliedtonewerplants.However,actionshavebeentakensinceinitialoperation toensurethatsystem,structure, andcomponents configuration andperformance areconsistent withdesignbases.Surveillance testingprogramshavebeeninplacethroughout NMP1'soperating lifeandareformalized byprocedures.

Suchtestsprovideaprimarybasistoensurethatperformance ofsystemsmeetdesignbasesrequirements.

Additionally, post-maintenance andmodification testingisroutinely performed toensurethatdesignbasesrequirements continuetobemetfollowing maintenance andmodification activities.

Pressureretaining components arealsoroutinely testedthroughISIandtestingprograms.,

Inadditiontoconfirming thatSSCsmeetacceptance requirements, thesetestingprogramsprovideamecha'nism toidentifydeficiencies usingtheDERprocessandtotrendequipment performance.

Severalinitiatives havebeentakenorareinplacetoconfirmthatthephysicalconfiguration oftheplantisalsoconsistent withdesignbases.AspartoftheDBRprogram,anumberofsystemwalkdowns wereperformed forselectedsafetysignificant systems.Theseincludedverification activities relatingtomajorelectrical andmechanical components andsystemsaswellaspiping/pipe supportandpenetration walkdowns.

NMP1wasinanextendedoutagefrom1987-1990.

Aspartofthisextendedregulatory outage,NMP1preparedaRAPandRestartReadiness Report,whichincludedanumberofactionstoconfirmdesignadequacypriortorestart.In1990,aPowerAscension Programwascompleted forNMP1.Testswereconducted atvariouspowerlevelstoverifytheperformance ofindividual systemsaswellasinter-related systemperformance andoverallstationoperation andcontrol.'he testingalsoprovidedabasisforadditional evaluation ofstationoperating andsurveillance testprocedures.

Operations experience andSSFIs/Electrical Distribution SystemFunctional Inspection (EDSFIs)havebeenappliedtofurtherandmorespecifically evaluateNMP1'sconformance andperformance againstdesignbases.NMPC'sOperations Experience Programroutinely evaluates NRCBulletins, Notices,GLs,aswellasotherindustryinputsincluding INPO'sSOERs,SERs,andvendorissuances.

Evaluations suchasEDSFIandOperations Experience includeourassessment ofmotor-operated valves(MOVs)capability underGL89-10,ServiceWaterSystemcapability underGL89-13,Instrument AirSystemcapability aspartofGL88-14,GL91-06whichdiscussed theadequacyofsafety-related directcurrent(DC)powersupplies, GL87-0239

~w~y regarding seismicadequacy, andSBO-USIA-44.Theseassessments, coupledwithongoingevaluations ofplantperformance, assurethatconfiguration toperformance parameters areupdatedasappropriate.

Theaboveactivities, coupledwithourcorrective actionprogram,willensureroutineproblemidentification andevaluation ofas-builtconditions andtestresultsandprovidereasonable assurance thatcurrentperformance andconfiguration areconsistent withthedesignbases.NMPC'sresponsetoRequested Action(a)providesadescription oftheengineering designandconfiguration controlprocesses currently inplaceatNMP1,including thosethatimplement 10CFR50.59, 10CFR50.71(e),

andAppendixBto10CFRPart50.OurresponsetoRequested Action(d)providesadetaileddescription oftheprocesses fortheidentification ofproblemsandimplementation ofcorrective actionstopreventrecurrence (i.e.,theDER).NMPCisconfident thatadherence totheseprocesses providereasonable assurance thatNMPNSSSCconfiguration andperformance areconsistent withthedesignbases.NMPCbasesthisconfidence notonlythequalityoftheseprocesses, butonthemultipleefforts,reviews,inspections, testsandauditsthathavetakenplaceandthatarecurrently beingtakentoassureSSCconfiguration andperformance areconsistent withourdesignbases.Adiscussion ofsomeoftheseefforts,reviews,inspections, testsandauditsisprovidedbelow.Routinesurveillance testingandexaminations provideaprimarymethodbywhichtheperformance andmaterialcondition ofplantSSCsareconfirmed tobeconsistent withdesignbases.AnNDDestablishes therequirements fordevelopment andexecution ofaprogramforsurveillances andtestsrequiredbytheTechnical Specifications, regulatory commitments including theISTProgram,industryexperience, andspecialtestsandexperiments.

Asurveillance andtestprogramhasbeenestablished todemonstrate thatSSCsperformsatisfactorily inservice.Theregulatory requirements areidentified intheoperating license,Technical Specifications andUFSAR.Thesurveillance andtestprogramisupdatedasaresultofdesignchanges,corrective actionsidentified aspartoftheDERprocess,evaluations ofindustryoperating andmaintenance experience andchangestosourcerequirements.

Also,testrequirements forsurveillance andtestsmeettherequirements oftheASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCodeandRGsasappropriate.

Specificprocedures aredeveloped foreachsurveillance andtest,andwillsimulate, asnearaspractical, theactualconditions underwhichthesystemmustoperateondemand,Post-maintenance andmodification'ests verifythecapability ofSSCstoperformsatisfactorily inservice.Theextentofthetestingiscommensurate withtheworkperformed andtheimportance oftheSSCtostationsafetyandreliability.

Thetestrequirements andacceptance criteriafordesignchangesarederivedfromdesigndocuments orsourcesforregulatory requirements.

SSCdeficiencies andtestdatatrendsareevaluated andaDERinitiated asappropriate.

NMP140 A'I>>~

AnNDDalsoestablishes therequirements forthedevelopment ofISIandTestingprograms.

Thisdirective appliestotheexamination andtestingofthepressureretaining components oftheNMPNSreactorcoolantpressureboundaryandtocomponents requiredtobetestedinaccordance withtheASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.Unacceptable examination ortestresultswillresultintheinitiation ofaDERandappropriate actions.Suchtestingandexamination activities assurethatSSCscontinuetoperformasdescribed inthedesignbasisdocuments.

DuringtheNMP1extendedoutagefromDecember1987toJuly1990,'anumberofdesignbasisrelateddeficiencies wereidentified whichsupported theneedforadesignbasisproject.TheDBRProject,initially calledtheEngineering ProgramIntegration Project(EPg,wasimplemented toreviewandprovidethebasisforintegrating thevariousactivities involvedwithengineering supportandprogrammanagement forNMP1intotheappropriate functional groupsoftheNuclearDivision.

TheprogramsincludedintheDBRProjectwerethosewhich:1~Definedandverifiedthecurrentplantconfiguration, thecorresponding designbasisdocuments,

'anddeveloped toolsnecessary forcontrolling theplantconfiguration afteritwasdefinedandverified.

~Assessedthematerialcondition oftheplantsystemsandstructures, assessedmaintenance effectiveness, developed thelong-term strategyforplantmonitoring onacontinuous basis,andcoordinated thiswithplantlifeextension activities,

~Established theapproachforaddressing plantupgrades, technical issuesandsystemassessments.

Coordinated engineering resourcedevelopment including organization,

training, engineering computer/software supportandadvancedmethodology development.

Astheprogramevolved,theprogramfocusedonDBRandconfiguration management activities.

Thespecificobjectives ofDBRandconfiguration management upgradeprogramwereto:ARecoveranddocumentdesignbasisinformation forplantsystem,components andstructures ofNMP1.DevelopSDBDandDesignCriteriaDocuments (DCDs)whichincludethedesignbasisinformation.

~Determine anddocumentthecurrentas-builtconfiguration oftheplant.~Validatevendordocumentation basedontheas-builtinformation.

41

~Establish systemstoprovideaccessandcontrolforplantdesignconfiguration information.

'lWhentheDBRProjectwasendedinJune1994,thefollowing itemshadbeencompleted:

~21SDBDs.~23DCDs.~71programreviews.1VaxEquipment List(E-List)thatincludescomponents identified fromthedatabases whichweremergedintotheE-Listandadditional components identified throughthedevelopment ofSDBDs.TheE-Listwasconverted afterDBRintotheMEL-1whichisconsistent withtheformatatNMP2andiscurrently used.26walkdowns (system,piping,pipesupports, electrical panels,cables,etc.).~Integration oftheVendorTechnical ManualsProgram..Improvements totheConfiguration Management System,IDevelopment ofaprocesstoimproveplantcondition assessment anddemonstration ofinitialevaluations ofonesystemandtwocomponents.

~3areasoftechnical assessment improvement.

~8engineering toolsdeveloped.

'moredetaileddiscussion ofsomeoftheaboveitemsisprovidedbelow:TheSDBDsweredeveloped asaresultofrecovering/reconstituting thesystemdesignbasisofcertainsystemsatNMP1.TheSDBDsareintendedtosummarize thetechnical andregulatory basesforthesystemdesignandoperation andtoprovidearoadmaptotheunderlying designbasisdocuments.

The21SDBDsrepresent themajorityofthesafety-related systemsatNMP1.ThosesystemschosenwerebasedoninputfromEngineering andOperations andwerejudgedtobehighlyrisksignificant (although theIndividual PlantExamination (IPE)wasnotcompleteatthetime).TheDCDsaretopicaldesignbasissummarydocuments foruseinengineering supportofNMP1.Thesubjectofthesetopicaldesignbasisdocuments include,butarenotlimitedto,pipesupports, seismicclassification, fireprotection

criteria, hydraulic designrequirements, Instrument

&Controlsetpointcriteria, andDCloadandpowerdistribution.

TheDCDscontainboththeoriginaldesignbasesandoptionalupgrades(i.e.,requirements fromnewercodes,etc.,thatarenotcurrently partofthedesignbases).42 5L+,~

Manyconfiguration management improvements wereimplemented asaresultoftheDBRprogramincluding theupgrading oftheolderequipment listsintoanintegrated MEL-1anddevelopment ofsoftwareinterfaces withtheotherconfiguration databases (PCR,CDS,andEWC).Specificexamplesincludethefollowing:

~Thecontrolled documentdatabasewaslinkedwithMEL-1throughtheEquipment/

Component Identification and,Alternate Identification.

~ThePCRdatabasewaslinkedwithMEL-1throughtheEquipment/Component Identification andinterfaces withMEL-1fortheComponent Identification, Subsystem/System andSafetyClass.~Theinterface withtheEWC(WCMosse)databasewasimproved.

Thesesoftwareupgradesprimarily improvedthetimeliness andcoordination ofequipment statusanddocumentstatus,sothatplantstaffcanmoreeasilyrecognize whenpendingchangeshavebeencompleted, whentheyhavebeenmadeoperational, andthestatusofassociated designdocuments.

Technical assessment improvements resulting fromDBRactivities includedtheIPEIntegration whichcoordinated thedevelopment scheduleandcontentfortheSDBDsandDCDs.TheDBRprogramalsoresultedinthedevelopment oftheengineering toolsdescribed below:~Acableroutingdatabasewasestablished throughtheuseofsoftwarefortrackingandevaluating cablerouting.Thedatabaseusedwasbasedondrawingreviewsandwalkdowns.

Selectedampacitycalculations werealsoperformed.

~Afusingindexwasestablished usingacomputerprogramfortrackingfuseinformation.

Necessary information oncertainfuseswasobtainedandafinaldatabasewasintegrated intheE-List.~Fortycalculations forkeyEOPsandsafety-related instrumentation weredeveloped.

Thesecalculations wereusedtodefineNMPC'sapproachtoInstrument

&Controlinstrument loopaccuracycalculations.

Personnel trainingmaterials weredeveloped toinstructengineers intheuseandcareofdesignbasisinformation.

ClassesweregiventoNuclearEngineering andselectedothergroups,~Aprototype AdvancedSearchandImageRetrieval MethodsforDesignBasisInformation system,usedfordocumentretrieval, wasdeveloped forCoreSpraySystemdocuments.

Thissystemwasbasedonadetailedreviewofavailable technology.

NMP143 0I

~ComputerAidedDrawing(CAD)versionsofthePipingandInstrument Diagrams(P&IDs)weredeveloped including coloroverlays.

Prototype CADversionsofotherdrawingtypesforeachdiscipline weredeveloped todemonstrate linkingofdrawinginformation.

~NMPCprocuredacomputerprogram,trainingandtechnical supportforpipingandhangeranalysiscode.AnalysiscodewastailoredtospecificNMPCdocumentformatsandcompatibility requirements.

~NMPCalsoprocuredathermal-hydraulic analysistoolfor'Mechanical Engineering anddeveloped specificinterfaces forthesoftwaretofacilitate itsuse.Trainingandmanualsforusingthesoftwarewerealsodeveloped.

Thesetoolsaiddesigners andengineers inorganizing andtrackingdesigninformation whichshould,inturn,helpthemtorecognize andsatisfydesignbasisrequirements.

ITheDBRProgramincludedaVendorTechnical ManualReviewandUpgradeProject.Thisintegrated programincludedprocessing over10,000vendordocuments whichresultedinthereviewandapprovalofover7,000vendortechnical manualsforbothsafetyandnonsafety-relatedequipment.

PartofthiseffortwastodevelopanEquipment toVendorTechnical Manualcross-reference.

OpenItemsweregenerated duringtheDBRProgramasaresultofwalkdowns andthedevelopment ofSDBDsandDCDs.DuringtheconductofDBRwalkdowns, openitemsweregenerated whentheinstalled equipment and/orconfiguration ofthesystemwasinconsistent withthecontrolled designdocumentation.

AnOpenItemwasdefinedas:~Aninconsistency betweendocuments, databases, anddrawingsreviewed, or~Missingorincomplete designbasisinformation, or~DBRcommitments toberesolvedduringthepreparation oftheDesignBasisSummaryDocument, or~Interfaces betweenDesignBasisSummaryDocuments thatcannotbeconfirmed duetothecompletion statusoftheinterfacing documents.

Discrepancies betweentheas-installed configuration andthedesigndocumentation wereclassified asobservations.

Observations,,which areasubsetofOpenItems,wereassessedfortechnical significance andassignedaclassification of:~RoutineMaintenance Item~Non-Technically Significant Discrepancy (NTSD)44.

~Potential Technically Significant Discrepancy (PTSD)Observations classified asPTSDwerepresented totheSeniorEngineering ReviewTeam(SERT)whichconsisted ofEngineers fromthevariousdisciplines assignedresponsibility forevaluation anddisposition ofobservations (i.e.,mechanical, electrical, structural).

TheSERTdiscipline engineerwouldprovideguidancetotheEvaluation Engineertoevaluatetheimpactofthediscrepancy onequipment, systemsafetyfunction, etc.Asappropriate, theobservations wouldbebroughttotheattention ofthefullSERTmembership toobtainabroaderperspective oftheissue.Inaddition, discrepancies whichwereevaluated tobeTechnically Significant Deficiencies (TSDs)werereviewedbytheentireSERTTeamandrepresentatives fromDBR,licensing, andoperations.

TheOpenItemsclassified asObservations weredispositioned inaccordance withDBRguidelines, TheObservations wereassessedfortechnical significance.

ADERwaspreparedforTSDsandtheywerereviewedforoperability andreportability.

OpenItemswereclosed/resolved bycorrecting equipment/components throughroutinemaintenance, performing evaluations toacceptasis,issuingDesignChangeRequests(DCRs)toreworkinstalled components, orreconstitution ofdesignbases,etc.AsaresultoftheDBRprogram,atotalof6009OpenItemswereoriginated asofJune1,1994,andattheconclusion ofDBR,5083OpenItemswereclosed.Remaining OpenItemswereevaluated anddetermined nottorequireadditional action,withtheunderstanding thatasasystemrequiresamodification, enhancement, orforotherreasons,themissinginformation,

analysis, etc.,willbeinvestigated, collected orpursued.Thoseitemsthatinvolveadiscrepancy withtheUFSARarebeingresolvedbythecorrective actionprogram.Aspreviously discussed, systemwalkdowns wereperformed aspartofourDBReffort.Thesewalkdowns, performed for19ofthe21systemsforwhichSDBDsweredeveloped, wereconducted toverifythattheas-builtconfiguration ofthesystemswasconsistent withdesigndrawingsanddocuments, including theSafetyAnalysisReport(SAR)description.

Thisincludedobtaining nameplateinformation formajorelectrical andmechanical components inthesystem.Inaddition, piping,pipesupportsandcontainment penetration configurations werewalkeddown.Inaddition, piping/pipe supportslimitedscopewalkdowns (i.e.,forlargeborepiping,penetrations, etc.)wereperformed forfivesystemsforwhichSDBDswerenotdeveloped.

Thesefivesystemsarecondensate

transfer, mainsteam,reactorrecirculation, reactorwatercleanupandspentfuelpoolfiltering andcoolingsystems.Electrical panelwalkdowns werealsoperformed separatefromthesystemwalkdowns aswellasawalkdownofRG1.97instrument cables.NMP145 00 4tDuringtheconductofDBRwalkdowns, OpenItemsweregenIIcratedwhentheinstalled equipment and/orconfiguration ofthesystemwasinconsistent with'thecontrolled designdocumentation.

Thereviewprocesses assuredthatOpenItemswereevaluated promptlyandadetermination wasmaderegarding operability, significance andadditional actionsAdditional information concerning theprocessing ofOpenItemsisprovidedinourpreviousdescription oftheDBRprogram.Insummary,theDBRProjectwasthemajorengineering sponsored activitytowardtheimprovement oftheunitperformance between1989andmid-1994.

Theprojectresultedinseveralsignificant accomplishments, including thedocumentation ofdesignbasisinformation ofimportant safetysystems(SDBDs)andtopicaldesigncriteria(DCDs).Insomecases,designbasisdocumentation wasreconstituted becauseitwasimportant and/orfoundational information suchasservicewaterheatloadsandthermal-hydraulic

analysis, oremergency dieselgenerator electricloadsandtransient analysis.

DuringtheDBRProgram,improvements weremadetotheconfiguration management processaswellastothemethodsforresearching andreconstituting designbasisinformation.

Anypotential safetyconcernswerereviewedbyaSERTandappropriate actionstaken.Therewerenodesignbasisissueswhichconcluded thatanysystemorcomponent wasinoperable.

Exceptforafewinstances suchasselectedpipesupportsbeingoverstressed andsizingoffuses,plantconfiguration wasfoundtobeinaccordance withthedesignbasisoftheplant.Inthoseinstances offusesandpipingsupports, actionshavebeentakentobringthediscrepancies intodesignbasiscompliance forsafety-related systems.Asdiscussed inourresponsetoRequested Action(b),theNMPCRAPcontained anumberofactionstodetermine theadequacyofprocedures anddesign.Additionally, theRAPconducted actionsrelativetoequipment configuration andperformance including thefollowing:

1.Theplantfirebarrierswerewalkeddowntoreconcile the'"as-installed" configuration withdesignbasedocuments.

Specificaccountability forensuringthatthedesignbasebekeptcurrentwasalsoassignedviatheissuanceofaNEPdefiningfireprotection engineering responsibilities.

2.Thedesignbasesforthestationbatterychargerswere'pecified inadesignreportasaresultofconcernsidentified withtheirsafetyclassification.

Thesewerelaterreplacedwithstaticsafety-related batterychargers.

3.ASSFIoftheCoreSpraySystembytheNRCresultedinseveralfindingsthatwereincorporated intotheRAP.Severalcorrective actionsforthesefindingsresultedinanupdatingandaugmentation oftheCoreSpraydesignbasesinformation.

Asaresultofthissituation, problemreportsdocumenting specificdeficiencies indesignbasisdocumentation werereviewedandevaluated.

Anydeficiencies thatwereconsidered tobeofsafetyconsequence wereresolvedpriortostartup.46 0kt.

Inaddition, alongertermcommitment wasmadetodevelopandimplement aDBRandConfiguration Management UpgradeProgram.Adetaileddescription andstatusofthisprogramwasprovidedearlierinthisresponse.

4.Thedesignbasisofthe125VDCsystemwasevaluated following concernsidentified withtheabilitytodemonstrate operability andfunctional capability.

Subsequently, threenewbatteries wereinstalled, twosafety-related andonenonsafety-related.

Inaddition, thissystemwasincludedintheDBRprogram.InSeptember 1989,NMPCissuedthe"RestartReadiness Report".Thisreportprovidedstatusandassessments forthecorrective actionscontained intheRAP.Aportionoftherestartreportprovidedanassessment ofthereadiness ofthephysicalplantforrestart.Oneoftheconditions tobemetforrestartwasthat"theas-builtdesignoftheplantisknowntoagreewiththesafetydesignbasis'asdescribed intheFSAR".Anengineering evaluation

entitled, "DesignBasisJustification forNineMilePointRestart"wasperformed inMay1990todocumentthatthiscondition wassatisfied.

Theevaluation wasstructured tojustifytheadequacyoftheNMP1safetysystemsinsupportofrestarttoensurethesafetyofsubsequent operation withtheunderstanding thatdesignbasisandconfiguration inadequacies wouldberesolvedbythelongertermDBRandConfiguration Management UpgradeProgramdiscussed earlier.Anevaluation oftheNMP1safetysystemswasinitiated basedonreviewing thesignificant topicsandissuesaffecting boththedesignandoperation oftheNMP1safetysystems.Thistopic-based evaluation approachmadeuseofthesafetysystemrelatedconclusions, recommendations, andactionsimplemented bytheNMPCengineering andstationprogramsandactivities completed priortounitrestart.Thisapproachwassimilartoasystem-based evaluation, suchasisdonewithaSSFIsincebothapproaches addressvirtually thesametopics.Theprimarydifference intheapproaches wasthattopicswereidentified onanissuebasisoronasystembasis.Anadvantage oftheprogramreviewapproachwasthattheinformation reviewedcoveredagreaterperiodoftime.Theevaluation developed thespecifictechnical basisforapplyingengineering judgement totheassessment oftheadequacyoftheas-builtdesignandconfiguration ofthe13safetysystemsevaluated forNMP1.Thesesystemswereselectedforevaluation basedontheiraccidentcontrolandmitigation roles.Theevaluation supported conclusions ontheadequacyofNMP1as-builtdesignforunitrestart.Thekeyfactorsconsidered inevaluating thesafetysystemadequacyprovidedbyeachactivitywere:~Functional adequacy~Structural adequacy47 III1IIP

~Configuration agreement

~Procedure/Document ControladequacyTheexecution, findingsandimplementation statusofeachactivityprovidedthetechnical basisforanengineering judgmentineachoftheseareas.Anoverallconclusion ontheadequacyofNMP1safetysystemswasprovided'by evaluating thecompleteness oftheindividual programevidence.

Theevaluation ofprogramandissueresolution activityasdescribed inthisreportconcluded thatthedesignbasisandconfiguration concernraisedfortheNMP1safetysystemshadbeenaddressed.

Theevaluation concluded thattherewasahighdegreeof,confidence thatthethirteenkeysafetysystemsevaluated wouldbeconsistent withandperformtheirsafetydesignbasisfunctions asdescribed intheNMP1UFSARandthattheNMP1safetysystemswereadequately as-builtforunitrestart.NMPCcompleted aPowerAscension ProgramforNMP1in1990todemonstrate theplantwilloperateconsistent withthedesignbases.Systemswhichcouldnotbefullytestedduringtheextendedrefueling outage(1988-1990) weretestedduringthePowerAscension Program.ThePowerAscension Programwasdividedintothreephases:0to25%,25to75%,and60to100%power.Thetestswereconducted toverifytheperformance ofindividual systems,verifyinter-related systemperformance, andoverallstationoperation andcontrol.Additionally, thetestingprovidedadditional evaluation ofsystem,stationoperating andsurveillance procedures.

Theseprocedures wereusedintheirnormalfashionwhereverpossibletosupportpowerascension testing.Theprogramconsisted of3administrative procedures and13powerascension tests.The13testsweredetermined basedon'reviewofthefollowing documentation:

1)NMP1initialstartuptestprogram;2)NMP2startuptestprogram;(3)modifications andoutagemaintenance activities; 4)industryissuesforwhichtestingcouldsupportpreviousevaluations; 5)otherrecentBoilingWaterReactor(BWR)restartpowerascension testprograms; and6)transient analysisassumptions.

TheprogramtestcontrolsincludedSORCreviewofeachtestprocedure, testresult,andtestexception.

SORCreviewedtheresultsofeachtestphaseandrecommended approvaltomovetothenexttestphase.Theprocedure fortestcontrolsprovidedgeneralguidance, instructions fortestinterpretations, datacollection, reviewofacceptance

criteria, shiftlogs,turnover, andshiftbriefings.

ThePowerAscension Self-Assessment procedure assessedmanagement effectiveness including personnel performance, duringthePowerAscension Program.Evaluations andassessments werecompleted bythelinemanagement, NuclearQAOperation, theIndependent Assessment GroupandSORC.Assessments werebasedonNMPNSstandards ofperformance, departmental performance criterion, andINPOPerformance Standards.

SORCdetermined iftheselfassessments weresatisfactory priortoproceeding tothenexttestphaseforcompletion ofthePowerAscension Program.NMPCdocumented theresultsofouroverallassessment ofthePowerAscension PrograminareporttotheNRCasrequiredbyConfirmatory ActionLetter88-17.Thereportconcluded thattheoperating andsupportpersonnel havepreparedthemselves andarecapableofcontinued safeoperation ofNMP1.NMP148

• ',le)'

Thereportalsoconcluded thatselfassessment andotherproblemidentification andresolutions areinplacetoprevent,ordetect,andcorrectfutureproblems.

DuringtheperiodbetweenSeptember 23andOctober25,1991,anNRCinspection teamconducted anEDSFIatNMP1.Theinspection wasperformed todetermine iftheelectrical distribution systemwascapableofperforming itsintendedsafetyfunctions asdesigned, installed, andconfigured.

Theteamalsoassessedthelicensee's engineering andtechnical supportofelectrical distribution systemactivities.

Forthesepurposes, theteamperformed plantwalkdowns andtechnical reviewsofstudies,calculations, anddesigndrawingspertaining totheelectrical distribution system,andconducted interviews, ofcorporate andplantpersonnel.

Baseduponthesampleofdesigndrawings, studiesandcalculations reviewedandequipment inspected, theteamconcluded thattheelectrical distribution systematNMP1iscapableofperforming itsintendedfunctions.

Inaddition, theteamconcluded thattheengineering andtechnical supportstaffprovideadequatesupportforthesafeoperation oftheelectrical distribution systemattheplant.Theinspection alsoidentified twoviolations (onewaslaterwithdrawn),

onenon-cited violation, twelveunresolved items,variousstrengths andobservations asdiscussed intheparagraphs below.Theteamfoundthatrootcauseanalyseswerethorough, corrective actionsweretakeninatimelymanner,andNMPC'splantmodification anddesignchangeprogramwasadequate.

Theteamalsofoundthatthelicenseehadaneffective programforcontrolling temporary modifications intheplant,andtheprocedures tooperatetheelectrical distribution systemweresufficient andwouldassureelectrical distribution systemoperability undernormal,abnormal, andaccidentconditions.

Operators werefoundtobeknowledgeable oftheelectrical distribution systemandassociated procedures.

TheNRCfoundthatNMPNShadacommendable self-assessment programthatallowsplantpersonnel toidentifytheproblemareas,evaluatetheproblems, andinitiatecorrective actionstoimproveplantperformance.

Seniormanagement wasdirectlyinvolvedinthisprogram.Threestrengths thatwereidentified intheengineering andtechnical supportareaconsisted of:1)aninternalsystematic assessment oflicenseeperformance (SALP)programtoevaluateandimproveperformance; 2)aself-initiated EDSFItoidentifyelectrical distribution systemdeficiencies andtakecorrective actions;and3)aDERprogramtoidentifyproblemareasandinitiatecorrective actionsbeforetheybecomeasafetyconcern.Theteam'sreviewofthedesignattributes withinthescopeofthisinspection concluded that,withtheexception ofthespecificfindingsinthereport,theelectrical distribution systemcomponents wereadequately sizedandconfigured, designwasgenerally

adequate, andnooperability problemsexist.Intheareaofmechanical support'systems fortheelectrical 49 e

distribution system,theteamconcluded thatthetechnical staffwasknowledgeable ofthemechanical systemsaffecting theelectrical distribution system.,Sufficient information wasavailable toreviewandassesstheoperability ofthesemechanical systemswiththeexception ofthelackofgooddocumentation forpumpperformance curvesandadequateheatingventilating airconditioning (HVAC)calculations fortheelectrical distribution system.However,boundingcalculations wereperformed andadminist'rative controlsimplemented toassuretheoperability ofthesystem.Ingeneral,theNRCconcluded thatadequatecontrolshadbeenimplemented tomaintaintheelectrical systemconfiguration forallsafety-related electrical distribution systemcomponents.

OurletterdatedFebruary18,1992,providedourresponsetotheEDSFI,including thecorrective actionstakentoaddresstheidentified deficiencies topreventrecurrence.

LASSFIwasconducted duringtheperiodofSeptember 12,1988,throughOctober7,1988.Theeffortinvolvedanassessment oftheoperational readiness andfunctionality oftheHPCImodeoftheFeedwater (HPCI/Feedwater) systemandtheCoreSpraySystem.Particular attention wasdirectedtothedetailsofmodifications anddesigncontrol,maintenance, operation, andtestingoftheapplicable systems.Additionally, theprogramsforassuringoperability intheseareaswerereviewedtodetermine theireffectiveness.

Theinspection teamconcluded thatdesigninformation forboththeCoreSprayandHPCI/Feedwater Systemswasnotadequately controlled norsupported bysufficiently detailedanalyses.

Aspreviously discussed, manyofthesefindingswereincorporated intotheRAP.Corrective actionsincludedupdatingandaugmenting theCoreSpraydesignbasisinformation.

Anydeficiencies thatwereconsidered tobeofsafetyconsequence wereresolvedpriortostartup.Further,theDBRprogrampreviously described resultedinimprovements todesignbasisinformation andreconciliation withoperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures forthissystem.Insummary,function'al inspections areconducted todetermine ifplantsystemsarecapableofperforming theirintendedsafetyfunctions asdesigned, installed, andconfigured, andtherefore, providearationale thatSSCsconfiguration andperformance areconsistent withthedesignbases.Industryoperations experience itemsprovidetheNMPNSopportunities toconfirmthatSSCconfiguration andperformance isconsistent withthedesignbases.,Asaminimum,NRCBulletins, Notices,GLs,andINPOissuances suchasSOERsandSERs,aswellasvendorissuances arereviewedtodetermine applicability totheNMPNS.NuclearDivisionpersonnel arerequiredbyprocedure andtrainedtoinitiateaDERupondiscovery ofadeviation/event orNMPl50

~i0Ill".

condition adversetoqualityorwhenitisdetermined thatanindustryexperience isapplicable totheNMPNS.TheDERprocess,asdescribed inourresponsetoRequested Action(d),requiresadisposition andcorrective actions,asnecessary.

Someexamplesofoperations experience itemsthathaverequiredNMPNStoconfirmand/o'rtakeactiontoassurethatSSCconfiguration andperformance isconsistent withthedesignbasesareprovidedbelow:GL89-10requested thatlicensees developandimplement aprogramtoensurethatMOVswitchsettingsareselected, setandmaintained sothatMOVswouldoperateunderdesignbasisconditions forthelifeoftheplant.TheNMP1MOVProgramPlanwasdeveloped inresponsetoGL89-10toidentifythescopeoftheprogramandassureproperdesignbasisreviewandconfirmation thatsafety-related MOVscouldperformtheirdesignfunctionunderalldesignconditions.

