ML20029D024

Submits More Conservative Setpoint Calculation for RCS Barrier Loss Indicator Based on Containment Activity on GT-RE-59/60,in Accordance w/940425 Conversation Re Numarc/ NESP-007 EAL Submittal.Revised Annunciator EALs Encl

ML20029D024
Person / Time
Site:	Callaway
Issue date:	04/25/1994
From:	Stiller M UNION ELECTRIC CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
ULNRC-3008, NUDOCS 9405030279
Download: ML20029D024 (9)

Text

y CE!!nway Plant Prst 01% Bus f U!!!;n. h46 'Jun.

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{yggy April 25,1994

_Etucnue E3 Document Control Desk Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop PI-137 Washington, DC 20555 ULNRC-3008 Gentlemen:

DOCKET 50-483 CALLAWAY PLANT NUMARC/NESP-007 EAL SUBMITTAL REOUEST FOR ADDITIONAL,INFORMATION in accordance with our conversation on April 25,1994 we submit a more conservative setpoint calculation for the RCS BARRIER lass Indicator based on containment activity on GT-RE-59/60. Also enclosed is a copy of our annunciator EALs revised to reduce the number of pr;wer supplies failed from thirteen to " Ten or more" In regards to a potential overlap problem in Group i between Alert and Site Emergency classifications, we are currently revising our source terms used for these calculations. We will submit revised setpoints for Site and General Emergency efIluent monitors by October 1,1994. These monitors are not used to classify the emergency unless dose assessment cannot be performed. Further, since these setpoints reduce our current overlap, the level of effectiveness of the RERP is marginally increased.

If you have any questions regarding these responses please call me at (314) 676-8212 or Mr. Mark Ilicks at (314) 676-8705.

Very Truly Yours, h*1 h Milton A. Stiller Manager, Nuclear Safety and Emergency Preparedness MAS /MWil: alt Enclosure j

9405030279 940425 k

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USNRC Document Control Desk -

ULNRC-3008

u April 25,1994 Page 2'-

ly cc:

J. B. O'Brien, EP Specialist, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, w/a-U L. R. Wharton, Licensing Project Manager, Callaway Plant, w/a J. B. Martin, USNRC Regional Administrator, Region III, w/a B. A. Bartlett, USNRC Resident Inspector, Callaway Plant, w/a L. R. Greger, USNRC Region III - Chief, Reactor ProjectsSection III A, w/a Manager, Electric Department, Missouri Public Service Commission, w/a Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge, w/a s

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1 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATIONS BASES Group 2 Fission Product Barriers

.RCS BARRIER EALa' (cont) :

3.

Containment Radiation Monitorino 1

The (11 R/hr) reading is a value which indicates the release of reactor coolant to the containment. The reading was calculated assuming the i

instantaneous release and dispersal of the reactor coolant noble gas and d

iodine inventory associated with normal operating concentrations (i.e.,

within T/S) into the containment atmosphere.

- Table 15A-1 of the FSAR describes the parameters used in our accident analysis. All values are assumed for it failed fuel. Specific isotopes for 1% failed fuel are listed in FSAR Table 11.1-5.

Using the listed I

isotopes for Iodine we calculate the DEI-131 to be 3.28 pci/cc.for 1%

failed fuel, above our Tech. Spec. limit. Technical Information Document (TID) - 14844 provides factors to calculate DEI-131 when Iodine concentrations are known.

FSAR 11.1-5 DEI-131 Factor Normalized to Iodine per TID-14844 DEI-131 I-131 2.25E+0 1.00 2.25E+0 I-132 8.33E-1

.036 3.00E-2

)

I-133 3.1'E+0

.270 8.56E-1 I-134 3.92E-1

.017 6.66E-3 I-135-1.58E+0

.064

'1.33E-1 Total 8.23 3.28 pei/cc These DEI-131 values were ratio'd (divided by 3.28) reducing.them to values corresponding to 1 pci/cc DEI-131, 4

I-131 6.87E-1 I-132 9.16E-3 I-133 2.61E-1 I-134 2.03E-3 1

I-135 4.05E-2 J

Total 1.00 pci/gm DEI-131 From Table 11.1-5, the following noble gas concentrations are for 1%

2 failed fuel. Since it failed fuel equals 3.28 ci/cc DEI-131, these values were ratio'd (divided by 3.28) and reduced to values corresponding to 1 pei/cc DEI-131.

