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=Text=
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{{#Wiki_filter:y1                       -
{{#Wiki_filter:y1 men,w-
men,w-
[gg LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COM PANY a -----enmucessmrca 17 5 EAST OLD COU NTRY ROAD
[gg                         LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COM PANY 17 5 EAST OLD COU NTRY ROAD
* H ICKSVI LLE, NEW YORK 11001 MILLARD S. POLLOCK vsCE PRESictNT-NUCLEAR July 10, 1981 SNRC-593
* H ICKSVI LLE, NEW YORK 11001 a -----enmucessmrca MILLARD S. POLLOCK vsCE PRESictNT-NUCLEAR July 10, 1981 SNRC-593 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director                                                   /\ v(-      D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation                                                           [
/\\ (-
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission                                           x               yhD Washington, D. C.               20555 ff    (M  gep    g Fire Protection                               3\Yv b
D Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director v
Shoreham Nuclear Power Station - Unit 1 7                                       '
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Docket No. 50-322                           k *s.*I
[
                                                                                                          /
yhD U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ff (M
gep g
x Washington, D. C.
20555 Fire Protection 3\\Yv b
k *s.*I Shoreham Nuclear Power Station - Unit 1 7 Docket No. 50-322
/


==Dear Sir:==
==Dear Sir:==
                                                                        ' '/<
' '/<
In response to the staff concerns presented in the Shoreham safety evaluation report, we have forwarded our evaluation of the Shoreham fire protection measures as they relate to the technical requirements of Appendix R to 10CFR Part 50 (SNRC-572, dated 5/21/81) . That assessment, as well as previous submittals dealing with the Shoreham Fire Hazards Analysis Report and the Cable Separation Analysis, provided a basis for the resolution of the staff's concerns.
In response to the staff concerns presented in the Shoreham safety evaluation report, we have forwarded our evaluation of the Shoreham fire protection measures as they relate to the technical requirements of Appendix R to 10CFR Part 50 (SNRC-572, dated 5/21/81).
Subsequent meetings with members of your staff, June 9, 1981 in Bethesda and July 1, 1981 at the Shoreham site have led to resolution of this issue. This letter documents our understanding of the res61ution reached with your staff regarding the following:
That assessment, as well as previous submittals dealing with the Shoreham Fire Hazards Analysis Report and the Cable Separation Analysis, provided a basis for the resolution of the staff's concerns.
: 1)   The present fire detection system wiring to to the Control Room is acceptable. Additional descriptive information to support this con-clusion is provided in Attachment 1.
Subsequent meetings with members of your staff, June 9, 1981 in Bethesda and July 1, 1981 at the Shoreham site have led to resolution of this issue.
: 2)   The installed station fire dampers are adequate and their operability will be veri-fied and any required modification to assure                           1 operability will be implemented prior to fuel load.
This letter documents our understanding of the res61ution reached with your staff regarding the following:
                                                                                                              }pDS
1)
: 3)   The existing manually actuated deluge system                         / l for the HPCI/RCIC equipment area will be modified to an automatic / pre-action actuation system.
The present fire detection system wiring to to the Control Room is acceptable.
8107230014 810710 PDR ADOCK 05000322; F                       P DR_.
Additional descriptive information to support this con-clusion is provided in Attachment 1.
2)
The installed station fire dampers are adequate and their operability will be veri-fied and any required modification to assure 1
operability will be implemented prior to
}pD fuel load.
S 3)
The existing manually actuated deluge system
/ l for the HPCI/RCIC equipment area will be modified to an automatic / pre-action actuation system.
8107230014 810710 PDR ADOCK 05000322; F
P DR_.