Theprogramexaminesdesignbasisrequirements ofallMOVsundertheprogramanddocumented theresultsofthisreviewunderNMPC'scalculation procedure'to assurefutureaccesstothisinformation.

Thisreviewencompasses suchdesignbasisdocumentation asapplicable UFSARsectioris, Technical Specifications, systemdesigncriteria, systemdescriptions, operating, andmaintenance procedures.

Withthesedesignrequirements firmlyestablished andverified, eachMOVisevaluated inasizingcalculation toassuresufficient actuatorcapability toperformdesignated designfunctions.

Appropriate MOVmaintenance procedures aredeveloped tostatically anddynamically testMOVs.AselectednumberofMOVsaretestedunderdynamicconditions asclosetodesignbasisdifferential pressureasachievable inaccordance withNMP1'sMOVtestinggroupingstudy.Wherein-situplanttestinginformation isdetermined insufficient tovalidatedesignassumptions usedinMOVsizingcalculations, applicable industrydataisappliedtosupplement NMP1information.

Asaresultofthesereviewsandtestingresults,additional

'safetymarginwasidentified asdesirable forselectedMOVsandresultedinseveralmodifications totheplantdesign.Modifications performed includeactuatorreplacement, gearingchanges,andspringpackchanges.Insummary,theeffortsofGL89-10haveprovidedaddedassurance thatMOVswilloperateasneededfordesignbasesconditions.

GL89-10testingactivities arescheduled tobecompleted bytheendofREFOUT97scheduled fortheSpringof1997.Programclosure,including incorporation oftest.results,isscheduled for30daysaftertheendoftheoutage.GL89-13statesthatnuclearpowerplantsmustensurethattheServiceWaterSystemisincompliance withtheminimumrequirements of10CFR50,,'Appendix A,GeneralDesignCriteria(GDC)44,45,and46,andAppendixB,SectionXI.ActionshavebeentakeninresponsetoGL89-13tohelpensuretheperformance andconfiguration oftheServiceWaterSystemareconsistent withthedesignbases.Theseactionsinclude,butarenotlimitedto,thefollowing:

I~51 Ir Erosion/Corrosion Programdeveloped fortheServiceWaterSystemtoidentifyareasmostsusceptible toerosion/corrosion, provideresolution tospecificerosion/corrosion

problems, andestablish amonitoring programtodetectonsetoferosion/corrosion.

Aspartofplantpowerascension in1990,thermalperformance testingand/orsupporting calculations wereperformed forReactorBuildingClosedLoopCooling(RBCLC)andContainment Sprayheatexchangers.

Testingandcalculations demonstrated acceptable heatexchanger performance inaccordance withdesignbasis.~Rawwatersafety-related heatexchanger maintenance (inspections andcleanings) frequencies werereviewedandrevisedasrequired.

Frequencies established tominimizedegradation, maintaining baselinetestedheatexchanger condition.

~RBCLCheatexchanger thermalperformance testingisperformed semi-annually.

Testingperformed toevaluateheatexchanger condition andensuretheymeetminimumthermalperformance requirement.

Aspreviously discussed, anauditoftheNMP1ServiceWaterSystemw'asconducted toreviewsystemdesignandoperation including commitments toGL89-13.Thisauditconcluded thattheNMP1ServiceWaterSystemwassufficiently

designed, operated, tested,and'maintained toassureperformance ofdesignsafetyfunctions underpostulated designbasisaccidents.

ThepurposeofGL88-14wastorequestthateachlicensee/applicant reviewNUREG-1275, Volume2,Operating Experience FeedbackReport-AirSystemsProblems, andperformadesignandoperations verification oftheIAS.InresponsetoGL88-14,NMPCverifiedandevaluated theIASdesignandoperation.

Specificequipment anddesigndocumentenhan'cements wereidentified andmodifications performed toenhanceIASreliability andperformance.

Enhancements includednewinstrument airdryers,development ofaSDBD,verification ofdesignbasisrequirements forsystemendusercomponents, systemwalkdowns, upgrading ofexistingdocuments.

Theseactivities provideassurance thatIASconfiguration andperformance isconsistent withthedesignbasis.GIA-30,"Adequacy ofSafety-Related DCPowerSupplies,"

isconcerned withmultipleandcommoncausefailuresofDCpowersupplies; primarily astheresultofinadequate maintenance, surveillance, andfailuredetection.

GL91-06requested licensees tosubmitplant-specific information concerning theirsafety-related DCpowersuppliestoenabletheNRCtodetermine iflicensees hadadequately resolvedGIA-30.GL91-06alsogave52

'tj licensees theoptionofproviding certainsupporting information aspartoftheirIPEsubmittal insteadofsupplying itinresponsetotheGL.Following thedirection giveninGL91-06,NMP1responded thatitcompliedwithmostofthedesign,maintenance, andtesting'attributes described intheletter.Inparticular, thelevelofredundancy, controlroomindication, weeklytesting,performance testing,andbatterysystemcapacitywereinaccordance withtheprovisions setforthintheletter.Exceptions werelateraddressed intheNMP1IPEsubmittal datedJuly1993.Justification wasprovidedfor1)alternative alarmindications, and2)performing certaintestingona24-monthcycleversusthe,recommended 18-monthfrequency.

Inconclusion, NMP1'sresponsetoGL91-06demonstrated thatmaintenance, surveillance, andmonitoring provisions areappropriate toprecludemultipleandcommoncausefailuresofthesafety-related DCsystem.NInGL87-02,datedFebruary19,1987,theCommission setforththeprocessforresolution ofUSIA-46,SQofEquipment inOperating Plants.InGL87-02,theNRCconcluded thattheseismicadequacyofcertainequipment mustbereviewedagainstseismiccriterianotinusewhentheplantswerelicensed.

InSupplement 1toGL87-02,datedMay22,1992,theCommission requiredthatlicensees submitacommitment totheGenericImplementation Procedure'(GIP) forSeismicVerification ofNuclearPlantEquipment, Revision2,(GIP-2),preparedbytheSeismicQualification UtilityGroup(SQUG).ByletterdatedSeptember 18,1992,NMP1,responded toSupplement 1ofGL87-02.Ourresponseincludedacommitment toimplement GIP-2,including theclarifications, interpretations, andexceptions inSupplemental SafetyEvaluation Report(SSER-2),

andtocommunicate totheCommission anysignificant orprogrammatic deviations fromtheGIPguldallce.

IBasedontheScreening Evaluation Worksheet (SEWS)evaluations performed, theNMP1A-46SafeShutdownEquipment List(SSEL)equipment meetstheintentoftheGIP-2withtheexception ofidentified outliers.

Outliersnotmeetingthecriteriaidentified intheSEWSwereidentified onDERsandoperability determinations performed inaccordance withNineMilePoint(NMP)Engineering guidelines andprocedures.

Althoughdeficiencies havebeennoted,theequipment wasdetermined tobeoperableandmodifications fortheseoutliers(tocomplywithGIP-2)scheduled tobecompleted attheconclusion ofRFO15.Theactivities ofGL87-02haveprovidedaddedassurance thatplantequipment willperformtheirintendedfunctions.

ForNMP1,ninesystemswithsafety-related pumpswereevaluated forpotential minimumflowconcerns.

Oftheninesystems,eightwerefoundacceptable basedonevaluation NMP153 If'1 alone.Fortheoneremaining system,corespray,atestwasconducted toverifyoperability.

Thetestsimulated smallbreakLOCAconditions including pumpinitiation sequenceandmaximumoperating timeintheminimumflowmode.ThetestresultsverifiedthatthecorespraypumpsandtoppingpumpswouldbeabletooperateintheminimumflowmodeduringasmallbreakLOCA.Additionally, toaddressthepossibility thatdegradation ofthepumpscouldaffecttheinitialtestresults,andtherefore, requirerepeatedtesting,NMPCinstalled individual recirculation linesforthepumps.TheeffortsinresponsetoBulletin88-04providedadditional assurance throughanalysisandspecifictestingthatsusceptible safety-related pumpswereinfactdesignedwithadequateminimumflowprotection tomeetdesignbasisrequirements.

NRCUSIA-44,"StationBlackout" (SBO),wasconcerned withtheabilityofanuclearpowerplanttocopewithatotallossofbothoffsiteandonsiteACelectrical power.TheNRCresolvedtheissuebyincorporating requirements forcopingwithaSBOintheCodeofFederalRegulations (CFR),specifically 10CFR50.63.

Assessment andimplementation oftheSBOrequirements resultedinthefollowing:,

I~Analyseswereperformed todemonstrate thatthereactorcore,primarycontainment, controlroom,andothercritical'areas intheplantwouldnotbeadversely affectedbyanSBOdurationof4hours.~Anemergency dieselgenerator reliability requirement ofatleast.975orgreaterwasshowntobesatisfied.

~Analyseswereperformed toinsurethatcriticalDCpowersuppliesandassociated instrumentation requiredforthe4-hourcopingdurationwereavailable.

~Systemwalkdowns wereperformed asnecessary,to validatetheexistence ofadequatelighting, thatequipment wasphysically locatedasdetermined fromconfiguration documents andthatplantequipment couldbephysically controlled inthemannerassumedbytheprocedures.

Theseeffortshaveprovidedassurance ofNMP1'sabilitytocopewithaSBO.Self-audits haveconfirmed thatthisdesignbasischangehasbeenadequately implemented therebydemonstrating theproperimplementation ofthedesigncontrolsdescribed inresponsetoRequested Action(a),Additionally, aswithanychangemadetothefacility, activities suchaswalkdowns andreanalysis providetheopportunity topotentially identifyexistingdiscrepancies.

Forthesereasons,theactivities associated withSBOhelpprovideassurance thatsystem,structure andcomponent configuration andperformance areconsistent withthedesignbases.54

(

Ahistorical analysiswascompleted oftheDERdatasystem.Specifically, asearchwasdonetodetermine thenumberofdesignandconfiguration controlissueswhichhavebeenidentified.

Since1991,over1400DERshavebeeninitiated whichhadacausalfactorcode"DesignandConfiguration Analysis."

Theseincluded519DERsforNMP1,922DERsforNMP2,and21DERswhichwerecommontobothplants.ThenumberofDERsrelatingtodesignandconfiguration controlissueshasincreased inmorerecentyears.Thespecificresultsareasfollows:DERs199119921993199419951996Unit1Unit291512507984205204341155276CommonTOTAL202813129454810441Asameasureofsignificance oftheover1400issuesidentified, wedetermined thenumberofLERsidentified asaresultoftheseissues.Inthesametimeperiod,8oftheDERsforNMP1werereportedonLERsand10forNMP2.Thedetailsbyyearareasfollows:LERs199119921993199419951996Unit1Unit2TOTAL0'ftheover1400DERsinitiated since1991,19wereinitiated asaresultofNRCidentified issues.Thedetailsbyyearandunitareasfollows:DERsUnit1Unit2TOTAL19911992001993199419951996Insummary,theabovedataindicates thatNMPCisroutinely identifying issuesassociated withtheNineMilePointDesignandConfiguration Controlprocesses andprograms.

Thefactthatthenumberofissueshasincreased since1991doesnotmeanthatdesignandconfiguration controlismoredeficient, butthatourabilitytoidentifyissuesisimproving.

Also,becauseveryfewoftheseissuesresultedinreportable events,thesafetysignificance ofmostissuesissmall.Theseresults55 P1r(

supportourbeliefthattheoveralldesignbasesforbothunitsaresoundandareunderconstantscrutinyandincreased questioning toensurethatdiscrepancies, regardless ofsigni6cance, arepromptlyidentified~and resolved.

NMP156 cp4 Describetheprocesses foridentification ofproblemsandimplementation ofcorrective actions,including actionstodetermine theextentofproblems, actionstopreventrecurrence, andreporting totheNRC.NMPCutilizestheDERastheadministrative toolfordocumenting, evaluating (including reportability totheNRC),determining cause,anddetermining corrective andpreventive actionsforproblemsthatareidentified attheNMPNS.Problemidentification resultsfromawiderangeofsources,whichincludein-houseevents,testingandinspection activities, observations, auditandsurveillance activities, self-assessments, andoutsideagencies'nspections andevaluation activities.

TheDERisalsousedasthetrackingtoolforOperations Experience issues.Thetextthatfollowsdescribes indetailtheNMPNS'sprocessforproblemidentification andultimateresolution, thecornerstone ofwhichistheDER,andassociated administrative procedures thatensureeffective implementation oftheprocess.AnNDDestablishes therequirements fortheidentification, documentation, notification, evaluation, correction, andreporting ofdeviations/events orconditions adversetoqualitythatmayimpactthesafeandreliableoperation oftheNMPNSorpersonnel safety,withtheexception ofcertainSafeguards information.

ThisNDDdirectseachNuclearDivisionemployee, aspartofhis/hernormalduties,tobealertforandtopromptlyidentifyeventsandnonconforming items,including hardwarefailures.

Acontinuous assessment ofoperating andindustryexperience forimpactonsafeoperation isperformed andaformalprogramforreviewing industryexperience established.

Asaminimum,NRCBulletins, Notices,GLs,andINFOissuances suchasSOERsandSERs,aswellasvendorissuances arereviewedtodetermine applicability totheNMPNS.NuclearDivisionpersonnel aredirectedtoinitiateaDERupondiscovery ofadeviation/event orcondition adversetoqualityorwhenitisdetermined thatanindustryissuanceisapplicable totheNMPNS.Thedetermination ofreportability andoperability isthenperformed asnecessary, theDERdispositioned, andappropriate corrective andpreventive actionstaken.ANIPprescribes themethodforprocessing DERsfortheidentification, documentation, notification, evaluation, correction, andreporting ofconditions, events,activities, andconcernsthathavethepotential foraffecting thesafeandreliableoperation oftheNMPNS.Thisinterfacing procedure appliestoconditions havinganadverseorpotentially adverseeffectonactivities important tonuclearsafety,industrial safety,plantreliability, orhumanperformance, including butnotlimitedtothefollowing:

57 01~I0'4f'$<

~hardwarefailuresotherthannormalwearandtear;~hardwareorcomponent malfunctions resulting fromdesignormanufacturing deviations ordefects;~out-of-calibration measuring andtestequipment knowntohaveadversely orpotentially adversely affectedotherplantequipment; I~non-compliances havingnuclearsafetysignificance;

~adversepersonnel performance suchasfailuretofollowprocedures orviolations ofpersonnel safetyrulesorpractices;

~radiation protection deviations;

~preventive maintenance activities notcompleted beforelatedateordeferraldate;~recurring corrective maintenance/

hardwarefailures;

~humanperformance problems/issues;

~inadequate corrective actionsortestfailures;

~deviations fromdesigndocumentrequirements (otherthannormalwearandtear)including stationconfiguration discrepancies;

~conditions adversetofireprotection suchasfailures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective components, uncontrolled combustible

material, andnonconformances.

1Alsoapplicable aredeficiencies,

concerns, orissuesresulting fromregulatory

agencies, industryandinternaloperating experience, inspections, observations orpublications, reportable eventstotheNRCandotherregulatory

agencies, issuesresulting fromself-assessment, andissuesthatdonotmeettheabovecriteriabut,intheopinionofmanagement, warrantevaluation.

ADERrequiresaconcisesummaryoftheeventordeviation, thecomponent number,ifapplicable, theidentifying organization andadescription ofanyimmediate actionstakentoplacetheplantinastablecondition ortominimizepersonnel andequipment safetyhazards.TheDERinitiator thenmusthand-deliver theDERtohisorherSupervisor.

Ifthedeviation/event couldhaveanimpactonplantequipment, ispotentially reportable, orissecurityrelated,theDERishanddelivered totheSSS/Assistant StationShiftSupervisor (ASSS)forreportability andoperability determinations.

NMP158 0I,$S Anoperations administrative procedure establishes amethodfordetermining theoperability ofSSCs.Thisoperations administrative procedure wasspecifically developed toprovideguidancetoOperations personnel asnecessary whenmakingoperability assessments ofSSCsthathavebeenidentified onDERsorWorkOrdersasbeinginadegradedornonconforming condition.

Includedinthisprocedure isanEquipment Operability Determination Checklist whichdocuments thedecisionaffirming thecapability ofasystem/component toperformitsspecified functionasrequiredbytheTechnical Specifications ortheFSAR.Guidanceprovidedintheprocedure indicates thataSSCiseitheroperableorinoperable atalltimes.Operability determinations arerequiredtobeperformed promptly(inmostcaseswithin24hours),withatimeliness thatiscommensurate withthepotential safetysignificance oftheissue.ForSSCsinTechnical Specifications, theSSS/ASSSusesthetimelimitcontained inthespecificLimitingCondition forOperation (LCO)actionstatement asguidancetodetermine safetysignificance.

Engineering mayberequested tosupportanoperability determination.

AnEngineering Supporting Analysismustbecompleted within5daysofnotification orasdirectedbytheplantmanagerbasedonthesignificance ofthedeviation.

InordertodeclareanSSCoperablewhiletheengineering reviewisbeingperformed, operations personnel musthavereasonable assurance, basedonthebestinformation available, thattheSSCiscapableofperforming itsdesignfunctionifcalledupon.Intheabsenceofreasonable assurance, orifmountingevidencesuggeststhefinalanalysiswillconcludetheSSCcannotperformitsspecified

function, theSSCisdeclaredinoperable andtheappropriate actionsimplemented.

WhenEngineering ispreparing anEngineering SupportAnalysis, theindividual mustconsiderthefollowing:

calculations, testresultsandotherdocumentation whichdefinetheSSCdesignbasis;thepotential adverseaffectsonsafetyandTechnical Specification impact;thelengthoftimethecondition hasbeenandwillremainineffect;foreachequipment functionadversely

impacted, theimpactonrelatedsystemfunctions; foreachsystemfunctionadversely

impacted, theimpactonanyequipment orsystemssupported bytheimpactedsystemfunctions.

TheEngineering SupportAnalysismustbeofsufficient depthtoprovidealogicalanddefensible basisforoperability conclusions andtodetermine whethera10CFR50.59 safetyevaluation isrequiredtosupportanyoperability decisions.

Guidancetodetermine ifadeviation/event isreportable totheNRCisprovidedbyaNIP.TheNIPprovidesasummaryoftherequiredNRCnotifications andreportsandtheresponsible organizations.

Following reportability/operability determination activities, theDERisdelivered tothePlantManager's officebytheendoftheoperating shift.Theplantmanager,basedonthesignificance ofthedeviation, assignsacategorytotheDERfordispositioning.

Thedisposition totheDERrequiresthataRootCauseEvaluation beperformed anddocumented intheDERifthethreshold guidelines forperforming aformalrootcausearemet.Aformalrootcauseisperformed forallCategory1(highestsignificance category)

DERsandintheeventofanyofthefollowing:

NMPI59 jII,~~l'~V%

~asevereorunusualplanttransient;

~safetysystemmalfunction orimproperoperation;

~majorequipment damage;~othereventsinvolving nuclearsafetyorplantreliability;

~fuelhandlingorstorageevent;~excessive radiation exposureorseverepersonnel injury;~excessive discharge ofradioactivity;

~oradeficiency indesign,analysis, operations, maintenance, testing,procedures ortrainingthatcouldcauseasignificant eventasdescribed above.TheDERprocedure requiresthatpersonnel performing root'cause analysisbequalified inthetechniques ofrootcauseanalysis.

Apparentcausedeterminations areusedwhenaformalrootcauseevaluation isnotrequired.

Apparentorrootcausesarevalidated forpotentially significant DERsbyensuringadeviation/event wouldnothaveoccurredhadthecausenotbeenpresent,thatthedeviation/event willnotrecurduetothesamecausalfactor(s) ifthecauseiscorrected oreliminated, andthatcorrection orelimination ofthecausewillpreventrecurrenc'e ofsimilarconditions.

Thecondition isassigned, aDeviation EventTrendCodefortrackingpurposes.

Adisposition totheDERisthengenerated whichincludescorrective actionsandforpotentially significant DERs,preventive actionstopreventrecurrence.

References tocurrentandapproveddesigndocuments, procedures, instructions forrepairs,retest/inspection requirements, acceptance

criteria, supporting sketchesanddocumentation areincludedasappropriate, IftheDERisforanindustryissuance, thepotential impactonequipment documents suchasvendormanualsandvendordesigndocuments isidentified.

Theprocedure governing theDERprocessrequiresthatifaDERisanonconformance andnotcorrected, thenonconformance willbeassessedforimpactontheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR).Ifanonconformance resultsinadeviation fromtheUFSAR,theplantmanagerisnotifiedandthenonconformance mustbereconciled withinsixmonthsofthedeviation (orearlierasdetermined bytheplantmanager).

Thedisposition willimplement thefollowing asappropriate:

1)restorethenonconformance tocompliance withtheUFSAR,or2)changetheUFSARpertheNIPgoverning applicability reviewsandsafetyevaluations, or3)ifitisnotpossibletocorrectthenonconformance withinsixmonths(suchasifaplantoutageisrequired),

provideanEngineering SupportAnalysisthatsupportsoperation withthenonconformance fortheperiodoftimerequired.

Anonconformance isdefinedasadeficiency incharacteristic, documentation, orprocedure thatrendersthequalityofanitemunacceptable orindeterminate.