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EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATIONS BASES Group 2 Fission Product Barriers RCS BARRIER EALs (cont) :

t 1% failed fuel pei/cc Normalized to Isotope FSAR 11.1-5 1 uci/cc DEI-131-Kr-83m 1.82E-1 (1.82E-1/3.28) = 5.56E-2 Kr-35m 9.00E-1

= 2.75E-1 Kr-85 6.70E-2

~2.05E-2 Kr-87 5.27E-1 1.61E

Kr-88 1.69E+0

= 5.16E-1 Kr-89 4.53E-2

= 1.38E-2 4

Xe-131m 1.59E-1

= 4.85E-2 Xe-133m 8.67E-1

= 2.65E-1 Xe-133 4.33E+1

= 1.32E+1 Xe-135m 1.18E-1

= 3.60E-2 Xe-135 2.58E+0

= 7.88E-1 Xe-137 8.15E-2

= 2.49E-2 Xe-138 3.96E-1

= 1.21E-1 Total 1.55E+1 We then take the above Iodines and noble gases in pei/cc and multiply by the total number of ec in the RCS, i.e.

3.46E+8 cc.

Total Activity Isotope N.G.

conc. = 11tci/ccDEI-131 In RCS uci Kr-83m 5.56E-2 (3.46E+8cc) 1.93E+7

=

Kr-85m 2.75E-1 (3.46E+8cc) 9.52E+7

=

Kr-85 2.05E-2 (3.46E+8cc) 7.09E+6

=

Kr-87 1.61E-1

'( 3. 4 6 E + 8 cc) 5.57E+7

=

Kr-88 5.16E-1 (3.46E+8cc) 1.79E+8

=

Kr-89 1.38E-2 (3.46E+8cc) 4.79E+6

=

Xe-131m 4.85E-2 (3.46E+8cc) 1.tJE+7

=

Xe-133m 2.65E-1 (3.46E+8cc) 9.17E+7

=

Xe-133 1.32E+1 (3.46E+8cc) 4.58E+9

=

Xe-135m 3.60E-2 (3.46E+8cc) 1.25E+7

=

Xe-135 7.88E-1 (3.46E+0cc) 2.73E+8

=

Xe-137 2.49E-2 (3.46E+8cc) 8.62E+6

=

Xe-138 1.21E-1 (3.46E+8cc) 4.19E+7

=

1-131 6.87E-1 (3.46E+8cc) =

2.38E+8 I-132 9.16E-3 (3.46E+8cc) 3.17E+6

=

I-133 2 61E-1 (3.46E+8cc) 9.05E+7-

=

I-134 2.03E-3 (3.46E+8cc) 7.05E+5

=

I-135 4.05E-2 (3.46E+8cc) 1.40E+7

=

Total 5.73E+9.

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EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDICATIONS BASES Group 2 Fission Product Barriera i

RCS BARRIER EALs (cont) :

Taking the Total activity in pci, we disperse each isotope into containment. The volume of.our containment is 7.08E+10 cc.

