ENS 53160: Difference between revisions

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| emergency class =  Non Emergency
| emergency class =  Non Emergency
| notification date = 01/10/2018 02:13
| notification date = 01/10/2018 02:13
| retracted = Yes
| notification by = Phil Bales
| notification by = Phil Bales
| NRC officer = Mark Abramovitz
| NRC officer = Mark Abramovitz
| event date = 01/09/2018 19:28 EST
| event date = 01/09/2018 19:28 EST
| last update date = 01/10/2018
| last update date = 03/08/2018
| title = Both Trains of Containment Air Return Fans Inoperable
| title = Both Trains of Containment Air Return Fans Inoperable
| event text = During normal power operations at 100 percent power on Unit 2, both trains of Containment Air Return Fans (CARF) were declared inoperable at 19:28 [EST] on January 9, 2018 due to a common issue with control power fuses. The fuses potentially could not handle the in-rush current upon re-energizing the circuits. This condition resulted in a loss of a reasonable expectation that the Unit 2 Containment Air Return Fans would meet their design safety function and mitigate an accident. This loss of safety function is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 8 hour report.  The site entered T.S. 3.0.3 at 19:28 and exited at 20:54 when repairs to 2B CARF were completed. 2A CARF repairs are complete. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.  The senior NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
| event text = During normal power operations at 100 percent power on Unit 2, both trains of Containment Air Return Fans (CARF) were declared inoperable at 19:28 [EST] on January 9, 2018 due to a common issue with control power fuses. The fuses potentially could not handle the in-rush current upon re-energizing the circuits. This condition resulted in a loss of a reasonable expectation that the Unit 2 Containment Air Return Fans would meet their design safety function and mitigate an accident. This loss of safety function is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 8 hour report.  The site entered T.S. 3.0.3 at 19:28 and exited at 20:54 when repairs to 2B CARF were completed. 2A CARF repairs are complete. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.  The senior NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The licensee verified this problem does not affect unit-1.
The licensee verified this problem does not affect unit-1.
| URL = https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2018/20180111en.html#en53160
* * * RETRACTION AT 0939 EST ON 03/08/2018 FROM JUSTIN BLACK TO TOM KENDZIA * * *
A subsequent evaluation determined that the fuses for the Containment Air Return Fans (CARFs) would be able to perform their safety function and were operable at the time of discovery. The limiting safety condition for the fuses is the return to power following a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP). The evaluation determined that the fuses would satisfy their safety function upon re-energizing the circuits if a LOOP occurred and would not impact the ability of the CARFs to perform their safety function. The subject fuses were replaced on January 9, 2018." 
The Licensee notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (Musser).
| URL = https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2018/20180309en.html#en53160
}}{{unit info
}}{{unit info
| Unit = 2
| Unit = 2

Latest revision as of 08:01, 9 March 2018

ENS 53160 +/- *RETRACTED*
Where
Mcguire Duke Energy icon.png
North Carolina (NRC Region 2)
Reporting
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident
Time - Person (Reporting Time:+1.75 h0.0729 days <br />0.0104 weeks <br />0.0024 months <br />)
Opened: Phil Bales
02:13 Jan 10, 2018
NRC Officer: Mark Abramovitz
Last Updated: Mar 8, 2018
53160 - NRC Website
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