DERdispositions mustbeapprovedbytheappropriate BranchManager,andifrequired, bytheSORCandtheplantmanager.DERsarenotcloseduntilrequired60 1~

~~~~~Pdisposition actions,havebeencompleted andidentified deficiencies havebeencorrected.

FinalclosurerequiresaBranchManagersignature; XxcQRlgTrendinformation isgenerated bytheQAdepartment usingtheTrendCodesportionoftheDERdatabase.

Reportsaresubmitted totheBranchManagersonaquarterly basis.BranchManagersareexpectedtoinvestigate andevaluatetrendsidentified, toassesstheirstrengths andweaknesses, andtodetermine, whattypesofcorrective actionshavebeeneffective andwheretheyneedtoimproveperformance intheirbranch.ANIPprovidestheadministrative controlsforcommunication of"lessonslearned"information throughout theNuclearDivision.

ALessonsLearnedTransmittal isusedwhenitisnecessary tocommunicate appropriate actionsthatshouldbeencouraged orinappropriate actionsthatmustbeprevented fromrecurring.

LessonsLearnedTransmittals containadescription oftheevent,causeofevent,andlessonslearnedandtypically resultfromdispositioning DERs.AnNDDgoverning safetyreviewsestablishes therequirements forthedevelopment andexecution ofaprogramfortheplanned,systematic reviewoftheoperation ofNMPNSandtoassignresponsibility forimplementing thoserequirements.

SafetyReviewOrganizations includetheSORCandtheSRAB.Theresponsibilities foreachofthesegroupsisdelineated intheplantTechnical Specifications.

TheSORCfunctions toadvisetheplantmanageronallmattersrelatedtonuclearsafety.TheSORCisresponsible fortheinvestigation ofviolations oftheTechnical Specifications, including thepreparation andforwarding ofreportscoveringevaluation andrecommendations topreventrecurrence, totheVice-President andGeneralManager-Nuclear, andtotheSRAB.TheSORCisalsoresponsible forthereviewofallreportable events,reviewofunitoperations todetectpotential hazardstonuclearsafety,performance ofspecialreviews,investigations, oranalysesandreportsasrequested bythePlantManagerortheSRAB.ANIPprovidestheadministrative controlsandconductoftheSRABtoensurethattheExecutive VicePresident-Generation BusinessGroupandChiefNuclearOfficerisadvisedonmattersofnuclearsafety.Currently, theSRABiscomposedofaChairmanand12membersincluding fournon-NMPCmembers.TheSRABprovidesan'independent reviewandauditofdesignated activities intheareasofplantoperations, nuclearengineering, chemistry andNMP161 nat'(>>~'

radiochemistry, metallurgy, instrumentation andcontrol,radiological safety,mechanical andelectrical engineering andQA.TheSRABreviewssignificant operating abnormalities ordeviations fromnormalandexpectedperformance ofplantequipment thataffectnuclearsafety,allreportable events,recognized indications ofanunanticipated deficiency insomeaspectofdesignoroperation ofstructures, systemsorcomponents thatcouldaffectnuclearsafety,andreportsandmeetingminutesoftheSORC.Auditsofunitactivities thatoccurunderthecognizance oftheSRABencompass, butarenotlimitedto,theconformance ofunitoperations toprovisions contained withintheTechnical Specifications andapplicable licenseconditions, theresultsofactionstakentocorrectdeficiencies occurring inunitequipment, structures, systemsormethodsofoperation thataffectnuclearsafetyandtheperformance ofactivities requiredbytheOperational QAProgramtomeetthecriteriaof10CFR50AppendixB.TheQADepartment reviewsNMPNS'sadherence toengineering designandconfiguration controlprocedures andprograms.

Thethreegroupswhichspecifically dothisareaudits,inspection, andQualityVerification andSafetyAssessment (QVSA).TheAuditGroupperformsauditswhichmeettherequirements ofTechnical Specifications, UFSAR/USAR AppendixBandAppendixBto10CFRPart50.Auditsarescheduled andplannedbasedonamatrixpreparedtoreflectthelicensebasisandinternalrequirements.

Insomecasesauditsareperformed fortheSRAB.Auditplanningconsiders resultsfrompreviousaudits,surveillances andinspections andtakesintoaccountDERs,trends,internalandexternalperformance information, NRCandINPOperformance criteriaandreports,andapplicable directives andprocedures.

Auditsareperformed inaccordance withtheapprovedplans.TheDERprocessisusedtodocumentanydeviations andnonconformances identified duringauditorsurveillance activities.

QAreviewsthedisposition ofauditinitiated DERsandfollowsupontheirclosureinsubsequent surveillances andaudits.Auditresultsarecommunicated toappropriate management throughexitmeetingsandauditreports.TheInspection Groupperformsexaminations, inprocess,andfinalinspections inaccordance withcodes,standards, regulations orasspecified byNuclearEngineering acceptance criteria.

Thisgroupindependently confirmsthatcriticalcharacteristics identified byEngineering meetacceptance criteria.

Otherinspections andexaminations maybeperformed onselectedoperations whereitisdeemednecessary toverifyconformance tospecified requirements.

TheDERprocessisusedtodocumentnonconformances.

TheQASurveillance Programisperformed bytheQVSAGroup.,Surveillance topicsarescheduled basedoninputfromotherorganizations, previoussurveillance results,currentactivities, projectsandprogramchanges,DERsandregulatory commitments, upcomingaudittopicsandauditresults.Surveillances reviewperformance inseveralways.Theseincludeprocessmonitoring whichevaluates aselection of'ongoing workactivities todetermine effectiveness andconformance torequirements, productreviewwhichreviewsselectedoperations, maintenance, engineering andsupportgroupworkoutputstoevaluatequalityandtechnical content,andcomponent configuration reviewwhichevaluates thecontinuing designcontrolofselectedplanthardwarebyreviewing currentconfiguration againstthedesignbasisNMP162 vr andsubsequent designchangesandreplacements.

TheDERprocessisusedtodocumentanydeviations andnonconformances.

Also,theeffectiveness oftheOperations Experience program(screening andimplementation) isperiodically reviewedduringQVSAsurveillances andQAaudits.Severalorganizations, including INPO,ANI,andANII,providethirdpartyreviewsfortheNMPNS.NMPCpersonnel areresponsible forinterfacing withtheseorganizations anddocumenting their.findingsonDERsasdiscussed above.INPOevaluations currently reviewtheNMPNSusingINPOCriteria90-015,"Performance Objectives andCriteriaforOperation andNear-term Operating LicensePlants."ANIIevaluations reviewtheplants'esign conformance andmaintenance ofASMESectionXI.AnANIIInspector isassignedfulltimetoNMPNS.Thisinspector verifiesthat,asneeded,therequiredASMEexaminations, systemhydrostatic testing,andrepairsareperformed anddocumented correctly.

Findingsaredocumented andresolvedusingtheDERprocess.ANIevaluations aredonetodetermine insurance premiums.

TheNMPNSadherence tocodesanddesigncriteriaarespecifically reviewed.

Theevaluations arebrokenintotwoparts,FireProtection andPressureSystem(BoilerandMachinery).

FindingsfromtheANIevaluations aredocumented andresolvedusingtheDERprocess.TheANIreviewstheresolution ofallofitsfindingsandevaluates themtodetermine iftheywereacceptable forclosure.ANIPestablishes theself-assessment programto,achievehigherstandards ofqualityandperformance.

Eachnucleardivisionbranchmanagerensuresthatatleasttwobranchself-assessments areperformed anhually.

Atleastoneself-assessment normallyinvolvesanassessment ofthecorrective actionprogramtodetermine ifadverseconditions andcommoncausesreceiveappropriate management attention, andthatcausesfrompreviousself-assessment findingswereaddressed andactionstakenwereeffective.

Areastobeconsidered whendeveloping self-assessment schedules includeactivities thatexhibitnegativetrendsbasedoninformation fromtheDERdatabase.

TheassessorensuresaDERisgenerated forself-assessment findingsthatmeettheDERinitiation criteria.

Further,branchmanagersmeetwiththeSeniorManagement Teamtoreviewtheresultsoftheirfindings.

Theresults,methods,andplannedcorrective actionsarediscussed withtheSeniorManagement Teamtoassuretheadequacyoftheassessments andresultant corrective actions.Surveillance testingandplantexaminations asrequiredbytheTechnical Specifications andtheASMECodeareanadditional meansofverifying equipment iscapableofperforming itsintendedfunctionandidentifying problems.

Surveillance testingandexaminations arediscussed inourresponsetoRequested Action(c).NMP163 If1jltlI Seniormanagement hasstatedthattheysupporttheworkers'ight toraisesafetyissuesandthatthoseworkerswhoraisesafetyconcernswillnotbesubjected toharassment, intimidation, ordiscrimination.

Seniormanagement recognizes thatthepreferred vehicleformostemployees foridentification andresolution ofconcernsisthroughthenormallineorganization.

Seniormanagement providessupporttolinesupervision inaddressing concernsraisedthroughthenormallineorganization.

Notwithstanding resolution ofproblemsinthenormallineorganization, seniormanagement alsoprovidesforandsupportsaconfidential employeeconcernsprogramtoaddressconcernsraisedbyworkers.ANIPgoverning theQ1Pprovidestheadministrative controlsfortheconfidential reporting ofconcernsandsubsequent evaluation andcorrective action.Thisprocedure appliestoNMPCemployees andcontractors havingsafety,quality,andnonsafety-related concerns.

Inadditiontothereporting activities controlled throughtheDERprocess,NMPCmaintains apositiveandprofessional workingrelationship withNRCpersonnel throughforthright communication ofidentified problemsandtheactionstakentothoroughly evaluateandcorrectsuchdeficiencies.

NDDsandNIPsestablish aprimaryinterface withtheNRCthroughtheLicensing Branchwithcertainadditions.

Training, Emergency Preparedness andSecurityhavedirectNRCinterfaces.

Further,thePlantManagersaredesignated tohavetheprimaryinterface withtheNRCResidentInspector(s).

Eachorganization orpositionhasdefinedresponsibilities tomanagetheirrespective interfaces forvariousformsofcommunication.

First,formalinterfaces includeon-siteinspections orinvestigations, technical ormanagement

meetings, andtelephone conferences inresponsetorequestsforinformation

'onanyissue.Secondly, informalcommunications areinitiated toprovidepertinent information totheResidentInspector ortheNuclearReactorRegulation (NRR)ProjectManagerconcerning situations thatwouldnototherwise requirereporting.

Inaddition, aspartoftheiroverallmanagement responsibilities, thePlantManagersroutinely meetwiththeResidentInspection Stafftokeepthemapprisedonthestatusofplantoperations anddevelopments onspecificissues,including theresolution ofidentified deficiencies.

Otherseniormanagersdothesameperiodically forissuesintheirrespective functional areas.TheLicensing staffroutinely assistsandadvisesthePlantManagerswithrespecttotheirsiteNRCinterface, andmaintains anormalinterface withtheNRRProjectManageronlicensing mattersrequiring Staffinvolvement.

Typically,'his includeslicenseamendment applications, GLandBulletinresponsereviews,andresolution ofavarietyoftechnical issues.Inaddition, Licensing regularly adviseseachNMPCdepartment, onlicensebasesissuestoassurethatproblemidentification andcorrective/preventive actionspecification areconsistent withthatbases,theregulations andNMPCcommitments.

IPl)

Theprocedures alsoassurewrittencommunications, including incomingandoutgoingcorrespondence, meetingminutes,andreports,areappropriately distributed,

reviewed, andaddressed.

Inaddition, procedures provideforoutgoingcorrespondence toreceiveathoroughmanagement reviewpriortosubmittal toensureitsaccuracy.

NMPCmaintains aprocessfortrackingdocketedcommitments contained insuchcorrespondence (bothincomingandoutgoing) toassuretheyarecompleted inatimelymanner(i.e.,NCTS).WhiletheNCTSsystemfocusesondocketedcommitments, theDERsystemtracksthecompletion ofotherassociated actions.Stationpersonnel havereceivedtrainingontheDERprocedur'e andasprocedure revisions aremade,follow-up trainingisconducted withintheindividual departments.

Stationpersonnel alsoreceiveappropriate reportability trainingrelatedtotheirspecificjobfunction(e.g.,Operation receives10CFR50.72, 50.73training).

Variousstationpersonnel haveattendedformalHumanPerformance Evaluation System(HPES)rootcausetrainingandsimilartraining(e.g.,barrieranalysis, etc.)andare'capable ofperforming arootcausedetermination.

TheDERprocedure currently requiresthattheappropriate BranchManagerensureaRootCauseEvaluation isperformed, whenrequired, andthattheindividual assignedisknowledgeable inthetechniques ofRootCauseAnalysis.

SORCandSRABmembersreceivesafetyevaluator trainingandattendQualified Applicability ReviewerSafetyEvaluator (QARSE)requalification training.

QARSEtrainingisextensive withtheinitialtrainingsessionlastingthreedaysandcontinued traininglastingfourhourseverytwoyears.Approximately, 400NMPNSemployees aretrained(asQARSE)including membersofeachoperating shift.NMP165, Nl4lw Describetheoveralleffectiveness ofyourcurrentprocesses andprogramsinconcluding thattheconfiguration ofyourplantisconsistent withthedesignbases.Basedupontheinformation presented inourresponses toRequested Actions(a),(b),(c),and(d),NMPChasevidencethatreasonable assurance existsthatdesignbasesrequirements arebeingtranslated intotheappropriate procedures; thatSSCsconfiguration andperformance areconsistent withtheirdesignbases;andthataneffective administrative toolfordocumenting, evaluating, determining causeandappropriate corrective andpreventive actionsexistsatNMPNS(i.e.,theDERsystem).Asdiscussed inourresponsetoRequested Action(c),NMP1wasbuiltpriortoestablishment ofQACriteriaof10CFR50AppendixBandothermoreformalcontrols.

However,appropriate andextensive actionshavebeentakensinceinitialoperation thatassurethatSSCsconfiguration andperformance areconsistent withdesignbases.Surveillance testingprogramshavebeeninplacethroughout NMP1'soperating lifeandareformalized byprocedures.

Suchtestsprovideaprimarybasistoassurethatperformance ofsystemsmeetdesignbasesrequirements.

Additionally, post-maintenance andmodification testingisroutinely performed toassurethatdesignbasesrequirements continuetobemetfollowing maintenance andmodification activities.

Pressureretaining components arealsoroutinely testedthroughISIandtestingprogramsasapplicable.

Inadditiontoconfirming thatSSCsmeetacceptance requirements, thesetestingprogramsprovideamechanism toidentifydeficiencies (usingtheDERprocess)andtotrendequipment performance.

Severalinitiatives havebeentakenorareinplacetoconfirmthatthephysicalconfiguration oftheplantisconsistent withdesignbases.AspartoftheDBRprogram,anumberofsystemwalkdowns wereperformed forselectedsafetysignificant systems.Theseincludedverification activities relatingtomajorelectrical andmechanical components andsy'stemsaswellaspiping/pipe supportandpenetration walkdowns.

NMP1wasinanextendedoutagefrom1987through1990.Aspartofthisextendedregulatory outage,NMP1preparedaRAPandRestartReadiness Reportwhichincludedanumberofactionstoconfirmdesignadequacypriortorestart.In1990,aPowerAscension Programwascompleted forNMP1.Testswereconducted atvariouspowerlevelstoverifytheperformance ofindividual systemsaswellasinter-related systemperformance andoverallstationoperation andcontrol.Thetestingalsoprovidedabasisforadditional evaluation ofstationoperating andsurveillance testprocedures.

SSFIshavebeenconducted todetermine ifselectedplantsystemsarecapableofperforming theirintendedfunction.

Industryoperations experience isalsoroutinely appliedtofurtherandmorespecifically evaluateNMP1'sconformance andperformance againstdesignbases.NMP166 4I Theseactivities, coupledwithourcorrective actionprogram,assureroutineproblemidentification andevaluation ofas-builtconditions andtestresults.Thisprovidesadditional assurance thatcurrentperformance andconfiguration areconsistent withthedesignbases.Asdiscussed inourresponsetoRequested Action(b),administrative procedures establish requirements forthepreparation, review,andapprovaloftechnical procedures.

Technical procedures implement requirements fortheoperation, maintenance andtestingdescribed intheOperating License,Technical Specifications andUFSAR.Duringthedevelopment, reviewandapprovalofoperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures, areviewofdesigndocuments wasconducted.

Thisreviewencompassed designdrawings, DesignSpecifications, Technical Specifications, andtheFSAR.Following thedevelopment ofoperating, maintenance andtestprocedures, technical accuracyoftheprocedures wasmaintained throughprogramcontrolsforprocedure revisionandperiodicreview.Theseprogramshavebeencontinually strengthened overtime,NMPChasutilizedknowledgeable andappropriately qualified individuals todevelop,review,approve,andreviseprocedures.

Programrequirements havebeeninplaceforyearsandhavebeenenhanced, overtime,toimprovetheeffectiveness ofthedevelopment, reviewandapprovalprocess.Thetrainingprogramandotheradministrative requirements assurethatpersonnel assignedtoperformthesefunctions arecompetent toperformthosetasks.ThisassuresthatNMPCcaneffectively implement programrequirements associated withthedevelopment, review,approvalandrevisionofadministrative andtechnical procedures.

Alsodiscussed inourresponsetoRequested Action(b)weresomeoftheassessments andinitiatives usedtoprovideassurance thatdesignbasisrequirements aretranslated intoprocedures.

ThisincludestheSVP,UFSARVerification Program,RAP,QAaudits,andOperations Experience items.Asdiscussed intheresponsetoRequested Action(a),extensive programsandcontrolsareutilizedatNMPNStoassurethatdesignbasisinformation isaccurately maintained andupdatedasconditions warrant.Procedures areupdatedtoreflectchangesindesign,corrective actions(identified bythecorrective actionprogram),

industry.

operating experience, andchangestosourcerequirements.

Inaddition, NMPChasconducted "Back-to-Basics" trainingforNMPNSpersonnel.

"Back-to-BasicsI"providedtrainingonlicensing basisdocuments andoperation withinthelicensing basis.Alsodiscussed wastheexpectation thatifworkcannotbeperformed withinthecontrolofaprocedure, theworkshouldbestoppedandaresolution obtainedbeforeworkcontinues.

"Back-to-Basics II"wasconducted toassistorganizations inunderstanding howBack-to-Basics relatestotheirspecificjobs.Thistrainingincludedadescription ofourlicensing basisanddiscussions of10CFR50.59 and50.92,commitments madeto;operational experience items,RGs,industrystandards, andtheprocessforchangingcommitments.

Also,adefinition ofoperability withanemphasisonpostaccidentfunction, reportability, andhowvariousactivities interactwiththedesignbasiswasincluded.

Theeffectiveness ofthistrainingandtheresulting increased awareness byplantpersonnel todesignbasisissuescanbeseeninthelower67 Il5fs>

threshold atwhichconfiguration anddesigncontrolissuesarebeingreportedviatheDERsystem.Adiscussion ofdesignbasisdeficiency trendsisincludedinourresponsetoRequested Action(c).Also,themajorityofplantengineering, maintenance support,andothersinmanagement andtechnical positions aretrainedon10CFR50.59 andqualified asApplicability Reviewers/Safety Evaluators andhavetocompletearequalification everytwoyears.Theeffectiveness ofourcurrentprocesses andprogramswhichassurethattheplantconfiguration isconsistent withthedesignbasisareassessedonanongoingbasis.Theseassessments, whichincludetestingactivities, functional inspections, compliance verification

projects, auditsandsurveillances, andlinemanagement self-assessments, provideanoverallindication thatNMP1isoperatedwithinitsdesignbasesandthatourprocesses andprogramsareeffective.

NMP1sUFSARVerification effort,whichisscheduled forcompletion bytheendof1998,willprovideanongoingassessment ofdesignbasisrelatedinadequacies.

Also,NMPChasreinforced theimportance ofmaintaining consistency withourdesignbasisthrough"Back-to-Basics" trainingaswellas10CFR50.59 training.

Onthebasisofourprogramsandprocesses andassessment

activity, NMPChasreasonable assurance thattheconfiguration ofNMP1isconsistent withitsdesignbasis.NMP168

ENCLOSURE IDESIGNCONFIGURATION DOCUMENTS LIST1.0DESIGNINPUTDOCUMENTS "DesignInputStatements

-Generated and/orapprovedbyNuclearEngineering

2.0 DESIGNOUTPUTDOCUMENTS

DATABASES

~~2.1Drawings-Generated and/orapprovedbyNuclearEngineering 2.2"Specifications

-Generated and/orapprovedbyNuclearEngineering.

.Thescopeand.contentofthesespecifications varybytopicasfollows:2.2.1Installation 2.2.2Design2.2.3Fabrication 2.2.4Procurement 2.2.5.Inspection

.andTesting2.2.6Configuration ControltI-~~2.3ChangePaper-Engineering generated and/orapprovedchangestoEngsn'eering documents ord'atabas'es

.2.4Databases neededtomaintainplantconfiguration, suchas:'MasterEquipment List(MEL)-Datafieldsmaintained and/orapprovedbyNuclearEngineering

~CableConfiguration andTrackingSystems~Validated MasterPartsLists2.5SystemDesignBasisDocuments (SDBDs)-Generated and/orapprovedbyNuclearEng>neering 2.6SetpointDataSheets-ApprovedbyNuclearEngineering 2.7ProgramsandPlans-ApprovedbyNuclearEngineering andthatspecifylantconfiguration details,suchasErosion/Corrosion, AppendixJesting,etc.3.0DESGOCDOCUMNTSDATABASES Calculations

-ApprovedoracceptedbyNuclearEngineering Controlled DocumentSystem(CDS)4.0OTHERDESIGN-RE ATDDOCUMENTS VendorDocuments

-Engineering accepted69

ENCLOSURE 2DESIGNINPUTCONSIDERATIONS Eachdiscipline orprogramareashallconsiderthefollowing asaminimuminthedevelopment ofdesigninput.Discipline DesignInputcriteriamaybeusedinconjunction withtheconsiderations andaretheresponsibility ofthediscipline/program tomaintainanduse.Designbases,including available SystemDesignBasisDocuments (SDBDs).andDesignCriteriaDocuments (DCDs)Regulatory requirements CodesandStandards, including issue,rev.Basicsystem,structure orcomponent (SSC)Functions Performance requirements DesignConditions LoadsOperating Experience reviewsandassessments, suchasDERtrending, NRCSOERs,INPONPRDSandothersAnticipated Environmental conditions (internal andexternaltotheplant)during:~NormalPlantOperation

~Anticipated Tran'sients

~'ccidents

~SpecialEvolutions Functional andphysicalinterfaces ofSSCsMaterialRequirements, compatibility,

coatings, etc.Mechanical requirements Structural requirements, including seismic/dynamic qualification Hydraulic requirements Chemistry requirements IElectrical requirements, including processcomputerrequirements Layoutandarrangement requirements Instrumentation andControlrequirements AccessandAdministration controlrequirements Redundancy, diversity, separation requirements FailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)Testrequirements; pre-operational andperiodicAccessibility, maintenance, repair,inservice requirements Personnel qualification requirements foroperation, maintenance, testing.Transportation requirements Fireprotection requirements

,Handling, storage,cleaningrequirements Otherrequirements topreventunduerisktopublicMaterials, processes, parts,equipment suitability Personnel safetyrequirements, electrical, radiation, heat,confinedspace;etc.Oualityandqualityassurance requirements 70

ENCLOSURE 3'-':-DESIGN'CHANGE

'OPERABILITY ACCEPTANCE DesignChangeControlNumber1.0-Initiation 1.1Title0Partially Accepted1.2Thefollowing finalSefetyEveluetions/Applicebility ReviewforthisdesignchengeereSORC/Technicel Reviewepproved.

SE/ARNumbers:Revision:

1.3Thefollowing WOshavebeencompleted 1.WO3.WO6.WO7.WO11.WO2.WO4.WO6.WO6.WO10.WO12.WO2.0-SystemEngineer2.10ThetestslistedontheDesignChangeTestRecordhavebeencompleted,

reviewed, andapproved.

0NotApplicable 2.2Thefollowing procedures wererevisedbythisdesignchange.NumberTitle0NotApplicable

.30Requiredtrainingiscompleted orinprogress.

2.4Completed By3.0-Modification Coordinator 3.1Thefollowing Technical Specification wasrevisedbythisdesignchange.Date0NotApplicable 0NotApplicable SectionTitle3.20RiskBasisdesignchangedocuments havereceivedfinalEngineering approval.

3.30ControlRoomCriticalDrawingshavebeenupdatedtoreflectinstalled condition.

3.4Comments0NotApplicable 0NotApplicable 3.5Completed ByDate4.0-Acceptance forOperation Manager/General Supervisor Operations ordesigneeDate71

ENCLOSURE 41.0-In'ation1.1Title1.2MajorOrderNo.1.3Remarks'"-"DESIGN'CHANGE CLOSEOUTAccountCodeDesignChangeControlNumber1.4Operability Acceptance Date1.5Modification Coordinator RequiredCompletion DateDate2.0CloseoutActivit)es ISignwhenactivityiscompleteandreturntoModification Coordinator)

No.2.12.22.32.42.52.62.82.92.102.112.122.132.142.152.162.172.182.192.202.212.22Department Modification Coordinator PlantAccounting StoresTechnical SupportISI-Installer ISI/ISTNuc.Engineering IST-TechSupport/Ops Operations TrainingTrainingQAProjectEngineerALARAMechanical Maintenance Electrical Maintenance Instrument

&ControlFireProtection Modification Coordinator SystemEngineering Technical SupportMechanical DesignRadwasteOperators CloseoutActivitySiteDocumentLogClosedProperty-In-Service Rept.Completed

&M.O.ClosedMajorOrderOverstock Dispositioned NPRDSCoordinator InformedISIReqSatisfied/INIS-2)

ISI/ISTProgramRevisedISTReqSatisfied/Procedures RevisedAllOperations Proc/STsRevised/Markup DatabaseRevised/PM STReviewedforincorporation intoTrainingProgramSimulator Evaluated QAFilesClosedFinalDesign/Safety Evaluation ReviewedALARAReviewS-AIP-2,JobReviewsCompleteAllProcedures Revised/PMs Required/PMST RevisedAllProcedures Revised/PMs Required/PMST RevisedAllProcedures Revised/PMs Required/PMST RevisedAllProcedures Revised/PMs Required/PMST RevisedOtherRequiredProcedure ChangesCompleted Post<perability Acceptance TestingCompleted Changesevaluated againstmaintenance rulerequirements P&ID'supdatedforsignificant changes(Unit1only)AllRadwasteOperations procedures revisedandmarkupdatabaserevised/PMST ActionN/A(I)Completed ByDate3.0CloseotCom'letion3.1CloseoutActivities Complete:

Modification Coordinator Date.2DatabaseUpdatedandRecordssenttoPermanent FileDate72

ENCLOSURE 5YNAGARA0MOHAWKNUCLEARENGINEERING DVARIANCRISKDDCCIAfieldvariance, MHILEMORKISINPROGRESS, toapproveddesigndocuments orchangedocuments maybeissuedona"riskbasis"ifthefollowing criteriaissatisfied.

Therequested fieldvarianceshallNOT:A.Extendthescopeofadesignorconfiguration change.IB.Altertheintent(purposeasdescribed intheapplicability revieworsafetyevaluation) ofadesignchangeorplantprocedure.

C.AffecttheDesignInput/Impact Assessment.

D.Altertheacceptance criteriabeyondtherangedefinedinthecontrolling designorplantdocumentation.

E.Alterthefunctionofequipment fromthatdefinedinthecontrolling designorplantdocumentation.

F.Beirreversible.

73

ineieointnit

Provideadescription ofengineering designandconfiguration controlprocesses, including thosethatimplement 10CFR50.59, 10CFR50.71(e),

andAppendixBto10CFRPart50.ThetextthatfollowsinresponsetoRequested Action(a)ofthe50.54(fjletterprovidesadescription ofhowthedesignandconfiguration controlprocessismanaged,controlled, andimplemented atNineMilePointNuclearStation(NhPNS).Inaddition, detailsareprovidedtoshowthatprocedures existforensuringthatengineering designandconfiguration changesaffecting theUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR)areevaluated inaccordance withthecriteriaof10CFR50.59 andincorporated intotheUFSARinaccordance withtherequirements of10CFR50.71(e).

Alsodetailedarethequalityprogramelementsthatassurethatanyworkinvolving safety-related structures, systems,orcomponents meetsthedesignandconfiguration controlrequirements ofAppendixBoftheNMPNSUFSARinaccordance withourcommitment toAppendixBto10CFR50.NMPNSpersonnel performworkinaccordance withprocedures thathavebeendeveloped and,inrecentyears,significantly

improved, tomeettheregulatory requirements established tooperateandmaintaintheplantinaccordance withourlicense.Theseprocedures areperiodically reviewedandundergorevision, asappropriate.

Themanagement andthestafFofNMPNShavesignificantly improvedtheirawareness ofthelicensing anddesignbasisdocuments inrecentyears.Back-to-Basics trainingprogramshavebeenestablished whichhaveemphasized theimportance oflicense-based thinking.

Ourcorrective actionprogramfocusesattention onthecorrection andprevention ofmistakesresulting fromafailuretofullyunderstand oradheretotherequirements ofourprocedures.

Theapproachforassuringthatprocedures existtocontrolengineering worksuchthattheplantdesignandconfiguration controlconformswiththeNineMilePointUnit2(NMP2)licensing basisfollows.TheNiagaraMohawkPowerCorporation (NMPC)NuclearDivisionPolicyandDirectives Manualsetsforththeoverallprogramforcontrolling theoperation, maintenance, andmodification oftheNMPNStoassurecompliance withapplicable regulatory requirements, licenseconditions, andNMPCcommitments.

ThetotalprogramconsistsoftheNuclearDivisionPolicy,theNuclearDivisionDirectives (NDDs),andlowertierdocuments (administrative andimplementing procedures) developed toimplement theapplicable requirements.

Thehierarchy ofPolicy,Directives, andadministrative andimplementing procedures isshownonFigure1inourresponsetoRequested Action(b).

TheNDDsarethevehiclebywhichmanagement communicates requirements forperforming andcontrolling activities tothoseresponsible forpreparing NuclearDivision, departmental, andbranchprocedures.

TheNDDsidentifyapplicable regulatory requirements andassociated QualityAssurance (QA)programcommitments thatmustbeincorporated intoimplementing procedures.

Eachactivityaddressed inanNDDidentifies thespecificrequirements andorganizational responsibilities concerning thatactivity.

NuclearInterface Procedures (NIPs)arepreparedtoimplement NDDs.NIPsgovernactivities involving interfaces betweenorganizational departments andforthoseactivities performed bymorethanoneNuclearDivisiondepartment whereacommonmethodology isdesired.Department andbranchleveladministrative procedures arepreparedtodefinetheorganization, assignresponsibilities withintheorganization, andprescribe methodsforaccomplishing thoseactivities orportionsofactivities addressed inNDDsorNIPs.Engineering designandconfiguration controlactivities're primarily implemented inconformance withNuclearEngineering Procedures (NEPs)andapplicable Generation Administrative Procedures (GAPs).Technical implementing procedures arestep-by-step procedures preparedtoprescribe methodsforaccomplishing thoseactivities orportionsofactivities asoutlinedintherespective NDD,NIP,ordepartment administrative procedure tobeconducted withintheindividual branch.Thehierarchy described aboveismaintained fortheengineering designandconfiguration controlprogram.TheNDDonDesignControlestablishes therequirements fortheNMPNSdesigncontrolprogramandassignstheresponsibility forimplementing thoserequirements.

TheDesignControlDirective appliestodesignactivities associated withsafety-related orquality-related structures, systems,andcomponents (SSCs).Thedesigncontrolrequirements includedinthisdirective arespecified intheNMPCQualityAssurance TopicalReport(NMPC-QATR-1),

theTechnical Specifications administrative controlsectionandtheNDDsgoverning nuclearcomputersystems.Activities subjecttodesigncontrolarecategorized asoneormoreofthefollowing:

engineering evaluation oranalysis, designchange,configuration change,temporary modification, orplantcondition monitoring program.AseparateNDDestablishes therequirements andresponsibilities forconfiguration management, including requirements toidentifyandupdateselectedcontrolled documents anddatabases toassurethattheNMPNSisoperated,

modified, andmaintained inconformance withtheapproveddesignandcurrentlicensing basis.Thisfunctionisaccomplished bycontrolling changestoessential plantSSCsandassociated procedures,

programs, anddatabases sothattheyaremaintained consistent withapproveddesignoutputdocuments, Information ordataaboutplantconfiguration thatisnecessary forefficient andcorrectdesign,operation, andmaintenance ofessential plantsystemsissubjected toconfiguration controls.

Thefollowing discussion describes currentmethodsforcontrolling engineering designandplantconfiguration, including designchanges,configuration changes,designdocumentchanges(DDCs),procedure changes,temporary modifications, programchanges,plant

'r maintenance, andtheevaluation ofvarioussourcesofinformation forpossibleimpacttothedesignbasis.Typicalofnuclearplantsthroughout theindustry, theNMPNSiscommitted toasystemofdesignandconfiguration controlsbasedontherequirements ofAppendixBto10CFRPart50,aswellasotherregulations andindustrystandards.

Thissystemincludesnotonlycontrols, butalsofeedbackloops(testing, evaluation) thatresultinanongoingcomparison ofactualconfiguration withthedesignbasis.Successful implementation ofthedesignandconfiguration controlsystemassuresthattheNMPNSisoperated, tested,andmaintain'ed withinitsdesignbasisthroughout itslife.Thediscussion thatfollowsisorganized intofourbroadareasofactivities.

Thefirstareaincludesthoseactivities affecting thephysicalplant.Thesecondareaincludesthoseactivities affecting configuration documents/data.

Thethirdareaincludesactivities associated withspecific10CFR50requirements.

Thefourthareaincludescommonprogramsapplicable totheotheractivities.

Eachoftheseareasisfurtherorganized intodetailedactivities asfollows.1.Activities Affecting ChangestothePhysicalPlant:1A.DesignChange1B.Configuration Change1C.Temporary Modification 1D.SetpointChange1E.Maintenance andSurveillance 2.Activities Affecting ChangestoConfiguration Documents/Data:

2A.Procedure Changes2B.DesignDocumentChanges(DDCs)2C.ProgramChanges2D.ChangestoTraining2E.Evaluations/Analyses 2F.DatabaseChanges2G.VendorManualChanges III~

2H.SupplierDocumentAcceptance 2I.ChangestoLicensing Documents/New Regulatory Commitments 2J.ExternalSourcesofChange3.Activities Associated withSpecific10CFR50Requirements:

3A.10CFR50.59 SafetyEvaluation Process3B.10CFR50.71(e) 3C.QAProgram/10CFR50 AppendixB4.CommonPrograms:

4A.ProblemIdentification Processes 4B.TrainingWhenphysicalplantchangesarerequested, theyareevaluated inaccordance withaNIPtodetermine whetherdesigncontrolsshouldbeappliedtothechange.Increasing levelsofcontrolareappliedtoplantchangescommensurate withthesafetysignificance ofthechangeasperAppendixBto10CFR50.Changestothephysicalplantareaccomplished usingoneofthefollowing processes:

designchange,configuration change,ortemporary modification.

Eachoftheseprocesses isdescribed below.Setpointchanges,maintenance, andsurveillance activities arealsodiscussed becausetheyrepresent processes thatassure,orconfirmcontinuing, reliablesystemoperation and,assuch,mustbecontrolled toremainconsistent withdesignbasisparameters.

1A.DesignChangeThedesignchangeprocessisacontrolled processthatisappliedwhendesignconfiguration documents and/ordatabases (aslistedinEnclosure 1tothisAttachment) areaffected, andtheproposedchangeaffectsthefunctionofsafety-related orquality-related SSCsortheirreliability, expectedlife,localenvironment, orfailuremodes.Additionally, thedesignchangeprocessisappliedtochangesinvolving interfaces withsafety-related orquality-related SSCs.Theprocessmayalsobeusedforothersituations atthediscretion ofEngineering orplantmanagement whenstringent controlsaredesirable.

Whenaplantchangehasbeenevaluated andapprovedforimplementation, itisenteredintothePlantChangeRequest(PCR)database.

Ifitistobetreatedasadesignchange,itisgivenNMP2 J'

adesignchangenumber.Intheinitialstagesofadesignchange,theresponsible engineerordesignerusesadesignimpactchecklist todetermine thepotential impactofthechange,possibleissuestobeconsidered, andthekindsofdesigninputrequired.

Basedonthechecklist review,inputisrequested fromdiscipline experts,programadministrators, andaffectedgroups.Thedesigninputprocedure requiresthatthoseproviding inputconsideracomprehensive listoftopics.Theseprimarily emphasize thedesignbasisrequirements, functionality andperformance requirements, andotherrequirements relatedtomaintaining theintegrity ofthedesign(Enclosure 2tothisAttachment).

Specifically, thedesigninputprocedure requiresthatdesigninputsuchasdesignbases,performance requirements, regulatory requirements, andcodesandstandards, areidentified, documented, andtheselection reviewedandapprovedbythedesignorganization.

Also,references mustbesufficiently specifictoallowtraceability.

Thisprovidestheinitiallinkbetweentheproposedchange,thedesignbases, andthelicensingbasis.

Thedesignchangeissubsequently developed onthebasisoftheseinputs.Aslaterdescribed, theseinputsareverifiedinaccordance withprocedures andthedesignissubjected tofurthercomparison withthelicensing basisatotherstagesofthedesignprocess.Concurrently, theconfiguration management processes arealsoinitiated.

TheMasterEquipment List(MEL)andtheControlled DocumentSystem(CDS)aresearchedforpotentially affecteddocuments, forotherpendingworkorwork-in-progress thatcouldaffectthedesign,andforconfirmation ofequipment/document currentstatus.TheMELmayalsobeusedasaconfirmatory sourceofinformation formanyoftheitemsinthedesignimpactchecklist becauseitlistsvariousequipment requirements andcharacteristics, including safetyclass.Avarietyofotherinformation mayalsobeavailable, including whetherEquipment Qualification (EQ),SeismicQualification (SQ),Inservice Inspection (ISI)andNuclearPlantReliability DataSystem(NPRDS)considerations applytothecomponents.

Thenextphaseofthedesignchangeprocessisthedevelopmental phase.Intermediate

products, suchasevaluations andanalyses, stressreports,andcalculations, areprepared.

Theseactivities areperformed usingcontrolled procedures andresultincontrolled productsthatcannotbechangedwithoutre-invoking theoriginallevelofreviewandapproval.

Newdesignoutputdocuments orchangestodesignoutputs,suchasrevisions todrawings, vendortechnical manuals,acceptance

criteria, setpointdatasheets,designbasisdocuments/design

criteria, andspecifications, aredeveloped.

ChangesmayeitherbeintheformofDDCsthatarepostedagainsttheaffecteddocumentorbyfullrevisionofthedocument.

Pendingchangestoconfiguration databases arealsoidentified andprocessed.

Changestolicensing documents, including theUFSARandTechnical Specifications, aredeveloped inaccordance withcontrolled procedures.

SystemEngineers intheTechnical SupportDepartment arerequested bytheresponsible engineertonotifyprocedure ownersofrequiredchangestoprocedures, andtocoordinate requiredtraining.

Finally,anyguidancenecessary tosupportinstallation andtestingisdeveloped incoordination withtheinstalling organization.

Uponcompletion ofthesesteps,thedesignpackageissufficiently completefromatechnical pointofviewtoallowfinalreviewpriortoissuance.

Designoutputsareapproved, butnotreleasedforimplementation untilthereviewsrequiredinthefinaldesignphasearecomplete.

p Duringthefinaldesignphase,theresponsible engineer/designer reviewsthepackagetoassurethatthedesignobjective ismet,thatnoopentechnical issuesexist,andthatappropriate designimpactshavebeensatisfactorily addressed.

Anyindividual whoprovideddesigninputmayrequestfinaldesignreviewtoconfirmthatthedesigninputwascorrectly implemented inthefinaldesignchangepackage.Thenextstepisindependent designverification byaqualified individual pertheengineering designverification procedure.

Thisactivityprovidesanindependent reviewtoassurethatappropriate designcriteria, qualitycriteria, anddesignbaseshavebeencorrectly identified, andtoassurethatthedesignoutputmeetsthespecified designinputsandtheoveralldesignobjective.

Ifnotdonepreviously, anapplicability reviewandsafetyevaluation arecompleted asdescribed laterunderthe10CFR50.59 safetyevaluation process.Afterverification (andresolution ofanyconcerns),

thedesignchangeisreadyforfinalreviewandapproval.

Thesereviewsinclude:~Reviewandapprovalbyaqualified engineering approver; ReviewbyaQualified Technical ReviewerperTechnical Specification 6.5.2.3;~Cross-disciplinary reviews,ifrequiredbytheQualified Technical ReviewerperTechnical Specification 6.5.2.4;and~ReviewandapprovalbythePlantManagerorManagerTechnical SupportperTechnical Specification 6.5.2.3.Completion ofthedesign,review,andapprovalactivities isdocumented onaDesignChangeControlform.Thisformservesasaflagtoeitherpreventorallowissuanceofdesignoutputdocuments tothefieldforinstallation, asdescribed below.Designoutputdocuments areissuedandreleasedperthedocumentcontrolinterface procedure.

TheyareenteredintotheCDSasdocuments thatareapprovedbutnotyetOperations Accepted(i.e.,theydonotyetrepresent installed configuration).

Theyarethendistributed toastandarddistribution thatincludestheModification Coordinator intheTechnical Supportdepartment.

TheModification Coordinator servesasthecoordination pointforplantdesignchangesanditisthroughtheModification Coordinator thatdesignoutputdocuments aretransmitted tothefieldforinstallation.

WhentheModification Coordinator receivesdesignoutputdocuments (e.g.,reviseddrawings, DDCs,etc.),thedocument(s) isretaineduntilacopyoftheassociated DesignChangeControlformisreceived.

Thispreventspremature orinadvertent issuanceofdesignoutputdocuments thathavenotbeenfullyreviewedandapprovedforinstallation; i.e.,approvedatboththedocumentlevelandatthedesignchangelevel.NMP2

WorkOrdersarewrittenbytheresponsible

engineer, Modification Coordinator, ormaintenance plannerusingtheelectronic workcontrol(EWC)system.TheseWorkOrdersandtheirassociated designoutputdocuments arecross-referenced inthePCRdatabaseundertheassociated designchangenumber,sothatwhentheWorkOrdersassociated withthedesignchangearecompleted, theModification Coordinator cannotifyinvolvedpartiesthatOperations Acceptance (turnover toOperations) ispossible.

Uponcompletion oftheWorkOrdersassociated withadesignchange,theModification Coordinator confirmsthattheapplicability reviewnumberandsafetyevaluation number(ifapplicable) arelistedinthedesignpackage(asachecktoverifycompletion oftheapplicability reviewandsafetyevaluation ifapplicable),

andnotifiestheSystemEngineertoverifycompletion ofanyprocedure changes,testing,andtrainingrequiredtoplacethesysteminservice.PlantSupportEngineering isnotifiedto"redline" criticaldrawingssothatplantoperators willhavecurrentandaccuratedrawingsintheControlRoomwhenthenewdesignchangeisOperations Accepted.

TheModification Coordinator alsoverifiesthatallrequiredrisk-released documents havebeenresolvedpriortoOperations Acceptance (seebelowforanexplanation oftherisk-release process).

Nonconformances identified duringtheprocessaredocumented onDeviation/Event Reports(DER),evaluated, andresolved.

Whentheseactionsarecomplete, theyaredocumented onaDesignChangeOperability Acceptance form.Thesignature oftheManager/General Supervisor Operations (ordesignee) conveysOperations acceptance ofthedesignchange(Enclosure 3tothisAttachment).

Operations acceptance isrequiredpriortorelyingontheSSCtoperformitsfunction.

ADesignChangeCloseoutForm(Enclosure 4tothisAttachment) isinitiated toensurethatactivities associated withthedesignchangeareverifiedanddocumented ascomplete.

TheModification Coordinator thenenterstheOperations Acceptance dateintothePCRdatabasetoindicatethatthedesignchangehasbeenacceptedandisnowcurrentplantconfiguration.

Thisinformation issharedwiththeCDSdatabasetostatustheassociated designdocuments asOperations Accepted.

TheMELdatabaseisautomatically updatedtomovethependingMELchangesfromthe"pending" filetothe"active"filewithastatusof"C"whichdesignates thatitreflectscurrentconfiguration.

Atcloseout, theresponsible engineerforwardstheDesignChangeControlform,andanyotherrequiredrecordsthatwerenotpreviously releasedthroughtheCDS,tothepermanent plantfile.Thedocuments usedtotrackthedesignchangethroughinstallation toOperations Acceptance; e.g.,logs,Operations Acceptance form,DesignChangeCloseoutform,andPCRsareforwarded tothepermanent plantfilebytheModification Coordinator.

Theseactionsensurethatpermanent recordsofthedesignchange,frominitiation tocloseout, areavailable forthebalanceofplantlifeforfurtherrevieworaudit,ifneeded.Therearetwovariantsofthedesignchangeprocess;1)risk-release ofdesignchanges;and2)partialoperations acceptance ofdesignchanges.Risk-release isdefinedinourengineering procedures asaprocessbywhichanorganization formallyrecognizes andapprovesthefinancial riskofbeginning animplementation orinstallation priortofullapprovalofthefinaldesign.Risk-release doesnotinvolvearisktopersonnel safetyornuclearsafety.Usually,

designoutputdocuments areissuedonlyafterappropriate aspectsofthedesigndevelopment, review,andapprovalarecomplete.

Undercertaincircumstances, itisnecessary toreleasecertaindesignoutputsona"riskbasis"toallowpre-staging, pre-fabrication, pre-installation, partialinstallation, andtoallowforfieldvariances toworkinprogress.

However,becausethesecircumstances involvefinancial risk,therisk-release processisusedsparingly.

Activities suchaspre-staging, pre-fabrication, andpre-installation/partial installation maybeinitiated andprocessed usingtherisk-release process.First,theresponsible engineermustprepareadocumented justification ofwhythedesignorpartialdesignmustbereleasedpriortobeingfullyapproved.

Theactivitymustbereversible withinatimeframeconsistent withtheactivitytosupportoperating requirements.