This gives us a Total RCS Activity dispersed into Containment in pci/cc, Kr-83m 2.72E-4 Kr-85m 1.34E-3 Kr-85 1.00E-4 Kr-87 7 87E-4 i

Kr-88 2.53E-3 Kr-89 6.77E-5 Xe-131m 2.38E-4 Xe-133m 1.30E-3 Xe-133 6.47E-2 Xe-135m 1.76E-4 Xe-135 3.86E-3 Xe-137 1.22E-4 Xe-138 5.92E-4 I-131 3.36E-2 I-132 4.48E-5 I - 1:33 1.28E-3 I-1:34 9.96E-6 1-Jf65 1.9AE-4 Total 8.10E-2 Taking these total activities dispersed into containment and applying the Doce Conversion Factors from FSAR 15A-4 in (R-M3/Ci-sec) gives us a containment doce rate in R/sec. Converting to R/hr we get the contribution of each isotope to the Containment High Range Area j

-radiation monitors, GT-RE-59/60.

i Isotope Total lici/cc DCF sec/hr Dose Rate i

'I Kr-83m 2.72E-4 2.40E-6 3600 2 35E-6 Kr-85m 1.34E-3 3.71E-2 3600 1.80E-1 Kr-85 1.00E-4 5.11E-4 3600 1.84E-4 Kr-87 7.87E-4 1.BBE-1 3600 5.33E-1

.I Kr+88 2,53E-3 4.67E-1 3600 4,25E+0 Kr-89 6.77E-5 5.27E-1 3600 1.28E-1 Xe-131m 2.38E-4 2.91E-3 3600 2.49E-3 j

Xe-133m 1.30E-3 7.97E-3 3600 3.72E-2 i

Xe-133 6.47E-2.

9.33E-3 3600 2.17E+0 Xe-135m 1.76E-4 9.91E-2 3600 6.29E-2 Xe-13S 3.86E-3 5.75E-2 3600 7.98E-1 Xe-137 1.22E-4 4.51E-2 3600 1.98E-2 Xe-138 5.92E-4 2.80E-1 3600 54 96E <

I-131 3.36E-2 8,72E-2 3600 1.06E+0 I-132 4.48E-5 5.13E-1 3600-8.28E-2 I-133-1.28E-3 1.55E-1 3600 7.14E-1 I-134 9.96E-6

'5.32E-1<

3600 1.91E-2 I-135 1.98E-4 4.21E-1 3600 3 '. 01 E - 1 Total 1.09E+1 We will use 11 R/hr for our indicator.for the dispersion of RCS into the Containment at an activity of 1-pci/gm DEI-131.

04/26/94 20

CALLAWAY - SP i

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TABLE-15A-1 PARAMETERS USED IN ACCIDENT ANALYSIS I

General 1.

Core power level, Mwt 3636 (102% power) 2.

Number of fuel assemblies in the core 193 3.

Maximum radial peaking factor 1.65 4.

Percentage of failed fuel 1.0 5.

Steam generator tube leak, lb/hr 500 II.

Sources 1.

Core inventories, Ci Table 15A-3 2.

Gap inventories, Ci Table 15A-3 3.

Primary coolant specific activities, Table 11.1-5*

pCi/gm 4,

Primary coolant activity, technical i

specification limit for iodines - I-131 1

dose equivalent, pCi/gm 1.0 i

5.

Secondary coolant activity technical u

specification limit for iodines - I-131 dose equivalent, pCi/gm 0.1 j

j i

III.

Activity Release. Parameters

]

1.

Free volume of containment, ft 2.5 x 10s 2.

Containment leak rate 1.

0-24 hours, % per day 0.2 11.

after 24' hrs, % per day 0.1 IV.

Control. Room Dose Analysis (for LOCA) 1.

Control building 1.

Mixing volume, cf 150,000 11.

Filtered intake, cfm Prior to operator action (0-30

_f.

minutes) 900 After operator action (30 minutes - 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br />) 450 l

111.

Unfiltered ~inleakage, cfm 300 iv.

Filter efficiency (all forms of iodine), %

_90 2.

Control room i.

Volume, cf 100,000 11.

Filtered flow from control build-ing, cfm 540 i

• Except for SGTR events for which Table 11.I-4 is used.

Rev. OL-4 6/90

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'CALLAWAY - SP j

TABLE 11.1-5

,, s

-REACTOR COOLANT SPECIFIC ACTIVITY ACCIDENT SOURCE TERMS -

-ONE PERCENT FUEL DEFECTS-Isotope Class 1 pCi/gm Kr-83m 1.82E-1 Kr-85m 9.00E-1 Kr-85 6.70E-2 Kr-87 5.27E-1 Kr-88 1.69E+0 Kr-89 4.53E-2.