                                                                        ~_    _
.y.-
.y.-           _
~_
e l
e
                      - Mr. Harold.R. Denton, Director                                 ,
- Mr. Harold.R. Denton, Director i
i July'10,'1981_
July'10,'1981_
                      .Page two
.Page two
                                  -4) The Cable Separation Analysis provided for Shoreham is an acceptable method for demon-strating that adequate separation exists between redundant trains of safety related equipment in the Reactor Building. This conclusion is based on our_ccmmitment to review the separation Analysis results, in conjunction with our "as built" effort, in order.to insure.that a minimum ~ separation of 20 feet exists between redundant safety related components.
-4)
: 5) The separation for redundant safety related cabling outside the Reactor Luilding is adequate.- This conclusion reflects the summary of station design presented in Attachment 2 of this letter.
The Cable Separation Analysis provided for Shoreham is an acceptable method for demon-strating that adequate separation exists between redundant trains of safety related equipment in the Reactor Building.
This conclusion is based on our_ccmmitment to review the separation Analysis results, in conjunction with our "as built" effort, in order.to insure.that a minimum ~ separation of 20 feet exists between redundant safety related components.
5)
The separation for redundant safety related cabling outside the Reactor Luilding is adequate.-
This conclusion reflects the summary of station design presented in of this letter.
Based on the:information which we have submitted, and the understandings identified in this letter, we believe that the issue of fire protection has been resolved and that thefstaff has concluded that adequate fire protection has been provided.for Shoreham.
Based on the:information which we have submitted, and the understandings identified in this letter, we believe that the issue of fire protection has been resolved and that thefstaff has concluded that adequate fire protection has been provided.for Shoreham.
Very truly yours, Y8 $       k M. S. Pollock Vice President -
Very truly yours, Y8 $ k M. S. Pollock Vice President -
Nuclear RAH:mp Attachments cc:   J. Higgins
Nuclear RAH:mp Attachments cc:
        + - - -
J. Higgins
+ - - -


                                                                                                . . . ~ . - - -   p
... ~. - - -
                  .. + .          .
p
ATTACHMENT'l r,                                               FIRELDETECTORS FIRE ALARM _ SYSTEM WIRING-SHOREHAM-NUCLEAR POWER STATION
.. +.
                      ;;u V J.Thei fireL detection system consists of various types _ of detectors
ATTACHMENT'l r,
                            .(ionization,Jrate. compensated-thermostatic and photoelectric) which fare _either area or panel. mounted throughout the plant.- These
FIRELDETECTORS FIRE ALARM _ SYSTEM WIRING-SHOREHAM-NUCLEAR POWER STATION
                            .' detectors'are wired to:a switching pane 1Llocated within the relay room.- This wiring is, Class "A" as defined by NFPA.' The detectors are hard wired; utilizing'one pair.of aLtwo pair. cable. The switching
;;u V J.Thei fireL detection system consists of various types _ of detectors
                          , panel allows _ manual switching tx) the second pair.
.(ionization,Jrate. compensated-thermostatic and photoelectric) which fare _either area or panel. mounted throughout the plant.- These
.' detectors'are wired to:a switching pane 1Llocated within the relay room.- This wiring is, Class "A" as defined by NFPA.' The detectors are hard wired; utilizing'one pair.of aLtwo pair. cable.
The switching
, panel allows _ manual switching tx) the second pair.
^
^
Thel alarm outputLcables from the switching panel are wired first to a         the + zone: module panels and then to the. interface panel, also located
Thel alarm outputLcables from the switching panel are wired first to a
the + zone: module panels and then to the. interface panel, also located
:inothe relay room.- Cable _for these connections are not redundant.
:inothe relay room.- Cable _for these connections are not redundant.
The function offthe': interface. panel is-to multiplex the signals on alfour. conductor cable ~for. input to the computer for the. fire detection and station security: system console, located in the control room. A parallel four conductor. cable is,also'provided for.this interface-wiring tx) provide'a second path should.a' conductor break. The alarms appear on the CRT in'this consolo and the printer associated with it..-
The function offthe': interface. panel is-to multiplex the signals on
: alfour. conductor cable ~for. input to the computer for the. fire detection and station security: system console, located in the control room.
A parallel four conductor. cable is,also'provided for.this interface-wiring tx) provide'a second path should.a' conductor break.
The alarms appear on the CRT in'this consolo and the printer associated with it..-
Simultaneously they also appear on the.CRT and printer. located in the-Security Building. :The entire wiring for the detection system is
Simultaneously they also appear on the.CRT and printer. located in the-Security Building. :The entire wiring for the detection system is
: supervised'and~any. broken or shorted wire'will alarm at both locations.
: supervised'and~any. broken or shorted wire'will alarm at both locations.
Line 64: Line 90:
9
9