Iftheresponsible Engineering supervisor approvestherisk-release, itissubmitted tothePlantManagerforapproval.

Inaccordance withthesafetyevaluation procedure, whichprohibits anychangetotheplant(temporary orpermanent) withoutanappropriate review,anyrisk-released workmusthavebeenproperlyevaluated forplantsafetyimpactandcomparedwiththedesignandlicensing basespriortoimplementation.

AfterPlantManagerapproval, theresponsible engineermakeslimiteddistribution oftherequireddesigndocuments, whicharestatusedas"risk"intheconfiguration databases.

Untilthis"risk"statusisresolved, thedesignchangecannotbeOperations

Accepted, (i.e.,turnedovertoOperations) orreliedupontoprovideitsfunction.

Whentheriskisresolved, thedesignchangeprocesscontinues normallythroughOperations Acceptance andcloseout.

Risk-release offieldvariances maybeauthorized byaresponsible engineertoallowminorchangestoworkinprogress(e,g.,correcting interferences).

Inthesecases,theinstaller requestsEngineering toreviewthesituation andtherequested fieldvarianceforinitialfeasibility.

Ifthefieldvariancesatisfies theprocedural criteria(listedinEnclosure 5tothisAttachment),

theengineermayinitiatearisk-release DDCtoallowtheworktocontinuewithoutinterruption.

TheriskDDCisgivenlimiteddistribution bytheresponsible engineer.

Onecopygoestotheinstaller tocontinuework;onecopytotheModification Coordinator toentertheriskDDCintothedesignchangedocumentlogforsubsequent trackingandresolution priortoOperations Acceptance; onecopytoDocumentControlforentryintoCDSwitha"Risk"status;andtheoriginaltoEngineering forcompletion ofallreviewsandapprovals inaccordance withtherequirements ofthenormaldesignchangeprocess.IftheEngineering reviewandapprovalprocessuncoversproblemswiththeriskDDC,theworkisstoppedandreversed, orotherwise corrected.

WhentheriskDDCisfullyapprovedperEngineering procedures, itisissuedthroughDocumentControltoitsstandarddistribution.

Thedocumentstatusischangedfrom"risk"to"approved".

OncetheModification Coordinator receivesanddistributes thefullyapprovedDDC,theworkiscompleted orconfirmed completeinaccordance withthefullyapprovedDDC.ThedesignchangecanthenbeOperations Acceptedandclosedoutfollowing thenormaldesignchangeprocess.TheothervarianttothenormaldesignchangeprocessistheoptionofpartialOperations Acceptance.

Thisoptionmaybeusedwhenthedesignchangeaffectsmultiplecomponents ortrainsthatmaybesafelyputbackintoservicebeforeeverycomponent or"train"hasbeenmodified.

Anexampleofhowp'artialOperations Acceptance couldbeusedistheprocessofimplementing achangethataffectsmanyidentical components acrossavarietyofapplications NMP2 p"Ip orsystems.Inthiscase,thedesigndocuments andassociated safetyevaluation wouldbewrittentocovermanyspecificapplications ofasingletypeofcomponent (e.g.,pipesnubbers).

TheModification Coordinator wouldthenbeabletotrackandobtainOperations Acceptance ofthedesignchangeatthecomponent levelratherthanhavingtowaituntilallaffectedcomponents inthedesignchangewereOperations Accepted.

Asinthenormaldesignchangeprocess,thedatabases areupdatedatthetimeofpartialOperations Acceptance toshowthatthedesignchangehasbeencompleted forcomponent Xforexample(butnotYandZ),andthecomponent isreadytogobackintoservice.Therequirements forpartialOperations Acceptance aresimilartofullOperations Acceptance, thatis,thesafetyreviewprocessmustbecomplete; associated WorkOrders,including thosefortesting,mustbecomplete; applicable procedures mustberevised;requiredtrainingcompleted orinprogress; risk-releaseddocuments mustbefullyapprovedandtheriskresolved; andtheControlRoomcriticaldrawingsaccurately updatedtoshowtheportionofthechangethatisbeingpartially Operations Accepted.

Fuelreplacement, becauseofitsuniquerequirements, iscontrolled byasetofprocedures thatincludesNEPsandFuelsGroupEngineering DesignStandards (OT-EDS)thatmeet10CFR50AppendixBrequirements.

Keydesigninputsaresolicited,

reviewed, andapprovedaspartofthedesignprocess.Thepreliminary fuelbundledesignisprovidedbyanNMPC-qualified vendor.Designiterations occurbetweenthefuelvendorandNMPC.Analysesandcalculations supporting thecoredesignareperformed andverifiedbyNMPCusingcontrolled procedures.

Thefinalcoredesignisverifiedindependently bythevendorundertheirNMPC-qualified QAprogram.Calculations andanalysessupporting licensing requirements fortransients andloss-of-coolant accidents (LOCA)areperformed todetermine fueloperating limitsforthenewcoredesign.ThevendorsubmitsafinalreporttoNMPCdocumenting theverification ofthedesign,compliance todesignrequirements, analysisresults,andnewoperational limits.NMPCacceptsthedesignbytechnical reviewandperformsa10CFR50.59 safetyevaluation asdescribed laterinthissection.Licensing documentchangesareperformed inaccordance withcontrolled procedures.

Thefinalreviewandapproval,

issuance, installation, andacceptance followaprocesssimilartothedesignchangeprocess.Insummary,thedesignchangeprocess(including risk-release andpartialOperations Acceptance, andfuelreplacement) isacontrolled processwhichrequiresreviewandcomparison oftheproposedchangetothedesignbasisoftheplant.Theprimarybarrierofdefenseagainstdeviations fromthelicensing basisisthe10CFR50.59 processthatisrequiredforeachplantchange.Thedesignimpactassessment anddesigninputprocessrequiretheresponsible engineerand,asnecessary, otherdiscipline experts,programadministrators, andotheraffectedgroupstodescribeorreference appropriate designrequirements andconstraints toassurecompliance withtheplantdesignbasis.Additionally, configuration databases provideconfirmatory sourcesofdesignbasisinformation.

Anindependent verifierreviewsthedesignforconsistency withdesigninputs,including designbasisrequirements.

Finally,avarietyofconfiguration

controls, including administrative procedures anddatabases, areinplacetoassurethatinformation necessary tosupportthechangeisaccurateandisputinplaceconcurrent withthechange(e.g.,revisions toprocedures,

drawings, training, anddatabases).

Thisassuresthatdesignbasisandlicensing basisrequirements cascadedownthroughthe 4

systemandresultinproperoperation, maintenance, andtestingoftheplantaslicensedbytheNuclearRegulatory Commission (NRC).1B.Configuration ChangeTheconfiguration changeprocessisusedforactivities including plantchangesthataffectdesigndocuments ordatabases (Enclosure 1tothisAttachment),

and:1)donotaffectthefunctions ofsafety-related orquality-related SSCs;2)donotadversely affectthereliability, expectedlife,localenvironment, orfailuremodesofsafety-related orquality-related SSCs;3)donotinvolveinterfaces withsafety-related orquality-related SSCsand;4)donotchangetheintentoreffectiveness ofprogramsrequiredbyregulation.

Thisprocessisprimarily intendedfornonsafety-related changeshavingnosafetyimpactandnointerfaces withsafety-related systems.However,itmayalsobeusedforsafety-related equivalerit replacements suchaslike-for-likecomponent replacements.

1Thefirststepintheconfiguration changeprocessistoconfirmthattheproposedchangeeithersatisfies ordoesnotaffectthecurrentdesignandlicensing basis.Thisstepisinadditiontothe10CFR50.59 reviewthatwilleventually alsobeperformed; however,itassuresthattheresponsible engineerwillcomparetheproposedchangewiththeUFSAR,Technical Specifications, andotherlicensing documents andregulations asearlyintheprocessaspossible.

Theprocedure alsorequiresthatiftheengineerdetermines thatsafety-related orquality-related functions described inthecurrentdesignandlicensing basisareaffected, thedesignchangeprocessmustbeusedinsteadoftheconfiguration changeprocess.Likethedesignchangeprocess,aconfiguration changerequiresassessment ofpotential impactsusingthedesignimpactchecklist andtheidentification ofpotentially affecteddocuments anddatabases.

Atthispoint,outputdocuments suchasdrawings, drawingrevisions, DDCs,specifications, andvendormanualrevisions areprocessed andpendingchangestodatabases aredeveloped.

Changestolicensedocuments areprocessed pertheinterface procedure governing controloflicenses, UFSARs,andNRCapprovedplansandprograms.

Ifthechangeinvolvessafety-related orqualityrelatedSSCs,anequivalency evaluation isdocumented forth'epermanent plantfileshowingwhy'thechangehasnoeffectonthedesignbases.Ifequivalency cannotbejustified, thechangeisprocessed asadesignchange.Likeanyotherplantchange,configuration changesareevaluated per10CFR50.59.

Atthispoint,theconfiguration changeisreadyforfinalreviewbytheEngineering approver.

Unlikeadesignchange,independent verification andPlantManagerapprovalarenotnecessary.

However,similartoadesignchange,thecompletion andapprovalofaconfiguration changeisdocumented onaConfiguration'Change Controlform.Processing fromthispointforwardissimilartotheprocessing ofadesignchange.Outputsaredistributed throughDocumentControltotheModification Coordinator who,uponreceiptofanapprovedConfiguration ChangeControlform,issuesthechangetothefieldand,uponcompletion, presentsittoOperations forreviewandacceptance.

Thesameconfiguration controlsthat10

appliedtothedesignchangeprocessareinvokedbytheconfiguration changeprocessatOperations Acceptance, including automatic databaseupdates,verification ofprocedures andtraining, and"redlining" ofcriticaldrawings.

Insummary,althoughtheconfiguration changeprocessisaimedprimarily atchangesthatdonotaffectthedesignbasisoftheplant,therearenumerouscontrolsinplacetopreventthesechangesfromcompromising theplantoperating, maintenance, andtestrequirements, andthedesigndocuments uponwhichtheyarebased.1C.Temporary Modification Temporary modifications arecontrolled peraGAP.ThisGAPappliestotemporary modifications tositeinstallations, facilities, structures, andinservice systemsandcomponents therein,asdescribed intheUFSAR.Likeconfiguration anddesignchanges,temporary modifications mustbescreenedtodetermine whetherdesigncontrolsapplyandif10CFR50.59 applies.Becauseofthehierarchical structure oftheprocedures, theinterfacing procedures governing designcontroland10CFR50.59 reviewsarealwaysinvokedforplantchangesthatcouldimpactthelicensing basis,including temporary modifications, Asaresult,temporary modifications receivethesamereviewaspermanent changesregarding conformance withdesignandlicensing basisrequirements.

Temporary modifications arecoordinated bytheSystemEngineers intheTechnical SupportBranch.Designchangesareprocessed perengineering procedures described previously.

Atemporary modification controlformisusedtocontroltheinstallation andremovalofthetemporary modification.

Associated 10CFR50.59 safetyevaluations aredeveloped andreviewedasdescribed laterintheresponse.

Temporary modifications thataffectnuclearsafetyarereviewedbyaQualified Technical ReviewerandapprovedbythePlantManagerorManagerTechnical Support.Priortoauthorizing implementation ofatemporary modification, theStationShiftSupervisor (SSS)reviewstheassociated applicability review/safety evaluation andWorkOrdertoensurecompliance withtheTechnical Specifications.

Atthispointintheprocess,thetemporary modification maybeinstalled perapplicable work/design documents withthepermission oftheoperating shiftleadership (SSSandChiefShiftOperator).

Temporary modifications aretaggedandtestedasrequiredbyprocedure.

Theyareverifiedashavingbeeninstalled inaccordance withapplicable work/design documents andControlRoomcriticaldrawingsareredlinedaspartofimplementation.

TheSSSreviewsthecompleted temporary modification packagetodetermine theoperability statusoftheaffectedsystem(s).

Clearance oftemporary modifications isthereverseoftheaboveexceptthat10CFR50.59 reviewsarenotnecessary unlesstheequipment isbeingreturnedtoastateotherthantheoriginaldesign.Inthatcase,theactivitywouldgothroughthescreening processes againandbere-evaluated perprocedure.

Clearance involvesindependent verification, confirmation ofcompletion ofprocedure revisions, testing,andasnecessary traininganddetermination ofsimulator impact.Ifdesigndocuments ordatabases wereaffected, Engineering isnotifiedso11 J~~y~

thattheoriginalconfiguration canberestored.

ControlRoomcriticaldrawingsareupdatedtotheoriginalconfiguration, ifpreviously affected.

TheSSSreviewsclearedtemporary modification packagestodetermine theoperability oftheaffectedsystem(s).

1Insummary,thetemporary modification processisacontrolled processthatassurestheintegrity ofthelicenseanddesignbasesbyinvokingthereviewsofthelicensebasisrequiredby10CFR50.59, andbyapplyingconfiguration controlsthatassurethattheplant,associated procedures,

training, andtestingconformtothedesignbasisoftheplant.Thesechecksareappliedbothduringinstallation andclearance oftemporary modifications, assuringthatthechangesfrom,andtherestoration to,theoriginalcondition areverifiedascompleteandcorrect.I1D.SetpointChangeNMPNSmaintains setpointcontrolthroughthehierarchy ofdesigncontrolandconfiguration management procedures.

Changestosetpoints areperformed andcontrolled inaccordance withNEPsincluding thoseassociated with"DesignChange,""Configuration Change,""DesignDocumentChange,""DesignInput,"and"Calculations."

Adesigninputstatement isrequiredforsetpointchangesthataredefinedasadesignchangeandprovidestheinputandbasisforthechange.Inaddition, eachsetpointchangerequiresanapplicability reviewtobeperformed inaccordance withtheNIPforApplicability ReviewsandSafetyEvaluations.

NMP2iscommitted tocompliance withtheRegulatory Position(Paragraph C)ofRegulatory Guide(RG)1.105,Instrument Setpoints.

TheprocessisoutlinedinanEngineering DesignStandard.

Thisdocumentalsoprovidesthecriteriaforestablishing aninstrument setpoint.

Setpointrequirements forplantinstruments, bothsafety-related andnonsafety-related, aredefinedincontrolled documents andaremaintained viathedocumentcontrolprocess,Changestosetpoints areconsidered plantchangesandaremanagedbytheengineering changeprocessviatheappropriate NIPsandNEPs,Asetpointchangemaybeaconfiguration change,adesignchange,oratemporary modification.

I1E.Maintenance andSurveillance Maintenance andsurveillance activities, whethercorrective maintenance, preventive maintenance (PM)ortesting,arebasedon,orareconsistent with,approveddesigndocumentation, Technical Specifications, orregulatory sourcedocuments.

Recurring activities suchasPMorsurveillance testingareaddressed bycontrolled procedures.

Corrective maintenance maybeperformed utilizing procedural

guidance, ormaybeperformed usingdesigndocuments directlyaspartofaWorkOrder.Drawings, vendormanuals,specifications, setpointdatasheets,DDCs,andotherapprovedEngineering documents areoftenreferenced intheMaintenance WorkOrderssothattheycanbeusedtoaccurately returntheSSCtoitsas-designed state.NMP212

)h~4I 2.Thepreceding textcoveredhowchangestothephysicalplantaremade,including theprocesses usedtocomparethechangetothedesignbasestoassurecontinued compliance, andtherevisionofaffecteddocuments/databases toreflectthechange.Inthissection,thediscussion willcoversituations whereachangetodocuments ordatabases, ratherthanachangetothephysicalplant,istheinitiator, andhowthatchangeiscomparedtothelicensing basisanddesignbasesforcompliance and,ifnecessary, isincorporated intotheplantconfiguration.

Thesechangeprocesses include:1)Procedure Ch'anges; 2)DDCs;3)ProgramChanges;4)ChangestoTraining; 5)Evaluations/Analyses; 6)DatabaseChanges;7)VendorManualChanges;8)SupplierDocumentAcceptance; 9)ChangestoLicensing Documents/New Commitments; and10)OtherExternalSourcesofChange.Theseprocesses mayimpactthewaytheNMPNSisoperated, tested,maintained andmodified; therefore, theyarediscussed indetailasfollows.2A.Procedure ChangesTheprocedure changeprocessusedatNMPNSincludescontrolled requirements fordevelopment, requiredreviews,'approvals, andconfiguration control.Theprocessgenerally conformswiththerequirements andrecommendations ofAmericanNationalStandards Institute (ANSI)/ANS-3.2-1976 asendorsedbyRG1.33,Revision2,andSection5.3ofANSI/ANS-3.2-1982, andhasbeenexpandedandrefinedbeyondthebasicrequirements toincorporate operating experience andlessonslearned.Keysupportprogramsandguidancedocuments havebeenestablished toenhanceprogramefficiency andfacilitate timelyincorporation ofchanges.Theprocessconsistsoffourdistinctelements:

1)development; 2)developmental reviews;3)finalreview;and4)approval.

Thedetailsoftheprocessdifferslightlyforadministrative procedures andtechnical procedures (e.g.,changestoadministrative procedures donotrequireatechnical verification unlesstheprocedures arerequiredbyTechnical Specification 6.8orotherwise affectnuclearsafety),however,thebasicelementsareemployedforbothtypesofprocedures.

Thedevelopment phaserequiresassignment ofanindividual knowledgeable intheareacoveredbytheprocedure.

Toassistinthedevelopment proces's, NMPChasdeveloped aProcedure WritersManualwhichprovidesextensive guidanceonthestructure, content,andhumanfactorsprinciples tobeusedinpreparing procedures.

TheProcedures WritersManualisusedtoensureconsistency throughout theroughly3,500procedures maintained atNMPNS.Fortechnical procedures, therevisionprocessrequiresthatprocedure preparers researchandusecontrolled reference documents including, butnotlimitedto,engineering specifications,

drawings, vendormanuals,andTechnical Specifications.

Theuseofcontrolled documents ensuresthatinformation usedtoprepareprocedures reflectscurrentdesignconfiguration.

Developmental reviewsareconducted totheextentrequiredbytheprocedure.

Cross-disciplinary reviewsmaybeconducted whenaprocedure involvesareasofspecificexpertise thatareoutsidethegroupthatprep'ared,the procedure, orwhenanothergroupisrequiredto13 sfP IIperformactivities withintheprocedure.

Fortechnical procedures, avalidation reviewisnormallyperformed (contingent uponcomplexity, potential consequences, andexpectedenvironment including reducingradiation toaslowasreasonably achievable (ALARA))bytheenduserstoensuretheprocedure isworkableandcontainsasufficient levelofdetailfortheintendedusers.Thefinalreviewphaseisknownastechnical verification.

Aspreviously discussed, changestoadministrative procedures donotrequireatechnical verification unlesstheprocedure isrequiredbyTechnical Specification 6.8orotherwise affectsnuclearsafety.Technical review,asrequiredbyTechnical Specification 6.5.2.1,isperformed byanindividual otherthantheindividual whopreparedtheprocedure.

Thefinalreviewispermitted onlyafterdevelopmental reviewshavebeencompleted.

Theverification involvesareviewoftheprocedure andreference documents usedtodeveloptheprocedure toindependently verifytheaccuracy.

Thisreviewmayonlybeperformed byqualified individuals previously designated bythePlantManager.Thesequalified reviewers, asdefinedbyTechnical Specification 6.5.2.4,aremembersofthestationsupervisory staffandtheyarequalified inareasspecifictotheirexpertise (suchasOperations, Maintenance, orRadiation Protection).

Following finalrevieweachtechnical procedure andTechnical Specification relatedadministrative procedure isreviewedforapplicability under10CFR50.59 asdescribed laterunderthe10CFR50.59 safetyevaluation process.Intheapprovalphase,theresponsible procedure ownerandtheresponsible approver(e.g.,BranchManager,etc,)provideapprovalandensurethatrequiredreviewsbyqualified personnel havebeenaccomplished.

Theapprovalp'rocessalsoincludesrequirements toassurethatpendingchangeshavebeenappropriately addressed, thattheTechnical Specification classification (adetermination astowhetherornotaprocedure isrequiredbyTechnical Specification 6.8orotherwise affectsnuclearsafety)isappropriate, thatanychangesmadeduringreviewhavenotinvalidated previousreviews,andthatanyrequiredimplementation traininghasbeenarranged.

Insummary,theprocedure revisionprocessprovidescontrolstoensurethatprocedures arepreparedtoreflectcurrentconfiguration, thatadequatereviewisperformed byappropriately qualified personnel toindependently verifyaccuracy, andthatappropriate approvals areobtained.

2B.DesignDocumentChanges(DDCs)DDCs,evenwherinotassociated withaphysicalchangetotheplant,areprocessed undereitherthedesignchangeortheconfiguration changeprocessaspreviously discussed.

Therearetwoothermeansofdocumentchangesthatinvolveengineering enhancements andeditorial changes.Thefirstmeans,engineering enhancement, isatermusedforthecorrection ofaverifiederror.Theengineering enhancement processhastraditionally beenusedtocorrectdrawingerrors.InNMP214

$IIfgal)jII' effect,itisarevisiontoadrawingperformed inaccordance withtheapplicable procedure, butseparatefromtheconfiguration changeprocess.PertheEngineering procedure governing drawingcontrol,anapplicability reviewisperformed toassurethattheapplicability of10CFR50.59 isconsidered; i.e.,whetherthechangecouldaffectthelicensing basis.Thedrawingrevisionischeckedand'approved justlikeanyotherrevision, andthenissuedtoitsstandarddistribution sothatallholderswillbeprovidedwiththe"enhanced" drawing.Thesecondmeans,editorial changes,areminorchangesthatdonotaffectthetechnical contentorintendedpurposeofthedocument.

Examplesarespelling, typographical, andgrammatical errors.'ecause theyareinconsequential, theyareusuallynotinitiated independently.

Mostcommonly, theseerrorsareidentified whenthedocumentisbeingrevisedforsomeotherpurposesuchasadesignchange.Theyareusuallyprocessed andcontrolled aspartoftheassociated designorconfiguration change.Ifaneditorial changewas'adeindependently ofanyotherprocess,itwouldbedoneasarevisioninaccordance withthecontrolled procedure forthattypeofdesigndocument.

Ifthechangepotentially affectedtheUFSAR,Technical Specifications, orNRCapprovedprograms, suchasnomenclature changes,itwouldbeprocessed pertheprocedure forinitiating licensing documentchanges.2C.ProgramChangesProgramchangestoNRC-approved programsmustbeprocessed pertheprocedures thatgovernapplicability reviews,safetyevaluations,

licenses, UFSARs,andNRC-approved plansandprograms.

Additionaladministrativecontrois mayalsobeapplied.

Forexample, thereisanengineering procedure forplantcondition monitoring p'rograms whichinvokesprogramresponsibilities, andrequiresreviewsforcontinuing compliance andeffectiveness.

Adescription ofhowregulatory requirements arereflected intheNMPCprocedure hierarchy isdescribed inourresponsetoRequested Action(b)under"Administrative Procedure UpdateProgram."

ChangestoprogramsthatarenotNRCapprovedbutarerequiredbyregulation, suchastheMaintenance RuleProgramrequiredby10CFR50.65, arealsocontrolled byadministrative procedures.

2D.ChangestoTrainingChangestotrainingassociated withdesignorconfiguration changesareaddressed byrequiring theModification Coordinator tonotifytheTrainingDepartment.

Requestsforchangestotrainingortrainingprogramsthatarepartofthelicensebasisareprocessed asdescribed laterinresponsetoRequested Action(a)under"Training."

2E.Evaluations/Analyses Specificrecurring evaluations likesafetyevaluations,'reach permitevaluations, evaluations oftemporary shielding, andseismicevaluations areaddressed bycontrolled administrative procedures.

Otherevaluations thatpotentially affectdesignfunctions aredirectedtotheEngineering Department andprocessed peracontrolled Engineering procedure.

Thisprocedure requiresthatanyevaluation oranalysisperformed todefinethedesignbasisforaNMP215 IE designchangeortoestablish adesignbasisbeprocessed inamannerthatassuresthatpropertechnical input,impactassessments, designreviews,andverifications areobtained.

Independent verification isrequiredwhentheevaluation oranalysiswillresultinachangetothedesignorlicensing basis.Examplesofwhenverification mayberequiredinclude:IEvaluations doneinresponsetoregulatory requirements; Analysisdoneinsupportofadesignchangeorthatislikelytoresultinadesignchange;~Evaluations oranalysissupporting changestoNRCapprovedprograms; and~Analysis/Evaluation ofsafety-related orquality-related activities.

Aspreviously discussed, thecontrolled Engineering procedure forindependent verification requiresthatappropriate designcriteria, qualitycriteria, anddesignbasesbereviewedtoassurethattheyhavebeencorrectly identified andincorporated.

2F.DatabaseChangesIConfiguration databasechangesareaccomplished percontrolled procedures.

Primarily, thesechangesresultfromdesignorconfiguration changes;however,someareinitiated independently asEngineering enhancements oreditorial changes.Regardless ofthereasonforinitiation, eachproposedchangetoconfiguration dataisreviewedforcompleteness andaccuracybeforeentry,aswellasbeingcheckedfortheaccuracyofthedataentryitself.Changestocomputerhardwareandsoftwarearealsocontrolled byadministrative procedures.

Verification andvalidation (V&V)processes areappliedtoassurethatsoftwareprogramsoperateasintendedanddonotresultinerroneous displaysofinformation.

2G.VendorManualChangesNMPCmaintains avendorinterface programthatprovidesforannualcontactwithourNuclearSteamSupplySystem(NSSS)supplierandbi-annual contactswithvendorsforotherselectedkeysafety-related equipment.

Thesevendorsarecontacted torequestthelatesttechnical manuals,servicebulletins, notices,advisories, letters,andoperation, maintenance, andrepairprocedures fortheselectedequipment.

Additionally, thevendorinterface programprovidesforthemaintenance ofanindexofapplicable technical documents andalogofvendorcontactsandcorrespondence.

Periodically, thelistofvendorstobecontacted isupdatedbasedonresponses receivedandEngineering reviewsofthelistsofkeysafety-related equipment.

Follow-up contactsaremadewithnon-responsive vendorstoensurethatagoodfaitheffortwasmadetoobtainthenecessary equipment information.

NMP216 I

Vendormanualchangesmaythenbeinitiated byreceiptofnewinformation fromthevendor,orbyNMPCtoaccommodate preferred practices, materials, orotherconsiderations.

Revisions ofbothkindsareaddressed inanengineering procedure governing vendortechnical manuals.Vendorinitiated changesareforwarded totheVendorDocumentCoordinator forloggingandtracking.

Thechangeisthenforwarded toanassignedresponsible engineerwhoreviewsitforapplicability totheNMPNS.Ifappropriate, theresponsible engineerobtainsmulti-disciplinary reviews.Ifthemanualisassociated withequipment oractivities thataresafety-related,quality-related, EQrelated,orTechnical Specification related,atleastoneotherknowledgeable reviewermustreviewthechange.Nonconformances betweentheNMPC-acceptedvendorproductandtheproposedchangearedocumented inaDER.Whenreviewcommentsandnonconformances havebeenresolvedwiththereviewers andthevendor,therevisedmanualisapprovedanddistributed.

NMPC-initiated changestovendormanualsareprocessed inthesameway,exceptasfollows:ADDCmaybeposted-against themanualinsteadofrevisingandredistributing theentiremanual.InvokingtheDDCprocessinvolvesdesignimpactassessment,

checking, andapproval.

~TosupportthePMOptimization Program,vendorrecommended PMmethodsandfrequencies maybechangedwithoutrevisingthevendormanualbasedonMaintenance, Operations, Technical Support,andEngineering reviewandconcurrence.

Additionally, thereviewmustbedocumented andfiledintheMaintenance Department andrevisedPMmethodorfrequency identified onacomponent levelinthePreventive Maintenance Surveillance Testing(PMST)database.

'H.SupplierDocumentAcceptance Supplierdocuments, otherthanVendorTechnical Manualsare processed inaccordance withthecontrolled procedure forthespecificdocumenttype.Theprocessofsupplierdocumentacceptance issimilartoothertypesofdesigndocuments andincludes:,1) preparation,

checking, verification, review,andapproval, controlled eitherbythevendor's(NMPCapproved)

QAprogramorbyNMPCprocedures and2)formalacceptance byNMPCbasedonadetailedreviewoftechnical content,certificate ofcompliance, orsurveillance ofworkinprogress.

I2I.ChangestoLicensing Documents/New Regulatory Commitments Changestolicensing documents/new regulatory commitments areprocessed pertheinterface procedure governing controloflicenses, UFSARs,andNRC-approved plansandprograms.

Newcommitments areprocessed pertheinterface procedure thatgovernsNRCinterfaces andtrackedviatheNuclearCommitment TrackingSystem(NCTS).Inbothcases,proposedchangesmustbereviewedforimpactonthedesignconfiguration andprocessed appropriately 17

~Ip asadesignchange,configuration change,aprogramchangeoracontrolled evaluation/analysis.

Aspreviously discussed, anychangetothedesignbasesinvokestherequirement forreviewsinaccordance with10CFR50.59, including areviewofpotential impactonTechnical Specification requiredprocedures.

'heabovecontrolsassurethatwhennewregulatory orlicensechangesareimplemented, theyarepropeilyreflected intheplant,thedesignbasis,theaffectedprograms, andprocedures.,

2J.ExternalSourcesofChangeExternalsourcesofchangederivedfromdeficiencies,

concerns, orissuesidentified byregulatory

agencies, industryoperating experience, vendorinformation notices(INs),orexternalpublications areprocessed pertheDERprocess.Asdiscussed inourresponsetoRequested Action(d),DERsoftenresultinreferraltootherprocesses suchasdesignchange,procedure change,andevaluation/analysis forcorrective andpreventive action.UseoftheDERprocessensuresthatevaluation, disp'osition, resolution andtrendingoftheissuewilloccur.3.3A.10CFR50.59 SafetyEvaluation ProcessAnNDDregarding safetyevaluations establishes therequirements forassessing proposedchanges,tests,orexperiments todetermine ifadditional

analysis, evaluation, orNRCapprovalisrequiredbeforeimplementation.

Thisdirective appliestoproposedch'angestoNMPNSfacilities (permanent ortemporary),

proposedrevisions orchangestoprocedures, andproposedtestsorexperiments.

Aqualified evaluator determines whether10CFR50.59 appliestotheproposedchange,testorexperiment bydetermining ifitinvolvesachangetothefacilityorprocedures asdescribed intheUFSAR,atestorexperiment notdescribed intheUFSAR,andwhethertheactivityaffectsnuclearsafetyinawaynot'previously evaluated intheUFSARorrequiresachangetoaTechnical Specification.

Thisdetermination isdocumented aspartoftheapplicability review..Whentheapplicability reviewdetermination identifies thattherequirements of10CFR50.59 areapplicable, a10CFR50.59 safetyevaluation isthenperformed todetermine ifanunreviewed safetyquestion(USQ)exists.Thepreparermustalsoobtainthereviewofhis/herBranchManager,signifying asufficient cross-disciplinary reviewhasbeenperformed.

TheManagerTechnical Supportmayspecifyadditional technical reviewandmaywaiveStationOperations ReviewCommittee (SORC)reviewifitisdetermined thataproposedchangedoesnotaffectnuclearsafety.Priortoimplementation, safetyevaluations forchangesthataffectnuclearsafetyarereviewedbytheSORC.SORCrendersadetermination, inwriting,astowhetherornotthesafetyevaluation constitutes aUSQ.Iftheproposedchange,testorexperiment involvesaUSQ,itwillnotbeimplemented withoutpriorNRCapproval.

TheSafetyReviewandAuditBoard(SRAB)reviewssafetyevaluations toverifythatactionscompleted undertheprovisions of10CFR50.59 didnotconstitute aUSQ.ANIPgoverning applicability reviewsandsafetyevaluations providesadministrative controlsforthereviewofchanges,tests,andexperiments.

ThesereviewsassessimpacttoOperating 18 0tI~pl1 ILicenses, UFSARs,NRCapprovedplansandprograms, andNRCcommitments; determine whetherthechangeinvolvesaUSQ;anddetermine whetherNRCreviewandapprovalisrequired.

Consistent withthegoverning NDD,theprocedure appliestoallproposedchangestoNMPNSstructures, systems,orcomponents (permanent andtemporary),

proposedrevisions orchangestoprocedures, and'proposed testsorexperiments.

Whenanapplicability reviewindicates achangetoalicensing documentisrequired,"

theproposedchangeisprocessed perasecondNIP.Thissecondinterface procedure, whichcontrolslicenses, UFSARs,andNRC-approved plansandprograms, providesadministrative controlsforamendments andrevisions toOperating

Licenses, UFSARs,andNRC-approved plansandprograms.

Theeffectsofproposedfacilitychanges,procedure changes,testsandexperiments areidentified onaLicensing DocumentChangeRequest(LDCR).EachLDCRisreviewed,

approved, andincorporated intolicensedocuments inaccordance withspecificrequirements identified withintheprocedure.

InSeptember 1996,NMPCbeganusingAdobeAcrobatsoftwaretosearchandviewelectronic versionsoftheNMPNSUFSARandplantTechnical Specifications.

TheAdobesoftwareprovidesfull-text searchcommandsthatcanfindallthewordsonapage,nomatterwhereorhowtheyareused.AdobeAcrobatsoftwareisanewtoolforApplicability Reviewers andSafetyEvaluators toidentifyandassesstheimpactofproposedchangesoninformation presented intheUFSARandTechnical Specifications.

3B.10CFR50.71(e)

AnNDDregarding changestoOperating

Licenses, UFSARs,andNRCapprovedplansandprogramsreflectstherequirements of10CFR50.71(e).

ANIPgoverning changestoLicenses, UFSARs,andNRC-approved plansandprogramsprovidesadministrative controlsfortheinitiation, review,andapprovalofproposedchangestotheUFSAR.ANIPgoverning interface withtheNRCprovidesadministrative controlsforfilingtheUFSARrevision.

Theseprocedures provideadministrative controlsforrevisingtheUFSARtoincludetheeffectsof:a11changesmadeinthefacilityorprocedures asdescribed intheUFSAR;allsafetyevaluations performed bythelicenseeeitherinsupportofrequested licenseamendments orinsupportofconclusions thatchangesdidnotinvolveanUSQ;andallanalysesofnewsafetyissues'performed byoronbehalfofthelicenseeattheNRC'srequest.Theupdatedinformation isappropriately locatedwithintheUFSAR.II3C.QAProgram/10CFR50 AppendixBTheNMPNSQATR(UFSARAppendixB)addresses therequirements foradescription oftheQAProgramfortheoperations phaseoftheNMPNS.TheQATRappliestoorganizations performing workthataffectstheoperation, maintenance, ormodification ofsafety-related structures, systemsorcomponents andindicates thattheaccountability forthequalityofsafety-related workrestswiththeperformer, whereasaccountability forverifying thequalityofworkrestswiththeverifying organizations.

19 VE TheQATRprovidesfortheoperation, maintenance, andmodification ofNMPNSconsistent withANSUAmerican SocietyofMechanical Engineers (ASME)NQA-1,ANSI/ANS-3.2 andBranchTechnical Position(BTP)APCSB9.5-1,AppendixA.TheQATRisorganized topresenttheNMPCQAprogramintheorderofthe18criteriasetforthin10CFR50AppendixB.TheQATRstatesNMPC'spolicyforeachofthesecriteriaanddescribes howthecontrolspertinent toeacharecarriedout.Amatrixshowingthe18criteriaof10CFR50AppendixBandthepolicyanddirectives andorganization procedures implementing thesecriteriaispresented intheQATR.ChangesmadetotheQATRthatdonotreducecommitments previously acceptedbytheNRCaresubmitted totheNRCinaccordance withtherequirements of10CFR50.71(e).

ChangesmadetotheQATRthatdonotsatisfythecriteriaofAppendixBto10CFR50,orreducecommitments previously acceptedbytheNRC,aresubmitted totheNRCandmustreceiveNRCapprovalpriorto'implementation.

Thechangesdescribed abovearesubmitted inaccordance withtherequirements of10CFR50.54.

Aspreviously stated,NMPNSiscommitted toasystemofdesignandconfiguration controlsthatsatisfytherequirements ofAppendixBof10CFR50.Concerning AppendixB,CriteriaIII,theNMPNSQATRstatesthatstationmodifications areaccomplished inaccordance withapproveddesignsandprocedures.

Thecontrolsapplytopreparation, review,andrevisionofdesigndocuments, including thecorrecttranslation ofapplicable regulatory requirements anddesignbasesintodesign,procurement, andprocedural documents.

Thecontrolsapplytodesignworkperformed bycontractors aswellasbyNMPCengineering andtechnical organizations.

Administrative procedures atNMPNSweredeveloped to'ssurethatlicenserequirements, including AppendixBrequirements, areaccurately implemented andthatresponsibilities forimplementation areproperlyassigned.

4.4A.ProblemIdentification Processes ANIPprescribes themethodforprocessing DERs.Guidanceisprovidedregarding identification, documentation, notification, evaluation, correction, andreporting ofconditions, events,activities, andconcernsthathavethepotential foraffecting thesafeandreliableoperation oftheNMPNS.TheDERprocessisdescribed indetailinourresponsetoRequested Action(d)under"Deviation/Event Report-(DER)."

DERsareinitiated upondiscovery ofadeficiency, including deficiencies inourengineering designandconfiguration controlprocess,orinconsistencies betweenourlicensedocuments, physicalplant,andprocedures.

Anumberofotherprocesses existatNMPNSthathavethepotential toidentifyproblems.

Theseprocesses includeself-identification, reviewsperformed bytheSORCandtheSRAB,requiredtechnical reviews,QAauditsandsurveillances, selfassessments, surveillance andexamination activities, Independent SafetyEngineering Group(ISEG)assessments, Institute ofNuclearPowerOperations (INPO)evaluations, NRCinspections, andtheevaluation ofindustryoperational experiences.

20

/f>'

IAsproblemsareidentified, DERsareinitiated, dispositioned, andappropriate corrective andpreventive actionstaken.Theseprocesses areafeedbacklooptothedesignandconfiguration controlprocessinthattheyeitherconfirmthattheprocesses" areworkingeffectively oridentifyproblemareaswithsubsequent corrective actionstoenhancetheprocess.Resultsfromsomeoftheseprocesses arepresented inourresponses toRequested Actions(b)and(c),providing partofourbasesforconcluding thatdesignbasesrequirements arebeingtranslated intooperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures, andthatSSCconfiguration andperformance isconsistent withthedesignbases.4B.TrainingTrainingconcerning engineering designandconfiguration controlprocedures isprovidedtostationoperating andtechnical/engineering personnel aspartoftheircontinuing training/position specifictrainingprogramsasrequired.

Operators areroutinely trainedontheprocesses usedfortemporary/permanent changestoplantdesignorprocedures.

Additionally, reviewsofactualchangestoprocedures andsignificant plantdesignchangesaftermajormaintenance outagesarecovered,asappropriate, beforestartup.Simulators maybeusedtotrainoperators andothersonnewsystems/components beforeactualsystemstartupandtodevelopnewprocedures forsystemoperation before.thesystem/component isturnedoverfortesting.Plantsystemconfiguration changes,specialtestsandsignificant evolutions maybetestedonthesimulator beforetheyareactuallyaccomplished intheplant.ThePCRdatabaseissearchedbythesimulator supportstaffquarterly asareviewofplantchangesforsimulator impact.Administrative controlsareinplacethatensurethatanyplantchangeshavingpotential impactonthesimulator areevaluated andchangesimplemented asrequired.

Maintenance, chemistry, radiation protection, andengineering personnel receivetraininginplantdesign/procedure changesaspartofthecontinued trainingprogram,eitheronanasneededbasisorcyclically.

Procedure changesandplantdesignchangescanalsoreachthetrainingprogramviatheTrainingReviewRequest/Training ChangeOrderprocess.Thisprocessrequiresthateachchangethatpotentially hastrainingprogramimpactbeevaluated andrevisions madeasappropriate.

Plantpersonnel caninitiateaTrainingReviewRequestonanyissuewhichcouldhavetrainingprogramimpact.TrainingReviewRequests/Training ChangeOrdersareroutinely usedforissuesthatrequiretrainingprogrammodification.

Concerning trainingonthe10CFR50.59 process,operations shiftmanagement, designated engineering andmaintenance supportpersonnel, andothersinmanagement andtechnical positions aretrainedandqualified asApplicability Reviewers/Safety Evaluators andhavetocompletearequalification everytwoyears.Trainingincludesanoverviewoflicensedocuments including Technical Specifications, UFSAR,andNRC-approvedplansandprogramstogetherwithanoverviewofthehierarchy ofprocedures.

Currently, thereareapproximately 400fullytrainedandqualified personnel onsitewhohavetheknowledge andabilitytodoapplicability reviewsandsafetyevaluations.

Thistraining/knowledge basecontributes totheawareness andsensitivity thatexiststhroughout theworkforcewithregardtooperating theplantwithinthelicensing basis.21 4l,p<'g CBranchManagersandSeniorManagersalsoperformobservations ofsimulator andotherclassroom trainingaspartoftheirnormalduties.Theirfeedbacktothetrainingorganization isfactoredintotheoverallprogramtoensurethecurriculum andconductoftrainingmeetsmanagement's expectations.

II22

Providetherationale forconcluding thatdesignbasesrequirements aretranslated intooperating, maintenance andtestingprocedures.

Asdiscussed below,NiagaraMohawkhasreasonable assurance thatdesignbasesrequirements aretranslated intooperating, maintenance andtestingprocedures atNMP2;Therationale supporting thisconclusion isbasedonnumerousactions,programs, andoversight activities.

Asdescribed inNDDs,administrative procedures establish requirements forthepreparation, review,andapprovaloftechnical procedures.

Technical procedures definerequirements fortheoperation, maintenance, andtestingdescribed intheOperating License,Technical Specifications, andUFSAR.Asdiscussed intheresponsetoRequested Action(a),extensive programsandcontrolsareutilizedatNMPNStoensurethatdesignbasisinformation isaccurately maintained andupdatedasconditions warrant.Procedures areupdatedtoreflectchangesindesign,corrective actions(identified bythecorrective actionprogram),

industryoperating experience, andchangestosourcerequirements.

Duringtheinitialdevelopment, review,andapprovalofoperating, maintenance andtestingprocedures, areviewofdesigndocuments wasconducted.

Thisreviewincludedreviewsofrelevantsystemdescriptions, designdrawings, DesignSpecification DataSheets,vendormanuals,Technical Specifications, andtheFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR).Additional procedure development activities iricluded selecteddesignwalkdownverifications, andinthecaseofpreoperational testprocedures, reviewofapplicable engineering designcalculations toensurethattheas-builtsystemmetdesignrequirements.

Preoperational testdevelopment alsoutilizedsystempreoperational teststandards fortheNSSS.Following theapprovalofinitialope'rating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures, thetechnical accuracyoftheprocedures hasbeenmaintained throughprogrammatic controlsforprocedure revisionandperiodicreview.Theseprogramshavebeenstrengthened overtheyearstotheircurrentstatus.NMPChasutilizedknowledgeable andappropriately qualified individuals todevelop,review,approve,andreviseprocedures.

Programrequirements havebeeninplacestartingwiththeinitialdevelopment ofprocedures andhavebeenenhancedovertimetoimprovetheeffectiveness ofthedevelopment, review,andapprovalprocess.Thetrainingprogramandotheradministrative requirements assurethatpersonnel assignedtoperformthesefunctions arecompetent toperformtheirassignedtasks.ThisassuresthatNMPCcaneffectively implement programrequirements associated withthedevelopment, review,approval, andrevisionofadministrative andtechnical procedures.

23 11/P Finally,NMPChasbeeninvolvedinnumerousassessments thatdemonstrate howeffectively designrequirements aretranslated intooperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures.

Theseassessments include,inpart,functional inspections, compliance verification

projects, audits,andprocedure (bothadministrative andtechnical) andrelatedprogramupgradeprojects.

NMPC'sresponsetoRequested

'Action(a)providesadescription oftheengineering designandconfiguration controlprocesses currently inplaceatNMP2,including thosethatimplement 10CFR50.59, 10CFR50.71(e),

andAppendixBto10CFRPart50.OurresponsetoRequested Action(d)providesadetaileddescription oftheprocesses fortheidentification ofproblemsandimplementation ofcorrective actionstopreventrecurrence (i.e.,theDER).OurresponsetoRequested Action(b)discusses theprocesswhichwasusedtodevelop,review,andapprovetheinitialoperations, maintenance, andtestingprocedures.

Anoverviewofthehistoricprocedure revisionprocessispresented, aswellasthecurrentrevisionprocess.Thetrainingprogramisdiscussed toshowthatindividuals arecapableofeffectively implementing theprocedure development, review,approval, andrevisionprocess.Finally,areviewofassessments conducted isprovidedtofurtherdemonstrate thattheimplementation ofprogramrequirements hasbeeneffective inassuringthatdesignbasisrequirements arebeingtranslated intooperating, maintenance andtestingprocedures.

NMPCisconfident thatadherence toourdesignandconfiguration controlprocesses andtheDERprocessprovidesreasonable assurance thatdesignbasesrequirements areproperlytranslated intooperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures andthat,wheninconsistencies arefound,propercorrective actionsaretaken.NMP2'soperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures wereinitially developed inthemid-1980s.Theyweredeveloped utilizing administrative procedures andcontrolscontained inmultipledocuments.

Theseprogramcontrolsdefinedtherequirements necessary inordertoassuredesignbasisrequirements wereadequately translated intooperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures.

Someoftheprogramdocuments inplaceatthetimeincludedthefollowing:

~ANSVANS-3.2 providedtherequirements forthepreparation, reviewandapprovalprocessforprocedures, aswellasanappendixofactivities whichrequireprocedures.