Xe-131m 1.59E-1 Xe-133m 8;67E-1 Xe-133 4.33E+1 Xe-135m 1.18E-1 Xe-136 2.58E+0 Xe-137 8.15E-2 Xe-138 3.96E-1 Total noble gases 5.09E+1 Class 2 a

Br-83 4.00E-2 Br-84 2.17E-2 Br-85 2.50E-3 I-130 1.75E-2 I-131 2.25E+0 I-132 8.33E-1 I-133 3.17E+0 I-134 3.92E-1 I-135 1.58E+0 Total halogens 8.31E+0 Class 3 Rb-86 7.08E-4

.i Rb-88 1.67E+0 H

Cs-134 2.08E-1 1

Cs-136 1.08E-1 Cs-137 1.50E-1

. Total Cs, Rb 2.14E+0 i

.Rev. OL-0 6/86

EIP-ZZ-00101 Rev.16 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS -

^

Grr.up 2 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS A.

UNUSUAL EVENT B.

ALERT C-SITE EMERGENCY D.

SITE EMERGENCY E. GENERAL EMERGENCY

&;y CONTAINMENT BARRIER A_ny RCS BARRIER Indicator A_ny FUEL CLAD BARRIER A CTMT BARRIER Loss Indicator A Lgs Indicator from any two

[

Indicator er Indicator and turriers My FUEL CLAD BARRIER and Anv RCS or FUEL CLAD BARRIER and Indicator any RCS BARRILR Indicator Indicator My Indicator from the third -

~

CONTAINMENT BARRIER RCS BARRIER Ft:EL CLAD BARRIER MODES 14 MODES: 1-4 MODES: 1-4 Ims indicators:

Ims indicators:

Ims indicators:

1.

Containment Pressure 1.

RCS Leak Rate 1.

Critical Safety Function Status a) A rapid tmexplamed loss of CTMT pressure following an Safety Injection initiated with a loss of subcooling (less than Meet the entry requirements for initial iruease in pressure, instrument error) using Attachment 2 or 3 of Emerg. Procedure E FRC.1, Red Path for Core cooling.

g 2.

SG Tube Runture 2.

Primary Coolant Activity Ixtel b) CTMT pressure g stunp level not increasing with a a) Any of the following:

RCS coolant actisity >300 Ci/cc LOCA.

1) GE-RE-92 (Channel 925) >2 0E-5 Ci/cc dose equivalent I-131.

2.

Containment Isolation Valve Status

2) BM-RE-25 (Channel 256) >l.0E-t yCi/cc 3.

Containment Radiation Monitorinz Incomplete CTMT isolation allowing a direct release to the

3) SJ-RE-02 (Channel 026) >l.0E-4 pCi/cc GT-RE-59/60 (Channels 591/601) environment, following a valid CRfT isolation signal (CISA,

4) Narrow range level in any SG continues to increase in an reading >3 E+3 R/hr.

CISB, CPIS).

uncontrolled manner 3.

So Ocase with Primary-SecondarV Ecakage and Potential Ims indicator:

a) Pri-to-sec leakage greatcr than Tech Spec allowable b) either of the followinz:

4.

Critical Safetv Function Status agl

1) He ruptured SG pressure is decreasmg in an uncontrolled Meet the entry requirements for b) either of the following:

manner or completely depressurized.

FRC.2, Orange Path for Core

1) He leaking SG pressure is decreasing in an

2) Manual use of the niptured SG PORV for cool dows Cooling g FRIL1. Red Path for 1leat uncontrolled manner or completely depressurized.

3.

Containment Radiation Monitorine Sink.

2) Mantal use of the leaking SG PORV for cool down GT-RE-59/60 (Channels 591/601) reading 11 R/hr.

5.

Core Exit Hermocounles Potential Ims. dicators:

m Potential Ims indientors:

Core exit TCs >700*F.