                                              ~-                       .
~-
ATTACHMENT 2 m                            FIRE PROTECTION SHUTDOWN CIRCUITS IN AREAS OTHER.THAN SECONDARY CONTAINMENT r       o             _
ATTACHMENT 2 FIRE PROTECTION m
                                                                    ~
SHUTDOWN CIRCUITS IN AREAS OTHER.THAN SECONDARY CONTAINMENT r
                    .The cable for redundant shutdown components not in the reactor
o
.The cable for redundant shutdown components not in the reactor
~
:buildingisecondary containment run through the relay room in the
:buildingisecondary containment run through the relay room in the
              - , control: building, the diesel-generator' rooms, the emergency switch-
-, control: building, the diesel-generator' rooms, the emergency switch-
_ 13earfrooms, the' fuel oil pumphouse, the screenwell, and the HVAC rooms.
" _ 13earfrooms, the' fuel oil pumphouse, the screenwell, and the HVAC rooms.
                    .The redundant circuits'in'the. relay room are separated in accordance
.The redundant circuits'in'the. relay room are separated in accordance
:with. Regulatory Guide 1.75 as-indicated 11n the FSAR; those in the D/G rooms, the emergency switchgear rooms, the fuel. oil pumphouse
:with. Regulatory Guide 1.75 as-indicated 11n the FSAR; those in the D/G rooms, the emergency switchgear rooms, the fuel. oil pumphouse
                    ; rooms and screenwell rooms
; rooms and screenwell rooms
* are run in underground ducts and the Trooms that contain redundant raceways.and equipment are separated with 3 hour fire rated-walls; those in the HVAC rooms are separated inJaccordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75 as indicated in the FSAR, however, in the unlikely. event,that-both ac units for the control room are' disabled,. shutdown can be achieved from the remote shutdown 4
* are run in underground ducts and the Trooms that contain redundant raceways.and equipment are separated with 3 hour fire rated-walls; those in the HVAC rooms are separated inJaccordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75 as indicated in the FSAR, however, in the unlikely. event,that-both ac units for the control room are' disabled,. shutdown can be achieved from the remote shutdown
                    ; panel-in the. reactor building.
; panel-in the. reactor building.
                      *Screenwell rooms also'contain circuits designated as " orange" which
4
                    ~are separated in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75 as indicated in the FSAR.
*Screenwell rooms also'contain circuits designated as " orange" which
~are separated in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75 as indicated in the FSAR.
U s
U s
k
k
                        $}}
$}}

Latest revision as of 00:20, 23 December 2024

Forwards Evaluation of Fire Protection Measures Re Technical Requirements of 10CFR50 App R.Adequate Fire Protection Has Been Provided
ML20009D046
Person / Time
Site: Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date: 07/10/1981
From: Pollock M
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO.
To: Harold Denton
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
SNRC-593, NUDOCS 8107230014
Download: ML20009D046 (4)


Text

y1 men,w-

[gg LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COM PANY a -----enmucessmrca 17 5 EAST OLD COU NTRY ROAD

  • H ICKSVI LLE, NEW YORK 11001 MILLARD S. POLLOCK vsCE PRESictNT-NUCLEAR July 10, 1981 SNRC-593

/\\ (-

D Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director v

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

[

yhD U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ff (M

gep g

x Washington, D. C.

20555 Fire Protection 3\\Yv b

k *s.*I Shoreham Nuclear Power Station - Unit 1 7 Docket No. 50-322

/

Dear Sir:

' '/<

In response to the staff concerns presented in the Shoreham safety evaluation report, we have forwarded our evaluation of the Shoreham fire protection measures as they relate to the technical requirements of Appendix R to 10CFR Part 50 (SNRC-572, dated 5/21/81).

That assessment, as well as previous submittals dealing with the Shoreham Fire Hazards Analysis Report and the Cable Separation Analysis, provided a basis for the resolution of the staff's concerns.

Subsequent meetings with members of your staff, June 9, 1981 in Bethesda and July 1, 1981 at the Shoreham site have led to resolution of this issue.