~AStartupAdministrative Procedure (SAP)definedtherequirements forthepreparation ofstationprocedures referring toRG1.33Revision2,asthegoverning regulatory documentanddefinedwhatprocedures wererequiredtobeinplacepriortolicensing NMP2.~ASAPdefinedthequalification andcertification ofsiteandunitpersonnel.

24 C

Administrative procedures prescribed theprocessforthegeneration,

approval, publication, distribution, andcontrolofprocedures.

~Administrative procedures prescribed theSORCrequirements associated withthecommittee's responsibilities.

Amongthosewererequirements forformalprocedure reviewandthedocumentation ofthosereviews.Aspartoftheprocedure development, review,approval, andrevisionprocessforinitialtechnical procedure development, thefollowing actionstookplaceinordertoassurethetechnical adequacyofthoseprocedures:

1"~Thefollowing engineering controlled documents werereviewedduringtheinitialpreparation andreviewofprocedures asapplicable:

l.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.FSKs,Mechanical onelinedrawingsESKs,Electrical schematics LSKs,LogicdiagramsVendormanualsEEs,wiringdiagramsSystemDesignSpecification DataSheets(DSDS)Systemdescriptions OthersasrequiredCross-disciplinary reviewsandconsultation withvendors,theNSSSsupplier(GeneralElectric(GE)),andtheArchitect-Engineer (AE)wereconducted asappropriate.

AspartoftheEOPdevelopment program,aspecialized reviewprocesswasutilizedtoensuredesignbasisrequirements wereappropriately capturedintheprocedures.

Anextensive verification ofdesigninputswasutilizedtosupportEOPcalculations.

Eachprocedure wasreviewedbytheSORC.~Procedures wereroutinely validated utilizing theplantsimulator, wherepossible, aspartoftheinitialtrainingprograms.

Sincethesimulator designandprocedure development werebaseduponplantdesignrequirements, utilizing procedures inthesimulator providedagoodmeasureofthetechnical accuracyoftheprocedures andsimulator.

~TheOperations Department Superintendent wasassignedasamemberoftheJointTestGroup(JTG).Thisgroupwasrequiredtoreviewandapprovepreoperational testprocedures toberuninthestationaswellascompleted testresults.Thisalloweddirectfeedbackcapability totheAEregarding discrepancies betweendesignrequirements andprocedures.

Thisgroupprovidedtechnical reviewandoversight functions.

25 VVft

~Operating experience fromotherplantsdeveloping initialoperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures wassoughtoutandincorporated intoNMPC'sprogram.NMPChasutilizedknowledgeable andappropriately qualified individuals todevelop,review,approve,andreviseprocedures.

Program'requirements wereestablished beforeinitialdevelopment ofprocedures.

Personnel involvedintheinitialwritingoftechnical procedures wereeitherNMPCemployees orcontractors cognizant intheareaforwhichtheprocedure wasbeingwritten.Ineithercase,individuals assignedtothosetaskswerecompetent toperformtheirrespective tasks.Individuals assignedtosupportthereview,approvalandrevisionfunctions ofprocedure development andmaintenance werealsoappropriately qualified.

Throughthetrainingprogramandotheradministrative requirements, reasonable assurance isprovidedthatpersonnel assignedtoperformthesefunctions arecompetent toperformtheirassignedtasks.Thisinturn,reasonably assuresthatNMPCcaneffectively implement theprogramrequirements associated withthedevelopment, review,approval, andrevisionofadministrative andtechnical procedures.

Following initialprocedure development, review,andapproval, procedures weremaintained uptodateutilizing administrative controlsfortherevisionprocess.AtthetimeofreceiptoftheNMP2lowpowerlicense(10/31/86),

requiredprocedures hadbeendeveloped,

reviewed, andapprovedinaccordance withexistingprogrammatic requirements.

Procedure revisioncontrolswereinplacetoestablish requirements necessary toensurethatprocedures weremaintained appropriately.

Theserequirements, coupledwithconfiguration anddesigncontrolprocesses, ensuredthatdesignbasisrequirements weretranslated intooperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures inatimelymanner.Overtime,theprocedure development, review,approval, andcontrolprocesshasbeenstrengthened.

Abriefsummaryofmajorprogramenhancements follows:~1984-AnAdministrative Procedure changeincorporated theNineMilePointUnit1(NMP1)andNMP2organizations underacommonsiteadministration program.~1985-AnAdministrative Procedure providedsignificantly moredetailregarding thedevelopment, review,andrevisionprocessforprocedures.

'989-ASiteProcedure Writer'sGuidewasdeveloped andapprovedinordertoprovideconsistent guidanceonformatandhumanfactors.Thiswascompleted inanticipation ofamajorprocedure rewriteeffort,i1990-1992

-Anewprocedure hierarchy development wasinitiated.

Thiswasdonetoprovideamoreorganized, tieredprocedure structure andhierarchy.

'dministrative Procedures forprocedure generation,

approval, distribution,

revision, andusewouldbetransformed intotheNDDandNIP-PROseries.Amajortechnical procedure rewriteprogramwasalsounderway, utilizing theSiteProcedure Writer'sGuide.Thebulkofthiseffortwascompleted in1992.Concurrent withthetechnical procedure upgrade,26

,r~"

APsgoverning procedural controlswerethemselves enhancedtobetterdescribecertainrequirements forprocedure reviewandcontrol,activities.

Akeyattribute tothischangewasbetterdefiningtheexpectations forprocedure authorsandreviewers, aswellasimproving the10CFR5059screening process.ITrainingeffortswerecompleted toensureprocedure writers,reviewers, approvers andthoseinvolvedintherevisionprocesscouldeffectively implement theprogramrequirements.

~1992-1997

-Thequalityofprocedures andrelatedprocesses continuetoimproveduetoenhancements intheareasoftechnical review,validation, verification, andthe10CFR50.59 screening processandsafetyevaluation quality.Initialqualification andrequalification programsintheseareashav'ebeenstrengthened considerably.

Theseprogramchangeshaveledtoourcurrentprogramrequirements described inourresponsetoRequested Action(a).NMPChasconducted severalinitiatives inordertoimprovetheprocessbywhichdesignrequirements aretransferred intooperating, maintenance andtestingprocedures.

Additionally, severalassessments havebeenconducted whichreviewedplant,procedures, demonstrated thatNMPC'sprogramscontainsufficient requirements, andthatNMPCpersonnel arequalified toimplement theprogramrequirements.

Thisreasonably assuresthatNMPCcanconcludethatdesignbasisrequirements aretranslated intooperating,

'maintenance andtestingprocedures.

Asummaryofthesignificant initiatives andassessments inthisareaisprovidedonthefollowing pages.Operating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures aredeveloped andmaintained inaccordance withtherequirements ofvariousadministrative procedures andprograms.

Theadministrative controlsapplicable tooperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures aredescribed indetailinourresponsetoRequested Action(a).Thissectiondescribes theAdministrative Procedure UpdateProgramwhichwascompleted in1992torestructure andvalidateadministrative procedures andprogramsatNMPNS.Theprimaryobjectives oftheprogramwereto:~Reviewlicensing documentation toidentifylicensing requirements andcommitments applicable toNMPNS.~Verifythatlicenserequirements andcommitments werecompletely andaccurately implemented throughadministrative procedures andprograms.

~Verifythatresponsibilities forimplementing licenserequirements wereappropriately assignedwithintheorganization.

27

TheAdministrative Procedure UpdateProgramwasinitiated bydeveloping aNuclearDivision"Policy"document.

ThePolicyprovidedasummaryofthemajororganizational responsibilities, generalprogramrequirements, andotherelementsforensuringthesafe,reliable, andefficient operation ofNMPNS.ThePolicyalsodefinedahierarchy ofprocedures tofacilitate organized implementation oflicenserequirements.

Thecurrenthierarchy isdepictedinFigure1:ZIGIlKMNuclearDivisionPolicyNuclearDivisionDirectives NuclearInterface Procedures

,Department SpecificAdministrative Procedures BranchLevelAdministrative Procedures Technical Implementing Procedures Initialeffortsalsoinvolveddevelopment ofacomprehensive listoffunctional areastoencompass allaspectsofoperation, maintenance, modification, andtestingoftheNMPNS.28

Thelistoffunctional areasisasfollows:ALARAProgramAuditsandSurveillances Budget/Expenditure ControlChemistry Configuration Management DesignControl'Document ControlEvaluation andCorrective ActionEnvironmental Protection Emergency Preparedness FitnessforDutyFireProtection ProgramHumanResourceManagement Housekeeping andSystemCleanness ISIandTestingInspections Interfacing withRegulatory andIndustryGroupsInventory, Identification andPhysicalControlofMaterials, Equipment, PartsandSuppliesLicenses, PlansandProgramsMaintenance Measuring andTestEquipment NuclearComputerSystems,NuclearFuelManagement Occupational SafetyandHealthOperations OutageManagement NuclearDivisionPolicyandDirectives ManualControlProcurement ofMaterials, Equipment, Parts,SuppliesandServicesProcedures andOrdersPlanningandScheduling ProjectandTaskManagement Radiological Effluents StationReliability RecordsManagement Radioactive MaterialProcessing, Transport andDisposalRadiation Protection ProgramRegulatory PostingRequirements Safeguards Information ControlSurveillance andTestingSecuritySafetyEvaluations SpecialNuclearMaterialAccountability SpecialProcesses ControlSafetyReviewsTraining, Qualification andSimulators Following development ofthePolicy,NDDsweredeveloped foreachfunctional areaidentified above.NDDsareusedtoestablish requirements thatmustbeaccomplished tocomplywithregulatory requirements andguidelines, industrystandards andpractices, andcommitments toregulatory agenciesoutlinedintheOperating License,UFSAR,andTechnical Specifications.

Theyserveasavehiclebywhichmanagement communicates requirements forperforming andcontrolling activities tothoseresponsible forpreparing theassociated administrative andimplementing procedures.

SubjectmatterexpertswereassignedtocompileeachNDDbyperforming acomprehensive assessment oflicensing requirements andcommitments toidentifyapplicable requirements foreachfunctional area.EachNDDwasreviewedbyresponsible individuals inthefunctional areaandthenbytheSeniorManagement Team.TheNDDswereissuedasasetintheNuclearDivisionPolicyandDirectives Manual.Administrative controlsareappliedtoensuretheNDDsremainaccurate.

29

Following issuanceoftheNuclearDivisionPolicyandDirectives Manual,theAdministrative Procedure UpdateProgramwascompleted byincorporating requirements contained intheNDDsthroughout variouslowertieradministrative procedures.

Itisimportant tonotethat,inparallelwithimplementation oftheNDDs,NMPNSconducted acomprehensive "Back-to-Basics"programtoeducatestationpersonnel onthestructure andcontentofthelicensing basis,including itsrelationtotheNuclearDivisionPolicyandDirectives Manual.Thisprogramisdescribed laterinourresponsetoRequested Action(b)under"Training."

IncontrasttotheNDDswhichestablish "what"therequirements areforaparticular functional area,implementing procedures providethedetailsofmethodstobeusedtoimplement therequirements contained intheNDDs.Thiswasaccomplished usingtheprocedure hierarchy developed earlierintheprogram.Twotiersofadministrative procedures areemployedintheprocedure hierarchy toensureappropriate levelsofreviewandapprovalareobtained:

Department leveladministrative procedures whichinclude:1)NIPswhichimplement commonoruniversal programsforNMPNSdepartments (suchasprocedure reviewandcontrol,corrective action,andsecurity).

NIPsarereviewedbyresponsible individuals fromappropriate areasandapprovedbytheVicePresident andGeneralManager-Nuclear;and2)Department-specific administrative procedures whichimplement commonprogramsassignedtoaspecificdepartment (suchasGeneration orEngineering).

Department-specific administrative procedures arereviewedwithintheappropriate department andapprovedbythedepartm'ent head.Lowertier(branchlevel)administrative procedures whicharespecifictofunctional areaswithindepartments (suchasOperations orRadiation Protection) andinvolveimplementation ofrequirements byanindividual group.Branchleveladministrative procedures arereviewedandapprovedwithinthefunctional areaandallowflexibility inimplementing detailedrequirements providedcompliance withtheNDDsandhighertierprocedures ismaintained.

Adherence totheprocedure hierarchy wasmaintained toensureimplementing procedures weredeveloped totheextentnecessary toexecutetherequirements contained intheNDDs.Theeffortwascoordinated byacentralgrouptoensurecompleteness andtominimizeoverlapandduplication.

Aprocedure numbering schemewasemployedthatassociated implementing procedures totheirparentNDD.Thisphaseoftheprogramresultedinrevisionofnearlyallofthemorethan800administrative procedures thatwereinplaceatthattime.Insummary,thiseffortverifiedthatlicensebasisrequirements werebeingimplemented throughadministrative procedures including thoseapplicable todeveloping andmaintaining operations, maintenance, andtestingprocedures.

Theprogramalsoservedtoconsolidate requirements formoreeffective implementation andtoeliminate outdatedorundesirable practices.

Uponcompletion, thetotalnumberofadministrative procedures wasreducedfrommorethan800toapproximately 350.Thedescribed procedure programandhierarchy remainsinplacetodayasanintegralpartoftheNMPNSprocedure program.30

NMPChasinitiated severalsurveillance programreviewsoverthepastsixyears.Severalofthesewereconducted byindependent consultants toensureanunbiasedreview.Specifically, theInservice Testing(IST)ProgramforpumpsandvalveswasreviewedbyStoneandWebsterEngineering Corporation personnel, the10CFR50AppendixJProgramwasreviewedbyGeneralPhysicsCorporation, andtheremainder oftheSurveillance ProgramwasreviewedbyVectraTechnologies, Inc.In.addition, NMPChasperformed internalreviewsoftheISIProgram.In1990,NMPCutilizedtheservicesofStoneandWebsterEngineering Corporation toreviewtheNMP2ISTProgramforpumpsandvalves.Thisreviewconsisted ofevaluating allAmericanSocietyofMechanical Engineers (ASME)classandsafety-related pumpsandvalvestoassurethattheNMP2programplanscopecontained applicable pumpsandvalvesandassociated codetestingrequirements.

Theresultsofthatreviewverifiedthattheprogramplancontained applicable components; ifnot,theprogramplanwasrevised.Inaddition, thereviewassuredthattestingprocedures wereadequateandthattestswereperformed attheproperperiodicity.

During1989-1990, NMPCperformed averification oftheASMESectionXIISIProgram.AgroupofNMPCengineers andconsultants performed thisreview.TheyverifiedthatweldsandsupportsrequiredbytheASMEcodewereintheprogramandthattheplanincludedprovisions tomeetthe10yearinspection require'ments.

Subsequently, someminorrevisions totheprogramhavebeenimplemented.

In1993,NMPCutilizedtheservicesofGeneralPhysicsCorporation,to performareviewoftheNMP210CFR50AppendixJTestingProgram.Thereviewverifiedcommitments toandcompliance withthetestingrequirements of10CFR50AppendixJ.Thisreviewincludedapenetration bypenetration reviewofplantdrawings, andareviewofplantsurveillance procedures usedtoconductTypeA,B,andCtests.Inaddition, theNMP2AppendixJTestingProgramwasreviewedagainsttherequirements of10CFR50AppendixJ,ANSN45.4-1972,Leakage-Rate TestingofContainment Structures forNuclearReactors, ANSI/ANS56.8-1981, Containment SystemLeakageTestingRequirements andNRCAppendixJInspection Procedures.

Areviewoftheremainder oftheNMP2Surveillance Programwasperformed utilizing theservicesofVectraTechnologies, Inc.Thiseffortwascompleted inJanuary1995.Thiseffort31 II entailedathoroughreviewofNMP2Technical Specifications andapplicable procedures.

Wherewarranted, interviews wereconducted withcognizant personnel responsible forthetesting.Requiredsurveillances wereidentified, including ChannelChecks,ChannelFunctional Tests,ChannelCalibration, LogicSystemFunctional Tests,andothersurveillance tests.Specifically excludedfromthisreviewwereASMESectionXIweldandsupport(ISI)surveillance requirements andtheAppendixIProgramsince,theyhadbeenpreviously reviewedasdiscussed above.Thereviewalsoincludedthedocumentation ofthebasisandthemethodformeetingeachtypeofsurveillance requirement.

Duringthistask,thefollowing typesofinformation/sources werereviewed:

DesignBasisDocuments (e.g.,FSAR,drawings)

SystemDescriptions andDesignCriteriaDocuments (DCDs)SystemLevelDrawings-pipingandinstrument diagrams(P&IDs),electrical singlelineandschematics, logicdrawings, etc.Information relativetothedevelopment oftheoriginalTechnical Specifications andsubsequent amendments ILicensing correspondence Vendorinformation relatedtocomponent operation andsurveillance requirements Testprocedures andresultsASMEXIPumpandValveProgram,including deviation requestsApplicable safetyanalysisInstrument setpointinformation andmethodology System/Component FailureModesandEffectsAnalysisApplicable Engineering AnalysesIndustryCodesandStandards NRCRegulations andRGs'naddition, thebasisforacceptance criteriaandhowthosecriteriarelatetothesurveillance requirement wasdefined.Thiseffortincludedtheidentification ofthelimitsthatareprotected bythespecification, thebasisfortheacceptance criteriaalongwiththereferences tothesourcedocuments fromwhichthesubjectinformation wasobtained, theacceptance criteriaandsurveillance testintervals, andadiscussion ofthereasons.and/or basesforanyexceptions.

Theresultsoftheverification effortwerecompiledinasurveillance basisdocument.

Theresultant documentprovidedthebasisfortheTechnical Specification Surveillance Programandmethodsofcompliance withthesurveillance requirements, andtheiracceptability.

Inaddition, adatabasewasdeveloped whichcreatedamatrixofsurveillance requirements, implementing procedures, andcomponents.

Thisdatabasefileprovidestheendusertheabilitytosearchanyfieldtocompileuniquereportsofrequirements, procedures, and/orcomponents.

Intheprocessofcompiling thisdocument, thebasisforelimination ofpossibleduplication and/orunnecessary surveillance requirements wasexplored.

Consequently, redundant orunnecessary surveillance requirements wereidentified.

Furthermore, duringtheperformance ofthistask,areaswheresurveillance requirements couldbecombinedwereexplored.

TheNMP232

~Iv~V evaluation alsofocusedonthesurveillance program"process" andidentified weaknesses and/oromissions thatmayhaveexisted.Alongwiththeidentification ofweaknesses and/orpotential omissions, recommended actionstoaddresstheareasofconcernwereproposed.

AspartoftheTechnical Specification review,thePMSTdatabasewasreviewedtoverifycompliance withTechnical Specification requirements, frequency requirements, andanyspecialmoderestraints.

Ineachverification effortdescribed above,theoverriding requirement (e.g.,ASMEcodeorTechnical Specification) hasbeenverifiedandthedesignprogramplansandprocedures reviewed.

Theprocesses considered definition oftherequirement, comparison ofdesigntotherequirement, comparison oftheprogramplanstotherequirement andreviewoftheimplementing procedures toensurecompliance.

BasedupontheresultsofISI,IST,AppendixJandremaining Technical Specification surveillance requirement reviews,NMPChasahighdegreeofconfidence thatrequiredsurveillances arebeingperformed, andthattheseprogramsareappropriately implementing thedesignrequirements.

Inadditiontotheabove,onJanuary10,1996,theCommission issuedGenericLetter(GL)96-01,"TestingofSafety-Related LogicCircuits,"

tonotifyaddressees aboutproblemswithtestingofsafety-related logiccircuits.

ByletterdatedApril18,'1996, NMPCprovideditsinitialresponsetoGL96-01.Ourletterstatedourintenttoperformanassessment ofNMP2surveillance testprocedures toverifythatlogiccircuitsofthereactorprotection system,Emergency DieselGenerator (EDG)loadsheddingandsequencing, andactuation logicforengineered safetyfeaturesaretestedinaccordance withTechnical Specifications.

Moreover, ourresponserecognized thatGL96-01requested thatthisassessment and,ifrequired, anyprocedure changesbecompleted priortostartupfromNMP2Refueling OutageNo.6(RFO6)scheduled forSpringof1998.Afterdetermining thescopeofworkandresourcerequirements, NMPCconfirmed itscommitment tocomplete'the GL96-01assessment and,ifrequired, procedure changespriortostartupfromRFO6,byletterdatedAugust14,1996.OnMarch28,1996,NMPCpersonnel identified thatfullcoreoffloadstothespentfuelpoolperformed duringrefueling outageswereoutsidethedesignbasesoftheplant.Thiseventwasdescribed inLicenseeEventReport(LER)96-03,Supplement 1,"FullCoreOffloadandSpentFuelPoolCoolingSystemOperating OutsideofDesignBasis."Corrective actionincludedalessonslearnedtransmittal describing thisevent'ndtheneedtoperformanin-depthreviewandevaluation ofdesignbaseswhenwritingand/orrevisingprocedures.

TheBranchManagersreviewedthisissuewithpersonnel qualified todoapplicability reviewsandsafetyevaluations.

Also,inresponsetoLER96-03,Supplement 1,aswellasindustryissuesconcerning UFSARdiscrepancies, areviewteamwasformedtoevaluateasampleofsystemscontained intheNMP2UFSAR.Theteamwastaskedwithevaluating thissampleofsystemstodetermine whetheranyomissions orerrorsexistbetweenplantprocedures andthelicensebasisdocuments.

Todate,theseevaluations haveindicated thattheNMP2UFSARisgenerally 33 4III accurateindescribing theoperation oftheplant.Althoughdeficiencies andminorinconsistencies havebeenidentified, theyhavebeendetermined nottoimpactplantoperation, performance, orbeareportable condition outsidethedesignbasisoftheplant.Theassessment does,however,indicatethatNMPCshouldcontinuetofocusonimproving theaccuracyoftheUFSAR.Thisprocesswouldalsoconfirmthevalidityofthedesignbasisfortheremaining systems,andimprovetheabilitytoefficiently maintaintheUFSAR.~IAccordingly, wearecurrently finalizing ourplansfora'UFSARverification effort.Weintendtoperformacomprehensive reviewwhichwillbecompleted bytheendof1998.Thisreviewwillincludeprovision forpromptevaluation ofidentified deviations foroperability andreportability.

Itwillalsoassess,onanongoingbasis,whethertherearebroadunderlying concernsofdesignbasisrelatedinadequacies.

TheUFSARVerification ProgramconfirmsNMPC'scommitment toensurethedesignbasisisreflectedin theday-to-day operation oftheunit,andthatplantpersonnel areknowledgeable andawareofthesignificance ofoperating withinthelicensing basis.Asdescribed intheresponsetoRequested Action(c),NMP2developed aprogramtoimplement a4.3%poweruprate.Engineering reviewedGENSSSandturbinegenerator changes,NMP2designcalculations,

'andaffecteddrawings, making,appropriate changes.SelectedGeneration systemengineers andOperations personnel thenreviewedtheEDCs.AffectedMaintenance andOperations procedures werereviewedandrevisedtoreflecttheupratedpowercondition basedonthenewdesignbasesrequirements.

Thesereviewsprovidedtheopportunity toexamineexistingprocedures andprovidesreasonable assurance thattheyaccurately reflected theexistingdesignbasis.IIIISignificant QAaudits(vertical slices)havebeenperformed intheareasofFireProtection andServiceWaterinwhichareviewofprocedures againstdesignbasisdocuments wasincluded.

tAQAauditwasperformed in1995,underthecognizance oftheSRAB,tomeettherequirements oftheannual,bierinial, andtriennial fireprotection auditsdescribed intheTechnical Specifications.

Theauditobjectives weretoevaluatethefireprotection programandimplementing procedures toassuretherequirements fordesign,procurement, fabrication, installation, testing,maintenance andadministrative controlsfortherespective programsareincludedintheQATRandmeetprogramrequirements established bythelicensedocuments andBTPAPCSB9.5-1,AppendixA-1976,SectionC.~Additional objectives weretoassesstheplantfireprotection equipment andprogramimplementation toverifycompliance withtheNRCrequirements addressed inlicensedocuments andimplementing procedures.

Theauditteamconcluded thattheNMPNSFireProtection Programwasincompliance withapplicable Coderequirements andtheNationalFireProtection Association (NFPA)fireprotection 34

guidelines.

Thefireprotection designanddesignchangeprocesses wereconsidered aprogramstrength.

Opportunities forprogramimprovements wereidentified whichincludedattention todetailconcerning theidentification ofrelateddocu'ment changesneededwhenFireProtection programchangeswereimplemented.

DERswerewrittenagainsttheprogramwhichincludedinconsistencies withtheFSAR,butnoneindicated anymajorprogramflawsorviolations.

The'audit evaluated thedesigncontrolandprocurement documentcontrolprocesses forfireprotection byreviewing DDCsforrecentplantchanges/modifications, reviewing procurement documents forfireprotection systemreplacement itemsandconducting interviews withdesignengineering andprocurement personnel.

Theauditteamfoundthedesignchangecontrolprocessforfireprotection tobeastrength, particularly inregardstothethoroughness ofengineering evaluations forAppendixRrequirements.

Qualitystandards, suchasfireprotection codes,werespecified indesigndocuments anddeviations fromthesecodesorstandards wereappropriately controlled.

Also,newdesignsandplantmodifications werereviewedbyqualified personnel toensureinclusion ofapplicable fireprotection requirements.

Theauditteamalsoreviewedprocedures, instructions anddrawingstoensurethatfireprotection programelementshadbeenappropriately incorporated intotheimplementing documents.

Theteamalsoobservedpersonnel performance regarding fireprotection procedures andinterviewed personnel toassesstheimplementation oftheseprocedures andprogramelements.

Theteamfoundthatthetrainingprogramsforfirefightingandfireprevention werebeingimplemented inaccordance withdocumented procedures andthatthetrainingprogramsforfirebrigademembersmettheminimumrequirements of10CFR50AppendixR.Theteamalsofoundthattheinstructions, procedures, anddrawingsfordesign,installation, inspection, test,maintenance, modification, andadministration offireprotection activities andsystemswerebeingproperlyreviewed, andcontained appropriate requirements forcontrolofignitionsources,combustibles, precautions andcompensatory actionswhenfiresystemswereremovedfromservice.TheauditteamreviewedtheNMPNSUFSARAppendixB(NMPC-QATR-l),

fireprotection surveillance testprocedures, NFPAstandards andfireprotection relatedworkdocuments toensurethataprogramofindependent inspection hadbeenestablished.

Theauditteamalsoreviewedtestandsurveillance procedures andrelatedworkdocuments, witnessed testingactivities andinterviewed personnel toverifythatatestprogramhadbeenestablished.

Theteamfoundthatthetestprocedures incorporated therequirements andlimitscontained inapplicable designdocuments andthattheschedules andmethodsforperiodictestinghadbeenappropriately developed andimplemented.

Theteamalsofoundthatfireprotection equipment andcommunications equipment weretestedperiodically toassurethattheequipment wouldproperlyfunctionandcontinuetomeetdesigncriteria.

AnauditoftheNMP2ServiceWaterSystemwasconducted in1993toreviewsystemdesignandoperation, maintenance, testingandvariousregulatory commitments suchasheatexchanger performance (GL89-13),motor-operated valve(MOV)controlprogram(GL89-10)andcheckvalvemonitoring gNPOSignificant Operating Experience Report(SOER)86-03).35 e1III Thepurposeoftheauditwastodetermine iftheNMP2ServiceWaterSystemwasdesigned,

operated, tested,andmaintained toassureperformance ofdesignsafetyfunctions inresponsetopostulated accidentconditions, p'ostulated naturalphenomena, andhazardous systeminteractions.

Theauditteamemployeddeep,vertical-slice techniques originally developed bytheNRCSafetySystemFunctional Inspection (SSFQprogram.Specifically, theServiceWaterSystemwasreviewedtoevaluatesystemdesignandmodification processes, andtoevaluatetheimplementation ofthedesigninoperations, maintenance, testing,trainingandadministrative controlsprogram.Theresultsofthisaudit,93003-RG/IN "Unit2ServiceWaterSystem(GL-13),"

werepresented totheCommission onJune9,1993inKingofPrussia,PA.Theexecutive summaryof93003-RG/IN statesthefollowing:

"Theauditteamconcluded thattheNMP2ServiceWaterSystemissufficiently

designed, operated, tested,andmaintained toassureperformance ofitsdesignsafetyfunctionunderpostulated designbasisaccidentconditions, including themostlimitingsinglefailures',

postulated naturalphenomena, orhazardous systeminteractions.

Continuing flowdegradation andrelatedtrends,similartothoseobservedatotherpowerplants,indicatethatcontinuing actionsandvigilance areessential toassurelong-term availability."

Concurrent withthetimetheauditplanwasbeingpreparedtheCommission issuedTemporary Instruction 2515/118, Revision1,ServiceWaterSystemOperational Performance Inspection (SWOP/."NMPCwasrequested toreviewtheirauditplanversustheNRCrequirements andprepareamatrixtoensurethatallitemsoftheNRCInspection Manualwereaddressed.

Thiswascompleted andpresented totheCommission.

TheNMPCeffortatself-assessment precededtheissuancebytheNRCofInspection Procedure 40501,"Licensee Self-Assessments RelatedtoArea-of-Emphasis Inspections.",

Theoverall'conclusion wasthattheNMP2ServiceWaterSystemwassufficiently

designed, operated, tested,andmaintained toassureperformance ofdesignsafetyfunctions underpostulated designbasisaccidentconditions.

Thus,itcanbefurtherconcluded thattheSWPsystemdesignbasesrequirements havebeentranslated intooperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures, Inconclusion, theseauditsweredesigned, inpart,toverifythatthedesignbasiswasproperlyreflected intheapplicable operating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures forthosefunctional areas.Theresultsindicatethatwhilenotperfect,thereisareasonable basisforconcluding thatgoalhasbeenaccomplished.

Continual verification throughauditandsurveillance activities isamanagement expectation.

NMP2safety-related andnonsafety-related vendormanualswereoriginally reviewedfortechnical content,and generalapplication toNMP2andissuedforusebyourA/E.AftertheissuanceofGL83-28,vendormanualswereidentified toacomponent levelandaplant-specificapplicability reviewwasperformed foreachmanual,identifying thoseportionsofthemanualapplicable totheidentified components.

Thisapplicability reviewwasperformed byaNMP236 N

Icontractor andwasgenerally accomplished byreviewing plant-specific drawings.

Thisactivitywascompleted inthelate1980's.InSeptember 1990,NMP2initiated aVendorManualUpgradeProgram.Thisprogram.involvedtheupdating(baselining) ofNSSSSystemLevelManualsandupdating225component levelvendormanualsforselectedsafety-related piecesofequipment.

TheupdatingofNSSSsystemmanualswascompleted byourNSSSsupplierwiththeobjective toprovideabaselineupdateofNMP2'sNSSSsystemmanualstoreflectnewconfiguration information (i.e.,changesmadetotheplantsincethemanualsweresuppliedorlastupdated),

newtechnology, BoilingWaterReactor(BWR)fieldexperience information andareviewofServiceInformation Letterstoretrieveanyoperating ormaintenance information.

Thisprojectwascompleted in1996.NMPCupdatedselectedcomponent levelmanuals.Theupdateprocessfocusedontwokeyelements:

equipment suppliercomponent configuration changesandareviewofnewtechnologies.

Thereviewofnewtechnologies includedaninvestigation ofoperating experiences fromthesuppliers whichcouldprovideimprovedorsimplified operating andmaintenance procedures fortheequipment (i.e.,newlubricants, simplified

assembly, orcalibrating procedures, etc.).Whenapplicable neworrevisedvendormanualswereprovidedtoNMPC,theywerereviewedandapprovedbyNMPCEngineering andthenissued,superseding ourcurrentrevision.

Thisprojectwascompleted inSeptember 1993.InNovember1991,actionswerecompleted toimplement amethodtotrackandtrendthereviewandapprovalofvendormanuals.Thisinvolvedtheappointment ofaVendorManualCoordinator (VMC),andthecleanupandenhancement ofthePlanningandScheduling DatabaseintheCDS.MonthlyreportsarenowissuedbytheVMCtodepartment supervisors andmanagement toidentifymanualsthatare"inthereviewcycleandtheoverallstatusofmanualsissued,added,andbacklogged.

InNovemberof1995,theprocessforvendormanualuseand.control wasenhancedusingINPO'sGoodPracticeDE-102,INPO87-009,ControlofVendorManuals,asaguide.Thereviewprocessensuresplantpersonnel areprovidedwithcurrentandtechnically accuratevendormanualstosupporttheoperation andmaintenance andincludesthefollowing:

I1.Identification oftheprimaryresponsibilities ofvariousindividuals responsible forcontrolofvendormanualsincluding theVendorDocumentCoordinator.

2.Expectations forturnaround timeforthereviewandapprovalofvendormanuals.3.Requirements forthereceipt,review,approval, issue,,and revisionofvendormanuals,andnotifications todepartm'ents andresponsible personnel fornewand/orrevisedvendormanuals.Thisnotification servesasthetriggertostationpersonnel toreviewandreviseappropriate programsandprocedures iftheyareaffectedbyaparticular vendormanual.NMP237 Vi,il 4.Aprocessforplantpersonnel totakeexception torequirements specified byavendor.IIBasedontheabove,NMPCisconfident thatplantpersonnel areprovidedwithcurrentandtechnically accuratevendormanualstosupportplantoperation andmaintenance.

TheVendorInterface Programandtheinternalreviewandapprovalprocessassuresthatvendormanualinformation isreviewedagainstthedesignbasis.Thisprocessconfirmstheacceptability oftechnical information thathasnotchanged,andidentifies otherinformation thatrequiresrevision, NMP2isintheprocessofconverting itscurrentTechnical Specifications totheITS.NMP2isalsoconverting froman18-monthtoa24-monthoperating cycle.Thisconversion processisdescribed below.IITheITScontainsagenericBaseswhichissubstantially greaterindetailthantheBasesofthecurrentTechnical Specifications.

Duringtheconversion process(i.e.,draftingoftheproposedlicenseamendment) thegenericBasesoftheITSisreviewedandcomparedwiththeUFSARofNMP2.Incertaininstances, calculations andanalysesarealsoreviewedduringtheconversion process.Inaddition, duringtheconversion processandonanas-needed basis,theNRC's"SafetyEvaluation ReportRelatedtotheOperation ofNineMilePointNuclearStationUnit2"(NUREG-1047),

including itssixsupplements, isalsoreviewedbyNMPC.Basedonthesereviews,thegenericBasesoftheITSisappropriately modifiedtoreflecttheLicensing andDesignBasisofNMP2.tTheconversion ofNMP2totheITSalsoincludesincreasing thelengthoftheoperating cyclefrom18to24months.Each18-monthSurveillance Requirement isevaluated todetermine thefeasibility ofincreasing itssurveillance interval.

Thisevaluation includesareviewofhistorical maintenance andsurveillance data,theUFSARandappropriate calculations,

analyses, andvendormanuals.Basedonthesereviewsandevaluations, theoperating cycleofNMP2isexpectedtobeincreased from18to24months.Asaresultoftheabovereviewsandevaluations forITSand24-monthconversion, requiredchangeswillbemadetothefacility, anditscalculations,

analyses, procedures, UFSAR,andvendordocuments.

Inthoseinstances wheretheconversion willresultinnewormorestringent requirements, plantprocedures willbeappropriately revisedandtherebymadeconsistent withthedesignbasisoftheunit.Theaboveprocessprovidesassurance thatthedesignandlicensing basisoftheplant,itsprocedures, andtheperformance ofplantequipment (i.e.,SSCs)willsupportconversion totheITSandtoa24-monthcycle.ThefunctionofISEGistoexamineplantoperating characteristics, variousNRCissuances, industryadvisories,'ERs andothersourcesofunitdesignandoperating experience information, including unitsofsimilardesign'which mayindicateareasofimproving unit38

'

safety.Thishasincludedindependent reviewsofplantactivities/programs, including maintenance, modifications, operational concernsandanalysis.

TheISEGmakesdetailedrecommendations forprocedure changes,equipment modifications, maintenance activities, operations activities orothermeansofimproving unitsafetytotheVicePresident

-NuclearSafetyAssessment andSupport.Manyofthereviews/assessments performed todatehavebeenrelatedtodesignbasesandconfiguration controlissues.Industryoperations experience itemsprovideNMPNSopportunities toconfirmthatdesignbasesrequirements aretranslated intooperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures.

Asaminimum,NRCBulletins, Notices,GLs,andINPOissuances suchasSOERsandSignificant EventReports(SERs),aswellasvendorissuances arereviewedtodetermine applicability totheNMPNS.NuclearDivisionpersonnel aredirectedtoinitiateaDERupondiscovery ofadeviation/event orcondition adversetoqualityorwhenitisdetermined thatanindustryexperience isapplicable totheNMPNS.TheDERprocess,asdescribed inourresponsetoRequested Action(d),requiresadisposition andcorrective actions,asnecessary.

Someexamplesofoperations experience itemsthathaverequiredNMPNStoconfirmand/ortakeactiontoconcludethatdesignbasesrequirements arebeingtranslated intooperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures arediscussed below.ThepurposeofGL88-14,was torequestthateachlicensee/applicant reviewNUREG-1275,Volume2,andperformadesignandoperations verification oftheinstrument airsystem(IAS).AsstatedintheGL,theverification shouldinclude"verification thatmaintenance practices, emergency procedures, andtrainingareadequatetoensurethatsafety-related equipment willfunctionasintendedonlossofinstrument air."Inresponsetotherequest,NMPCreviewedthespecified procedures andfoundthemtobeadequatetoensurethatthesubjectsafety-related equipment wouldfunctionasintendedonlossofinstrument airorduringdesignbasisaccidents.

Inadditiontofurtherenhancemaintenance ofthesystem,anewsamplingprocedure wasdeveloped totestforqualitycriteria, andexistingprocedures wererevisedtoaddressfilterchangeout practices andcheckvalvetesting.Thereviewsandenhancements conducted aspartofthisGLeffortprovideassurance thatfortheIAS,designbasishasbeenproperlytranslated intoprocedures.

NRCURIA-44,SBOwasconcerned withtheabilityofanuclearpowerplanttocopewithatotallossofbothoffsiteandonsitealternating current(AC)electrical power.TheNRCresolvedtheissuebyincorporating requirements forcopingwithaSBOin10CFR50.63.

39 4I0 AspartofNMPC'seffortstoaddressensuringcompliance withtheserequirements, existingprocedures werereviewedandmodifiedtomeet10CFR50.63 requirements andtheguidelines inNuclearManagement andResourceCouncil(NUMARC)87-00.Aspartofthisreview,NMPCconfirmed thatexistingprocedures providedguidancewhichwouldpermittherestoration ofACpowereitherfromoffsiteorfromtheemergency dieselgenerators.

Additionally, corporate operating instructions wereidentified thataddresstherestoration ofoffsitepowertoNMP2andtheScriba,Substation fromvarioussources.Confirmation oftheseexistingprocedural andoperating controlsalongwiththoseaddedtomeetNUMARC87-00providesarationale thatoperating procedures adequately addressthedesignbasisforlossofACpowerevents.IIIn1992,NMPCdeveloped anew,,training courseentitled"Back-to-Basics."

Thiscourseprovidedtrainingonlicensing basisdocuments andoperation withinourlicensing

envelope, andwasdesignedtoresultinenhancements toourmanagement andleadership skills.Alsodiscussed wastheexpectation thatifworkcouldnotbeperformed withinthecontrolsofaprocedure, theworkshouldstopandaresolution obtainedbeforeworkcontinues.

ThistrainingwasprovidedtoBranchManagersandselectedSupervisors whowerethenresponsible toteachthe"Back-to-Basics" coursetotheindividual workgroups.'"Back-to-Basics'II" trainingwasconducted in1995-1996 toassistorganizations inunderstanding howBack-to-Basics relatestotheirspecificjobs.Thistrainingincludedadiagramofourlicensebasisanddiscussions of10CFR50,59 and50.92,commitments madetoOperational Experience items,RGs,andindustrystandards andhowwechangethese"commitments, adefinition ofoperability withanemphasisonpostaccidentfunction, discretionary enforcement, reportability requirements of10CFR50Parts72,73and21,andhowspecific.

workactivities interactwiththedesignbasis.Concerning 50.59training, thebiennialrequalifiication trainingforpersonnel authorized topreparesafetyevaluations nowincludesaspecificdiscussion oftheconsequences offailingtoprepareaspecificevaluation.

MembersoftheSeniorManagement Teamrecentlyattendedtherequalification trainingtoensuretheirexpectations areincorporated, andtoheightenawareness of10CFR50.59 requirements andissues.MembersoftheSORCandtheSRABarealsorequiredtoattendrequalification training.

Operation Experience, including industryevents,aretypically analyzedfortrainingvalueinconjunction withDERdispositions and,ifappropriate, areincludedinthecontinuing trainingprogramforoperations, maintenance, engineering, chemistry, radiation protection, andsupportorganizations.

Routineandspecialtrainingperiodically resultsinenhancements toprocedures.

Operators canprocessprocedure changeswhentrainingactivities showthatthereisabetterwaytoaccomplish thespecifictask.Procedures arereviewedperiodically withintenttopreventpersonnel errors,ensurebetterunderstandin'g, andtrainpersonnel onthedesignorlicensing 40, 4

IIbasisoftheplant.Anexampleofwhereanengineering supportcontinued trainingclassidentified aconcernwasthediscussion ofcontrolroddriveflowandhowitisusedtocalculate corethermalpower.Asaresultofthisdiscovery, configuration changestotheplantprocesscomputerweremadetocorrectthedeficiency.

Thishassincebeenidentified asanindustryproblemthatinitiated actionatotherplants.Administrative procedures andcontrolshavebeeninplacepriortoNMP2receiving alowpowerlicensetomandaterequirements associated withthepreparation, review,approval, andrevisionofoperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures.

Theseprocedures andprocesses containappropriate requirements whichreasonably ensuredesignbasisrequirements areincorporated intoadministrative andtechnical procedures.

Personnel qualification requirements assurethatNMPCiscapableofimplementing theprogramrequirements.

Continuous improvement ofprogramrequirements andimplementation hasbeenaregularpracticeatNMPNS.Additionally, multipleassessments havebeenconducted whichdemonstrate theoveralleffectiveness ofvariousprogramsinthedesign/configuration controlandprocedure area.Coupledtogether, theseactivities andprocesses providereasonable assurance thatdesignbasisrequirements aretranslated intooperating, maintenance andtestingprocedures atNMP2.P41

Providetherationale forconcluding thatsystem,structure andcomponent configuration andperformance areconsistent withthedesignbases.Duringthedesign,construction andstartupofNMP2,arigorousQAProgramwasapplied.Thisprogramincludedprocedures andprocesses consistent with10CFR50,AppendixBrequiring proceduralized designcontrolstoensuredesignadequacyandcheckingprocesses throughout construction andtestingtoconfirmthatEngineering requirements wereimplemented.

TheNMP2initialtestprogrambeganassystems,components, andstructures werenearingconstruction completion.

Theobjectives oftheprogramweretodemonstrate thatplantSSCsoperateinaccordance withthedesignperformance requirements whileutilizing totheextentpossibleplantprocedures anddemonstrating, wherepractical, thattheplantiscapableofwithstanding anticipated transients andpostulat'ed accidents.

Theprocedures fortheNMP2StartupTestProgramrequiredtestengineers toperformwalkdowns ofthesystems/equipment.

Markupsofmasterdrawingsweremaintained andas-builtchangesweredocumented aspartoftheprocess.Thisprogramincludedpreliminary, preoperational'and startuptesting.Surveillance testingandexamination programshavebeenusedsincestartup.Thesetestsandexaminations areformalized byprocedures andensurethatsurveillances andtestsrequiredbyTechnical Specifications andotherregulatory commitments areestablished.

'Thesetestsandexaminations provideaprimarybasistoensurethattheperformance ofsystemsmeetdesignbasesrequirements.

Additionally, post-maintenance andmodification testingisroutinely performed toensurethatdesignbasesrequirements continuetobemetfollowing maintenance andmodification activities.

Pressureretaining components arealsoroutinely testedinaccordance within-service inspection andtestingprograms.

Inadditiontoconfirming thatSSCsmeetacceptance requirements, thesetestingprogramsprovideamechanism toidentifydeficiencies usingtheDERprocess.Additional designverification andpowerascension testingwasperformed aspartofthe4.3%poweruprateeffortimplemented in1995.Operations Experience andSSFIs/Electrical Distribution SystemFunctional Inspections (EDSFIs)havebeenappliedtofurtherandmorespecifically evaluateNMP2'sconformance andperformance againstdesignbases.NMPC'sOperations Experience Programevaluates NRCBulletins, Notices,GLsaswellasotherindustryinputsincluding INPO'sSOERs,SERs,andvendorissuances.

Evaluations suchasEDSFIandOperations Experience includeourassessment ofMOVcapability underGL89-10,ServiceWaterSystemcapability underGL89-13,Instrument AirSystemcapability aspartofGL88-14,pumpdead-heading issuesasdescribed inBulletin88-04,andURIA-44,SBO.Theseassessments, coupledwithongoingevaluations ofplantperformance, assurethatconfiguration andperformance parameters areupdatedasappropriate.

42 I