4.

Critical Safety Function Status 4.

Critical Safety Function Status Meet the entry requirements for FRZ.1, Red Path Summary Meet the entry requirement for FRIL1, Red Path licat Sink g 6.-

Reactor Vessel Water level frC M FRP.1, Red Path for Integrity.

a) RVLIS (Pumps OtT)less than 5.

Containment Pressure 5.

RCS Leak Rate 40%

t a) 112 concentration in containment >4%

RCS le&ge >50 gpm.

g E

6.

SG Tube Runture b) RVLIS(Pumps On)less than b) Less than I full train of Ctmt spray an! Ctmt cooling a) f h follo%.

em i

fans, with Ctmt pressure greater than 27 psig~

1) GE-RE-92 (Channel 925) >2.0 E-5 pCi/cc RCI's on Minimum 6.

Sienificant Radioactive Inventory m Ctmt

2) BM-RE-25 (Channel 256) >l.0 E-4 pCi/cc 4

44 GT-RE-59/60 (Channels 591/601) readmg >l5 E+3 R/hr

3) SJ-RE-02 (Channel 026) >l.0 E-4 pCi/cc 3

30 7.

Core Exit Thermocouples

4) Narrow range level in any SG continues to increase in an 2

20 a) Core exit TCs >l200*F ggi restoration procedures not imcontrolled manner.

I 13 -

t effective m 15 minutes.

and E~

b)the pnmary-to-secondary leak rate exceeds 50 gpm.

I b) Core exit TCs >700*F a_n_d RVLIS (pumps ofl) <40% aml restoration procedures not effective in 15 minutes.

Page 3 of 10 ATTACIBiENT 1

EIP-22-00101 e

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Rev.16-i Group 4 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Annunciator Events UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE EMERGENCY A

B.

C.

Unplanned Irss of Most or All Alarms Unplanned Loss of Most or All Annunciators With inability to Monitor a Significant Transient in (Annunciators) for Greater Than 15 Minutes.

Either a Transient in Progress, or the Plant Progress.

Computer is Unavailable.

i MODES: 1-4 MODES: 1-4 MODES: 1-4 Indicators Indicators Indicators 1

1.

Either of the following:

1.

Either of the following:

All of the following:

a.

3 of 4 field power supplies hne failed for a.

3 of 4 field power supplies have failed for greater than 15 minutes (loss of all greater than 15 minutes (loss of all 1.

a.

Either of the following:

annunciators) and not a result of planned annunciators) and not a result of planned

1) 3 of 4 field power supplies have failed action.

action.

(loss of all annunciators).

b.

Ten or more logic power supplies have b.

Ten or more logic power supplies have

2) Ten or more logic power supplies have failed for greater than 15 minutes (loss of all failed for greater than 15 minutes (loss of all failed (loss of all annun_iators).

annunciators) and not a result of planned annunciators) and not a remit of planned pr action.

action.

b.

Both of the following:

or or

1) Any combination of power supplies All of the following:

All of the following:

(including OpticalIsolators) have c.

Any combination of power supplies c.

Any combination of power supplies failed.

(including Optical Isolators) have failed for (including Optical Isolators) have failed for

2) Any failed power supply's minimum greater than 15 minutes.

greater than 15 minutes.

compensatory actions, per d.

Any failed power supply's minimum d.

Any failed power supply's minimum OTO-RK-00001, cannot be maintained.

compensatory actions, per OTO-RK-00001, compensatory actions, per OTO-RK-00001, and.

cannot be maintained.

cannot be maintained.

2.

The plant computer is unavailable.

c.

The loss does not result from planned c.

The loss does not result from planned and

~ action.

action. -

3.

Either of the following:

I an_d a.

A change in reactor power greater than i 2.

Any of the following:

10 %

a.

A change in reactor power greater than i b Safety injection initiation.

10 %

b.

Safety injection initiation.

c.

The plant computcr is unavailable.

l Page 7 of 10 ATTACHMENT I.

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