ML20004D416

Request for Stay of Initial & Supplemental Initial Decisions.Commission Should Refer Decisions to ASLAP for Review.Potential for Irreparable Harm Due to Serve Hydrogen Explosion Is Great.Affirmation of Svc Encl

ML20004D416
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	06/05/1981
From:	Jeffrey Riley CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY GROUP
To:	NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
References
ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8106090372
Download: ML20004D416 (6)

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Of'.:-,.u, UNITED STATES OF AMER Wasnington, D.C.

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BEFORE THE COMMISSION In tha Master of

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DUKE POWER COMPANY

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Docket Nos. 50-369-OL

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50-370-OL (William 3. McGuire Nuclear

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Station, Units 1 and 2)

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CESG'S COMMENT RE IMMEDIATE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INITIAL DECISION Under the revised Final Rule regarding Immediate Effectiveness, 10 CFR Part 2, effective May 28, 1981, CESG herewith files a brief comment ((lf)(2)(iii)) in the matter of the Initial and

~^ Supplemental Initial Decisions for the McGuire Nuclear Station.

This Commission should stay the effectiveness of the McGuire decision until there has been an adequ' ate judicial review of

.that decision.

CESG is, of this date,. requesting a stay under the provisions of 10 CFR 2 788 and is also filing exceptions to g both the Initial and Supplemental Initial Decisions.

The potential for irreparable harm due to a severe hydrogen on is great.

The following facts are germane:

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The hydrogen generated at TMI was only 45% of that

(=k a n. bla to generate (Supplemetal Initial Decision (ID) hl7).

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"he ASL3 did not consider hydrogen release accidents

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severe than S D.

The ASLB rejected CESG's proferred 2

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hibits relating to more severe hydrogen release accidents (ID, Intervenor's Exhibits (CESG Exh.) 43, 46, 51, and 59).

3 The hydrogen combustion at TMI-2 caused a peak pressure g 82 08090pg 6 sb i

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-2 of 28 psig.

In the smaller McGuire containment the pressuro reached would have been 58 psig (Tr. 3780, Riley testimony, p. 1).

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Tne source of hydrogen ignition at TMI-2 was not identified.

5.

Calculations of the McGuire conta:inment strength resulted in average failure pressures of 67.5 psig (ID H37),

66 psig (ID H38), and 84 psig with a 3 standard deviation l

range down to 48 psig (ID 039).

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6.

The combustion of a hydrogen release somewhat in j

excess of 455 metal-water reaction would exceed any of the pressure values in 5. foregoing.

7.

The ASLB relies on improvements in procedures, training, and instrumentation to prevent a. replay of TMI-2 (ID H32, 33).

8.

The ASLB fails to consider an onsite power outage as a cause of ECCS failure to function and resultant hydrogen

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generation.

9.

The ASLB finds' there will not be undue risk in the operation of McGuire'(ID S58(2)).

However the ASLB ignores f

i the Staff definition of risk as involving both accident

_._prqbability and accident consequences.

10.

Based on a theory of "substantially reduced likelihood" (ID 932) of a TMI-2 type accident, and disregarding other hydrogen generation accident sequences, the ASLB finds it unnecessary to consider containment breach consequences (ID H58(3)).

The,dSLBrejectedtheconcernsofanimpartialwitness, i

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~3-Dr. Marshall Berman of Sandia National Laboratory, Chief Investigator on a contract to study in-containment hydrogen combustion, who views deliberate ignition in the' upper compartment of the containment as "a difficult quantitative problem".

The deliberate ignition mitigative concept employed at Sequoyah and McGuire is, in Dr. Berman's opinion, " fraught with danger" (ID, Staff Exhibit E, p. 5; also CESG Exh. 40).

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12.

The Staff did not seek to include in the decisional record the outcome of an ASLB initiated meeting with Dr.

John Lee, an authority on hydrogen detonation.

The meeting was held the day after the hearing adjourned.

Staff concluded that in relation to in-containment hydrogen detonation, which produces about" double the pressure of a hydrogen burn, further research was required.

AEP, TVA and Duke Power Company were requested to include this matter in their joint research program.

This indication of the credibility of in-containment hydrogen detonation is opposite the finding made (ID 1151) yet was available before the final closing of the record, April 13, 1981

~~~

~~~(ID$ Applicant's Exh. 9).

For these good and sufficient reasons which show that the record does not give reasonable assurance that McGuire can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public, CESG respectfully requests this Commission to refer the Initial and we se 9

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Supplemental Initial Decisions to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board for review, withholding authorization to the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, to proceed with the issuance of an operating license for the McGuire Nuclear Station.

Respectfully submitted, Rtf.

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• b" J sse L. Riley fo SG Sk Henley Place Charlotte, NC 28207 (704) 375-k3k2

-~0f Counsel Shelley Blum i

1402 Vickers Avenue Durham, NC 27707 (919) 493 2238 I

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o UNITED STn"SS OF AMERICA

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'xOyg NUCLEAR REGUi.ATORY CO:cCSS:ON c,

BEFORE THE COMMISSION D,Jg

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e In the Matter of

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s DUKE POWER COMPANY

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Docket Nos. 50-369 O..

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50-370-0 (William B. McGuire Nuclear

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Station, Units 1 and 2)

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AFFIRM / TION OF SERVICF I hereby affirm that copies of "CESG's Comment Re Immediate Effectiveness of the Initial Decision", dated June 5, 1941,b 6%

were served on the Commission and other listed NRC persons this day of June, 1981, by deposit in U.S. Express Mail and on the other parties listed by deposit in the U.S. Mail first cidss:

Joseph Hendrie, Chairman Robert M.

Lazo, Esq.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Chairman, Atomic Safety and Commission Licensing Board

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Washington, D.C.

20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission John F. Ahearne, Commissioner Washington, D.C.

20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Dr. Emmeth A.

Luebke Washington, D.C.

20555

' Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Peter Bradford, Commissioner g.S.

Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 Washington, D.C.

20555 Dr. Richard F. Cole Victor Gilinsky, Commissioner Atomic Safety a?d Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulator 7 boarc Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C P0555 Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 Samuel Chilk, Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission J. :'icna c1 ocCa: ry, 111, asq.

Washington, D.C.

20555 o bevoice and,,:,,acrman t

'900 Seventeenth Strcot,

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Edward G.

Ketchen, Esq.

dashington, D.C.

20C36 Counsel for NRL Regulatory Staff Chairman, Atomic Safety Office of the Executive and Licensing Appeal Board Legal Director U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 Washington, D.C.

20555 William L.

Porter, Esq.

Dr. John barry 1200 Blytne blvd.

Ass,ociate General Counsel Charlotte, NC 2b207 Duke Power Company Post Of fice-'Scx 217 8 Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 i

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, Diane 3. Cohn, Esq.

Shelle-j 51un, isq.

".lillian 3. Schultz, Esq.

IhC2 Vickers nye.

Public Citizen Litigation Group Durham Suite 700

!;. C.

27707 2000 P Street, L'. W.

Washington, D.C.

20036 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Co.r.ission ATTN:

Cnief, Docketing & Service Sr.

Washington, D.C.

20555 I

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