~~~~~~~~~~~Theaboveactivities, coupledwithourcorrective actionprogr'amensureroutineproblemidentification andevaluation ofas-builtconditions andtestresultsandprovidereasonable assurance thatcurrentperformance andconfiguration areconsistent withthedesignbases.NMPC'sresponsetoRequested Action(a)providesadescription oftheengineering designandconfiguration controlprocesses currently inplaceatNMPNS,including thosethatimplement 10CFR50.59, 10CFR50.71(e),

andAppendixBto10CFRPart50.OurresponsetoRequested Action(d)providesadetaileddescription oftheprocesses fortheidentification ofproblemsandimplementation ofcorrective actionstopreventrecurrence (i.e.,theDER).NMPCisconfident thatadherence totheseprocesses providereasonable assurance thatNMPNSconfiguration andperformance areconsistent withthedesignbases.NMPCbasesthisconfidence notonlyonthequalityoftheseprocesses, butonthemultipleefforts,reviews,inspections, tests,andauditsthathavetakenplaceandthatarecurrently beingtakentoassureconsistency betweenourplantsandthedesignbases.Adiscussion ofthesevariouseffortsisprovidedbelow.DuringtheNMP2licensing process,NMPCestablished aprogramfortheverification ofthefinaldraftTechnical Specifications andtheFSAR.Theverification effortconsisted ofannotating bothlicensing documents tocontrolling plantdocuments suchasdrawings,