This letter documents our understanding of the res61ution reached with your staff regarding the following:

1)

The present fire detection system wiring to to the Control Room is acceptable.

Additional descriptive information to support this con-clusion is provided in Attachment 1.

2)

The installed station fire dampers are adequate and their operability will be veri-fied and any required modification to assure 1

operability will be implemented prior to

}pD fuel load.

S 3)

The existing manually actuated deluge system

/ l for the HPCI/RCIC equipment area will be modified to an automatic / pre-action actuation system.

8107230014 810710 PDR ADOCK 05000322; F

P DR_.

.y.-

~_

e

- Mr. Harold.R. Denton, Director i

July'10,'1981_

.Page two

-4)

The Cable Separation Analysis provided for Shoreham is an acceptable method for demon-strating that adequate separation exists between redundant trains of safety related equipment in the Reactor Building.

This conclusion is based on our_ccmmitment to review the separation Analysis results, in conjunction with our "as built" effort, in order.to insure.that a minimum ~ separation of 20 feet exists between redundant safety related components.

5)

The separation for redundant safety related cabling outside the Reactor Luilding is adequate.-

This conclusion reflects the summary of station design presented in of this letter.

Based on the:information which we have submitted, and the understandings identified in this letter, we believe that the issue of fire protection has been resolved and that thefstaff has concluded that adequate fire protection has been provided.for Shoreham.

Very truly yours, Y8 $ k M. S. Pollock Vice President -

Nuclear RAH:mp Attachments cc:

J. Higgins

+ - - -

... ~. - - -

p

.. +.

ATTACHMENT'l r,

FIRELDETECTORS FIRE ALARM _ SYSTEM WIRING-SHOREHAM-NUCLEAR POWER STATION

u V J.Thei fireL detection system consists of various types _ of detectors

.(ionization,Jrate. compensated-thermostatic and photoelectric) which fare _either area or panel. mounted throughout the plant.- These

.' detectors'are wired to:a switching pane 1Llocated within the relay room.- This wiring is, Class "A" as defined by NFPA.' The detectors are hard wired; utilizing'one pair.of aLtwo pair. cable.

The switching

, panel allows _ manual switching tx) the second pair.

^

Thel alarm outputLcables from the switching panel are wired first to a

the + zone: module panels and then to the. interface panel, also located

inothe relay room.- Cable _for these connections are not redundant.

The function offthe': interface. panel is-to multiplex the signals on

alfour. conductor cable ~for. input to the computer for the. fire detection and station security: system console, located in the control room.

A parallel four conductor. cable is,also'provided for.this interface-wiring tx) provide'a second path should.a' conductor break.

The alarms appear on the CRT in'this consolo and the printer associated with it..-

Simultaneously they also appear on the.CRT and printer. located in the-Security Building. :The entire wiring for the detection system is

supervised'and~any. broken or shorted wire'will alarm at both locations.

r f '

9

~-

ATTACHMENT 2 FIRE PROTECTION m

SHUTDOWN CIRCUITS IN AREAS OTHER.THAN SECONDARY CONTAINMENT r

o

.The cable for redundant shutdown components not in the reactor

~

buildingisecondary containment run through the relay room in the

-, control: building, the diesel-generator' rooms, the emergency switch-

" _ 13earfrooms, the' fuel oil pumphouse, the screenwell, and the HVAC rooms.

.The redundant circuits'in'the. relay room are separated in accordance

with. Regulatory Guide 1.75 as-indicated 11n the FSAR; those in the D/G rooms, the emergency switchgear rooms, the fuel. oil pumphouse
rooms and screenwell rooms
  • are run in underground ducts and the Trooms that contain redundant raceways.and equipment are separated with 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated-walls; those in the HVAC rooms are separated inJaccordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75 as indicated in the FSAR, however, in the unlikely. event,that-both ac units for the control room are' disabled,. shutdown can be achieved from the remote shutdown
panel-in the. reactor building.

4

  • Screenwell rooms also'contain circuits designated as " orange" which

~are separated in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75 as indicated in the FSAR.

U s

k

$