'rocedures, specifications, andcalculations.

Thiseffortincludedprovisions forupdatingthelicensing documents, asnecessary, toreflecttheas-builtconfiguration oftheplant.Theverification programprovidedassurance thattheplantwasconstructed inaccordance withtheFSARandtheTechnical Specifications tobeissuedwiththelowpowerlicense.TheNMP2startupandtestprogramconsisted ofthreephaseswhichbeganassystemsandcomponents andstructures werenearingconstruction completion.

Theobjectives ofthestartupandtestprogramincludedthefollowing:

Demonstrate, totheextentpractical, thattheplantSSCsoperateinaccordance withtheirdesignandperformance requirements.

~Utilizeandevaluate, totheextentpossible, theplantprocedures.

Demonstrate, wherepractical, thattheplantiscapableofwithstanding anticipated transients andpostulated accidents.

Thethreemajorphasesofthetestprogramprovidedasystematic andcontrolled approachtoplantstartup.Thethreephases,preliminary-testing, preoperational testing,andstartuptesting,aredescribed inthefollowing paragraphs.

43 l'"~I Preliminary testing-testsperformed subsequent toreleaseoftheequipment, system,orstructure fromconstruction.

Thistestphaseverifiedproperinstallation andoperation ofequipment, systemsand,whereapplicable, structures.

Preoperational testing-performed aftersystemturnoverandusuallypriortofuelloadtoverifythattheperformance ofplantsystemsandcomponents metapplicable performance designandregulatory requirements.

Twotypesoftestswereincludedduringpreoperational testing:ao\lPreoperational tests-performed toprovideverification thatSSCsmetperformance requirements andsatisfied thedesigncriteria.to theextentpossible.

Thesetestswereperformed onsafety-related systemsasspecified inRG1.68,systemsdesignated undertheaugmented QAprogram,andothersystemsimportant toreactorsafetyorthesafeshutdownofthereactor.b.Acceptance tests-similartopreoperational testsexcepttheywereperformed onnon-safety systemsandwerenotspecified inRG1.68.1Startuptesting-consisted offuelloading,precritical, lowpower,andpowerascension teststhatensurefuelloadinginasafemanner,confirmthedesignbases,demonstrated wherepractical thattheplantiscapableofwithstanding theanticipated transients andpostulated accidents, andensuredthattheplantissafelybroughttoratedcapacityandsustained poweroperation.

TheNMP2StartupProgramwasgovernedbySAPswhichrequiredtestengineers toperformwalkdowns ofthesystems/equipment.

Component verification andsystempreparation werethetwophasesofthepreliminary testactivities fortheStartupProgram.Component verification includedinitialenergizing, calibration, logictesting,andequipment operation, whilesystempreparation includedinitialsystemoperation.

Yellowlinemarkupsofapplicable masterdrawingsweremaintained andas-builtchangesweredocumented aspartoftheprocess.Insummary,theNMP2initialtestprogram'wasimplemented,to demonstrate, totheextentpractical, thattheplantSSCsoperatedinaccordance withtheirdesignandperformance requirements priortocommercial plantoperation.

Italsodemonstrated thattheexistingplantconfiguration wasinconformance withtheFSARdescription, withas-builtchangesdocumented.

Following completion oftheinitialtestprogram,routinesurveillance testingandexaminations haveprovidedtheprimarymethodbywhichperformance andmaterialcondition ofplantSSCsareconfirmed tobeconsistent withthedesignbasis.Routinesurveillance testingandexaminations providesaprimarymethodbywhichtheperformance andmaterialcondition ofplantsystems,structures andcomponents areconfirmed tobeconsistent withdesignbases.AnNDDestablishes therequirements fordevelopment andexecution ofaprogramforsurveillances andtestsrequiredbytheTechnical Specifications, NMP244 0C regulatory commitments including theISTprogram,industryexperience, andspecialtestsandexperiments.

Asurveillance andtestprogramhasbeenestablished todemonstrate thatSSCsperformsatisfactorily inservice.Theregulatory requirements areidentified intheoperating license,Technical Specifications andUFSAR.Thesurveillance andtestprogramisupdated,inpart,asaresultofdesignchanges,corrective actionsidentified aspartoftheDERprocess,evaluations ofindustry, operating andmaintenance experience, andchangestosourcerequirements.

Also,requirements forsurveillances andtestsmeettherequirements oftheASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCodeandRGsasappropriate.

Specificprocedures aredeveloped foreachsurveillance testandsimulate, totheextentpractical, theactualconditions underwhichthesystemmustoperateondemand.Post-maintenance andmodification testsverifythecapability ofSSCstoperformsatisfactorily inservice.Theextentofthetestingiscommensurate withtheworkperformed andtheimportance oftheSSCtostationsafetyandreliability.

Thetestrequirements andacceptance criteriafordesignchangesarederivedfromdesigndocuments andsourcesforregulatory requirements.

SSCdeficiencies andtestdataadversetrendsareevaluated andaDERinitiated asappropriate.

AnNDDalsoestablishes therequirements forthedevelopment ofISIandTestingprograms.

Thisdirective appliestotheexamination andtestingofthepressureretaining components oftheNMPNSreactorcoolantpressureboundaryandtocomponents requiredtobetestedinaccordance withtheASMEBoiler&PressureVesselCode,SectionXI.Unacceptable examination ortestresultswillresultintheinitiation ofaDERandappropriate corrective actions.Suchtestingandexamination activities assurethatSSCscontinuetoperformasdescribed inthedesignbasisdocuments.

APowerUprate-PowerAscension StartupProgramwasdeveloped andperformed toimplement a4.3%powerupratein1995.Therequirements fortestingwerederivedfromtheNMP2powerupratelicensing submittals, theNRCStaff'sSafetyEvaluation Reportforpoweruprate,Chapter14oftheUFSAR,theGEpowerupratepowerascension testspecification andtheTechnical Specifications forpow'eruprate.TheresultsofthistestprogramwerereportedtotheNRCintheNMP2"PowerUpratePowerAscension TestProgramInterimStartupReport,"Rev.1datedNovember1995,andrevisedperiodically.

ThePowerAscension ProgramfollowedthenormalNMP2administrative procedures, andoneadministrative procedure specifically writtenfortheprogram,whichdelineated thepowerupratepowerascension testrequirements.

TheprogramtestcontrolsincludedSORCreviewofeachspecialtestprocedure, specialtestresults,andtestexceptions.

TheManagerTechnical Supportreviewedtheresultsofeachtestphaseandapprovedmovingtothenextphase.Aspartofthepoweruprateeffort,Engineering reviewedtheGEpoweruprateevaluations andanalysestransmitted toNMPCandtheappropriate NMP2designcalculations anddrawings.

Theappropriate changesweremade.TheassignedGeneration personnel reviewedsubsequent Engineering changes.Applicable procedures wererevisedandupdatedtoreflecttheupratedpowercondition andanynewdesignbasesrequirements.

Thepowerascension programNMP245 r'4r~."pl providedatestingevaluation toconfirmtheperformance andconfiguration ofindividual systemsandoverallstationoperation andcontrol'atvariouspowerlevels.IAnEDSFI(Inspection ReportNo.50-410/93-81) wasconducted atNMP2fromNovember29,1993throughJanuary28,1994.Thisinspection wasdirectedtowardareasimportant topublichealthandsafety.Thepurposeofthisinspection wastodetermine whethertheelectrical distribution systemasdesigned, installed, andconfigured atNMP2wascapableofperforming itsintendedsafetyfunctions.

Inaddition, thisinspection alsoincludedareviewofourself-assessment oftheelectrical distribution systemandareviewofourresponsetothedeficient condition thattheHighPressureCoreSpray(HPCS)Systeminjection valvefailedtoopenduringtestingasreportedinLER93-10.Basedontheteam'sindependent reviewofselectedelectrical andmechanical designareas,andmaintenance andtestareas,theteamdetermined thatourelectrical distribution systemwascapableofperforming itsintendedfunction.

Theteamalsodetermined thatourself-assessment wascomprehensive andofhighquality,andthatouractionsinresponsetothedeficient condition involving theHPCSsysteminjection valve'ere appropriate.

Inaddition, asdiscussed inourresponsetoRequested Action(b)underQAAudits,aSSFItypeauditwasperformed ontheNMP2ServiceWaterSystem.Thepurposeofthisauditwastodetermine iftheSWPsystemwasdesigned,

operated, testedandmaintained toassureperformance ofdesignsafetyfunctions.

DetailsofthisauditcanbefoundinourresponsetoRequested Action(b).Insummary,functional inspections areconducted todetermine ifplantsystemsarecapableofperforming theirintendedsafetyfunctions asdesigned, installed andconfigured and,therefore, providearationale thatSSCsconfiguration andperformance areconsistent withthedesignbases.Industryoperations experience itemsprovidetheNMPNSopportunities toconfirmthatSSCconfiguration andperformance isconsistent withthedesignbases.Asaminimum,NRCBulletins, Notices,GLs,andINPOissuances suchasSOERsandSERs,aswellasvendorissuances arereviewedtodetermine applicability totheNMPNS.NuclearDivisionpersonnel arerequiredbyprocedure andtrainedtoinitiateaDERupondiscovery ofadeviation/event orcondition adversetoqualityorwhenitisdetermined thatanindustryexperience isapplicable totheNMPNS.TheDERprocess,asdescribed inourresponsetoRequested Action(d),requiresadisposition andcorrective actions,asnecessary.

Someexamplesofoperations EI46

~IN'a experience itemsthathaverequiredNMPNStoconfirmand/ortakeactiontoassurethatSSCconfiguration andperformance isconsistent withthedesignbasesareprovidedbelow:GL89-10requested thatlicensees developandimplement aprogramtoensurethatMOVswitchsettings(i.e.,torque,torquebypass,positionlimit,overload) areselected, setandmaintained sothatMOVswouldoperateunderdesignbasisconditions forthelifeoftheplant.TheNMP2MOVProgram'Plan wasdeveloped inresponsetoGL89-10toidentifythescopeoftheprogramandassureproperdesignbasisreviewandconfirmation, thatsafety-related MOVscouldperformtheirdesignfunction.

Theprogramexamineddesignbasisrequirements ofMOVsundertheprogramanddocumented theresultsofthisreviewunderNMPC'scalculation procedure toassurefutureaccesstothisinformation.

Thisreviewencompassed suchdesignbasisdocumentation asapplicable UFSARsections, technical specifications, systemdesigncriteria, systemdescriptions, operating, andmaintenance procedures.

Withthesedesignrequirements firmlyestablished andverified, eachMOVwasevaluated inasizingcalculation toassuresufficient actuatorcapability toperformdesignated designfunctions.

Appropriate MOVmaintenance procedures weredeveloped toperiodically statically test,performpreventative maintenance, anddynamically testMOVs.'AselectednumberofMOVsweretestedunderdynamicconditions asclosetodesignbasisdifferential pressureasachievable inaccordance withNMP2'sMOVtestinggroupingstudy.Wherein-situplanttestinginformation wasdetermined insufficient tovalidatedesignassumptions usedinMOVsizingcalculations, applicable industrydatawasappliedtosupplement NMP2information.

Asaresultofthesereviewsandtestingresults,additional safetymarginwasidentified asdesirable forselectedMOVsandresultedinseveralmodifications totheplantdesign.Modifications performed includeactuatorreplacement, gearingchanges,andspringpackchanges.NMP2ispresently intheclosureprocessoftheGL89-10program.Asaresultofinspector concernsidentified duringtheGL89-10closureauditinOctober-November 1996,additional marginisbeingaddedtothedesignbasisforseveralMOVs.Thiswillresultinseveraladditional modifications suchasmotorreplacement, additional gearingchanges,andpotential actuatorreplacement, toassurereasonable futuresetupcapability ofMOVsduringperiodicverification.

Theinspector identified thattheactualfieldsetupofNMP2'sMOVsprovidesufficient operating safetymarginforcontinued plantoperation butthatadditional designspecified andcontrolled marginmaybewarranted toaddresspresently unknownvalvedegradation betweenperiodicverifications.

Insummary,theeffortsofGL89-'10haveprovidedaddedassurance thatMOVswilloperateasneededunderdesignbasisconditions.

NMP247 IIyp IGL89-13statesthatnuclearpower'lants mustensurethattheservicewatersystemisincompliance withtheminimumrequirements of10CFR50,AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriteria(GDC)44,45,and46,andAppendixB,SectionXI;ActionsweretakeninresponsetoGL89-,13toensurecompliance withtheserequirements.

Aspreviously discussed, anauditoftheNMP2'Service WaterSystemwasconducted toreviewsystemdesignandoperation, including commitments toGL89-13.Thisauditconcluded thattheNMP2ServiceWaterSystemwassufficiently

designed, operated, tested,andmaintained toassureperformance ofdesignsafetyfunctions underpostulated designbasesaccidents.

ltThepurposeofGL88-14wastorequestthateachlicensee/applicant reviewNUEEG-1275,Volume2,Operating Experience FeedbackReport-Air SystemsProblems, andperformadesignandoperations verification of.theIAS.InresponsetoGL88-14,NMPCverifiedandevaluated theIASdesignandoperation.

Specificequipment anddesigndocumentenhancements wereidentified andmodifications performed toenhanceIASreliability andperformance.

Modifications/enhancements includedreplacement oftheIAScompressors andaP&IDupgradetoprovideasummaryoftheendusersdownstream

'ofeachrootvalve.Asystemwalkdownwasperformed toverifytheP&IDvalvedata.Also,Automatic Depressurization System(ADS),MainSteamIsolation Valve(MSIV),andSafetyReliefValve(SRV)accumulator sizing,testmethodsandcalculations werereviewedtoverifydesignandlicensing requirements werebeingmetandIASmodesofoperation werewithintheoperational designbasis.NRCBulletin88-04,requested licensees toinvestigate'and correct,asappropriate, thepotential forpumpdead-heading duetopump-to-pump interactions andtheadequacyofinstalled minimumflowcapacityforsafety-related systems.ForNMP2thereareonlytwosafety-related systemsthatcouldhavetwopumpsrunninginparallelwithacommonminimumflowline,ThesesystemsaretheLowPressureCoreSpraySystem(CSL)andtheResidualHeatRemovalSystem(RHS).Theoriginaldesignwasfoundadequatetoprecludedead-heading ofoneormorepumpsduringminimumflowoperation, andtherefore, andnocorrective actionswererequired.

Thereviewidentified threesystems;HPCS,CSL,andRHS,pumpswithpotential foroperation forextendedperiodsonminimumflowafterasystemstartonaLOCAsignal.Therecommendation wastominimizetheamountoftimethepumpisinthe48 II tminimumflow'ode.

Accordingly, theoperating procedures includecautionsagainstextendedoperation intheminimumflowmode.I,Insummary,theconcernsofBulletin88-04havebeenaddressed providing reasonable assurance thatNMP2ECCSSystemswillperformconsistent withdesignbases.NRCURIA-44,SBO,wasconcerned withtheabilityofanuclearpowerplanttocopewithatotallossofbothoffsiteandonsiteACelectrical power.TheNRCresolvedtheissuebyincorporating requirements forcopingwithaSBOin10CFR50.63.

Assessment andimplementation of-theSBOrequirements resultedinthefollowing:

~Analyseswereperformed toinsurethatcriticaldirectcurrent(DC)powersuppliesandassociated instrumentation requiredforthe4-hourcopingdurationwereavailable.

~Anemergency dieselgenerator targetreliability of0.975wasshowntobesatisfied.

~Analyseswereperformed todemonstrate thatcondensate inventory fordecayheatremovalwassufficient, thatreasonable assurance oftheoperability ofSBOresponseequipment wasdetermined fortheeffectsofloss'ofventilation, andthatreactorcoolantinventory wasadequateunderSBOconditions.

~Systemwalkdowns wereperformed asnecessary tovalidatetheexistence ofadequatelighting, thatequipment wasphysically locatedasdetermined fromconfiguration documents, including breakerpositions, andthatplantequipment couldbephysically controlled inthemannerassumedbytheprocedures.

Theseeffortshaveprovidedassurance ofNMP2'sabilitytocopewithaSBO.Inspection reportsandself-audits haveconfirmed theproperimplementation ofthedesigncontrolsdescribed inresponsetoRequested Action(a).Forthesereasons,theactivities associated withSBOhelpprovideassurance thatsystem,structure andcomponent configuration andperformance areconsistent withthedesignbases.Ahistorical analysiswascompleted oftheDERDataSystem.Specifically, asearchwasdonetodetermine thenumberofdesignandconfiguration controlissueswhichhavebeenidentified.

Since1991,over1400DERshavebeeninitiated whichhadacausalfactorcode"DesignandConfiguration Analysis."

Theseincluded519DERsforNMP1,922DERsforNMP2,and21DERswhichwerecommontobothplants.ThenumberofDERsrelatingtodesignandconfiguration controlissueshasincreased inmorerecentyears.Thespecificresultsareasfollows:49

DERsUnit1Unit2CommonTOTAL199120199215122819935079"131199484205,2941995204341548199615527610441Asameasureofsignificance oftheover1400issuesidentified, wedetermined thenumberofLERsidentified asaresultoftheseissues.Inthesametimeperiod,8oftheDERsforNMP1werereportedonLERsand10forNMP2.Thedetailsbyyearareasfollows:Unit1Unit2TOTAL1991199219931994019951996Oftheover1400DERsinitiated since1991,19wereinitiated asaresultofNRCidentified issues.Thedetailsbyyearandunitareasfollows:DERs199119921993199419951996Unit1Unit2TOTAL00Insummary,theabovedataindicates that,NMPC isroutinely identifying issuesassociated with'heNineMilePointDesignandConfiguration Controlprocesses andprograms.

Thefactthatthenumberofissueshasincreased since1991doesnotmeanthatdesignandconfiguration controlismoredeficient, butthatourabilitytoidentifyissuesisimproving.

Also,becauseveryfewoftheseissuesresultedinreportable events,thesafetysignificance ofmostissuesissmall.Theseresultssupportourbeliefthattheoveralldesignbasesforbothunitsaresoundandareunderconstantscrutinyandincreased questioning toensurethatdiscrepancies, regardless ofsignificance, arepromptlyidentified andresolved.

50

Describetheprocesses foridentification ofproblemsandimplementation ofcorrective actions,including actionstodetermine theextentofproblems, actionstopreventrecurrence, andreporting totheNRC.NMPCutilizestheDERastheadministrative toolfordocumenting, evaluating (including reportability totheNRC),determining cause,anddetermining corrective andpreventive actionsforproblemsthatareidentified attheNMPNS.Problemidentification resultsfromawiderangeofsources,whichincludein-houseevents,testingandinspection activities, observations, auditandsurveillance activities, self-assessments, andoutsideagenciesinspections andevaluation activities.

TheDERisalsousedasthetrackingtoolforOperations Experience issues.Thetextthatfollowsdescribes indetailtheNMPNS'sprocessforproblemidentification andultimateresolution, thecornerstone ofwhichistheDER,andassociated administrative procedures thatensureeffective implementation oftheprocess.AnNDDestablishes therequirements fortheidentification, documentation, notification, evaluation, correction, andreporting ofdeviations/events

'orconditions adversetoqualitythatmayimpactthesafeandreliableoperation oftheNMPNSorpersonnel safety,withtheexception ofcertainSafeguards information.

ThisNDDdirectseachNuclearDivisionemployee, aspartofhis/hernormalduties,tobealertforandtopromptlyidentifyeventsandnonconforming items,including hardwarefailures.

Acontinuous assessment ofoperating andindustryexperience forimpactonsafeoperation isperformed andaformalprogramforreviewing industryexperience established.

Asaminimum,NRCBulletins, Notices,GLs,andINPOissuances suchasSOERsandSERs,aswellasvendorissuances arereviewedtodetermine applicability totheNMPNS.NuclearDivisionpersonnel aredirectedtoinitiateaDERupondiscovery ofadeviation/event orcondition adversetoqualityorwhenitisdetermined thatanindustryissuanceisapplicable totheNMPNS.Thedetermination ofreportability andoperability isthenperformed asnecessary, theDERdispositioned, andappropriate corrective andpreventive actionstaken.ANIPprescribes themethodforprocessing DERsfortheidentification, documentation, notification, evaluation, correction, andreporting ofconditions, events,activities, andconcernsthathavethepotential foraffecting thesafeandreliableoperation oftheNMPNS.Thisinterfacing procedure appliestoconditions havinganadverseorpotentially adverseeffectonactivities important tonuclearsafety,industrial safety,plantreliability, orhumanperformance, including butnotlimitedtothefollowing:

NMP251 liI~I il~hardwarefailuresotherthannormalwearandtear;~hardwareorcomponent malfunctions resulting fromdesignormanufacturing deviations ordefects;out-of-calibration measuring andtestequipment knowntohaveadversely orpotentially adversely affectedotherplantequipment; non-compliances havingnuclearsafetysignificance; adversepersonnel performance suchasfailuretofollowprocedures orviolations ofpersonnel safetyrulesorpractices; radiation protection deviations;

~PMactivities notcompleted beforelatedateordeferraldate;~recurring corrective maintenance/

hardwarefailures;

~humanperformance problems/issues; inadequate corrective actionsortestfailures; deviations fromdesigndocumentrequirements (otherthannormalwearandtear)including stationconfiguration discrepancies; conditions adversetofireprotection suchasfailures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective components, uncontrolled combustible

material, andnonconformances.

Alsoapplicable aredeficiencies,

concerns, orissuesresulting fromregulatory

agencies, industryandinternaloperating experience, inspections, observations orpublications, reportable eventstotheNRCandotherregulatory

agencies, issuesresulting fromself-assessment, andissuesthatdonotmeettheabovecriteriabut,intheopinionofmanagement, warrantevaluation.

ADERrequiresaconcisesummaryoftheeventordeviation, thecomponent number,ifapplicable, theidentifying organization andadescription ofanyimmediate actionstakentoplacetheplantinastablecondition ortominimizepersonnel andequipment safetyhazards.TheDERinitiator thenmusthand-deliver theDERtohisorherSupervisor.

Ifthedeviation/event couldhaveanimpactonplantequipment, ispotentially reportable, orissecurityrelated,theDERishanddelivered totheSSS/Assistant StationShiftSupervisor (ASSS)forreportability andoperability determinations.

52 U

Anoperations administrative procedure establishes amethodfordetermining theoperability ofSSCs.Thisoperations administrative procedure wasspecifically developed toprovideguidancetoOperations personnel asnecessary whenmakingoperability assessments ofSSCsthathavebeenidentified onDERsorWorkOrdersasbeinginadegradedornonconforming condition.

Includedinthisprocedure isanOperability Checklist whichdocuments thedecisionaffirming thecapability ofasystem/component toperformitsspecified functionasrequiredbytheTechnical Specifications ortheFSAR.Guidanceprovidedintheprocedure indicates thataSSCiseitheroperableorinoperable atalltimes.Operability determinations arerequiredtobeperformed promptly(inmostcaseswithin24hours),withatimeliness thatiscommensurate withthepotential safetysignificance oftheissue.ForSSCsinTechnical Specifications, theSSS/ASSSusesthetimelimitcontained inthespecificLimitingCondition forOperation (LCO)actionstatement asguidancetodetermine safetysignificance.

Engineering mayberequested tosupportanoperability determination.

AnEngineering Supporting Analysismustbecompleted within5daysofnotification orasdirectedbythePlantManagerbasedonthesignificance ofthedeviation.

InordertodeclareanSSCoperablewhiletheengineering reviewisbeingperformed, operations personnel musthavereasonable assurance, basedonthebestinformation available, thattheSSCiscapableofperforming itsdesignfunctionifcalledupon.Intheabsenceofreasonable assurance, orifmountingevidencesuggeststhefinalanalysiswillconcludetheSSCcannotperformitsspecified

function, theSSCisdeclaredinoperable andtheappropriate actionsimplemented.

WhenEngineering ispreparing anEngineering SupportAnalysis, theindividual mustconsiderthefollowing; calculations, testresultsandotherdocumentation whichdefinetheSSCdesignbasis;thepotential adverseaffectsonsafetyandTechnical Specification; thelengthoftimethecondition hasbeenandwillremainineffect;foreachequipment functionadversely

impacted, theimpactonrelatedsystemfunctions; foreachsystemfunctionadversely

impacted, theimpactonanyequipment orsystemssupported bytheimpactedsystemfunctions.

TheEngineering SupportAnalysismustbeofsufficient depthtoprovidealogicalanddefensible basisforoperability conclusions andtodetermine whethera10CFR50.59 safetyevaluation isrequiredtosupportanyoperability decisions.

Guidancetodetermine ifadeviation/event isreportable totheNRCisprovidedbyaNIP.TheNIPprovidesasummaryoftherequiredNRCnotifications andreportsandtheresponsible organizations.

Following reportability/operability determination activities, theDERisdelivered tothePlantManager's officebytheendoftheoperating shift.Theplantmanager,basedonthesignificance ofthedeviation, assignsacategorytotheDERfordispositioning.

Thedisposition totheDERrequiresthataRootCauseEvaluation beperformed anddocumented intheDERifthethreshold guidelines forperforming aformalrootcausearemet.Aformalrootcauseisperformed forallCategory1(highestsignificance category)

DERsandintheeventofanyofthefollowing:

NMP253 1)PI~

~asevereorunusualplanttransient;

~safetysystemmalfunction orimproperoperation;

~majorequipment damage;~othereventsinvolving nuclearsafetyorplantreliability;

~fuelhandlingorstorageevent;~excessive radiation exposureorseverepersonnel injury;~excessive discharge of,radioactivity;

'radeficiency'in design,analysis, operations, maintenance,'testing, procedures ortrainingthatcouldcauseasignificant eventasdescribed above.TheDERprocedure requiresthatpersonnel performing rootcauseanalysisbequalified inthetechniques ofrootcauseanalysis.

Apparentcausedeterminations areusedwhenaformalrootcauseevaluation isnotrequired.

Apparentorrootcausesarevalidated forpotentially significant DERsbyensuringadeviation/event wouldnothaveoccurredhadthecausenotbeenpresent,thatthedeviation/event willnotrecurduetothesamecausalfactor(s) ifthecauseiscorrected oreliminated, andthatcorrection orelimination ofthecausewillpreventrecurrence ofsimilarconditions.

Thecondition isassignedaDeviation EventTrendCodefortrackingpurposes.

Adisposition totheDERisthengenerated whichincludescorrective actionsandforpotentially significant DERs,preventive actionstopreventrecurrence.

References tocurrentandapproveddesigndocuments, procedures, instructions forrepairs,retest/inspection requirements, acceptance

criteria, supporting sketchesanddocumentation areincludedasappropriate.

IftheDERisforanindustryissuance, thepotential impactonequipment documents suchasvendormanualsandvendordesigndocuments isidentified.

Theprocedure governing theDERprocessrequiresthatifaDERisanonconformance andnotcorrected, thenonconformance willbeassessedforimpactontheUFSAR.Ifanonconformance resultsinadeviation fromtheUFSAR,theplantmanagerisnotifiedandthenonconformance mustbereconciled withinsixmonthsofthedeviation (orearlierasdetermined bytheplantmanager).

Thedisposition willimplement thefollowing asappropriate:

1)restorethenonconformance tocompliance withtheUFSAR;or2)changetheUFSARpertheNIPgoverning applicability reviewsandsafetyevaluations; or3)ifitisnotpossibletocorrectthenonconformance withinsixmonths(suchasifaplantoutageisrequired),

provideanEngineering SupportAnalysisthatsupportsoperation withthenonconformance fortheperiodoftimerequired.

Anonconformance isdefinedasadeficiency incharacteristic, documentation, orprocedure thatrendersthequalityofanitemunacceptable orindeterminate.

DERdispositions mustbeapprovedbytheappropriate BranchManager,andifrequired, bytheSORCandtheplantmanager.DERsarenotcloseduntilrequireddisposition actionshavebeencompleted andidentified deficiencies havebeencorrected.

FinalclosurerequiresaBranchManagersignature.

NMP254 0I<we Trendinformation isgenerated bytheQAdepartment usingtheTrendCodesportionoftheDERdatabase.

Reportsaresubmitted totheBranchManagersonaquarterly basis.BranchManagersareexpectedtoinvestigate andevaluatetrendsidentified, toassesstheirstrengths andweaknesses, andtodetermine whattypesofcorrective actionshavebeeneffective andwheretheyneedtoimprovep'erformance intheirbranch.ANIPprovidestheadministrative controlsforcommunication of"lessonslearned"information throughout theNuclearDivision.

ALessonsLearnedTransmittal isusedwhenitisnecessary tocommunicate appropriate actionsthatshouldbeencouraged orinappropriate actionsthatmustbeprevented fromrecurring.

LessonsLearnedTransmittals containadescription oftheevent,causeofevent,andlessonslearnedandtypically resultfromdispositioning DERs.AnNDDgoverning safetyreviewsestablishes therequirements forthe'development andexecution ofaprogramfortheplanned,systematic reviewoftheoperation ofNMPNSandtoassignresponsibility forimplementing thoserequirements.

Safetyrevieworganizations includetheISEG,theSORC,andtheSRAB.Theresponsibilities foreachofthesegroupsisdelineated intheplantTechnical Specifications.

TheISEGgroupfunctions toexamineunitoperating characteristics, NRCissuances, industryadvisories, LERs,andothersourcesofunitdesignandoperating experience information, including unitsofsimilardesign,whichmayindicateareasforimproving unitsafety.TheISEGmakesdetailedrecommendations forprocedure changes,equipment modifications, maintenance activities, operations activities, orothermeansofimproving unitsafetytotheVicePresident-Nuclear SafetyAssessment andSupport.Thisincludesassessments ofplantmaintenance, modification, andoperations activities aswellasassessments ofdesignbasesandconfiguration controlissues.TheISEGiscomposedoffive,dedicated, full-time engineers locatedonsite.TheSORCfunctions toadvisetheplantmanageronallmattersrelatedtonuclearsafety.TheSORCisresponsible fortheinvestigation ofallviolations oftheTechnical Specifications, including thepreparation andforwarding ofreportscoveringevaluation andrecommendations topreventrecurrence, totheVice-President andGeneralManager-Nuclear, andtotheSRAB.TheSORCisalsoresponsible forthereviewofallreportable events,reviewofunitoperations todetectpotential hazardstonuclearsafety,performance ofspecialreviews,NMP255 4P investigations, oranalysesandreportsasrequested by,thePlantManagerortheSRABandreviewofsafetyevaluations andanalysesresulting fromTechnical ReviewandControlActivities described inSections6.5.2.1,6.5.2.2,6.5.2.3,and6.5.2.5oftheTechnical Specifications.

ANIPprovidestheadministrative controlsandconductoftheSRABtoensurethattheExecutive VicePresident-Generation BusinessGroupandChiefNuclearOfficerisadvisedonmattersofnuclearsafety.TheSRABiscomposedofaChairmanand12membersincluding fournon-NMPCmembers.TheSRABprovidesanindependent reviewandauditofdesignated activities intheareasofplantoperations, nuclearengineering, chemistry andradiochemistry, metallurgy, instrumentation andcontrol,'radiological safety,mechanical andelectrical engineering andQA.TheSRABreviewssignificant operating abnormalities ordeviations fromnormalandexpectedperformance ofplantequipment thataffectnuclearsafety,allreportable events,allrecognized indications ofanunanticipated deficiency insomeaspectofdesignoroperation ofstructures, systemsorcomponents thatcouldaffectnuclearsafety,andreportsandmeetingminutesoftheSORC.Auditsofunitactivities thatoccurunderthecognizance oftheSRABencompass, butarenotlimitedto,theconformance ofunitoperations toprovisions contained withintheTechnical Specifications andapplicable licenseconditions, theresultsofactionstakentocorrectdeficiencies occurring inunitequipment, structures, systemsormethodsofoperation thataffectnuclearsafetyandtheperformance ofactivities

'required bytheOperational QAProgramtomeetthecriteriaof10CFR50AppendixB.TheQADepartment reviewsNMPNS'sadherence toengineering designandconfiguration controlprocedures andprograms.

Thethreegroups'whichspecifically dothisareaudits,,inspection, andQualityVerification andSafetyAssessment (QVSA).TheAuditGroupperformsauditswhichmeettherequirements ofTechnical Specifications, UFSAR/USAR AppendixBandAppendixBto10CFRPart50.Auditsarescheduled andplannedbasedonamatrixpreparedtoreflectthelicensebasisandinternalrequirements.

Insomecasesauditsareperformed fortheSRAB.Auditplanningconsiders resultsfrompreviousaudits,surveillances andinspections andtakesintoaccountDERs,trends,internalandexternalperformance information, NRCandINPOperformance criteriaandreports,andapplicable directives andprocedures.

Auditsareperformed inaccordance withtheapprovedplans,TheDERprocessisusedtodocumentanydeviations andnonconformances identified duringauditorsurveillance activities.

QAreviewsthedisposition ofauditinitiated DERsandfollowsupontheirclosureinsubsequent surveillances andaudits.Auditresultsarecommunicated toappropriate management throughexitmeetingsandauditreports.TheInspection Groupperformsexaminations, inprocess,andfinalinspections inaccordance withcodes,standards, regulations orasspecified byNuclearEngineering acceptance criteria.

Thisgroupindependently confirmsthatcriticalcharacteristics identified byEngineering meetacceptance criteria.

Otherinspections andexaminations maybeperformed onselectedoperations whereit56 I44 isdeemednecessary toverifyconformance tospecified requirements.

TheDERprocessisusedtodocumentnonconformances.

TheQASurveillance Programisperformed bytheQVSAGroup.Surveillance topicsarescheduled basedoninputfromotherorganizations, previoussurveillance results,currentactivities, projectsandprogramchanges,DERsandregulatory commitments, upcomingaudittopicsandauditresults.Surveillances reviewperformance inseveralways.Theseincludeprocessmonitoring whichevaluates aselection ofongoingworkactivities todetermine effectiveness andconformance torequirements, productreviewwhichreviewsselectedoperations, maintenance, engineering andsupportgroupworkoutputstoevaluatequalityandtechnical content,andcomponent configuration reviewwhichevaluates thecontinuing designcontrolofselectedplanthardwarebyreviewing currentconfiguration againstthedesignbasisandsubsequent designchangesandreplacements.

TheDERprocessisusedtodocumentanydeviations andnonconformances.

Also,theeffectiveness oftheoperations experience program(screening andimplementation) isperiodically reviewedduringQVSAsurveillances andQAaudits.Severalorganizations, including INFO,ANI,andANII,providethirdpartyreviewsfortheNMPNS.NMPCpersonnel areresponsible forinterfacing withtheseorganizations anddocumenting theirfindingsonDERsasdiscussed above.INPOevaluations currently reviewtheNMPNSusingINPOCriteria90-015,"Performance Objectives andCriteriaforOperation andNear-term Operating LicensePlants."ANIIevaluations reviewtheplants'esign conformance andmaintenance ofASMESectionXI.AnANIIInspector isassignedfulltimetoNMPNS.Thisinspector verifiesthat,asneeded,therequiredASMEexaminations, systemhydrostatic testing,andrepairsareperformed anddocumented correctly.

Findingsaredocumented andresolvedusingtheDERprocess.ANIevaluations aredonetodetermine insurance premiums.

TheNMPNSadherence tocodesanddesigncriteriaarespecifically reviewed.

Theevaluations arebrokenintotwoparts,'ire Protection andPressureSystem(BoilerandMachinery).

FindingsfromtheANIevaluations aredocumented andresolvedusingtheDERprocess.TheANIreviewstheresolution ofeachofitsfindingsandevaluates themtodetermine iftheywereacceptable forclosure.ANIPestablishes theself-assessment programtoachievehigherstandards ofqualityandperformance.

Eachnucleardivisionbranchmanagerensuresthatatleasttwobranchself-assessments areperformed annually.

Atleastoneself-,assessment normallyinvolvesanassessment ofthecorrective actionprogramtodetermine ifadverseconditions andcommoncausesreceiveappropriate management attention, andthatcausesfrompreviousself-assessment findingswereaddressed andactionstakenwereeffective'.

Areastobeconsidered whendeveloping self-assessment schedules includeactivities thatexhibitnegativetrendsbasedoninformation'rom theDERdatabase.

TheassessorensuresaDERisgenerated forself-assessment findingsthatmeettheDERinitiation criteria.

Further,branchmanagersmeetwiththeSeniorManagement Teamtoreviewtheresultsoftheirfindings.

Theresults,methods,57

andplannedcorrective actionsarediscussed with'theSeniorManagement Teamtoassuretheadequacyoftheassessments andresultant corrective actions.Surveillance testingandplantexaminations asrequiredbytheTechnical Specifications andtheASMECodeareanadditional meansofverifying equipment iscapableofperforming itsintendedfunctionandidentifying problems.

Surveillance testingandexaminations arediscussed inourresponsetoRequested Action(c).Seniormanagement hasstatedthattheysupporttheworkers'ight toraisesafetyissuesandthatthoseworkerswhoraisesafetyconcerns"willnotbesubjected toharassment, intimidation, ordiscrimination.

Seniormanagement recognizes thatthepreferred vehicleformostemployees foridentification andresolution ofconcernsisthroughthenormallineorganization.

Seniormanagement providessupporttolinesupervision inaddressing concernsraisedthroughthenormallineorganization.

Notwithstanding resolution ofproblemsinthenormallineorganization, seniormanagement alsoprovidesforandsupportsaconfidential employeeconcernsprogramtoaddressconcernsraisedbyworkers.ANIPgoverning theQ1Pprovidestheadministrative controlsfortheconfidential reporting ofconcernsandsubsequent evaluation andcorrective action.Thisprocedure appliestoNMPCemployees andcontractors havingsafety,quality,andnonsafety-related concerns.

Inadditiontothereporting activities controlled throughtheDERprocess,NMPCmaintains apositiveandprofessional workingrelationship withNRCpersonnel throughforthright communication ofidentified problemsandtheactionstakentothoroughly evaluateandcorrectsuchdeficiencies.

NDDsandNIPsestablish aprimaryinterface withtheNRCthroughtheLicensing Branchwithcertainexceptions,

Training, emergency preparedness andsecurity, havedirectNRCinterfaces.

ThePlantManagersaredesignated tohavetheprimaryinterface withtheNRCResidentInspector(s).

Eachorganization orpositionhasdefinedresponsibilities tomanagetheirrespective interfaces forvariousformsofcommunication.

First,formalinterfaces includeon-siteinspections orinvestigations, technical ormanagement

meetings, andtelephone conferences inresponsetorequestsforinformation onanyissue.Secondly, informalcommunications areinitiated toprovidepertinent information "totheResidentInspector ortheNuclearReactorRegulation (NRR)ProjectManagerconcerning situations thatwouldnototherwise requirereporting.

Inaddition, aspartoftheiroverallmanagement responsibilities, thePlantManagersroutinely meetwiththeResidentInspection Stafftokeepthemapprisedonthestatusofplantoperations anddevelopments onspecificissues,including theresolution ofidentified deficiencies.

Otherseniormanagersdothesameperiodically forissuesintheirrespective functional areas.58

IITheLicensing staffroutinely assistsandadvisesthePlantManagerswithrespecttotheirsiteNRCinterface, andmaintains anormalinterface withtheNRRProjectManageronlicensing mattersrequiring Staffinvolvement.

Typically, thisincludeslicenseamendment applications, GLandBulletinresponsereviews,andresolution ofavarietyoftechnical issues.Inaddition, Licensing regularly adviseseachNMPCdepartment onlicensebasesissuestoassurethatproblemidentification andcorrective/preventive actionspecification areconsistent withthatbases,theregulations andNMPCcommitments.

Theprocedures alsoassurewrittencommunications, including incomingandoutgoingcorrespondence, meetingminutes,andreports,areappropriately distributed,

reviewed, andaddressed.

Inaddition, procedures provideforoutgoingcorrespondence toreceiveathoroughmanagement reviewpriortosubmittal toensureitsaccuracy.

NMPCmaintains aprocessfortrackingdocketedcommitments contained insuchcorrespondence (bothincomingandoutgoing) toassuretheyarecompleted inatimelymanner(i,e.,NCTS)."WhiletheNCTSsystemfocusesondocketedcommitments, theDERsystemtracksthecompletion ofotherassociated actions.Stationpersonnel havereceivedtrainingontheDERprocedure andasprocedure revisions aremade,follow-up trainingisconducted withintheindividual departments.

Stationpersonnel alsoreceiveappropriate reportability trainingrelatedtotheirspecificjobfunction(e.g.,Operations receive10CFR50.72,50.73training).

Variousstationpersonnel haveattendedformalHumanPerformance Evaluation System(HPES)rootcausetrainingandsimilartraining(e.g.,barrieranalysis, etc.)andarecapableofperforming arootcausedetermination.

TheDERprocedure currently requiresthattheappropriate BranchManagerensureaRootCauseEvaluation isperformed, whenrequired, andthattheindividual assignedisknowledgeable inthetechniques ofRootCauseAnalysis.

SORCandSRABmembersreceiveSafetyEvaluator trainingandQualified Applicability ReviewerSafetyEvaluator (QARSE)requalification training.

QARSEtrainingisextensive withtheinitialtrainingsessionlastingthreedaysandcontinued traininglastingfourhourseverytwoyears.Approximately 400NMPNSemployees aretrained(asQARSE)including membersofeachoperating shift.59

Describetheoveralleffectiveness ofyourcurrentprocesses andprogramsinconcluding thattheconfiguration ofyourplantisconsistent withthedesignbases.Basedupontheinformation presented inourresponses toRequested Actions(a),(b),(c),and(d),NMPChasevidencethatreasonable assurance existsthatdesignbasesrequirements arebeingtranslated intotheappropriate.

procedures; thatSSCsconfiguration andperformance areconsistent withtheirdesignbases;andthataneffective administrative, toolfordocumenting, evaluating, determining causeandappropriate corrective andpreventive actionsexistsatNMPNS(i.e.,theDERsystem).Asdiscussed inourresponsetoRequested Action(c),duringthedesign,construction andstartupofNMP2,arigorousQAProgramwasapplied.Thisprogramincludedprocedures andprocesses consistent with10CFR50,AppendixBrequiring proceduralized designcontrols.

Thesedesigncontrolsweretoassuredesignadequacyandcheckingprocesses usedthroughout construction andtestingconfirmed thatEngineering requirements wereimplemented.

TheNMP2initialtestprogramandPowerUpratedemonstrated thatplantSSCsoperateinaccordance withthedesignperformance requirements.

Thiswasdemonstrated whileutilizing, totheextentpossible, plantprocedures anddemonstrating wherepractical thattheplantiscapableofwithstanding anticipated transients andpostulated accidents.

Surveillance testingandexamination programshavebeenimplemented sinceinitialstartup.Thesetestsandexaminations areformalized byprocedures toassurethatsurveillances andtestsrequiredbytheTechnical Specifications andotherregulatory commitments areestablished.

Thesetestsandexaminations provideaprimarybasistoassurethatperformance ofsystemsmeetdesignbasesrequirements.

Additionally, post-maintenance andmodification testingisroutinely performed toassurethatdesignbasesrequirements continuetobemetfollowing maintenance andmodification activities.

Pressureretaining components arealsoroutinely testedusingin-service inspection andtestingprograms.

Inadditiontoconfirming thatSSCsmeetacceptance requirements, thesetestingprogramsprovideamechanism toidentifydeficiencies usingtheDERprocess.4Powerascension testingwasperformed atNMP2aspartofthe4.3%poweruprateeffortimplemented in1995.SSFIshavebeenconducted todetermine ifselectedplantsystemsarecapableofperforming intendedfunctions.

IndustryOperations Experience isalsoroutinely appliedtofurtherandmorespecifically evaluateNMP2'sperformance andtheplant'sconformance withdesignbases.Thesetypesofactivities, coupledwithourcorrective action,program,assureroutineproblemidentification andevaluation ofas-builtconditions andtestresults.Thisprovidesreasonable assurance thatthecurrentplantperformance andconfiguration areadequately consistent withthedesignbases.'0

Asdiscussed inourresponsetoRequested Action(b),administrative procedures establish requirements forthepreparation, review,andapprovaloftechnical procedures.

Technical procedures implement requirements fortheoperation, maintenance andtestingdescribed intheOperating License,Technical Specifications andUFSAR.Duringtheinitialdevelopment, reviewandapprovalofoperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures, areviewofdesigndocuments wasconducted.

Thisreviewencompassed designdrawings, DesignSpecification DataSheets,vendormanuals,TestLoopDiagrams, Technical Specifications, andtheFSAR.Additional technical reviewsincludeddesignwalkdownverifications, andinthecaseofpreoperational testprocedures, reviewofapplicable engineering designcalculations toassurethattheas-builtsystemmetdesignrequirements.

Designvaluesforvariousparameters wereincludedthroughout theinitialtechnical procedures.

Following theapprovalofinitialoperating, maintenance, andtestprocedures, technical accuracyoftheprocedures wasmaintained throughprogramcontrolsforprocedure revisionandperiodicreview.Theseprogramshavebeencontinually strengthened overtime.NMPChasutilizedknowledgeable andappropriately qualified individuals todevelop,review,approve,andreviseprocedures.

Programrequirements havebeeninplacesinceinitialdevelopment ofprocedures.

Theseprogramshavebeenenhanced, overtime,toimprovetheeffectiveness ofthedevelopment, reviewandapprovalprocess.Thetrainingprogramandotheradministrative requirements assurethatpersonnel assignedtoperformthesefunctions arecompetent toperformthosetasks.ThisassuresthatNMPCcaneffectively implement programrequirements associated withthedevelopment, review,approvalandr'evision ofadministrative andtechnical procedures.

Alsodiscussed inourresponsetoRequested Action(b)weresomeoftheassessments andinitiatives usedtoprovideassurance thatdesignbasisrequirements aretranslated intoprocedures.

ThisincludestheSVP,UFSARVerification Program,QAaudits,andOperations Experience items.Asdiscussed intheresponsetoRequested Action(a),'xtensive programsandcontrolsareutilizedatNMPNStoassurethatdesignbasisinformation'is accurately maintained andupdatedasconditions warrant.Procedures areupdatedtoreflectchangesindesign,corrective actions(identified bythecorrective actionprogram),

industryoperating experience, andchangestosourcerequirements.

Inaddition, NMPChasconducted "Back-to-Basics" trainingforNMPNSpersonnel.

"Back-to-BasicsI"providedtrainingonlicensing basisdocuments andoperation withinthelicensing basis.Alsodiscussed wastheexpectation thatifworkcannotbeperformed withinthecontrolofaprocedure, theworkshouldbestoppedandaresolution obtainedbeforeworkcontinues.

"Back-to-Basics II"wasconducted toassistorganizations inunderstanding howBack-to-Basics relatestotheirspecificjobs.Thistrainingincludedadescription ofourlicensing basisanddiscussions of10CFR50.59 and50.92,commitments madetooperational experience items,RGs,industrystandards, andtheprocessforchangingcommitments.

Also,adefinition ofoperability withanemphasisonpost-accident

function, reportability, andhowvariousNMP261

activities interactwiththedesignbasiswasincluded.

Theeffectiveness ofthistrainingandtheresulting increased awareness byplantpersonnel todesignbasisissuescanbeseeninthelow'erthreshold atwhichconfiguration anddesigncontrolissuesarebeingreportedviatheDERsystem.Adiscussion ofdesignbasisdeficiencies trendsisincludedinourresponsetoRequested Action(c).Also,themajorityofplantengineering, planttechnical staff,andothersinmanagement andtechnical positions aretrainedon10CFR50.59 andqualified asApplicability Reviewers/Safety Evaluators andarerequiredtocompletearequalification everytwoyears.Theeffectiveness ofourcurrentprocesses andprogramswhichassurethattheplantconfiguration isconsistent withthedesignbasisareassessedo'nanongoingbasis.Theseassessments, whichincludetestingactivities, functional inspections, compliance verification

projects, auditsandsurveillances, andlinemanagement self-assessments, provideanoverallindication thatNMP2isoperatedwithinitsdesignbasesandthatourprocesses andprogramsareeffective.

NMP2UFSARverification effort,whichisscheduled forcompletion bytheendof1998,willprovideanongoingassessment ofdesignbasisrelatedinadequacies.

Also,NMPChasreinforced theimportance ofmaintaining consistency withourdesignbasisthrough"Back-to-Basics" trainingaswellas10CFR50.59 training.

Onthebasisofourprograms, processes andassessment activities, NMPChasreasonable assurance thattheconfiguration ofNMP2isconsistent withitsdesignbasis.62

ENCLOSURE 1DESIGNCONFIGURATION DOCUMENTS LIST1.ODESIGNINPUTDOCUMENTS DesignInputStatements

-Generated and/orapprovedbyNuclearEngineering

2.0. DESIGNOUTPUTDOCUMENTS

DATABASES 2.12.22.3Drawings-Generated and/orapprovedbyNuclearEngineering Specifications

-Generated and/orapprovedbyNuclearEngineering.

Thescopeandcontentofthesespecifications varybytopicasfollows:2.2.I.Installation 2.2.2Design2.2.3Fabrication 2.2.4Procurement 2.2.5Inspection andTesting2.2.6.Configuration ControlIChangePaper-Engineering generated and/orapprovedchangestoEng>neering documents ordatabases 2.4Databases neededtomaintainplantconfiguration, suchas:~MasterEquipment List(MEL)-Datafieldsmaintained and/orapprovedbyNuclearEngineering

~CableConfiguration andTrackingSystems2.5~Validated MasterPartsListsSystemDesignBasisDocuments (SDBDs)-Generated and/orapprovedbyNuclearEng>neering 2.6SetpointDataSheets-ApprovedbyNuclearEngineering 2.7ProgramsandPlans-ApprovedbyNuclearEngineering andthatspecifylantconfiguration details,suchasErosion/Corrosion, AppendixJesting,etc.3.0DESGOCDOCUMNTSDATABASES Calculations

-ApprovedoracceptedbyNuclearEngineering Controlled DocumentSystem(CDS)4.0OTHERDESIGN-RE ATEDDOCUMENTS VendorDOcuments

-Engineering accepted

ENCLOSURE 2DESIGNINPUTCONSIDERA IONSEachdiscipline orprogramareashallconsiderthefollowing asaminimuminthedevelopment ofdesigninput.Discipline DesignInputcriteriamaybeusedinconjunction withtheconsiderations andaretheresponsibility ofthediscipline/program tomaintainanduse.Designbases,including available SystemDesignBasisDocuments (SDBDs)andDesignCriteriaDocuments (DCDs)Regulatory requirements CodesandStandards, including issue,rev.Basicsystem,structure orcomponent (SSC)Functions Performance requirements DesignConditions LoadsOperating Experience reviewsandassessments, suchasDERtrending, NRCSOERs,INPONPRDSandothersAnticipated Environmental conditions (internal andexternaltotheplant)during:~NormalPlantOperation

~Anticipated Transients

~Accidents

~SpecialEvolutions Functional andphysicalinterfaces ofSSCsMaterialRequirements, compatibility,

coatings, etc.Mechanical requirements Structural requirements,.including seismic/dynamic qualification Hydraulic requirements Chemistry requirements Electrical requirements, including processcomputerrequirements Layoutandarrangement requirements Instrumentation andControlrequirements AccessandAdministration controlrequirements Redundancy, diversity, separation requirements FailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)Testrequirements; pre-operational andperiodicAccessibility, maintenance, repair,inservice requirements Personnel qualification requirements foroperation, maintenance, testing.Transportation requirements Fireprotection requirements

Handling, storage,cleaningrequirements Otherrequirements topreventunduerisktopublicMaterials, processes, parts,equipment suitability Personnel safetyrequirements, electrical, radiation, heat,confinedspace,etc.gualityandqualityassurance requirements 64

ENCLOSURE 3='"":DESIGNCHANGE

'OPERABILITY ACCEPTANCE DesignChangeControlNumber1.0-Initiation 1.1Title0Partially Accepted1.2Thefollowing finalSafetyEvaluations/Applicability ReviewforthisdesignchangeereSORC/Technical Reviewapproved.

SE/ARNumbers:Revision:

1.3Thefollowing WOshavebeencompleted 1.WO'.WO5.WO7.WOB.WO2.WO4.WO5.WO5.WO10.WO11.WO12.WO2.0-SystemEngineer2.10ThetestslistedontheDesignChangeTestRecordhavebeencompleted,

reviewed, andapproved.

0NotApplicable 2.2Thefollowing procedures wererevisedbythisdesignchange.NumberTitle0NotApplicable

.30Requiredtrainingiscompleted orinprogress.

2.4Completed ByDate0NotApplicable 3.0-Modification Coordinator 3.1Thefollowing Technical Specification wasrevisedbythisdesignchange.0NotApplicable SectionTitle3.20RiskBasisdesignchangedocuments havereceivedfinalEngineering approval.

3.30ControlRoomCriticalDrawingshavebeenupdatedtoreflectinstalled condition.

3.4Comments0NotApplicable 0NotApplicable 3.5Completed ByDate4.0-Acceptance forOperation Manager/General Supervisor Operations ordesigneeDate65

ENCLOSURE 41.0-In'ation~~1.1Title1.2MajorOrderNo.1.3Remarks'"'-:'""DESIGN CHANGE'CLOSEOUT AccountCodeDesignChangeControlNumber1.4Operability Acceptance Date1.5Modification Coordinator RequiredCompletion DateDate2.0CloseoutActivities

{SignwhenactivityiscompleteandreturntoModification Coordinator)

No.Department CloseoutActivityActionN/AVICompleted ByDate2.1Modification Coordinator SiteDocumentLogClosed2.2PlantAccounting 2.3Stores2.4Technical Support2.5ISI-Installer Property-In-Service Rept.Completed

&M.O.ClosedMajorOrderOverstock Dispositioned NPRDSCoordinator InformedISIReqSatisfied/(NIS-2) 2.6ISI/ISTNuc.Engineering ISI/ISTProgramRevised.7IST-TechSupport/Ops

.8Operations 2.9Training2.10Training2.11QA2.12ProjectEngineer2.13ALARAISTReqSatisfied/Procedures RevisedAllOperations Proc/STsRevised/Markup DatabaseRevised/PM STReviewedforincorporation intoTrainingProgramSimulator Evaluated QAFilesClosedFinalDesign/Safety Evaluation ReviewedALARAReviewS-AIP-2,JobReviewsComplete2.14Mechanical Maintenance AllProcedures Revised/PMs Required/PMST Revised2.15Electrical Maintenance 2.16Instrument

&Control2.17FireProtection AllProcedures Revised/PMs Required/PMST RevisedAllProcedures Revised/PMs Required/PMST RevisedAllProcedures Revised/PMs Required/PMST Revised2.18Modification Coordinator OtherRequiredProcedure ChangesCompleted 2.19SystemEngineering 2.20Technical Support2.21Mechanical Design2.22RadwasteOperators Post-Operability Acceptance TestingCompleted Changesevaluated againstmaintenance rulerequirements P&ID'supdatedforsignificant changes(Unit1only)AllRadwasteOperations procedures revisedandmarkupdatabaserevised/PMST 3.0CloseotComletion3.1CloseoutActivities Complete:

Modification Coordinator Date.2DatabaseUpdatedandRecordssenttoPermanent FileDate66

ENCLOSURE 5hlYNAGARAII0MOHAWKNUCLEARENGINEERING DAANCISKDDCCAfieldvariance, l6iILEifORKISINPROGRESS, toapproveddesigndocuments orchangedocuments maybeissuedona"riskbasis"ifthefollowing criteriaissatisfied.

Therequested fieldvarianceshallNOT:A.Extendthescopeofadesignorconfiguration change..'

B.Altertheintent(purposeasdescribed intheapplicability revieworsafetyevaluation) ofadesignchangeorplantprocedure.

C.AffecttheDesignInput/Impact Assessment.

D.Altertheacceptance criteriabeyondtherangedefinedinthecontrolling designorplantdocumentation.

E.Alterthefunctionofequipment fromthatdefinedinthecontrolling

.designorplantdocumentation.

F.Beirreversible.

67

ineieointnitannit

Specificcommitments madeinresponsetoNRCRequestforInformation Pursuantto~~~10CFR50.54(f)

Regarding AdequacyandAvailability ofDesignBasesInformation.

CompleteaUFSARVerification Programbytheendof1998,asdescribed inourresponsetoRequested Action(b).CompleteaUFSARVerification Programbytheendof1998,asdescribed inourresponsetoRequested Action(b).